The Results Act: Observations on the Department of Justice's February
1997 Draft Strategic Plan (Correspondence, 07/11/97, GAO/GGD-97-153R).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) draft strategic plan, as required by the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993.
GAO noted that: (1) of the six elements required by the act, three--the
relationship between long-term goals/objectives and the annual
performance plans, the key factors external to DOJ that could affect
DOJ's ability to meet its goals, and a program evaluation
component--were not specifically identified in the draft plan; (2) the
remaining three elements, the mission statement, goals and objectives,
and strategies to achieve the goals and objectives, were discussed; (3)
however, each of these elements had weaknesses, some more significant
than others; (4) the three elements discussed in DOJ's plan generally
contained some, but not all, of the attributes that would be desirable
to meet the purposes of the act and to be consistent with the Office of
Management and Budget's guidance; (5) the draft plan makes no explicit
mention of the other three required elements; (6) with regard to
relating long-term goals/objectives to performance plans the plan
provided no substantive comment; (7) instead, DOJ stated that the draft
plan provides a basis for its components to develop more detailed annual
plans and related program performance information; (8) the plan does not
contain a section on key external factors; (9) the draft plan appears to
reflect consideration of most of DOJ's major statutory responsibilities;
(10) however, the plan does not contain specific references to the
underlying statutory bases for major functions and operations, provide
specifics of how any particular statutory responsibility will be
implemented, or provide linkages between the stated goals and objectives
and DOJ's relevant statutory authorities that form the basis for them;
(11) in addition, the draft plan could be more useful to DOJ, the
Congress, and other stakeholders if it provided a more explicit
discussion of crosscutting activities, major management challenges, and
DOJ's capacity to provide reliable information to manage its programs or
determine if it is achieving its strategic goals; (12) the draft plan is
silent on crosscutting issues and does not mention whether DOJ
coordinated with related external law enforcement stakeholders; (13) the
plan is also silent on the formidable management problems GAO and
others, including the DOJ Inspector General and the National Performance
Review, have identified in recent years; and (14) the plan does not
mention how data limitations may affect DOJ's ability to manage its
programs or performance.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-97-153R
TITLE: The Results Act: Observations on the Department of
Justice's February 1997 Draft Strategic Plan
DATE: 07/11/97
SUBJECT: Strategic planning
Agency missions
Congressional/executive relations
Law enforcement
Interagency relations
Program evaluation
Management information systems
Internal controls
Financial management systems
IDENTIFIER: National Performance Review
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter **
** titles, headings, and bullets are preserved. Major **
** divisions and subdivisions of the text, such as Chapters, **
** Sections, and Appendixes, are identified by double and **
** single lines. The numbers on the right end of these lines **
** indicate the position of each of the subsections in the **
** document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the **
** page numbers of the printed product. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
September 1997
GAO/GGD-97-153R
DOJ's Draft Strategic Plan
(182039)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
BOP - Federal Bureau of Prisons
CFO - Chief Financial Officers
DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
DOJ - Department of Justice
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
NPR - National Performance Review
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-277403
July 11, 1997
The Honorable Richard K. Armey
Majority Leader
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Kasich
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives
The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bob Livingston
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Subject: The Results Act: Observations on the Department of
Justice's February 1997 Draft Strategic Plan
On June 12, 1997, you asked us to review the strategic plans
submitted by the cabinet departments and selected major agencies for
consultation with the Congress as required by the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act or GPRA). This
letter is our response to that request concerning the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Our overall objective was to review and evaluate the latest available
version of DOJ's draft strategic plan. Specifically, we (1) assessed
the plan's compliance with the Results Act requirements and its
overall quality, (2) determined if DOJ's major statutory authorities
were reflected, (3) identified whether discussions about crosscutting
functions and interagency involvement were included, (4) determined
if the plan addressed major management problems, and (5) discussed
DOJ's capacity to provide reliable information about performance.
We obtained the February 1997 DOJ draft plan provided to the House of
Representatives staff working with DOJ. This was the latest version
available at the time we did our work. Our overall assessment of
DOJ's draft strategic plan was generally based on our knowledge of
DOJ's operations and programs, our numerous reviews of DOJ and
Justice-related issues, recent work on DOJ's fiscal year 1996 audit
by an independent public accountant, and other existing information
available at the time of our assessment. The criteria we used to
determine whether DOJ's draft strategic plan complied with the
requirements of the Results Act were the Results Act and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on developing the plans
(Circular A-11, part 2). To make judgments about the strengths and
weaknesses of the plan and its elements, we used our May 1997
guidance for congressional review of the plans (GAO/GGD-10.1.16) as a
tool. To determine whether the plan contained information on
interagency coordination and addressed management problems, we relied
on our general knowledge of DOJ's operations and programs and our
previous reports.
As you requested, we coordinated our work on DOJ's capacity to
provide reliable information with the DOJ Inspector General's office.
We also relied on our June 1995 report in which we described DOJ's
initial efforts to address the Results Act, including performance
measures.\1 Because of time constraints in doing this work, we did
not review any supporting documents related to the plan or interview
DOJ officials about its development and preparation.
We did our work between June 21 and July 10, 1997. On July 7, 1997,
we provided a draft of this letter to the Attorney General for her
review and comment. DOJ's comments are discussed at relevant points
in this letter and in a section at the end.
--------------------
\1 Managing for Results: The Department of Justice's Initial Efforts
to Implement GPRA (GGD-95-167FS, June 20, 1995).
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The Department of Justice was created in June 1870 (see 28 U.S.C.
501, 503),\2 with the Attorney General as the head of the Department.
DOJ encompasses a wide array of core functions, whose
responsibilities range from assisting state and local governments in
reducing juvenile delinquency to working with foreign governments to
fighting terrorism. The Attorney General is responsible for
provision of legal advice to the President and department heads,
representation of the executive branch in court, investigation of
federal crimes, and enforcement of federal laws.\3 The Attorney
General also supervises and directs the operation of the various
components of DOJ, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI),\4 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),\5 Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS),\6 Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP),\7
and the Offices of U.S. Attorneys,\8 U.S. Marshals,\9 and U.S.
Trustees.\10 Each of these components has statutory authorities under
which they operate and/or which they enforce. In addition, the
Attorney General has been given numerous other statutory
responsibilities over the years through anticrime legislation and in
the context of various appropriations acts.
The Results Act specifies that all agencies' strategic plans should
have six critical components: (1) a comprehensive agency mission
statement; (2) agencywide long-term goals and objectives for all
major functions and operations; (3) approaches (or strategies) to
achieve the goals and objectives and the various resources needed;
(4) a description of the relationship between the long-term
goals/objectives and the annual performance plans required by the
Act; (5) an identification of key factors, external to the agency and
beyond its control, that could significantly affect achievement of
the strategic goals; and (6) a description of how program evaluations
were used to establish and revise strategic goals and a schedule for
future program evaluations.
DOJ's strategic plan is organized around what DOJ has identified as
its seven core functions: (1) investigation and prosecution of
criminal offenses; (2) assistance to state and local governments; (3)
legal representation, enforcement of federal laws, and defense of
U.S. interests; (4) immigration; (5) detention and incarceration;
(6) administration and improvement of the justice system; and (7)
management.
It is important to recognize that we reviewed a draft of DOJ's
strategic plan and that the final plan is not due to the Congress and
OMB until September 1997. Furthermore, the Results Act anticipated
that several planning cycles would be needed to perfect the process
and that the final plan would be continually refined as future
planning cycles occur. Thus, our comments reflect a snapshot status
of the plan at a given point in time. We recognize that developing a
strategic plan is a dynamic process and that DOJ officials, with
input from OMB and congressional staff, are continuing to revise the
draft.
--------------------
\2 The Judiciary Act of 1789 originally created the position of
Attorney General and also directed the President to appoint an
attorney for each federal judicial district to represent the United
States. 1 Stat. 73, 92-93.
\3 See chapter 31 of title 28 of the U.S. Code.
\4 The FBI was established in 1908 by the Attorney General, who
directed that DOJ investigations be handled by its own staff.
General statutory provisions related to the FBI are contained in
chapter 33 of title 28 of the U.S. Code. The FBI is charged with
investigating all violations of federal law except those that have
been assigned by legislative enactment or otherwise to another
federal agency.
\5 DEA was created in July 1973, by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1973 (5 U.S.C. app. 1), which merged four separate drug law
enforcement agencies. DEA is the lead agency in enforcing narcotics
and controlled substances laws, primarily contained in title 21 of
the U.S. Code.
\6 INS was created in March 1891 (see 8 U.S.C. 1551 note), and its
purpose and responsibilities were further specified by the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1101 note),
which charges the Attorney General with the administration and
enforcement of its provisions. The Attorney General has delegated
authority to the Commissioner of INS to carry out these provisions of
immigration law.
\7 BOP is generally responsible for the operation of federal penal
and correctional institutions. Its general statutory provisions are
contained in chapter 303 of title 18 of the U.S. Code.
\8 The government is represented in each of the 94 judicial districts
by a U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorneys prosecute criminal offenses
against the United States, represent the government in civil actions
in which the United States is concerned, and initiate proceedings for
the collection of fines, penalties, and forfeitures owed to the
United States. General statutory provisions related to the U.S.
attorneys are contained in chapter 35 of title 28 of the U.S. Code.
\9 The government is represented in each of the 94 judicial districts
by a U.S. Marshal. The primary mission of the U.S. Marshals
Service is protection of the federal judiciary, protection of
witnesses, execution of warrants and court orders, management of
seized assets, and custody and transportation of unsentenced
prisoners. General provisions related to the U.S. Marshal Service
are contained in chapter 37 of title 28 of the U.S. Code.
\10 The U.S. Trustees supervise the administration of bankruptcy
cases and private trustees in the Federal Bankruptcy Courts. General
provisions related to the U.S. Trustees are contained in chapter 39
of title 28 of the U.S. Code.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Of the six elements required by the Act, three--the relationship
between long-term goals/objectives and the annual performance plans,
the key factors external to DOJ that could affect DOJ's ability to
meet its goals, and a program evaluation component--were not
specifically identified in the draft plan. The remaining three
elements--the mission statement, goals and objectives, and strategies
to achieve the goals and objectives--were discussed. However, each
of these elements had weaknesses, some more significant than others.
The three elements discussed in DOJ's plan generally contained some,
but not all, of the attributes that would be desirable to meet the
purposes of the Act and to be consistent with OMB guidance. For
example,
-- the mission statement includes six of the seven core functions
of DOJ, but it does not include DOJ's detention and
incarceration function;
-- the goals and objectives are not consistently results oriented
or expressed in as measurable a form as they could be; and
-- the strategies to achieve the goals and objectives do not
explain the extent to which DOJ programs and activities will
contribute to the achievement of the goals and how DOJ plans to
assess progress in meeting the goals. Further, the performance
indicators are not always as outcome related as they could be,
nor do the strategies describe the processes and resources
needed to meet the goals and objectives of the plan, as required
by the Act.
The draft plan makes no explicit mention of the other three required
elements. With regard to relating long-term goals/objectives to
performance plans, the plan provided no substantive comment.
Instead, DOJ stated that the draft plan provides a basis for its
components to develop more detailed annual plans and related program
performance information. The plan does not contain a section on key
external factors. It is important that factors that could
significantly affect the achievement of strategic goals be identified
and that mitigation strategies be considered. A program evaluation
element was also missing, even though OMB guidance states that the
plan should, among other things, (1) describe how program evaluations
were used to prepare the plan and (2) outline the scope and
methodology, timetable, and key issues to be addressed in future
evaluations. Program evaluations are a critical source of
information for assessing progress toward achieving strategic goals
as well as ensuring their validity and reasonableness.
The draft plan appears to reflect consideration of most of DOJ's
major statutory responsibilities. However, the plan does not contain
specific references to the underlying statutory bases for major
functions and operations, provide specifics of how any particular
statutory responsibility will be implemented, or provide linkages
between the stated goals and objectives and DOJ's relevant statutory
authorities that form the basis for them. Including such linkages
may facilitate a better understanding of the diversity and complexity
of DOJ's overall mission and goals and objectives.
In addition, the draft plan could be more useful to DOJ, the
Congress, and other stakeholders if it provided a more explicit
discussion of crosscutting activities, major management challenges,
and DOJ's capacity to provide reliable information to manage its
programs or determine if it is achieving its strategic goals. The
draft plan is silent on crosscutting issues and does not mention
whether DOJ coordinated with related external law enforcement
stakeholders, such as the Customs Service and state and local law
enforcement agencies. Recognizing crosscutting issues and the
coordination required to address them is particularly important for
DOJ because as the federal government's attorney, it helps the
various federal agencies enforce the law in federal courts. The
draft plan does not explicitly discuss how crosscutting issues might
arise or affect the successful accomplishment of DOJ's goals and
objectives.
The plan is also silent on the formidable management problems we and
others, including the DOJ Inspector General and the National
Performance Review (NPR), have identified in recent years.
Consideration of these problems is important because they could
affect DOJ's ability to develop and meet its goals. Also, we and
others have identified problems with the reliability and availability
of data in DOJ's program-related and financial management systems.
The draft plan does not mention how data limitations may affect DOJ's
ability to manage its programs or to measure performance.
Consideration of these areas could give DOJ a better framework for
achieving the purposes of the Act and help stakeholders to better
understand DOJ's operating constraints and environment.
DRAFT PLAN DOES NOT ACHIEVE ALL
THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT, AND
THE QUALITY OF INDIVIDUAL
ELEMENTS COULD BE IMPROVED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
DOJ's strategic plan is incomplete and does not provide the Congress
with critical information for its consultations with DOJ. DOJ's plan
includes the first two critical elements--mission statement and goals
and objectives--but the mission statement is not complete and the
goals and objectives are not consistently results oriented and
expressed in as measurable a form as they could be. While DOJ
partially included a third element--its strategies to achieve the
goals and objectives--it does not explain to what extent DOJ programs
and activities will contribute to achieving the goals and how DOJ
plans to assess progress in meeting the goals. Further, the
strategies are not always outcome related, nor do they describe the
processes and resources needed to meet the goals and objectives of
the plan, as required by the Act. In addition, three other elements
have not been included in the plan--the relationship between
long-term goals/objectives and the annual performance plans, key
external factors, and the use of program evaluations to establish or
revise strategic goals.
MISSION STATEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
DOJ's plan contains a mission statement that is results oriented and
generally defines the basic purpose of DOJ with emphasis on its core
programs and activities. DOJ's mission statement is as follows:
"Our mission at the United States Department of Justice is to
enforce the law and defend the interests of the U.S. according
to the law, provide Federal leadership in preventing and
controlling crime, seek just punishment for those guilty of
unlawful behavior, administer and enforce the Nation's
immigration laws fairly and effectively and ensure fair and
impartial administration of justice for all Americans."
DOJ's mission statement covers six of the seven core functions that
DOJ identified but does not specify the detention and incarceration
function, which is one of DOJ's largest budget items. Nevertheless,
the plan incorporates the detention and incarceration function in its
goals and objectives and strategies to achieve the goals and
objectives.
In commenting on a draft of this letter, DOJ officials said that they
do not agree that the DOJ mission statement omits detention and
incarceration or that the major functions of DOJ need to be
explicitly spelled out in a mission statement. They believe this
function is covered by the phrases "seek just punishment. . .", and
"ensure fair and impartial administration of justice. . ." While we
agree that mission statements may vary in the extent to which they
specify particular activities, our view that it would be helpful to
include the detention and incarceration function in this case arises
from DOJ's decision to specify all of the other major functions in
its mission statement. In our view, the omission of one of DOJ's
larger functions makes the mission statement appear to be incomplete.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
DOJ's goals and objectives cover its major functions and operations
and are logically related to its mission. However, they are not
consistently results oriented and sometimes focus on activities and
processes. For example, one set of results-oriented goals involve
reducing violent, organized, and gang-related crime; drug-related
crime; espionage and terrorism; and white collar crime. DOJ's goals
in other areas are more process oriented, such as representing the
United States in all civil matters and promoting the participation of
victims and witnesses in legal proceedings.
Another weakness of the goals is that they are not always expressed
in as measurable a form as they could be. For example, two of DOJ's
goals in the legal representation, enforcement of federal laws, and
defense of U.S. interests core function are to guarantee the civil
rights of all Americans and safeguard America's environment and
natural resources. It is not clear how DOJ is able to measure its
progress in achieving these goals.
STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE GOALS
AND OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
The Results Act and OMB Circular A-11 indicate that DOJ should
describe the processes that will be used to achieve its goals and
objectives. Our review of DOJ's strategic plan, specifically the
strategies and performance indicators, showed where improvements
could be made to better meet the Act's purposes and OMB Circular A-11
guidance.
Some of the strategies could be clarified to better explain how and
to what extent DOJ programs and activities will contribute to
achieving the goals and how DOJ plans to assess progress in meeting
those goals. For example, because DOJ has limited ability to control
criminal activities, it is not clear how DOJ will be able to
determine the degree to which its programs and activities have
contributed to changes in violent crime, availability and abuse of
illegal drugs, espionage and terrorism, and white collar crime.
Similarly, in its immigration core function, DOJ has a goal to
maximize deterrents to unlawful migration by reducing the incentives
of unauthorized employment and entitlements. It is likewise unclear
how DOJ will be able to determine the effect of its efforts to deter
unlawful migration, compared to the effect of changes in the economic
and political conditions in countries from which illegal aliens
originated. The plan does not address either issue.
DOJ elected to include performance indicators in its strategic plan.
While we are supportive of the concept of using performance
indicators to measure outcomes, we noted that DOJ's performance
indicators are more output than outcome related. For example, a
strategy to achieve the goal for ensuring border integrity is to
increase the strength of the Border Patrol. One of the performance
indicators DOJ is proposing to measure how well the strategy is
working is the percentage of time that Border Patrol agents devote to
actual border control operations. While this may indicate whether
agents are spending more time controlling the border, it is not clear
how it will help DOJ assess how this practice affects its progress in
deterring unlawful migration.
Further, the plan's strategies do not discuss the types of resources
(e.g., human skills, capital, and information technology) that will
be needed to achieve the strategic and performance goals, including
any significant changes to be made in resource levels. Such
information could be beneficial to DOJ and Congress in establishing
the goals, evaluating the progress in achieving the goals, and making
resource needs allocations during the budget process.
In commenting on a draft of this letter, DOJ officials said that the
additional draft material provided to us includes estimates of
resource needs. While we did not review the supplemental information
DOJ provided, we believe the purposes of the Results Act would be
better achieved if the strategic plan included--as OMB guidance
suggests--information on resource needs linked to goals and
objectives.
THREE ELEMENTS NOT INCLUDED
IN DRAFT PLAN
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4
The plan does not discuss (1) the relationship between long-term
goals/objectives and the annual performance goals, (2) key external
factors, and (3) use of program evaluations.
Under the Results Act, DOJ's long-term strategic goals are to be
linked to its annual performance plans and the day-to-day activities
of its managers and staff. The intent for this linkage is to provide
a basis for judging whether an agency is making progress toward
achieving its long-term goals. However, the DOJ plan generally does
not provide such linkages.
DOJ officials commented that the plan provides a basis for a linkage
between the long-range goals of the strategic plan and the annual
performance plans. They said that DOJ's 1999 annual performance
planning and budget formulation activities are to be closely linked
and both are to be driven by the goals of the strategic plan.
According to these officials, this interrelationship is the
cornerstone of DOJ's Results Act implementation approach. They also
said that while the draft plan itself does not describe these
connections, the linkages are in fact "real" and would become more
apparent as the 1999 annual performance plan and budget request are
issued. Further, they said they would amend the plan to more
adequately explain this process.
The strategic plan also does not identify or discuss key factors
external to DOJ that could significantly affect it in achieving its
strategic goals. External factors can at times invalidate
assumptions about DOJ's ability to achieve its strategic goals. For
example, the purpose of the Act would be more fully achieved if DOJ
would discuss its alternative plan for achieving its goals if it does
not get the coordination with other federal agencies and foreign
governments. Another external factor that may significantly affect
DOJ accomplishing its strategic plan is that of having to respond to
changes in its statutory responsibilities, such as new immigration
initiatives.
In commenting on a draft of the letter, DOJ officials strongly agreed
that external factors significantly affect DOJ's work and that events
and conditions over which it has little or no control are likely to
determine to a significant degree its success in achieving its goals.
In this regard, they said they expect the next version of the plan to
include such external factors as emergencies and other unpredictable
events (e.g., the Murrah building bombing); changing statutory
responsibilities; and the capacity and effectiveness of their
federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.
Finally, the strategic plan does not include a program evaluation
element. Under the Act and OMB guidance, this element should
describe program evaluations that were used in preparing the
strategic plan and outline the general scope and methodology for
future evaluations, key issues to be addressed, and when such
evaluations are to occur. Program evaluations can be a potentially
critical source of information for ensuring the validity and
reasonableness of goals and strategies, and for identifying factors
likely to affect performance.
DOJ officials commented that program evaluation can and should be
linked to strategic planning and that this is an area where DOJ needs
to make improvements. They said that the next version of the plan is
to have a much more extensive discussion of program evaluation,
including a list of anticipated future evaluations.
DRAFT PLAN GENERALLY REFLECTS
MOST OF DOJ'S MAJOR STATUTORY
RESPONSIBILITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The February 1997 DOJ plan appears to reflect consideration of most
of DOJ's major statutory responsibilities. The plan addresses these
responsibilities generally and does not contain specific references
to the underlying statutory bases for DOJ's major functions and
operations. It cites three of the laws that DOJ is charged with
enforcing or implementing: the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,
and the Violence Against Women Act.
A listing that briefly summarizes DOJ's responsibilities under the
laws that are reflected in various parts of the plan and the relevant
DOJ components that are responsible for implementing them could be
useful in helping stakeholders to better understand the diversity and
complexity of DOJ's overall mission. It would also help to clarify
the linkages between stated goals and objectives and the underlying
statutory authorities on which they rest.
Consistent with your request, we did not attempt to identify whether
all of the statutory responsibilities of DOJ were reflected in the
plan. Instead we focused on whether the "major" ones were addressed,
and we found that, for the most part, they were. However, one area
of statutory responsibility that is not mentioned in the DOJ plan is
the Attorney General's authority to regulate controlled substances
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.). This
authority has been delegated to DEA.
DRAFT PLAN COULD BETTER ADDRESS
CROSSCUTTING PROGRAM ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Many law enforcement organizations--international and domestic (i.e.,
other federal, state, and local)--perform either similar or the same
activities as DOJ. The draft plan includes a goal to coordinate and
integrate law enforcement activities, wherever possible, and
cooperate fully with other federal agencies. However, the plan could
better serve the purposes of the Results Act by discussing how DOJ
will coordinate with external organizations' activities and how
inputs, outputs, and outcomes will be measured and assessed. For
example, the plan does not discuss
-- how DOJ plans to work with the Departments of Defense and State,
the intelligence agencies, and foreign governments in fighting
international terrorism;
-- how DOJ's drug enforcement activities will relate to the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, which has governmentwide
planning responsibilities for drug control activities;
-- how DOJ and the Department of the Treasury, which have similar
responsibilities concerning the seizure and forfeiture of assets
used in connection with illegal activities (e.g., money
laundering) will coordinate and integrate their operations; and
-- how INS and the Customs Service, which both inspect arriving
passengers at ports of entry to determine if they are carrying
contraband and are authorized to enter the country, will
coordinate their resources.\11
Along these lines, certain program areas within DOJ have similar or
complementary functions that are not addressed in the strategic plan.
For example, both BOP and INS detain individuals, but the plan does
not address the interrelationship of their similar functions or
prescribe comparable measures for inputs and outcomes. As a second
example, the plan could do a better job of recognizing the linkage
among DOJ's investigative, prosecutorial, and incarceration
responsibilities.
--------------------
\11 We discussed this issue in our report--Customs Service and INS:
Dual Management Structure for Border Inspections Should Be Ended
(GAO/GGD-93-111, June 30, 1993).
DRAFT PLAN DOES NOT ADDRESS
SOME MAJOR MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Over the years, our work and the work of others, including the DOJ
Inspector General and the NPR, addressed many management challenges
that DOJ faces in carrying out its mission. In addition, recent
audits under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act),
which the Government Management Reform Act\12 expanded, have revealed
internal control and accounting problems. Further, DOJ will face
emerging management challenges of implementing modern technology and
resolving the need for computer systems to be changed to accommodate
dates beyond the year 1999--the "year 2000 problem."
DOJ's draft strategic plan is silent on these issues. Specifically,
the plan does not mention how DOJ has addressed the management
problems that have been identified over the years and the status of
its efforts to address them. These types of information could help
DOJ and its stakeholders in at least two ways. First, it could help
in the processes of developing and reviewing the selection of goals,
strategies, and objectives. Second, major management problems could
impede DOJ's efforts to achieve its goals and objectives.
Stakeholders could benefit from knowing what DOJ has done, is doing,
or plans to do to address such problems or, if DOJ has addressed such
problems in the past, thereby avoiding their reoccurrence.
--------------------
\12 This legislation requires agencies to have their agencywide
financial statements annually audited beginning with the fiscal year
1996 financial statements. The first year financial audits of DOJ
and its components focused primarily on evaluating their control
structures and environments and did not include auditing of their
statements of operation, which include the entities' operating costs.
The fiscal year 1996 audit reports are expected to be issued before
the September 30, 1997, submission date for strategic plans.
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED
CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
In recent years, we\13 and the NPR\14 have identified the following
challenges faced by DOJ: (1) the coordination and structure of
federal enforcement agencies; (2) problems with INS' enforcement,
delivery of service, budget development and execution, and control
over a decentralized organization; (3) the vulnerability of the asset
forfeiture program within DOJ to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement; and (4) management of debt collection efforts.
We believe these areas are significant enough to warrant some
discussion in the plan. In problem areas where DOJ has taken
successful corrective actions, such as law enforcement coordination,
some discussion of how DOJ addressed those problems and intends to
prevent them from resurfacing would be informative and useful. For
other problems where DOJ may have had less success, such as debt
collection, the plan could identify these problems and discuss how
DOJ plans to resolve them. If not adequately addressed, these
management problems could have a negative impact on DOJ's ability to
achieve goals and measure performance and thus its ability to
successfully implement the Results Act may be hampered.
--------------------
\13 Justice Department: Improved Management Processes Would Enhance
Justice's Operations (GAO/GGD-86-12, Mar. 14, 1986); Immigration
Management: Strong Leadership and Management Reforms Needed to
Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, Jan. 23, 1991); Justice
Issues (GAO/OCG-89-13TR, Nov. 1988); Justice Issues
(GAO/OCG-93-23TR, Dec. 1992); Asset Forfeiture Programs
(GAO/HR-93-17, Dec. 1992); Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-95-7,
Feb. 1995); Quick Reference Guide (GAO/HR-97-2, Feb. 1997); and
High-Risk Program: Information on Selected High-Risk Areas
(GAO/HR-97-30, May 16, 1997).
\14 From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works
Better and Costs Less, report of the NPR, Vice President Al Gore,
Sept. 7, 1993. We provided our views on NPR's
recommendations--Management Reform: GAO's Comments on the National
Performance Review's Recommendations (GAO/OCG-94-1, Dec. 3, 1993);
and Management Reform: Implementation of the National Performance
Review's Recommendations (GAO/OCG-95-1, Dec. 5, 1994).
INTERNAL CONTROL AND
ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.2
Work under way by us and others has identified internal control
weaknesses and problems with financial information reporting. DOJ is
one of the 24 federal agencies covered under the CFO Act. The audit
work done pursuant to this act, while not yet finalized, has revealed
several significant internal control weaknesses. For instance,
significant problems with DOJ's ability to safeguard and account for
physical assets generally occurred because inventory systems, which
were used to account for DOJ's assets and those in DOJ's custody,
were not updated in a timely manner and in accordance with
established policies and procedures. As a result, the systems could
not provide a complete and accurate inventory of assets. This places
DOJ at increased risk of loss or theft of assets that are in its
possession but are not accounted for in its inventory systems.
This audit work also found weaknesses in DOJ's data processing
operations. As a result, the general controls cannot be relied upon
to provide reasonable assurance that financial data is reliable.
Also, since fiscal year 1996 was the first time that DOJ's financial
statements were subject to audit and operating costs were not
included as part of this audit, it is unknown whether DOJ's systems
can produce the necessary cost information regarding its programs and
related outcomes. Such information would be needed to relate the
cost of various programs and activities to their performance outputs
and results.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.3
In discussing the goals relating to its management core function, DOJ
states that it intends to make effective use of the best available
management practices, including current and new information
technology, that will improve program performance and overall
efficiency. DOJ's stated strategy for accomplishing this goal is to
integrate information technology programs and initiatives with other
planning and decisionmaking processes, including those for human
resources, budget, and financial management.
In this regard, we identified two issues that the strategic plan does
not address. First, the plan does not discuss how DOJ intends to
meet requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 for implementing a
framework of modern technology management to improve performance and
meet strategic goals. This management framework would describe DOJ's
approach for ensuring that (1) senior executives are involved in
information management decisions, (2) a qualified senior-level Chief
Information Officer is appointed, (3) appropriate agencywide
technology standards are established, (4) discipline over technology
spending is imposed through implementation of an information
technology investment strategy, and (5) performance measures are used
to assess technology's contribution in achieving mission results.
Second, the plan does not discuss how DOJ will resolve the "year 2000
problem" as well as any significant information security
weaknesses--two issues that we have identified as high risk across
government. Many of DOJ's critical systems dealing with the
investigation, apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of
criminals are date dependent and exchange data with federal, state,
and local government agencies. As a result, these systems are at
risk of unauthorized access and disclosure or malicious use of
sensitive data due to weaknesses in security and could malfunction or
produce incorrect information due to problems associated with the
year 2000.
CONCERNS ABOUT CAPACITY TO
PROVIDE RELIABLE PERFORMANCE
INFORMATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
To efficiently and effectively operate, manage, and oversee its
diverse array of law enforcement-related responsibilities, DOJ needs
reliable data on their results and those of other responsible
organizations. These data are needed so that DOJ can measure its
progress and monitor, record, account for, summarize, and analyze
crime and crime-related data.
DOJ's strategic plan contains little discussion about its capacity to
provide performance information for assessing its progress toward its
goals and objectives over the next 5 years. For example, under its
discussion of the immigration core function, DOJ's plan states that
it intends to establish and maintain automated systems that provide
reliable, timely, and accessible employment and entitlement
eligibility verification. However, there is no discussion on its use
of information management systems to positively identify criminal
aliens. Also, DOJ's strategy over the legal representation,
enforcement of federal laws, and defense of U.S. interests core
function states that it intends to enhance financial litigation and
debt collection through automation improvements. The narrative under
this function appears to be limited to the collection of tax debts
and does not discuss DOJ's efforts to alleviate the long-standing
weaknesses in accounting for, collecting, and reporting on monetary
penalties imposed on federal criminals.
Further, DOJ will need to rely on a variety of external data sources
to assess the impact of its plan. For example, those goals that are
crime related are primarily dependent on data from state and local
law enforcement agencies. Goals related to juvenile criminal
activity will also depend on program information that is generated by
state and local agencies. DOJ has little control over the
completeness, accuracy, timeliness, and reliability of these data.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
On July 9, 1997, we met with DOJ officials, including the Director,
Management and Planning Staff, Justice Management Division, who has
responsibility for DOJ's strategic plan. DOJ officials agreed with a
number of our observations, noting that their strategic plan
addresses three of the six statutorily required elements. DOJ
officials said that DOJ has started working on the three other
elements and expects to address each of these elements in the next
version of the plan.
The DOJ officials expressed the opinion that our draft letter did not
fully or fairly reflect the DOJ's progress in developing the
strategic plan and they provided a description of their planning
process and its achievements. As noted in the introductory section
of this letter, our scope was limited to a review of the plan itself.
Accordingly, we did not incorporate this additional information in
this letter.
DOJ officials said that notwithstanding the merits of our specific
suggestions, there is a risk of unintentionally undermining the
plan's usefulness as a means for spurring public dialogue if it
becomes a vehicle for addressing other issues and concerns. Despite
this reservation, they agree that the plan could be enriched by
greater attention to information technology and other
management-related topics not required by the Results Act.
Therefore, they said that DOJ intends to address these topics in
their revised version.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this letter
until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies
of this letter to the Ranking Minority Members of your committees,
and to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of other committees
that have jurisdiction over DOJ activities, the Attorney General, and
to the Director, OMB. We will send copies to others on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-8777 if you or your staffs have any
questions concerning this letter. Major contributors to this letter
are listed in the enclosure.
Norman J. Rabkin, Director
Administration of Justice Issues
Enclosure
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS LETTER
=================================================== Appendix Enclosure
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION
------------------------------------------------- Appendix Enclosure:1
Richard M. Stana, Acting Associate Director
James M. Blume, Assistant Director
Samuel A. Caldrone, Assignment Manager
Mary B. Hall, Evaluator-in-Charge
Michael H. Little, Communications Analyst
Michelle Wiggins, Issue Area Assistant
Lessie M. Burke, Writer-Editor
ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION
------------------------------------------------- Appendix Enclosure:2
Ronald B. Bageant, Assistant Director
John P. Finedore, Assistant Director
Deborah A. Taylor, Assistant Director
Anastasia P. Kaluzienski, Auditor
Brian C. Spencer, Technical Assistant Director
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
------------------------------------------------- Appendix Enclosure:3
Jan B. Montgomery, Assistant General Counsel
*** End of document. ***