Violent Crime: Federal Law Enforcement Assistance in Fighting Los Angeles
Gang Violence (Letter Report, 09/06/96, GAO/GGD-96-150).

GAO reviewed how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
federal agencies worked with local law enforcement agencies to target
gangs in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

GAO found that: (1) FBI provided assistance to local law enforcement in
the Los Angeles area through the Los Angeles Metropolitan Task Force on
Violent Crime; (2) federal assistance provided through the task force
included the use of federal laws and authority not otherwise available
to local law enforcement, personnel, overtime pay, office space, various
types of equipment, and funding for law enforcement activities; (3)
local law enforcement officials believed that the task force enhanced
their ability to conduct long-term, proactive investigations into entire
gangs rather than short-term, reactive investigations; (4) local law
enforcement officers believed that, overall, federal assistance helped
to reduce gang violence; and (5) local law enforcement officers believed
that the number of FBI agents assigned to the task force was
insufficient, agent turnover hindered operations, and a lack of cellular
telephones hindered operations.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GGD-96-150
     TITLE:  Violent Crime: Federal Law Enforcement Assistance in 
             Fighting Los Angeles Gang Violence
      DATE:  09/06/96
   SUBJECT:  Gangs
             Federal aid for criminal justice
             Law enforcement agencies
             Crimes or offenses
             Arrests
             Intergovernmental relations
IDENTIFIER:  DOJ Anti-Violent Crime Initiative
             Los Angeles (CA)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Attorney General

September 1996

VIOLENT CRIME - FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE IN FIGHTING
LOS ANGELES GANG VIOLENCE

GAO/GGD-96-150

Federal Assistance in Fighting Gang Violence

(182000)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
  DOJ - Department of Justice
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  GREAT - Gang Reporting Evaluation and Tracking database
  PCP - phencyclidine

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-260641

September 6, 1996

The Honorable Janet Reno
The Attorney General

Dear Madam Attorney General: 

In announcing the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Anti-Violent Crime
Initiative in March 1994, you emphasized that violent crime had
traditionally been left to state and local governments and that the
federal role would be to form a partnership with state and local
governments.  To learn more about the partnership concept and federal
assistance to local governments in fighting gang violence, we
reviewed how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
federal investigative agencies worked with local law enforcement
agencies to target gangs in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  This
review, done on a self-initiated basis, evolved from our earlier
efforts on DOJ priorities in eight selected U.S.  Attorney districts. 
Those efforts included the Central District of California, which
covers Los Angeles.\1

Our review objectives were to determine and describe

  -- how and what federal law enforcement assistance was provided to
     local law enforcement in the Los Angeles area to fight gang
     violence,

  -- how useful Los Angeles area local law enforcement officials
     believed federal assistance was in fighting gang violence, and

  -- what results Los Angeles area local law enforcement officials
     believed were achieved from joint efforts to fight gang
     violence. 

While limited to one metropolitan area, what we learned about federal
law enforcement efforts targeting gangs in Los Angeles-- one of the
areas in the country with the most gangs and gang members-- may be
useful as the administration seeks to direct federal efforts
targeting gangs elsewhere. 


--------------------
\1 U.S.  Attorneys:  More Accountability for Implementing Priority
Programs Is Desirable (GAO/GGD-95-150, June 23, 1995). 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

To obtain local views on the usefulness of federal assistance, we
conducted structured interviews with 37 members of local law
enforcement agencies that participated in the principal federal
anti-violent crime task force for metropolitan Los Angeles.\2 We
interviewed 3 levels of employees within the local law enforcement
agencies that participated in the task force:  24 participating line
officers, 8 supervisory officers, and 5 agency heads or agency
representatives.  For reporting purposes, we combined the responses
of the 8 supervisory officers and the 5 agency heads or
representatives into 1 category of 13 responses, which we refer to in
this report as responses from local officials. 

We also conducted structured interviews with representatives of nine
local law enforcement agencies that did not participate in the task
force to obtain their views on federal anti-gang assistance.\3 In
addition, federal and local law enforcement agencies provided
statistics on the results of task force efforts.  A detailed
description of our objectives, scope, and methodology is contained in
appendix I. 

We performed our work in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, CA, from
March 1995 through April 1996 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.  We requested comments on a draft of
this report from the Attorney General.  Responsible Department of
Justice officials provided comments, which are discussed at the end
of this letter. 


--------------------
\2 Local law enforcement agencies that participated in the Los
Angeles Metropolitan Task Force at the time of our review included
the Compton, Inglewood, Long Beach, and Los Angeles Police
Departments and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. 

\3 The local law enforcement agencies we contacted that were not
participating in the LA Task Force at the time of our review were the
Gardena, Hawthorne, Irwindale, Pasadena, San Bernardino, Santa
Monica, and West Covina Police Departments and the Riverside County
and San Bernardino Sheriff's Departments. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

On the basis of discussions with federal and local law enforcement
personnel in the Central District of California, we determined that
federal law enforcement assistance provided to combat gangs during
the time of our review consisted primarily of the use of federal laws
and authority not otherwise available to local law enforcement
agencies (e.g., prosecutive and wiretap authority); funds; equipment;
and personnel.  Such assistance was provided principally through task
forces of federal and local law enforcement officers-- mainly the Los
Angeles Metropolitan Task Force on Violent Crime (LA Task Force). 
This FBI-led task force consisted of several squads, most of which
targeted gangs that committed violent crimes, with each squad usually
focusing on a different gang. 

Five of the 47 local law enforcement agencies that we identified in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area participated in the LA Task Force. 
According to the head of the LA Task Force, given its resource
constraints, the FBI, in the wake of the Los Angeles riots of 1992,
tried to target those localities that had the greatest gang problems
and where it believed its resources could have the most impact.  The
majority of local law enforcement officials we contacted, including
agencies that were not participating in the task force, believed the
FBI had selected the appropriate targets.  Representatives of seven
of the nine nonparticipating agencies we contacted stated that either
their gang problems did not warrant the agencies' participating or
that they did not have the resources to participate.  According to
the head of the LA Task Force, nonparticipating agencies generally
did not receive the amount and types of FBI assistance on gangs
generally available to task force participants. 

Fifteen of the 18 local line officers we interviewed who expressed an
opinion believed that the task force met their overall needs to a
great extent.  The line officers were most satisfied with wiretap
assistance, money received to pay informants, and funding for drug or
gun purchases in undercover operations. 

Eight of the 13 local law enforcement officials we interviewed who
expressed an opinion believed that task force efforts had reduced
gang violence.  While they differed as to the extent of the impact,
six of the eight officials believed that task force efforts had a
significant or great impact overall.  FBI statistics showed that from
February 1992 through September 1995, the LA Task Force was
responsible for 156 federal convictions and 119 state convictions,
about three-fourths on violent crime charges.  Some local officials
also credited the task force with reducing the crime rates in certain
neighborhoods.  Others credited the task force with making it safe
for children to play outdoors again. 

Of the 24 line officers we interviewed, 21 stated that their agencies
could not obtain similar results without using federal task forces. 
In this regard, most of the line officers mentioned long-term,
proactive investigations of entire gangs as an advantageous element
differentiating the federal task force approach to violent crime from
local law enforcement's approach, which generally involves
short-term, reactive investigations of individual gang members. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Violent crime, which had been a DOJ priority since 1989, became the
Department's top priority in March 1994 with the announcement of the
Anti-Violent Crime Initiative--a nationwide program to establish
partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement to
address major violent crime problems, including gangs.  Moreover, in
his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1996, the President
cited taking back our streets from gangs and drugs as our nation's
fourth great challenge.  Specifically, the President said: 

     "Our next step in the fight against crime is to take on gangs
     the way we once took on the Mob.  I am directing the FBI and
     other investigative agencies to target gangs that involve
     juveniles in violent crime and to seek authority to prosecute,
     as adults, teenagers who maim and kill like adults."

Members of Congress also have expressed concern over youth and gang
violence.  For example, at February 1994 hearings held to formulate
an effective federal response to the gang problem in America the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary stated: 

     "Not too long ago, the Federal Government believed that street
     crime was not its business, but today, we recognize that violent
     gang crime is a national problem and one that we must do our
     share to address."\4

In this regard, Title XV of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, P.L.  103-322 (1994), strengthened federal
laws dealing with criminal street gangs.  Also, Congress has funded
federal efforts to assist state and local law enforcement in fighting
violent crime. 

According to DOJ, the nationwide growth in violent crime can be tied
closely to the development of gangs.  Although definitive statistics
were not available, law enforcement professionals believed that gang
violence was a factor--and perhaps the primary factor--in the
increase in violent crime during the past decade.  DOJ's 1995
report\5

on its anti-violent crime initiative emphasized that violent gang
members threatened the safety and stability of neighborhoods,
inflicted fear and bodily harm on others through the commission of
crime, and robbed residents of the ability to enjoy their streets and
homes.  Many jurisdictions had focused their efforts on dismantling
violent criminal gangs. 

The Los Angeles District Attorney's Office estimated that in May 1992
there were 1,000 gangs with 150,000 members in Los Angeles County. 
The District Attorney also reported in 1992 that gangs had been
responsible for virtually all growth in the number of homicides since
1984, and that half of all gang members participate in violence.\6 In
addition, Los Angeles-based gangs have migrated to other communities
around the country, according to studies sponsored by the National
Institutes of Justice and the National Drug Intelligence Center.\7

The LA Task Force grew out of the Los Angeles riots of 1992 as
federal and local law enforcement combined resources to address gang
violence.  According to the FBI and other sources, much of the damage
caused in the riots could be attributed to acts instigated by
specific gangs.  Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, the FBI
made the development of a joint federal, state, and local effort to
fight gang violence a major emphasis of its anti-violent crime
strategy for the Central District of California, which includes Los
Angeles.\8 This strategy, which was developed primarily by the FBI
agent in charge of the LA Task Force, emphasized targeting violent
gangs in neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime. 

The LA Task Force was formalized in October 1992 by written agreement
between the FBI and participating local law enforcement agencies
covering, among other things, roles and responsibilities.  An FBI
representative was to assume the role of program manager for all task
force operations and was to receive input from leaders of the
participating agencies.  The FBI was to provide necessary resources
for the task force, including vehicles, when requested and if
possible.  The original agreement included the FBI; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); the Immigration and
Naturalization Service; the Compton, Inglewood, Long Beach, and Los
Angeles Police Departments; and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department. 

The original mission of the LA Task Force was to identify and
prosecute those individuals responsible for committing violent crimes
during the 1992 riots.  There was particular emphasis on perpetrators
associated with violence-prone street gangs, especially gang leaders
and core members.  After completing its efforts related to the riots,
the LA Task Force's mission was broadened to include the
identification and prosecution of the most criminally active and
violent individuals and enterprises in the Los Angeles metropolitan
area, but the emphasis on gang-related violence was maintained. 

The total authorized fiscal year 1996 budget for the LA Task Force
was almost $394,000.  This did not include undisclosed confidential
expenditures for specific investigations. 


--------------------
\4 The Gang Problem in America:  Formulating an Effective Federal
Response:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.  1,2 (1994). 

\5 Anti-Violent Crime Initiative:  The Attorney General's Report to
the President--The First Year (March 1994 - February 1995), U.S. 
Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.:  Mar.  27, 1995). 

\6 Gangs, Crime, and Violence in Los Angeles:  Findings and Proposals
From the District Attorney's Office, the Office of the District
Attorney, County of Los Angeles, May 1992. 

\7 Prosecuting Gangs:  A National Assessment, National Institute of
Justice, U.S.  Department of Justice, February 1995; Bloods & Crips
Gang Survey Report, National Drug Intelligence Center, May 20, 1994. 

\8 The Central District Court of California includes Los Angeles,
Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San
Luis Obispo counties, which have a combined population estimated at
over 16 million. 


   FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL LAW
   ENFORCEMENT IN THE LOS ANGELES
   AREA WAS PROVIDED MAINLY
   THROUGH THE LA TASK FORCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

According to the various federal and local law enforcement personnel
in the Los Angeles area whom we interviewed, federal law enforcement
assistance targeted directly at gangs in the area consisted primarily
of the use of federal laws and authority not otherwise available to
local law enforcement agencies, funds, equipment, and personnel. 
Such assistance was provided principally through task forces of
federal and local law enforcement officers-- mainly the FBI-led LA
Task Force.  This task force consisted of several squads, each of
which targeted a specific crime problem, such as fugitives, or a
specific crime, such as bank robbery.  Within their areas, most
squads targeted gangs that committed violent crimes, and each squad
usually focused on a different gang.  Five of the 47 law enforcement
agencies we identified in the Los Angeles metropolitan area
participated in the LA Task Force. 

Assistance provided through the LA Task Force included the use of
federal laws and authority (including prosecutive, wiretap, and
witness security assistance); overtime pay; office space; various
types of equipment; personnel; and money for undercover drug/firearms
purchases and informants.  For example, according to DOJ and FBI
officials, FBI expenses approved (in September 1995) for fiscal year
1996 in support of state/local officers participating on the LA Task
Force included the following. 

  -- Rental and maintenance expenses for 36 automobiles at a total
     cost of $298,350. 

  -- Rental expenses for 120 pagers at total cost of $8,740. 

  -- Rental expenses for 48 cellular phones and associated airtime at
     a total cost of $77,760. 

  -- Expenses of $9,052 for the operation of covert telephone lines
     and the maintenance of various task force equipment. 

In addition, the FBI reimbursed about $80,000 to state/local agencies
in the Los Angeles area to provide for the payment of overtime to
officers participating on the LA Task Force. 

The FBI agent in charge of the task force said that nonparticipating
agencies generally did not receive the amount and types of FBI
assistance available to the five agencies formally participating in
the task force.  However, according to other FBI officials, training,
forensic services, fugitive apprehension, and various other
specialized types of assistance could be made available to any local
law enforcement agency through less formal, "as needed" arrangements. 

Besides the assistance provided directly through the task force, 7 of
the 13 local law enforcement officials we interviewed said their
agencies received other federal law enforcement assistance, such as
training.  Six of the seven officials indicated that obtaining such
assistance was facilitated directly by their agency's participation
in the task force. 

As previously noted, 5 of the 47 local law enforcement agencies in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area that we identified participated in
the LA Task Force.  The FBI agent-in-charge of the LA Task Force
stated that given its resource constraints, the FBI, in the wake of
the Los Angeles riots of 1992, tried to target those localities that
had the greatest gang problems and where it believed its resources
could have the most impact.  According to the agent-in- charge, the
five participating agencies were selected on this basis. 

The majority of local law enforcement officials we contacted believed
that the FBI had selected the appropriate targets and expressed no
concerns about not having been invited, or being able, to
participate.  We contacted representatives from nine agencies in the
Central District whose jurisdictions had relatively high rates of
violent crime but were not participating in the task force.  Seven of
the nine agencies' representatives stated that either their gang
problems did not warrant federal task force involvement or that their
agencies did not have the resources to participate in a task force
even if they would have been invited, or had wanted, to participate. 
The remaining two agencies' representatives indicated that they had
gang problems and expressed interest in participating in the task
force, given the opportunity.  Also, seven of the nine
representatives expressed the belief that if their agencies needed
federal assistance on a gang problem, it would be available from the
local FBI office on an as-needed basis.  The remaining two agency
representatives had no opinion. 

Even those local agencies that were involved in the LA Task Force
could not always participate fully because of resource constraints. 
For example, one local law enforcement agency said it had to reduce
the personnel committed to the task force from 60 officers to 15
officers.  A representative of this agency stated that this reduction
represented tight budgetary conditions in the agency, not
dissatisfaction with task force results, and that many of these
officers had been reassigned to community policing\9 efforts, which
were a higher priority for the agency.  Another local law enforcement
agency intended to completely withdraw from the LA Task Force due to
budget restrictions, but the FBI persuaded the agency to continue
because the agency's participation was critical in completing an
anti-gang effort. 

In addition to the FBI-led LA Task Force, ATF, according to agency
officials, provided direct assistance, such as personnel and
equipment, to local law enforcement agencies combating gangs, using
federal firearms laws and other laws against gang members.  ATF's
efforts, according to the officials, were smaller than the FBI's and
less formal in that they did not always involve formal task forces. 
In this regard, they said that ATF-led task forces, in contrast to
the FBI's LA Task Force, usually targeted a specific local gang
problem and consisted of one or two ATF agents working with local
police. 


--------------------
\9 Community policing has been generally defined as proactively
working with residents to prevent crime.  This represents a shift in
police efforts from a solely reactive response to crime.  Citizens,
police departments, and other agencies work together to identify
problems and apply appropriate problem-solving strategies. 


   LOS ANGELES AREA LAW
   ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL FOUND
   FEDERAL ASSISTANCE VERY USEFUL
   IN TARGETING GANG VIOLENCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Fifteen of the 18 local line officers we interviewed who expressed an
opinion felt that the LA Task Force met their overall needs to a
great extent.  We questioned them about the usefulness of specific
categories of federal assistance provided through the task force. 
About three-fourths of the line officers indicated that the
assistance was very useful in 8 of 11 categories of assistance.  (See
app.  II for the line officers' perceptions of the usefulness of the
specific categories of assistance.)

Of all the types of assistance received through the task force, the
line officers were most satisfied with wiretap assistance, money
received to pay informants, and funding for drug or gun purchases in
undercover operations.  The 16 who received wiretap assistance said
they found it to be very useful.  They cited the value of information
gained through wiretaps and the difficulty of doing them at the state
level.\10 Some line officers stated that their investigations could
not have been completed without wiretaps. 

The line officers we interviewed expressed some concerns about the
personnel assistance and equipment they received, as well as about
federal prosecution of targeted gang members, although more than half
believed that such assistance was very useful.  In regard to
personnel assistance, 10 of the 23 line officers who received such
assistance believed that the number of FBI agents assigned to their
squads was insufficient, and 5 believed that turnover in FBI agents
assigned to their squads hindered task force operations.  For
example, one line officer reported that some FBI agents were assigned
to his squad for only 6 months, which was not long enough for an
agent to gain an informant's trust and work effectively with him. 
Eight line officers also said FBI agents' lack of street experience
hindered task force operations. 

Four line officers expressed concern that some of the FBI agents who
participated in the task force were not interested in working gang
cases.  When we asked Los Angeles FBI officials about task force
agents' interest in anti-violent crime work, they said the FBI tried
to assign agents to areas that interest them, but it was not always
possible to give them their first choice.  They acknowledged that new
agents may not always be suited to violent crime work and that the
office was attempting to recruit agents who were interested in gang
work from other FBI offices.  The FBI officials noted, however, that
it is important for new agents to gain some task force experience so
that they can effectively replace experienced task force agents who
"burn out." The officials also told us that although new agents are
limited in the tasks they can perform, they can contribute to task
force operations by assisting in arrests or completing paperwork. 

Although, overall, line officers believed the equipment they received
through the task force was very useful, several felt that some of the
equipment they received did not fully meet their needs, either in
terms of quantity or quality.  For example, they believed that
cellular phones--which were critical to their work because they
provided a constant and reliable means of communication with
informants and other task force members--were not available in
sufficient quantity.  In this regard, one local officer noted that
task force members were on call 24 hours a day and that cellular
phones allowed informants to call them at home during off hours
without requiring task force members to give informants their home
phone numbers, which might compromise the officers' personal safety. 
Another line officer told us that the lack of a cellular phone caused
him to miss an opportunity to apprehend a murder suspect.  Some line
officers said they had either bought their own cellular phones or
that phone costs often exceeded the FBI's reimbursable limit. 

FBI officials acknowledged that the lack of cellular phones was a
serious safety issue, but they said that the FBI lacked the funds to
equip every task force member with a cellular phone.  One official
stated that the FBI Los Angeles Office was following FBI guidelines,
which called for providing one cellular phone for every three FBI
agents and task force members.  In fiscal year 1996, the Los Angeles
Office was funding 48 cellular phones for use by 143 task force
members--a ratio of 1 phone for every 3 members.  The official
believed one phone for every two task force members would be a better
ratio, but that, either way, more phones would be needed in the
future due to an expected increase in the number of task force
members. 

Eleven of 19 line officers who worked with the U.S.  Attorney's
Office to prosecute gang cases in federal court said that federal
prosecution was very useful.  Five said that federal prosecution was
important to them because federal sentences are much longer in actual
time served than state sentences.  However, some line officers were
critical of the length of time the U.S.  Attorney's Office took to
prosecute cases, the amount of evidence they required, and the high
district prosecutive thresholds.\11

In response, the Violent Crime Coordinator for the U.S.  Attorney's
Office in the Central District of California commented in September
1995 that local law enforcement officers were more familiar with the
state prosecutive system, and in contrast federal prosecutions may
seem overly slow and require excessive evidence.  He said that
federal cases often required more preparation time and better
evidence to meet federal court standards.  Regarding the prosecutive
thresholds, he said that the standards for accepting violent crime
cases in Central California for federal prosecution generally had
become less stringent during the last year and a half and that the
U.S.  Attorney's Office was accepting more cases for prosecution. 

Six of the 13 law enforcement officials we interviewed from agencies
that participated in the LA Task Force said that joint federal and
local task forces led to better relations and increased cooperation
and coordination among law enforcement agencies in general.  Eleven
of the 13 officials we interviewed said that they had good
relationships with the FBI.  Many said that current relations with
the FBI were the best they had ever been, partly as a result of the
LA Task Force. 

With regard to the previously noted direct assistance provided local
law enforcement officials by ATF, the officials we interviewed who
worked with ATF were generally satisfied with the assistance they
received. 


--------------------
\10 We did not independently confirm officers' perceptions of the
differences between California and federal wiretap requirements. 
However, we did identify some differences between the two procedures. 
Both California and federal wiretap authorizations can be granted for
30 days and can be renewed in 30-day increments.  However, under
California law, officers must report on their progress as the judge
may require, but not less than every 72 hours, whereas federal law
requires agents to report at such intervals as the judge may require. 
Only officers who have attended a special 2-day training course are
allowed to run a California wiretap.  Prior to establishing a federal
wiretap, all agents and deputized local officers are to be briefed by
an Assistant U.S.  Attorney and instructed on the federal guidelines
for conducting a wiretap.  Local officers, when participating in a
federal wiretap, are not required to receive additional wiretap
training.  Also, prior to January 1, 1996, and during the time of our
review, California wiretaps were available only for major narcotics
violations (involving at least 10 gallons of liquid or 3 pounds
solid) or the conspiracy to commit major narcotics violations. 
Federal wiretaps, on the other hand, were available for a variety of
federal criminal offenses. 

\11 Prosecutive thresholds are guidelines used by each U.S. 
Attorney's Office to determine whether cases should be accepted or
declined for prosecution. 


   LOS ANGELES AREA LAW
   ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL GENERALLY
   BELIEVED THAT TASK FORCE
   EFFORTS REDUCED GANG VIOLENCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Eight of the 13 local law enforcement officials we interviewed
generally believed that LA Task Force efforts had reduced gang
violence, while 5 believed it was too early to measure the impact. 
Of the eight who said LA Task Force efforts had reduced gang
violence, six believed that task force efforts had had a significant
or great impact on gang violence.  One official said that his agency
could not have achieved the same results without the assistance of
the LA Task Force. 

Local law enforcement line officers who participated in the LA Task
Force were also quite positive about current or future task force
impact on gang violence.  Sixteen of the 22 line officers who
expressed an opinion spoke positively about current or future task
force impact.  Twelve of them believed that LA Task Force efforts had
reduced violent gang crime to a great or very great extent.  Six
others said it was too early in their investigations to say what
impact task force efforts would have on violent gang crime, but three
of them expected positive results. 

The 21 local line officers who expressed an opinion stated that their
agencies could not obtain similar results without using federal task
forces.  Twenty-two officers mentioned long-term investigation as an
element differentiating the federal task force approach to violent
crime from local law enforcement's approach.  Several line officers
indicated that long-term investigations permitted local law
enforcement to deal more effectively with violent criminal gangs. 

Federal and local officials also provided us with statistics on the
results of task force efforts.  These statistics focused on arrests,
indictments, and convictions that officials attributed to the LA Task
Force's efforts.\12 FBI statistics\13 showed that from February 1992
through September 1995, the LA Task Force was responsible for 2,086
arrests (918 of which were for violent crimes), 239 federal
indictments (161 involving violent crime), and 156 convictions (116
involving violent crimes such as bank robbery).  According to FBI
statistics, the LA Task Force was also responsible for 119 state
convictions, 25 of which involved narcotics violations such as the
sale and transportation of cocaine and 94 of which involved violent
crimes, such as robbery, murder, and assault with a deadly weapon. 
Overall, three-fourths of the federal and state convictions were on
violent crime charges.  The FBI also credited the LA Task Force with
drug and firearm seizures and the recovery of assets. 

Some federal and local officials also credited the LA Task Force with
reducing the crime rates in certain neighborhoods.  Others credited
the LA Task Force with making it safe for children to play outdoors
again. 

We also obtained examples of specific federal anti-gang
investigations targeting Los Angeles-based gangs, including five LA
Task Force investigations and one ATF investigation.  The examples
indicated that the LA Task Force had an impact on gangs in Los
Angeles and in other communities to which Los Angeles-based gangs had
migrated.  The examples are described in appendix III. 


--------------------
\12 We did not independently verify the statistics provided by
federal and local officials and cannot attest to their validity. 

\13 These statistics applied to all squads within the LA Task Force,
not just those targeting violent gangs. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney
General.  A representative of DOJ's Office of the Assistant Attorney
General for Administration informed us at a meeting on July 24, 1996,
that comments were requested from the Department's various
headquarters and field office units with responsibility for its
operations combating violent crime as described in this report.  The
representative and officials from DOJ's Criminal Division, the
Executive Office of U.S.  Attorneys, and the FBI said that the
general consensus of the officials representing those units was that
the report, by and large, accurately represented these operations. 
However, the officials provided additional information concerning
DOJ's monetary commitment to support the LA Task Force during fiscal
year 1996.  We incorporated the information in this report, where
appropriate. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

We are sending copies of this report to the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental
Affairs; the chairman and ranking member of the House Committee on
the Judiciary; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of ATF;
the Director of the FBI; the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration; and the heads of the local law enforcement agencies
that participated in our study.  We also will make copies available
to others upon request. 

The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.  If
you have any questions concerning this report, please call me on
(202) 512-8777. 

Sincerely yours,

Norman J.  Rabkin
Director, Administration
 of Justice Issues


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

The objective of this self-initiated review was to examine the
Department of Justice's (DOJ) anti-violent crime initiative in the
Central Judicial District of California, which covers the Los Angeles
area, as it pertained to gang violence.  We focused our review on the
Los Angeles area because it was one of the areas that had the most
gangs and gang members in the country.  We focused on the Los Angeles
Metropolitan Task Force on Violent Crime (LA Task Force) because it
was the primary federal anti-gang effort in the Los Angeles area. 
Specifically, we wanted to determine and describe

  -- how and what federal law enforcement assistance was provided to
     local law enforcement in the Los Angeles area to fight gang
     violence,

  -- how useful Los Angeles area local law enforcement believed
     federal assistance was in fighting gang violence, and

  -- what results Los Angeles area local law enforcement officials
     believed were achieved from joint efforts to fight gang
     violence. 

Our scope was limited to law enforcement assistance and did not
address social programs aimed at preventing or reducing gang
violence. 

To obtain general information on anti-violent crime efforts, we
interviewed officials from DOJ headquarters offices, including the
Criminal Division, Executive Office of the U.S.  Attorneys, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  We also interviewed
representatives from the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) headquarters offices.  We
reviewed DOJ and ATF policy statements on violent crime, including
the Attorney General's National Anti-Violent Crime Strategy\14 and
DOJ's Report on First-Year Accomplishments:  Anti-Violent Crime
Initiative.\15

We met with representatives from the Office of the U.S.  Attorney for
the Central District of California and the Los Angeles District
Attorney's Office to discuss federal and local investigative and
prosecutive strategies for fighting gang violence.  We discussed how
federal investigative efforts were coordinated with local efforts,
how prosecutive decisions were made on gang cases, and the
differences between state and federal approaches to prosecuting gang
cases.  We also reviewed the Central District's strategy for fighting
violent crime, as directed by the Attorney General's National
Anti-Violent Crime Strategy.  In addition, we interviewed the U.S. 
Attorney's designated Violent Crime Coordinator to determine how
state and local law enforcement agencies participated in the
development of the strategies and to discuss the Office's policy for
accepting task force cases for prosecution. 

To understand how and what federal law enforcement assistance was
provided to local law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles to fight
gang violence and what results were obtained from joint federal and
local efforts, we interviewed representatives from the FBI, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, and ATF who oversaw federal task force efforts.  Our review,
however, focused primarily on the anti-gang efforts of the FBI, and
to a lesser extent ATF, since federal law enforcement assistance for
gang enforcement in Los Angeles at the time of our review came mainly
through the FBI-led LA Task Force.  We also reviewed data from the
FBI and U.S.  Attorney's Office on LA Task Force operations during
fiscal years 1992 through 1995, including the number of state and
federal arrests, indictments, and prosecutions that resulted from
task force operations.  We did not independently verify these
statistics and cannot attest to their validity. 

To obtain views of local law enforcement personnel on the usefulness
of federal law enforcement assistance in fighting gang violence, we
conducted structured interviews with 37 members of the 5 local law
enforcement agencies that participated in the LA Task Force.\16
Because local law enforcement personnel's perceptions on the
usefulness of federal assistance varied according to their position
and relationship with the federal agencies, we interviewed 3 levels
of employees within the local agencies that participated in the task
force:  24 participating line officers, 8 supervisory officers, and 5
agency heads or agency representatives.  For reporting purposes we
combined the responses of the 8 supervisory officers and the 5 agency
representatives into 1 category of 13 responses, which we referred to
as responses from local officials. 

We identified a universe of 44 officers who participated in the LA
Task Force at the time of our review.  In doing so, we counted only
those local task force members whose squads specifically targeted
violent gangs.  Although the squads that we excluded also
investigated violent gang members, gangs were not the primary focus
of their investigations.\17 According to FBI officials, approximately
60 local law enforcement officers were participating in the LA Task
Force at the time of our review. 

From the universe, we judgmentally selected 24 line officers.  To do
so, we interviewed all participating officers from three of the five
police agencies:  the Compton Police Department, the Inglewood Police
Department, and the Long Beach Police Department.  For the Los
Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, the two local agencies that dedicated the most personnel
to the task force, our selection of officers was based on several
factors, including geographic areas of interest, the gangs they
targeted, and the officers' availability. 

We also reviewed local law enforcement records on crime rates and
task force costs, procedures, and accomplishments during fiscal years
1992 through 1995.  We did not independently verify these statistics
and cannot attest to their validity. 

We identified nine local law enforcement agencies in the Central
District of California--eight of whose jurisdictions had relatively
high rates of violent crime--that did not participate on a federal
task force.  We conducted structured interviews with agency
representatives to determine (1) what types of federal assistance, if
any, they requested and received from the federal investigative
agencies; (2) how satisfied they were with that assistance; and (3)
why their agencies did not participate on a federal task force. 


--------------------
\14 The Attorney General's National Anti-Crime Strategy, U.S. 
Department of Justice, (Washington, D.C.:  Oct.  15, 1993). 

\15 Anti-Violent Crime Initiative:  The Attorney General's Report to
the President--The First Year (March 1994 - February 1995), U.S. 
Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.:  Mar.  27, 1995). 

\16 Local law enforcement agencies that participated in the LA Task
Force at the time of our review included the Compton, Inglewood, Long
Beach, and Los Angeles Police Departments and the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department. 

\17 These squads focused on categories of crime, such as bank
robbery, rather than gangs. 


LOCAL LOS ANGELES AREA LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS
OF THE USEFULNESS OF FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE
========================================================== Appendix II

We conducted structured interviews with 24 local law enforcement line
officers who participated in the LA Task Force.  We interviewed at
least two officers from each of the five local agencies participating
in the task force, except the Inglewood Police Department, which had
only one officer on the task force.  As shown in table II.1, most
officers were quite positive about the assistance they received from
the LA Task Force. 



                                    Table II.1
                     
                      Summary of Local Los Angeles Area Law
                      Enforcement Officers' Views of Federal
                                    Assistance


                                                              Of
                             Don't      Very  Somewhat   limited   Of no   Don't
Assistance     Yes      No    know    useful    useful       use     use    know
----------  ------  ------  ------  --------  --------  --------  ------  ------
Overtime        23       0       1        18         4         0       0       1
 pay
Manpower        23       0       1        14         6         3       0       0
Office          22       2       0        17         1         2       2       0
 space
Wiretaps        16       8       0        16         0         0       0       0
Equipment       23       1       0        18         4         1       0       0
 (cars,
 computers
 ,
 cellular
 phones)
Money for       14       7       3        13         1         0       0       0
 drug/
 gun
 purchases
Money for       17       1       6        17         0         0       0       0
 informants
Federal          7      15       2         4         1         1       0       1
 Witness
 Protectio
 n Program
Coordinati      19       5       0        14         4         1       0       0
 on
 between
 law
 enforceme
 nt
 agencies\
 a
Training        18       6       0        14         2         0       0       2
Federal         19       5       0        11         4         3       1       0
 prosecuti
 on
 of cases
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes coordination and cooperation on criminal investigations
between federal and local agencies and/or between local agencies. 

Source:  GAO analysis. 


SUMMARIES OF SEVERAL ANTI-GANG
INVESTIGATIONS
========================================================= Appendix III

FBI and ATF officials provided us with information on several federal
anti-gang efforts.  The following briefly describes five LA Task
Force efforts and one ATF investigation.  Some of these efforts
targeted specific factions or "sets" within a gang or were part of
larger investigations directed at a gang over time. 


   INVESTIGATION #1
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

This operation was part of a long-term investigation of a Los Angeles
gang that figured significantly in the 1992 riots.  The FBI began
investigating the gang in 1989 and established a joint investigation
with a local law enforcement agency in 1992, after the riots. 

After over 2 years of joint investigation, the FBI and the local
agency initiated a widely publicized 1-day anti-gang operation
involving about 800 FBI agents and local law enforcement officers,
covering a 30-by-30-block neighborhood in South Central Los Angeles. 
According to the local agency, the gang faction targeted in the
effort accounted for less than 1 percent of the community population
but was responsible for over 80 percent of the community's violent
crime. 

The 1-day operation resulted in four federal indictments on charges
such as felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent
to distribute.  Task force members also seized 67 firearms, about
2,000 rounds of ammunition, and 2 kilos of methamphetamine.  Local
law enforcement officials also credited the operation with reducing
violent crime in the targeted area by 57 percent in the 2 months
following the effort.  According to police statistics, violent crime
(including robbery, attempted murder, rape, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, and assault with a deadly weapon) dropped from 262 crimes in
the same 2-month period of the preceding year down to 112 crimes.\18

The operation received widespread media attention, with some
community residents quoted as being pleased with the Task Force's
efforts and others as being upset with them.  FBI officials believed
that these efforts were successful, citing, as an example, that gang
members went into seclusion after the operation.  The officials
justified the large amount of personnel resources expended as
necessary to ensure officer safety, protect evidence, and apprehend
suspects.  The local agency that took part in the operation felt that
the results of the effort, in terms of the reduction of violent
crime, were more significant than what could have been achieved by a
local anti-gang squad in 6 months for the same amount of money. 


--------------------
\18 We did not independently verify these statistics. 


   INVESTIGATION #2
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

One LA Task Force investigation involving gang migration received the
1994 Attorney General's award for excellence.  The investigation
involved a gang member who used his Hollywood music studio to
facilitate an interstate drug trafficking network.  Working with the
Denver, CO, FBI office, the LA Task Force was able to wiretap the
gang member's home, business, and cellular phone.  Through the
wiretaps, the task force learned that the drug trafficking network
extended to Milwaukee, WI; Cleveland, OH; Knoxville, TN; Atlanta, GA;
Birmingham, AL; Denver; and Seattle, WA. 

The drug trafficking network was able to make substantial profits by
selling its drugs in other cities.  For example, rock cocaine that
would sell for $20 to $25 in Los Angeles could be sold for $100 in
Birmingham.  An ounce of cocaine that would sell for $500 in Los
Angeles would sell for $1,000 in Birmingham. 

The LA Task Force's efforts led to the arrest of the ring's
associates in the cities in which they operated.  Two of the gang's
ring leaders and at least four other gang members have been convicted
of conspiracy to distribute drugs and of possession and distribution. 
All are awaiting sentencing.  The ring leaders are likely to receive
20-year sentences, while the other four gang members face sentences
ranging from 14 to 30 years. 


   INVESTIGATION #3
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3

This investigation was one of several task force efforts directed
against one of Los Angeles' most notorious and violent street gangs. 
In this effort, the LA Task Force squad apprehended 2 gang members
who led a ring responsible for more than 175 "takeover" bank
robberies\19 in the Los Angeles area.  The two gang members used
juvenile gang members to commit the robberies, supplied them with
weapons and plans for carrying out the heists, and kept the bulk of
the money for themselves.  By showing that the two gang leaders had
directed and organized the robberies, the U.S.  Attorney's Office was
able to successfully prosecute both ring leaders on federal charges
of carjacking, armed bank robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed
bank robbery.  Both members pled guilty to the charges; one received
a 25-year sentence, and the other received a 30-year sentence. 

FBI officials told us this was an "enormously successful" case
because it showed gang members that the federal government was
serious about prosecuting gang cases.  The number of takeover bank
robberies in the Central District was increasing until these gang
members were arrested in June 1993; over the next few years, the
number of such robberies decreased approximately 57 percent. 
According to an FBI official, the apprehension of these two gang
members was a major factor in the decrease in takeover bank robberies
in the Los Angeles area. 


--------------------
\19 A "takeover" bank robbery is an especially violent form of
robbery in which one or more armed individuals seize control of a
bank and physically and verbally assault customers and employees. 
Physical intimidation can include the display of weapons and the
firing of shots into the air. 


   INVESTIGATION #4
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4

The fourth effort we reviewed focused on a prison-based gang that
also had control over gang activities in local communities.  This
effort represented a combined federal/local effort to prevent a gang
from consolidating and gaining more control over street narcotics
sales in the Hispanic community.  The effort reflects the federal
task force's proactive approach to gangs, that is, investigating a
gang overall to help prevent crime from spreading rather than
reacting to the crimes of individual gang members on a case-by-case
basis. 

This effort not only led to federal indictments against 22 defendants
but also, according to both FBI and local officials, led to the
prevention of over 40 homicides.  The U.S.  Attorney is pursuing
further indictments on the basis of organized criminal activity as
well as individual criminal acts. 


   INVESTIGATION #5
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5

Another investigation by the LA Task Force involved migration by gang
members from Long Beach, near Los Angeles, to Spokane, WA.  According
to a task force member, Long Beach, Compton, and Los Angeles gangs
had spread to Spokane, where they faced little or no competition and
could make tremendous amounts of money from drug trafficking.  When a
detective with the Spokane Police Department saw an influx of gang
members into Spokane, he accessed the Gang Reporting Evaluation and
Tracking (GREAT) database\20 and discovered that many of the gang
members were from Long Beach.  He contacted the Long Beach Police
Department and was referred to the LA Task Force.  Task force members
arrived in Spokane within 3 or 4 days after being contacted. 

According to the Spokane Police Department detective, the LA Task
Force's assistance was invaluable.  Task force members were very
familiar with gang members from Long Beach and were able to provide
information on these gang members, including photographs.  An LA Task
Force member said that task force efforts helped to indict 9 gang
members in Spokane on federal charges, while the Spokane Police
Department detective said 40 or more indictments were obtained on 7
to 9 gang members, with most indictments being handled at the state
level.  According to another Spokane law enforcement officer, gang
members were given sentences of up to 20 years. 

According to the Spokane Police Department detective, after the
federal indictments, many of the Long Beach gang members fled and
gang activity in Spokane dramatically decreased.  However, gang
activity has gradually increased since then as the LA Task Force
squad targeting the Long Beach gang was temporarily discontinued and
as gang members adjusted their strategies.  An LA Task Force member
reported that since termination of the task force squad, the Long
Beach gang was suspected of once again sending major amounts of
cocaine to Spokane. 


--------------------
\20 The GREAT database is based on arrest reports, personal
interviews, probation reports, and field inquiry cards filled in by
law enforcement officers throughout Los Angeles County.  In those
jurisdictions that have joined the system, all persons identified as
gang members go into GREAT, along with basic information (birth date,
gender, race, physical description, address, etc.); gang information
("monikers," gang affiliations, tattoos, and other distinguishing
marks, etc.); and information on police contacts. 


   INVESTIGATION #6
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6

In another effort, ATF agents worked with local police to target one
of the most violent and criminally active street gangs in Los
Angeles.  This gang distributed phencyclidine (PCP) in California and
other states.  ATF initiated the investigation by making drug buys
from lower level gang members.  ATF was able to gain the cooperation
of those who had sold them drugs and others charged with firearms
violations in targeting higher level gang members.  Ultimately, ATF
was able to target not only the gang but also the organization that
manufactured the PCP. 

During the 3-year investigation, law enforcement personnel seized 44
firearms, $120 million (street value) worth of PCP, the largest PCP
lab site ever seized by law enforcement in the United States, and
other assets.  Charges against eight defendants, who were gang
members or affiliates, included running a continuing criminal
enterprise, conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, aiding
and abetting the manufacture of PCP, and distribution/ possession of
a controlled substance.  The defendants pled guilty or went to trial
and were convicted.  Sentences ranged from 17-1/2 to 45 years.  Two
of three defendants who had not yet been sentenced were scheduled for
sentencing in April 1996 and were expected to receive life sentences. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV

GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Daniel C.  Harris, Project Director
Barry J.  Seltser, Supervisory Social Science Analyst
Katrina R.  Moss, Senior Evaluator
Seto J.  Bagdoyan, Evaluator
Pamela V.  Williams, Communications Analyst

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ann H.  Finley, Senior Attorney

LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE

Richard R.  Griswold, Project Manager
Barbara A.  Guffy, Site Senior
James R.  Russell, Evaluator

*** End of document. ***