Federal Fugitives: More Timely Entry on National Wanted Person File Is
Needed (Letter Report, 02/26/96, GAO/GGD-96-64).
GAO reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) wanted person file, focusing on the: (1)
length of time it takes federal law enforcement agencies to enter
fugitives onto the file; (2) information that agencies have on data
entry times and the means used to monitor entry times; and (3) agencies'
plans to reduce entry delays.
GAO found that: (1) FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) require
that fugitives be entered onto the wanted persons file within 1 day
after an arrest warrant is issued; (2) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms (ATF) allows up to 10 days for data entry if the delay
serves a valid law enforcement purpose; (3) the Customs Service requires
data entry after reasonable efforts to locate a fugitive has failed; (4)
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has no policy regarding
the timeliness of data entry; (5) 28 percent of FBI, USMS, ATF, and
Customs' entries are made 1 day after issuance of the arrest warrant, 54
percent within 1 week, and 70 percent within 4 weeks; (6) data entry
times for dangerous fugitives do not differ substantially from overall
data entry times; (7) ATF and Customs do not monitor their data entry
times or know the reasons for delays in entering fugitives on the wanted
persons file; (8) FBI found that there are delays in between 30 and 50
percent of its data entries, with a median delay of about 1 week; and
(9) all the federal law enforcement agencies plan to take action to
minimize data entry delays.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-96-64
TITLE: Federal Fugitives: More Timely Entry on National Wanted
Person File Is Needed
DATE: 02/26/96
SUBJECT: Criminal procedure
Criminals
Arrests
Law enforcement
Interagency relations
Data integrity
Information processing operations
Data bases
Crimes or offenses
IDENTIFIER: FBI National Wanted Persons Data Base
FBI Inspection Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury
February 1996
FEDERAL FUGITIVES - MORE TIMELY
ENTRY ON NATIONAL WANTED PERSON
FILE IS NEEDED
GAO/GGD-96-64
More Timely Entry on Wanted Person File
(182015)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
NCIC - National Crime Information Center
USMS - United States Marshals Service
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-261866
February 26, 1996
The Honorable Janet Reno
The Attorney General
The Honorable Robert E. Rubin
The Secretary of the Treasury
As a result of our earlier work on interagency coordination in
apprehending federal fugitives, we noted that many entries in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Crime Information
Center's (NCIC) wanted person file were made long after issuance of
the arrest warrants.\1 This was generally contrary to the stated
policies of the agencies that made the entries and the generally
accepted view of NCIC officials, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, and others that timely use of the file facilitates
apprehension and reduces risks to law enforcement personnel and the
general public. On our own initiative, we conducted a follow-up
review to identify (1) how long federal agencies took to enter
fugitives onto the wanted person file; (2) what information the
agencies had on entry times and the means used to monitor entry
times; and (3) what actions agencies took, considered, or could take
to reduce any entry delays. Because the Attorney General is the
chief official responsible for the wanted person file and since the
agencies we reviewed are under your jurisdictions, we are reporting
our findings to you.
To accomplish our objectives, we analyzed various information,
including federal fugitive records on the wanted person file as of
April 6, 1994. Then, we interviewed officials and reviewed various
documents from the Department of Justice's FBI, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and United States Marshals Service
(USMS) and from the Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Customs Service. These agencies
accounted for 22,903 (78 percent) of the 29,339 federal fugitive
records on the wanted person file as of April 6 and were the
principal fugitive-hunting agencies within the Justice and Treasury
Departments.\2 We reviewed these two departments in our earlier
fugitive work as well. Our objectives, scope, and methodology are
discussed in more detail in appendix I.
We performed our work in Washington, D.C., from May 1995 to August
1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. Responsible
Justice and Treasury officials provided oral comments at meetings on
December 5 (Treasury) and December 11, 1995 (Justice). Their
comments are discussed later in this report.
--------------------
\1 Federal Fugitive Apprehension: Agencies Taking Action to Improve
Coordination and Cooperation (GAO/GGD-95-75, May 2, 1995).
\2 We analyzed 20,968 of the 29,339 records on the wanted person file
as of April 6, 1994. We excluded 1,935 fugitive records from the
FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service from our wanted person
file analysis because they did not have the data needed to determine
entry times. Most of these excluded records (1,777) were from INS.
We interviewed INS officials about their entry policies and times.
We also excluded 6,436 records of various other agencies responsible
for apprehending federal fugitives, including the Departments of
Defense and State, which were not included in the scope of our
review.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service all believed that
use of the NCIC wanted person file enhances the likelihood of a
fugitive's apprehension and avoids endangering the general public and
law enforcement officers. The FBI and USMS required entry onto the
file within 24 hours after the arrest warrant was issued. ATF
allowed up to 10 days for entry if the delay served a valid law
enforcement purpose. The Customs Service required entry after
reasonable efforts to locate the fugitive had failed, and INS had no
policy on how soon fugitives' data were to be entered.
Despite these criteria, many FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service
fugitives were entered onto the wanted person file long after their
arrests were authorized. For these 4 agencies' 20,968 fugitive
entries as of April 6, 1994, 28 percent were made by the day after
issuance of the arrest warrant, 34 percent within 2 days, 54 percent
within 1 week, 64 percent within 2 weeks, and 70 percent within 4
weeks. Of the 4 agencies' records, 7,864 involved fugitives who had
a caution notation--a warning that the fugitives were dangerous or
suicidal or had a serious medical condition--on their record. Entry
times for these fugitives, many of whom were considered dangerous,
were about the same proportions as the overall entries. For example,
only 67 percent were entered within 4 weeks. The most recent
entries, the 3,794 records entered between September 30, 1993, and
April 6, 1994, had slightly better entry times, such as 75 percent
entered within 4 weeks (71 percent of the caution records were
entered in 4 weeks).
Generally, the FBI, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service either had
limited information, or lacked overall information, on their entry
times, including the reasons so many entries were made after the
deadline prescribed by agency policy. The agencies generally
expressed concern about our findings and said they would take any
necessary actions to address the matter. The FBI, ATF, and the
Customs Service subsequently did their own reviews and noted similar
entry time problems. USMS officials said they would review their
entry times. FBI officials said that it was imperative that entry
delays be kept to a minimum and that the FBI would continue efforts
to minimize delays. ATF and Customs Service officials identified
various actions they would take to improve their entry times.
Although no data were available on their entry times, INS officials
said they too would take steps to improve the likelihood of timely
entries.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Federal law enforcement agencies pursue fugitives wanted for crimes
that fall within their jurisdictions. Generally, federal fugitives
are persons whose whereabouts are unknown and who (1) are being
sought because they have been charged with one or more federal
crimes; (2) have failed to appear for a required court action or for
deportation; or (3) have escaped from federal custody. The agencies
we contacted generally required that information on these persons be
entered quickly onto the NCIC wanted person file to facilitate
location by others and enhance public and law enforcement personnel
safety.\3
NCIC has the nation's most extensive computerized criminal justice
information system. Its system consists of a central computer at FBI
headquarters in Washington, D.C.; dedicated telecommunications lines;
and a coordinated network of federal and state criminal justice
information systems. NCIC's system consists of millions of records
in 14 files, including files on wanted persons, stolen vehicles, and
missing persons. Over 19,000 federal, state, and local law
enforcement and other criminal justice agencies in the United States
and Canada have direct access to NCIC. An additional 51,000 agencies
can access NCIC indirectly through agreements with agencies that have
direct access. An Advisory Policy Board composed of representatives
from criminal justice agencies throughout the United States is
responsible for establishing and implementing the system's
operational policies. NCIC and the Advisory Policy Board also
receive suggestions from a federal working group composed of several
representatives from federal law enforcement agencies, which include
ATF, the Customs Service, INS, and USMS. The FBI is responsible for
the overall management of NCIC.
Agencies entering data onto the NCIC files are expected to comply
with the specifications and standards set by NCIC and must perform
periodic reviews to ensure that the information they entered on NCIC
is still valid (e.g., that a valid arrest warrant still exists).
NCIC personnel are to also periodically review the agencies' NCIC
records.
--------------------
\3 Staff in FBI field offices enter fugitive information directly
onto the wanted person file. Staff in USMS, ATF, Customs Service,
and INS field offices generally send their information to
communication centers, which enter the data onto the wanted person
file. The USMS, ATF, and INS centers are at the agencies'
Washington, D.C., area headquarters. The Customs Service has four
communications centers located in different geographic districts, but
the agency is planning to consolidate them into a single center in
Orlando, FL.
MANY FUGITIVES ENTERED ONTO
NCIC WANTED PERSON FILE LONG
AFTER ARREST WARRANT ISSUED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Despite agencies' policies calling for entry of fugitives onto the
NCIC wanted person file as early as possible after issuance of an
arrest warrant, many fugitives' data, including those fugitives
classified as dangerous, were entered long after arrest warrants were
issued.
FUGITIVE ENTRY POLICIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
NCIC written policy calls for timely entries, which it defines as
entry made immediately after a decision is made to (1) arrest or
authorize arrest and (2) extradite the located fugitives (extradition
generally involves state or local law enforcement agencies). NCIC
officials said that when they review an agency's use of NCIC records
they consider entries made after 24 hours (48 hours if a weekend
intervenes) as untimely. However, participating agencies are not
required to adhere to the suggested NCIC criteria for timeliness.
Rather, each agency sets its own criteria on when to enter fugitives
onto the wanted person file.
FBI, USMS, and ATF policies for entering fugitives onto the wanted
person file required entry shortly after the arrest warrant, notice
of escape, or other document authorizing detention was issued: the
FBI and USMS required immediate entry, meaning within 24 hours; ATF
allowed up to 10 days for entry if the delay served a law enforcement
purpose. Customs Service policy called for entry after reasonable
efforts to locate the fugitive had failed and essentially defined
"reasonable" as being after all investigative leads on the fugitive's
location have been exhausted. INS' policy provided no time frame for
making the entry.
OVERALL FUGITIVE ENTRIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
Figure 1 illustrates the entry times, by time elapsed since arrest
warrant issuance, for the 20,968 FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service
fugitive records on the wanted person file as of April 6, 1994, and
for the 3,794 of those records that were entered after September 30,
1993.
Figure 1: Fugitive Entries on
the Wanted Person File as of
April 6, 1994
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
As figure 1 shows, only 34 percent of all fugitives were entered onto
the file within 2 days and slightly more than half (54 percent) were
entered within 1 week. These entry times were better for the records
entered after September 30, 1993. For example, 41 percent were
entered within 2 days and 61 percent within 1 week. These entry
times and others are shown in appendix II (table II.1).
"CAUTION" FUGITIVE ENTRIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
Agencies are to enter a caution notation on the wanted person file
records of fugitives who are considered dangerous or suicidal or who
have a serious medical condition. According to FBI and USMS
officials, most fugitives with a caution notation on their file
should be considered dangerous. Figure 2 illustrates the entry times
for the 7,864 FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service fugitive records
with a caution notation on the wanted person file as of April 6,
1994, and the entry times for the 1,838 of these caution-noted
records that were entered after September 30, 1993.
Figure 2: Caution Fugitive
Entries on the Wanted Person
File as of April 6, 1994
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
Despite the caution notation, as figure 2 shows, only 36 percent of
all caution fugitives were entered onto the file within 2 days and
slightly more than half (52 percent) were entered within 1 week.
Entry times were better for the records entered after September 30,
1993. For example, 42 percent were entered within 2 days and 59
percent within 1 week. These entry times and others are shown in
appendix II (table II.2).
AGENCIES DID NOT ALWAYS
COMPLY WITH THEIR OWN ENTRY
POLICIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4
As noted earlier, except for the Customs Service, the agencies whose
records we analyzed generally required that their fugitives be
entered onto the wanted person file soon after the arrest warrant was
issued. However, the agencies did not always comply with their own
policies. For example, the FBI's policy is to enter fugitives onto
the file as soon as the decision to make an arrest is made or
immediately after the arrest warrant is issued. The FBI has defined
"immediately" to mean not more than 24 hours after the arrest warrant
is issued because it believes that failure to promptly enter fugitive
records onto the file places every member of the criminal justice
system, as well as the general public, at risk. However, our
comparison of NCIC entries with arrest warrant dates revealed that
only 31 percent of the FBI's entries overall and 34 percent of
caution fugitive entries were made on the same day of the arrest
warrant, and 48 percent and 50 percent, respectively, were made by
the end of the next day. Table 1 shows the agencies' reported
policies for entering fugitives onto the NCIC wanted person file and
entry times for their fugitives on the file as of April 6, 1994.
Table 1
Reviewed Agencies' Policies and Entry
Times for All Fugitives and Caution
Fugitives as of April 6, 1994
Cauti Cauti Cauti Cauti
Agency Policy All on All on All on All on
-------- ---------------------------- --- ----- --- ----- --- ----- --- -----
FBI Written policy says enter 31 34 68 68 74 74 79 78
immediately after arrest
warrant issued or as soon (48 (50)
as arrest decision made. )
FBI officials told us, and
a 1991 written message to
all FBI offices stated,
that immediately meant
within 24 hours. Also, FBI
internal inspections used
24 hours in reviewing
entries made by FBI field
offices.
USMS Written policy says enter 11 11 52 44 62 54 70 61
immediately on receipt of
arrest warrant or (23 (20)
notification (escape )
cases). A key USMS official
said immediately meant
within 24 hours.
ATF\a Written policy says entry 3 3 21 21 34 34 49 49
may be delayed up to 10
days for a valid law (7) (7)
enforcement purpose. If a
person is known to have
fled, entry may be made
immediately after arrest
warrant issued.
Customs Written policy says enter 4 5 21 20 32 28 42 34
Service after all reasonable
efforts to locate and (7) (8)
arrest the fugitive have
failed. Reasonable is
defined as being after all
investigative leads on the
fugitive's location have
been exhausted.
INS Written policy provides no \b \b \b \b \b \b \b \b
time frame for making
entry.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a All but 9 of ATF's 493 fugitives were rated caution; thus, the
entry time percentages for all fugitives and caution fugitives were
the same.
\b We could not compute entry time because the wanted person file did
not have dates of documents authorizing apprehension.
Source: Agencies' policy guidance, interviews, and GAO analysis of
NCIC wanted person file.
Except for the Customs Service, the agencies' entry times for the
April 6, 1994, records that were entered onto the wanted person file
after September 30, 1993, were somewhat shorter than the times for
all of the April 6 fugitive records. For example, 79 percent of all
FBI records on the file as of April 6, 1994, were entered within 4
weeks versus 84 percent of the records entered after September 30,
1993. The Customs Service entered 42 percent of its April 6 records
within 4 weeks versus 31 percent of those entered after September 30,
1993. More statistics on entry times for records on the April 6
wanted person file are included in appendix II (tables II.3 through
II.6).
All of the agencies we contacted believed that unwarranted delays in
entering fugitives onto the wanted person file could adversely affect
timely apprehensions and endanger lives. Many fugitives are
apprehended by an agency other than the one responsible for entering
them onto the file. Therefore, timely entries onto the file allow
law enforcement agencies that come into contact with the fugitives
for other reasons, such as minor traffic violations, to check the
file and detain these fugitives immediately. NCIC officials told us
they developed a procedure to compensate, in part, for delayed
entries. Under this procedure, NCIC is to compare a new wanted
person file entry with all file queries made 72 hours prior to the
entry. When there is a match, NCIC officials are to notify the
involved agencies. While the fugitive, for example, may not have
been detained after a traffic stop because he or she was not on the
file when the query was made, the subsequent matching could provide
leads to the person's location. NCIC officials told us that in June
1995, for example, this procedure provided 369 leads from the wanted
or missing person files that resulted in 9 persons being arrested or
located. However, the officials did not know how many of the 369
leads involved fugitives who were not apprehended because they had
fled before the delayed match occurred.
AGENCIES HAD LIMITED DATA ON
ENTRY TIMES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Except for the FBI internal inspection program and USMS' program
reviews, the agencies we contacted did not systematically monitor or
have information on the time taken to enter fugitives on the wanted
person file. Nor did they have information on the reasons for delays
in entering fugitives. Moreover, NCIC had done limited reviews of
ATF's, the Customs Service's, and USMS' entry times on the wanted
person file.
The FBI's internal inspections are to include a review of entry times
for a sample of wanted person file records.\4 According to the FBI,
24 (or 65 percent) of the 37 FBI field office inspections completed
between October 1993 and July 1995 had findings regarding the failure
to make timely entries. For 21 of the 24 field office inspections,
officials reported that over 10 percent of the entries they reviewed
were not in compliance with entry time requirements. Of the 21
inspections, officials reported that 12 showed delays in over 30
percent of the entries reviewed and that 4 showed delays in over 50
percent of the entries reviewed.
Furthermore, 7 of the 24 inspections reported a median delay of 1
week or more, 10 were less than a week, and 7 did not identify the
number of days the entries had been delayed. The reports generally
did not identify reasons for delayed entries, but officials
recommended that the office heads strengthen administrative controls
to prevent future delays.
Also, 3 of the 24 reports noted that entry delays were found during
the preceding review of the involved offices. The remaining 21
reports, based on data the FBI provided us, made no mention of prior
inspections. Of the 21 reports, 7 were done during fiscal year 1995.
On the basis of information provided by the FBI during our previous
fugitive work, we determined that at least three of the seven reports
involved offices that were found to have entry time problems during
their prior inspections.
According to a USMS program review official, its internal program
reviews involved looking at some fugitive cases, and these reviews
generally found that entries were made within 1 or 2 days after the
arrest warrant date.
NCIC officials told us that they had reviewed wanted person file use
by ATF, the Customs Service, and USMS at least once since 1992. The
officials do not review FBI use, relying instead on the FBI's
inspection program. An NCIC 1995 report covering various federal
agencies, including ATF and the Customs Service, reported problems
with one of the Customs Service communications centers that entered
records onto the wanted person file.\5 The report stated that there
was a significant delay in entering records and that the average
delay ranged from 1 week to 1 month. It did not identify the number
of records with problems or the reasons for delays. But, it noted
that a Customs Service headquarters official contacted the
communications center about taking corrective action. Another NCIC
1995 report involving a review of selected USMS offices and other
agencies reported that all records reviewed had been entered in a
timely manner.\6
--------------------
\4 FBI inspection policy has been to review each field office and
headquarters every 2 years. However, FBI inspection officials told
us they expected to move to a 3-year review cycle.
\5 Treasury Enforcement Communications System II, February 6-22,
1995.
\6 Department of Justice: Justice Telecommunications System, January
17-27, 1995.
SOME AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN AND/OR
ARE CONSIDERING VARIOUS ACTIONS
TO FACILITATE TIMELY ENTRIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service officials we briefed on the
results of our analyses of the wanted person file generally expressed
concern about our findings. None could explain specifically why
entries were delayed. They believed that some were the result of
employees becoming involved with higher priority matters (e.g.,
responding to another more immediate case) or delaying entry for a
valid law enforcement purpose (e.g., the opportunity to
simultaneously arrest several suspects). However, all agreed that
some delays were due to the lack of oversight or various other
problems that could be addressed. For example, USMS officials said
there might have been some delays in their being notified by (1) the
courts of persons who failed to make a required court appearance or
(2) the Drug Enforcement Administration regarding drug case fugitives
that the USMS is responsible for pursuing.\7
As a result of our work, FBI, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service
officials committed to examining their more recent entry times and
identifying actions they would take, if necessary, to address any
problems. Because of our findings regarding these agencies' entry
times, INS officials also said they would take action to help ensure
that INS field offices submit their fugitive cases for entry onto the
wanted person file in a timely manner.
A Supervisory Special Agent representing the FBI Violent Crime and
Fugitive unit in headquarters said his unit reviewed the entry times
for all entries to the wanted person file from January 1994 through
June 1995. He said they found that 58 percent of their fugitives had
been entered within 1 day after the date of the arrest warrant and 78
percent within 10 days. These times were better than the overall
rates (48 percent by the next day and 79 percent within 4 weeks) we
found for all FBI fugitives on the April 6, 1994, wanted person file.
The FBI official further stated that the entry times for the persons
wanted for the federal crime of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution
were much better (80 percent entered in 1 day) than the entry times
(40 percent entered in 1 day) for those wanted for other federal
crimes, such as bank robbery. In commenting on a draft of this
report, FBI officials noted that it was imperative that delays be
kept to an absolute minimum and that they would continue efforts to
minimize entry delays. They said that the FBI inspection program
would continue to audit the field offices' entries to help ensure the
timely entry of fugitives without unmitigated delay.
USMS officials said they would review their entry times and, if
necessary, send out reminders to their field offices about prompt
entries. Entry within 24 hours is one of the new performance
measures they plan to use for field offices. The officials believe
that this, along with their internal reviews and the periodic NCIC
audits, should minimize any future problems with entry times.
ATF officials said they reviewed some of their recent entries and the
fugitive cases from our work involving entry times over 3 months,
which we provided at their request. They said that their review
validated our findings and that they advised the agents in charge of
the involved ATF field offices of the problems and the need for
corrective action. Overall, ATF officials said they would enhance
their capacity to monitor entry times and identify problems.
Specifically, they said their communications center will obtain more
information when making entries onto the wanted person file as
requested by ATF's field offices. The field offices are to be
contacted about entries made after 15 days (ATF's 10-day period when
entry may be delayed for a valid reason plus a 5-day grace period).
The officials also noted that ATF's communications center staff will
review entry times during the periodic validation checks they make of
the agency's wanted person file records. They also stated that ATF's
internal inspections staff will consider looking at entry times when
they conduct inspections of ATF's field offices. ATF officials said
they expected a marked improvement in their entry times within a
year.
The Customs Service's National Fugitive Program Coordinator said he
reviewed recent entries to the wanted person file and noted that
improvements in entry times were needed. He plans to monitor entry
times and contact field office officials as needed. He also noted
that the Customs Service is revising its entry criteria to state:
"Effective immediately, whenever an arrest warrant is issued
pursuant to a Customs investigation and the arrest of the
subject is not anticipated within a reasonable amount of time, a
Customs Fugitive Report will be faxed to the Communications
Center (for entry into NCIC) within 24 hours. A reasonable
amount of time should be that operationally necessary to effect
the arrest of the subject, but should not exceed 10 days."
Furthermore, the Customs Service's coordinator said the criteria will
note that there can be exceptions, such as the need to avoid
interference with an ongoing investigation. When the delay is no
longer needed, the reason for the delay is to be identified on the
submitted fugitive report. Customs Service officials also told us
that their agency's office that oversees periodic validation checks
of Customs Service wanted person file records will now also look at
entry times and will use "within 24 hours" as the criterion for
timely entry.
As a result of our findings involving other law enforcement agencies
and their desire to address problems that may exist or occur, INS
officials told us they will add a reminder about the need for timely
entries on the form that their field offices complete and that INS
headquarters officials then use to make entries to the wanted person
file. Noting that INS had only been using the file since 1991, the
officials said they expect, as their use of NCIC grows, to develop
improved ways for promoting timely use of the wanted person file as
well as other NCIC files.
USMS, ATF, Customs Service, and INS officials noted that the periodic
audits of the wanted person file by NCIC officials would help
agencies identify problem areas. However, NCIC officials told us
that they are now doing less checking of entry times because of
increased workload and staff downsizing.
--------------------
\7 Under the 1988 Justice Department policy on fugitive apprehension,
the Drug Enforcement Administration usually transfers responsibility
for drug crime fugitives not caught within 7 days to USMS.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The FBI, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service entered many fugitives
onto the wanted person file long after their arrest had been
authorized. This occurred despite policies generally calling for
quick entry and the view that use of the wanted person file aids
apprehension and public and law enforcement personnel safety. In
response to our findings, the FBI, ATF, and the Customs Service did
their own reviews and noted similar entry time problems. USMS
officials said they would review their entry times.
Given the concern about public and law enforcement personnel safety
and fugitive apprehension, we believe it is important that NCIC and
its participating agencies have clear, written policies calling for
and defining immediate entry and setting forth any exceptions. While
there seems to be agreement on the need for prompt entry, there is no
generally accepted definition of immediate entry. However, a
consensus seems to be evolving, at least among the agencies we
reviewed. NCIC officials consider entry after 24 hours to be
untimely, although NCIC has not made this a part of its written
policies. FBI and USMS officials told us that although a definition
does not appear in written form, immediate entry meant within 24
hours. The Customs Service plans to adopt and put the 24-hour
criterion in writing. Exceptions to immediate entry could be allowed
for those cases where an arrest is expected to occur quickly or for
other established operational reasons. Furthermore, adherence to the
policies could be better ensured if the agencies periodically
monitored and reviewed entry times and reasons for delays and
communicated problems and suggested actions to their field offices.
Finally, although we did not examine the entry times for all law
enforcement agencies in the Departments of Justice and the Treasury,
we believe that the same reasons for timely entry generally would
apply to these other agencies. Moreover, it seems reasonable that
timely entries would be of concern to law enforcement organizations
in other federal agencies.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We recommend that the Attorney General require the Directors of the
FBI and USMS and the Commissioner of INS and that the Secretary of
the Treasury require the Director of ATF and the Commissioner of the
Customs Service to ensure that they have written policies that
require immediate entry of fugitives onto the NCIC wanted person
file, unless imminent arrest is expected or other mitigating reasons
exist. In this regard, we also recommend that the Attorney General,
as the official ultimately responsible for NCIC and the wanted person
file, seek consensus among federal law enforcement agencies on a
definition of immediate entry and include this definition as guidance
in the NCIC operating policies on the use of the wanted person file.
To ensure that timely entries are made, we recommend that the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury require the agency
heads to establish and implement measures for ensuring compliance
with the policy for immediate entry of fugitives' data onto the NCIC
wanted person file, including periodically reviewing entry times and
identifying and evaluating reasons for delays.
Also, we recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Treasury require the heads of other agencies within their respective
Departments that use the wanted person file to determine whether they
have adequate entry time policies and monitoring mechanisms and, if
not, to establish such policies and mechanisms. Furthermore, we
recommend that the Attorney General require the FBI Director, working
with the NCIC Advisory Policy Board, to (1) advise law enforcement
organizations in federal departments and agencies outside of the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury of the importance of timely
entry and (2) encourage them to determine whether they have adequate
entry time policies and monitoring mechanisms.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Treasury. Responsible Department of
Justice officials from the Office of the Assistant Attorney General
for Administration, the FBI, INS, and USMS provided Justice's
comments in a meeting on December 11, 1995. Responsible Department
of the Treasury officials from the Office of the Under Secretary for
Enforcement, ATF, and the Customs Service provided Treasury's
comments in a meeting on December 5, 1995.\8
Justice officials said that the Department generally agreed with our
findings and recommendations and that the Department's component
agencies recognize the need for timely wanted person entries to
protect law enforcement officers and the general public and to assist
in the location of criminal and alien absconders. They said,
however, that setting a single policy for timeliness and measuring
timeliness is not a simple matter. They specifically noted the
following.
A myriad of reasons may preclude the entry of a wanted person
within 24 hours of the date of the warrant. For example, entry
might be delayed because of (1) insufficient data (e.g., date of
birth) to properly identify the fugitive; (2) circumstances
germane to a particular case (e.g., where the subject is given
opportunity to surrender in exchange for the subject's
cooperation); or (3) the involvement of sealed indictments,
particularly in multiple subject cases where the government does
not want to disclose ongoing investigations not ready for
indictment.
When modifying records, it is sometimes easier to delete the entry
and reenter it. This would result in an entry date on the
wanted person file that appears to be late, but does not reflect
the earlier data entry.
Compelling the entry of all INS fugitive alien cases within a
specific time frame will not meet the criteria required for
successful conclusion of the cases in many instances. For
example, in INS' failure to surrender cases, entry is dependent
on meeting certain criteria (e.g., has failed to appear for
deportation upon demand by INS) rather than a specific time.
When measuring timeliness, it would be more useful to evaluate the
reasons for delayed entry rather than reviewing the entry's date
against that of the warrant.
We recognize that not all fugitives can or should be entered onto the
wanted person file within a short time frame and that some entry
dates on the file may be incorrect. How much of the delay we found
is due to valid reasons or incorrect dates is unknown. We noted
earlier in this report that the agencies could not explain
specifically why entries were delayed but did identify both valid and
invalid reasons why delays might occur (see pp. 11-12). Our
recommendations recognize that entry policies need to allow for
delays for valid reasons and that monitoring mechanisms need to
identify and evaluate reasons why specific entries were delayed.
Furthermore, we believe that the findings of the FBI's inspection
program, the checks made by ATF and Customs Service officials after
we brought our findings to their attention, and the agencies' overall
agreement with our findings and recommendations make it clear that
substantial delays have occurred for invalid reasons and that the
agencies can improve upon the entry times we found.
Also, the Justice officials said that despite the many reasons for
delaying entry and INS' particular situation, actions have been taken
or are being taken to better define and ensure timely entry of
fugitives onto the wanted person file. Concerning changes to overall
NCIC policy guidance, they said that any changes must be made
pursuant to established procedures and that the FBI would formally
submit our recommendations for review by the NCIC's Advisory Policy
Board during meetings to be held in the spring of 1996. The Justice
officials also noted that the FBI, INS, and USMS are initiating or
have been using systems for ensuring timeliness of fugitive entries.
They cited the FBI inspection program, which they said recently
identified a 22-percent unmitigated delay in fugitive entries in one
field office and led to the office taking corrective action.
Referring to plans for the USMS to take over responsibility for INS'
criminal fugitives, they noted that INS plans to meet the USMS entry
criteria (i.e., immediate entry, which USMS officials earlier told us
meant within 24 hours).\9 They also noted that USMS plans to evaluate
entry times as part of a system to assess the performance of its
field offices on fugitive cases.
Treasury officials generally agreed with the recommendations we made
to their Department. Furthermore, given that Treasury works closely
with Justice to address federal law enforcement issues, the Under
Secretary's representative expressed Treasury's interest in working
with Justice to address our recommendations to seek a consensus on a
definition of immediate entry and to bring the need for adequate
entry time policies and monitoring mechanisms to the attention of
other federal law enforcement organizations.
Concerning specific agency actions, the ATF officials noted that ATF
(1) issued a memorandum to its field offices in 1995 reiterating its
entry time policy and outlining steps taken or planned to enforce it,
including establishing audit and follow-up procedures, and (2) will
further revise its policy guidance to call for entry within 24 hours.
The Customs' official noted that the Customs Service has issued
revised policy guidance to require entry within 24 hours and will
follow through on measures to ensure compliance as discussed on page
13 of this report.
--------------------
\8 Representatives at these meetings included (1) Justice's Audit
Liaison in the Office of the Assistant Attorney General for
Administration and (2) Treasury's Director of the Office of Finance
and Administration in the Office of the Under Secretary for
Enforcement.
\9 INS is negotiating a memorandum of understanding with USMS under
which USMS, among other things, will be responsible for entering on
the wanted person file an INS fugitive who is the subject of a
criminal arrest warrant. This does not include aliens who are wanted
by INS for deportation as described in the footnote on page 22 of
this report.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and members. We are also sending copies to the heads of
various other federal agencies that had records on the April 6, 1994,
wanted person file for their information. These agencies include the
Department of Defense, Department of State, and the U.S. Postal
Service. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. If
you have any questions concerning this report, please call me on
(202) 512-8777.
Norman J. Rabkin
Director, Administration
of Justice Issues
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
Our overall objective was to follow up on information from earlier
work that seemed to show that federal law enforcement agencies were
not timely entering in their fugitives onto the NCIC wanted person
file. Specifically, we sought to identify (1) how long federal
agencies took to enter fugitives onto the wanted person file; (2)
what information the agencies had on entry times and the means used
to monitor entry times; and (3) what actions agencies took,
considered, or could take to reduce any entry delays. We focused on
the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service. These agencies
accounted for 78 percent of the records on the April 1994 wanted
person file that we acquired during our earlier work. They were also
the principal fugitive-hunting agencies within the Justice and
Treasury Departments, the two departments mainly addressed in our
earlier fugitive work.
To accomplish our objectives, we analyzed principally the wanted
person file data obtained on a prior review of interagency
cooperation of federal fugitive activities. We also interviewed
officials and reviewed various documents obtained at the headquarters
offices of the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service. The
wanted person data involved federal fugitive records on the wanted
person file as of April 6, 1994. We did not update these data by
obtaining and analyzing more recent files since the agencies
expressed the willingness to look into or otherwise act to address
actual or potential problems with entry time.
Sufficient data were available on the wanted person file we earlier
obtained to identify the elapsed time between the date of the arrest
warrant, or other document authorizing apprehension, and the date of
record entry for at least 99 percent of the April 6, 1994, individual
records of the FBI, USMS, ATF, and the Customs Service. INS' wanted
person file records did not have this information and thus were
excluded from our analysis.\1 Table I.1 shows by agency the number of
records we analyzed.
Table I.1
Number of Wanted Person File Records
Used in Analysis of Entry Times
Cautio
n
notati
Those on
entere entere
d Those d
after with after
9/30/ caution 9/30/
Agency All 93 notation 93
---------------------------------- ------ ------ ---------- ------
FBI 5,593 1,275 3,325 820
USMS 14,048 2,284 3,960 895
ATF 493 118 484 116
Customs Service 834 117 95 7
======================================================================
Total 20,968 3,794 7,864 1,838
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
We briefed FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, and Customs Service officials
responsible for fugitive policies on the results of our analyses. We
also interviewed them as to any (1) current information they might
have on entry policies and times; (2) means their agencies had for
staying abreast of entry times and for ensuring timely entries; (3)
known or possible causes and effects of delayed entries; and (4)
actions that had been taken to address entry time problems or actions
that would be or could be taken as a result of our findings. We also
interviewed NCIC officials and FBI and USMS officials responsible for
conducting reviews of field office operations (called "inspections"
in FBI and "program reviews" in USMS) about their findings regarding
entry times. We reviewed sections of inspection reports that
represented, according to FBI officials, all findings on entry time
problems from inspections conducted from October 1993 to July 1995.
We did not review any USMS reports since officials told us they
generally did not find problems with entry times. Officials at the
other agencies we contacted said they did not have such reviews (INS)
or that their reviews did not look at entry times (ATF and the
Customs Service).
We also interviewed a representative of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police about the importance of the wanted person file in
fugitive apprehension and public and law enforcement personnel
safety.
--------------------
\1 According to INS officials, INS' wanted person file records mostly
involved (a) other than Mexican aliens who had been ordered deported
for entering the United States illegally and the entry was within the
previous 5 years and (b) aliens who were ordered deported based on a
criminal conviction or an aggravated felony due to legal opinions
requiring underlying criminal activity. For these wanted persons,
INS entered the date of the general deportation order but not the
date of the document authorizing apprehension because of the alien's
subsequent failure to surrender for deportation or the alien's escape
from custody.
ENTRY TIMES FOR FUGITIVE RECORDS
ON THE WANTED PERSON FILE AS OF
APRIL 6, 1994
========================================================== Appendix II
Table II.1
Fugitive Entries on the Wanted Person
File as of April 6, 1994
Those
entered
after 9/30/
Entered within All 93
------------------------------------------------ ------ ------------
Same day 16 22
Next day 28 36
2 days 34 41
1 week 54 61
2 weeks 64 70
3 weeks 68 73
4 weeks 70 75
3 months 80 85
6 months 84 90
1 year 88 94
Over 1 year 100 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
Table II.2
Caution Fugitive Entries on the Wanted
Person File as of April 6, 1994
Those
entered
after 9/30/
Entered within All 93
------------------------------------------------ ------ ------------
Same day 20 28
Next day 32 39
2 days 36 42
1 week 52 59
2 weeks 61 66
3 weeks 64 69
4 weeks 67 71
3 months 77 82
6 months 82 90
1 year 86 93
Over 1 year 100 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
Table II.3
Entry Times by Agency for Fugitives on
the Wanted Person File as of April 6,
1994
(Numbers in percents)
Custom
s
Servic
Entered within FBI USMS ATF e
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Same day 31 11 3 4
Next day 48 23 7 7
2 days 53 29 9 10
1 week 68 52 21 21
2 weeks 74 62 34 32
4 weeks 79 70 49 42
3 months 86 79 71 64
6 months 89 83 79 75
1 year 91 87 88 84
Over 1 year 100 100 100 100
Average (days) 201 269 220 267
Median (days) 2 7 29 41
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
Table II.4
Entry Times by Agency for April 6, 1994,
Fugitive Records Entered on the Wanted
Person File After September 30, 1993
(Numbers in percents)
Custom
s
Servic
Entered within FBI USMS ATF e
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Same day 44 12 3 5
Next day 61 25 9 9
2 days 65 31 11 9
1 week 76 58 21 17
2 weeks 81 68 32 24
4 weeks 84 74 52 31
3 months 94 82 71 60
6 months 96 89 81 70
1 year 97 93 88 87
Over 1 year 100 100 100 100
Average (days) 51 118 262 231
Median (days) 1 6 28 55
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
Table II.5
Entry Times by Agency for April 6, 1994,
Wanted Persons With Caution Notation on
Record
(Numbers in percents)
Custom
s
Servic
Entered within FBI USMS ATF e
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Same day 34 11 3 5
Next day 50 20 7 8
2 days 55 25 9 14
1 week 68 44 21 20
2 weeks 74 54 34 28
4 weeks 78 61 49 34
3 months 85 71 71 59
6 months 87 78 79 67
1 year 90 82 88 81
Over 1 year 100 100 100 100
Average (days) 245 351 218 404
Median (days) 1 11 29 42
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
Table II.6
Entry Times by Agency for April 6, 1994,
Wanted Persons With Caution Notation
Entered on the Wanted Person File After
September 30, 1993
(Numbers in percents)
Custom
s
Servic
Entered within FBI USMS ATF e
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Same day 48 13 3 29
Next day 63 21 10 29
2 days 66 25 11 29
1 week 75 49 22 29
2 weeks 79 60 32 29
4 weeks 82 64 52 29
3 months 94 73 72 71
6 months 96 86 81 71
1 year 97 90 89 100
Over 1 year 100 100 100 100
Average (days) 60 155 263 88
Median (days) 1 8 28 58
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of NCIC wanted person file.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Daniel C. Harris, Assistant Director, Administration of Justice
Issues
Carl Trisler, Evaluator-in-Charge
Andrew Goldberg, Intern
Pamela V. Williams, Communications Analyst
David Alexander, Senior Social Science Analyst
*** End of document. ***