INS Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems (Chapter Report, 07/22/97,
GAO/GGD-97-132).
GAO reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) progress
in addressing long-standing management problems, focusing on whether INS
had: (1) developed goals and priorities to guide planning and resource
allocation; (2) revised its organizational structure; (3) improved
internal communications and updated its field and administrative
manuals; (4) improved the process of allocating budgetary resources; and
(5) improved its capability to monitor its financial status.
GAO noted that: (1) INS has made progress toward addressing some of its
management problems, but much remains to be done and top management
attention is still required; (2) INS issued a strategic plan in 1994 to
guide its decisionmaking and policymaking and to set the stage for the
implementation of a priorities management process; (3) INS developed
annual goals and priorities and used them in fiscal years 1995 and 1996
to plan and allocate new resources provided by Congress; (4) in
addition, in 1994 the Commissioner established a new organizational
structure with four Executive Associate Commissioners (EAC) and regional
directors who report to one of the executive associate commissioners;
(5) the reorganization reportedly has improved oversight of district
offices and Border Patrol sectors but has also created some internal
communication problems; (6) a lack of clear guidance has also hampered
internal communication and may be impeding front-line employees in
carrying out their mission-related activities; (7) INS implemented
several initiatives intended to improve upon its processes for
allocating budgetary resources; (8) INS made improvements in planning
resource allocation to be more consistent with agencywide annual
priorities and workload demands; (9) furthermore, INS has contracted
with a consultant to develop a software program that is compatible with
existing staffing models; (10) in addition, the consultant is to review
and refine the deployment planning process and the prototype automated
software support; (11) INS has had long-standing problems with its
financial management system and is in the process of acquiring a new
one; (12) INS selected a financial management system in March 1997, even
though it had not defined its business processes before it selected the
new system; (13) to mitigate the risks associated with its approach, INS
plans to analyze its business processes during implementation of the new
system, finalize a detailed implementation plan, and develop a risk
management plan; (14) GAO did not determine how successful each
individual INS action has been in addressing management problems; and
(15) however, GAO's survey of INS managers conducted in the fall of
1995, a year after the Commissioner's initial policy and organizational
changes, and subsequent interviews with INS managers indicated that
although many managers perceived that some initiatives were having a
positive effect, communications problems and other challenges remained.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-97-132
TITLE: INS Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems
DATE: 07/22/97
SUBJECT: Federal agency reorganization
Immigration or emigration
Strategic information systems planning
Financial management systems
Federal agency accounting systems
Internal controls
Communication
Requirements definition
Systems design
IDENTIFIER: INS Financial Accounting and Control System
INS Position Tracking System
INS Hiring Tracking System
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service
July 1997
INS MANAGEMENT - FOLLOW-UP ON
SELECTED PROBLEMS
GAO/GGD-97-132
INS Management Problems
(183594)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
EAC - Executive Associate Commissioner
FACS - Financial Accounting and Control System
HITS - Hiring Tracking System
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRCA - Immigration Reform and Control Act
JMD - Justice Management Division
NAPA - National Academy of Public Administration
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
POSTS - Position Tracking System
PS&B - Personal Services and Benefits
VCRTF - Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund
WAM - Workload Analysis Model
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-260846
July 22, 1997
The Honorable Doris Meissner
Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization
Service
Dear Ms. Meissner:
This report discusses the progress that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) has made toward addressing long-standing
management problems. It discusses actions taken by INS to address
management problems and areas that continue to need attention.
This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal
agency is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on
actions taken on these recommendations to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of the report. A
written statement also must be sent to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others on request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8777. This report was done under the
direction of Evi L. Rezmovic, Assistant Director, Administration of
Justice Issues. Other major contributors are listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Norman J. Rabkin
Director, Administration
of Justice Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), an agency of the
Department of Justice, has received considerable public attention in
recent years as immigration, especially illegal immigration, has
become a focus of national attention. From fiscal year 1993 to
fiscal year 1997, INS' budget more than doubled, and its personnel
resources increased by about 45 percent to more than 26,000
positions.
In 1991, GAO reported that INS was experiencing severe management
problems in a variety of areas.\1 Specifically, GAO reported that
among other things, INS (1) lacked clearly defined priorities, (2)
lacked management control over regional commissioners, (3) had poor
internal communications and outdated policies and procedures, (4) did
not use workload data to allocate resources and had budget management
and resource allocation problems that perpetuated backlogs in
processing immigrants' applications for adjustment of status and
naturalization, and (5) had unreliable financial information that
resulted in inadequate budget monitoring.
Because of the history of management problems and the recent dramatic
growth in INS' resources, GAO initiated this review to determine what
progress INS had made in these areas. Specifically, GAO's follow-up
review assessed whether INS had (1) developed goals and priorities to
guide planning and resource allocation, (2) revised its
organizational structure, (3) improved internal communications and
updated its field and administrative manuals, (4) improved the
process of allocating budgetary resources, and (5) improved its
capability to monitor its financial status. GAO's audit work was
conducted between March 1995 and February 1997.
The scope of GAO's follow-up work for this report did not include
evaluating the recent issues that have arisen regarding the
effectiveness of specific program areas or components, such as the
naturalization program, criminal alien removal program, and delays in
implementing several major automation systems. Nonetheless, other
GAO work on some of those issues indicated that they share, at least
in part, common causes in terms of some of the long-standing
management weaknesses discussed in this report.
--------------------
\1 Immigration Management: Strong Leadership and Management Reforms
Needed to Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, Jan. 23, 1991).
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
INS is responsible for both administering immigration-related
services and enforcing immigration laws and regulations. INS
headquarters in Washington, D.C., administers its functions through a
network of 3 regional offices, 33 district offices, and 21 Border
Patrol sectors throughout the United States. Immigration-related
services include such activities as port-of-entry admissions and
processing requests for adjustment of status, naturalization, and
work authorization. Enforcement responsibility includes such
activities as border control, apprehension of illegal residents and
workers, and detention and removal of criminal aliens.
In 1990, Congress created the Commission on Immigration Reform, which
was tasked with reviewing and evaluating the impact and
implementation of U.S. immigration policy. The Commission's work,
still ongoing as of March 1997, has indicated that implementation of
immigration policies is beset with problems. In 1994, the Commission
reported that illegal aliens were entering the United States too
easily, unlawful residents of the United States were not being
removed, and legal immigrants encountered too much difficulty in
gaining entry to the United States. That report concluded that
"[t]he United States can do a more effective job, but only with
additional financial resources and the political will to take
action."
Since 1994, additional laws have been enacted to strengthen
immigration policy and to provide additional resources to INS. For
example, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
increased penalties for such offenses as failure to depart, illegal
reentry, and document fraud. It also authorized additional resources
for criminal alien deportations and detention bed space and provided
for asylum claims to be processed more expeditiously.
More recently, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. This law provides for (1)
improvements in border control through increased resources and
enhanced use of technology, (2) provisions to help facilitate legal
entry, (3) increased resources for investigators to perform interior
enforcement activities, (4) enhanced enforcement and penalties
against alien smuggling, (5) provisions to further deter the use of
fraudulent documents, (6) revised procedures for removal of
inadmissible and deportable aliens, (7) pilot programs for
enforcement of restrictions against employment of illegal aliens, and
(8) restrictions on benefits for aliens. In addition, recently
passed welfare reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, also has implications
for significantly increasing INS' naturalization applications
workload.
INS will also be affected by the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (referred to as the Results Act or GPRA), which provides
a statutory framework for achieving more results-oriented management.
The Results Act requires federal agencies to develop strategic plans
by September 30, 1997, that contain mission statements and
outcome-related strategic goals. Once the mission and outcomes are
articulated, agencies are to align their activities, processes, and
resources so that they support their missions and goals.
Amidst these new developments, INS has continued to receive attention
from GAO, the media, and Congress concerning internal management
issues. Such issues are important because how well INS manages its
budgetary and personnel resources has a direct impact on its ability
to efficiently and effectively carry out its mission. In the context
of rapid growth in resources and growing demand for both law
enforcement and provision of services to legal immigrants, INS has
undertaken new initiatives intended to improve how it is managed.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
INS has made progress toward addressing some of its management
problems, but much remains to be done and top management attention is
still required. Since the appointment of a new Commissioner in 1993,
INS has developed a strategic plan, implemented a priorities
management process, taken steps to use priorities and workload
information to allocate resources, and implemented a new
organizational structure intended to provide for more direct
oversight of field units. Sustained top management attention and
commitment to continuously improve operational performance will be
needed to ensure that these changes have the intended effect. Less
progress has been made on other needed improvements, such as
providing employees with clear guidance on how to implement the
immigration laws by issuing updated policies and procedures manuals
and establishing clear channels of communication within the new
organizational structure. Additionally, INS selected a new financial
management system without focusing first on conducting an analysis of
its business processes--a practice that GAO guidelines for acquiring
information technology endorsed and Congress required in legislation.
INS issued a strategic plan in 1994 to guide its decisionmaking and
policymaking and to set the stage for the implementation of a
priorities management process. The agency developed annual goals and
priorities and used them in fiscal years 1995 and 1996 to plan and
allocate new resources provided by Congress. However, INS, like
other government agencies, is in the early stages of implementing the
Results Act's requirements. INS recognizes that it has not yet
implemented a coordinated Results Act effort, especially in terms of
the measures it has in place.
In addition, in 1994 the Commissioner established a new
organizational structure with four Executive Associate Commissioners
(EAC) and regional directors who report to one of the executive
associate commissioners. The reorganization reportedly has improved
oversight of district offices and Border Patrol sectors but has also
created some internal communication problems. A lack of clear
guidance has also hampered internal communication and may be impeding
front-line employees in carrying out their mission- related
activities.
INS implemented several initiatives intended to improve upon its
processes for allocating budgetary resources. INS made improvements
in planning resource allocations to be more consistent with
agencywide annual priorities and workload demands. Furthermore, INS
has contracted with a consultant to develop a software program that
is compatible with existing staffing models. In addition, the
consultant is to review and refine the deployment planning process
and the prototype automated software support. This effort is
intended to move INS toward better deployment planning. INS' efforts
appear to be steps in the right direction, but continued management
support and attention will be required to ensure that the intended
results are achieved.
INS has had long-standing problems with its financial management
system and is in the process of acquiring a new one. INS implemented
some interim strategies to facilitate budget execution monitoring to
assist it until a new financial management system is in place. INS
selected a financial management system in March 1997, even thought it
had not defined its business processes before it selected the new
system. GAO guides on information management\2 and the Clinger-Cohen
Act\3 discuss the need to analyze business processes before acquiring
a new system. GAO's 1994 guide stated that information system
projects that do not focus on process improvements typically fail or
reach only a fraction of their potential. To mitigate the risks
associated with its approach, INS plans to analyze its business
processes during implementation of the new system, finalize a
detailed implementation plan, and develop a risk management plan.
GAO did not determine how successful each individual INS action has
been in addressing management problems. Moreover, GAO recognizes
that it is not reasonable to expect that all problems would be
corrected immediately and that adjustments will be necessary as these
and future changes are fully implemented. However, GAO's survey of
INS managers conducted in the fall of 1995--a year after the
Commissioner's initial policy and organizational changes--and
subsequent interviews with INS managers indicated that although many
managers perceived that some initiatives were having a positive
effect, communications problems and other challenges remained.
Problems INS has experienced recently in several key program
areas--e.g., naturalization, criminal alien deportation
programs--appear to be, at least in part, caused by some of the
long-standing weaknesses in key management functions addressed in
this report, such as organizational structure, budgeting and
financial management, and management and administrative
communications.
--------------------
\2 Executive Guide: Improving Mission Performance Through Strategic
Information Management and Technology; Learning From Leading
Organizations (GAO/AIMD-94-115, May 1994); Assessing Risks and
Returns: A Guide for Evaluating Federal Agencies' IT Investment
Decision-making (GAO/AIMD-10.1.13, February 1997 Version 1); and
Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.15,
April 1997 Version 3).
\3 The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 renames both
the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 and the Information
Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 as the "Clinger-Cohen Act of
1996."
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
INS IMPLEMENTED A STRATEGIC
PLAN AND PRIORITY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
To better focus its attention on key mission and operational
priorities, INS developed and issued a strategic plan in 1994. The
INS strategic plan--Toward INS 2000, Accepting the
Challenge--identified eight major strategic priorities, including
such challenges as facilitating compliance with immigration laws,
deterring unlawful migration, and reengineering INS work processes.
Top INS headquarters and field managers participated in the
development of this strategic plan. GAO's fall 1995 survey confirmed
that INS' mission and priorities were clear to a majority of INS
managers. A majority of managers who said they had a basis to judge
also agreed that the strategic planning process had aided INS
headquarters and regional planning and decisionmaking. (See pp. 31
through 33 and pp. 37 and 38.)
To facilitate achievement of the strategic priorities identified in
the plan, INS implemented a priorities management process in fiscal
year 1995. Specific annual goals related to strategic priorities
were identified for special management attention, including the
establishment of objectives, tasks, time frames, and performance
measures. In fiscal year 1996, to further focus management attention
on the most important goals, INS ranked the annual goals according to
their priority. By assigning senior INS managers specific
responsibility for achieving the annual priority goals, INS intended
to establish better organizational and individual accountability.
These steps appear to be consistent with the intent of GPRA.
Although INS' initial steps in developing a strategic plan and
management priorities have been positive, GAO's past work at INS and
at other agencies indicates that to be successful, such initiatives
require sustained top management attention and commitment to
continuously improve program performance. (See pp. 32 through 35
and p. 39.)
INS REORGANIZED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Before 1994, INS' 33 district directors and 21 Border Patrol chiefs
were supervised by a single senior INS headquarters manager. To
reduce this supervisory span of control and to improve program
planning, review, and integration, the Commissioner reorganized INS
in 1994. The reorganization established EAC positions for (1) policy
and planning, (2) program development, (3) management, and (4) field
operations. The EAC for Field Operations has overall responsibility
for managing INS' operational field activities through three regional
directors, who have been delegated budget and personnel authority
over the district directors and Border Patrol chiefs in their
respective geographic areas. (See pp. 21 through 25.)
GAO found that the reorganization succeeded in shifting some
management authority to officials closer to the field activities, and
many INS managers that GAO interviewed perceived the reorganization
as a positive step in providing oversight of field units. However,
the implementation of the headquarters reorganization also appears to
have created some uncertainty among INS managers and field staff
about the relative roles and responsibilities of the offices of some
of the EACs. This uncertainty has been amplified by internal
questions about possible staffing imbalances among the offices. GAO
found that no analysis had been done, for example, to determine the
appropriate number of staff needed for the office of program
development, given the reassignment of some of its responsibilities
to other offices. (See pp. 40 through 43 and p. 48.)
INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS AND
CURRENCY OF MANUALS
PROBLEMATIC
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Managers responding to GAO's survey in late 1995 indicated that poor
communication, especially between headquarters and field units, was a
problem. The EACs took some steps during 1995 to clarify their roles
and channels of communication, but INS managers and staff told GAO in
the spring of 1996 that they still had difficulty determining the
proper channels through which to obtain policy guidance or implement
program initiatives. Communication problems continued to be evident
in April 1997, when a consultant to the Department of Justice
reported that three different versions of guidance on naturalization
procedures had been distributed throughout INS and that some offices
were using the wrong version. (See pp. 43 through 48.)
Lack of up-to-date policies and procedures was a finding of GAO's
1991 review. Although INS has begun to update its field and
administrative manuals, no updated manuals had been issued as of
February 1997.\4 According to INS, in the absence of current manuals,
managers and staff needed to seek oral guidance more frequently than
would otherwise have been the case. Confusion over some offices'
roles and responsibilities may result in further strain on agency
communications and could result in inconsistencies in guidance across
locations.
In late 1995, a project officer was appointed to focus responsibility
for completing the field manuals. INS field manuals contain guidance
on program operations, such as how to conduct border inspections or
process alien applications. The project officer told GAO that the
updating of these manuals had been slowed in the past and at the time
of GAO's review because priority for use of available staff resources
was given to developing regulations to implement new legislation.
Part of the Inspections Field Manual was expected to be issued in May
1997. The project officer began work on other manuals in the spring
of 1996, but work was halted to develop regulations. A revised
version of the administrative manual, which contains guidance on such
matters as personnel procedures, cash collection, and use of
firearms, had been drafted, but negotiations about changes with the
INS employee unions had slowed finalization of the manual for several
years. In the spring of 1996, steps were taken to set priorities for
union review of the administrative manual segments, but at the time
of GAO's review, no milestone had been established for the issuance
of the manual. (See pp. 51 through 54.)
--------------------
\4 In commenting on a draft of this report, INS officials said that
agreement had been reached with INS unions that 51 of the 295
chapters of the administrative manual needed only minor modifications
and did not affect work practices. INS staff were notified in April
1997 that those chapters were issued in computerized form.
INS TOOK STEPS TO IMPROVE
PROCESSES FOR ALLOCATING
RESOURCES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
Beginning in fiscal year 1995, INS incorporated the Commissioner's
priorities into decisions about the allocation of new budget
resources, such as those provided by the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. INS also took steps to use workload
information in making decisions on the allocation of resources, as
GAO recommended in 1991. (See pp. 62 through 66.)
The Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Acts
annually require INS and other agencies that receive funding under
these acts to notify the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
of adjustments in funding allocations within an account. This
reprogramming process applies whether funding is from fees or general
funds. The Department of Justice requires that its components wait
to implement reprogrammings until a response from Congress is
received. In fiscal year 1994, according to INS officials, the
agency experienced a dramatic decline in applications filed, which
resulted in a commensurate decline in revenue available to fund its
operations. Consequently, INS took steps to reduce spending to
ensure that it did not exceed available balances. (See pp. 68
through 70.)
Therefore, in fiscal year 1995, when INS experienced a dramatic
increase in applications filed, it delayed its reprogramming proposal
to increase permanent staff in order to determine whether, and at
what level, workload increases would continue. As a result, INS did
not obtain approval to reallocate funds until late in the fiscal
year. Because the late funding delayed planned hiring to meet the
workload demands, it contributed significantly to a doubling of the
delay in processing immigrants' applications for adjustment-of-status
and naturalization. For example, the average delay in processing
naturalization applications went from 8.2 months at the end of fiscal
year 1994 to 17.3 months at the end of fiscal year 1995. INS
prepared a proposal for additional spending authority earlier in
fiscal year 1996 to address the continuing workload increase. (See
pp. 70 through 75.)
Although INS has incorporated strategic priorities into its budget
decisionmaking and has begun to develop processes to improve the
allocation of resources based on analysis of workloads, use of
workload information varied among INS' program offices. A May 1996
INS consultant's study of how the agency deploys its personnel
resources concluded that INS' current processes tended to be reactive
rather than prospective and were driven more by resources that were
available than by a determination of workload-driven requirements.
The study concluded that better workload data were needed and that
models currently in use needed to be updated. INS has hired an
additional consultant to identify personnel deployment planning
process improvements; that effort, which includes design,
installation, implementation and testing of a prototype, was
scheduled to be completed in June 1997. INS intends to contract for
enhancements to the model for other resource needs, such as equipment
and facilities. (See pp. 67 and 68.)
INS DID NOT FOLLOW FUNDAMENTAL
PRACTICES FOR ACQUIRING A NEW
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO, the Department of Justice's Inspector General, and the Justice
Management Division have all reported on serious weaknesses with INS'
principal accounting system--the Financial Accounting and Control
System. GAO reported that these problems persisted as recently as
1993 and 1995,\5 and the Justice Management Division assessments of
the system in 1993, 1994, and 1995 revealed that actions had not been
taken to address recommended improvements. Inaccurate financial
data; unreliable and antiquated financial management systems; and
insufficient internal controls over allocation, obligation, and
expenditure of funds have made it difficult for managers in INS
headquarters to readily determine the financial status of INS field
units. These problems, in turn, made it difficult for INS to monitor
budget execution and to make sound budgetary decisions. (See pp. 75
and 76.)
To improve financial management, INS took interim steps, such as
managing some resources at the regional level rather than the local
level. These steps were intended to improve the efficiency of
collecting financial information by reducing the number of reporting
units and to facilitate the collection of surplus\6 funds from the
field for reallocation to unfunded needs. INS has also implemented
an independent position tracking system intended to better manage
personnel resources. (See p. 79.)
INS has also taken action toward implementation of a new financial
management system. On March 31, 1997, the agency selected a new
financial management system that is to have a phased implementation.
INS expects to implement some core functions at key financial
management locations at the start of fiscal year 1998. However, INS
did not analyze its financial management processes before selecting
its new system. Previous GAO work highlights the importance of
business process analyses prior to information system acquisition.
Specifically, GAO's February 1997 guide,\7 which provides a structure
for evaluating and assessing how well a federal agency is selecting
and managing its information technology resources, stated that a key
hazard in acquiring information technology is that the new system
will automate outmoded, inefficient business processes. Also, the
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires executive agencies to analyze
processes before making significant investments in information
technology. The act sought to remedy the dilemma of using technology
to correct process problems by insisting that process redesign drive
the acquisition of information technology, and not the other way
around. According to INS, it had an urgent need to replace its
system by fiscal year 1998. The agency also believed that due to the
urgency, it could not perform an analysis of its financial management
processes before selecting a new system. To mitigate the risks of
its approach, INS plans to perform business process analyses during
implementation and develop a comprehensive implementation plan and
risk management plan. (See pp. 81 through 85.)
--------------------
\5 Immigration Issues: Making Needed Policy and Management Decisions
on Immigration Issues (GAO/T-GGD-93-18, Mar. 30, 1993); and INS:
Update of Management Problems and Program Issues (GAO/T-GGD-95-82,
Feb. 8, 1995).
\6 INS uses the term surplus funds to refer to funds that were not
used during the fiscal year for Personal Services and Benefits and
therefore become available for other purposes.
\7 Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating Federal
Agencies' IT Investment Decision-making (GAO/AIMD-10.1.13, February
1997, Version 1).
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
GAO recommends that the INS Commissioner (1) further clarify the
roles and responsibilities of the EACs and determine whether staffing
adjustments are needed to fully implement the objectives of the
reorganization, (2) establish milestones for issuance of manuals or
the parts of manuals that can stand alone, (3) develop a strategy and
schedule for periodically evaluating the new deployment planning
process to ensure that it is compatible with INS' key planning
processes and provides information managers need to adequately plan
for resource needs and make resource decisions, and (4) take steps to
mitigate the risks associated with INS' planned approach for
acquiring a new financial management system. Such steps should
include fully implementing plans to analyze its current financial
management processes and determining future financial management
process needs, finalizing a comprehensive implementation plan, and
fully developing and implementing a risk management plan.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7
INS reviewed a draft of this report. INS said that it was pleased
that GAO had recognized its progress in developing a strategic plan,
initiating an annual priorities process, improving the resource
allocation process, and linking resource allocations to the
Commissioner's annual priorities. INS said that its staff were
working on GAO's recommendations to clarify roles and
responsibilities, establish milestones for issuance of manuals or
parts of manuals, and develop a strategy and schedule for
periodically evaluating the new deployment planning process. INS
presented additional information for actions that it is performing or
plans to perform to mitigate the risks associated with having
selected a new financial management system without first performing
process analysis. GAO agrees that these actions, if carried out
effectively, are more consistent with the approach that GAO's work
has indicated would mitigate risk, and the recommendation on this
issue was revised accordingly.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
During the 1990s, heightened anxieties about legal and illegal
immigration have placed the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) in the forefront of public attention. Congress has
significantly increased the agency's resources to primarily enhance
INS' enforcement of immigration policy and laws. INS has promoted
naturalization and increased enforcement activities to deter illegal
immigration. At the same time, INS has undergone a significant
reorganization to address management problems that have troubled it
for years.
A NEW ERA FOR INS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Since 1993, INS has had a change in leadership, its budget has
increased by over 100 percent, and it has experienced an
unprecedented increase in naturalization applications. INS has also
been under increased pressure from Congress, states, and citizens to
reduce illegal immigration. In 1993, within the framework of the
administration's multiyear immigration initiative, INS announced
plans to more aggressively enforce immigration laws to prevent
illegal immigration. The multiyear plan is intended to protect U.S.
borders, reduce work incentives for illegal immigrants, expeditiously
remove criminal aliens, stop asylum abuse, reinvent and revitalize
INS, and encourage legal immigrants to become naturalized citizens.
In addition, INS reorganized to improve its oversight of field
operations and enhance its management capabilities.
INS HAS NEW LEADERSHIP AND
MORE RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT
IMMIGRATION LAWS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1
In November 1993, INS' current Commissioner was sworn in. In March
1995, she testified before the House Committee on Appropriations that
when she took office in 1993, "[I]mmigration was a backburner issue.
Its budget was insufficient because it failed to keep pace with INS'
complicated and growing responsibilities."\1
Since 1993, with congressional and presidential support, INS' budget
has been increased dramatically to enable the agency to better
implement and enforce immigration laws. INS anticipates that at the
end of fiscal year 1997 its budget appropriation will be $3.2
billion, which represents an increase of 113 percent over the fiscal
year 1993 level of $1.5 billion, and an increase of 23 percent over
the fiscal year 1996 level of $2.6 billion.
At the end of fiscal year 1996, INS' estimated on-board strength of
full-time permanent employees was about 23,000.\2 This represents
about a 28-percent increase over the fiscal year 1993 level of about
18,000 employees. INS' fiscal year 1997 appropriation provided for
more than 26,000 positions, about a 44-percent increase over 1993.
--------------------
\1 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996: Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong.,
lst Sess. pt.7, at 613 (1995) (statement of Doris Meissner,
Commissioner, INS).
\2 INS also has about 3,000 part-time employees who have a role in
adjudicating applications and inspecting travelers.
MORE ALIENS APPLYING FOR
NATURALIZATION AND OTHER
STATUS CHANGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2
As debates in Congress and in state legislatures focus on burdens
created by both illegal and legal immigrants, an increasing number of
legal permanent residents across the country are seeking U.S.
citizenship, often years after they first became eligible to apply.
In fiscal year 1995, INS experienced unprecedented increases in
naturalization applications, which grew from approximately 600,000 in
fiscal year 1994 to over 1.2 million in fiscal year 1996.
Federal and state actions have prompted legal aliens to apply for
naturalization. For example, welfare proposals that were considered
in Congress during 1995 to deny federal assistance to legal
immigrants who were not citizens contributed to a spurt in
naturalization applications. Subsequent passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996\3 made
changes in the eligibility of noncitizens for federal, state, and
local benefits that according to an INS official, contributed to more
applications for naturalization. INS could also see a significant
increase in naturalization applications as aliens who qualified for
legal status under amnesty provisions in the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) became eligible to apply for naturalization.
In addition, the Commissioner's fiscal year 1995 annual priorities
for INS included promoting naturalization through public education
programs. Furthermore, Proposition 187, which passed in California
in November 1994,\4 may have motivated some legal aliens to apply for
naturalization because of its general anti-immigrant sentiment. This
legislation is intended to bar illegal immigrants from obtaining
educational, social, and nonemergency medical services.
INS also had a surge in applications during fiscal year 1995 from
aliens who sought to adjust their status. This surge resulted from
the amendment adding subsection 245(i) to the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. Subsection 245(i) permits aliens within
certain categories (e.g., entered without inspection, worked
illegally, or overstayed their visas) to apply for permanent
residence if physically present in the United States and eligible to
receive immigrant visas in their own countries.\5 Initially, these
aliens paid a sum of five times the standard filing fee in addition
to the standard filing fee.\6 During fiscal year 1996 and the first
quarter of fiscal year 1997, INS continued to receive a high level of
new applications.
--------------------
\3 P.L. 104-193, August 22, 1996.
\4 Proposition 187 was a California ballot initiative to deny most
public services to illegal immigrants. It was adopted in November
1994 but was promptly challenged in court as unconstitutional. A
federal judge put a hold on the state's implementation of the
initiative, pending resolution of the court challenges.
\5 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies 1995 Appropriations and 1994 Supplemental
Appropriations, P.L. 103-317, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i). See INS:
Information on Aliens Applying for Permanent Resident Status
(GAO/GGD-95-162FS, June 8, 1995).
\6 The filing fee was changed, however, by an amendment in the
recently enacted Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. The amendment to 245(i) set the amount
of this fee at $1,000, effective at the end of December 1996. P.L.
104-208 (1996), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i).
INS IS PLACING MORE EMPHASIS
ON STRENGTHENING BORDER
CONTROL, ENFORCING EMPLOYER
SANCTIONS, AND REMOVING
CRIMINAL ALIENS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3
Most of INS' fiscal year 1996 increased resources were to go toward
strengthening border control and, to a lesser extent, to stronger
workplace enforcement to reduce the lure of jobs to illegal
immigrants and expedited deportation of criminal aliens. INS'
strategy for controlling illegal entry across U.S. borders between
ports of entry includes adding border patrol agents; placing fencing
and lighting strategically; and using all-terrain vehicles, infrared
scopes, and other new equipment.
Although IRCA mandated that employers verify job applicants'
employment eligibility,\7
according to the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, the law has
not been effectively enforced.\8 INS has received funding to increase
enforcement of employer sanctions, and in fiscal year 1996 it
received authorization to hire 384 new investigators and support
staff to conduct and assist in workplace inspections. The agency is
also taking steps to issue work authorization documents that are
designed to be fraud-resistant, tamper-proof, and cost-effective, and
to pilot-test other methods of verification.
The removal of criminal aliens from the United States is another key
component of INS' comprehensive strategy to prevent and deter illegal
migration. A focus of the criminal alien removal initiative has been
more expeditious removal of aliens incarcerated in federal and state
prisons and local correctional facilities. INS' stated strategy
includes deporting more criminal aliens by increasing detention
capacity; streamlining administrative procedures for deportation; and
expanding its Institutional Hearing Program, which is designed to
place criminal aliens in deportation hearings so they can be readily
deported upon their release from prison.
--------------------
\7 8 U.S.C. 1324a.
\8 U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, A Report to
Congress, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Sept. 1994.
INS REORGANIZED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4
One of the first tasks the new Commissioner undertook in 1993 was to
reorganize INS. The reorganization was designed to address a span of
control problem that INS had identified as an unintended consequence
of a 1991 reorganization and to alleviate other management problems
identified by others, such as the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) and Congress.
The 1991 reorganization had centralized oversight of district offices
and Border Patrol sectors under one manager in headquarters. INS'
Commissioner at that time gave the program managers in headquarters
increased budget authority to allocate funding for personnel within
their programs in the second quarter of fiscal year 1990.
Politically appointed regional commissioners were replaced with
career managers, who were called regional administrators. These
regional administrators provided administrative support to field
offices but did not exercise authority over field operations. Figure
1.1 depicts INS' structure as a result of the 1991 reorganization.
Figure 1.1: INS'
Organizational Structure, 1991
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1994, Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. 2B, at 3(1993).
The 1994 reorganization sought to remedy at least two problems with
the 1991 structure. First, the Commissioner thought the agency's
field performance was uneven and poorly coordinated. In particular,
the headquarters operations office had an unrealistically large span
of control because of its responsibility for overseeing the
operations of 33 district offices and 21 Border Patrol sectors.
Second, the Commissioner believed that program planning, review, and
integration had suffered because the operations office was
preoccupied with matters that should have been handled by field
managers and therefore could not focus on program planning. To
address these and other problems, the new structure (1) established a
new Office of the Executive Associate Commissioner (EAC) for Field
Operations to oversee field operations; (2) redesignated the previous
EAC for Operations as the EAC for the Office of Programs to develop
and disseminate policies, procedures, and other appropriate
guidelines required for program execution servicewide and to provide
analytical and evaluative support related to specific program
operations; (3) established an Office of Policy and Planning under an
EAC to replace the previous Office of Strategic Planning; and (4)
established the EAC for Management with many of the same management
functions as it had under the previous organizational structure, plus
some new ones. The purpose of establishing the Office of Policy and
Planning at an executive level was to reinforce the importance of
servicewide planning on an annual and long-term basis and to provide
appropriate attention to macrolevel immigration policy development
and issue analysis. Figure 1.2 depicts INS' organizational structure
after the reorganization and at the time of our review.
Figure 1.2: INS'
Organizational Structure,
November 1994, With Revisions
as of March 1997
(See figure in printed
edition.)
\a Function detailed to Office of Field Operations in June 1995.
\b Incorporated into revised 1995 organizational chart.
Source: 8 C.F.R. 100.2, 1996 and INS.
Figure 1.2 shows that the regional offices now report to the Office
of Field Operations and have line authority over the district offices
and Border Patrol sectors. The regional offices are managed by
regional directors rather than regional administrators. The district
offices and sectors are to provide direct service to applicants for
benefits and carry out statutory enforcement responsibilities in
their respective geographical areas. Support and services are to be
delivered to field offices through four administrative centers.
All of the EACs are to serve as principal advisors to the
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, who is the Chief Operating
Officer for INS. The EACs also are to participate in the budget
formulation and execution processes as do the regional directors.
Further information on the specific roles and responsibilities for
the offices of the EACs and the regional directors is presented in
appendix I.
Implementation of the current organization began in July 1994 and was
officially in place in October 1994. Some of the EACs were acting in
their positions prior to their official appointments to the new
posts. Figure 1.3 shows some of the key events related to the 1994
reorganization.
Figure 1.3: Key Events in the
1994 Reorganization
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: INS.
PAST MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
Several of our past reports identified significant management
problems that have troubled INS for years.\9 Our Immigration
Management report identified many management problems related to INS
leadership, service delivery, the budget process, the financial
management system, and the organizational structure. Major problems
cited in the reports included the following:
-- INS lacked clearly defined priorities and goals.
-- INS' organization was fragmented both programmatically and
geographically. In our report we attributed part of the
fragmentation to the inability of INS' leadership to control the
politically appointed regional commissioners, who routinely used
their authority to thwart headquarters' efforts to allocate
resources and manage programs.
-- INS' leadership had not adequately defined the roles of the two
key enforcement divisions, Border Patrol and Investigations,
which resulted in overlapping responsibilities, inconsistent
program implementation, and ineffective use of resources.
-- Poor communications led to weaknesses in INS' formulation of
some policies and procedures, and policy information was
outdated.
-- Budget management and resource allocation problems perpetuated
backlogs for processing aliens' applications.
-- Budgets were not based on agencywide priorities, and the budget
process did not adequately use workload to allocate staff.
-- Unreliable financial information resulted in inadequate budget
monitoring.
In response to management problems that were documented by an
internal Department of Justice audit in December 1988 and our 1990
and 1991 management reports, in 1990, Justice requested that NAPA
provide INS and Justice with a strategy to assist in the
determination of the critical management problems that needed to be
addressed and courses of action available to address them. The team
preparing the NAPA report did not conduct its own management review
but instead relied on our studies, audits and inspections by the
Department of Justice's Inspector General and Justice Management
Division, other INS and Justice documents, and interviews with
various officials. The NAPA report focused on providing another
perspective on the management problems and recommendations to resolve
them. NAPA's findings generally agreed with our management review
findings but offered some different recommendations to resolve the
problems.\10
INS management problems have continued, as indicated in testimony by
the Department of Justice Inspector General before the House
Appropriations Committee in February 1997. The Inspector General
reported that INS failed to conduct criminal history checks before
granting applications for citizenship, INS managers in Miami and the
Eastern Regional Office intentionally misled a congressional
delegation, and some major systems in INS' automation initiatives
were behind schedule.
--------------------
\9 Immigration Management: Strong Leadership and Management Reforms
Needed to Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, Jan. 23, 1991);
Financial Management: INS Lacks Accountability and Controls Over Its
Resources (GAO/AFMD-91-20, Jan. 24, 1991); and Information
Management: Immigration and Naturalization Service Lacks Ready
Access to Essential Data (GAO/IMTEC-90-75, Sept. 27, 1990).
\10 Managerial Options for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, A Report for the U.S. Department of Justice, National
Academy of Public Administration, Feb. 1991.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The objective of this review was to follow up on our past INS
management report to determine whether steps had been taken to
correct some of the most significant management problems identified.
Specifically, we determined whether INS had
-- developed goals and priorities to guide planning and resource
allocation,
-- revised its organizational structure,
-- improved internal communications and updated its field and
administrative manuals,
-- improved the process of allocating budgetary resources,
-- improved its capability to monitor its financial status.
We used a variety of techniques to determine whether INS had taken
steps to address management problems. We reviewed past management
studies of INS; sent a survey in September 1995 to 3,676 career and
appointed INS managers and senior staff agencywide; and conducted
interviews with managers in headquarters, the regional offices, and
certain district and sector offices. We also reviewed agency
documents on the reorganization and budget execution. We began our
audit work during the first fiscal year that the reorganization was
implemented. Therefore, our findings represent INS' progress in
accomplishing its goals as of the time of our review. The scope of
this review cut across various INS program areas (e.g., employment
verification and naturalization); components (e.g., Border Patrol and
Office of Investigations); and field offices (e.g., districts and
sectors); however, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of specific
program areas, components, or field offices. Furthermore, we did not
review management issues identified more recently, such as delays in
implementing several major automation systems. Appendix II provides
a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, and
methodology. Further details of the survey methodology are presented
in appendix III.
We did our work between March 1995 and February 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We requested
comments on a draft of this product from the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and her comments are
presented and evaluated in chapters 2 and 3.
INS MADE PROGRESS TOWARD SOME
MANAGEMENT GOALS OF THE
REORGANIZATION, BUT OTHERS
CONTINUE TO BE PROBLEMATIC
============================================================ Chapter 2
The purpose of INS' reorganization in 1994 was to address a broad
spectrum of management problems. The INS Commissioner wanted to
reduce headquarters' span of control over field units to help improve
field supervision. In addition, the reorganization sought to improve
servicewide planning and policy development, strengthen operational
program planning, and enhance communications. We identified these
management areas as problems in our past studies. Table 2.1 lists
INS' management goals for the reorganization, the intent of the
goals, and the structural or role change made to facilitate
accomplishment of the management goals.
Table 2.1
Goals INS Established for the 1994
Reorganization
Goal Intent Structure/role change
---------------------- ---------------------- ----------------------
Goal 1
Develop a capability To provide long-range Establishment of the
and commitment to plan program and priority Office of Policy and
for the future, set planning Planning
customer service
standards, and
establish quantitative
performance measures
to enable INS to
evaluate its programs
and service delivery
Goal 2
Decentralize To decentralize the Regional directors
decisionmaking and INS management were to supervise the
delegate authority to structure district directors and
persons geographically Border Patrol chiefs.
closer to the Regional directors
locations where work were also given
is being done authority to manage
personnel and funds
for the districts and
sectors.
Goal 3
Empower field To directly involve Regional directors
operational units to regional directors in were to oversee
improve the delivery field activities to district directors and
of services to provide consistency in Border Patrol chiefs.
customers field operations
Goal 4
Create a clearer sense To combine major Establishment of the
of mission by knitting functions and place Office of Programs,
together INS' major them in separate the Office of Policy
functions and programs offices, such as and Planning, and the
program planning, Office of Field
policy planning, and Operations
field operations
Goal 5
Reengineer major To establish planning Establishment of the
processes, such as across INS rather than Office of Policy and
those that develop and have each headquarters Planning
disseminate program office
organizational policy planning for its own
and guidelines, and program without
that are outdated considering agencywide
approaches to handling needs
records and
information
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 224, p. 60066, Nov. 22,
1994, and interviews with INS officials tasked with recommending a
revised organization structure.
Consistent with these goals and with alleviating a problem identified
in our 1991 management report, INS developed a strategic plan and has
set annual priorities. A majority of INS' managers who responded to
our survey in the fall of 1995 and expressed an opinion indicated
that the annual priorities aided planning and decisionmaking. Also,
managers whom we interviewed told us that they perceived that
oversight of field operations had improved under the reorganization.
In addition, INS decentralized its management structure by restoring
regional directors to manage field units, which is intended to help
improve field supervision.
Although some progress was made toward addressing past management
problems through INS' reorganization, the implementation of the
reorganization has yet to address others and created some new
problems. INS' implementation of the reorganization did not clearly
delineate the responsibilities and authority of the Office of Field
Operations and the Office of Programs, causing confusion for some
managers. Also, poor communication continued as a problem that was
exacerbated by the reorganization and the lack of up-to-date field
and policy manuals.
INS' STRATEGIC PLAN AND ANNUAL
PRIORITIES PROVIDED DIRECTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
In our 1991 management review, we reported that INS lacked a
strategic plan and that past priority management processes were not
successful. We also stated that past efforts to implement agencywide
planning systems lacked sustained top management support, managers
were not held accountable for achieving goals and objectives, and
priorities were not used in planning for decisionmaking. INS'
current leadership developed a strategic long-term plan and
established annual goals and objectives. Annual priorities were used
to plan and make resource decisions in fiscal years 1995, 1996, and
1997. Top managers were major participants in the annual priorities
management process, and INS' objectives had performance measures.
INS DEVELOPED A STRATEGIC
PLAN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
In 1993, INS began an 18 month strategic planning process that
included all top INS headquarters and field managers, as well as
external stakeholders interested in and affected by INS' mission, to
brainstorm issues facing the agency over the next decade. A
strategic planning work group comprising a cross-section of INS
program representatives and managers was established to guide the
development of INS' strategic plan. Subsequently, teams were formed
to develop goals, objectives, and alternative strategies for each key
area. In the spring of 1994, the team leaders presented their
recommendations to the INS executive staff. In November 1994, INS
formally issued Strategic Plan: Toward INS 2000, Accepting the
Challenge.
The INS Strategic Plan presented a blueprint intended to take INS
into the next century. The plan included the Commissioner's vision
for INS and a mission statement. Eight major strategic directions,
which were to guide decision- and policymaking within INS, emerged
from the planning process. The eight strategic directions were: (1)
facilitate compliance with immigration laws, (2) deter unlawful
migration, (3) reinvent INS work processes, (4) build partnerships to
manage the immigration system, (5) promote professionalism, (6)
carefully collect and communicate immigration information, (7)
concentrate resources, and (8) measure effectiveness. These
strategic directions were to be the guiding operating principles for
development of more specific issue area program goals and objectives.
INS' strategic planning effort was undertaken at about the same time
that Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993\1 (the Results Act). Also referred to as GPRA, the Results Act
provided a statutory framework for achieving more results-oriented
management and requires federal agencies to develop strategic plans
by September 30, 1997, that contain mission statements and
outcome-related strategic goals.
--------------------
\1 P.L. 103-62, August 3, 1993.
ANNUAL PRIORITY PROCESS
INITIATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
During fiscal year 1995, INS also started to implement an annual
priorities management process. Annual priorities, referred to as the
Commissioner's Priorities Program, include a statement of annual
goals in support of INS' strategic plan. According to INS, annual
priorities seek to address both the key current operational
imperatives for the fiscal year and, to the extent possible, the
strategic goals and objectives previously identified. INS defined a
priority goal as that part of the INS mission, strategic direction,
or area of activity that the Commissioner has identified for special
management attention. Priority goals are defined as change-oriented
initiatives that address areas of high visibility, a new or renewed
interest that would not otherwise have received adequate attention,
or special needs that the Commissioner deems compelling. A
particular goal may be included in the Commissioner's annual
priorities for 1 or more years. Each goal has several objectives
that contribute to accomplishment of the goal, and objectives within
a priority are intended to be accomplished in 1 year. Objectives are
to have specific tasks, time frames for accomplishing tasks, and
performance measures.
During fiscal year 1995, INS had nine priority goals. According to
the EAC for Policy and Planning, the 1995 priority goals were not
ranked in their order of importance. For fiscal year 1996, INS had
six annual priority goals, which were ranked in their order of
importance. See appendix V for more information on the annual
priority goals for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
The Commissioner communicated her commitment to the 1995 priority
goals at the annual Commissioner's conference held in November 1995.
We found that INS' mission and priorities were clear to a majority of
INS' managers. Figure 2.1 shows that 66 percent of the managers who
responded to our 1995 survey thought that INS' overall mission was
somewhat clearly or very clearly communicated. Similarly, 61 percent
of the managers who responded to our 1995 survey believed that INS'
priorities have been somewhat clearly or very clearly communicated.\2
Figure 2.1: A Majority of INS
Managers Responded That INS'
Mission and Priorities Are
Clear
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Analysis of GAO 1995 survey responses.
--------------------
\2 This particular question has a 4-point scale rather than the
5-point scale that is generally used.
INS MANAGERS ARE CHARGED
WITH IMPLEMENTING THE
COMMISSIONER'S PRIORITY
PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3
The Commissioner emphasized the importance of priority management by
assigning responsibility for its implementation to key members of the
executive staff. In fact, in the new organizational structure,
priority management planning and implementation are primary
responsibilities of the EAC for Policy and Planning. As shown in
figure 1.2, the EAC for Policy and Planning function is at the same
organizational level as executives responsible for field operations,
management, and program planning.
The EACs, General Counsel, assistant commissioners, and regional
directors are responsible for accomplishing goals and objectives.
Specifically, each of the EACs and the General Counsel, who report to
the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, are lead officials
responsible for the oversight and accomplishment of one or more of
the priority goals. Lead officials are to take "ownership" of a
priority and be responsible for directing, coordinating, and
integrating the activities of cross-cutting programs in order to
achieve the priority. Assistant commissioners or regional directors
are generally the action officers responsible for accomplishing the
objectives within a priority. For example, the EAC for Programs was
the lead official for the 1995 goal to reduce incentives for unlawful
migration. This goal had several objectives, one of which was to
analyze and reinvent employer sanctions.\3 The action officers for
this objective were the regional directors for the eastern and
western regions and the Assistant Commissioner for Investigations at
headquarters. Figure 2.2 illustrates the general structure for the
priority management process and the responsible officials, using one
of the 1995 priority goals as an example.
Figure 2.2: General Structure
of the INS Priority Management
Program
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: INS implementation plan for its 1995 annual priorities.
According to INS guidance on the annual priorities management
program, the program provides a means by which organizational and
individual accountability can be established. Furthermore, quarterly
reviews provide for periodic evaluation of progress toward achieving
the objectives. Although we did not evaluate whether INS had
achieved its priorities, we note that in our 1991 management report
we said that various planning systems INS had used since 1980 fell
into disuse after top management support for them faded. Thus, we
believe that the ultimate success of the annual priorities management
system will be dependent on the sustained commitment of top
management.
--------------------
\3 INS is responsible for enforcing the employer sanctions provision
of IRCA. IRCA requires employers to verify the employment
eligibility of workers and imposes civil and criminal penalties,
e.g., sanctions against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized
workers.
THREE STAGES OF PRIORITY
PROCESS COINCIDE WITH BUDGET
PLANNING AND MONITORING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.4
INS guidance states that there must be a correlation between priority
planning and budget formulation and between priority implementation
and budget execution. According to INS guidance, the Commissioner's
Priorities Program has three principal stages: (1) priority
identification, (2) implementation planning, and (3) assessment and
reporting. Priority identification is to take place between April
and June each year so that the Commissioner can approve and issue
priority statements for the next fiscal year by July 1.
Implementation planning is to occur between July and mid-September so
that approval of the annual priorities can coincide with the
beginning of the fiscal year. According to an INS official, since
the start of the fiscal year 1996 priorities cycle, INS has also
combined the annual priorities reporting and assessment reviews and
budget execution financial reviews so that the annual priorities are
an integral part of the budget monitoring process.
Fiscal year 1995 was the first year that the Commissioner issued
annual priorities. Because the annual priorities were identified in
the fall of 1994 and implementation plans were not formally issued
until January 1995, they were not used in budget formulation for
fiscal year 1996, which would have begun in the spring of 1994.
However, according to INS officials, priorities were used in budget
execution planning for new initiatives in fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
Also, during the fiscal year 1995 quarterly reviews, the assessment
of the annual priorities implementation was conducted concurrently
with the budget financial review. We discuss the link between the
annual priorities and the budget process further in chapter 3.
For fiscal year 1996, INS identified its annual priorities in August
1995. According to INS officials and INS budget guidance, the
emphasis for fiscal year 1996 was to allocate new budget resources to
support the Commissioner's 1996 priorities. According to an INS
official, new resources for fiscal year 1997 were used to support the
1997 priorities. INS was also examining ways that it could estimate
obligations to specific annual priorities.
Similar to many other government agencies, INS' fiscal year 1996
budget was subject to several continuing resolutions, and the agency
experienced periods of employee furloughs. For fiscal year 1996,
prescribed time frames for establishing performance measures and
assessment of the annual priorities were not followed. According to
a memorandum prepared by the EAC for Policy and Planning, management
of the 1996 annual priorities was an iterative process, and
implementation plans were revised as needed to address changes caused
by the furloughs and the delay in receiving a final budget from
Congress.
According to an INS official, INS needs to link the fiscal year
priorities, which are to be finalized in the two quarters preceding
the beginning of the new fiscal year, and INS' budget formulation,
which occurs 2 years before the actual fiscal year involved. To that
end, in December 1996, INS engaged in a process for obtaining
headquarters and field manager input to identify priorities that
should be addressed for fiscal year 1999. This activity reportedly
led to initial identification of fiscal year 1999 priorities, which
are serving as the backdrop for the development of the fiscal year
1999 spring budget plan.
SURVEY RESULTS INDICATED
MANY MANAGERS BELIEVED
ANNUAL PRIORITIES AIDED
PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.5
In our survey, we asked INS managers their opinions on the extent to
which the strategic planning process, which identified nine
priorities for fiscal year 1995, had aided INS. Thirty-eight to 54
percent of the managers responded that they had no basis to judge.
However, of those who had an opinion, a majority of managers
responded positively. Figure 2.3 shows that INS managers who had an
opinion perceived that the strategic planning process aided INS
headquarters and regional planning and decisionmaking from "some
extent" to " a very great extent." Seventy-nine percent of the
managers who expressed an opinion said that the process aided
headquarters planning, and 81 percent of the managers who expressed
an opinion responded that the process aided regional planning.
Seventy-four percent of the managers who expressed an opinion said
that the process aided headquarters decisionmaking, and 79 percent of
the managers who expressed an opinion said that the process aided
regional decisionmaking. A majority of survey respondents who
expressed an opinion also perceived that the priorities process aided
budget execution. Sixty-eight percent of the managers who expressed
an opinion said that the process aided budget execution planning, and
67 percent of the managers who expressed an opinion said that the
process aided budget execution decisions.\4
Figure 2.3: Many INS Managers
Perceived That the Fiscal Year
1995 Strategic Planning Process
That Identified Nine Priorities
Aided Headquarters, Regional,
and Budget Execution Planning
and Decisionmaking
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Analysis of GAO 1995 survey responses.
These responses showed that progress had been made toward using
annual priorities to plan and make decisions. However, 19 to 33
percent of the INS managers responded that priorities had marginally,
i.e. to little or no extent, aided planning and decisionmaking.
This indicated that some managers believed that more could be done in
this area.
--------------------
\4 For survey responses on whether the priorities had aided INS, we
have deviated from the usual presentation by combining the response
scales "to some extent" through "to a very great extent" and kept the
response scale "to little or no extent" separate. We did this to
measure whether the strategic planning process has had an impact, not
to measure the degree of the impact. Figure 2.2 shows the extent to
which priorities were perceived to be helpful. We did not include
respondents who answered "no basis to judge" in our analysis.
INS PRIORITY MANAGEMENT
PROCESS INCLUDED SOME TASKS
REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.6
The Results Act was passed in 1993 to, among other things, improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of federal programs by establishing
a system to set performance goals and measure results. The Act is to
improve the performance of governmental programs through a set of
integrated activities that include strategic planning, setting annual
performance targets, measuring progress toward reaching those
targets, and reporting on results. INS took some early steps
consistent with the goals of the Act's requirements with the
establishment of its strategic plan in 1994 and the implementation of
the Commissioner's Annual Priorities Program in fiscal year 1995.
INS officials told us that during the development of the fiscal years
1996 and 1997 implementation plans, increased attention was given to
establishing and tracking performance measures that would align with
the Results Act. INS officials said that they recognized that
additional efforts are still required to fine-tune performance
measurement, reporting, and coverage of appropriate program
activities. In April 1997, INS officials told us that both the
Office of Planning and the Office of Budget were combining efforts to
review the Act's measures. GAO's past work at INS and at other
agencies indicates that to be successful, such initiatives require
continued top management attention and commitment to continuously
improve program performance.
REORGANIZATION RESTORED
REGIONAL DIRECTORS TO MANAGE
FIELD UNITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The 1994 reorganization restored regional directors into the chain of
command to supervise district directors and Border Patrol chiefs. As
a result, according to some managers, district directors and Border
Patrol chiefs received more supervision. Prior to the 1994
organization, the EAC for Operations was responsible for directly
supervising 33 district directors and 21 Border Patrol chiefs. Some
managers told us that district directors and Border Patrol chiefs
were often able to operate independently of headquarters direction.
The current Commissioner considered this span of control too large
and supervision too far removed.
Under the current organization, the EAC for Field Operations is to
provide headquarters direction to the field by supervising the three
regional directors. Each regional director in turn is to supervise
an average of 18 district directors and Border Patrol chiefs.
According to INS managers, with the smaller span of control, regional
directors can be more responsive to field needs and provide more
oversight than the EAC for Operations could under the previous
structure. According to a headquarters Field Operations manager, an
assistant district director, and a deputy regional director, the
strength of the regional structure lies in the direct, personal
contact between regions and districts. This is reportedly better
than the former structure, because headquarters does not have the
resources to respond to all the districts and sectors and is too far
removed from the field to know the problems that the field is having.
In addition to reestablishing a regional structure with oversight
responsibility for field units, INS' reorganization delegated
resource allocation authority to regional directors to provide
consistency in field operations and improve the delivery of services.
According to regional directors, they had gradually begun to exercise
their new authorities. For example, one regional director told us of
having taken the unprecedented act of moving a couple of positions
from one district to another. Furthermore, regional offices began to
manage personal services and benefits (PS&B) funds for district
offices and Border Patrol sectors beginning in fiscal year 1996.
PS&B funds are payroll costs and represent the majority of INS'
budget. The allocation and management of PS&B funds were being
maintained at the district and sector levels during fiscal year 1995.
Two regional directors told us that the district directors were no
longer able to act independently.
Managers responding to our survey were divided in their perceptions
of the success of the reorganization. Generally, 35 to 40 percent of
managers responding to our survey believed that the reorganization
was somewhat or very unsuccessful in clarifying lines of authority,
delegating authority to persons geographically closer to locations
where work was being done, and decentralizing decisionmaking. About
20 percent of the managers responding believed that the
reorganization had been very or somewhat successful in achieving
these goals.\5 More information on the survey results and our
interpretation of them is presented later in this chapter. Probing
the reasons behind these survey responses was beyond the scope of our
study.
--------------------
\5 This survey question listed 11 goals and had 8 response
categories. For more details, see appendix IV, question 34.
REORGANIZATION NOT FULLY
IMPLEMENTED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
At the time of our review, INS had not fully defined the
responsibilities and authorities of the offices of Field Operations
and Programs, nor had it determined staffing levels for these offices
on the basis of their new responsibilities. Also, INS had not
improved communications and coordination among offices or updated
field manuals and the policy manual, as we previously recommended.
We recognize that the Commissioner did not expect the reorganization
to correct all problems immediately and that adjustments are needed
as a new organizational structure is implemented. However, we
believe that fully implementing the reorganization as soon as
possible would help INS work more efficiently and help achieve the
goals of the reorganization.
Our survey and interviews with managers indicated that headquarters
and field managers were confused and frustrated because INS'
implementation of its new organizational structure left unclear the
differences in responsibility and authority between the Office of
Field Operations and the Office of Programs. Also, INS did not
determine the staffing levels that would be needed for the Office of
Field Operations to carry out its new functions, did not determine
the staffing levels for the Office of Programs to meet its changed
responsibilities, and did not move all operational activities to the
Office of Field Operations. Some INS managers told us that they were
having difficulty determining whom to coordinate with, when to
coordinate, and how to communicate with each other because they were
unclear about headquarters offices' responsibilities and authority.
Some managers also said that they believed resources in the Office of
Field Operations were insufficient to meet field needs.
RESPONSIBILITIES AND
AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE OF
FIELD OPERATIONS AND OFFICE
OF PROGRAMS WERE UNCLEAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
In December 1994 INS published an organizational chart and general
description of the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Field
Operations and the Office of Programs in the Federal Register (see
ch. 1). However, we were told by headquarters and field managers
that INS had not clearly delineated the respective roles and
responsibilities of these two offices. As stated by an INS field
manager, "Neither [office] seems to know the limits of its
responsibilities nor the parameters of its authority." INS managers
whom we interviewed also said that because the authority of the EACs
was not clear, decisions that should have been made at the EAC level
often had to go to the Deputy Commissioner for resolution.
In our interviews with INS managers and in comments written on our
survey, some managers indicated that they felt frustrated by a lack
of clear understanding of responsibilities and authority at
headquarters. As one INS manager stated on our survey:
"With respect to the whole reorganization of 1994, there seemed
to be little thought given to its implementation and actual
practical working[s] beyond just an organizational chart.
Overnight the [re]organization was implemented with virtually no
transition, leaving . . . each office [to] themselves to
figure out what to do. Rather than plan for this organization
in some detail, it was left to personal ideas of the top
management who gained the new positions in the new structures to
determine what would happen."
INS managers whom we interviewed provided examples to demonstrate the
lack of clear delineation of responsibility between the Office of
Field Operations and the Office of Programs. One example related to
the development of the deployment plan for interior enforcement for
fiscal year 1996. The Office of Programs drafted the deployment plan
because it does the program planning for allocating resources to meet
the Commissioner's priorities. It sought input from the field units
and subsequently provided a draft to the other EACs. When the EAC
for Field Operations received the Program Office's subsequent draft,
he determined that the revised draft did not adequately consider or
incorporate field concerns. The EAC for Field Operations sent his
own draft proposal for a deployment plan to the field units with
assumptions different from those in the plan prepared by the Office
of Programs. The field units provided input to the second draft
proposed by the Office of Field Operations. Subsequently, the Deputy
Commissioner intervened and instructed the two EACs to develop a
single proposal that they could agree upon.
Another example provided to us involved the selection of employees
from the field to train as instructors for firearms courses. A
district manager said that headquarters Field Operations staff asked
the region to provide a list of employees to attend instructor
training for new firearms that were being issued. The district
manager provided a list to headquarters of employees that the
district wanted to recommend for instructor training. The
headquarters Field Operations staff selected employees from the list
to attend the training.
Subsequently, the headquarters Programs office staff asked the
district manager to provide a list of employees to be trained as
instructors for the firearms training. The district manager provided
the Office of Programs the same list of employees recommended for
instructor training, and the staff in the Programs office selected
from it. The Office of Programs and the Office of Field Operations
selected different employees from the lists provided. It was
initially unclear to the district manager who was responsible and had
the authority to select employees for instructor training. The
Office of Programs ultimately made the decision on who would take the
instructor training but, according to the district manager who
provided this example, field staff were confused and frustrated by
the situation.
Some headquarters and field managers whom we interviewed told us that
it is difficult to separate program planning activities and
operational activities. For example, some headquarters managers said
it is clear that the Office of Programs is responsible for such
things as planning where resources should be allocated and that the
Office of Field Operations is then responsible for implementing the
use of resources as planned. But, as stated by an INS official, it
is unclear where planning ends and implementation begins. This had
implications for where responsibilities and authorities should begin
and end and where coordination is needed.
An example that illustrates the difficulty in separating program
planning and implementation was the development of a new automated
system for allowing people to enter the United States at remote
locations along the northern border.\6 According to INS officials,
the headquarters program office was working with staff in the
district office in Montana to test the use of new systems for the
northern border. The headquarters Program Office manager and the
staff in Montana proceeded to develop the new systems without
including the region or the Office of Field Operations until they
needed staff for the project. The region did not know that it would
have to provide a staff position to the Montana office in order to
implement the new technology until the Program Office contacted the
Field Operations office when the resource was needed. The region was
not involved in the program planning for this initiative but was
eventually responsible for providing the district resources to
support it. This started out as a planning activity but became an
operational one.
--------------------
\6 At selected remote ports-of-entry that are not open 24 hours,
local residents on both sides of the border are to be able to apply
for a permit allowing them to cross the border during the hours when
the port is closed using new technology for identification. Montana
piloted the use of computerized voice recognition and video
conference by inspectors located at the nearest 24-hour
port-of-entry.
COMMUNICATION PROCESSES
WITHIN THE NEW STRUCTURE HAD
NOT BEEN CLEARLY DEFINED AND
COMMUNICATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
In a February 1994 memo to INS employees, the Commissioner stated
that the new organizational structure would build communication
capabilities. As one of its new responsibilities, the Office of
Programs was to develop communication capabilities. However, under
the reorganization, it had difficulty developing new communication
paths with the rest of the agency. Managers in the Investigations
Office of Programs told us they initially thought that their chain of
command for communicating with the districts was through the Office
of Field Operations. This reportedly became too burdensome over
time. Consequently, according to these headquarters program
managers, the EAC for Field Operations provided oral guidance to the
field units on when it was appropriate for the headquarters Programs
Office to contact the field directly and when the Programs Office
should go through the Office of Field Operations. However,
headquarters program managers told us that in practice, some
headquarters Field Operations staff continued to require that all
communications go through their office. Also, field units continued
to consider their appropriate channel of communication to be through
the regions and the Office of Field Operations. At the time of our
review, INS had not provided any written guidance on what needs to be
communicated and coordinated and when it should happen.
In March 1996 we met with the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to
obtain their perspectives on particular problems that managers in the
agency had described to us. During this meeting they told us that it
would be appropriate for field managers to communicate with
headquarters program managers without going through the Office of
Field Operations when program managers are seeking information or
getting the field's input. The Commissioner told us that
headquarters program managers need to talk with the field to develop
policies and assess the effectiveness of policies. According to the
Deputy Commissioner, the headquarters program managers should go
through the Office of Field Operations and regional directors when
they are tasking the field to do something that will involve
consumption of operational resources.
Nonetheless, according to headquarters program managers, some staff
in the Office of Field Operations continued to require program staff
to go through their office before contacting the field. This was
reportedly the case regardless of the purpose of the contact. Some
headquarters program managers reported that they have received mixed
messages from the Office of Field Operations on the circumstances
under which they can communicate directly to the field.
Another example of problems with the channels of communication
pertained to who had responsibility for a priority and the lack of
coordination between offices. We were told by some INS managers that
communication problems had occurred between the Office of Policy and
Planning and the Office of Programs. Headquarters program managers
in the investigations program area believed that the Office of Policy
and Planning had developed a priority objective for antismuggling but
had not consulted with the headquarters investigation managers even
though the headquarters investigations program area has an
antismuggling branch that has a role in planning for the area. The
investigations program managers responsible for antismuggling
activities said they would have liked to have been involved.
According to one official, it was unclear whether the Office of
Policy and Planning did not see a need for their involvement or if
there were not enough people in the Office of Policy and Planning to
coordinate the sharing of products. However, according to an Office
of Policy and Planning official, the EAC for Field Operations--not
Policy Planning--was the lead official for a priority that included
this objective. The official said that the Office of Field
Operations did not include the Office of Programs Investigations
Division staff in the process and, thus, was not employing the proper
approach to priority management by involving appropriate offices.
SURVEY RESPONSES REFLECTED
PROBLEMS WITH COMMUNICATION
AND COORDINATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3
INS managers responding to several questions in our September 1995
survey indicated that there were problems coordinating and
communicating, particularly between headquarters and field units.
Sixty-three percent of the managers indicated that poor
communications was a problem to a great and very great extent.\7
Ninety-two percent of the managers responded that headquarters should
consult more with the field when developing policy. Seventy-three
percent of the managers responded that headquarters was not in touch
with events, problems, and concerns of the field. Fifty-nine percent
of the managers responded that coordination and cooperation among INS
units needed improvement to a great or very great extent. Although
field managers were more likely to respond that headquarters should
consult the field more and that headquarters was not in touch with
events and concerns of the field, a majority of both headquarters and
field managers responded that there was a problem. Table 2.2
presents these survey results for all managers combined and for
headquarters managers and field managers separately.
Table 2.2
Survey Responses Indicate Communication
and Coordination Problems
Percent of
-----------------------------------------
Response All Headquarter
Question Statement category managers s managers Field managers
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ---------------
Thinking Headquarter Agree or 92 83 95
about the s should strongly
implementat consult agree
ion of INS more with
internal the field
policy, when
would you developing
agree or policy.
disagree
with the
following
statements
as they
apply
servicewide
?
Do you Headquarter Disagree or 73 64 76
agree or s is in strongly
disagree touch with disagree
with the events,
following problems,
statements and
concerning concerns in
INS as an the field.
organizatio
n?
In your Coordinatio To a great 59 70 56
opinion, to n and or very
what cooperation great
extent, if among INS extent
at all, do units.
you feel
the
following
areas need
improvement
s
servicewide
?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Analysis of GAO 1995 survey.
The following written comments from INS managers in our survey
further illustrated the perceived problems with communication and
coordination in the fall of 1995:
-- "The Commissioner's reorganization has created so many layers of
oversight that it delays all communications to the field. Even
on routine program or operational matters, all communications
must go through the EAC for Field Operations."
-- "Since the reorganization, the lines of authority and
communication between Programs and Field Operations have become
more complex. We need better understanding and cooperation
among all INS functions."
-- "The reorganization has created lots of confusion in our office.
Many areas do not know if they report to the regional office or
headquarters . . . . There is no clear definition of who
reports where."
--------------------
\7 The analysis of survey data in this paragraph does not include
respondents who answered "no basis to judge."
INS ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY
RESPONSIBILITIES AND
COMMUNICATION PROCESSES, BUT
PROBLEMS HAD NOT YET BEEN
RESOLVED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.4
INS has taken actions to try to solve some of the concerns about
roles, responsibilities, and communications. In April 1995, the EAC
for Field Operations sent an electronic mail message to the western
region requesting feedback on the reorganization and suggestions for
communication mechanisms. The Western Regional Director forwarded
the request to the districts and sectors under his jurisdiction and
then provided their comments to the Office of Field Operations.
Several district directors and Border Patrol chiefs reported many of
the same coordination and communication problems that were reported
to us from the cross-section of managers whom we interviewed. We
could not determine whether a message had been sent to the other
regional offices, but the regional managers for the eastern and
central region told us that they did not remember such a request.
In August 1995, the EACs and staff from the headquarters Field
Operations and Programs offices met and discussed their roles,
responsibilities, and communication issues. The EAC for Field
Operations summarized the results of the meeting and communicated
them to the regional and international affairs directors. The
summary defined the roles of each of the offices.
The summary said that Field Operations was looking to the Office of
Programs to develop plans, conduct analysis, and devise tools for
tracking progress in the field. In addition, according to the EAC's
summary, the group agreed that the Office of Programs would conduct
an inventory of reports that it prepares that could be shared with
the Office of Field Operations. The summary also stated that the
group agreed there would be more active sharing of information
between the two offices.
The EAC's summary listed actions to be taken by the Office of Field
Operations and the Office of Programs. These included developing
mechanisms for Field Operations to provide input to the Office of
Programs and clarifying Field Operations organizational structure for
liaison purposes. The summary also recommended that the Office of
Programs and the Office of Field Operations set up regular meetings
at the assistant commissioner level with structured agendas.
Furthermore, the summary presented other ideas that the group
discussed, such as (1) having an 800 number for the reporting of
problems and incidents, (2) including managers from the Office of
Management in a later meeting, and (3) discussing at a later meeting
where the Office of Policy and Planning fits in.
According to an INS official in the Office of Field Operations, the
summary was provided to the regional directors but was not shared
with the Office of Programs. The Office of Programs did not prepare
a summary of the meeting, according to officials in that office.
In the spring of 1996, we interviewed several headquarters
investigations and detention and deportation program managers about
problems between headquarters and field managers. We also
recontacted some field managers in the central and western regions
about problems described to us earlier in the review. According to
several headquarters program managers, some improvements had
occurred, but communication problems continued. The weekly meetings
between the managers in the individual program offices and the Office
of Field Operations provided a mechanism for sharing some information
on routine operations, but the participating officials did not have
the authority to make major decisions. Several field managers that
we recontacted told us that there was still confusion in the field
regarding responsibilities and communication. A recent example of
continuing communication problems was reported by a consultant to the
Justice Department who was reviewing INS' naturalization procedures.
The consultant reported that three different versions of guidance on
naturalization procedures had been distributed throughout INS and
that some offices were using the wrong version. One version was a
copy of the memorandum signed by the Commissioner, another was an
unsigned electronic version of the memorandum with different
attachments, and the third was an early version drafted for the
Deputy Commissioner's signature.
STAFFING LEVEL FOR THE
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS
WAS PERCEIVED TO BE
INSUFFICIENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.5
Several managers whom we interviewed stated that the Office of Field
Operations had not been sufficiently staffed to accomplish its
function and duties. According to the EAC for Field Operations, the
initial plan for the reorganization intended that the Office of Field
Operations have a relatively small staff and that the regional office
staff be an extension of the headquarters office. The expectation
was that regional offices would be more involved with the districts
and sectors and would respond to their needs. However, as the
reorganization evolved, the headquarters office found that it needed
more staff at headquarters to accomplish its functions. A June 1994
organization chart provided for 29 positions in the Office of Field
Operations. According to an INS official in the Office of Field
Operations, as of March 1996, the Office of Field Operations had 41
authorized positions, of which 32 were filled. No analysis had been
done to determine what the staffing levels should be in relation to
the responsibilities of the headquarters Office of Field Operations.
Headquarters investigations managers in the Office of Programs
provided an example of the problem of insufficient staffing level in
the Office of Field Operations. Within the Field Operations office,
three people handled field issues for investigation activities; and
in each of the three regions, three or four staff were dedicated to
investigations work. According to the headquarters program managers
in investigations, the investigations staff in the Field Operations
Office were overwhelmed because there were about 2,000 investigators
in the field units seeking assistance from the few staff in the
regional office and headquarters Field Operations. Several managers
told us in interviews and through written comments on our September
1995 survey that the headquarters field operations office was not
sufficiently staffed to handle the workload.
Some Office of Programs managers told us that they felt that they had
to respond to field inquiries and assist the Office of Field
Operations because that office was unable to handle the numerous
calls and accompanying heavy workload. According to these
headquarters program officials, field managers called them for
assistance because they were unable to reach headquarters Field
Operations staff. However, some staff in the headquarters Office of
Field Operations perceived that headquarters program officials were
unwilling to relinquish the authority they formerly had over field
operations.
STAFFING LEVEL FOR THE
OFFICE OF PROGRAMS HAD
REPORTEDLY NOT BEEN
REASSESSED AFTER
RESPONSIBILITIES CHANGED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.6
According to managers in headquarters, the regional offices, and
field units, staffing levels for the Office of Programs were not
changed as a result of the reorganization even though the
responsibilities of the office had changed.
Some managers outside of the Office of Programs perceived that there
was an imbalance between resources in the Office of Programs and the
Office of Field Operations, and some survey respondents commented
that the personnel resources of the Office of Programs remained the
same despite the change in its role and responsibilities. For
example, at headquarters, the Office of Programs had 531 authorized
positions compared to the 41 authorized positions in the Office of
Field Operations in March 1996. Further, the investigations program
in the Office of Programs had 46 staff and, as mentioned previously,
the Office of Field Operations' investigations staff consisted of 3
people, according to INS officials. It would seem logical that with
changed responsibilities, INS would need to reassess its staffing of
this office.
LEAVING OPERATIONAL
ACTIVITIES IN THE OFFICE OF
PROGRAMS CAUSED SOME
CONFUSION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.7
One of the objectives of the reorganization was to separate program
planning and operational activities so that headquarters program
managers could focus on program planning and not be involved in the
day-to-day operations. However, INS management decided that some
operational activities should remain in the Office of Programs.
According to the headquarters program managers whom we interviewed in
the Investigations and Detention and Deportation Offices, some
operational activities were left in the headquarters Office of
Programs because the workload needed to be done at headquarters and
was too large for the Office of Field Operations to take over. These
program managers also told us that another reason operational
activities were left in the headquarters Programs office was that the
staff had particular expertise in a particular program area that was
relevant to both planning and operations. According to the
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, INS needed the mix in expertise
of staff left in the Programs Office to do the program planning
functions. However, headquarters program managers told us that
because they continued to do operational activities, they did not
feel that they were able to devote enough time to planning
activities.
We did not identify all the operational activities that continued to
be the responsibility of the Office of Programs, but through
interviews we were able to identify a sample of the kinds of
operational activities that remained there. Management of the Mariel
Cubans\8
and juveniles in detention facilities are two activities that were
left in the Office of Programs. According to INS officials, the
caseload for processing Mariel Cubans was too large for the newly
created Office of Field Operations to handle. In the case of
juveniles, headquarters program managers told us that they had the
expertise to contract for juvenile bed space. Until the
reorganization, the Office of Programs' detention and deportation
staff handled both the planning and operational aspects of detaining
juveniles. Since they had the experience, INS management decided to
have the staff in Programs continue handling both planning and
operations for juveniles. Other operational activities that remained
in the Office of Programs included processing of applications for
immigrant benefits through INS' four service centers, oversight of
the witness security program, and review and approval of requests for
authority to conduct undercover operations.
We found no evidence that field units were unable to accomplish their
missions because some operational functions remained in the Office of
Programs. However, several headquarters and regional managers told
us that having operational functions remain in the Office of Programs
contributed to the confusion regarding when and how to coordinate
with the Office of Field Operations.
--------------------
\8 Mariel Cubans are Cuban nationals who were allowed to enter the
United States as refugees in 1980.
FIELD AND POLICY MANUALS STILL
HAVE NOT BEEN UPDATED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
Through the reorganization, INS sought to create a structure that
would enable it to reengineer major processes, such as those that
develop and disseminate organizational policy and guidelines. We
reported in 1991 that policy information was outdated, and we found
in this review that policy information still has not been updated.
INS was in the process of updating manuals in some program areas but
not in others. Sections of the manuals are to be issued as they are
completed, but no revised manuals or sections of manuals had been
issued as of February 1997.\9
--------------------
\9 In commenting on a draft of this report, INS officials said that
agreement had been reached with INS unions that 51 of the 295
chapters of the administrative manual needed only minor modifications
and did not affect work practices. INS staff were notified in April
1997 that those chapters were issued in computerized form.
INS WAS BEGINNING TO UPDATE
FIELD MANUALS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1
Six program areas\10 are to have field manuals containing policies
and procedures on how to implement the immigration laws. These field
manuals are basic reference tools for managers. For example, INS
managers rely on the inspector's field manual to explain the
procedures for inspecting cruise ships and cargo vessels and the
necessary forms for each of these inspections. If a stowaway is
found, the field manual also explains the procedures INS employees
are expected to follow.
According to an INS official, until 1995, no work had been done on
the manuals for about 5 years. To help alleviate this problem, in
November 1995, INS assigned a project officer specifically
responsible for updating manuals.\11 The project officer told us that
in the past and at the time of our review, completion of field
manuals had been delayed because staff assigned to develop them had
been sidetracked to develop regulations to implement legislation. In
a briefing report used in March 1996, INS stated that the lack of
updated field manuals had created a burden for employees because they
had to search out too many sources of information on immigration laws
or regulations. This had reportedly made it difficult for employees
to follow INS procedures because they received conflicting
information on procedures. The briefing report said that the lack of
current manuals also led to field officers creating policy locally,
and this compounded the confusion and the difficulties in
coordination.
INS was in the process of updating the Inspections Field Manual and
expected that parts of the revised manual would be issued in May
1997. INS began updating the Adjudications and Nationality Field
Manual in March 1996. The project officer said that in the spring of
1996 he had also held preliminary meetings with the detention and
deportation and investigations program area officials to discuss
updating their manuals. However, according to the project officer,
as of February 1997, nothing more had been accomplished on these
manuals because he had to respond to a higher priority to develop
legislatively mandated regulations. The intelligence program area is
to have a chapter in each of the other five program area field
manuals in addition to having its own general manual on procedures to
follow for reporting intelligence information. The Intelligence
Program Office is to develop the general Intelligence Field Manual.
--------------------
\10 The six program areas are inspections, adjudications and
nationality, detention and deportation, investigations, Border
Patrol, and intelligence.
\11 This excludes the Border Patrol manual, which is being updated by
the Border Patrol Program Office.
INS HAD DRAFTED A REVISED
ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL BUT
WAS NOT SURE WHEN IT WOULD
BE ISSUED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2
INS staff rely on the administrative manual to provide information on
internal technical policies that are not related to immigration law.
The administrative manual includes information on procedures, such as
cash collection, disciplinary actions, firearms, uniforms, personnel
issues, and financial management. INS took about 2 years to revise
the manual, and several additional years have passed as changes were
being negotiated with the employee unions.
According to an INS official, as part of the partnership agreement
that INS has with its employee unions, the unions can review changes
to the administrative manual and field manuals. When INS completed a
draft of the administrative manual in 1993, the two unions were given
the draft to review. According to INS' labor relations manager and a
union president, the changes made to the administrative manual were
voluminous, and the unions were unable to review it expeditiously.
As a result, negotiations with the unions on the changes have gone on
for more than 3 years. In the spring of 1996, INS management and the
unions agreed on a list of sections in the draft manual that needed
to be reviewed with the unions and have prioritized the list to
expedite the process. The section on use and storage of firearms is
the first item on the priority list.
Due to the negotiations between INS and the unions, INS had not yet
established a timeline for completing the revised administrative
manual as of February 1997. According to the INS official directing
the field manuals project, sections of the administrative manual may
be issued when they are finalized with the unions. To avoid similar
delays with the field manuals, INS management was seeking agreement
with the unions on small sections of each manual as they are approved
by INS management. This was done with the draft section of the
Inspections Manual and worked well, according to the project officer.
The following written comments by respondents to our survey
illustrate INS' problems communicating policies and procedures in the
fall of 1995:
-- "The Administrative Manual is extremely out-of-date. There have
been numerous times that I have researched an issue and arrived
at a conclusion, only to be told by [the] Region that, `That's
so old; we don't follow that anymore.' If it's still `on the
books' then I should be able to use it as a tool for completing
my work. Of course, the alleged current policy or procedure is
rarely validated by a written issuance."
-- "With regard to . . . policy implementation, field personnel
all do their own thing. There is not one place an officer can
go for direction. The . . . operating instructions are out
of date and policy wires often don't make it to the field."
-- "The reorganization was recent, and it is understandable that
policies and procedures may still be in the process of being
developed, but headquarters should at least communicate that
guidance is in process and provide interim guidance. As an
example, legislation effective October 1, 1995 calls for
charging fees for some services at the land border. No policy
guidance for collecting the fees has been issued. Over $50,000
was collected in San Diego the first week. Apparently, there
was a disconnect between the Office of Programs and the Office
of Field Operations about who is responsible for implementing
the program. It should be a coordinated effort. Even if
headquarters is still in the process of developing the policies
and procedures, interim guidelines, such as `follow the
district's cash collection procedures' would have been fine.
Headquarters does not see the urgency. They do not see the
people lining up with applications."
-- "I was recently told by a regional staff employee that it was
not the policy to put things out in writing. How are employees
suppose[d] to know what to do if they are not told. I believe
the word is `chaos.' (confusion) [Headquarters] needs to know
[and] understand the needs of district [and] sectors.
[Headquarters] needs to establish written policies in a
multitude of areas using input from field office personnel.
[Headquarters] must communicate with regional personnel as well
as field offices when establishing procedures."
-- "Dissemination of policies in my unit is sometimes through
hearing instead of in writing . . . execution of policies
differ greatly . . ."
SURVEY RESULTS ON GAINS MADE AS
A RESULT OF REORGANIZATION WERE
MIXED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
INS identified goals for the reorganization to help it manage better.
We asked a question on our survey about the success of the
reorganization in accomplishing INS' goals, and respondents to the
survey had mixed opinions. Concerning the reorganization's success
in clarifying lines of authority, for example, 20 percent of the
managers responded that the reorganization was very successful or
somewhat successful, 21 percent responded that the reorganization was
as successful as unsuccessful, and 41 percent responded that the
reorganization had been somewhat or very unsuccessful. Another 15
percent of the managers responded that they had no basis to judge.
Table 2.3 presents the question that we asked managers and responses
by INS' managers on the success of the reorganization in achieving
some of the goals. A complete list of the goals and managers'
responses can be found in appendix IV.
Table 2.3
Managers' Responses to the Question:
Generally, How Successful or
Unsuccessful Do You Think the
Reorganization Has Been in Achieving the
Following Goals?
Managers responding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As successful Goal achieved
Very or somewhat as Somewhat or very prior to Too early No basis
Goals successful unsuccessful unsuccessful reorganization to say to judge
---------------------------------------------------------- --------------------- --------------- ----------------- ----------------- ---------- ----------
Clarifying lines of authority 20% 21% 41% 2% 3% 15%
Delegating authority to persons geographically closer to 22 18 36 1 4 20
locations where work is being done
Decentralizing decisionmaking authority 22 18 35 1 5 20
Improving processes to develop and disseminate 17 21 44 1 4 13
organizational policy and guidelines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: Analysis of GAO 1995 survey.
There were several possible reasons cited by various INS managers as
to why the percentage of managers who thought the reorganization had
been unsuccessful in achieving certain goals was roughly twice as
great as the percentage who thought the reorganization had been
successful. First, they said overlaps in the roles and
responsibilities of the Offices of Programs and Field Operations may
have led managers to believe that lines of authority were unclear.
Second, we were told that regional directors did not assume all of
their new authority immediately, and the agency was going through a
transition phase the first year. Thus, some managers could have
perceived that the reorganization had not accomplished its goal for
delegating authority closer to where the work is performed or
decentralizing authority. A third reason given was that not enough
time had passed for significant changes to occur. For example, some
of the goals of the reorganization, such as developing planning
capability, improving the delivery of services, and establishing
quantitative performance measures, could take several years to
accomplish. Furthermore, INS had not begun to implement some of the
strategies to achieve its goals. For example, in March 1996, the
Commissioner told us that the agency has not formalized processes to
disseminate information and procedures.
In April 1996, INS' Office of Policy and Planning began a review of
the 1994 reorganization. According to an INS official, the review
was an ongoing effort, and, as the need for organizational changes or
refinements are identified, changes can be included in future INS
plans and budgets.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
INS has taken some steps to address long-standing management
problems. INS developed a strategic plan and initiated an annual
priorities management process--initial steps in the Results Act
process. We believe that such efforts are important components of
effective planning and decisionmaking. The priorities process had
top management support, had been linked with planning and decisions
for resource allocations, and had been clearly communicated
throughout the organization. The long-term impact is yet to be
determined and will require that top management persist in its
commitment to using priority management for planning and
decisionmaking.
INS achieved some of its management goals for the reorganization,
but, as can be expected in the first years of implementing a new
structure, not all management goals were achieved. INS reestablished
a regional structure with oversight responsibility of district
directors and Border Patrol chiefs; and regional directors have been
delegated authority to manage the field resources, which places
responsibility closer to where the work is performed. It is too soon
to determine whether the organizational changes will improve customer
services and enforcement activities.
According to many managers we interviewed, the lack of delineation of
responsibilities and authority between the Office of Programs and the
Office of Field Operations had caused confusion for headquarters and
field managers. For example, separate requests to a field manager
from each of the offices to identify trainers resulted in a
duplication of effort and in different employees being selected as
potential trainers from the same list. Furthermore, headquarters and
field managers perceived that too many decisions that should be
resolved at the EAC levels had to go to the Deputy Commissioner for
resolution because lines of responsibility and authority were not
clear. The agency had not clearly defined the responsibilities and
authority of the Office of Field Operations and the Office of
Programs in relation to each other and to other INS units and had not
clearly defined how and when these offices should coordinate with
each other.
INS' new structure and the Commissioner's Priority Program had
created new ways of communicating. Managers reported to us that they
were confused and frustrated about when and how to communicate with
each other. INS' new structure and the Commissioner's Priority
Program required that communication and coordination cut across the
agency. The EAC for Field Operations had reportedly provided oral
guidance on communications between the Office of Programs and the
field units and had taken some actions to address communication
problems. However, these efforts did not appear to have provided a
clear understanding of what communication is needed and when it
should occur. INS had not provided any written guidance on what
needs to be communicated and coordinated and when it should happen
for this new way of working.
The agency reorganized in 1994 and created a new Office of Field
Operations, created new Regional Director offices, and changed the
role of the previous EAC for Operations to EAC for Programs.
However, the agency did not determine what resources would be needed
for these offices to carry out their new responsibilities. One of
INS' goals for the reorganization was to enhance program planning
capabilities by relieving headquarters program managers of
responsibility for day-to-day operations. Yet, some operational
activities remained with the Office of Programs. According to
headquarters program managers, they did not have any more time for
program planning as a result of the reorganization. Although INS
provided reasons for some activities remaining in the Office of
Programs, this may be counterproductive to accomplishing an intended
goal of the reorganization to create a clearer sense of mission by
separating policy planning, program planning, and field operations.
INS' field and administrative manuals had not been updated since we
reported the lack of policies and procedures as a problem in 1991.
One of the goals of the reorganization was to improve the processes
for dissemination of organizational policy and guidelines. The lack
of current manuals made it difficult for employees to carry out their
mission-related activities and led to field officers creating policy
locally. The agency was in the process of revising some of the field
manuals and finalizing approval of the revised administrative manual.
In the past and at the time of our review, completion of field
manuals had been delayed because staff assigned to develop them had
been sidetracked to develop regulations to implement legislation.
The administrative manual had not been issued because of negotiations
between INS and its two unions. INS had not established milestones
for issuing manuals or parts of manuals. Having milestones could
help INS management to recognize when slippage occurs and focus the
need to remain vigilant with respect to issuing current guidance.
Overall, we found that the reorganization had addressed some of the
management problems identified in past reports, but the
reorganization had not been fully implemented. INS was beginning to
evaluate the 1994 reorganization as we concluded our review.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7
We recommend that the INS Commissioner take the following actions to
help achieve the reorganization goals:
-- provide written guidance to all INS managers on the
responsibilities and authority of the EACs for Field Operations
and Programs in relation to each other;
-- provide written guidance on the appropriate coordination and
communication methods and channels between offices to include
(1) when and how Field Operations and Programs should coordinate
and communicate with each other, (2) when and how the Office of
Programs should coordinate and communicate with the regional
offices and the districts and sectors, and (3) when and how the
Office of Policy and Planning should coordinate and communicate
with the other offices;
-- determine whether staffing levels need to be adjusted for
Programs, Field Operations, and regional offices to accomplish
their prescribed roles and responsibilities consistent with the
respective mission and workloads for each office;
-- establish milestones for issuance of manuals or parts of manuals
that can stand alone; and
-- incorporate into INS' current evaluation of the reorganization
the issues raised in this report so that they can be addressed
as INS attempts to fully achieve the goals of the
reorganization.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8
INS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
printed in full in appendix VI. INS said that it agreed with our
assessment that some objectives of the reorganization had not been
achieved and stated that it has proposed changes to improve lines of
responsibility that address many of the concerns raised in the
report.
INS provided technical comments separately, which we incorporated
where appropriate. INS also provided updated information on the
administrative manual. According to INS officials, INS and the
unions reviewed 85 of the 295 chapters of the administrative manual
to identify ones that needed only minor modifications and did not
constitute changes in working conditions. Following this review, 51
chapters were issued in a computerized format in December 1996, and
the EAC for Management sent a memo to field offices in April 1997 to
inform staff that these new chapters were available for their use.
We added this information to our report. INS was to meet with union
representatives again in June to review another group of 70 to 80
chapters to identify ones that require minor modifications and do not
constitute changes in working conditions so that more chapters can be
issued. Chapters that need further negotiation are to be handled at
a later date.
IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO MANAGEMENT OF
BUDGET RESOURCES, BUT PROBLEMS
PERSIST
============================================================ Chapter 3
In 1991, we reported that INS' budget allocations had not been based
on agencywide priorities, INS had not adequately used workload
information as a factor in making budget allocations, and budget
management and resource allocation problems perpetuated backlogs for
processing aliens' applications for naturalization and adjustment of
status. We also reported that INS' primary accounting system was
outmoded and had weak internal controls, and the use of unreliable
financial information had resulted in INS inadequately monitoring its
budgetary resources.
During our review of INS' fiscal year 1995 budget execution process,
we found that INS (1) had improved its management of budget resources
by using annual priorities to help make budget allocation decisions
and using workload information for planning to some extent in four of
its six program areas,\1 and (2) was seeking to improve its
capability to use workload information in each of its program areas.
However, problems persisted because INS continued to (1) experience
resource allocation problems that caused field offices to have
backlogs in processing alien applications and (2) lack accurate,
complete, and consistent data to efficiently monitor budgetary
resources.
INS has been taking steps intended to improve workload analysis,
improve the data it uses to monitor the budget, and implement a new
financial management system. Although these steps, if fully
implemented, should move INS in a positive direction toward
resolution of the problems we identified, continued top management
attention to monitoring progress and reducing the risks associated
with these initiatives will be necessary.
--------------------
\1 Adjudications and nationality, Border Patrol, detention and
deportation, inspections, intelligence, and investigations are the
six major INS program areas.
INS MADE IMPROVEMENTS IN
PLANNING RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
For several years, INS acknowledged the need to make better use of
the agency's financial resources. Accordingly, INS took several
steps intended to improve its allocation of budgetary resources. INS
sought to find ways to better match resources to workload demands and
performance at each field location and to more strongly link program
activities to strategic planning. As discussed in chapter 2, INS
initiated a strategic planning process that tied annual priorities
and performance measures to resource allocation. In addition, steps
were taken to improve the use of workload data in deciding how to
allocate resources in the six major INS program areas. Also, for the
first time, INS developed a table of organization\2 to assist the
various field and program units in planning and managing personnel
resources. In addition, deployment plans were being used in fiscal
year 1996 to allocate new resources. Finally, INS developed a
long-range growth management plan to assist the agency in
accomplishing its resource allocation goals of directing the
additional resources provided by Congress to priorities and workload
demands.
--------------------
\2 A table of organization is a document prepared by INS' Office of
Budget in conjunction with the various field and program units. It
provides detailed information to unit managers on authorized funded
staffing levels.
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS LINKED
TO PRIORITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
As discussed in chapter 2, in 1995 INS began implementing a
priorities management process to establish annual priorities in
support of, among other things, its strategic plan. The purpose of
these priorities was to provide a means of monitoring crosscutting
program initiatives important to the agency's mission. They provided
a mechanism to tie agency resources to annual priority activities.
Under this approach, senior INS executives were required to make
recommendations to the Commissioner on priorities for budget
formulation, allocations for budget execution, and other resource
issues that have an agencywide effect. The goal was to ensure that
allocation of budgetary resources supports the Commissioner's annual
priorities.
INS receives funding through the appropriations process from several
sources. These sources include: (1) general revenues, (2) the
Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund\3
(VCRTF), and (3) various fees paid by users of immigration services.
INS linked its allocation of additional resources from these funds to
program initiatives and annual priorities. At the beginning of
fiscal year 1995, INS instituted a priorities implementation review
process that established connections among the strategic plan,
priorities, budget initiatives, and program requirements. Extending
this effort, INS then linked the priorities implementation review
sessions to its quarterly financial review process. The quarterly
financial reviews helped identify needs for additional funding and
the availability of resources that had not been obligated and that
could be reallocated to other priorities or agency needs. The
intended outcome of the linkage was to ensure that resource
allocation decisions were consistent with the agency's annual
priorities.
--------------------
\3 A separate account in the Treasury, the Violent Crime Reduction
Trust Fund was created by the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322, 42 U.S.C. 14211). Amounts
in the Fund are to be used for the purposes authorized in that act.
STEPS TAKEN TO BETTER
INCORPORATE THE USE OF
WORKLOAD INFORMATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
INS has taken steps to better use and incorporate workload
models--referred to in INS as workload analysis models (WAMs)--into
its budget allocation decisions. The purpose of WAMs is to help
determine the distribution of current personnel resources and to base
projected future staffing needs on operational priorities and
cross-cutting programmatic needs. WAMs were designed as a management
tool to assist INS officials in basing program resource allocation
decisions on workload distribution while maintaining flexibility to
respond to changing events, circumstances, and emerging priorities.
Under the reorganized management structure created in 1994, the role
of INS' program offices was to shift away from managing field
resources. The new focus of these offices was to be on program
development and integration that anticipate growing workloads and
demands on the agency. Program offices were to be primarily
responsible for developing, maintaining, and utilizing WAMs that
provide INS managers with information to enable them to respond to
changes in workload demands. Much of the information included in the
workload models relies on workload data from the various INS field
and service units.
We interviewed cognizant officials and found that the type and use of
workload information varied among the six major INS program areas.
As table 3.1 shows, during fiscal years 1995 and 1996, four of the
six program areas used workload data to some extent for planning and
allocation purposes. Inspections used a WAM; adjudications used WAMs
for service centers, but not for district offices; investigations had
a WAM in place, but it was not used; intelligence had no model but
utilized workload information; and neither Border Patrol nor
detention and deportation had WAMs or used workload data to project
how to allocate budgetary resources.
Table 3.1 INS' Use of WAMs and Workload
Data in Planning Fiscal Year 1995 and
1996 Resource Allocations
Workload data
WAM in place? used?
-------------- --------------
INS
Program Yes No Yes No Brief description of situation
-------- ------ ------ ------ ------ --------------------------------------
Adjudica WAM was used to recommend allocation
tions of resources among adjudication
and service centers.
National No evidence that WAM was used for
ity planning and projecting allocation of
-- resources in district offices.
Service
Centers
--
District
Offices
Border According to an INS official,
Patrol allocation of resources in this
program area in fiscal year 1995 was
decided primarily by program
initiatives and agency and
congressional priorities, which
continued into fiscal year 1996.
Detentio INS had entered into a contract to
n and develop a WAM for this program area.
Deportat No evidence of the use of workload
ion data in planning and projecting
resource allocations.
Inspecti Detailed WAM and automated workload
ons data collection system were in place
and were used in planning and
projecting resource allocations.
Intellig No WAM existed. An INS official said
ence that INS utilized workload information
in making resource allocation
decisions in fiscal years 1995 and
1996.
Investig Detailed WAM was in place. However, it
ations had not been used in planning and
projecting resource allocations since
1992. Workload information was
considered in making some of the
resource allocation decisions in
fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: INS documents and interviews with cognizant officials.
Inspections, investigations, and the adjudications service centers
had mathematical workload analysis models. Inspections' model seemed
to be the most sophisticated because it took baseline information
from ports of entry and did computer simulations to estimate
personnel resource needs under different scenarios and changing
priorities. The investigations workload model used data to estimate
a weighted workload based on the relative size of work among
districts and the priority of the work area, e.g., removal of
criminal aliens and proactive investigations of major alien smuggling
organizations to project future workload allocations. The
adjudications service centers' workload information was based on
incoming receipts and the productivity per employee, among other
things, to project resources needed to meet workload demands.
Despite not having WAMs, the adjudications district offices and
intelligence used workload information to decide how to allocate
resources in fiscal years 1995 and 1996. Border Patrol resource
allocations were based on priorities and program initiatives that
among other things, sought to increase the number of agents on the
border to deter illegal entry into the United States. The detention
and deportation program area has a contract with a firm to develop
mathematical workload analysis models that are intended to identify
the most effective distribution of current personnel resources and to
project future staffing needs.
We did not attempt to evaluate how effectively the units were using
WAMs or workload data to help them allocate resources. We also did
not attempt to verify the quality of the workload data being utilized
by the INS programs. However, INS' efforts to improve workload
information and the use of models to make resource decisions are
steps in the right direction.
OTHER STEPS TAKEN IN FISCAL
YEAR 1996 TO IMPROVE
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
INS has taken further steps intended to improve the linkage between
workload and the way it allocates and tracks the deployment of its
resources. In fiscal year 1996, INS began providing tables of
organization to its various resource managers, developed deployment
plans to manage the allocation of additional resources that were
being provided by Congress, and developed a long-range plan for
growth management.
TABLES OF ORGANIZATION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.3.1
Tables of organization are a management tool intended to assist
managers with resource allocation planning. The information in the
tables of organization allows INS managers to compare the existing
staff distribution to funded personnel levels. According to INS
headquarters officials, INS tries to ensure that the tables of
organization are updated quarterly to reflect changes in authorized
funded staffing levels. Prior to the use of the tables of
organization, INS resource managers did not have information readily
available on authorized funding levels to use in making hiring plans
and resource allocation decisions.
To alleviate this problem, INS began drafting tables of organization
with its resource managers starting with the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 1995. The first table of organization drafted was for the
Border Patrol Program. In April 1996, INS provided a draft
consolidated table of organization to all headquarters and field
locations for review. The final version was distributed in July
1996. The tables of organization are intended to help INS manage
staffing for the various INS units, including regional offices,
Border Patrol sectors, adjudications service centers, and district
offices.
DEPLOYMENT PLANS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.3.2
In fiscal year 1996, INS formalized the use of deployment plans with
the intent of ensuring that additional resources received during the
year were allocated in a way that was consistent with priorities,
program initiatives, and identified workload needs. Deployment plans
are management tools intended to specify when and where to distribute
new positions. These deployment plans had generally been developed
through an iterative process that included statistical analysis and
field input. For example, an INS official responsible for managing
the development of the deployment plan for the interior border
enforcement initiative said that WAMs and the table of organization
have served as a base of information for developing deployment plans.
INS' Interior Enforcement Deployment Plan outlines specific steps to
be taken in fiscal year 1996 for the deployment of new resources to
key geographic locations in support of established priorities,
program initiatives, and workloads for fiscal year 1996.
GROWTH MANAGEMENT PLAN
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.3.3
INS also took steps in fiscal year 1996 to implement a growth
management plan that included long-range deployment planning and a
management process that tied into budget formulation and priorities
planning, incorporated congressional requirements, and projected
general plans for growth, by location. As part of this effort, INS
had developed a long-range plan that was intended to assist the
agency in managing planned growth in the size of its officer
workforce and support staff through fiscal year 1998. The growth
management plan called for INS to implement its deployment plans by
building sound multiyear staffing models and to redesign its
deployment plans to incorporate projected growth. The growth
management plan outlined goals for recruiting, hiring, and training
officers and support staff and for ensuring field readiness to absorb
planned growth. INS intended to monitor these plans to ensure that
any required adjustments could be made in a timely manner.
INDEPENDENT STUDY
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.3.4
In April 1996, INS hired a consultant to do an independent analysis
of how INS deploys its personnel resources, including an assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of WAMs and deployment planning
processes. The results of the May 1996 independent study indicated
that INS' processes tended to be reactive rather than prospective and
were driven more by resources that were available than by a
determination of actual requirements. The consultant concluded in
part that (1) workload was not adequately captured and reflected in
the processes that were intended to recommend staff allocations and
(2) WAMs currently in use needed to be updated to better serve as
forecasting tools. Among other things, the consultant recommended
that INS develop a minimum 5-year, rolling strategic planning
process; develop an INS-wide requirements-based model to assist
planners at all levels that builds on the strengths of existing
stand-alone tools, such as WAMs; and conduct further analyses to
formulate a more integrated INS deployment planning process.
In response to these recommendations, INS hired another consultant to
identify deployment planning process improvements that were needed;
assess INS' deployment planning requirements; develop a stand-alone,
automated deployment planning tool for INS, which included design,
installation, implementation, and testing of a prototype software
program; and train selected INS personnel on the implementation of
the software program. The prototype software program is to initially
help plan for deploying personnel resources by service locations and
is to be capable of expanding to include planning for training,
equipment, and facilities. The prototype is also to be compatible
with existing automated staffing models. The contractor was to
accomplish its tasks by June 1997. INS intends to contract for
enhancements to the model for other resource needs, such as equipment
and facilities.
PROCESS FOR NOTIFYING CONGRESS
OF NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS
FROM FEE ACCOUNT CONTRIBUTED TO
APPLICATION BACKLOGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Approximately one-third of INS' funds in fiscal year 1995 were
derived from fees, with the Immigration Examinations Fee Account
being the largest. The demand for examinations fee services, and
therefore funding levels, fluctuates more than for other INS fee
activities. Consequently, examination fee levels are more likely to
require adjustments after the current year budget has been enacted.
If INS anticipates a need for a change in funding authority as a
result of higher or lower-than-expected fee collections, then INS is
to prepare a reprogramming proposal for transmittal by the Department
of Justice to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and,
subsequently, to the appropriation subcommittees with jurisdiction
over the Department of Justice.
INS started fiscal year 1995 with a higher-than-expected
adjudications workload. An amendment adding subsection 245(i) to the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and California's Proposition
187, passed in November 1994, led to a dramatic surge in the demand
for adjudication benefits in 1995. INS also experienced a tremendous
growth in its examinations fee account receipts because of (1) a new
adjustment-of-status application process under the 245(i) amendment
and increased fees from that provision, and (2) increases in the
number of naturalization applications received. When INS determined
that the increase in the number of applications was likely to persist
and that it needed to respond to the additional demand for services,
it took steps to notify Congress of the need to use additional funds
from the Immigration Examinations Fee Account.\4 A proposal for
additional spending authority was submitted to Congress in the third
quarter of the fiscal year. According to INS officials, INS wanted
to determine the extent to which the number of applications would
rise after the passage of the 245(i) amendment and whether the growth
would continue. Therefore, it monitored data on application rates
for the first 3 months of fiscal year 1995. After INS determined
that there was a need for additional funding, the internal and
external processes for planning, preparing, and reviewing the
proposal for reprogramming of funds consumed another 4 months before
the proposal could go to Congress. As a result, backlogs and average
wait times for processing applications continued to grow in the field
units.
--------------------
\4 INS' Examinations Fee Account derives revenue from fees collected
for processing 59 types of applications, petitions, hearings, and
appeals forms for immigration benefits, such as naturalization and
permanent resident status. INS collects fees and processes
applications at 4 regional service centers and 33 district offices.
INS REPROGRAMMING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
During most of fiscal year 1994, INS experienced a lower-than-normal
level of receipts. Consequently, INS proposed several reprogrammings
to decrease spending for activities funded by the Examinations Fee
Account. However, INS experienced a surge in applications in the
final 2 months of fiscal year 1994 and had a large pending workload
going into fiscal year 1995. This workload was compounded by a
further increase in the applications filed during the first quarter
of fiscal year 1995. As a result, INS determined that it needed
additional funding to hire people to process the applications.
According to an INS budget official, other fee accounts are more
predictable, which enables INS to project revenues more reliably.
Because the Examinations Fee Account has "peaks and valleys,"
reprogrammings are used to address the uncertainty of the workload in
this program area. But, according to INS officials, the
reprogramming process does not respond quickly enough to the need for
additional funds.
As part of the 1995 congressional action, INS' spending level
authority for the Examinations Fee Account was $291.1 million. In
establishing this funding level, the Conference Report acknowledged
that it might not cover INS' full cost of inflation increases. The
report directed that if INS realized examination fee receipts in
fiscal year 1995 that were higher than the current estimate, INS
should use those funds for base inflation costs, as necessary, and to
the extent possible, to provide additional resources for the
processing of naturalization applications. The conferees stated that
they expected to be notified of changes in spending plans as
delineated by the reprogramming requirements of the appropriation
bill.\5 Under these requirements, which are found in section 605 of
the Appropriation Act, notification to the Appropriation Committees
of both Houses of Congress must be provided 15 days in advance of
reprogramming of funds.
In accordance with section 605 of the 1995 Appropriation Act and
section 8 of the Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization
Act, 1980, P. L. 96-132, the Department of Justice notified the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the Judiciary of
proposed reprogramming actions for INS' Examinations Fee Account, the
Legalization account, and the VCRTF in April 1995. The reprogramming
provided additional spending authority of $76.6 million.
--------------------
\5 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies 1995 Appropriations and 1994 Supplemental
Appropriations, P.L. 103-317; H.R. Rep. No. 103-708, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess at 35 (1994).
PROCESS FOR PROPOSING
REPROGRAMMING ACTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
The Department of Justice requires INS and its other department
components to prepare and submit a report containing a justification
for the reprogramming proposal. Justice also requires INS and its
other components to obtain congressional response to the
reprogramming action before expending any of the additional funds
being sought. Several internal and external layers of review and
approval were required before a reprogramming proposal could be
forwarded to Congress. These layers contributed to the time it took
to process a reprogramming proposal.
INS officials said that before proceeding with a reprogramming
proposal in fiscal year 1995, INS managers decided that they needed
data on the aftermath of the 245(i) and proposition 187 legislation.
INS officials said that the agency decided to wait until 3 months of
trend data on applications were available before reacting to any
increases in workload demands. INS officials said that they took
this approach because they wanted to be certain that the increases in
workload trends were not a temporary surge in response to the passage
of the new legislation.
Examinations fees collected in the first 2 months of fiscal year 1995
increased substantially and exceeded expectations. INS officials
said they assumed this increase was a temporary reaction in response
to the new legislation and not a trend that would continue. However,
after the results from the third month in the first quarter showed a
continuing increase in fees, INS officials determined it was not a
short-term rush but a growing demand that would require additional
resources. Once a decision was made to proceed in January 1995,
officials said that internal discussions were held to decide whether
additional resources should be for permanent or temporary personnel,
given that the 245(i) amendment would expire in October 1997. This
discussion and development of the resource needs, along with other
internal reviews of reprogramming documents by INS budget officials,
EACs and their staffs, the Office of the General Counsel, the Deputy
Commissioner, and the Commissioner, took about 2 months.
External layers of review and approval also contributed to the amount
of time it took to obtain congressional response to the reprogramming
proposal. Justice and OMB reviewed the proposal before it was
submitted to Congress. Because INS waited 3 months before starting
to draft the reprogramming proposal and then the internal development
and external reviews took another 4 months, a reprogramming proposal
was not submitted to Congress until April 1995. Figure 3.1 shows the
timeline of key activities for INS' reprogramming of funds in fiscal
year 1995 to respond to increasing adjudication workload demands.
Figure 3.1 Timeline of Key
Activities for INS' Fiscal Year
1995 Reprogramming
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Justice, INS, and OMB officials.
AVERAGE WAIT TIMES FOR
ADJUDICATION APPLICATIONS
GREW DURING FISCAL YEAR 1995
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
The time spent in the preparation and review of the fiscal year 1995
reprogramming proposal contributed to an increase in average
projected waiting times for processing certain adjudication
applications. For fiscal year 1995, INS' self-designated acceptable
time for processing all I-485 adjustment-of-status and N-400
naturalization applications was 4 months.\6 Our analysis of applicant
waiting times revealed that the average projected agencywide waiting
time for processing adjustment-of-status applications during fiscal
year 1995 grew from about 5 months as of September 30, 1994, to about
10 months as of September 30, 1995. The average projected waiting
time for the processing of naturalization applications grew from
about 8 months to about 17 months.
At the beginning of fiscal year 1995, 8 of the 33 INS districts
exceeded INS' acceptable processing time of 4 months by 1 month or
more for adjustment-of-status applications. At the end of fiscal
year 1995, 18 of the 33 INS districts exceeded INS' acceptable
processing time of 6 months by 1 month or more. Twenty-one of the 33
INS districts exceeded the acceptable processing time for processing
naturalization applications by 1 month or more at the beginning of
the fiscal year compared to 26 of the 33 INS districts at the end of
the fiscal year.
During fiscal year 1995, average projected wait times for
adjustment-of-status applications more than doubled in 19 of the 33
INS districts, as shown in table 3.2. In the Harlingen, Texas,
District Office, average projected wait times increased from an
average of 27 months to an average of 53 months.\7 Average projected
wait times for naturalization applications more than doubled in 11 of
the 33 districts. The average projected wait time for naturalization
in the Chicago District Office increased from an average of 8 months
to an average of 40 months and in Miami from an average of 9 months
to an average of 49 months.
Table 3.2
Average Projected Wait Times for INS
Processing of I-485 Adjustment-of-
Status and N-400 Naturalization
Applications at the Start and End of
Fiscal Year 1995
I-485 Applications to adjust
status N-400 Naturalization applications
---------------------------------- ----------------------------------
Average projected Average projected
wait time (in months) wait time (in months)
---------------------------------- ----------------------------------
INS As of As of As of As of
District September 30, September 30, September 30, September 30,
Offices 1994 1995 1994 1995
-------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Servicew 4.5 9.5 8.2 17.3
ide
Eastern region districts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta 1.6 5.1 5.1 7.7
Baltimor 9.7 1.6 3.9 6.8
e
Boston 2.2 7.6 2.8 7.9
Buffalo 2.3 2.2 5.6 4.5
Clevelan 1.2 4.3 3.7 9.9
d
Detroit 1.8 3.5 5.7 13.0
Miami 6.7 9.0 8.6 48.6
Newark 5.6 19.6 2.5 8.9
New 2.2 9.7 7.5 4.0
Orleans
New York 8.6 18.5 4.8 23.7
City
Philadel 1.7 4.7 6.1 5.4
phia
Portland 2.1 1.6 10.3 1.5
, Maine
San 2.7 9.6 6.2 16.6
Juan,
Puerto
Rico
Washingt 4.1 7.9 3.5 6.5
on,
D.C.
Central region districts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago 3.3 2.7 7.9 39.7
Dallas 2.4 4.2 12.7 11.0
Denver 2.2 3.6 3.9 5.2
El Paso 1.7 9.3 6.6 9.4
Harlinge 26.5 52.8 11.9 11.2
n,
Texas\a
Helena 6.8 3.8 5.6 3.9
Houston 4.7 16.8 8.6 16.0
Kansas 3.0 2.0 5.1 4.2
City,
Missour
i
Omaha 1.8 7.3 1.5 10.2
San 3.5 11.8 4.6 5.4
Antonio
St. Paul .1 .6 2.6 3.8
Western region districts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anchorag 4.9 3.7 3.2 4.8
e
Honolulu 4.0 4.3 5.7 7.3
Los 9.7 19.6 12.6 26.3
Angeles
Phoenix 6.1 12.9 9.7 10.5
Portland 0.5 10.1 4.1 9.5
,
Oregon
San 3.2 12.6 13.7 7.5
Diego
San 2.8 10.2 18.2 21.5
Francis
co
Seattle 2.0 4.4 9.2 7.4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: INS computed the processing wait times by dividing the number
of applications pending at month's end by the number of applications
completed for the month and multiplying by the number of calendar
days in the month. This method computes how long it would take to
complete all cases pending at the end of the month if the rate of
completions remained constant.
\a The average projected wait times for adjustment-of-status
applications for the Harlingen district appear anomalous. We do not
know if these wait times are correct or are due to an error.
Source: INS data.
INS officials attributed delays in the processing of adjudication
applications to the lack of authority to spend funds to hire
additional personnel to address increased workload demands.
--------------------
\6 INS set a priority for fiscal year 1996 to complete the processing
of naturalization applications within 6 months and, in September
1996, revised the adjustment-of-status goal to 5 months.
\7 The average projected wait times for adjustment-of-status
applications for the Harlingen district appear anomalous. We do not
know if these wait times are correct or are due to an error.
INS SUBMITTED FISCAL YEAR
1996 REPROGRAMMING PROPOSAL
TO CONGRESS EARLIER IN THE
FISCAL YEAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4
For fiscal year 1996, INS began drafting a reprogramming proposal in
August 1995. The reprogramming proposal was submitted to the Justice
Department in September 1995, to OMB in October 1995, and to Congress
in November 1995. Congress responded in January 1996. The
reprogramming provided additional spending authority for the
Examinations Fee Account to expedite the processing of naturalization
applications and 245(i) applications and to expand direct mail
services and cover mandatory expenses. An INS budget official said
that this reprogramming action was less complex than that of fiscal
year 1995.
The fiscal year 1995 reprogramming was more complex because it
included several proposed actions within different sources of funds.
INS' fiscal year 1995 reprogramming proposed actions within its
Examinations Fee Account, Legalization Account, and VCRTF. It sought
increased resources for processing naturalization applications and
adjustment-of-status applications under the section 245(i) amendment;
disseminating information on the naturalization process; staffing and
contract support for Ask Immigration, which is INS' public
information system; supplementing operational and support components;
and increasing positions for the Institutional Hearing Program.
MONITORING OF BUDGET RESOURCES
SUFFERED FROM INADEQUATE DATA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
INS continued to experience problems in fiscal year 1995 with
monitoring its budgetary resources because of inaccurate and
incomplete data in its financial management system and
inconsistencies in data available to and provided by headquarters and
field units. For example, INS experienced problems monitoring its
resources because the Budget Office did not have the information it
needed on commitments made by field units, staff attrition, and
hiring plans.
LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS WITH
INS' FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
A financial management system is to integrate accounting, budget,
personnel, and procurement systems, as well as other information
systems.\8 Inaccurate financial data; an unreliable and antiquated
financial management system; and insufficient internal controls over
allocation, obligation, and expenditure of funds have made it
difficult for managers in INS headquarters to readily determine the
financial status of INS' field units. These serious financial
management problems are not new at INS. They have long affected INS'
ability to effectively manage and accurately report the results of
its program and administrative operations. The Department of
Justice's Office of the Inspector General and Justice Management
Division (JMD) and we have issued several reports on the serious
weaknesses in INS' internal controls and accounting system.
In 1991, we reported that INS' primary accounting system---Financial
Accounting and Control System (FACS)---was outmoded and had weak
internal controls.\9 These 1991 reports stated that weaknesses had
existed for many years and would require a commitment by INS
leadership across succeeding administrations to correct. We reported
again in 1993 and 1995 about these problems.\10
Furthermore, JMD assessments of problems identified with FACS in
fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 1995 revealed that actions had not been
taken to address recommended improvements. Specifically, the JMD
audits concluded that FACS (1) lacked reliable information, (2)
failed to comply with administrative policies and procedures in
regard to funds control, and (3) contained significant weaknesses in
internal controls over payments and obligations. Managers within INS
also perceived the need for improvements in financial management.
Seventy-two percent of the respondents to our 1995 survey on INS
management issues said that servicewide improvements were needed to a
great or very great extent in INS' financial management. The INS
Commissioner told us that in the past, INS was required to use
Justice's financial management information system because Justice
wanted all of its components on the same system. She said that INS
has always maintained that the Justice system would not meet INS'
management needs. In the spring of 1994, Justice reached an
agreement with INS that enabled the agency to develop its own
financial management system. However, INS did not receive funding to
pursue a new financial system until May 1995.
Since fiscal year 1992, quarterly financial reports have generally
been prepared for INS nationwide, encompassing every program and
field office. INS quarterly reports are intended to enable INS
managers to better monitor expenditures and availability of funds,
make accurate end-of-year financial projections of obligations, and
allow for the timely preparation of requests for changes in spending
authority. Further, these quarterly reports are to provide managers
with the information that INS believes is necessary to detect and
address potential problems in a timely manner by comparing budget
allocations with obligations and projected spending. In addition, in
November 1994, INS appointed the EAC for Management as its Chief
Financial Officer, responsible for overseeing all of INS' financial
management activities. The Chief Financial Officer's
responsibilities include, among other things, overseeing the
integration of budgeting and accounting information; the preparation
of financial statements; and the production of complete, reliable,
timely, and consistent financial information.
--------------------
\8 Framework for Federal Financial Management Systems, Joint
Financial Management Improvement Program (FFMSR-O, Jan. 1995).
\9 Financial Management: INS Lacks Accountability and Controls Over
Its Resources (GAO/AFMD-91-20, Jan. 24, 1991); and Immigration
Management: Strong Leadership and Management Reforms Needed to
Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, Jan. 23, 1991).
\10 Immigration Issues: Making Needed Policy and Management
Decisions on Immigration Issues (GAO/T-GGD-93-18, Mar. 30, 1993);
and INS: Update of Management Problems and Program Issues
(GAO/T-GGD-95-82, Feb. 8, 1995).
DATA FROM INS' FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
SYSTEM CONTINUED TO BE
INADEQUATE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2
During our review of INS' fiscal year 1995 budget execution process,
we found that adequate financial information was neither readily
available nor being maintained in INS' FACS. Consequently, INS
budget officials and managers did not have the requisite information
in FACS to determine the amount of funds available in specific INS
units or to prepare accurate financial status reports. Consistent
with what we found in 1991, INS' financial accounting system in
fiscal year 1995 still failed to provide INS managers with the
financial management information they needed to adequately control
funds and evaluate program operations in an efficient manner.
The information in FACS did not provide management with accurate and
complete financial information on its program and administrative
operations. Also, because much of the financial information that
FACS produced was not a correct reflection of the financial status of
INS field units, it was unreliable. In addition, INS' financial
management system did not adequately integrate information that INS
managers needed, such as information on commitment of funds,
attrition of staff, and hiring plans in the field. For example, FACS
had generally maintained data on commitment of funds only at the INS
headquarters level, which did not provide headquarters or regional
managers with detailed information on the commitment of funds at
specific INS field units. Commitments had generally been tracked
directly by the individual INS field locations.
INS DID NOT HAVE COMPLETE
FINANCIAL AND PERSONNEL
INFORMATION NEEDED TO MANAGE
ITS BUDGET EXECUTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.3
FACS was not able to provide accurate data to INS managers on the
financial status of each field unit. Also, the Office of Budget in
headquarters did not have ready access to personnel data that would
have enabled it to identify current and planned staffing levels in
INS field units. To obtain the necessary accounting and personnel
information for an accurate picture of the financial status of its
field units, managers in INS headquarters had to rely on information
obtained from each of INS' 33 districts and 21 sectors. For example,
the Office of Field Operations, which is responsible for managing
resources in INS field units, had to obtain information on, among
other things, attrition of personnel, commitment of funds, and hiring
plans from INS' 33 districts and 21 sectors to be able to project
what funds would be available for reallocation during quarterly
financial reviews for fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 1995, the
allocation and management of PS&B funds, including information on
financial commitments and vacant positions associated with these
funds, were being maintained at the district and sector levels.
Accurate information on spending in PS&B funds in INS field units was
not consistently available to managers at INS headquarters or being
readily maintained in INS' financial accounting system.
INCONSISTENCIES EXISTED IN
THE DATA PROVIDED BY INS
RESOURCE MANAGERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.4
Inconsistencies in the financial data being used by INS managers in
headquarters and in the field resulted in very different projections
of the financial status of the various INS units. During fiscal year
1995, field unit projections of funds expected to be used and funds
available to reallocate differed significantly from initial
projections that the Office of Budget had developed from data in INS'
financial accounting system.
For example, relying on FACS data as of March 31, 1995, the Office of
Budget projected that the field would have about $115 million in
surplus funds through the end of the fiscal year.\11 This was a
baseline projection that the Office of Budget used as a starting
point to obtain input from the field offices on the status of
finances as part of the normal financial review process.
Subsequently, the Office of Field Operations, relying on data
provided by the INS regional offices and the 33 districts and 21
sectors, projected that the INS field units would experience a $5
million shortfall in funding for the remainder of fiscal year 1995.
Managers in INS headquarters and field units said that they spent a
great deal of time attempting to reconcile the $120 million
difference in fiscal year 1995 projections. Ultimately, the Office
of Budget based and revised its initial mid-year estimate on data
provided by INS field units. After incorporating field data on
attrition of staff, commitment of funds, and hiring plans, and
reconciling other differences, the Office of Budget indicated in its
Prospective Financial Status report for the period ending March 31,
1995, that about $25 million in surplus funds would be available to
Field Operations through the remainder of the fiscal year. This was
about $90 million less than the Office of Budget's initial estimate
of $115 million in surplus funds.
Office of Budget officials said that the process of determining the
financial status of INS units was impeded by several factors. These
officials said that the following factors contributed to the
problems:
-- various officials responsible for collecting information to be
used in the financial reports used different data sources,
-- various officials responsible for reporting financial data did
not consistently use formats that the budget office provided,
and
-- data provided by the field had errors.
--------------------
\11 INS uses the term surplus funds to refer to funds that were not
used during the fiscal year for PS&B and therefore become available
for other purposes.
INS HAS TAKEN INTERIM STEPS
UNTIL NEW ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
IS AVAILABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.5
INS has acknowledged that FACS is old and labor-intensive and has had
difficulty accounting for and controlling its resources in an
accurate and timely manner. To work toward having more complete,
accurate, and useful information, in October 1996, INS decided to use
a competitive selection process to acquire a new financial management
system through an interagency agreement with a federal agency that
could best meet its user needs. The Office of Management and Budget
endorses the use of cross-servicing with other federal agencies as a
cost effective and efficient way to obtain services. In January
1997, a letter of interest and a solicitation to acquire a system
were sent to the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, and
the Department of the Interior's U.S. Geological Survey. INS had
identified these agencies as having the potential for meeting its
needs. Proposals were to be provided to INS by January 31, 1997;
however, as of the beginning of February 1997, INS had one proposal
that it was evaluating and was negotiating an extension for proposals
from another agency. INS evaluated the proposals during February and
March 1997 and selected a vendor on March 31. INS' solicitation for
a financial management system specified that the agency expected to
have a core financial management system implemented by October 1,
1997, to meet the deadline agreed upon with the Department of
Justice.
In the meantime, INS officials said that starting with the first
quarter of fiscal year 1996, PS&B resources were allocated and
managed at the regional level instead of at the district and sector
levels. This change was undertaken to alleviate, among other things,
the need to collect information from the 33 districts and 21 sectors.
As previously presented, INS developed a table of organization, which
provided information to field units and headquarters' managers on
authorized funded staffing levels. This document was intended to
help INS managers better monitor and control personnel resources in
the various INS units. According to an INS official, the tables of
organization data were manually compared to on-board staffing level
data to derive vacancy levels by office and major occupations. This
manual reconciliation process is a temporary measure, which is to be
eventually automated through implementation of a new Position
Tracking System (POSTS).
INS' implementation of the new Position Tracking System is to address
the lack of information on current staffing levels, staff attrition,
vacancies, and hiring plans. POSTS is to contain both the tables of
organization control data and data on occupied positions. When fully
operational, POSTS is to provide INS managers with an up-to-date
summary of filled and vacant positions. Additionally, POSTS is to
interface with the new Hiring Tracking System (HITS) to provide INS
managers with, among other things, an account by location of all
vacancies in INS. Neither of these systems was sufficiently
implemented as of April 1997 to provide useful data to support the
activities of the Office of Budget, but INS expects the systems to be
available throughout the agency by the end of fiscal year 1997.
Concerning inconsistencies in the data provided by the various INS
units, little was done to correct the problem until the beginning of
fiscal year 1996. At that time, INS officials in the Office of
Budget, Office of Field Operations, and other INS units began working
together to establish mutually agreed-upon data sources and time
frames and to develop consistent and reliable reporting mechanisms to
be used for the first quarterly financial review of fiscal year 1996.
On the basis of lessons learned from prior financial reviews, a
revised financial review process and policy was developed with the
intent to, among other things:
-- ensure that all organizational components are using the same
financial data for review, projections, and adjustments;
-- guarantee that all organizational components utilize the same
automated tools, algorithms, and methodologies to perform
analyses and adjustments to projections, thereby providing
consistency and confidence in the results, particularly the
determination of available surplus funds; and
-- maximize the effectiveness of planning the use of resources by
utilizing not only actual to-date surplus funds, but also
projected surplus.
INS CONTRACTED FOR ASSISTANCE
TO STRENGTHEN ITS BUDGET
PROCESS AND IMPROVE ITS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
In April 1996, INS contracted with the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) to assist it with developing a framework to
change its budget and financial management process and execution.
INS stated in the contract that it had taken steps to address
problems in the budget and financial management areas, but it
believed it needed to further clarify and strengthen the budget
process at all levels of the organization. NAPA's January 1997
report\12 made 40 recommendations related to such issues as budget
account structure, budget formulation, budget execution, and
organizational issues affecting budgeting. In addition, as part of
the process of developing recommendations to clarify and strengthen
the INS budget process at all levels of the organization, the NAPA
project included an analysis of how the INS budget process connected
to the financial management system and agency efforts to develop a
new core financial management information system.
The NAPA report raised concerns regarding (1) the quality of systems
requirements that INS developed; (2) the need to analyze and document
current "as is" business processes and develop targeted "to be"
processes; and (3) the need for systems integration analyses, among
other things. According to the NAPA report, INS' acquisition of a
new core financial management information system will not resolve the
long-standing deficiencies in the agency's financial management
system because the root cause of its problems lies in the domain of
INS' business processes and procedures. The report stated that
although a new financial information system is needed, improvements
in agency processes and procedures must come first. NAPA also
reported that various offices within INS were engaged in activities
that could be construed as process analysis activities, but these
activities were independent and were not part of an overall
systematic process improvement strategy, plan, and program. In a
briefing to the Justice Department in January 1997 on NAPA's findings
and recommendations, INS recognized the need to address major process
problems and provided information on activities that it had
undertaken through its contract with a financial management
consultant to identify requirements and begin prioritizing options
for business process reengineering. However, NAPA questioned the
quality of INS' planning efforts and was concerned about INS'
expectation to implement a new financial system by October 1, 1997.
According to an INS official, as of January 1997, the agency was
committed to implementing a new system by October 1, 1997, because it
wanted to meet the agreed-upon deadline established with the Justice
Department and because problems have been long-standing, and the
agency wanted to show that it is making progress toward addressing
them.
In July 1996, INS contracted with a financial management consultant
to (1) assist it with reviewing and revising processes and procedures
in anticipation of converting to a new financial system and (2)
review requirements for selected functional areas of the system to
optimize process improvements to be derived from the new system.
INS' financial management consultant also suggested to INS that it
should first define business processes and clarify functional
requirements before selecting a new system. Specifically, the
consultant stated that its experience and best practices model
incorporated the concept of defining and improving business processes
as an antecedent to the selection and use of technology and software.
The consultant made several recommendations, one of which was for INS
to establish a risk management plan to allow for timely management
action so that quality, schedule, and cost objectives are achieved.
Both NAPA and INS' consultant raised concerns about the adequacy of
INS' planning efforts to acquire its new system and the feasibility
of implementing a core financial management system by October 1,
1997.
Our previous and current work highlights how important it is for INS
to address the issues raised by NAPA and the consultant. Our May
1994 guide,\13 which identified information and technology management
best practices, described how information systems initiatives must be
focused on process improvement and guided by an organizational
architecture.\14 The guide also stated that information systems
projects that do not focus on process improvement typically fail or
reach only a fraction of their potential. Our February 1997
guide,\15 which provides a structure for evaluating and assessing how
well a federal agency is selecting and managing its information
technology resources, stated that a key hazard in acquiring
information technology is that the new system will automate outmoded,
inefficient business processes. Another guide that we issued in
April 1997\16 stated that technology is an enabler of process
reengineering, not a substitute for it. This guide also stated that
acquiring technology in the belief that its mere presence will
somehow lead to process innovation is a root cause of bad investments
in information systems. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996\17 requires
executive agencies to conduct analyses of work processes before
making significant investments in information technology. The act
sought to remedy the dilemma of using technology to correct process
problems by insisting that process redesign drive the acquisition of
information technology, and not the other way around. Thus, an
assessment of current processes (process mapping, baselining,
benchmarking) should be completed before a decision is made about
acquiring technology.
--------------------
\12 Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public
Administration for the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Budgeting for Performance: Strategy, Flexibility, and Accountability
to Meet a Demanding Mission, January 1997.
\13 Executive Guide: Improving Mission Performance Through Strategic
Information Management and Technology; Learning From Leading
Organizations (GAO/AIMD-94-115, May 1994).
\14 Architectures explicitly define common standards and rules for
both data and technology, as well as mapping key processes and
information flows.
\15 Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating Federal
Agencies' IT Investment Decision-making (GAO/AIMD-10.1.13, February
1997 Version 1).
\16 Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide
(GAO/AIMD-10.1.15, April 1997 Version 3).
\17 The Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 renames both
the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 and the Information
Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 as the "Clinger-Cohen Act of
1996."
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
Since fiscal year 1995, some, but not all, program areas used WAMs
and workload information in deciding how to deploy resources. INS
contracted with a consultant to develop a software program that would
be compatible with existing staffing models and that is intended to
move INS toward better deployment planning. In general, we believe
that the use of WAMs can help INS make resource allocation decisions,
because INS will be able to consider different factors and changing
scenarios. Thus, we support INS' initiative to develop WAMs and use
models to improve resource allocation planning.
INS has been taking steps to address the weaknesses in its financial
management system that have adversely affected financial reporting
and management at all levels and that hampered INS' ability to
prepare accurate quarterly financial management reports in fiscal
year 1995. The improvements made during fiscal year 1996 address
some of the weaknesses associated with INS not having consistent and
readily available data but will not remedy the problems. INS
selected a new financial management system. Ultimately, the new
system is intended to provide consistent and reliable data, integrate
information from other systems, and produce accurate and complete
information on commitment of funds, attrition of staff, and hiring
plans in the field. However, NAPA and INS' financial consultant
recommended that INS define its current business processes and define
its desired business processes before acquiring a new system. Our
guides on information management and the Clinger-Cohen Act also
endorse these practices. Problems with the accuracy, completeness,
and consistency of data that we identify in this chapter are process
issues, not technology issues. INS did not perform a comprehensive
analysis of its financial management processes before selecting a new
financial management system; therefore, the new financial management
system may not address process problems. As a result, INS has
incurred a risk that the system may not meet its financial management
requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
We recommend that the Commissioner of INS take the following actions:
-- Develop a strategy and schedule for periodically evaluating the
new deployment planning process to help ensure that it is
compatible with INS' key planning processes and provides
information needed by managers to adequately plan for resource
needs and make resource decisions.
-- Take steps to mitigate the risks associated with INS' planned
approach for acquiring a new financial management system. Such
steps should include fully implementing plans to analyze its
current financial management processes and determining future
financial management process needs, finalizing a comprehensive
implementation plan, and fully developing and implementing a
risk management plan.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7
INS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
printed in full in appendix VI. INS also provided technical comments
separately, which we incorporated where appropriate. INS agreed with
our recommendation that it should evaluate its improvements to the
deployment planning process to help ensure that the agency's
information needs are being met.
On the issue of INS' plans for implementing a new financial
management system, INS stated that we failed to recognize its urgent
need for a replacement financial system. To the contrary, we have
long recognized this need. We believe our report and many past
reports by us and others fully recognize the problems in INS'
financial management systems and the need to replace them. Thus, our
primary focus in this report was on expressing our concerns about
INS' plans for implementing a new system.
In this regard, INS disagreed with a recommendation in our draft
report that it analyze financial management processes prior to
acquiring a new financial management system and stated that it
thought we relied too much on the NAPA findings and did not follow up
appropriately with additional field work on the steps INS had taken
after the NAPA report was issued. We disagree that we relied
primarily on the NAPA findings. Although our report discusses the
NAPA findings as they related to INS' efforts to acquire a new
system, our recommendation was based in addition on our analysis of
agency documents, INS consultant reports, and our long history of
work on the implementation of major new information technology
systems. For example, our May 1994 guide, which we used in assessing
INS' approach, stated that information systems projects that do not
focus on process improvements typically fail or reach only a fraction
of their potential. To better clarify the basis for our
observations, we have added some information to the report about our
previous work in this area.
Although we continued to discuss these and other matters in this
report with INS as the report was being developed and reviewed, we
wanted to be sure that we had fully considered all of the most recent
developments in its plans for a new financial system that were raised
by INS in its comment letter. Accordingly, we met with the Assistant
Commissioner for the Office of Financial Management and other finance
officials in May 1997 to discuss actions that INS plans to take to
mitigate the risks associated with implementing its new financial
management system. In addition to establishing an Executive Steering
Committee and obtaining the contractual support described in INS'
comments, these officials told us that they were working with or
preparing to work with consultants on (1) analyzing INS' financial
management processes, (2) developing a comprehensive implementation
plan that would include how the system is to be evaluated, and (3)
developing a risk management plan. They also stated that the entire
system will not be in place by October 1, 1997, as originally
intended; rather, core functions will be implemented and tested at
some, but not all, locations.
In the time since our audit work was largely completed, INS' strategy
for implementing a new financial management system has evolved
further, and INS is currently taking steps to plan for a phased
implementation and other actions that should help to mitigate the
risks we observed. These actions, if carried out effectively, are
more consistent with the approach that our work in this area has
indicated would mitigate risk. For that reason, we have revised our
recommendation to focus more on actions the Commissioner needs to
take to fully develop and implement the plans that were discussed
with us in concept.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE
OFFICES OF THE EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONERS AND REGIONAL
DIRECTORS FOR FIELD OPERATIONS
=========================================================== Appendix I
EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF POLICY
AND PLANNING
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
-- Serve as principal advisor to the Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner on matters of policy and planning.
-- Formulate, review, integrate, codify, and disseminate national
INS policy.
-- Serve as a clearinghouse for the coordination and dissemination
of program-specific policy, regulations, guidelines, and
directives.
-- Develop strategic plans, annual priorities, and statistical
data.
-- Research and develop cross-program initiatives.
-- Establish an administration position on broader-than-INS
immigration policy questions and examine broad policy questions.
-- Analyze new legislative proposals and regulatory and procedural
changes.
-- Perform organizational analysis to assist in the allocation of
resources, identify structural deficiencies, and avoid
duplication of functions.
-- Implement governmentwide initiatives, such as quality management
and the Vice President's National Performance Review.
-- Provide high-quality agencywide statistical information for use
in decisionmaking.
-- Improve and expand technology assessment and research.
-- Participate with the Executive Staff in the budget formulation
and execution processes.
EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD
OPERATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
-- Serve as principal advisor to the Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner on field operations.
-- Plan, direct, and manage field operations through the three
regional directors and the Director, International Affairs.
-- Provide general guidance and supervision to the regional
directors and the Director, International Affairs.
-- Ensure that the annual operating plans of the regional directors
and the Director, International Affairs, are developed in
accordance with the Commissioner's priorities.
-- Allocate resources to the regional directors and the Director,
International Affairs.
-- Authorize the transfer of resources that cross regional
boundaries.
-- Monitor the implementation of approved plans by the regional
directors and the Director, International Affairs.
-- Recommend INS policies in areas related to field operations.
-- Respond to field office needs and provide a single point of
contact at headquarters for field issues.
-- Ensure policy consistency and program effectiveness in the work
of the districts and sectors.
-- Represent the Commissioner with other agencies, Members of
Congress, interest groups, law enforcement officials, and the
general public in matters related to field operations.
-- Serve as action officer on projects or special activities
requiring executive direction and high-profile leadership.
-- Participate with the Executive Staff in the budget formulation
and execution processes.
EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF
PROGRAMS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
-- Serve as the principal advisor to the Commissioner, Deputy
Commissioner, and the Executive Associate Commissioner for Field
Operations on enforcement and examinations program resources.
-- Strengthen INS policy and planning capabilities by providing a
cohesive framework for enforcement and examinations to function
as integrated elements of INS.
-- Establish a programmatic structure that will empower program
managers to develop program plans that anticipate demands on the
agency, build communications capabilities, and concentrate on
program integration.
-- Develop INS program policy and ensure policy consistency and
program effectiveness in the work of INS' districts and sectors.
-- Provide general guidance and supervision to the Associate
Commissioners for Enforcement and Examinations.
-- Ensure that program objectives are developed in accordance with
the Commissioner's priorities.
-- Represent the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner with other
agencies, Members of Congress, interest groups, law enforcement
officials, and the general public in matters related to INS
program policy.
-- Participate with the Executive Staff in the budget formulation
and execution processes.
EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4
-- Serve as the principal advisor to the Commissioner and INS
management on financial, human resources, administrative, and
information resource management issues.
-- Manage all INS management support services at headquarters,
regions, and field locations.
-- Develop policies related to all administrative functions.
-- Serve as action officer on projects or special activities
requiring executive direction and high-profile leadership.
-- Direct personnel management, facilities development,
procurement, and other administrative functions through the
Associate Commissioner, Human Resources and Administration.
-- Direct the affirmative employment and discrimination complaints
programs through the Director, Equal Employment Opportunity.
-- Direct budget, finance, and resource management through the
Associate Commissioner, Financial Management.
-- Direct data systems and systems integration through the
Associate Commissioner, Information Resource Management.
-- Direct regional management and administrative activities through
the regional administrators.
-- Direct all security and suitability activities through the
Director, Security.
-- Develop policies for the records program and Freedom of
Information Act through the Director, Files and Forms
Management.
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGIONAL
OFFICES FOR FIELD OPERATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5
-- Plan, direct, and manage field operations in their respective
regional areas.
-- Provide general guidance and supervision to district directors
and Border Patrol's chief Patrol agents.
-- Develop and recommend annual operating plans for the region.
-- Allocate and manage resources within the region.
-- Monitor the districts' and sectors' implementation of approved
plans.
-- Serve as the Commissioner's spokesperson in the geographic area.
-- Participate in the budget formulation and execution processes
for the region.
Note: These are INS' definitions of the roles and responsibilities.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================== Appendix II
The objective of this review was to follow up on our past INS
management report to determine whether INS had taken steps to correct
some of the most significant management problems identified.
Specifically, we reviewed whether INS had
-- developed goals and priorities to guide planning and resource
allocation;
-- revised its organizational structure;
-- improved internal communications and updated its field and
administrative manuals;
-- improved the process of allocating budgetary resources;
-- improved its capability to monitor its financial status; and
-- generated accurate, complete, and consistent data to monitor
budget execution.
Because this review was limited in its scope, we did not investigate
whether INS had better defined the roles of the two key enforcement
divisions--Border Patrol and Investigations. Also, we did not
examine how much progress INS had made in addressing all the goals
and objectives of the reorganization or whether all the newly created
offices had accomplished their new missions. With respect to the
process for notifying Congress of the need for additional spending
authority, we reviewed only the Examinations Fee Account. This is
the largest of the fee accounts, and we wanted to determine if INS'
reprogramming process enabled it to provide timely services to aliens
applying for benefits such as naturalization and
adjustment-of-status.
We used a variety of techniques to determine whether INS had taken
steps to address management problems. To obtain an understanding of
INS management issues, we reviewed our prior management studies, INS
management studies by the Committee on Government Operations and the
National Academy of Public Administration, agency documents, budget
materials, congressional testimonies, and transcripts of
congressional hearings. The reorganization structure was put in
place at the beginning of fiscal year 1995, and our review was
conducted during fiscal years 1995 and 1996. Information in this
report is on the first year and a half of the reorganization.
To obtain the perceptions of current INS management, we sent a survey
to 3,676 career and appointed INS managers and senior staff. Survey
recipients included all INS managers and senior staff at or above the
grade 13 level, as well as all other individuals designated as
managers or supervisors by INS at grades 11 and 12. All
organizational units within INS were represented in our survey. The
response rate for our targeted population was 69 percent.\1 Further
details of the survey are presented in appendix III.
We conducted interviews with the four Executive Associate
Commissioners (EACs); the three regional directors; assistant
regional directors, district office program managers, and Border
Patrol chiefs in Los Angeles, California; El Paso, Texas; and
Buffalo, New York, locations judgmentally selected with one from each
of the regions; and other headquarters and regional managers
responsible for budget activities, program planning, and operational
activities to obtain more detailed information than was obtained
through the survey regarding the new structure and the budget
execution process during fiscal year 1995. We also interviewed
budget officials at the Justice Department and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to obtain information on INS' procedures
for proposing the reprogramming of funds from the Examinations Fee
Account. In addition, we conducted a joint interview with the INS
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to discuss management issues
related to the new organizational structure and budget execution
during fiscal year 1995.
To determine whether INS had developed goals and priorities, we
reviewed INS documents to determine whether INS had a mission
statement, priority goals, strategies to attain the goals, and
performance measures. We also used information from interviews and
the survey data to ascertain management support for and use of the
priority goals. To determine whether INS' current organizational
structure achieved its major management goals, we reviewed INS
documents articulating the purpose and goals of the latest
reorganization; and we interviewed top headquarters officials,
regional directors, and headquarters and field managers concerning
their perceptions of the reorganization. We also obtained
information on the reorganization through the survey. To determine
whether INS had updated its policy handbooks and manuals, we
interviewed managers at headquarters and in the field offices and
used survey data on managers' perceptions of these and other
communication issues. We also reviewed policy documents and
interviewed managers on the status of efforts to update written
communication through guidance materials.
To determine whether INS had taken steps to improve its resource
allocation process, we collected and analyzed information on INS'
budget development, budget execution, and financial review processes
for fiscal years 1994 through 1996. We also collected copies of
workload models and resource allocation plans that INS developed and
used to assist in its decisionmaking process. Our examination of
INS' use of workload information was limited to determining which
program areas had workload analysis models or used workload
information in planning resource allocation needs and which ones did
not. For program areas that had workload models, we relied on
interviews with program and budget officials to determine if they
used the information to allocate resources. To assess the
relationship between INS' resource allocation process and its
management of alien applications, we examined INS' process for
obtaining congressional approval for increased funding authority from
the Examinations Fee Account and how well the process worked during
fiscal years 1995 and 1996. To determine whether INS had complete
and consistent data to monitor budget execution, we reviewed budget
documents and financial status reports and interviewed resource
managers and budget officials.
--------------------
\1 See appendix III sections "Problems with INS Mailing List" and
"Survey Response Rate" for clarification of this response rate.
SURVEY METHODOLOGY
========================================================= Appendix III
OVERVIEW
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
In an effort to obtain a broad spectrum of views on INS management
issues, we developed and pretested a survey that included questions
on the relationship between headquarters and the field, organization
changes, communication, budget execution, and other
management-related areas. Our target population was all INS
managers. For our survey, we defined a "manager" as any INS employee
at grade GS-13 or above as well as persons designated by INS as
managers or supervisors at grades GS-11 and 12. INS provided us a
list of employees who met our definition of manager.
To obtain managers' candid opinions and insights about INS'
management, we promised anonymity to the survey recipients. To
ensure anonymity, no identification numbers were included on the
survey. A postcard containing an identification number was included
in the package sent to our target population. The postcard was to be
mailed back to us separately from the survey. Receipt of the
postcard allowed us to remove names from our follow-up mailing list.
In September 1995, we mailed the survey to 3,676 INS employees whom
INS told us were managers. In late October 1995, we sent out a
follow-up mailing containing another survey and postcard to those who
did not respond to our first mailing.
PROBLEMS WITH INS' MAILING LIST
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
During the course of the survey, a number of INS employees who were
mailed surveys called or wrote to us indicating that they were not
managers. This led us to ask INS whether the list of managers that
it provided us may have included persons who should not have been in
our target population. The results of this follow-up inquiry showed
that we sent surveys to 714 INS employees who were in grades GS-11
and 12 but were not designated by INS as managers or supervisors.
These individuals should not have been sent surveys to complete.
In the course of our investigation, we also found that our mailing
list did not include a number of INS employees who should have been
included in our target population. We found that approximately 400
employees at grade GS-13 and above who should have received surveys
did not because INS did not include them on the mailing list it
provided us. One reason that we were concerned about this omission
is that if these employees were located in one or a few locations,
this could introduce a systematic bias into our results. However, we
were able to determine that these particular employees were located
throughout INS.
SURVEY RESPONSE RATES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
Because we inadvertently mailed surveys to 714 grade GS-11 and 12
nonmanagers, our survey response rate was adversely affected. This
is because individuals receiving our management survey who were not
managers were much less likely to return the survey than were
managers. Because of this, we are providing two separate response
rates for our survey, one response rate for the managers who
correctly received our survey and another for the nonmanagers who
incorrectly received our survey. These response rates are shown in
table III.1.
Table III.1
Survey Response Rates
Percent
----------
Number of
--------------------------------
Postcards
INS returned
employees indicating that a
receiving survey Response
surveys was returned rate
---------------------------------- ------------ ------------------ ----------
INS managers 2,962 2,034 69%
(correct target population)
Grade 11 and 12 nonmanagers 714 295 41
(should not have received
surveys)
================================================================================
Total 3,676 2,329\a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a We actually received 2,321 completed surveys. This discrepancy
may be due to the lack of a perfect match between those who returned
the survey and those who returned the postcard.
Source: GAO analysis.
From the postcards we received, the survey results used in this
report contain data from approximately 295 grade GS-11 and 12
nonmanagers who completed and returned our survey. Therefore,
responses received from INS employees who should not have been in our
survey population represent about 13 percent of the data used
throughout the report. We were not able to remove these data from
our database because the surveys were anonymous and, therefore, did
not contain any identifying information about the respondents.
REPORTING SURVEY RESULTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4
Throughout this report, the percentages presented do not include
respondents who skipped a question. For some questions the
percentages presented do not include respondents who answered "no
basis to judge." When this occurs, we indicated this in a footnote.
In general, when we report responses to five-point scales, we report
the combination of the percentages of respondents selecting the top
two response categories and the combination of the percentages of
respondents selecting the bottom two response categories.
Occasionally, we deviate from this practice. When this occurs, we
indicate this in a footnote.
Respondents to our survey provided numerous written comments dealing
with management issues. We did not analyze all of the written
comments in a systematic manner. We used a number of these comments
in our report to illustrate some of the management issues discussed
in the report.
NONSAMPLING ERRORS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5
The practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce
errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example,
differences in how a particular question is interpreted, in the
sources of information that were available to respondents, or in the
types of people who did not respond can introduce unwanted
variability into the survey results. We included steps in the
development of the survey, the data collection, and the data analysis
for minimizing such nonsampling errors. These steps include
practices, such as extensive pretesting of the survey, procedures to
ensure that respondents remain anonymous, and the inclusion of
various edit checks in the analysis program.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
GAO SURVEY ON INS MANAGEMENT
ISSUES
========================================================= Appendix III
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INS' FISCAL YEARS 1995 AND 1996
PRIORITIES
=========================================================== Appendix V
Table V.1
INS' Fiscal Year 1995 Priorities
Priority\a INS statement of priority
------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
1. Strengthen border INS will continue to improve border protection by
protection facilitating travel and commerce while ensuring
border integrity. This will be accomplished by
employing a strategy of prevention through
deterrence, concentrating resources at key transit
and entry points (foreign and domestic), and
employing resource-multiplying technology. Activities
will include continued implementation of a
comprehensive Southwest land border strategy,
improvement in the use of lookout systems through
better integration of data, and continued development
of automated inspections processes.
2. Expedite removal of INS will broaden its programs to identify and
criminal aliens apprehend criminal aliens and expedite their removal
from the United States. Activities will include
responding to federal, state, and local law
enforcement officers' requests on alienage and
immigration status; completing implementation of the
five-state Institutional Hearing Program model;
completing development of a national alien
transportation plan; expanding the use of technology,
including the use of electronic fingerprinting and
teleconferencing; and completing a comprehensive
review of the legal and regulatory processes for
removal.
3. Reduce incentives for INS will decrease the "pull factors" for illegal
unlawful migration migration and simultaneously support benefit
providers with information on alienage of
individuals. Strategies include making it easier for
employers to verify employment eligibility and
increasing efforts to educate employers about their
responsibility to comply with the law, focusing
enforcement efforts on industries that have
traditionally relied on unauthorized labor and
employers who knowingly violate the law, and
increasing the security of employment authorization
documents.
4. Implement asylum INS will implement a more timely asylum processing
reform regulations and decision system. New procedures, coupled with
additional resources, will enable the Service to keep
up with incoming applications and begin to handle
backlogged cases. This effort will also focus
enforcement on fraudulent applications, reducing
incentives for asylum abuse.
5. Improve customer INS will enhance delivery of services to its
service customers. This will be accomplished by improving the
current systems being used to obtain and apply
customer service feedback; implementing all
components of the Executive Order on "Setting
Customer Service Standards"; and applying
benchmarking to programs, where applicable, to
achieve best-in-the-business practices and standards.
6. Promote and streamline INS will encourage and promote naturalization through
naturalization public education programs by establishing cooperative
agreements with community-based organizations, ethnic
group networks, and educational institutions to
assist in preparation of applications and study for
civics and language tests; and by seeking ways to
streamline the naturalization process.
7. Improve INS will pursue professionalism at all levels of the
professionalism agency. This will be accomplished by maintaining high
standards of conduct fostered through proper training
and career development and hiring and promotion
practices--as reflected in the Service's new Equal
Employment Opportunity plan--that result in a
workforce that reflects the diversity of America and
our clientele.
8. Provide innovative INS will inform and shape immigration policy through
immigration policy production of timely, high-quality information and
leadership policy analysis. The Service will take a proactive
role in creating a better understanding of
immigration issues and in advancing new initiatives,
including legislation, to improve administration of
U. S. immigration law and policy.
9. Broaden and integrate INS will improve management information systems by
INS' systems developing accurate, timely, integrated databases
infrastructure that upgrade operational effectiveness and
productivity. The INS "information highway" will lead
to paperless work processes and national automated
immigration data repositories for both INS and
relevant non-INS users.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a According to INS officials, these priorities were not ranked in
their order of importance.
Source: INS.
Table V.2
INS' Fiscal Year 1996 Priorities
Priority\a INS statement of priority
------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
1. Strengthen the INS INS will rapidly increase the size of its officer
workforce workforce and support staff. To accomplish the goal
of hiring over 4,000 new, productive employees, INS
will (1) streamline and target recruitment, (2)
expand training, (3) increase retention of
experienced employees, and (4) deploy new employees
with proper equipment.
2. Strengthen border INS will regulate entry to the United States in a
enforcement and manner that facilitates lawful travel and commerce
facilitation while ensuring border integrity against unlawful
entry. Efforts in fiscal year 1996 will consolidate
and expand progress achieved at and between ports-
of-entry in the primary corridors of illegal
immigration. To pursue these strategic targets, INS
will (1) enhance control between ports-of-entry along
the Southwest Border, especially in San Diego,
Tucson, McAllen, and El Paso; (2) tighten control at
ports-of-entry in anticipation of the impact from
beefed-up Border Patrol activities; (3) facilitate
traffic by adding new inspectors, opening lanes, and
redesigning signs; (4) establish a proactive
intelligence program to support field managers in
anticipating and responding to shifts in illegal
alien crossing patterns; (5) develop overseas
deterrence activities, particularly in Mexico City,
to support border control efforts; and (6) expand
antismuggling operations.
3. Increase removal of INS will increase removal of criminal and noncriminal
deportable aliens illegal aliens, focusing especially on aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies. To increase
removals, INS will (1) increase criminal alien
removals through expanded Institutional Hearing
Programs and county jail projects; (2) expand
noncriminal alien removals with final orders of
deportation of aliens who have absconded, been
rejected for asylum, or are in the workforce
illegally; (3) improve functioning of primary
components of removal system, including the national
transportation system; and (4) enhance cooperative
efforts with other law enforcement agencies.
4. Enhance worksite INS will reduce opportunities for illegal employment
enforcement and through enhanced worksite investigations, document
verification systems improvements, and automated status verification
services. To increase control at the worksite, INS
will (1) target the worst violators of immigration
and employment standards laws and coordinate
investigations with the Department of Labor, (2)
increase worksite operations to remove unauthorized
workers and make jobs available for authorized
workers, and (3) test and expand pilot programs to
assist employers in complying with the law.
5. Improve immigration INS will continue to improve services to its various
services customers, including petitioners for immigration
benefits, other law enforcement agencies, its own
front-line employees, and the local communities
within which the Service works. To improve services,
INS will (1) reorganize service delivery to
applicants for immigration benefits by improving
forms, reducing waiting periods, and accelerating
processing times; (2) increase coordination with
other local law enforcement agencies to improve
sharing of information, response times, and joint
operations; and (3) expand outreach to local
communities through citizen advisory groups,
coordination with consulates, and participation in
public events, including expanded public affairs
activities and communication with local congressional
offices.
6. Implement citizenship INS will respond to the tremendous growth in
U.S.A. naturalization applications by reducing
naturalization processing times to 6 months. It will
greatly increase the efficiency, quality control, and
convenience of the process and work with a variety of
local organizations to meet the increase in
applications while maintaining examination standards.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a According to INS officials, these priorities were ranked in their
order of importance.
Source: INS.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE
=========================================================== Appendix V
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MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix VII
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Evi L. Rezmovic, Assistant Director, Administration of Justice
Issues
Linda R. Watson, Evaluator-in-Charge
Charity J. Goodman, Senior Evaluator
Charles Michael Johnson, Senior Evaluator
Stuart M. Kaufman, Senior Social Science Analyst
Katherine M. Wheeler, Publishing Consultant
Pamela V. Williams, Communications Analyst
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ann H. Finley, Senior Attorney
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE
Michael P. Dino, Senior Evaluator
Leah G. Riordan, Senior Evaluator
*** End of document. ***