Federal Fugitive Apprehension: Agencies Taking Action to Improve
Coordination and Cooperation (Letter Report, 05/02/95, GAO/GGD-95-75).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Justice's 1988 federal fugitive apprehension policy, focusing on
interagency coordination problems and agencies' efforts to address those
problems.
GAO found that: (1) officials from all federal agencies involved in
fugitive apprehension stated that they did not have extensive
interagency coordination problems, overlapping or duplicate efforts, or
jurisdictional disputes; (2) none of the agencies had empirical data on
the 727 fugitives who were wanted by more than one agency; (3)
interagency coordination problems could jeopardize fugitive apprehension
efforts, endanger law enforcement officials and the general public, and
waste limited law enforcement resources; (4) some interagency
coordination problems such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) and the U.S. Marshals Service's (USMS) failure to participate in
each other's fugitive task forces, disagreements over responsibility for
prison escapes involving possible conspiracy charges, and agencies'
failure to cooperate with the apprehension of other countries' fugitives
adversely affected the effectiveness of federal fugitive apprehension
efforts; (5) FBI and USMS have taken actions to deal with interagency
problems to improve coordination and eliminate duplication; and (6)
Justice established the Office of Investigative Agency Policies to
resolve coordination problems, ensure efficiencies in overlapping
efforts, and determine whether fugitive responsibilities are properly
aligned among agencies.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-95-75
TITLE: Federal Fugitive Apprehension: Agencies Taking Action to
Improve Coordination and Cooperation
DATE: 05/02/95
SUBJECT: Interagency relations
Criminal procedure
Jurisdictional authority
Agency missions
Law enforcement agencies
Crimes or offenses
Criminals
Information dissemination operations
Arrests
**************************************************************************
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
May 1995
FEDERAL FUGITIVE APPREHENSION -
AGENCIES TAKING ACTION TO IMPROVE
COORDINATION AND COOPERATION
GAO/GGD-95-75
Federal Fugitive Apprehension
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
NCIC - National Crime Information Center
OIA - Office of International Affairs
OIAP - Office of Investigative Agency Policies
USNCB - U.S. National Central Bureau
USMS - U.S. Marshals Service
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259789
May 2, 1995
The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives
The Honorable Cardiss Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
House of Representatives
This report responds to a recommendation contained in a report by the
former Committee on Government Operations and a subsequent request by
the Chairmen of that Committee and its Subcommittee on Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture that we review the Department
of Justice's 1988 policy on federal fugitive apprehension.\1 This
policy identifies the fugitive apprehension responsibilities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and
establishes conditions and coordination procedures for exceptions to
these responsibilities.
We agreed with the requesters to focus on determining (1) the extent
and nature of any interagency coordination problems among FBI, DEA,
USMS, and other federal agencies involved in fugitive investigations
and (2) if such problems existed, what actions had been or could be
taken to address them. Coordination problems could include
unnecessary duplicate or overlapping efforts, jurisdictional
disputes, and noncooperation that could adversely affect the
efficiency or effectiveness of efforts to apprehend fugitives.
To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed
various documents obtained from FBI, DEA, and USMS; other Justice
offices including the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB),
Criminal Division including the Division's Office of International
Affairs (OIA), Executive Office of United States Attorneys, and
Office of Investigative Agency Policies (OIAP); the Treasury
Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Customs
Service, and Secret Service; and the State Department. We also
reviewed the national wanted persons file, a database maintained by
the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and information
from FBI and USMS internal inspection reports. Our review
objectives, scope, and methodology are described in more detail in
appendix I.
--------------------
\1 House Government Operations Committee report entitled "They Went
Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green." H.R.
Rep. No. 537, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Officials for FBI, DEA, USMS, and the other federal agencies we
contacted, some of which had a prior history of coordination
problems, all said that they did not have extensive interagency
coordination problems in the fugitive apprehension area involving
overlapping or duplicate efforts, jurisdictional disputes, or lack of
cooperation. None of the agencies we contacted had any empirical
data on the number of their fugitive cases that involved (1)
coordination problems with another agency or (2) fugitives who were
also wanted by another agency, and thus could potentially involve
problems. Our analysis of NCIC data as of April 6, 1994, showed that
of the 28,438 federal fugitives in the NCIC system, 727 or about 2.6
percent, were wanted by more than one agency. We could not determine
whether the fugitive cases we found on NCIC that involved more than
one agency experienced interagency coordination problems, including
unnecessary overlapping or duplicate efforts. Nevertheless, if such
problems do exist, they could jeopardize fugitive apprehension
efforts, endanger law enforcement officials and the general public,
and waste limited law enforcement resources.
In this regard, we did identify some interagency coordination
problems that have or could have adversely affected the efficiency
and effectiveness of federal fugitive apprehension efforts. These
problems involved, primarily, FBI's and USMS' (1) failure to
participate on each other's fugitive task forces; (2) disagreements
over responsibility for prison escapes involving possible conspiracy
charges; and (3) failure, at times, to cooperate when involved with
the apprehension of other countries' fugitives. Also, in some
instances, coordination problems occurred between USMS and other law
enforcement agencies, such as the Customs Service, when the cases
involved subjects who became fugitives subsequent to their arrest for
violations under the jurisdiction of these other agencies.
During our review, FBI and USMS officials, responding in part to
directions from top Justice officials to improve coordination and
eliminate duplication, took or began taking actions to deal with
their interagency problems. Similarly, USMS officials said they
would address coordination issues with other agencies regarding
postarrest fugitives.
Also, during our review, Justice established OIAP to resolve
coordination problems and ensure efficiencies in areas where the
responsibilities or activities of Justice's criminal investigative
agencies overlapped. Among its specifically listed functions, OIAP
was to establish procedures to coordinate fugitive apprehensions and
to eliminate waste and duplication in the fugitive apprehension area.
OIAP has said it expects the agencies to resolve their interagency
coordination problems in a reasonable time and plans to stay abreast
of the agencies' efforts.
Besides being a vehicle for ensuring that interagency coordination
problems are addressed, OIAP represents a means to determine whether
fugitive responsibilities are appropriately aligned among the Justice
and non-Justice agencies to ensure efficient and effective use of
federal law enforcement resources. OIAP may look at this issue in
the future considering its other priorities, the availability of
resources, and the facts at the time.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The 1988 Justice policy on fugitive apprehension, which is still in
effect, (1) designates FBI, DEA, and USMS' apprehension
responsibilities, (2) establishes specific conditions for exceptions
to these responsibilities, and (3) identifies the types of fugitives
that the agencies are responsible for pursuing. Generally, fugitives
are considered persons whose whereabouts are unknown and who are
being sought because they have been charged with one or more crimes,
have failed to appear for a required court action, or have escaped
from custody. (See app. II for details on the 1988 policy.)
The Attorney General developed the 1988 policy in response to
congressional and Justice concerns over long-standing interagency
tensions and jurisdictional disputes, particularly between FBI and
USMS. These situations were considered to have been adversely
affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of fugitive apprehension
efforts by these agencies. For example, FBI claimed that USMS'
apprehension efforts were jeopardizing the safety of FBI agents,
adversely affecting FBI investigations, and duplicating work done by
FBI. (See app. III for a history of FBI and USMS fugitive
apprehension responsibilities.)
In general, FBI and DEA, as well as other federal law enforcement
agencies such as ATF, can pursue fugitives wanted for federal crimes
that fall within their jurisdictions. Pursuant to the 1988 policy,
however, DEA, according to DEA and USMS officials, usually transfers
its responsibilities for drug crime fugitives not caught within 7
days to USMS.
USMS generally is responsible for federal offenders who (1) after
their initial arrest, fail to appear as required before federal
courts, escape from confinement, or violate their probation or
parole; (2) are wanted by federal agencies whose agents do not have
arrest authority (e.g., Social Security Administration); or (3) are
wanted on federal misdemeanor charges. Also, USMS and FBI are the
principal Justice agencies responsible for other countries' fugitives
who are believed to be in the United States.
OIAP, which was established in November 1993, is headed by a director
(currently the FBI director serving dual roles) who is appointed by
the Attorney General and is to be staffed with representatives from
FBI, DEA, USMS, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and
Justice's Criminal Division. According to FBI and USMS officials,
OIAP replaced the Associate Attorney General as the mechanism
provided by the 1988 policy to resolve interagency problems involving
the apprehension of fugitives.
The federal law enforcement agencies we contacted generally require
entry of fugitive data into NCIC. This alerts other law enforcement
agencies and facilitates fugitive apprehensions. For example, a
fugitive wanted by FBI could be apprehended during a routine stop by
local police for a traffic violation. An active entry in NCIC
represents an open fugitive investigation by the entering agency.
Minimally, the agency must have an arrest warrant or notice of escape
for the subject and validate annually the fugitive data it has in
NCIC. Appendixes IV, V, and VI provide additional information
obtained from our analyses of the NCIC database regarding the
percentage of federal fugitive entries or cases by agency, the
general types of offenses for which federal fugitives were wanted,
and the percentage of dangerous federal fugitives by agency.
NO INDICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE
PROBLEMS INVOLVING INTERAGENCY
DUPLICATION, DISPUTES, OR
NONCOOPERATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The law enforcement agencies' officials we contacted, our analysis of
the NCIC wanted persons database, and our review of FBI and USMS
internal inspection reports all indicated that there were not
extensive interagency coordination problems in fugitive
apprehensions.
AGENCIES OFFICIALS' COMMENTS
ON INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Officials of the federal agencies we contacted, some of which had a
prior history of coordination problems, all opined that, based on
their experience, they did not have extensive interagency
coordination problems, such as overlapping or duplicate efforts,
jurisdictional disputes, or noncooperation with other agencies in the
fugitive apprehension area. These officials generally did not have
statistics or studies on the extent to which their respective
agencies and others were pursuing the same fugitives or their
fugitive cases entailed interagency problems. FBI officials, for
example, said that while the fugitive area presented numerous
opportunities for overlapping, redundant, and sometimes conflicting
interests, interagency coordination was generally effective. Noting
that any problems they had were generally with USMS, FBI officials
said that the instances of problems between the two agencies had been
minimal when compared to the number of fugitive investigations
conducted by both agencies. USMS officials also made similar
comments while adding that they had experienced some coordination
problems with Treasury's law enforcement agencies.
ANALYSIS OF NCIC WANTED
PERSONS DATABASE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The overall data maintained by federal agencies on their fugitive
caseloads varied. NCIC represented the best source, according to FBI
and USMS officials, for obtaining relative comparisons of the number
and types of fugitives sought by federal agencies. Our analysis of
the NCIC wanted persons database provided some confirmation of
comments we obtained from the agencies' officials in that the overall
number of fugitives wanted by two or more agencies, i.e., involving
overlapping jurisdictions, was not extensive.
We determined that the 29,339 active federal fugitive entries in NCIC
as of April 6, 1994, represented a total of 28,438 individual
fugitives after adjusting for multiple entries for the same fugitive.
Of the 28,438 fugitives, 727, or about 2.6 percent, were wanted by 2
or more federal agencies. Of these 727 fugitives, 705 were wanted by
2 agencies, 21 were wanted by 3 agencies, and 1 was wanted by 4
agencies. USMS and FBI were pursuing the most fugitives wanted by
more than one agency. Specifically, USMS wanted 633 (about 87
percent) of the 727 fugitives , FBI wanted 316 (about 43 percent),
and both FBI and USMS wanted 227 (about 31 percent).
The percentages of overlap for the 22,905 fugitives whose records
were removed from NCIC in 1992 and for the 23,928 fugitives whose
records were removed in 1993 were 1.3 percent and 1.5 percent
respectively.\2
While the results of our analyses of NCIC are consistent with the
contacted agencies' views that interagency problems are not
extensive, we could not determine the significance of the fugitive
cases we found on NCIC that involved more than one agency. We could
not readily identify what, if any, interagency coordination problems
these cases involved, including overlapping or duplicate efforts.
Nevertheless, if such problems do exist, they could jeopardize
fugitive apprehension efforts, endanger law enforcement officials and
the general public, and waste limited law enforcement resources.
--------------------
\2 FBI and USMS officials told us that records are removed from NCIC
usually because the fugitive has been apprehended. An FBI official
said that some removals occur because the charges against the
fugitives were dismissed or the entry was a mistake.
REVIEW OF INTERNAL
INSPECTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
We also found no indication of extensive interagency problems in the
fugitive apprehension area through our review of FBI and USMS
internal inspections reports information. Both agencies require
periodic internal reviews of their field offices to determine if
their offices are effectively, efficiently, and adequately performing
their program and administrative responsibilities. While there are
some differences, these reviews by each agency are to include efforts
to determine if relations are good with other federal law enforcement
agencies. For example, FBI reviewers are required to interview local
representatives of other federal law enforcement agencies. According
to FBI and USMS officials, the resultant reports should identify
significant problems and recommendations, if there are any.
Documents provided by FBI showed that 19 of 52 inspections of FBI
offices during fiscal years 1992 and 1993 had findings in the
fugitive area. We reviewed those findings and found none that dealt
with interagency problems.\3 Documents provided by USMS showed that
there were no findings on fugitive matters in the 12 inspection
reports issued on USMS offices in fiscal year 1993.
--------------------
\3 The findings generally involved delays in entering and removing
information from NCIC.
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION PROBLEMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
While the agencies we contacted did not reveal extensive interagency
problems, we did identify some problems that have or could have
adversely affected efforts to apprehend federal fugitives. The
problem areas primarily involved FBI's and USMS' (1) failure to
participate on each other's task forces, (2) disagreements over
responsibility for prison escapes when a conspiracy may have been
involved, and (3) unwillingness at times to cooperate or withdraw
from cases where both had separately been asked to assist in finding
other countries' fugitives who were suspected of being in the United
States. A fourth problem area mentioned by some agencies' officials
involved subjects who became USMS fugitives after their initial
arrest for violations under the jurisdiction of other agencies. FBI
and USMS provided examples claiming that the other's involvement in
specific operations and failure to share information jeopardized
investigative efforts or required that investigative steps or
information be replicated (e.g., records of telephone calls made by
known associates of the involved fugitive).
FBI and USMS officials told us that problems of overlapping efforts,
disputes, and noncooperation will be corrected through additional
interagency agreements and through the interagency planning and
coordination that is to occur in each federal judicial district in
conjunction with the Justice Department's National Anti-Violent Crime
Initiative.\4 Further, they told us in January 1995 that, contrary to
when we started our review (July 1993), there recently has been a
high state of cooperation and coordination between the two agencies,
including the establishment of an interagency working group to
address coordination problems.\5 They attributed these changes to the
(1) Attorney General and the new heads of FBI and USMS, who have made
it clear that interagency duplication, disputes, and noncooperation
will not be tolerated; (2) Department of Justice's emphasis on
ensuring sound use of its limited law enforcement resources; and (3)
Attorney General's establishment of OIAP. Consistent with its
charter, OIAP plans to stay abreast of the agencies' efforts to
address interagency coordination problems and to intervene if
necessary.
--------------------
\4 This initiative and the related OIAP violent crime resolution,
both announced on Mar. 1, 1994, required field offices of FBI, DEA,
USMS, and INS, in conjunction with U.S. Attorneys, to submit a
single investigative and prosecutive strategy designed to maximize
the federal response to the violent crime problem, including
apprehending violent fugitives in each federal judicial district.
Among other things, the strategy was to involve state and local
enforcement authorities and a well-defined use of resources including
the establishment, enhancement, and refocusing of existing task force
operations.
\5 This group, which first met in November 1994, was established by
several Justice law enforcement agencies on an ad hoc basis to
enhance interagency coordination on violent crime issues, including
fugitive matters. The group includes representatives from FBI, DEA,
USMS, INS, Justice's Criminal Division, and Bureau of Prisons.
Treasury's ATF is also a participant. Any of the participating
agencies can introduce issues for the group's consideration.
FBI AND USMS PARTICIPATION
IN FUGITIVE TASK FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
Generally, over the last several years, FBI and USMS did not
participate in each other's task forces, which at times, according to
FBI and USMS officials, targeted the same cities and fugitives and
competed for local police participation. FBI told us that USMS had
generally declined to participate in FBI-sponsored "safe streets task
forces," citing insufficient staff resources to participate on a
long-term basis.\6 For example, in November 1993, USMS staff were
participating in 8 of 107 FBI-sponsored task forces. In contrast,
FBI officials said that USMS had not invited FBI to participate in
USMS' fugitive investigative strike teams. These teams operated for
short periods and usually involved efforts in several U.S. cities.
In commenting on one such USMS effort involving violence-prone
fugitives in 58 U.S. cities ("Operation Trident," 1993), FBI
officials said that Trident "created redundancy in fugitive
apprehension efforts, presented problems of safety for 'Trident' and
'safe streets task force' personnel, jeopardized ongoing FBI
investigations related to substantive FBI violations and gang
investigations...." FBI officials also noted that the 1988 policy
does not require that such projects be coordinated and discussed with
FBI before they are implemented.
In addition to their strike teams, USMS operated ongoing fugitive
task forces jointly with local police in several cities. USMS
officials acknowledged that FBI generally had not been invited to
participate in the strike teams or task forces, given the general
atmosphere of distrust and noncooperation that had existed between
the two agencies. They noted, however, that in some locations there
was FBI participation due to good relations between the local USMS
and FBI offices. The officials cited their "gulf coast task force"
(in the Houston, TX, area) to illustrate the problems they
experienced with FBI over task forces. According to USMS, FBI (1)
was invited to participate as an equal partner but declined to do so
and (2) sought warrants for unlawful flight for some local fugitives
that were already targeted by the task force. If accurate, FBI
efforts to obtain such flight warrants would have been inconsistent
with the 1988 fugitive policy, which provides that FBI will not seek
these type of warrants if USMS is already pursuing the fugitives.
FBI and USMS officials told us that they will discontinue operating
independent, redundant fugitive task forces in the same geographic
area. The USMS official said that USMS will not conduct any fugitive
investigative strike teams unless they are requested by the Attorney
General and without first seeking the participation of FBI and other
agencies. The officials also noted that the interagency working
group they and other Justice law enforcement agencies established is
addressing duplication in the task force area as well as interagency
coordination problems in other areas. For example, according to FBI
officials, following the working group's review of apparent overlap
between FBI and USMS in the Houston, TX, area, both agencies
instructed their respective field offices to work toward
consolidating their efforts. Also, they said the interagency
planning and coordination that is to occur in each federal district
under the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative should provide a basis for
determining what fugitive or other law enforcement task forces are
needed, given the nature of the violent crime problem in each
geographic area and the availability of federal and local law
enforcement resources.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Justice
reaffirmed that the issues involving task forces are being addressed
by FBI and USMS through the interagency working group. Justice
stated that in cities where each agency has an operating task force,
efforts are under way to combine resources, and further stated that
the implementation of USMS "strike teams" has been discontinued.
--------------------
\6 These task forces focus on violent crime and/or violent fugitives.
Many involve fugitive apprehension efforts alone or along with
special investigative efforts, e.g., gang-related violence. In
August 1994, FBI officials told us that about half of the "safe
streets task forces" operating at that time were involved exclusively
or partly in fugitive apprehension efforts.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRISON
ESCAPES AND ESCAPE
CONSPIRACY CHARGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
FBI and USMS officials noted a disagreement over responsibilities
involving prison escapees. Specifically, this disagreement concerned
which agency had responsibility when the escape involved a conspiracy
charge, i.e., involved persons who helped plan the escape. Our
analysis of NCIC data showed that, as of April 6, 1994, USMS wanted
1,680 fugitives for prison escapes. Information was unavailable,
however, on how many involved possible conspiracy charges.
The 1988 policy did not specifically address the conspiracy aspect of
an escape case. USMS officials said that under their interpretation
of the 1988 policy, USMS was generally responsible for prison escapes
and related conspiracy matters. USMS officials did not view the
conspiracy charge as falling within the 1988 policy provision that
gave FBI the option of taking responsibility for the escape case if
new charges were involved. USMS officials believed that it would be
unnecessary and impractical for both agencies to be involved in the
same escape case. However, FBI officials believed that FBI was
better suited to address conspiracies than USMS and was, under the
1988 policy, responsible for escape conspiracies.
The disagreement persisted despite a December 1991 decision by the
Deputy Attorney General that FBI would be responsible for escape
conspiracies. USMS officials believed that the Deputy Attorney
General's decision was based on a misunderstanding that the 1988
policy limited USMS' role to actual escapes instead of also including
conspiracy matters. Consequently, USMS did not consider the issue
resolved and therefore did not change its operation to accommodate
the 1991 decision.
Responding to their directors' mandates to improve cooperation, FBI
and USMS officials agreed, in June 1994, on a memorandum of
understanding that gave FBI responsibility to investigate
conspiracies associated with escapes or escape attempts from federal
facilities. USMS would have responsibility for the actual escapee
unless the person had not been sentenced and was being investigated
by FBI for an additional crime or in connection with an organized
crime, terrorism, or national security matter. Also, the new
agreement specified that USMS was to be responsible for conspiracies
involving escapes or attempted escapes of sentenced federal prisoners
housed under contract in state prisons or local jails, unless the
situation involved a riot, hostage taking, or loss of life. USMS and
FBI also agreed to "fully share information and the fruits of their
respective investigations ...." The Federal Bureau of Prisons also
signed the memorandum of understanding since it would ordinarily be
the agency to first discover the attempted or actual escape.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Justice
said that disagreements between FBI and USMS over responsibilities
for prison escapees have been mutually resolved through the June 1994
agreement and that the agreement has been successful to date.
INTERAGENCY PROBLEMS
INVOLVING FOREIGN COUNTRIES'
FUGITIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3
The interagency coordination problems experienced by FBI and USMS
with foreign countries' fugitives stemmed in part from each agency's
desire to be responsive to other countries' requests for assistance
in locating their fugitives who were suspected of being in the United
States, according to officials from both agencies. The 1988 policy
generally assigned responsibility for these fugitives to USMS.
Exceptions were when an FBI foreign office (legal attache) was
directly contacted by the host country or if the case involved
various other special circumstances, e.g., FBI was also seeking a
foreign fugitive on an arrest warrant for a U.S. crime. Usually,
USMS was to receive cases when countries requested aid through the
U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB). FBI and USMS officials said
that problems generally arose when countries made requests or
contacts through either USNCB or OIA and also through an FBI legal
attache. In these instances, neither USMS nor FBI were willing to
let the other take exclusive responsibility once they discovered that
the other was involved.
Officials at USMS, FBI, OIA, and USNCB all mentioned the following
case to illustrate the types of problems that can occur between FBI
and USMS. USMS developed a lead on the possible location
(California) of a Swiss national wanted in connection with a robbery
in Geneva. Responding to USMS inquiries through USNCB, the Swiss
authorities advised USMS that they were not requesting an arrest
warrant at that time but would be requesting that the subject be
interviewed and his residence searched in the future with Swiss
police involvement. According to USMS officials, they were
subsequently advised by OIA and USNCB that an arrest warrant had been
requested and advised by FBI that FBI was working on the case
pursuant to a Swiss request made through the FBI legal attache in
Switzerland.
A difference of opinion existed between USMS and FBI concerning the
case and who had jurisdiction; representatives of both agencies met
to discuss the matter. According to USMS and USNCB (1) FBI wanted
sole jurisdiction because of the direct contact made by Swiss
authorities, even though USMS had been working on the case for about
a year; (2) although it was mutually agreed that the two agencies
would work on the case jointly, FBI continued its efforts, including
interviewing the subject, without coordinating with USMS; (3) FBI did
not give timely notice to USMS when FBI and Swiss police subsequently
went to the subject's location in California with an arrest warrant;
(4) the arrest warrant could not be served because the subject had
apparently fled the state after being earlier interviewed by FBI; and
(5) FBI later arrested the subject in Las Vegas, NV, without
informing USMS.
According to FBI (1) it maintained liaison with USMS, (2) USMS
officials were notified, but arrived late, for the initial arrest
effort by FBI and Swiss police in California, and (3) USMS
demonstrated little interest once it was determined that the
subject's location was unknown. Further, according to USMS and OIA,
FBI's aforementioned interview of the subject occurred unexpectedly
while FBI independently was conducting a preliminary search for the
subject without an arrest warrant.
USMS and FBI officials said problems similar to this example only
involved a few cases a year. USMS and FBI officials believed that,
given the overall emphasis by their directors and OIAP on improved
cooperation, they would avoid further problems in the future. In
addition, OIA and USMS officials told us that OIA in August 1994
established a fugitive unit to coordinate and monitor activities
involving other countries' fugitives or U.S.-fled fugitives. USMS
also planned to assign its foreign fugitive coordinator to OIA to
further improve coordination.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Justice
stated that OIA, in conjunction with FBI and USMS, will ensure that
no duplicative efforts are pursued. The Department also stated that
FBI and USMS will continue working together to avoid needless overlap
and to ensure effective use of resources.
The Treasury Department, in commenting on a draft of this report,
said that Customs Service and the Internal Revenue Service are
supporting the OIA effort with respect to high profile fugitives.
Treasury also stated that the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
will assist OIA by searching their databases for leads on
fugitives.\7
--------------------
\7 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small
Treasury agency established in 1990 to support law enforcement
agencies by analyzing and coordinating financial intelligence.
OVERLAPPING EFFORTS
INVOLVING FUGITIVES WANTED
ON OBSTRUCTION OF COURT
CHARGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4
According to USMS officials and our analysis of NCIC data,
overlapping efforts often involved USMS because a previously arrested
offender subsequently became a fugitive based on an obstruction of
court charge.\8 These fugitives initially were the responsibility of
the law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the crimes for
which the offenders were earlier arrested. Our analysis of NCIC data
showed that 418 fugitives, or about 57 percent of the 727 NCIC
fugitives wanted by more than one federal agency on April 6, 1994,
involved USMS court obstruction charges. These 418 fugitives
composed about 5 percent of the 8,814 fugitives wanted by USMS for
court obstruction.
USMS officials said that interagency problems in this area often
involved offenders wanted by agencies not covered by the 1988 Justice
fugitive policy. Particularly, problems involved fugitives wanted by
USMS for a court obstruction charge who also were wanted by Treasury
law enforcement agencies. Our analyses of the 418 NCIC fugitives
showed that of these, 194, or about 46 percent, were also wanted by
Treasury law enforcement agencies. Of these 194, 179 fugitives were
wanted by Treasury agencies for offenses other than court
obstruction. However, we could not determine how many of the 179
fugitives were being pursued by Treasury agencies on the basis of
their original responsibility for the fugitives and the subsequent
court obstruction charge or on the basis of the fugitives being
wanted for additional crimes. A USMS official believed that such
cases generally did not involve additional crimes, whereas a Customs
Service official believed they did.
Treasury and USMS officials said that they usually coordinated their
investigations on overlapping cases. However, according to USMS
officials, some duplication of effort still occurred because each
agency generally conducted its own separate investigation and
contacted the other agency only after a lead had proven to be
successful. The USMS spokesperson said that the duplicated efforts
between USMS and another agency to apprehend the same fugitives were
a waste of resources and could have impeded both agencies' fugitive
investigations. Furthermore, problems in this area may be
increasing. In December 1993, a Customs Service official told us
Customs considered court obstruction fugitives to be primarily USMS'
responsibility. However, in September 1994, USMS officials informed
us that Customs Service had recently begun pursuing more of these
fugitives. In November 1994, a Customs Service official told us that
Customs was updating its policy guidance on fugitive apprehension and
that it would address court obstruction fugitives. USMS officials
told us that they planned to resolve their interagency coordination
problems in this area through discussions with the involved agencies
and, if possible, by securing interagency agreements. If
unsuccessful, they planned to seek OIAP's assistance.
ATF, Customs Service, and Secret Service officials subsequently told
us that they were cooperating with USMS to resolve interagency
coordination problems. In commenting on a draft of this report, the
Treasury Department stated that Customs Service will retain
responsibility for court obstruction fugitives, given the general
complexity and international nature of Customs' investigations. We
discussed Treasury's comment with Customs and USMS officials. USMS
officials stated that they had met with the Treasury agencies and
believed they had reached agreement that court obstruction fugitives
in general would be USMS' primary responsibility. They said that
they would be meeting again with the agencies to ensure that there is
no disagreement or unresolved issue. A Customs Service official told
us that many of the fugitives in question are integral parts of
ongoing Customs' investigations and should continue to be pursued by
Customs. He noted that Customs and USMS have a history of good
relations and cooperation and that he expects that they will resolve
in future discussions any differences they might still have.
We also noted from our NCIC data analysis that, as of April 6, 1994,
FBI wanted 140, or about 33 percent, of the 418 fugitives wanted by
USMS for obstruction of court charges. Neither USMS nor FBI
officials knew precisely why they had such overlapping cases since
the 1988 policy defined the circumstances under which either FBI or
USMS would assume responsibility for each case. An FBI official said
that this overlap was caused, in part, by conflicts between one of
their field offices and the local USMS office. However, FBI and USMS
officials believed that any problems experienced in this area would
be corrected, given the mandates they were under to improve
coordination. Although the officials were not specific as to how
these problems would be corrected, they did not believe that any
systemic or procedural changes would be needed.
--------------------
\8 Court obstruction is a category of NCIC offense codes encompassing
various offenses such as failure to appear for a required court
appearance and probation/parole violators.
OIAP ROLE IN ADDRESSING
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.5
The Attorney General established OIAP as a partial response to the
Vice President's National Performance Review task force's
recommendations for improving the coordination and structure of
federal law enforcement agencies.\9 OIAP's overall mission is to (1)
improve coordination among Justice's criminal investigative agencies,
(2) reduce interagency duplication, (3) resolve issues where there is
overlapping jurisdiction, (4) facilitate better use of investigative
resources, and (5) advise the Attorney General on administrative,
budgetary, and personnel matters involving these agencies. Among
other things, OIAP's charter specifically called for it to establish
procedures for coordinating fugitive apprehensions and to perform
other functions in the fugitive area, as necessary, for effective
policy coordination and elimination of waste and duplication.\10
An OIAP spokesperson told us that when OIAP was considering how to
address the matter of fugitive coordination problems, it agreed to a
request by senior FBI and USMS officials to defer OIAP involvement
and allow the two agencies to first address these problems. He also
said that fugitive matters were being addressed to some extent as
part of the interagency cooperation required in connection with
Justice's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative, particularly the interagency
working group. Although the official did not have any specific
timeframe, he noted that OIAP's deference would not continue
indefinitely in the absence of positive results and that the agencies
are expected to resolve the problems in reasonable time. He also
said that OIAP has stayed abreast of the agencies' efforts through a
variety of ways and will continue to do so.
--------------------
\9 Similar recommendations were made to the Secretary of the
Treasury. Among other actions, the Secretary established an Under
Secretary position to coordinate Treasury's law enforcement
activities. Also, according to Treasury's Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Enforcement, Treasury recently revitalized its Enforcement
Council to mirror Justice's OIAP. The Council is chaired by the
Under Secretary and composed of representatives of Treasury's law
enforcement agencies.
\10 OIAP does not have jurisdiction over non-Justice agencies and
consequently any efforts to address issues involving Justice agencies
and non-Justice agencies (e.g., Customs Service) would require the
voluntary participation of the non-Justice agencies.
OIAP PROVIDES A VEHICLE FOR
DETERMINING WHETHER FUGITIVE
APPREHENSION RESPONSIBILITIES
ARE EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY
ALIGNED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
In addition to its role in ensuring that fugitive matters are
properly coordinated among the various Justice law enforcement
agencies, OIAP represents a means for Justice to ensure that the
current alignment of fugitive apprehension responsibilities among its
agencies is the most efficient and effective use of federal law
enforcement resources. The alignment of responsibilities has evolved
over the years, in part, as a result of efforts to resolve
intermittent interagency coordination problems. Consequently, this
alignment has led to a division of responsibilities, which could
cause interagency problems and may or may not represent the most
efficient and effective use of resources. This matter has not been
systematically examined.
Given its charter and with representatives from all Justice criminal
investigative agencies, OIAP is positioned to help ensure that the
current division of fugitive responsibilities among Justice agencies
is well founded and results in the most efficient and effective use
of resources. Also, by involving representatives from key
non-Justice agencies, OIAP could help to ensure that efficient and
effective use of limited law enforcement resources and fewer
interagency coordination problems occur across the federal
government.
NO ASSURANCE FUGITIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES ARE
EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY
ALIGNED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
Although the division of fugitive responsibilities as it has evolved
may be appropriate, no systematic assessment of the current alignment
of these responsibilities has been conducted to determine whether the
differences or inconsistencies are well founded and represent the
most efficient and effective use of law enforcement resources. For
example, under Justice' 1988 fugitive policy (see app. II), the FBI
is responsible for fugitives wanted on arrest warrants for crimes
that are within FBI's jurisdiction and for any of these fugitives
who, after arrest, flee prior to adjudication of guilt. On the other
hand, DEA may, and usually does, delegate its arrest warrant
fugitives not caught within a short period to USMS. However, unlike
the FBI, DEA does not have responsibility for any of its postarrest
fugitives who flee prior to adjudication of guilt, unless new charges
are involved and DEA elects to take responsibility.
Other federal agencies generally have retained responsibility for
fugitives wanted on their arrest warrants, but, to varying degrees,
they have deferred responsibility to USMS for postarrest fugitives.
Also, Customs Service agents may, under Customs' policy, refer any
fugitive cases to USMS after passage of a reasonable time.
The law enforcement agencies we contacted generally believed that
investigative work and fugitive apprehension are distinct functions.
ATF and Customs Service officials acknowledged that fugitive
apprehension was secondary to their primary responsibility of
conducting investigations. However, none of the representatives of
the agencies, other than DEA, expressed or indicated any interest in
giving up their basic responsibility for fugitives prior to the
initial apprehension. They believed that apprehension was a logical
part of their investigative case preparation responsibilities. They
believed that they were most informed about possible locations or
known associates that could lead to quick apprehensions. FBI
officials noted that their agents were as capable as USMS' deputy
marshals in pursuing fugitives. A Customs Service official stated
that, due to the complexity of Customs' investigations and the
sophistication of many of their fugitives, Customs case agents are
the best people to pursue Customs' fugitives, who are often an
integral part of a larger Customs' investigation.
The Treasury agencies had mixed views, however, on their
responsibilities for arrested offenders who subsequently become
fugitives. As noted earlier, USMS is seeking agreements with other
agencies on what responsibilities they and USMS will have regarding
postarrest fugitives.
DEA and USMS officials noted that assigning DEA fugitive
responsibilities to USMS makes sense given that USMS's deputy
marshals are trained and experienced at fugitive apprehension. DEA
staff are then available to work exclusively on drug investigations.
Under the 1988 policy, DEA may delegate responsibility to USMS if the
fugitive is not caught within 7 days after issuance of the arrest
warrant. DEA officials noted that the 7-day requirement gave them
time to follow up on any "hot leads" as to the possible location of
the fugitive and helped to ensure that the delegation process did not
hinder the apprehension of fugitives. For example, according to
USMS, DEA arrested 2,601, or about 44 percent, of all DEA fugitives
caught in fiscal year 1993. According to a USMS official, most of
these arrests were fugitives who had not been delegated to USMS and
who were caught shortly after the issuance of their arrest warrants.
The basis for these policy differences among USMS, FBI, and other
agencies and their relative efficiency and effectiveness are issues
that could be considered in any examination of federal fugitive
apprehension responsibilities. Besides looking at the agencies'
specific responsibilities for arrest warrant and postarrest
fugitives, such an examination also might include determining whether
a single agency, such as USMS or FBI, should have responsibility for
fugitives in general who have remained in fugitive status for a
specified time, i.e., where all leads have been exhausted and no
active apprehension efforts exist. In this regard, we noted that
many fugitives go unapprehended for long periods. For example, about
61 percent of the 29,339 federal fugitive entries in the NCIC
database as of April 6, 1994, were for fugitives who had been wanted
for 2 years or longer. In addition, consideration also could be
given to how changes in fugitive apprehension responsibilities among
the agencies would affect their other responsibilities or federal law
enforcement in general.
OIAP ROLE IN ADDRESSING THE
DIVISION OF FUGITIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
An OIAP spokesperson acknowledged the differences in the division of
responsibilities for fugitive apprehension and told us that it might
be appropriate for OIAP to address the overall issue of these
responsibilities at some future time. He said that such an effort
would be consistent with OIAP's charter. He noted, however, that
while OIAP has had several successful initiatives, it is just
beginning to develop credibility and has to work through the distrust
that has built up among the various agencies over the years.\11 He
said that to successfully review, and perhaps recommend changing the
current alignment of fugitive responsibilities, OIAP must first have
a high level of credibility with the affected law enforcement
agencies. He also noted that whether OIAP would conduct such an
examination would depend upon the facts, other priorities facing
OIAP, and the availability of resources at the time.
Although OIAP has no jurisdiction over the fugitive responsibilities
of non-Justice agencies, the OIAP spokesperson said that agencies,
such as the Treasury Department's law enforcement agencies, might
formally participate at the OIAP executive level at some future time.
He noted that non-Justice agencies already have been involved in some
OIAP initiatives at the working group level. For example, ATF was
participating in an OIAP working group on the Anti-Violent Crime
Initiative. He also said that OIAP can and would encourage the
Treasury agencies to work out any problems they have with the Justice
agencies.
--------------------
\11 Among other things, OIAP has issued resolutions and taken actions
involving (a) the sharing of federal drug intelligence and
responsibility for drug-related investigations in foreign countries,
(b) coordination of violent crime activities, (c) coordination of the
budget requests of the various OIAP agencies, (d) location and use of
Justice field offices and resources, and (e) savings relating to the
purchase of law enforcement equipment.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Indications are that the percentage of fugitive cases involving
interagency coordination problems, such as interagency duplication,
jurisdictional disputes, and noncooperation, is not large.
Nevertheless, there have been instances that agency officials said
have or potentially could have adversely affected their efforts to
apprehend federal fugitives. Officials from the principal agencies
involved--FBI and USMS--believe that the problems will be
sufficiently addressed as a result of (1) specific efforts they have
made or will make to resolve problems, (2) the planning and
coordination that will be done under Justice's Anti-Violent Crime
Initiative, (3) mandates from the Attorney General and their agency
heads that interagency squabbles and noncooperation will not be
tolerated, and (4) the establishment of OIAP. In addition, USMS
officials are taking steps to resolve problems involving non-Justice
agencies through direct negotiations, and, if unsuccessful, plan to
request assistance from OIAP.
OIAP was established, in part, to improve interagency coordination
and eliminate waste and duplication in the fugitive area. In this
regard, OIAP plans to continue staying abreast of the agencies'
efforts to address interagency coordination problems and expects the
agencies to do so in a reasonable amount of time. In view of the
actions being taken by FBI, USMS, and OIAP, we are not making any
recommendations.
OIAP also represents a unique opportunity to determine if the
alignment of fugitive responsibilities among Justice and non-Justice
agencies represents efficient and effective use of limited law
enforcement resources. The current alignment of responsibilities has
evolved over the years, in part, as a result of efforts to resolve
intermittent interagency coordination problems. Consequently, this
has led to differences in responsibilities that may or may not
represent the best use of resources.
OIAP has acknowledged differences in the division of fugitive
responsibilities and may, once it has established itself as a
credible interagency management group, look into the issue of
fugitive responsibilities among agencies. Such an examination would
then depend upon the facts existing at that time and OIAP's other
priorities. We believe that this is a reasonable approach and
consequently are not making any recommendation on this matter.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
The Justice Department and the Treasury Department provided written
comments on a draft of this report. These comments are presented in
appendixes VII and VIII. Overall, the agencies agreed that there are
not extensive interagency conflicts or coordination problems.
Justice also reiterated that appropriate corrective actions have been
or will be taken to address the interagency coordination problems
that have occurred. Justice specifically mentioned actions relating
to task forces, foreign fugitives, and prison escapes. Treasury
specifically referred to assistance being provided to Justice's OIA
and to Customs Service's responsibility for persons who flee after
their initial arrest. These comments are noted earlier in this
report.
Justice said that interagency disputes will not be allowed to affect
its efforts to pursue federal fugitives and that any disputes that
arise will be handled through interagency discussion, cooperation,
and departmental oversight. Justice stated that it remained vigilant
in its efforts to reduce or minimize instances that could jeopardize
fugitive apprehension efforts, endanger law enforcement officials and
the general public, or waste limited law enforcement resources. In
this regard, Justice noted that its fugitive programs are continually
reviewed by the responsible agencies to minimize any inefficiencies
or duplication.
With regard to working with non-Justice agencies, Justice reiterated
that OIAP does not have any jurisdiction over these agencies.
Justice noted that consequently any discussion of Treasury Department
participation in the OIAP process would require Treasury's consent.
We recognize that participation by non-Justice agencies with OIAP
would be voluntary and note that ATF is already cooperating with OIAP
in connection with Justice's Anti-Violent Crime Initiative.
Moreover, in its comments, Treasury reiterated that it had
revitalized the Treasury Enforcement Council as a means, similar to
OIAP, for providing enforcement agency coordination and for
addressing specific enforcement issues. We believe that, through
OIAP and the Enforcement Council, Justice and Treasury should be able
to enhance interdepartmental cooperation in the fugitive area, as
well as other areas, and surface and resolve any coordination
problems such as those discussed in this report. Furthermore, OIAP
and the Enforcement Council represent the means for Justice and
Treasury to ensure the interagency cooperation that would be needed
for any future review of whether the alignment of fugitive
apprehension responsibilities among the involved agencies is the most
effective and efficient use of their law enforcement resources.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General; the
Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make copies
available to others upon request.
The major contributors are listed in appendix IX. Should you need
additional information on the contents of this report, please contact
me on (202) 512-8720.
Daniel C. Harris
Assistant Director, Administration
of Justice Issues
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
As a result of its study of two specific fugitives, the former House
Government Operations Committee's Subcommittee on Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture was concerned about the overall
effectiveness of the Department of Justice's 1988 policy in resolving
interagency rivalries and problems in fugitive apprehensions.\1 This
policy identifies the fugitive responsibilities of FBI, DEA, and USMS
and establishes conditions for exceptions to these responsibilities.
The chairmen of the Committee and Subcommittee requested that we
review the policy. We agreed with the requesters to focus on
determining (1) the extent and nature of any interagency coordination
problems among FBI, DEA, and USMS and other federal agencies involved
in fugitive investigations and (2) if such problems existed, what
actions had been or could be taken to address them. Coordination
problems could include unnecessary duplicate or overlapping efforts,
jurisdictional disputes, and noncooperation that could adversely
affect the efficiency or effectiveness of efforts to apprehend
fugitives.
To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed
various documents obtained from FBI, DEA, and USMS; the Treasury
Department's ATF, Customs Service, and Secret Service; Justice's
USNCB, Criminal Division, Executive Office of United States
Attorneys, and OIAP; and the State Department. The Treasury agencies
were not part of the 1988 Justice policy. USMS officials identified
these agencies as those agencies outside of the Justice Department
with which it was likely to have overlapping efforts or interagency
disputes in the fugitive apprehension area. We contacted officials
of Justice's USNCB and the Criminal Division's OIA, and the State
Department for their perspectives on interagency problems involving
international fugitives. We contacted officials of the Executive
Office of United States Attorneys for any overall perspectives U.S.
attorneys might have on interagency problems. We contacted OIAP
officials to identify ongoing actions and plans for addressing
interagency fugitive matters.
We asked the designated spokesperson(s) of each agency, among other
things, about the nature and extent of any interagency problems their
agencies may have experienced with other agencies in the fugitive
area. We requested any studies or reports they had on interagency
fugitive activities and related problems.
Documentation obtained from FBI and USMS included (1) policy guidance
and descriptive information on their fugitive activities; (2) brief
descriptions of fugitive cases they selected, at our request, to
illustrate both good and poor interagency interactions; (3)
statistics on their fugitive caseloads and accomplishments; (4)
sections of reports dealing with internal reviews, inspections, or
other studies of fugitive matters; (5) memorandums of understanding,
agreements, and policies on the coordination and division of fugitive
apprehension responsibilities among federal agencies; and (6) various
other documents illustrating interagency relations and problems in
the fugitive area. Documentation obtained from DEA and the other
contacted agencies generally was limited to policy guidance on their
fugitive roles and operations and related statistics. These agencies
had far fewer fugitive caseloads than FBI and USMS.
It is possible that the representatives of the agencies we contacted
might not have been inclined to point out problems their agencies had
with other agencies. They were, however, sometimes critical of
another agency in one or more specific areas. Further, they were
generally consistent in noting that interagency relations were good
overall and in identifying the areas where problems occurred. In
view of their consistent views and the establishment of OIAP to
address interagency problems, we did not attempt to specifically
identify the extent of problems. Instead, we performed two limited
analyses to provide some assurance that the perspectives provided by
the agencies' representatives were reasonable.
First, we reviewed the NCIC wanted persons database for indications
of the overall extent and types of federal fugitives wanted by more
than one federal agency. We did not determine the extent to which
such fugitive cases involved any interagency disputes,
noncooperation, or duplication beyond the minimum work needed by an
agency to keep a fugitive record on NCIC and to maintain an open case
file. We analyzed NCIC entries for (1) persons wanted as of April 6,
1994, and (2) wanted persons whose records were removed from NCIC
during calendar years 1992 and 1993 to determine if two or more
agencies had entered the same fugitive in NCIC. While we have no
assurance that NCIC included all of the agencies' fugitives, every
agency we contacted had a policy requiring entry into NCIC. Based on
what the agencies told us, we determined that NCIC was the best
source for identifying their fugitives as well as fugitives wanted by
more than one agency. However, according to FBI and USMS officials,
some federal fugitives generally are not entered into the NCIC wanted
persons file and would not be identified in our analysis to determine
overlapping fugitive efforts. For example, according to USMS
officials, other countries' fugitives suspected of being in the
United States are not entered in the NCIC wanted persons database
unless there is an arrest warrant authorized by OIA.
To identify the extent to which different federal agencies entered
the same fugitive data into NCIC, i.e., fugitive matters involving
overlapping jurisdictions, we conducted a four-stage computer
analysis. We excluded all test entries and temporary warrant entries
from our analyses. Entries made by two or more offices within the
same agency were not counted as duplicate entries. We used the same
analysis scheme for fugitives wanted as of April 6, 1994, as we used
for fugitives removed from NCIC in 1992 and 1993. We discussed our
methodology with USMS and FBI officials who generally agreed that it
was a reasonable approach to identifying overlapping fugitive cases.
NCIC contains various identifying data on each fugitive. In the
first stage of matching, we identified multiple entries using FBI
numbers. An FBI number is unique to an individual and is assigned to
all persons for whom FBI receives fingerprint cards. Consequently,
the FBI number was the most reliable identifier of an individual in
the NCIC system. However, not all fugitives on NCIC had an FBI
number. In the second stage, for entries without such numbers, but
with social security numbers, we identified multiple entries with
identical social security numbers. In the third stage, we compared
nonmatching entries from the first stage that had a social security
number with nonmatching entries from the second stage. The fourth
stage involved entries without an FBI or social security number. We
matched these entries using name and birth date.
In addition to analyzing NCIC data, we reviewed policy guidance and
various parts of reports on FBI and USMS internal inspections of
their offices to determine what, if any, interagency problems were
found in the fugitive area. In this regard, USMS officials provided
us with copies of sections on fugitives from the 12 inspection
reports they said were issued in fiscal year 1993; each involved a
district office headed by a U.S. marshal. FBI officials provided us
with inspection information from fiscal years 1992 and 1993.
According to this information, 19 of 52 reports issued on FBI
headquarters, field offices, and overseas offices during fiscal years
1992 and 1993 contained findings on fugitive matters. They provided
us with copies of the findings sections of those reports. Given the
nature and size of the FBI and USMS fugitive programs, we did not
examine similar reviews conducted by the other federal law
enforcement agencies we contacted. Any major problems they had would
likely have involved FBI or USMS and be reflected in those agencies'
reports.
We further analyzed the information obtained from NCIC, interviews,
and documents provided by the agencies to better identify the types
of problems that occurred, their causes, actual or potential effects,
and needed corrective actions. We queried FBI, OIAP, and USMS
officials on and sought documentation of plans to implement needed
corrective actions.
We also relied on NCIC data to obtain general comparisons between
federal agencies on the number and type of their fugitive caseloads.
These comparisons could not be made using the data regularly
maintained and provided by the agencies on these caseloads because
the level of information varied significantly among them. USMS
regularly maintained a database of its warrants from which it could
provide information on the number, type (e.g., DEA, bond default),
and disposition (e.g., USMS arrested or other agency arrested) of the
fugitives for whom it had apprehension responsibility. However, the
same level of information on fugitive caseloads was not available
from FBI and other law enforcement agencies, such as Customs Service
and ATF. The focus of these agencies' efforts and management systems
is on investigating crimes that fall within their jurisdiction.
These investigations do not always involve pursuits of fugitives.
Thus, their databases generally could provide information on the
number and type of their investigations (e.g., fraud, organized
crime, and smuggling), but did not specifically track the number,
type, and disposition of their fugitive efforts. Although FBI could
provide some information on the number and type of escaped federal
prisoners and military deserters it wanted and state and local
fugitives it wanted under the unlawful flight program, FBI, ATF, and
Customs Service generally relied on NCIC data to obtain current
information on the number and type of fugitives they were pursuing.
Since the fugitive data we sought was unavailable from FBI, ATF, and
Customs Service, we did not determine the level of information
available from Secret Service.
Justice and Treasury provided written comments on a draft of this
report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII and
are incorporated in the report as appropriate.
Our work was performed from July 1993 to January 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\1 House Government Operations Committee report entitled "They Went
Thataway: The Strange Case of Marc Rich and Pincus Green." H.R.
Rep. No. 537, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992).
SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE
1988 JUSTICE POLICY ON FUGITIVE
APPREHENSION IN FBI, DEA, AND USMS
CASES
========================================================== Appendix II
Category FBI DEA USMS
------------------ ------------------ ------------------ --------------------
Arrest Responsible for May delegate those May get delegation
warrants\a cases involving cases from DEA of authority from
FBI investigations to DEA or lead agency
investigations. USMS if the in task force
fugitive is not investigation.
For joint FBI/DEA caught in 7 days.
and multiagency
task force May take back
investigations, these cases if new
the lead agency charges are
decides whether to involved.
keep or give the
case to USMS.
Post- Responsible for May elect Responsible for DEA
arraignment\b FBI cases. responsibility for cases unless new
DEA case if new charges are involved
charges are and DEA elects
involved. responsibility.
If electing
responsibility,
DEA must provide
written notice to
USMS.
Responsibility
becomes effective
7 days after
notification is
received, with
interim efforts to
be coordinated
between DEA and
USMS.
Post- Responsible when May elect Responsible after
conviction FBI case involves responsibility for judgment of guilt
other than counter- DEA case if new with noted
escapes\c intelligence, charges are exceptions (see FBI
organized crime, involved. and DEA).
terrorism, or new
charges. If electing Must notify original
responsibility, agency of the
If electing DEA must provide violation.
responsibility, written notice to
FBI must provide USMS. May ask to be
written notice to Responsibility involved after a 7-
USMS. becomes effective day period. If
Responsibility 7 days after denied, may appeal
becomes effective notification is within the 7 days to
7 days after received, with Associate Attorney
notification is interim efforts to General, who is to
received, with be coordinated decide within 48
interim efforts to between DEA and hours. Agencies are
be coordinated USMS. to coordinate in the
between FBI and interim.\d
USMS.
Escaped Responsible when May elect Responsible with
federal FBI case involves responsibility for noted exceptions
prisoners\e counter- DEA case if new (see FBI and DEA).
intelligence, charges are
organized crime, involved. Must notify original
terrorism, or new agency of the
charges. If electing escape.
responsibility,
If electing DEA must provide
responsibility, written notice to
FBI must provide USMS.
written notice to Responsibility
USMS. becomes effective
Responsibility 7 days after
becomes effective notification is
7 days after received, with
notification is interim efforts to
received, with be coordinated
interim efforts to between DEA and
be coordinated USMS.
between FBI and
USMS.
Unlawful Responsible for Is to be told by May provide
flight pursuing these USMS of state or information to state
fugitives\f types of local interest in and local
fugitives, but is DEA-pursued governments about
not to seek fugitive. their fugitives.
unlawful flight Formal pursuit is to
warrant if USMS is be done by FBI under
already pursuing unlawful flight
the fugitive statutes, except for
because of an special programs
escape, a bond such as USMS task
default, or a forces that are to
violation of be approved by the
probation, parole, Associate Attorney
or mandatory General.
release
conditions. Is to notify state/
local governments if
Is to notify USMS fugitive is
of state/local apprehended.
government
requests for If state/local
unlawful flight governments ask for
aid when USMS USMS aid for
special programs fugitive being
are involved (see pursued by FBI or
USMS) and notify DEA, USMS is to
state/local refer the requester
government to FBI/DEA and
authorities if notify FBI/DEA of
USMS is already the state/local
pursuing the request.
fugitive.
Is to be told by
USMS of state or
local interest in
FBI-pursued
fugitive.
Foreign Responsible if the Responsible if the Responsible for all
fugitives\g case (1) involves case involves a cases except those
counter- fugitive who is that are the
intelligence, the subject of a responsibility of
organized crime, DEA investigation FBI or DEA, and
or terrorism; (2) that is currently cases that USNCB\h
is an being conducted at refers to other
investigation a foreign agencies, such as
currently being government request Immigration and
conducted at the or when it Naturalization
request of the exclusively is Service and
concerned foreign referred to DEA state/local
government; (3) via a DEA country governments, as
involves a attache. appropriate.
fugitive FBI is
seeking on an If a request is If a request is
arrest warrant for received directly received directly
a federal offense; from a foreign from a foreign
or (4) involves a government, DEA is government, USMS is
referral made to notify USNCB\h to notify the
exclusively to FBI to determine if USNCB\h to determine
via an FBI country other requests if other requests
attache. have been made and have been made and
the case is being the case is being
If the request is worked on by other worked on by other
received directly agencies. agencies.
from a foreign
government, FBI is
to notify USNCB\h
to determine if
other requests
have been made and
the case is being
worked on by other
agencies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: USMS is to advise any federal agency seeking its help on a
fugitive if FBI or DEA are already involved. If an agency insists on
USMS aid, USMS is to notify FBI or DEA, which is to defer to USMS or
assert need for their continued work. If the other federal agency
does not accept deferral to FBI or DEA, then all parties are to
confer and go to the Associate Attorney General, if not resolved.
Note 2: This policy does not preclude an agency from delegating any
case(s) to USMS or vice versa.
\a These cases involve persons for whom federal agencies hold arrest
warrants but cannot find.
\b These cases involve persons who default on bond or fail to appear
in court.
\c These cases involve probation, parole, and conditional or
mandatory release violators.
\d The investigating agency is to return apprehension responsibility
to USMS if the reason for the exception is no longer applicable. For
example, if FBI is seeking a probation violator because it has an
arrest warrant for a new crime, and the warrant is later withdrawn
because the case was dismissed, apprehension responsibility for the
fugitive is to be returned to USMS.
\e These cases involve violations which are, as a group, referred to
as the federal Escape and Rescue Statutes.
\f These cases involve state/local fugitives who have been charged
with federal crime of unlawful flight.
\g These cases involve other countries' fugitives sought in the
United States.
\h OIA is to notify USNCB of any request it receives from a foreign
government for assistance in locating or apprehending a foreign
fugitive. This is to be done to determine if a parallel request
exists.
HISTORY OF FBI AND USMS FUGITIVE
APPREHENSION RESPONSIBILITIES
========================================================= Appendix III
Prior to 1979, USMS' fugitive apprehension efforts were limited to
those cases referred specifically by the courts or undertaken as
thought appropriate by individual U.S. marshals. In 1979, at the
request of FBI, the Attorney General transferred primary
responsibility to USMS for fugitive cases involving federal prison
escapes, bond defaulters, and parole and probation violators. The
intention was to free FBI resources for higher priority work, such as
organized crime investigations. These changes were agreed to by FBI
and USMS and presented in a memorandum of understanding.
In 1982, FBI sought to regain responsibility for any such USMS
fugitives who had originally been the subject of an FBI investigation
or who had committed additional crimes that fell under FBI's
responsibility. USMS, in return, asked that FBI transfer
responsibility for the unlawful flight fugitive program to USMS.
Neither agency agreed to the other's proposal, and the division of
responsibilities between the two remained as defined in the 1979
agreement. However, in 1982, an agreement between FBI and DEA gave
DEA the option of delegating to FBI responsibility for DEA's
"significant" fugitives (from DEA class 1 and class 2 drug cases).\1
This was one result of a debate over whether FBI should take over DEA
and assume responsibility for federal drug law enforcement. Although
there was no formal agreement, DEA also turned over to USMS
responsibility for some of its lower priority fugitives (from DEA
class 3 and 4 drug cases).
In 1986, we reviewed the feasibility of transferring responsibility
for FBI's unlawful flight program to USMS.\2 This review was in
response to congressional concerns over jurisdictional disputes
between FBI and USMS, whether USMS could perform the responsibility
more cheaply than FBI, and whether FBI resources could be better used
on higher priority matters. Given the general lack of data, e.g.,
cost of individual fugitive investigations, we reported that there
were no clear-cut answers about whether the program should be
transferred. We said that the matter appeared to be a policy
decision for the administration or Congress.
In 1987 and early 1988, disputes between USMS and FBI over fugitive
apprehension responsibilities again received congressional attention.
FBI claimed that USMS' fugitive efforts were jeopardizing the safety
of FBI agents, adversely effecting FBI investigations, and
duplicating work done by FBI. USMS responded that these claims were
unsupported and that FBI wanted USMS to be subservient to FBI. The
Attorney General told the interested congressional committees that he
would correct the problems, and the result was the August 1988
Department of Justice policy on fugitive apprehensions (see app.
II).
The 1988 policy and its effectiveness in eliminating interagency
problems came into question during the House Government Operations
Subcommittee hearings on two high profile fugitives. These hearings
led to the request for our review and this report.
--------------------
\1 Subjects of DEA investigations are classified under one of four
classifications indicating their relative role in the drug traffic
and investigative priority. There are four classifications, denoted
as 1, 2, 3, or 4, with 1 being the most significant.
\2 Criminal Justice: Who Should Be Responsible for State
Fugitives--the FBI or U.S. Marshals? (GAO/GGD 86-115BR, Sept. 10,
1986).
PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL FUGITIVE
CASES BY AGENCY ENTERED INTO NCIC
DATABASE
========================================================== Appendix IV
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Defense Department includes entries by the U.S. Army, U.S.
Navy, U.S. Marines, U.S. Air Force, and their investigative
agencies.
Note 2: Treasury Department includes entries by ATF, Customs
Service, Internal Revenue Service, and Secret Service.
Note 3: Other agencies include entries by 12 different federal
agencies/departments.
Note 4: Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: GAO Analysis of NCIC Wanted Persons File, Apr. 6, 1994.
TYPES OF OFFENSES FOR WHICH
FEDERAL FUGITIVES ARE WANTED
=========================================================== Appendix V
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: GAO Analysis of NCIC Wanted Persons File, Apr. 6, 1994.
PERCENTAGE OF DANGEROUS FEDERAL
FUGITIVES BY AGENCY ENTERED INTO
NCIC DATABASE
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Dangerous fugitives include those entries with caution
notations on their records. According to FBI and USMS officials, a
caution notation generally means that the fugitive should be
considered dangerous. About 30 percent of all NCIC entries contained
caution notations.
Note 2: Other agencies include entries by 22 different agencies/
departments.
Source: GAO Analysis of NCIC Wanted Persons File, Apr. 6, 1994.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now pp. 3, 13, 15, and 18.
Now p. 14.
Now p. 17.
Now p. 7.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VIII
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY
========================================================== Appendix VI
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IX
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Carl Trisler, Evaluator-in-Charge
Amy Lyon, Evaluator
David Alexander, Senior Social Science Analyst