    2000 Census: Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risks That Pose a
    Threat to a Successful Census (Letter Report, 12/14/1999, GAO/GGD-00-6).

    Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
    Year 2000 census, focusing on: (1) the need to boost the declining level
    of public participation in the census; and (2) the Census Bureau's need
    to collect timely and accurate data from nonrespondents.

    GAO noted: (1) with less than 4 months remaining until Census Day,
    significant operational uncertainties continue to surround the Bureau's
    efforts to increase participation in the census and to collect timely
    and accurate field data from nonrespondents; (2) key to a successful
    census is the level of public participation, as measured by the
    questionnaire mail response rate; (3) however, the response rate has
    been declining since 1970, in part because of various demographic and
    attitudinal factors, such as more complex housing arrangements and
    public mistrust of government; (4) based on the 1998 dress rehearsal for
    the 2000 Census, the Bureau estimates a 61-percent mail response rate in
    2000; (5) however, this goal may be optimistic because: (a) a key
    ingredient of the dress rehearsal mail response rate - a second
    "replacement" questionnaire - will not be used in 2000 because the
    Bureau is concerned that the questionnaire could confuse recipients,
    which could lead to duplicate responses, and (b) while the Bureau has
    instituted an extensive outreach and promotion effort to help it achieve
    its desired response rate, dress rehearsal results suggest the Bureau
    still has not resolved the long-standing challenge of motivating public
    participation in the census; (6) the Bureau's ability to complete its
    field operations on time without compromising data quality is another
    significant risk to a successful census; (7) past experience has shown
    that following up on nonresponding households is one of the most
    error-prone and costly of all census-taking activities, requiring the
    Bureau to fill about 860,000 positions and recruit up to 3.5 million
    people; (8) even if the Bureau achieves its 61-percent mail response
    rate objective, it will have a nonresponse follow-up workload of 46
    million housing units; (9) to complete this workload in the 10-week time
    frame that the Bureau has allocated, it will need to close an average of
    657,000 cases every day; (10) however, a lower-than-expected mail
    response rate, difficulties in recruiting a sufficient number of workers
    in a tight labor market, and a variety of other factors, could undermine
    the Bureau's efforts and result in higher costs and less accurate data;
    and (11) while the Bureau has established post-census coverage
    improvement procedures to improve the accuracy of the 2000 Census data,
    these procedures are similar to 1990 methods that had limited success.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  GGD-00-6
         TITLE:  2000 Census: Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risks
    	     That Pose a Threat to a Successful Census
          DATE:  12/14/1999
       SUBJECT:  Census
    	     Vital records
    	     Population statistics
    	     Cost analysis
    	     Mailing lists
    	     Surveys
    	     Statistical data
    	     Government information dissemination
    	     Communication
    	     Labor supply
    IDENTIFIER:  Census Bureau Complete Count Committee Program
    	     2000 Decennial Census

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    United States General Accounting Office
    GAO

    Report to the Subcommittee on the Census,

    Committee on Government Reform, House of

    Representatives

    December 1999

    GAO/GGD-00-6

    2000 CENSUS
    Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risks

    That Pose a Threat to a Successful Census

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    Contents
    Page 341GAO/GGD-00-6 Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risks
    Letter                                                                      1

    Appendix I                                                                 36
    Comments From the
    Secretary of Commerce

    Appendix II                                                                38
    GAO Contacts and Staff
    Acknowledgments

    Tables                     Table 1:  Dress Rehearsal Mail                   7
                               Response Rates
                               Table 2:  Impact of Second                       8
                               Questionnaire on Dress Rehearsal Mail
                               Response Rates
                               Table 3: Agencies Have Taken Actions            24
                               to Expand the Census Applicant Pool

    Figures                    Figure 1: Census Questionnaire Mail              6
                               Response Rates Have Been Steadily
                               Declining
                               Figure 2:  Percentage of Advertising            10
                               Budget Allocated to Targeted Ethnic
                               Groups Through the End of Fiscal Year
                               1999
                               Figure 3:  Paid Advertising Campaign            12
                                                                               13
                               Figure 4:  The Bureau's Nonresponse             20
                               Follow-up Workload Has Increased,
                               While Time Frames Have Been
                               Compressed

    Abbreviations

    HUD       Department of Housing and Urban
    Development
    OPM       Office of Personnel Management

    B-282565

    Page 32GAO/GGD-00-6 Contingency Planning Needed to
    Address Risks
         B-282565

         December 14, 1999

    The Honorable Dan Miller
    Chairman
    The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on the Census
    Committee on Government Reform
    House of Representatives

    Taking a complete and accurate census is an
    enormous and costly endeavor. For the 2000 Census,
    the Bureau of the Census estimates it will need to
    properly locate and collect information on more
    than 270 million residents living in about 119
    million housing units. To do this, the Bureau
    expects to open over 520 local census offices;
    fill about 1.35 million temporary positions;
    receive, at peak, from 40 to 70 million
    questionnaires; process about 1.5 billion pages of
    data; and use more than 20 million maps for
    fieldwork. The Bureau estimates that the cost of
    the 2000 Census will be at least $6.8 billion. 1
    This represents an increase of 113 percent in real
    terms over the $3.2 billion cost of the 1990
    Census in 1999 dollars. When measured on a cost-
    per-housing unit basis, the 2000 Census will cost
    an estimated $57 per housing unit in 2000 compared
    to about $31 in 1990 (in 1999 dollars), which is
    an increase of 84 percent.

    The 1990 Census was the most costly census in U.S.
    history and data were less accurate than the 1980
    Census, leaving millions of Americans-especially
    members of minority groups-uncounted. Throughout
    this decade, the Bureau has aggressively planned
    and implemented a census in 2000 that seeks to
    address the problems with prior censuses.  Despite
    the Bureau's efforts, however, our work in recent
    years has continued to show that formidable
    challenges surround key census-taking operations.
    In February 1997, our findings led us to conclude
    that there is a high risk that the 2000 Census
    will be less accurate and more costly than
    previous censuses.2

    Two of our long-standing concerns in this regard
    have been the need to boost the declining level of
    public participation in the census-a significant
    problem that is certainly beyond the Bureau's
    ability to control-and the Bureau's need to
    collect timely and accurate data from
    nonrespondents. As agreed with your offices, we
    reviewed the Bureau's progress in reducing the
    risks that these challenges pose to a successful
    census.

    Results in Brief
    With less than 4 months remaining until Census Day
    (Apr. 1, 2000), significant operational
    uncertainties continue to surround the Bureau's
    efforts to increase participation in the census
    and to collect timely and accurate field data from
    nonrespondents. These uncertainties raise concerns
    that the 2000 Census may be less accurate than the
    1990 Census.

       Operational Uncertainties Surround the 2000
    Census

    Motivating Public Participation Will Be a
    Formidable Task

    Achieving the Bureau's mail response rate
    objective will be difficult

    Outreach and promotion program may have only a
    modest impact on the mail response rate

    Field Follow-up Efforts Will Be Costly and May
    Produce Unreliable Data

    Operational challenges could undermine nonresponse
    follow-up efforts

    The Bureau may be challenged to meet field
    staffing goals

    Post-census day coverage improvement initiatives
    offer little hope of resolving the undercount

    Key to a successful census is the level of public
    participation, as measured by the questionnaire
    mail response rate. A high mail response rate
    helps the Bureau obtain more accurate census data
    and reduce its costly nonresponse follow-up
    workload. However, the response rate has been
    declining since 1970, in part because of various
    demographic and attitudinal factors, such as more
    complex housing arrangements and public mistrust
    of government.

    The Bureau estimates that, partly on the basis of
    its experience in the 1998 dress rehearsal for the
    2000 Census, it will achieve a 61-percent mail
    response rate in 2000. However, this goal may be
    optimistic for at least two reasons. First, a key
    ingredient of the dress rehearsal mail response
    rate-a second "replacement" questionnaire-will not
    be used in 2000 because the Bureau is concerned
    that the questionnaire could confuse recipients,
    which could lead to duplicate responses. Second,
    while the Bureau has instituted an extensive
    outreach and promotion effort to help it achieve
    its desired response rate, dress rehearsal results
    suggest that the Bureau still has not resolved the
    long-standing challenge of motivating public
    participation in the census.

    The Bureau's ability to complete its field
    operations on time without compromising data
    quality is another significant risk to a
    successful census. Past experience has shown that
    following up on nonresponding households is one of
    the most error-prone and costly of all census-
    taking activities. For 2000, the Bureau estimates
    that it will need to fill about 860,000 positions
    for nonresponse follow-up and other peak field
    operations. To fill this many positions, the
    Bureau plans to recruit 3.5 million people, which
    is a number roughly equivalent to the population
    of South Carolina.

    Moreover, even if the Bureau achieves its 61-
    percent mail response rate objective, it will have
    a nonresponse follow-up workload of 46 million
    housing units. To complete this workload in the 10-
    week time frame that the Bureau has allocated, it
    will need to close an average of 657,000 cases
    every day. However, a lower-than-expected mail
    response rate, difficulties in recruiting a
    sufficient number of workers in a tight labor
    market-despite the Bureau's recruiting efforts and
    offers of competitive, geographically based pay
    wages-and a variety of other factors, could
    undermine the Bureau's efforts and result in
    higher costs and less accurate data. Finally,
    while the Bureau has established post-census
    coverage improvement procedures to improve the
    accuracy of the 2000 Census data, these procedures
    are similar to 1990 methods that had limited
    success.

         Given the operational uncertainties
    surrounding public participation in the census and
    the Bureau's field follow-up operations, we
    recommend that the Bureau develop contingency
    plans to mitigate the impact of a lower-than-
    expected response rate. This recommendation is
    consistent with suggestions we made in our 1992
    summary assessment of the 1990 Census.3 Congress
    may also wish to consider opportunities to expand
    the potential census applicant pool. The Bureau
    has worked with other agencies to identify and
    implement several important provisions to expand
    the census labor pool.  Additional opportunities
    include, for example, legislative actions to
    remove financial disincentives that could
    discourage a wide range of people from seeking
    census employment, including recipients of Social
    Security, veterans healthcare, food stamp,
    Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy
    Families benefits, federal and military retirees,
    and others.

    Background
    A successful census is critical because, as
    required by the Constitution, census data are used
    to reapportion seats in the House of
    Representatives. In addition, every year, the
    government awards around $180 billion in federal
    funds to localities on the basis of census
    numbers, and states use census data, among other
    purposes, to redraw the boundaries of
    congressional districts. Businesses and private
    citizens also depend on census data for such
    purposes as marketing and planning. Census Day is
    April 1, 2000, with peak efforts to follow up on
    nonresponding households scheduled to run from
    April 27 to July 7, 2000. Population counts to be
    used to reapportion seats in the House of
    Representatives are to be delivered to the
    President by January 1, 2001.

    In 1998, the Bureau conducted a dress rehearsal
    for the 2000 Census during which it tested most of
    the procedures and operations planned for the
    decennial census under as near census-like
    conditions as possible. The dress rehearsal was
    the Bureau's last opportunity for an operational
    test of its overall design of the 2000 Census and
    to demonstrate to Congress and other key
    stakeholders the feasibility of its plans. (Dress
    Rehearsal Census Day was April 18, 1998). The
    dress rehearsal sites included Sacramento, CA; 11
    county governments and the City of Columbia, SC;
    and Menominee County, WI, including the Menominee
    American Indian Reservation.

    Scope and Methodology
    To review the Bureau's efforts to increase public
    participation in the census and to collect timely
    and accurate field data from nonrespondents, we
    examined documents that described the Bureau's
    budget, plans, procedures, progress, and
    evaluations relating to these operations. Further,
    we examined current laws, regulations, and
    legislation pertaining to staffing the Bureau's
    field operations. We also interviewed Bureau
    officials at headquarters and, where applicable,
    regional and local census officials responsible
    for planning and implementing the 1998 dress
    rehearsal and the 2000 Census.

    To obtain a local perspective on the Bureau's
    outreach and promotion and field follow-up efforts
    during the dress rehearsal, we made several site
    visits to the dress rehearsal jurisdictions and
    interviewed local officials who were responsible
    for organizing and implementing community outreach
    and promotion efforts. We also inspected each site
    for the scope and prominence of promotional
    material and activities, and observed nonresponse
    follow-up operations. To determine the dollar
    effect of a 1 percentage point decrease in the
    mail response rate, we reduced the assumed mail
    response rates used in the Bureau's cost model
    supporting its fiscal year 2000 amended budget
    request.

    We did our audit work at the Bureau's Census 2000
    dress rehearsal sites; Regional Census Offices in
    Charlotte, NC, and Seattle, WA; Bureau
    headquarters in Suitland, MD; as well as in
    Washington, D.C., between April 1998 and October
    1999, in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    We requested comments on a draft of this report
    from the Secretary of Commerce. On December 3,
    1999, the Secretary forwarded the Bureau's written
    comments on the draft (see app. I), which we
    address at the end of this report.

    Motivating Public Participation Will Be a
    Formidable Task

    Achieving the Bureau's Mail Response Rate
    Objective Will Be Difficult

    Outreach and Promotion Program May Have Only a
    Modest Impact on the Mail Response Rate

    Public participation is critical to a successful
    census because it helps improve the accuracy and
    completeness of census information, while reducing
    the Bureau's costly and time-consuming nonresponse
    follow-up workload. The mail response rate to the
    census questionnaire is the most commonly used
    indicator of the level of public participation.4
    Unfortunately, as shown in figure 1, the mail
    response rate has declined with each decennial
    census since the Bureau first initiated a national
    mailout/mailback approach in 1970.

    Figure 1: Census Questionnaire Mail Response Rates
    Have Been Steadily Declining

    Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

    According to the Bureau, this declining trend is
    due, in part, to various demographic, attitudinal,
    and other factors, such as concerns over privacy
    and mistrust of government. These and related
    issues led us to note, in our 1992 summary
    assessment of the 1990 Census, the formidable
    challenges the Bureau faces in increasing public
    cooperation. We identified several opportunities
    for improvements in this regard. One of these
    opportunities was to simplify the census
    questionnaire-which the Bureau has successfully
    done. However, even with a simplified
    questionnaire and other changes in census design,
    we noted the Bureau needed to prepare for a lower
    mail response rate in 2000.5

    For the 2000 Census, the Bureau is expecting a 61-
    percent mail response rate, which is 4 percentage
    points lower than what it achieved in 1990.
    However, the dress rehearsal results suggest that
    even this goal may be optimistic. First, while the
    Bureau generally achieved its mail response rate
    goals during the dress rehearsal, it did so only
    by mailing out a second, "replacement"
    questionnaire, which is an approach the Bureau has
    since dropped for 2000. Second, the Bureau's
    outreach and promotion program does not appear to
    have bridged the gap that typically exists between
    raising awareness of the census on the one hand
    and motivating people to respond on the other. The
    significant difficulty in both raising public
    awareness and motivating people to mail back their
    questionnaires was demonstrated during the 1990
    Census, when Bureau research showed that although
    93 percent of the public reported being aware of
    the census, the mail response rate was just 65
    percent.

    Achieving the Bureau's Mail Response Rate
    Objective Will Be Difficult
    The dress rehearsal results raise concerns as to
    whether the Bureau can achieve its 61-percent mail
    response rate goal in 2000. As shown in table 1,
    the Bureau generally met its dress rehearsal mail
    response rate objectives, exceeding its goal by
    three percentage points in Sacramento and falling
    slightly short in South Carolina and Menominee.

    Table 1:  Dress Rehearsal Mail Response Rates
    Site            Data          Response     Actual
                   collection   rate goal   response
                   strategy                     rate
    South Carolina  Mailout/Mai       55 %         55 %
                   lback
                    Update/Leav       55          48
                   e
                    Overall           55        53.4
    Sacramento, CA  Mailout/Mai       50          53
                   lback
    Menominee, WI   Update/Leav       40          39
                   e
    Note: In mailout/mailback areas, housing units are
    to receive all questionnaires and related material
    by mail, and are to return completed
    questionnaires by mail. In update/leave areas,
    enumerators are to deliver questionnaires to
    housing units while updating the Bureau's master
    address list. Residents at these housing units are
    to then return completed questionnaires by mail.
    Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

    However, a key ingredient of these response rates
    was the Bureau's use of a second, "replacement"
    questionnaire that was sent to all housing units
    located in mailout/mailback areas in South
    Carolina and Sacramento. The Bureau has since
    rejected this procedure because it concluded that
    the number of duplicate responses suggested that
    the second mailing confused the public. Bureau
    officials told us that a similar situation in 2000
    could cause overwhelming processing problems.

    Recognizing the potential impact of not using a
    second mailing, the Bureau reduced its initial
    goal of a 67-percent mail response rate by 6
    percentage points to 61 percent. However, the
    results of a subsequent Bureau study suggest that
    the second mailing during the dress rehearsal had
    an even greater impact on the mail response rate,
    and, as a result, the Bureau's current 61-percent
    response rate objective could be optimistic.

    Although the impact of the second questionnaire is
    difficult to measure precisely, as shown in table
    2, the Bureau estimates that the second
    questionnaire added between 8.2 and 15.8
    percentage points to the South Carolina response
    rate, and between 7.5 and 14.4 percentage points
    to the Sacramento response rate.6 Thus, without
    the second mailing, it is likely that the Bureau
    would have fallen far short of its response rate
    goals-by at least 8.2 percentage points in South
    Carolina and 4.5 percentage points in Sacramento.

    Table 2:  Impact of Second Questionnaire on Dress
    Rehearsal Mail Response Rates
    Sitea       Response  Actual Increase   Response
               rate goal             from       rate
                         respons   second    without
                               e  mailing     second
                            rate             mailing
    South            55 %    55 %    8.2 - %      46.8 %
    Carolina                        15.8
    Sacramen         50     53     7.5 -        45.5
    to, CA                          14.4
    aThe Menominee, WI, dress rehearsal site is not
    shown in this table because it did not test the
    mailout/mailback data collection strategy and,
    thus, was not used to test a second questionnaire
    mailing.
    Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

    Dress rehearsal mail response rates are not
    necessarily predictive of decennial response
    rates, which are higher because of the greater
    public and media attention that the actual census
    receives. Nevertheless, the dress rehearsal mail
    response rates provide a useful indication of what
    might occur during the actual census and, for
    2000, raise concerns that the Bureau is at risk of
    an even lower response rate than it had estimated.

    Outreach and Promotion Program May Have Only a
    Modest Impact on the Mail Response Rate
    To help combat the downward trend in response
    rates, the Bureau has instituted both a national
    and locally based outreach and promotion program.
    Two key components of the Bureau's outreach and
    promotion program include a paid advertising
    campaign and partnerships with local governments.

    Paid Advertising May Have a Limited Effect on
    Census Participation
    In October 1997, the Bureau hired a consortium of
    private-sector advertising agencies, led by Young
    & Rubicam, to develop an extensive paid
    advertising program for the 2000 Census. Marketing
    the census represents a particular challenge in
    that advertisers typically target their best
    prospects and specific segments of the population.
    In contrast, census advertising is aimed at the
    most resistant "customers" and every U.S.
    household.

    The Bureau estimates it will spend about $167
    million on the paid advertising campaign in fiscal
    years 1998 through 2000, of which $102.8 million
    (62 percent) has been allocated in fiscal years
    1999 and 2000 for media (television, radio, print,
    and other types of advertising). A substantial
    portion of the advertising is to be directed at
    minority groups. Through the end of fiscal year
    1999, for example, of the $16.4 million allocated
    for media purchases, about $7.3 million (45
    percent) was to be used to target specific race
    and ethnic groups (see fig. 2). The Bureau has not
    yet purchased advertising for 2000, although a
    similar spending pattern is likely.

    Figure 2:  Percentage of Advertising Budget
    Allocated to Targeted Ethnic Groups Through the
    End of Fiscal Year 1999

    Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

    According to Bureau officials, the paid
    advertising campaign is intended to motivate
    people to return their census forms by using a
    variety of media to stress the message that
    participating in the census benefits one's
    community.  We observed this during our visits to
    the dress rehearsal sites where we often saw
    billboards containing such taglines as "This is
    Your Future.  Don't Leave It Blank," "The Future
    Takes Just a Few Minutes to Complete," and "Pave a
    Road With These Tools" (see fig. 3).  The census
    was also publicized through broadcast and print
    media and promotional items, such as cups and T-
    shirts.

         [Blank page]

    Figure 3:  Paid Advertising Campaign

    Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the paid
    advertising campaign appears to have been limited
    during the dress rehearsal. An independent
    research firm, which the Bureau hired to evaluate
    the effectiveness of the advertising campaign,
    reported that the campaign generally had no more
    than a "modest" impact on the public's attitudes
    and knowledge of the census. Although the Bureau
    had expected a 30 percentage point increase in
    awareness at the South Carolina and Sacramento
    dress rehearsal sites, the evaluation results
    indicated that there already was a high level of
    census awareness among all demographic groups
    before the start of the advertising campaign. In a
    telephone survey of residents that was conducted
    before the advertising campaign, 86 percent of
    those responding in Sacramento and 93 percent of
    South Carolina respondents said that they had
    heard of the census. (The Bureau believes that
    events occurring before the start of the
    advertising campaign, such as news coverage about
    the census approach, among other factors, may have
    contributed to the high level of awareness
    observed before the start of the advertising
    campaign). Following the advertising campaign,
    awareness levels increased by 8 percentage points
    in Sacramento and 5 percentage points in South
    Carolina (minority groups, the less educated, and
    the less affluent experienced a greater increase
    in awareness).

    Significantly, much like the 1990 Census, the
    public's high level of awareness was not matched
    by similarly high mail response rates. As
    previously discussed, at the South Carolina and
    Sacramento dress rehearsal sites, the mail
    response rates were about 55 percent.

    Following the dress rehearsal, the Bureau expanded
    and enhanced the paid advertising campaign, in
    part by adding messages that are to run prior to,
    and following Census Day. The campaign, which is
    to run from November 1999 through late-May 2000,
    is divided into three phases: educational,
    motivational, and nonresponse follow-up. The
    phases will be similar in that they will all
    contain messages about census benefits and
    confidentiality. In addition, the motivational
    phase, timed to coincide with the census
    questionnaire mailings, is to let people know to
    expect the census form and to mail it back. The
    nonresponse follow-up phase, which is to occur
    when the Bureau is going door-to-door collecting
    data from nonrespondents, is to encourage people
    to cooperate with census enumerators.

    Still, the impact that this additional advertising
    might have on people's willingness to respond to
    the census is difficult to gauge. According to the
    Bureau, there did not appear to be a direct
    relationship between advertising exposure during
    the dress rehearsal and the likelihood of
    returning a census form.7 However, the Bureau
    suspects that the campaign had an "indirect
    effect" on public response to the census in that
    the campaign may have made people expect the
    census form in the mail, which, in turn, increased
    the likelihood that they would return it.
    Moreover, as noted earlier, even though the
    advertising campaign for 2000 has been greatly
    enhanced since the dress rehearsal, high levels of
    awareness do not guarantee high mail response
    rates.

    Mismatch Between Bureau Expectations and Local
    Governments' Capabilities Could Undermine
    Partnership Efforts
    In addition to the paid advertising campaign, the
    Bureau is seeking to form partnerships with local
    governments, community groups, businesses and
    nongovernmental organizations to promote the
    census on a grassroots basis. The Bureau has
    allocated $108 million for its partnership
    initiatives in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

    A key element of the Bureau's local partnership
    effort will be Complete Count Committees, which
    are to consist of local government, religious,
    media, education, and other community leaders. The
    committees are to promote the census by sponsoring
    promotional events, placing articles in local
    newspapers, and holding press conferences that
    convey the importance of the census, among other
    activities. For 2000, as a matter of long-standing
    policy, the Bureau is not directly funding local
    outreach and promotion activities. Instead, for
    fiscal years 1999 and 2000, the Bureau is to
    distribute about $1.2 million to each of the
    Bureau's 12 Regional Census Centers for in-kind
    services, such as printing handouts. The Bureau
    also plans on assigning employees, known as
    partnership specialists, to work with local groups
    to help them initiate and sustain grassroots
    marketing activities, such as the Complete Count
    Committees.

    The Complete Count Committee program stems from
    the Bureau's recognition that the paid advertising
    campaign alone will not get the message across to
    everybody-particularly the hard-to-count-that
    participating in the census is important. The
    Bureau hopes that local people who are trusted by
    members of the community can more effectively
    market the census to those who are difficult to
    convince through traditional advertising media.
    Thus, while the Bureau plans on partnering with a
    number of religious, service, community, and other
    organizations-often to increase census
    participation among certain groups or areas-the
    Bureau believes that Complete Count Committees are
    the key to making each and every community aware
    of the census and persuading everyone to respond.

    However, during the dress rehearsal, we found that
    the effectiveness of the Complete Count Committee
    program was undermined by an apparent mismatch
    between the Bureau's expectations of the
    committees and what the committees could
    realistically accomplish with their limited
    resources. While the Bureau expected local
    governments to plan and execute an outreach and
    promotion program largely on their own with
    minimal direct support from the Bureau, we found
    that many local governments lacked the money,
    people, and/or expertise to launch an adequate
    marketing effort during the dress rehearsal. If
    such expectations remain misaligned for 2000,
    these disappointing results could continue.

    Regarding money, officials representing 9 of the
    14 local governments participating in the dress
    rehearsal told us that they were unable or
    unwilling to fund promotional activities. For
    example, while the Sacramento committee initially
    developed a list of several dozen promotional
    activities involving local media and other
    organizations, a committee representative told us
    that many activities were dropped because of a
    lack of money. Although the Bureau encouraged
    committees to turn to local businesses for
    support, the committees (1) were generally too
    small to organize an effective outreach effort or
    (2) viewed such an effort as a federal function.
    As one South Carolina committee representative
    said, "Fundraising for the federal government
    doesn't go over well.. That's what taxes are for."

    The Bureau may also have overly optimistic
    expectations of the level of staff and expertise
    available at the local level to plan and implement
    outreach and promotion activities. This was
    evident during the dress rehearsal where some
    local governments had difficulty getting staff to
    volunteer to help plan and organize promotion
    activities. At the South Carolina and Menominee
    sites, for example, some local officials expressed
    frustration and others resentment for what they
    perceived as the burden of promoting the census
    and the time it was taking from their other
    responsibilities. In addition, local governments
    may lack the know-how to launch an effective
    marketing effort. During the dress rehearsal, for
    example, the Bureau's South Carolina partnership
    specialist said that the Bureau assumed that the
    South Carolina counties had the experience and
    knowledge to market the census. However, she noted
    that, in hindsight, the opposite was often the
    case in those counties.

    In addition, while the Bureau's partnership
    specialists are to provide needed expertise and
    assistance to local governments and other groups,
    the dress rehearsal suggested that these
    specialists may be spread too thin to offer
    meaningful support in 2000. In our past work,8 we
    reported that some South Carolina committees never
    formed, while others became inactive, partly
    because the Bureau's two partnership specialists
    were responsible for assisting 11 county
    governments and the City of Columbia-a geographic
    area covering more than 6,700 square miles.

    In 2000, the partnership specialists will likely
    have a far greater workload. The Bureau plans to
    fill 542 partnership specialist positions to
    assist local governments. According to the Bureau,
    as of the end of July 1999, about 6,800 local
    governments had formed Complete Count Committees,
    (including 50 of the 51 largest cities). The
    Bureau expects that as many as 8,000 committees
    will ultimately be formed. Thus, on average, each
    partnership specialist could be responsible for
    assisting between 13 and 15 local governments. By
    comparison, the problems we observed at the South
    Carolina dress rehearsal site occurred when each
    partnership specialist was responsible for
    assisting an average of six local entities.

    Further, as local governments have been forming
    Complete Count Committees for the 2000 Census,
    early indicators suggest that the potential impact
    of this program may not be fully realized. For
    example, the effectiveness of the Complete Count
    Committee program will be partly determined by the
    number of governments that decide to participate.
    In the spring of 1998, the Bureau formally invited
    all 39,000 local and tribal governments in the
    United States to establish such committees.
    Although the Bureau did not expect that all 39,000
    local governments would do so, the 6,800
    committees formed so far represent about 40.4
    million people-or only 16 percent of the U.S.
    population. Moreover, those local governments that
    do not form Complete Count Committees could add to
    the partnership specialists' workload, because the
    partnership specialists will need to develop some
    other method of publicizing the census in those
    locations.

    Field Follow-up Efforts Will be Costly and May
    Produce Unreliable Data

    Operational Challenges Could Undermine Nonresponse
    Follow-up Efforts

    The Bureau May Be Challenged to Meet Field
    Staffing Goals

    Post-Census Day Coverage Improvement Initiatives
    Offer Little Hope of Resolving the Undercount

    The Bureau implements a nationwide field follow-up
    operation in an attempt to count those individuals
    who did not mail back their census questionnaires.
    Specific activities include (1) nonresponse follow-
    up, during which temporary Bureau employees, known
    as enumerators, visit and collect census
    information from each nonresponding housing unit
    and (2) additional coverage improvement
    initiatives, which are aimed at collecting data
    from people missed during the initial enumeration
    and nonresponse follow-up.

    According to the Bureau, even if it achieves its
    anticipated 61-percent mail response rate,
    enumerators will need to follow up with 46 million
    nonresponding housing units. However, completing
    this workload in the 10-week time period the
    Bureau has allotted for nonresponse follow-up,
    without compromising data quality, could prove
    extremely difficult.

    During the 1990 Census, for example, field follow-
    up operations proved to be error-prone and costly,
    in part because a higher than expected nonresponse
    follow-up workload required the Bureau to hire
    more enumerators than originally anticipated.
    However, some local census offices could not meet
    the demand for additional enumerators, which
    delayed the completion of nonresponse follow-up.
    As the time spent on data collection dragged on,
    the rate of errors appeared to increase because
    people moved or could not recall who had been
    residing at their home on Census Day. Furthermore,
    to complete nonresponse follow-up, enumerators
    collected data from secondhand sources, such as
    neighbors and mail carriers-referred to as "proxy"
    data. However, the Bureau-on the basis of its work
    evaluating past census operations-has found that
    proxy data are not as reliable as data obtained
    directly from household residents.

    In addition, field follow-up operations are
    expensive. The Bureau estimates that, in 2000, the
    cost to enumerate a household that mails back the
    census questionnaire will be about $3. For those
    households that do not return a
    questionnaire-requiring enumerators to obtain the
    information-costs could be as high as $35 per
    questionnaire.

    Operational Challenges Could Undermine Nonresponse
    Follow-up Efforts
    The combined challenges that affected the success
    of the Bureau's 1990 nonresponse follow-up
    operations-completing nonresponse follow-up on
    time, maintaining data quality, and recruiting a
    sufficient number of enumerators-may pose similar,
    if not greater, challenges for the Bureau in 2000.

    Completing Nonresponse Follow-up on Schedule
    Without Compromising Data Quality May Be Difficult
    For the 2000 Census, the Bureau has based its $1.5
    billion nonresponse follow-up budget on the
    assumption that it will achieve a 61-percent mail
    response rate, which corresponds to a follow-up
    workload of about 46 million of the 119 million
    housing units estimated to comprise the nation.
    However, given the Bureau's experiences during
    past censuses, it will be challenged to complete
    the nonresponse follow-up workload on time and
    minimize the collection of proxy data.

    For example, during the 1990 Census, because of
    unanticipated workload, staffing, and scheduling
    problems, it took the Bureau 14 weeks to complete
    nonresponse follow-up on 34 million housing
    units-8 more weeks than the 6-week period that the
    Bureau initially estimated for that operation. For
    2000, the Bureau has scheduled 10 weeks to follow
    up on an expected 46 million housing units. Under
    this timetable, the Bureau has 4 weeks less time
    to follow up on 12 million more households, when
    compared to 1990 (see fig. 4).

    Figure 4:  The Bureau's Nonresponse Follow-up
    Workload Has Increased, While Time Frames Have
    Been Compressed

    Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data.

    Thus, to follow up on 46 million households within
    the 10-week time frame, the Bureau will need to
    complete over 657,000 cases each day for the
    entire 10-week period. In addition, the Bureau's
    quality assurance procedures, which call for
    enumerators to revisit certain households to
    identify and correct enumeration errors, will add
    more than 17,000 households to the Bureau's
    average daily workload. Maintaining this pace
    could prove difficult for a variety of factors
    that range from the availability of a productive,
    temporary workforce, to local weather conditions.

    According to senior Bureau officials, a mail
    response rate as little as 2 or 3 percentage
    points less than the Bureau's 61-percent goal
    could cause serious problems. For example,
    according to Bureau officials, the Bureau has a
    limited number of needed materials for nonresponse
    follow-up. Furthermore, while the amount added to
    total field data collection costs as a result of
    any increased workload will ultimately depend on
    where this workload is located and how the Bureau
    manages its resources in completing this workload,
    additional costs could, nonetheless, be
    substantial.

    Each percentage point drop in the mail response
    rate would increase the nonresponse follow-up
    workload by about 1.2 million households. In 1995,
    the Bureau estimated that a 1 percentage point
    increase in workload could add approximately $25
    million to the cost of the census. However, on the
    basis our analysis of fiscal year 2000 Bureau
    budget estimates, we project that a 1 percentage
    point increase in workload could add at least $34
    million in direct salary, benefits, and travel
    costs to the $1.5 billion budgeted for nonresponse
    follow-up. This $34 million in direct costs
    exclude, for example, indirect costs for
    headquarters and field support personnel, quality
    control operations, rent, and data processing,
    which may or may not be incurred. The Bureau's
    ability to absorb these additional costs in its
    fiscal year 2000 budget will be a function of the
    actual outcome of other assumptions, such as
    enumerator productivity, and the Bureau's ability
    to manage other uncertainties. Of course, a higher
    than expected mail response rate is possible and
    could result in significant savings, which the
    Bureau said it would use to augment its coverage
    improvement programs for hard-to-count
    populations.

    Completing the nonresponse follow-up workload in a
    timely manner will be critical to the Bureau's
    collection of quality field data in 2000.
    According to Bureau officials, the Bureau does not
    plan to extend the nonresponse follow-up schedule
    as it did during the 1990 Census. They noted that
    the Bureau must meet the 10-week nonresponse
    follow-up schedule to have time to complete other
    census operations, including the coverage
    evaluations that will be used to estimate census
    under- and over-counts, and the processing and
    preparation of census data for publication.
    However, during the 1990 Census, enumerators
    collected proxy data before they had collected
    data from 95 percent of the cases within each
    predefined housing district, as required by Bureau
    procedures. Indeed, about 36 percent of the
    Bureau's district offices used proxy data when the
    caseload completion level was 90 percent or less.
    Just 16 percent of the district offices began
    collecting proxy data when the caseload was 95
    percent or more complete.

    During the dress rehearsal, while nonresponse
    follow-up operations were completed on schedule in
    both Menominee and Sacramento, and 6 days ahead of
    schedule in South Carolina, the Bureau found that
    obtaining interviews with household members proved
    to be more difficult than it had anticipated. As a
    result, the Bureau relied more heavily on proxy
    data than it had planned. Although the Bureau
    hoped to limit the portion of the nonresponse
    follow-up universe that was proxy data to less
    than 6 percent, the Bureau did not achieve this
    objective at any of the three dress rehearsal
    sites. In Sacramento, 20.1 percent of the occupied
    nonresponse follow-up universe was proxy data; in
    South Carolina, the proportion was 16.4 percent,
    and in Menominee, it was 11.5 percent.

    Because of the comparatively high use of proxy
    data, a Bureau evaluation of the dress rehearsal
    nonresponse follow-up operation noted that data
    quality, especially for the long-form
    questionnaire-which was somewhat more likely than
    the short form to be enumerated via proxy-was a
    concern.9 According to the evaluation, the data
    obtained from the long-form questionnaire are
    "especially suspect when obtained from a non-
    household member."

    The Bureau May Be Challenged to Meet Field
    Staffing Goals
    A number of questions also surround the Bureau's
    ability to staff its nonresponse follow-up
    operations, which also has implications for timely
    and accurate field data collection. For example,
    while the Bureau was generally successful in
    staffing its dress rehearsal and initial census
    operations and kept turnover rates to manageable
    levels, the larger number of people the Bureau
    needs to hire in 2000, combined with a tight labor
    market and other factors, could pose problems.

    The Bureau plans to fill about 860,000 positions
    for peak field operations, including 539,000 for
    nonresponse follow-up. To do this-on the basis of
    the anticipated workload and the fact that the
    vast majority of people offered a position may not
    accept a census job or may resign before work
    assignments are completed-the Bureau estimates it
    will need to recruit nearly 3.5 million applicants
    (a number roughly equivalent to the population of
    South Carolina). However, achieving this staffing
    goal will not be easy because the labor market has
    become increasingly tight. According to the
    Bureau, it took this factor into consideration in
    setting an assumed enumerator productivity rate of
    1.03 households per hour, which is based on
    conservative senior management judgments. This
    assumed productivity rate represents a 20-percent
    reduction from an original assumption of 1.28
    households per hour.  Higher than expected
    productivity rates could reduce the Bureau's
    staffing needs.  Nevertheless, as we have reported
    in the past, staffing the census could still be
    difficult because census jobs tend to be temporary
    and do not offer benefits, such as health or life
    insurance, sick or annual leave, retirement plans,
    and childcare, and thus, may not be as attractive
    to applicants as other employment opportunities.10

    While the Bureau's recruiting initiatives appeared
    to be effective during the dress rehearsal and
    early operations for the 2000 Census, the Bureau
    still encountered pockets of problems in specific
    geographic locations. For example, when the Bureau
    was conducting field operations to build the
    address list for the 2000 Census in the resort
    areas of Michigan's Upper Peninsula and Vail, CO,
    the Bureau was competing for workers during the
    seasonal vacation period. To help attract workers,
    the Bureau quickly responded by raising hourly
    wages. According to a Bureau official, the Bureau
    anticipates similar pockets of recruiting problems
    to occur during nonresponse follow-up operations
    in 2000. Thus, it will be important for the Bureau
    to monitor the progress of nonresponse follow-up
    and respond quickly so that it can attract needed
    staff.

    To expand the applicant pool, the Bureau plans,
    among other things, to (1) focus its recruiting
    efforts on employed individuals seeking additional
    jobs, retirees, and homemakers, among others; (2)
    develop partnerships with state, local, and tribal
    governments, community groups, and other
    organizations to assist in recruiting efforts; (3)
    expand its employment advertising; and (4) use a
    geographic pay scale to set wages at 65 to 75
    percent of local prevailing wages (from about
    $8.25 to $21.50 per hour) to help make census jobs
    more competitive.

    The Bureau has also worked with other federal
    agencies to waive regulations and policies that
    restricted or financially discouraged certain
    groups of people from seeking census employment.
    As shown in table 3, the Department of Commerce
    has authorized the Bureau to bypass Commerce's
    policy preference against hiring noncitizens.11
    Also, the Department of Housing and Urban
    Development (HUD) waived regulations that could
    have reduced the benefits for heads of households
    receiving housing assistance because the
    regulations would have required census income to
    be included in the calculations used to determine
    program eligibility. To make census employment
    more attractive to former and current federal
    employees, the Office of Personnel Management
    (OPM) used its authority to allow federal and
    military retirees, as well as current federal
    workers, to work on the census without reducing
    their benefits or income. (The requirement that
    military retirees are to receive reduced annuities
    upon federal reemployment was repealed by P.L. 106-
    65, effective Oct. 1, 1999.) Regarding current
    federal employees, over 80 federal agencies
    employing over 2.4 million workers have authorized
    that their employees may hold second appointments
    with the Bureau. GAO, seeking to do its part to
    help ensure a successful census, is participating
    in this initiative.

    Although the precise impact these actions might
    have on census employment cannot be determined,
    the agencies' actions could expand the potential
    census applicant pool by millions of people.

    Table 3: Agencies Have Taken Actions to Expand the
    Census Applicant Pool
                                               Potential             Approximate
      Agency action                          applicanta                number of
                                                                people affected
                                                                     (millions)
    In July 1999, Commerce authorized the    Noncitizens who are              6
    Bureau to hire                           legal permanent
    noncitizens, subject to annual           residents
    appropriation act restrictionsb
    and immigration law. Previously, under
    Commerce policy, the
    Bureau could hire noncitizens only if
    there was a shortage of
    qualified U.S. citizens in a particular
    area.
    In February 1998, OPM revised personnel  Civilian federal                 2
    regulations to allow                     employees
    federal employees working on the census
    to retain the retirement
    and insurance benefits to which they are
    entitled under their
    primary federal job, while earning
    additional wages in their
    second, census job.c
    In May 1996, HUD agreed to exclude       Heads of households              4
    census income from                       receiving housing
    calculations used to determine           assistance
    eligibility for its public and
    assisted housing programs, including
    Indian housing assistance.
    In April 1996, OPM delegated to the      Federal civilian                 2
    Bureau the authority to waive            annuitants
    the requirement that federal civilian
    retirees reemployed by the
    federal government are to receive
    reduced salaries, while
    reemployed military personnel are to
    receive reduced annuities.d Retirees can
    only obtain this exemption subject to
    the approval
    of key Bureau headquarters officials or
    Bureau regional directors.
    aPotential applicant categories are not
    necessarily mutually exclusive.
    bAccording to OPM, since 1939, Congress has
    prohibited most federal agencies from using their
    appropriated funds to employ noncitizens within
    the United States. However, certain groups are
    currently excluded from this ban. They include (1)
    persons from countries allied with the United
    States in a defense effort; (2) citizens of
    Ireland, Israel, and the Republic of the
    Philippines; and (3) persons who owe permanent
    allegiance to the United States, such as natives
    of American Samoa.
    cBefore this action, the Bureau would have had to
    work closely with each employee's agency to
    determine the amount of additional retirement
    deductions, as well as life and health insurance
    premiums, to withhold from the employee's
    paycheck, a potentially error-prone and
    administratively burdensome process, according to
    OPM.
    dSee 5 U.S.C. 5532, 8344, 8468. The requirement
    that military retirees are to receive reduced
    annuities upon federal reemployment was repealed
    by Public Law 106-65, effective October 1, 1999.

    During the 1990 Census, exemptions were made for
    recipients of public housing assistance and
    federal civilian and military retirees, and both
    actions helped expand the census applicant pool.
    According to the Bureau, about 20,000 federal and
    military retirees worked on the 1990 Census, which
    was 3.6 percent of the more than 550,000 people
    hired overall. Similarly, when the public housing
    assistance exemption was used in 1990, the Bureau
    found that it helped generate applicants in
    difficult-to-recruit areas, such as high crime,
    inner city areas, and Indian reservations.

    Pending Legislation Could Expand the Census
    Applicant Pool
         Congress is considering three pieces of
    legislation designed to improve the recruitment of
    temporary census workers. H.R. 683, S. 752, and S.
    1588 are similar in that each would (1) exempt
    census income from calculations used to determine
    eligibility for, or the amounts payable under, any
    federal, state, or local program financed in whole
    or in part with federal funds and (2) provide a
    blanket exemption from income/annuity offset
    provisions for federal civilian annuitants and
    military retirees. As previously noted, this
    annuity offset requirement was repealed for
    military retirees by Public Law 106-65.

         The legislation, if enacted, would remove
    financial disincentives that could discourage a
    wide range of people from seeking census
    employment. They include recipients of Social
    Security, veterans healthcare, food stamp,
    Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy
    Families benefits, as well as federal and military
    retirees.

         The broadest of the measures-S. 1588-also
    includes financial incentives for volunteers who
    help with the census, namely: reimbursements for
    expenses, such as gasoline and food, and a program
    of undergraduate or graduate debt relief.

    Opportunities Exist for Expanding the Census
    Applicant Pool Still Further
         If enacted, the legislation could make census
    employment more attractive to millions of people.
    However, the bills contain restrictions that limit
    their applicability. In addition, other statutory
    provisions exist that prohibit or create financial
    disincentives for certain groups of people who
    might be interested in census employment.

         Regarding the restrictions contained in the
    measures currently before Congress, the exemption
    in all three bills would not apply to federally
    funded program beneficiaries who were appointed to
    temporary census positions before January 1, 2000.
    This could discourage some people who had worked
    on early census-taking operations, such as address
    list development activities, from seeking further
    census employment.

         At the same time, the census applicant pool
    is not as large as it could be because provisions
    contained in current laws continue to prohibit or
    potentially discourage large groups of people from
    considering census jobs. Although our review was
    not exhaustive, and we did not comprehensively
    weigh the pros and cons of each option, we
    identified three large sources of potential
    applicants who might be interested in census
    employment were it not for these provisions.

    �    Active duty military personnel. The Census
    Act allows uniformed personnel to take census jobs
    to enumerate members of the uniformed services.12
    However, active duty military personnel are
    generally not permitted to accept outside federal
    employment in the absence of specific statutory
    authority to do so.13 Thus, additional statutory
    authority would be needed to authorize military
    personnel to work on the census. Doing so could
    increase the potential census applicant pool by
    over 1 million individuals.

    �    Recipients of federal government voluntary
    separation incentive payments. Since the early
    1990s, as part of an effort to restructure the
    federal government, the Department of Defense and,
    later, civilian federal agencies, have had the
    authority to offer voluntary separation incentive
    payments (also known as buyouts) of as much as
    $25,000 to eligible employees who left federal
    service. For nondefense agencies, Congress has
    authorized both governmentwide buyouts and over 15
    agency-specific buyout programs. According to
    information provided by OPM, most of these buyout
    programs contain provisions that generally require
    buyout recipients to repay their buyout if they
    accept a federal job within 5 years of their
    separation date. According to Bureau officials,
    some buyout recipients have decided against census
    jobs because of the repayment requirement.
    Approximately 59,000 buyout recipients could
    potentially still be covered by these provisions
    during peak census field operations.
    �    Noncitizens from certain countries. Most
    federal agencies have historically been prohibited
    by statute from using their appropriated funds to
    employ noncitizens of the United States, with
    certain exceptions. A statutory exemption from
    this appropriations restriction (currently
    contained in section 605 of Public Law 106-58)
    exists that allows agencies to use appropriated
    funds to employ noncitizens in limited
    circumstances, such as for the temporary
    employment of translators or in the field service
    as a result of emergencies.  According to Bureau
    officials, the Bureau has used this exemption to
    hire temporary workers in the past and is
    exploring its further use for the 2000 Census.
    Nevertheless, a broad statutory exemption from
    this appropriations restriction would make it
    easier for the Bureau to hire noncitizens from
    currently nonexempt countries, such as India,
    Pakistan, and Brazil. Many of these individuals
    could better enumerate members of their own
    community because some hard-to-enumerate foreign-
    born residents may feel more comfortable providing
    information to persons with whom they share a
    common cultural heritage.
    Given the Bureau's past history of staffing
    problems, the magnitude of the Bureau's staffing
    challenge for 2000, and the importance of an
    adequate workforce to the collection of timely and
    accurate census data, it will be important for the
    Bureau to have as large an applicant pool as
    possible from which to hire census workers.

    Post-Census Day Coverage Improvement Procedures
    Offer Little Hope of Resolving the Undercount
    The Bureau's post-census coverage improvement
    procedures planned for 2000, while designed to
    improve the census count, are similar to 1990
    methods that had limited success. Bureau officials
    believe that these procedures represent the best
    the Bureau can reasonably do to enhance the
    accuracy of the census. However, these officials
    also said that they doubt that either the overall
    accuracy levels or differential undercount rates
    will show much improvement over 1990 levels
    because societal factors that led to a high
    undercount in 1990 are even more prevalent today.

    Congress directed the Bureau to begin preparing
    for a traditional census in November 1997.
    However, the Bureau, awaiting the Supreme Court's
    decision on the legality of sampling, did not
    complete plans for a traditional census until
    January 1999, when the Supreme Court ruled that
    the Census Act prohibited the use of statistical
    sampling for purposes of determining the
    population count used to apportion the House of
    Representatives.14 As a result, according to Bureau
    officials, there was no time to conduct additional
    research to estimate the effectiveness of new
    coverage improvement procedures and, therefore,
    too much risk to justify implementing them.  Thus,
    for 2000, the Bureau will primarily use post-
    census coverage improvement procedures used in
    1990, which added just 3.68 million persons (1.5
    percent) to the population count.

    Nevertheless, coverage improvement programs in the
    1990 Census were costly and yielded data of uneven
    quality. For example, the Bureau's 1990 Recanvass
    program-where enumerators did a second, post-
    Census Day canvass of addresses in selected
    neighborhoods to look for missed housing
    units-added 139,000 housing units to the census,
    which was 0.1 percent of the total, according to
    Bureau data. However, while the $14.7 million
    program added 178,000 people to the decennial
    count, the Bureau later estimated that nearly 22
    percent were added in error.

    Overall, Bureau officials have acknowledged that
    post-census coverage improvement programs are
    expensive and do not always produce expected or
    hoped for results. Thus, it is unlikely that the
    Bureau's post-census coverage improvement
    programs-programs that had limited success in
    1990-will address the overall and differential
    undercount in 2000.

    Conclusions
    With less than 4 months until Census Day, the
    Bureau faces some significant risks that, taken
    together, continue to jeopardize the success of
    the 2000 Census. Securing an adequate level of
    public participation is a great challenge with
    implications for the size of the nonresponse
    follow-up workload. Having to complete an even
    greater nonresponse follow-up workload than
    anticipated, or difficulty in filling the number
    of enumerator positions that the Bureau estimates
    it will need for this operation, would have
    implications for scheduling as well as data
    quality. Because of these combined risks, the 2000
    Census may be less accurate than 1990.

    Given the operational uncertainties surrounding
    public participation in the census and the
    Bureau's field follow-up operations, it will be
    important for the Bureau to have contingency plans
    in place to mitigate the impact of a lower-than-
    expected response rate. Because of the little time
    remaining and the need for senior Bureau managers
    to devote the bulk of their attention to effective
    execution of the census plans already in place,
    such contingency plans will be most useful if they
    focus on the critical challenges and trade-offs
    that the Bureau will face-such as the need to
    balance schedule pressures with the need to
    protect data quality-if its response rate goals
    are not met. In addition, even though the Bureau
    has already taken steps to expand the census
    applicant pool, additional statutory measures
    could be needed, given the Bureau's past history
    of staffing problems and the magnitude of the
    Bureau's staffing challenge for 2000.

    Matters for Congressional Consideration
    To help expand the census applicant pool, Congress
    may wish to consider legislative actions to modify
    legal provisions that potentially discourage or
    prohibit specific groups of people from seeking
    census employment. Options could include:

    �    expediting its consideration of H.R. 683, S.
    752, and S. 1588, which among other things, would
    remove financial disincentives that could
    discourage recipients of Social Security, veterans
    healthcare, food stamp, Medicaid, and Temporary
    Assistance for Needy Families benefits, as well as
    federal and military retirees from seeking census
    employment;
    �    allowing active duty military personnel to
    hold temporary census employment;
    �    exempting former federal employees who
    received voluntary separation incentives (buyouts)
    from requirements to repay their buyout amount if
    they work on the census; and
    �    providing a statutory exemption from the
    appropriations restriction currently contained in
    section 605 of Public Law 106-58, for purposes of
    temporary census employment.

         Although we recognize that each of these
    options entails policy, budgetary, and
    implementation considerations that would need to
    be addressed by Congress, they represent an
    initial list of options that Congress could
    consider to help reduce the Bureau's staffing
    burden.

    Recommendations
    To help ensure an accurate and cost-effective
    census, we recommend that the Director, Bureau of
    the Census, develop a contingency plan of actions
    the Bureau can take to address the operational
    challenges that would result from a questionnaire
    mail response rate that is lower-than-anticipated.
    At a minimum, the Bureau's plan should address the
    budgetary, scheduling, staffing, and other
    logistical implications of collecting data from a
    larger number of nonresponding households. The
    contingency plan should also include options and
    procedures to balance the pressure to meet census
    schedules with the need to limit the use of proxy
    data. The Bureau should share its plan with
    Congress and others to demonstrate its
    preparedness for collecting accurate census data
    in the event of lower-than-expected levels of
    public cooperation with the census.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
    The Secretary of Commerce forwarded written
    comments from the Bureau of the Census on a draft
    of this report.  Overall, the Bureau commented
    that the draft report conflicted with the intent
    of our earlier reports, which, according to the
    Bureau, concluded that there is little time to
    make final census design changes and to implement
    them, as Census Day approaches.

    The Bureau noted that early in the decade, it
    recognized the challenges to conducting a complete
    and thorough nonresponse follow-up operation, and
    it planned to address these challenges using
    statistical sampling to adjust census population
    counts. However, as we noted in our draft, in
    January 1999, the Supreme Court ruled that the
    Census Act prohibited the use of statistical
    sampling for purposes of determining the
    population count used to apportion the House of
    Representatives. Our draft also noted that
    according to the Bureau, there was insufficient
    time to develop, test, and implement new coverage
    improvement programs.

    The Bureau also said that our contention that it
    has not sufficiently planned for potential
    shortcomings in nonresponse follow-up or outreach
    and promotion operations appears to contradict our
    September 1999 report on the Bureau's fiscal year
    2000 amended budget request.15 According to the
    Bureau, in that report, we characterized the
    Bureau's expectations of enumerator productivity
    during nonresponse follow-up, as well as the
    effectiveness of the advertising campaign, as
    being "generally conservative."

    We revised the draft to include the language from
    our September report, which noted the Bureau's
    assumed enumerator productivity rate is 1.03
    households per hour.  This new assumed
    productivity rate represents a 20-percent
    reduction from an original assumption of 1.28
    households per hour and was primarily based on
    senior management judgments-which the Bureau
    acknowledged are very conservative-about factors
    such as the uncertainty of hiring a sufficient
    number of quality temporary workers in a tight
    labor market.  We also have added language to this
    report noting that higher-than-expected
    productivity rates could reduce staffing needs.

    Our September report did not state that the
    Bureau's expectations of the impact of its
    outreach and promotion campaign are conservative.
    Rather, the September report states that the
    Bureau had no data available to support how much,
    if any, the Bureau's plans to increase the amount
    of census advertising would increase the response
    rate. Overall, the Bureau acknowledges that
    completing nonresponse follow-up on time, hiring
    and training needed staff, and implementing a
    successful outreach and promotion campaign will be
    a challenge-overriding themes of our report.

    The Bureau further commented that there is
    inconsistent analysis supporting the conclusions
    in our draft. According to the Bureau, in some
    instances, the dress rehearsal is used to support
    certain conclusions (e.g., the mail response rate
    in 2000 will be difficult to achieve). In other
    cases, the Bureau notes that conclusions are drawn
    that directly contradict the dress rehearsal
    findings. We disagree with the Bureau's reading of
    the draft report.  We were very careful in drawing
    the lessons from the dress rehearsal and applying
    them to the 2000 Census.  For example, in
    discussing the challenges to motivating the public
    to respond to the census, we also noted that an
    augmented advertising campaign is planned for the
    2000 Census and that mail response rates for the
    actual census tend to be higher than response
    rates obtained for a dress rehearsal.  Regarding
    staffing, we noted that overall, the Bureau met
    its dress rehearsal staffing goals, but that the
    Bureau encountered pockets of problems in areas
    with especially difficult labor markets.  The
    draft noted that due to the number of staff the
    Bureau will need to hire in 2000 and the
    historically tight labor market, the Bureau faces
    a substantial challenge-a view consistent with the
    Bureau's.

    The Bureau's final comment concerned our
    recommendation calling on the Bureau to develop a
    contingency plan of actions it can take if it
    receives a lower-than-expected mail response rate
    to the census questionnaire. The Bureau noted that
    its paramount objective in the months remaining
    before Census Day is to implement the procedures
    and operations that have already been planned. The
    Bureau commented that the only serious contingency
    would be to request a supplemental appropriation.

    We agree that the Bureau needs to concentrate on
    successfully implementing the procedures and
    operations already planned for the 2000 Census
    and, as our draft noted, a lower-than-expected
    mail response has major cost implications.
    Nevertheless, prudent management and past history
    suggest that developing a reasonable contingency
    plan is an appropriate course of action.
    Additional funding will not by itself make up for
    a lower-than-expected mail response rate. It is
    questionable whether the additional enumerators
    that the Bureau will need to complete the
    resulting increase in the nonresponse follow-up
    workload will be available given the staffing
    challenges described in our draft.  By considering
    scheduling, data quality, staffing, and other
    logistical implications of a lower-than-expected
    mail response now-while time is still
    available-the Bureau could be better prepared to
    maintain the accuracy of census data.

    We are sending copies of this report to the
    Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce,
    and the Honorable Kenneth Prewitt, Director of the
    Bureau of the Census. Copies will be made
    available to others on request.

    This report was prepared under the direction of J.
    Christopher Mihm, Associate Director, Federal
    Management and Workforce Issues. Please contact
    Mr. Mihm on (202) 512-8676 if you have any
    questions. Key contributors to this report are
    included in appendix II.

    Nancy Kingsbury
    Acting Assistant Comptroller General
    _______________________________
    1Of the $6.8 billion, $4.5 billion is budgeted for
    fiscal year 2000. For more information on the
    Bureau's fiscal year 2000 budget request, see 2000
    Census: Analysis of Fiscal Year 2000 Amended
    Budget Request (GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-291, Sept. 22,
    1999).
    2See GAO High-Risk Series: Quick Reference Guide
    (GAO/HR-97-2, Feb. 1997) and GAO Performance and
    Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges
    and Program Risks - Department of Commerce
    (GAO/OCG-99-3, Jan. 1999).
    3Decennial Census: 1990 Results Show Need for
    Fundamental Reform (GAO/GGD-92-94, June 9, 1992).
    4The mail response rate is calculated by dividing
    the total number of questionnaires returned by the
    total number of questionnaires delivered (either
    by mail or by enumerators).
    5GAO/GGD-92-94.
    6According to a Bureau evaluation, the lower bound
    represents the percentage of housing units that
    mailed back only the replacement questionnaire.
    The upper bound represents the percentage of
    housing units that mailed back (1) the initial
    questionnaire after the second was sent, (2) the
    replacement questionnaire, or (3) both.
    7See Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal Evaluation
    Results Memorandum E1b, Effectiveness of the Paid
    Advertising Campaign: Reported Exposure to
    Advertising and Likelihood of Returning a Census
    Form, U.S. Census Bureau, April 1999.
    82000 Census: Preparations for Dress Rehearsal
    Leave Many Unanswered Questions (GAO/GGD-98-74,
    Mar. 26, 1998).
    9The short-form questionnaire includes basic
    population and housing questions and is to be
    delivered to about 83 percent of all housing units
    in 2000. The long-form questionnaire includes the
    short-form questions, as well as additional
    questions on the social and economic
    characteristics of the population, and the
    physical and financial characteristics of the
    housing unit. The long form is to be delivered to
    a sample of housing units that make up the
    remaining 17 percent of the population.
    10GAO/GGD-98-74.
    11Immigration law and appropriation act
    restrictions must still be considered in
    determining noncitizen eligibility for temporary
    census employment.
    12See 13 U.S.C. 24 (c).
    13See 64 Comp. Gen. 395 (1985).
    14Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of
    Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
    15GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-291.

    Appendix I
    Comments From the Secretary of Commerce
    Page 37GAO/GGD-00-6 Contingency Planning Needed to
    Address Risks

    Appendix II
    GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
    Page 39GAO/GGD-00-6 Contingency Planning Needed to
    Address Risks
    GAO Contacts
    J. Christopher Mihm, (202) 512-8676
    Robert N. Goldenkoff, (202) 512-2757

    Acknowledgments
         In addition to those named above, Victoria
    Miller O'Dea, Victoria E. Miller, Lynn M.
    Wasielewski, Anne K. Rhodes-Kline, James M. Rebbe,
    Scott McNulty and Cindy S. Brown Barnes made key
    contributions to this report.

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