Courthouse Construction: Improved 5-Year Plan Could Promote More Informed
Decisionmaking (Letter Report, 12/31/96, GAO/GGD-97-27).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the General Services
Administration (GSA) and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts'
(AOC) 5-year courthouse construction plan, focusing on whether the
5-year plan: (1) reflects the judiciary's most urgent courthouse
construction needs; and (2) provides information needed by
decisionmakers to evaluate the relative merit of project proposals.
GAO found that: (1) while the judiciary has developed a methodology for
assessing project urgency and a 5-year construction plan to communicate
its urgent courthouse construction needs, GAO's analysis suggests that
the 5-year plan does not reflect all of the judiciary's most urgent
courthouse construction needs; (2) in preparing the 5-year plan, the
judiciary developed urgency scores for 45 projects; (3) it did not
develop urgency scores for other locations that according to AOC also
need new courthouses; (4) GAO's analysis of available data on conditions
at the 80 other locations showed that 30 of them likely would receive an
urgency score higher than some projects in the plan; (5) for projects
that are in the plan, high urgency scores did not always lead to high
funding priority; (6) AOC officials said that this was a transitional
plan in that it placed heavy emphasis in assigning funding priorities on
the projects already in the GSA pipeline rather than solely on project
urgency; (7) GAO's work also showed that the judiciary's plan and
related material do not present competing projects in a long-term
strategic context or articulate a rationale or justification for
proposed projects and their relative priority; (8) they do not contain
project-specific information on the conditions that exist at each
location that would help decisionmakers compare the merits of individual
projects, better understand the rationale for funding priorities, and
justify funding decisions; and (9) GAO recognizes that the plan is
transitional and that it is reasonable for pipeline projects to receive
priority consideration for funding, but the plan and related material
should make a convincing argument as to why they should be funded before
others that have higher urgency scores.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-97-27
TITLE: Courthouse Construction: Improved 5-Year Plan Could Promote
More Informed Decisionmaking
DATE: 12/31/96
SUBJECT: Construction costs
Strategic planning
Federal courts
Federal office buildings
Government facility construction
Oversight by Congress
Appropriated funds
Prioritizing
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved. Major **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters, **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and **
** single lines. The numbers on the right end of these lines **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the **
** document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the **
** page numbers of the printed product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
December 1996
COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION - IMPROVED
5-YEAR PLAN COULD PROMOTE MORE
INFORMED DECISIONMAKING
GAO/GGD-97-27
Judiciary 5-Year Plan
(240193)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AOC - Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
CMG - Commissioner for Portfolio Management, the Courthouse
Management Group
GSA - General Services Administration
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-271103
December 31, 1996
The Honorable William S. Cohen
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management and the District of Columbia
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest
Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Buildings and
Economic Development
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The General Services Administration (GSA), together with the federal
judiciary, has embarked on a $10 billion courthouse construction
initiative. Its purpose is to address the urgent housing needs of
the federal judiciary, which have arisen due to reported space
shortages, security concerns, and operational inefficiencies at
courthouses around the country. One of the major criticisms of this
construction initiative by us and others has been the lack of a
long-term strategic plan that (1) identifies and prioritizes all the
judiciary's most urgently needed courthouse construction projects,
(2) helps congressional decisionmakers compare and evaluate the
merits of project proposals and priorities, and (3) provides a
rationale for allocating resources to the most urgently needed
projects.
In March 1996, the judiciary--with assistance from its administrative
arm, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC)--issued a
courthouse construction plan that identifies projects it proposes be
funded between fiscal years 1997 and 2001. This report responds to
your request that we assess whether the 5-year plan (1) reflects the
judiciary's most urgent courthouse construction needs and (2)
provides information needed by decisionmakers to evaluate the
relative merit of project proposals.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
While the judiciary has developed a methodology for assessing project
urgency and a 5-year construction plan to communicate its urgent
courthouse construction needs, our analysis suggests that the 5-year
plan does not reflect all of the judiciary's most urgent courthouse
construction needs. In preparing the 5-year plan, the judiciary
developed urgency scores for 45 projects. However, it did not
develop urgency scores for other locations that according to AOC also
need new courthouses. Our analysis of available data on conditions
at the 80 other locations showed that 30 of them likely would have an
urgency score higher than some projects in the plan. According to
AOC, 1 of these locations would have an urgency score higher than 40
of the plan's 45 projects.
In addition, for projects that are in the plan, high urgency scores
did not always correlate to high funding priority. For example,
seven projects identified for site and/or design funding in 1998 had
lower scores than eight projects identified for site and/or design
funding in 1999. One of these 1999 projects scores as the fifth most
urgent project among the 45 in the plan, yet 23 other projects with
lower urgency scores have higher funding priority.
AOC officials said that this was a transitional plan in that it
placed heavy emphasis when assigning funding priorities on the
projects already in the GSA "pipeline" rather than solely on project
urgency. They also said that, due to resource and time constraints,
they did not develop scores for all competing projects.
Our work also showed that the judiciary's plan and related material
do not present competing projects in a long-term strategic context or
articulate a rationale or justification for proposed projects and
their relative priority. Moreover, they do not contain
project-specific information on the conditions that exist at each
location that would help decisionmakers compare the merits of
individual projects, better understand the rationale for funding
priorities, and justify funding decisions. Finally, the plan and
related material do not explain that urgency scores were not
developed for all projects or that funding priorities were not based
exclusively on urgency.
The judiciary's efforts to assess urgency and willingness to prepare
the plan represent positive steps forward. We recognize that the
plan is transitional and that it will evolve. Furthermore, we
believe that it is reasonable for pipeline projects to receive some
priority consideration for funding, but the plan and related material
should make a convincing argument as to why they should be funded
before others that have higher urgency scores. We also recognize
that the overall process for identifying and funding courthouse
projects is dynamic and that various factors influence funding
decisions. Within this context for decisionmaking, the judiciary's
plan and related urgency score methodology have the potential to
provide important baseline information for use in weighing priorities
and making more informed decisions. Considering the magnitude of the
courthouse construction initiative and the scarcity of resources, we
believe that decisionmakers would benefit from a plan that provides
more information about project proposals and a more complete
explanation of priorities among all competing projects.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
In the late 1980s, the judiciary recognized that it was facing space
shortages, security shortfalls, and operational inefficiencies at
courthouse facilities around the country. To address this problem,
the Judicial Conference of the United States directed each of the 94
judicial districts, with assistance from AOC, to develop long-range
space plans to determine where new and additional space was needed.
To date, AOC has provided each judicial district with planning
guidance in developing 5-, 10-, and 30-year space shortage
projections. As a result of this process, the judiciary identified
approximately 200 locations that would be out of space within the
next 10 years and has estimated that funding for new courthouses at
these locations would cost approximately $10 billion. In addition to
identifying space shortages, these planning efforts also identified
security concerns and operational inefficiencies at many of these
facilities nationwide.
The judiciary makes requests for new courthouse projects to GSA, the
federal government's central agency for real property operations.
GSA requests funding for courthouses as part of the president's
annual budget request to Congress. Under the Public Buildings Act of
1959, as amended, GSA is required to submit to the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure detailed project descriptions,
called prospectuses, that contain project cost estimates and
justifications for projects that exceed a prospectus threshold.
Under the act, GSA can adjust the prospectus threshold upward or
downward based on changes in construction costs during the preceding
calendar year--the threshold is $1.74 million for fiscal year 1997.
Once projects are funded by Congress, GSA is to contract with private
sector firms for design and construction work.
In the early 1990s, Congress, we, and the private sector began
calling on the judiciary and GSA to prioritize projects for this
major initiative. In 1990, we began reporting that Congress needed
better information for decisionmaking, including a prioritization of
capital investment needs.\1 In 1994, the Conference Committee on
GSA's 1995 appropriations act directed that the courthouse
construction requirements established by GSA and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) include a prioritization of projects by
AOC.\2 A year earlier, the Independent Courts Building Program
Panel--which was formed in 1993 by GSA and AOC and comprised leading
architects, engineers, and construction professionals--recommended
that courthouse projects be prioritized into yearly 5-year plans.
More recently, in November 1995, we testified that the process for
funding new courthouse projects lacked--and could benefit from--a
comprehensive capital investment plan that articulates a rationale or
justification for projects and presents projects in a long-term
strategic context.\3 Furthermore, during the last 6 years, we have
reported that Congress lacks quality information to assess the merits
of individual projects, understand the rationale for project
priorities, and justify funding decisions.
In March 1996, the judiciary--through the Judicial Conference of the
United States--issued a 5-year plan for courthouse construction for
fiscal years 1997 through 2001. The plan, which is intended to
communicate the judiciary's urgent housing needs to Congress and GSA,
identifies 45 projects for funding based on information from Congress
and GSA that $500 million could be used as a planning target in
estimating funds that will be available for courthouse construction
each year. Appendix I shows the projects in the plan by fiscal year.
To determine project urgency, the judiciary developed a methodology
for assigning urgency scores to projects. The criteria and related
weights applied in assessing urgency include the length of time space
shortages have existed as defined by the year a location was or will
be out-of-space (30 percent); security concern ratings of 1 through 4
(30 percent), where a 1 indicates the lowest level of security
concern; operational inefficiency ratings of 1 through 5 (25
percent), where a 1 indicates minimal operational inefficiencies; and
the number of judges affected as defined by the number of judges
without courtrooms (15 percent). Under the methodology, each project
receives an urgency score on a scale of 100, with a score of 100
indicating the highest level or degree of urgency. Appendix II
contains a more detailed description of the judiciary's urgency score
methodology. In addition to the plan, AOC provided us with related
material, including a description of the methodology for assessing
urgency, an overview of the process used to develop the plan, and
urgency scores for the projects in the plan. AOC indicated that it
provided the same material to key congressional committees.
--------------------
\1 GAO reports and testimonies on GSA real property issues are listed
at the end of this report.
\2 GSA fiscal year 1995 appropriations act conference report (H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 103-741, at 47 (1994)).
\3 FEDERAL COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: More Disciplined Approach Would
Reduce Costs and Provide for Better Decisionmaking (GAO/T-GGD-96-19,
Nov. 8, 1995).
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Our objectives were to determine whether the judiciary's 5-year plan
(1) reflects the judiciary's most urgent courthouse construction
needs and (2) provides information needed by decisionmakers to
evaluate the relative merits of project proposals.
To meet the first objective, we focused on determining whether the
plan contains all the most urgently needed projects and if priorities
in the plan correlate with the judiciary's own project urgency
scores. In making this assessment, we relied primarily on the
urgency scores the judiciary developed for projects in the plan, its
methodology for assessing project urgency, and AOC data related to
urgency for projects that were not included in the plan. The
judiciary's methodology for assessing urgency appears to include
factors that would be important in gauging the relative urgency of
competing projects, and the process used to assign scores for each of
the four criteria, though subjective, seems straightforward.
However, we did not assess the validity of the methodology or the
reliability of the urgency scores developed for each location.
To determine whether the plan contains the most urgently needed
projects, we developed minimum urgency scores for 80 locations that
were not in the plan but, according to AOC, also need new courthouse
projects. AOC provided us with security concern and out-of-space
year data for these projects. As previously mentioned, security
concern and out-of-space year data each have weights of 30 percent
that are applied in developing the urgency score. Operational
inefficiencies and the number of judges affected--the two other
components of the urgency score--have weights of 25 percent and 15
percent of the score, respectively. Therefore, security concern and
out-of-space year data equate to 60 percent of the total urgency
scores these projects would receive.
To calculate minimum scores for these locations, we used the security
concern and out-of-space year data and applied the judiciary's
urgency score methodology to these 80 other locations. Because data
for operational inefficiencies were not available for these
locations, we assigned minimum ratings of "1" to each of the 80
locations. AOC officials told us that, according to the scoring
methodology, 1 was the lowest score locations could receive for this
criterion. For the fourth factor, number of judges affected, AOC did
not have data, and thus we used "0" for this factor in our
calculation. Therefore, our minimum scores do not include an
assessment of operational conditions at these locations or a
calculation for the number of judges affected. If actual scores for
these two factors were included, urgency scores for these projects
could either increase or remain the same--the scores could not
decrease. We then compared these minimum scores to the complete
scores assigned to the 45 projects in the 5-year plan and discussed
the results with AOC officials. Appendix II contains a more detailed
description of the urgency score methodology and our calculation of
minimum scores for projects not included in the plan.
To determine whether priorities in the plan correlate with the
project urgency scores the judiciary developed, we compared the
urgency scores for the 45 projects in the plan with the yearly
sequence of funding priorities specified in the plan for fiscal years
1997 through 2001. We specifically focused on comparing projects
that were at similar stages, such as site and design, that are
scheduled for funding in different years according to the plan. We
also discussed project priorities with AOC and GSA officials to
identify other factors that may have been considered in prioritizing
projects.
To meet the second objective, we compared the information in the plan
and related material to the types of information decisionmakers need
to effectively assess project proposals and funding requests. Our
past work specifically identified the types of information
decisionmakers need when making decisions on courthouse construction
funding. It includes a capital investment plan that prioritizes
individual projects and puts them in some long-term strategic context
and provides a rationale or justification for priorities set among
competing projects.
In making our comparison, we also considered the results of our work
on the first objective because knowing whether the plan reflects the
judiciary's most urgently needed projects has ramifications for the
amount of information decisionmakers would need to understand the
basis for the plan's priorities. Also, as mentioned before, the
judiciary's intent in developing the plan was to communicate its
urgent courthouse construction needs. In addition, we reviewed
congressional reports and testimonies pertaining to capital
investment planning. We also considered a 1993 report by a
GSA/judiciary-sponsored panel of private sector experts that outlined
ways to improve the courthouse construction initiative. We did our
work between March and November 1996 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. We received written comments
on a draft of this report from AOC, which we have included in
appendix III. GSA provided oral comments on a draft of this report.
We summarize and evaluate AOC's and GSA's comments on pages 14 and
15.
5-YEAR PLAN DOES NOT REFLECT
ALL THE MOST URGENTLY NEEDED
PROJECTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Our analysis showed that the 5-year plan does contain projects with
high urgency scores, including 13 projects with scores above 65.
However, it also contains others that have scores lower than projects
that were not included in the plan. Using the judiciary's
methodology and available data on security and space concerns and
assuming the lowest possible scores for operational conditions and
number of judges affected, we calculated minimum urgency scores for
80 projects that were not in the plan. Of these, we identified 30
projects that had minimum urgency scores higher than the complete
scores for some of the projects in the plan. In fact, according to
AOC, 1 of the 30 projects not in the plan would have a complete
urgency score that is higher than those for 40 of the 45 projects in
the plan.
In developing the plan, the judiciary did not develop urgency scores
for all competing projects. Instead, the judiciary focused on those
projects that were in the GSA pipeline or were previously identified
during earlier internal efforts to develop project priorities. Using
this approach and the assumption that $500 million would be available
for projects in each of the 5 years, the judiciary developed scores
for 45 projects. AOC officials told us that they were unable to
develop scores for other projects not included in the plan in time
for the plan's March 1996 issuance. They added that, based on their
general knowledge of conditions at the other locations, they believed
these other projects would not have urgency scores as high as the
projects in the plan, except for a few cases. However, AOC did not
provide any analysis to support these assertions. It said that it
intends to develop scores for all the projects for possible inclusion
in future versions of the plan.
Urgency scores and related data were not available for projects not
included in the plan when we began our review. However, AOC
subsequently provided us with out-of-space year and security concern
data it had developed for 80 projects identified for funding
consideration in the fiscal years 2002 through 2006 timeframe. These
two factors have a total weight of 60 percent that is applied in
developing the urgency score. We used these data to apply the
judiciary's methodology for assigning project urgency scores to
identify minimum scores for these 80 projects. Data for operational
inefficiencies at these locations were not available; therefore, we
assigned a minimum rating of 1 to each of the 80 locations.
According to the scoring methodology, 1 is the score locations
receive when operational inefficiencies are minimal. For the fourth
factor, number of judges affected, AOC did not have data, and we used
0 in our calculation, which is the minimum score a location can
receive for this factor. As shown in table 1, using these data and
the judiciary's methodology, we calculated that 30 locations have a
minimum urgency score of 41.3 or higher, which is higher than the
complete scores for 3 projects in the plan--San Diego, CA; San Jose,
CA; and Cheyenne, WY.
Table 1
Minimum Urgency Scores for 30 Projects
Not Included in the 5-Year Plan
Minimum Minimum
Location urgency score Location urgency score
------------------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Los Angeles, CA 54.5 Macon, GA 42.8
Jackson, MS 48.8 Rock Island, 42.8
IL
Guam 47.0 Aberdeen, MS 42.8
Austin, TX 47.0 Abingdon, VA 42.8
Anchorage, AK 46.4 Yakima, WA 42.8
Lexington, KY 46.4 Ft. 41.3
Lauderdale,
FL
Jefferson City, MO 46.4 Marquette, MI 41.3
Anniston, AL 44.6 Oxford, MS 41.3
Huntsville, AL 44.6 Columbus, OH 41.3
Boise, ID 44.6 Chattanooga, 41.3
TN
South Bend, IN 44.6 Harrisonburg, 41.3
VA
Alexandria, LA 44.6 Christiansted 41.3
, USVI\a
Billings, MT 44.6 Madison, WI 41.3
Honolulu, HI 43.4 Elkins, WV 41.3
San Antonio, TX 43.4 Casper, WY 41.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a U.S. Virgin Islands.
Source: AOC data and GAO analysis.
In addition to having a minimum score higher than the San Diego, San
Jose, and Cheyenne projects, Los Angeles has a minimum score higher
than another 16 locations that were included in the plan. Jackson
has a minimum score higher than a total of eight projects in the
plan. We also noted that the projects in San Diego and San Jose are
scheduled to begin receiving the $197 million they are estimated to
require in fiscal year 1998, which is 4 years before funding is to be
considered for any of the projects in table 1. Appendix II shows our
calculations of minimum urgency scores for each of the 80 projects
that were not included in the plan.
It is important to recognize that the minimum score calculations for
these 30 locations include a minimum assessment of operational
conditions and number of judges affected for these locations, 2
factors that have weights totaling 40 percent that are applied in
developing the urgency scores. Although we were unable to determine
the extent to which additional data on these other two criteria would
increase the urgency scores, our minimum score calculations clearly
showed that the 45 projects in the plan do not reflect the 45 most
urgent projects according to the judiciary's methodology.
The AOC official responsible for developing the plan told us that the
actual urgency score for Los Angeles when taking into account all 4
criteria would be somewhere in the 80s. Only 5 of the plan's 45
projects have scores of 80 or above. The official said that the
judiciary is aware of the conditions in Los Angeles and that the
project was left out of the 5-year plan until some key planning
decisions are made by GSA and the judiciary. The official added that
one major obstacle to moving this project up in the plan is its cost,
which is estimated at over $200 million. Another obstacle is the
unwillingness of certain judicial districts to have their projects
pushed back to make room for this project given that the plan assumes
only $500 million will be available each year. We recognize that
these factors will need to be considered in the funding process.
However, not explaining the situation in Los Angeles in the plan
seems questionable given the urgency score it would receive and that
the objective of the plan was to communicate the judiciary's urgent
needs. Further, the obstacles to including it in the plan provided
by AOC seem to be ones in which Congress has a stakeholder interest
since it funds the projects and may not be fully aware of the
situation in Los Angeles. We did note that the plan recognizes in a
footnote that further study is needed to determine how to resolve the
need for a project in Los Angeles. However, the plan provides no
indication of the forthcoming challenge of funding this large project
with limited resources or the severe conditions that exist in Los
Angeles.
For example, Los Angeles has a "severe" security concern rating of
4,\4 which is quite different from the two California locations that
are scheduled for funding beginning in 1998. These two locations,
San Jose and San Diego, had security concern scores of only 1--the
lowest score possible. No other locations, including those in the
plan, had security concerns lower than 2. In fact, six other
locations not included in the plan--including Jackson, MS--had
"major" security concerns warranting scores of 3.\5
--------------------
\4 According to AOC, a severe security concern means that most or all
of the following conditions exist: the facility lacks separate
circulation patterns for prisoners and judges; is in an area
designated by the Marshals Service as a high crime area; has specific
structural problems that would make the building susceptible to a
bomb or threat; has no platform through which to transport prisoners;
has a split district court situation causing prisoner transport
problems; and has been described by the Marshals Service as among the
worst in the nation and/or the Marshals Service has been forced to
move from the building.
\5 According to AOC, a major concern includes most or all of the
conditions for a severe concern except that the U.S. Marshals have
not designated the location as among the worst in the nation and the
Marshals have not moved from the building.
FUNDING PRIORITIES IN THE PLAN
NOT ALWAYS BASED ON URGENCY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
In addition to not reflecting the most urgent projects, project
funding priorities in the plan itself were not always exclusively
based on the urgency scores. Our analysis of project priorities and
urgency scores showed that several of the projects in the plan
identified for funding in fiscal year 1998 had lower urgency scores
than several projects scheduled for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The
first year of the plan, 1997, does contain several projects with high
urgency scores, including projects in Brooklyn, NY; Corpus Christi,
TX; Cleveland, OH; and Seattle, WA that have scores ranging from 77.5
to 100. However, eight projects identified for site and/or design
funding in 1999 had higher urgency scores than seven projects
identified for site and/or design funding in 1998. Table 2 shows
these projects and their urgency scores.
Table 2
Comparison of Selected 1998 and 1999
Projects
1998 project\a Urgency score 1999 project Urgency score
------------------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Little Rock, AR 54.8 Richmond, VA 85.0
Cape Girardeau, MO 52.3 Biloxi, MS 76.6
Fresno, CA 51.7 Buffalo, NY 68.3
Orlando, FL 50.3 El Paso, TX 61.9
Erie, PA 47.3 Mobile, AL 61.3
San Diego, CA 40.4 Norfolk, VA 58.9
San Jose, CA 39.5 Las Cruces, 56.3
NM
Charlotte 55.0
Amalie,
USVI\b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a About $19.4 million was appropriated for three of these
projects--Fresno, Orlando, and Erie--in the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No 104-208, 110 Stat 309, Title
IV � 404 (1996).
\b U.S. Virgin Islands.
Source: Judiciary 5-Year Plan for Courthouse Construction.
In fact, one 1999 project--Richmond, VA--has the fifth highest
urgency score among projects in the plan, yet 23 other projects in
the plan with lower urgency scores have higher funding priority.
Furthermore, five projects scheduled for site and/or design funding
in 2000 all have urgency scores higher than three of the projects
scheduled for site and/or design funding in 1998. These five 2000
projects have scores ranging from 47.9 to 50.8 and are located in
Harrisburg, PA; Sioux Falls, SD; Muskogee, OK; Birmingham, AL; and
Toledo, OH. Appendix I shows the scores for all these projects as
well as for the other projects in the plan.
AOC officials said that projects in the plan were not prioritized
exclusively on the basis of their urgency scores. As previously
mentioned, the plan places heavy emphasis on projects that were
already in the GSA pipeline. These pipeline projects include
projects in the latter stages of the GSA planning process that GSA
had already planned to request funding for in 1997 and 1998. The GSA
planning process includes assessing needs, estimating costs, and
developing prospectuses for congressional review. GSA officials
confirmed that projects in the plan for 1997 and 1998 were in the GSA
pipeline. They added that for projects identified for 1999 and
beyond, GSA was not prepared to request funding any sooner than is
specified in the 5-year plan. For example, they had only recently
become aware of the urgent need in Richmond and were not prepared to
request funds for a project there any earlier than 1999.
According to AOC officials, the plan is transitional in that it
addresses projects already identified for funding by GSA in 1997 and
1998, and then begins addressing urgent projects identified through
the judiciary's new process in 1999 and beyond. According to these
officials, these pipeline projects should be funded first because
their planning efforts are already under way. We recognize that the
process for identifying and funding projects is complex and dynamic
and that various factors, including planning decisions already made,
total funding available, and the political nature of the process,
will influence final decisions. Nonetheless, the judiciary's plan
and its related urgency score methodology have the potential to
provide important baseline information to help decisionmakers weigh
priorities and make more informed decisions. While we believe that
pipeline projects should compete for funding, we also believe that
the plan should make a convincing argument as to why these projects
should be funded first. As discussed in more detail in the next
section, the plan and related material do not (1) provide a rationale
or justification for why Congress should fund these pipeline projects
first or (2) discuss the consequences of or trade-offs involved in
funding projects with low urgency scores that GSA had already planned
to request instead of others that have higher scores.
PLAN LACKS KEY INFORMATION
DECISIONMAKERS NEED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The judiciary's 5-year plan and related materials do not provide all
the information needed by decisionmakers to fully assess the relative
merits of project proposals. Over the last several years, we have
stressed the importance of placing construction proposals in a
priority-based plan. And, our November 8, 1995, testimony on
courthouse construction noted that Congress lacked information that
(1) puts individual projects in some long-term strategic context and
(2) provides a rationale or justification for project priorities.
During our current review, we examined the judiciary's plan and its
related material to see whether they contained the type of
information we said Congress lacked when making critical capital
investment decisions. Our analysis showed that the plan and its
related material do not articulate priorities in a long-term
strategic context, primarily because they do not reflect an
assessment of the urgency of all competing projects. As mentioned
earlier, the judiciary focused on projects in the GSA pipeline and
others identified during earlier internal efforts to plan for future
projects. However, it did not assess other projects that, our work
showed, have higher urgency scores than several of the projects in
the plan. Although this approach produced a list of the judiciary's
priorities, it did not provide decisionmakers a long-term perspective
on the urgency of projects in the plan compared to others that were
not included. In addition, the plan did not explain that all needed
projects had yet to be assessed. Without this explanation,
decisionmakers could get the impression that projects not included in
the plan all have lower urgency scores.
Furthermore, the plan does not contain a rationale or justification
for its project priorities. As discussed earlier, the judiciary
fashioned the plan to give higher priority to projects in the GSA
pipeline. However, the plan and related material do not explain that
pipeline projects did not always have the highest urgency scores or
articulate why Congress should fund these projects first. As a
result, the plan does not convey to Congress the consequences of or
trade-offs involved in not funding higher urgency projects sooner in
favor of projects with lower urgency scores that are in the GSA
pipeline.
Related to not justifying its priorities, the plan and its related
material lack specificity about conditions that exist at each
location--information that would help decisionmakers better
understand priorities. The plan and its related material do not
discuss conditions such as security concerns or severe space
shortages at different locations. Although the urgency scores and
related data were provided, summarizing the specific conditions that
are driving the need for individual projects could strengthen the
plan and give decisionmakers a better perspective or understanding
about why one project is more urgent than another.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
The judiciary has made an effort to improve capital investment
planning for courthouse construction as evidenced by its methodology
for assessing project urgency and its efforts to prepare a
construction plan. However, the current 5-year plan does not reflect
all the judiciary's most urgently needed projects, and project
funding priorities are not always based exclusively on urgency.
Furthermore, the plan does not provide key project-specific
information needed by decisionmakers to compare and evaluate the
merits of individual projects and understand the rationale that
supports priorities.
We recognize that the plan is transitional and that it will evolve.
We also recognize that the process for funding courthouse projects is
dynamic and that various factors influence funding decisions. Within
this context, the judiciary's plan and the related urgency score
methodology have the potential to provide important baseline
information to help decisionmakers weigh priorities and make more
informed decisions. This plan and its related material do not alert
Congress, an important stakeholder, that the projects do not reflect
all the judiciary's most urgent needs nor do they explain that
pipeline projects with high funding priority do not always have the
highest urgency scores. Absent this information, decisionmakers may
not be aware of the severity of needs in other locations not included
in the plan--such as Los Angeles--or that projects in the plan with
high scores--such as Richmond--have a lower funding priority than
other projects with lower scores.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We recommend that the Director of AOC work with the Judicial
Conference Committee on Security, Space, and Facilities to make
improvements to the 5-year plan. These improvements should be aimed
at making the plan more informative and a more useful tool for
helping Congress to better understand project priorities and
individual project needs. At a minimum, the plan should (1) fully
disclose the relative urgency of all competing projects and (2)
articulate the rationale or justification for project priorities,
including information on the conditions that are driving
urgency--such as specific security concerns or operational
inefficiencies.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
AOC, on December 13, 1996, provided written comments on a draft of
this report that generally concurred with the draft and our
recommendations. AOC said that many of the improvements we
recommended were already under consideration (see app. III). AOC
recognized that the judiciary is responsible for providing its
requirements to GSA as one of GSA's many tenants and has done its
part to project space requirements in a methodical way. However, AOC
pointed out that, since the executive branch has not released
strategic real property plans for the federal government as a whole,
our comment about the lack of a strategic real estate plan would be
more appropriately addressed to the executive branch.
We agree that a governmentwide strategic plan for real property is
needed and have recommended that GSA take the lead in developing such
a plan in several of our prior products (see Related GAO Products at
the end of this report). However, the development of a
governmentwide plan was not the subject of this review. Instead, we
reviewed the judiciary's 5-year plan, which serves as input to GSA's
overall planning efforts. To date, through the 5-year plan and
related urgency score methodology, the judiciary has begun playing an
important role in improving strategic planning for the courthouse
construction initiative. Their approach has the potential to provide
important baseline data that are key ingredients to strategic
planning. However, the judiciary's efforts to date have been
incomplete and could benefit from the improvements outlined in our
recommendations.
We believe that any GSA customer with major capital investment needs
like the judiciary should think and plan strategically and have
significant input into the development of a governmentwide plan. The
proportion of courthouse projects in GSA's new construction budget
submissions has been significant, far surpassing that of all GSA's
other tenants combined--about $633 million of the $715 million GSA
requested for new construction in fiscal year 1997 were for
courthouse projects. According to the judiciary's plan, courthouses
could continue to take up a large proportion of GSA's construction
resources given that the plan identifies about $500 million in needs
per year between fiscal years 1997 and 2001 and that, as our work
showed, 80 additional locations have needs to be addressed beyond
2001.
We received oral comments on a draft of this report from key GSA
Public Buildings Service officials involved in the courthouse
construction initiative--the Assistant Commissioner for Portfolio
Management, the Courthouse Management Group (CMG) Program Executive,
and the CMG Program Director. These officials agreed with the thrust
of the report and said that it was a fair representation of issues
related to the 5-year plan. In addition, the Assistant Commissioner
pointed out that judiciary needs do not always have to be met through
new construction. GSA will consider other options, including leasing
and lease-construction, in developing proposals for consideration by
Congress. She said that, because the judiciary conveyed its needs in
what was called a construction plan, its audience may assume that new
construction is the only option for meeting these space needs.
The CMG Program Director, speaking for himself and the CMG Program
Executive, wanted to reemphasize that the pipeline projects
identified for 1997 and 1998, including those with low urgency
scores, were the only projects GSA was prepared to request in these
years. He said that GSA would need time to plan and develop
proposals for locations with high urgency scores identified for 1999
and beyond. Finally, these officials also suggested a few minor
clarifying changes to the draft, which we made where appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Director of AOC; Chairman
of the Judicial Conference Committee on Security, Space, and
Facilities; Administrator of GSA; Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and other interested congressional committees and
subcommittees. The major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV. If you have any questions or would like additional
information, please contact me on (202) 512-8387.
J. William Gadsby
Director, Government Business Operations
Issues
JUDICIARY 5-YEAR PLAN AND RELATED
URGENCY SCORES BY FISCAL YEAR
=========================================================== Appendix I
Table I.1
Fiscal Year 1997 Projects
($ in millions)
Priority Project Urgency
rank City phase score Cost
-------- ---------------------------- ---------- -------- --------
1 Brooklyn, NY (Cellar Annex) Constructi 100 $187.2
on
2 Corpus Christi, TX Constructi 87.2 26.2
on
3 Cleveland, OH Constructi 85.4 142.3
on
4 Seattle, WA Site 77.5 17.7
5 Las Vegas, NV Constructi 61.9 96.0
on
======================================================================
Total $469.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Table I.2
Fiscal Year 1998 Projects
($ in millions)
Priority Project Urgency
rank City phase score Cost
-------- ---------------------------- ---------- -------- --------
1 Brooklyn, NY\a Constructi 91.0 $122.6
on
2 Denver, CO Site & 76.4 9.8
design
3 Washington, DC Design 75.4 5.7
4 London, KY Constructi 69.4 15.1
on
5 Springfield, MA Site & 68.8 3.5
design
6 Columbia, SC Constructi 67.1 48.4
on
7 Jacksonville, FL Constructi 63.8 76.1
on
8 Eugene, OR Site & 63.7 6.3
design
9 Miami, FL Site & 62.0 26.0
design
10 Laredo, TX Constructi 58.9 24.3
on
11 Salt Lake City, UT Site & 55.9 11.8
design
12 Wheeling, WV Constructi 55.1 36.0
on
13 Little Rock, AR Site & 54.8 3.2
design
14 Covington, KY Constructi 54.3 18.9
on
15 Cape Girardeau, MO Design 52.3 2.2
16 Fresno, CA Design 51.7 7.8
17 Greeneville, TN Constructi 50.8 23.6
on
18 Orlando, FL Site & 50.3 10.7
design
19 Erie, PA Site & 47.3 3.3
design
20 Savannah, GA Constructi 45.8 30.5
on
21 San Diego, CA Site 40.4 18.2
22 San Jose, CA Site 39.5 2.7
======================================================================
Total $506.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Old U.S. Post Office building renovation.
Table I.3
Fiscal Year 1999 Projects
($ in millions)
Priority Project Urgency
rank City phase score Cost
-------- ---------------------------- ---------- -------- --------
1 Seattle, WA Constructi 77.5 $153.6
on
2 Denver, CO Constructi 76.4 62.5
on
3 Washington, DC Constructi 75.4 98.2
on
4 Springfield, MA Constructi 68.8 20.0
on
5 Eugene, OR Constructi 63.7 56.5
on
6 Salt Lake City, UT Constructi 55.9 35.5
on
7 Richmond, VA Site & 85.0 8.9
design
8 Biloxi, MS Site & 76.6 6.7
design
9 Buffalo, NY Site & 68.3 12.6
design
10 El Paso, TX Site & 61.9 8.2
design
11 Mobile, AL Site & 61.3 11.3
design
12 Norfolk, VA Site & 58.9 5.3
design
13 Las Cruces, NM Site & 56.3 3.5
design
14 Charlotte Amalie, USVI\a Site & 55.0 10.9
design
15 Rockford, IL Site & 54.3 3.6
design
16 Cedar Rapids, IA Site & 52.9 12.7
design
17 Nashville, TN Site & 51.8 13.4
design
======================================================================
Total $523.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a U.S. Virgin Islands.
Table I.4
Fiscal Year 2000 Projects
($ in millions)
Priority Project Urgency
rank City phase score Cost
-------- ---------------------------- ---------- -------- --------
1 Miami, FL Constructi 62.0 $91.4
on
2 Little Rock, AR Constructi 54.8 26.2
on
3 Cape Girardeau, MO Constructi 52.3 29.0
on
4 Fresno, CA Constructi 51.7 83.7
on
5 Orlando, FL Constructi 50.3 38.0
on
6 Erie, PA Constructi 47.3 17.2
on
7 San Diego, CA Design 40.4 5.2
8 San Jose, CA Design 39.5 9.8
9 Richmond, VA Constructi 85.0 50.6
on
10 Biloxi, MS Constructi 76.6 38.1
on
11 Buffalo, NY Constructi 68.3 71.1
on
12 Harrisburg, PA Site & 50.8 8.1
design
13 Sioux Falls, SD Site & 50.0 4.7
design
14 Muskogee, OK Site & 49.0 5.0
design
15 Birmingham, AL Site & 48.2 4.3
design
16 Toledo, OH Site & 47.9 6.6
design
17 Greenville, SC Site & 47.6 5.7
design
18 Cheyenne, WY Site & 33.2 2.7
design
======================================================================
Total $497.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Table I.5
Fiscal Year 2001 Projects
($ in millions)
Priority Project Urgency
rank City phase score Cost
-------- ---------------------------- ---------- -------- --------
1 San Diego, CA Constructi 40.4 $91.2
on
2 San Jose, CA Constructi 39.5 69.9
on
3 El Paso, TX Constructi 61.9 46.2
on
4 Mobile, AL Constructi 61.3 64.0
on
5 Norfolk, VA Constructi 58.9 29.8
on
6 Las Cruces, NM Constructi 56.3 20.0
on
7 Charlotte Amalie, USVI\a Constructi 55.0 33.4
on
8 Rockford, IL Constructi 54.3 20.4
on
9 Cedar Rapids, IA Constructi 52.9 44.5
on
10 Nashville, TN Constructi 51.8 75.8
on
======================================================================
Total $495.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a U.S. Virgin Islands.
Sources: The sources for tables I.1 through I.5 are the judiciary's
5-year plan for courthouse construction and an AOC listing of project
urgency scores. (Note: When it provided the plan and related
materials, the judiciary listed the urgency scores for projects in
the plan separately from, and not in the same order as, its yearly
funding priorities.)
EXPLANATION OF THE JUDICIARY'S
URGENCY SCORE METHODOLOGY AND OUR
CALCULATION OF MINIMUM SCORES FOR
80 PROJECTS NOT IN THE PLAN
========================================================== Appendix II
The criteria and related weights applied in assessing urgency under
the judiciary's methodology include the length of time space
shortages have existed as defined by the year a location was or will
be out of space (30 percent); security concern ratings of 1 through 4
(30 percent), where a 1 indicates the lowest level of security
concern; operational inefficiency ratings of 1 through 5 (25
percent), where a 1 indicates the lowest level of operational
inefficiency; and the number of judges affected as defined by the
number of judges without courtrooms (15 percent). Under the
methodology, the range of possible conditions for each of the four
criteria has a corresponding multiplication factor between 0 and 1.
These factors are multiplied by the weight for each of the criteria
to determine the urgency score. As a result, each project receives
an urgency score on a scale of 100, with a score of 100 indicating
the highest level or degree of urgency.
To calculate minimum scores for the 80 locations not included in the
5-year plan, we used security concern and out-of-space year data AOC
provided and applied the judiciary's urgency score methodology. The
data AOC provided are shown in table II.1 under the columns entitled
"security concern" and "out-of-space year." According to the
methodology, each level of security concern and out-of-space year
have corresponding multiples used in calculating the score. These
multiples are shown in table II.1 under the columns entitled
"security score multiple" and "out-of-space year multiple." The
security concern and out-of-space year portions of the urgency score
result from applying the multiple to 30, the weight given to each of
these factors. These scores are shown in table II.1 under the
columns "security score" and "out-of-space year score."
Although data for operational inefficiencies at these locations were
not available, we assigned a minimum rating of 1 to each of the 80
locations. AOC officials told us that, according to the scoring
methodology, 1 was the lowest score locations could receive for this
criterion. According to the judiciary's methodology, a score of 1
equates to 5 points in the calculation of the urgency score. For the
fourth factor, number of judges affected, AOC did not have data, and
thus we used 0 for this factor in our calculation, which is the
lowest score a location can receive for this factor. The minimum
urgency score total shown in the last column of table II.1,
therefore, represents an addition of the security score, out-of-space
year score, and minimum scores applied for operational conditions and
number of judges affected.
Table II.1
Minimum Urgency Scores
Security Out-of-space
Security score Out-of- year score Operational Number of Minimum
Security score (multiple x Out-of- space year (multiple x conditions judges urgency score
Location concern multiple 30) space year multiple 30) score affected score total
------------------ ---------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ -------------- ------------- -------------- --------------
Los Angeles, CA 4 1 30 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 54.5
Jackson, MS 3 0.75 22.5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 48.8
Guam 3 0.75 22.5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 47
Austin, TX 3 0.75 22.5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 47
Anchorage, AK 2 0.75 15 1991 0.88 26.4 5 0 46.4
Lexington, KY 2 0.5 15 1991 0.88 26.4 5 0 46.4
Jefferson City, MO 2 0.5 15 1991 0.88 26.4 5 0 46.4
Anniston, AL 2 0.5 15 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6
Huntsville, AL 2 0.5 15 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6
Boise, ID 2 0.5 15 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6
South Bend, IN 2 0.5 15 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6
Alexandria, LA 2 0.5 15 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6
Billings, MT 2 0.5 15 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6
Honolulu, HI 3 0.75 22.5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 43.4
San Antonio, TX 3 0.75 22.5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 43.4
Macon, GA 2 0.5 15 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8
Rock Island, IL 2 0.5 15 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8
Aberdeen, MS 2 0.5 15 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8
Abingdon, VA 2 0.5 15 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8
Yakima, WA 2 0.5 15 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Marquette, MI 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Oxford, MS 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Columbus, OH 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Chattanooga, TN 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Harrisonburg, VA 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Christiansted, 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
USVI\a
Madison, WI 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Elkins, WV 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Casper, WY 2 0.5 15 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3
Pocatello, ID 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Fort Wayne, IN 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Pikeville, KY 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Springfield, MO 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Charlotte, NC 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Greenville, NC 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Johnstown, PA 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Beaumont, TX 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Houston, TX 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Plano, TX 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Big Stone Gap, VA 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
Clarksburg, WV 2 0.5 15 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5
San Francisco, CA 3 0.75 22.5 2000 0.35 10.5 5 0 38
Benton, IL 2 0.5 15 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7
Great Falls, MT 2 0.5 15 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7
Greensboro, NC 2 0.5 15 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7
Statesville, NC 2 0.5 15 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7
Santa Fe, NM 2 0.5 15 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7
Riverside, CA 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Wilmington, NC 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Panama City, FL 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Columbus, GA 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Newnan, GA 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
E. St. Louis, IL 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Springfield, IL 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
New Orleans, LA 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Detroit, MI 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Dallas, TX 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Ft. Worth, TX 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
McAllen, TX 2 0.5 15 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9
Rome, GA 2 0.5 15 1998 0.47 14.1 5 0 34.1
Monroe, LA 2 0.5 15 1998 0.47 14.1 5 0 34.1
Ft. Smith, AR 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Wilmington, DE 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Hinesville, GA 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Peoria, IL 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Baltimore, MD 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Greenbelt, MD 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Flint, MI 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Durham, NC 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Winston-Salem, NC 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Aberdeen, SD 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Danville, VA 2 0.5 15 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3
Philadelphia, PA 2 0.5 15 2000 0.35 10.5 5 0 30.5
Tyler, TX 2 0.5 15 2000 0.35 10.5 5 0 30.5
San Diego, CA\b 2 0.5 15 2001 0.29 8.7 5 0 28.7
Medford, OR 2 0.5 15 2001 0.29 8.7 5 0 28.7
Bridgeport, CT 2 0.5 15 2002 0.24 7.2 5 0 27.2
Memphis, TN 2 0.5 15 2002 0.24 7.2 5 0 27.2
Portland, ME 2 0.5 15 2005 0.06 1.8 5 0 21.8
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a U.S. Virgin Islands.
\b Bankruptcy Court project.
Source: AOC data and GAO analysis.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Gerald Stankosky, Assistant Director, Government Business Operations
Issues
John F. Mortin, Assignment Manager
David E. Sausville, Evaluator-in-Charge
RELATED GAO REPORTS AND TESTIMONIES
Federal Courthouse Construction: More Disciplined Approach Would
Reduce Costs and Provide for Better Decisionmaking (GAO/T-GGD-96-19,
Nov. 8, 1995).
General Services Administration: Opportunitites For Cost Savings in
the Public Buildings Area (GAO/T-GGD-95-149, July 13, 1995).
Federal Real Property: Key Acquisition and Management Obstacles
(GAO/T-GGD-93-42, July 27, 1993).
Federal Office Space: Obstacles to Purchasing Commercial Properties
From RTC, FDIC, and Others (GAO/GGD-92-60, Mar. 31, 1992).
General Services Issues (GAO/OCG-93-28TR, Dec. 1992).
Real Property Management Issues Facing GSA and Congress
(GAO/T-GGD-92-4, Oct. 30, 1991).
Long-Term Neglect of Federal Building Needs (GAO/T-GGD-91-64, Aug.
1, 1991).
Federal Buildings: Actions Needed to Prevent Further Deterioration
and Obsolescence (GAO/GGD-91-57, May 13, 1991).
The Disinvestment in Federal Office Space (GAO/T-GGD-90-24, Mar. 20,
1990).
*** End of document. ***