Border Patrol: Procurement of MD 600N Helicopters Should Be Reassessed
(Letter Report, 09/29/2000, GAO/GGD-00-201).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1)
the Border Patrol's procurement of the MD 600N helicopter, including
procurement specifications and selection factors; and (2) whether the
experience has shown the MD 600N helicopter to be effective in safely
supporting the Border Patrol's primary air operations mission.
GAO noted that: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
procurement in which the MD 600N helicopter was selected for the Border
Patrol was intended to provide an aircraft capable of meeting a variety
of air operations requirements, such as low and slow surveillance and
transport of agents and mission equipment; (2) to obtain such a
multipurpose aircraft, the contract solicitation listed three minimum
performance criteria the aircraft needed to have; (3) the aircraft was
required to operate at a speed of up to 130 knots, operate at high
altitude with crew and equipment as outlined by the statement of work,
and be capable of operating at least 2 hours under normal conditions;
(4) the aircraft was also required to have seating for two pilots and
two passengers; (5) only two aircraft were determined to be within the
competitive range under these specifications; (6) some weaknesses were
noted with both of the aircraft, although overall both were considered
acceptable; (7) the contract was awarded to McDonnell Douglas based on
the best value to the government; (8) the Border Patrol has purchased 11
of these helicopters for about $1.3 million each; (9) most Border Patrol
pilots who have had experience flying the MD 600N and most sector chiefs
expressed strong reservations about the suitability of the helicopter
for supporting key operations missions; (10) pilots were concerned about
the safety of the MD 600N, citing difficulty in performing emergency
procedures and with other documented problems, such as malfunctioning of
the engine control system and defective control cables; (11) the pilots
also said that the MD 600N is generally difficult to operate and
fatiguing to fly; (12) the amount of time the MD 600N helicopters were
unavailable because of maintenance-related reasons also was a concern to
pilots, mechanics, and most Border Patrol sector chiefs; (13) Border
Patrol Air Operations records show the aircraft was unavailable about 50
percent of the time between December 1998 and March 2000; (14)
responding to GAO's inquiry regarding these concerns, the current
manufacturer of the MD 600N, MD Helicopters Incorporated (MDH), stated
that all known problems with parts or components have been or will be
corrected; (15) based on the problems they have encountered, and after
almost 2 years of experience with the helicopter, most pilots,
mechanics, and sector chiefs do not support acquiring more MD 600Ns for
the Border Patrol fleet; and (16) most sector chiefs questioned the
appropriateness of acquiring a multipurpose aircraft to meet the
individual needs in each sector.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-00-201
TITLE: Border Patrol: Procurement of MD 600N Helicopters Should
Be Reassessed
DATE: 09/29/2000
SUBJECT: Federal procurement
Helicopters
Solicitation specifications
Contract oversight
Operational testing
Contract performance
IDENTIFIER: MD-600N
OH-6A Helicopter
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United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Report to the Honorable Duncan Hunter
House of Representatives
September 2000
GAO/GGD-00-201
BORDER PATROL
Procurement of MD 600N Helicopters Should Be
Reassessed
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Contents
Page 381 GAO/GGD-00-201 Border Patrol Helicopters
Letter 1
Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the U.S. 40
Department of Justice
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 46
Acknowledgments
Tables Table 1: Border Patrol Aircraft Fleet 5
and Locations Along the Southwest
Border
Figures Figure 1: Border Patrol Sector 4
Headquarters Along the Southwest
Border
Figure 2: MD 600N Flight Controls 6
Figure 3: Height/Velocity Curves for 18
MD 500E, MD 600N, Bell 407, American
Eurocopter AS 350, and Hughes OH-6A
Figure 4: MD 600N Ergonomics 25
Figure 5: Downtime for Border Patrol 27
600N Helicopters
Figure 6: Aircraft Repairs Often 31
Require Interior to Be Removed
Abbreviations
ECU electronic control unit
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control
FLIR forward-looking infrared
HMU hydromechanical unit
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
MDH MD Helicopters Incorporated
NOTAR Patented name for MDH no tail rotor
antitorque system
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
B-284951
Page 34 GAO/GGD-00-201 Border Patrol Helicopters
B-284951
September 29, 2000
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Hunter:
The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), is procuring a
new type of helicopter-the MD 600N-as part of a
replacement program for its aging helicopter
fleet. The MD 600N was intended to be suitable for
a variety of Border Patrol air operations missions
and scenarios. However, many Border Patrol pilots
operating the first MD 600Ns expressed concerns
about the safety and suitability of the aircraft
for key mission applications. On the basis of
these concerns, you asked us to review the MD
600N's procurement, application, and suitability
for Border Patrol use.
Specifically, we agreed to provide information and
analysis on (1) procurement of the MD 600N,
including procurement specifications and selection
factors and (2) whether experience has shown the
MD 600N helicopter to be effective in safely
supporting the Border Patrol's primary air
operations mission. We also agreed to provide
information on the Border Patrol 's air operations
missions and resources.
Results in Brief
The INS procurement in which the MD 600N
helicopter was selected for the Border Patrol was
intended to provide an aircraft capable of meeting
a variety of air operations requirements, such as
low and slow surveillance and transport of agents
and mission equipment. To obtain such a
multipurpose aircraft, the contract solicitation
listed three minimum performance criteria the
aircraft needed to have. The aircraft was
required to operate at a speed of up to 130 knots,
operate at high altitude with crew and equipment
outlined by the statement of work, and be capable
of operating at least 2 hours under normal
conditions. The aircraft was also required to have
seating for two pilots and two passengers. Only
two aircraft were determined to be within the
competitive range under these specifications.
Some weaknesses were noted with both of the
aircraft, although overall both were considered
acceptable. The flight evaluation team for the
procurement reported that flying the MD 600N was a
heavy workload-controls were stiff, yet needed
constant adjustments to fly. The team also
reported that the cockpit was cramped,
particularly during night flight with additional
equipment. The contract was awarded to McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Systems (which later became MD
Helicopters, Inc.)1 based on best value to the
government. The Border Patrol has purchased 11 of
these helicopters for about $1.3 million each. The
contract contains options to purchase up to 34
additional helicopters over a 4-year period. A
funding request for new Border Patrol helicopters
is included in the fiscal year 2002 Department of
Justice budget request.
Most Border Patrol pilots who have had experience
flying the MD 600N and most sector chiefs
expressed strong reservations about the
suitability of the helicopter for supporting key
air operations missions. In particular, the pilots
reported that the MD 600N is inferior to the
smaller aircraft being replaced for low-level, low-
speed surveillance-which is a large portion of the
overall mission profile. The pilots were concerned
about the safety of the MD 600N, citing difficulty
in performing emergency procedures and with other
documented problems, such as malfunctioning of the
engine control system and defective control
cables. The pilots also said that the MD 600N is
generally difficult to operate and fatiguing to
fly. Two of the three local law enforcement
agencies with MD 600Ns that we spoke with shared
many of these concerns.
The amount of time the MD 600N helicopters were
unavailable because of maintenance-related reasons
also was a concern to pilots, mechanics, and most
Border Patrol sector chiefs. Border Patrol Air
Operations records show the aircraft was
unavailable about 50 percent of the time between
December 1998 and March 2000. Reasons for the
downtime included delays in obtaining an engine
repair contract, slow manufacturer approval for
modifications, and parts availability.
Responding to our inquiry regarding these
concerns, the current manufacturer of the MD 600N,
MD Helicopters Incorporated (MDH), stated that all
known problems with parts or components have been
or will be corrected. Company officials believed
that the concerns the Border Patrol pilots have
had regarding the MD 600N are typical of those
encountered with a new product. MDH has proposed
modifications to the helicopter to make it easier
and less fatiguing to fly. A major handling
improvement being considered-the addition of a
stabilization system-may greatly improve handling
concerns. However, this and other proposed changes
do not address all of the concerns surrounding the
limited availability, safety, or suitability for
certain missions. Regarding the availability of
the helicopter, an MDH official said that there is
no reason that the Border Patrol aircraft should
have so much downtime.
The Chief of the Air Operations support office
also believed that the problems encountered with
the MD 600N can be addressed and that pilots will
become accustomed to flying it. However, based on
the problems they have encountered, and after
almost 2 years of experience with the helicopter,
most pilots, mechanics, and sector chiefs do not
support acquiring more MD 600Ns for the Border
Patrol fleet. Moreover, most sector chiefs have
also questioned the appropriateness of acquiring a
multipurpose aircraft to meet the individual needs
in each sector.
We are recommending that before any more MD 600Ns
are purchased, Border Patrol officials and MDH
address the safety, handling, and availability
issues raised by pilots and mechanics. We are also
recommending that the Border Patrol reassess its
decision to purchase one type of multipurpose
helicopter to meet a variety of air operations
requirements. In its comments, INS concurred with
these recommendations and provided additional
information, which we evaluated and incorporated,
as appropriate.
Background
The Border Patrol is the mobile, uniformed,
enforcement arm of the INS. Its mission is to
detect and prevent the smuggling and illegal entry
of undocumented aliens into the United States and
to apprehend persons found in the United States in
violation of immigration laws. Border Patrol
agents perform their duties by land, sea, and air
near and along about 8,000 miles of U.S.
boundaries. The Border Patrol is divided into 21
sectors, 9 of which are along the southwest
border. Sectors are further subdivided into
stations. Each sector is headed by a chief patrol
agent, herein referred to as the sector chief. The
sector chief controls both ground and air
resources in their particular sector.
Figure 1: Border Patrol Sector Headquarters Along
the Southwest Border
Source: U.S. Border Patrol.
From fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 2000, funding
for the Border Patrol has increased from $362
million to over $1 billion (in constant dollars).
At the end of fiscal year 1999, there were 8,225
Border Patrol agents on duty and deployed, as
compared with 7,856 at the end of fiscal year
1998.
Border Patrol air operations support the overall
agency mission using aerial equipment to detect
and monitor illegal alien traffic while assisting
enforcement activities. One primary air operations
mission consists of border monitoring activities
to detect evidence of, or illegal entry of aliens,
alien smugglers, contraband, and violators of
other laws. According to Border Patrol officials
and documents, their mission requires aircraft
that can fly for extended periods at low altitudes
and speeds. In some Border Patrol sectors, low
altitude and slow speed flying can account for as
much as 90 percent of flight time.
Aircraft also provide (1) rapid response to remote
intrusion detection sensors, (2) assistance for
humanitarian missions in remote locations, and (3)
the capability to observe and coordinate law
enforcement activities over large geographic
areas. Using technology, including forward looking
infrared (FLIR) and night lighting systems,
aircraft also provide detection and safety
capabilities that are not otherwise available. The
primary aircraft used by the Border Patrol to meet
the mission requirements for border control
efforts, low altitude detection of cross border
violators and close ground/agent support has been
rotary wing aircraft-helicopters.
Support for air operations, such as the provision
of equipment, training and supplies is provided by
the Air Operations Center in El Paso Texas. The
Air Operations Chief directs air operations. The
Border Patrol aircraft fleet currently consists of
57 helicopters and 27 airplanes in 19 locations
around the country-primarily in the nine sectors
on the southwest border, as shown in table I. Over
half of the helicopters are 35 year-old military
surplus OH-6A craft, which are the light weight
category aircraft. The Deputy Air Operations
Chief described a need for helicopters in the
light, mid-range and utility categories. The bulk
of the Border Patrol's work is in the light
category.
Table 1: Border Patrol Aircraft Fleet and
Locations Along the Southwest Border
Sector Aircraft Model Number of Classificat Number of
make aircraft ion pilots
San Diego, CA Hughes OH-6A 3 Helicopter 18
McDonnell MD 500 E 4 Helicopter
Douglas
McDonnell MD 600N 3 Helicopter
Douglas
Bell UH-1H 1 Helicopter
El Centro, CA Cessna C-182 1 Airplane 5
Piper PA18 3 Airplane
Hughes OH-6A 3 Helicopter
McDonnell MD 500C 1 Helicopter
Douglas
Yuma, AZ Cessna C-182 1 Airplane 6
Hughes OH-6A 4 Helicopter
Tucson, AZ Cessna C-182 1 Airplane 7
Piper PA18 1 Airplane
Hughes OH-6A 4 Helicopter
El Paso, TX Cessna C-182 1 Airplane 8
Hughes OH-6A 5 Helicopter
McDonnell MD 600 N 1 Helicopter
Douglas
El Paso Air Cessna C-210 2 Airplane 7
Operations
Training
Center
Hughes OH-6A 3 Helicopter
McDonnell MD 600N 1 Helicopter
Douglas
Bell UH-1H 1 Helicopter
Marfa, TX Cessna C-206 1 Airplane 6
Piper PA18 1 Airplane
Hughes OH-6A 3 Helicopter
Del Rio, TX Cessna C-206 1 Airplane 11
Piper PA18 3 Airplane
Eurocopter AS350BA 4 Helicopter
(A-Star)
Hughes OH-6A 1 Helicopter
Laredo, TX Bell UH-1H 1 Helicopter
Cessna C-182 1 Airplane 6
Piper PA18 1 Airplane
Hughes OH-6A 1 Helicopter
McAllen, TX McDonnell MD 600N 3 Helicopter
Douglas
Cessna C-206 1 Airplane 11
Cessna C-182 1 Airplane
Piper PA18 1 Airplane
Hughes OH-6A 3 Helicopter
McDonnell MD 600N 3 Helicopter
Douglas
Note: Data is current as of June 2, 2000.
Source: U.S. Border Patrol.
Helicopter Primer
Helicopters operate using an engine to power the
main rotor blades, with the blades working much
like the wings on an airplane produces lift. The
force of the main rotor turning in one direction
has the effect of turning the fuselage (i.e.,
body) of the helicopter in the opposite direction.
To cancel the "torque" or spin created by the main
rotor, conventional helicopters have a tail rotor
that opposes the main rotor torque tendency. The
MD 600N differs from the conventional model by
using an antitorque system that that does not use
a tail rotor called a NOTAR system.
Figure 2: MD 600N Flight Controls
Source: GAO analysis of MDH Information.
Pilots simultaneously use three different controls
to operate a helicopter in a coordinated fashion
or "in trim."
� The cyclic control allows the pilot to change
the angle or tilt of the rotor blades to control
the forward, backward, and sideways direction of
the helicopter.
� The collective is the primary control for the
up and down action of the helicopter. The
collective varies the lift produced by the main
rotor by changing the pitch of the blades at one
time or collectively.
� The foot pedals in both NOTAR and
conventional helicopters control the antitorque
action, and control left and right turns when
hovering. The pedals control the pitch of the fan,
vertical stabilizers, and thruster of the NOTAR
system. The right pedal decreases the antitorque
action, while the left pedal increases it.
Movement with one control often requires a
corresponding move in other controls to coordinate
flight. For example, when the collective is moved
so there is less lift, the torque is reduced and
the right pedal must be adjusted to maintain
flight. To operate properly, a helicopter must
also have its weight balanced around a center of
gravity and be within weight limits.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to provide information and
analysis on (1) procurement of the MD 600N,
including procurement specifications and selection
factors; and (2) whether experience has shown the
MD 600N helicopter to be effective in safely
supporting the Border Patrol's primary air
operations mission. We also were to provide
information on the Border Patrol's air operations
missions and resources.
Information on the mission of Border Patrol air
operations was obtained from INS officials and
other documents as well as from interviews with
key Border Patrol and Air Operations officials.
To analyze the procurement of the MD 600N, we
reviewed procurement files at the INS Contracting
and Procurement Branch in Dallas, Texas. The
documents reviewed included the source selection
plan, the technical evaluation, business
evaluation, the contract, and contract
modifications. We also reviewed acceptance the
documents for each the MD 600Ns received by the
Border Patrol. We spoke with the head of the
technical evaluation team as well as pilots and
mechanics who tested the MD 600N and other
competing helicopters.
To obtain information on experience with the
Border Patrol's MD 600Ns, we interviewed pilots
and mechanics in the four sectors with MD 600Ns
(San Diego, CA; McAllen, TX; Laredo, TX; and El
Paso's substation in Deming, NM). We interviewed
25 of the 29 pilots then certified to fly the MD
600N and 3 of the 4 training pilots. We met with
the 12 mechanics that were available in the 4
sectors. Pilot and mechanic interviews were
conducted in both group settings and individually.
For Border Patrol management's views on the issues
surrounding the MD 600N, we interviewed Air
Operations senior managers and the chief or
assistant patrol agent (sector chief) in each of
the Border Patrol sectors where the MD 600Ns are
operated. We also reviewed correspondence on the
MD 600N between Border Patrol pilots, sector
chiefs, and Air Operations. We examined training
materials for the MD 600N used by Border Patrol
instructors.
We interviewed MDH officials and reviewed MDH
technical documentation for the MD 600N, such as
the flight training manual and descriptive
brochures. We examined MD 600N warranty service
requests and manufacturer's service notices.
To more fully understand the performance of the MD
600N, we held discussions with Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) aircraft certification
officials in Los Angeles, and a National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) official. We
also reviewed NTSB Aviation Accident Database
records on the MD 600N and other helicopters for
comparison purposes. We also talked to all three
other U.S. law enforcement agencies operating the
MD 600N: the Los Angeles, Orange County and San
Bernardino Sheriffs offices, about their
experience using the MD 600N helicopter.
We conducted our review between March 2000, and
August 2000, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
MD 600N Procurement Is Intended to Meet Wide Range
of Requirements
The MD 600N helicopter contract is intended to
provide a multipurpose aircraft capable of meeting
Border Patrol requirements for a variety of
missions and scenarios, such as low and slow
surveillance and transport of agents and mission
equipment. The flight evaluation of the MD 600N,
which was conducted during the competition for the
contract, noted several flight-related weaknesses,
including stiff controls that may contribute to
fatigue during typical low-level Border Patrol
operations and a cramped cockpit that could impede
night operations. Notwithstanding those
weaknesses, the contract was awarded to McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Systems (which later became MD
Helicopters, Inc.)2 because its proposal to supply
the helicopters represents the best overall value.
The Border Patrol has purchased 11 MD 600N
helicopters for about $1.3 million each and, under
the contract, could buy up to 34 more.
Procurement for a Multipurpose Aircraft
According to Air Operations officials, air
operations requirements were established based on
information provided by Border Patrol sectors.
These requirements varied by sector and included
needs such as low and slow flight operations, long-
range and improved night operations capabilities.
Initially, the intent was to replace the
lightweight OH-6A helicopters, but this approach
was dropped in favor of a multimission aircraft
that could meet a range of needs, a Deputy Chief
said. The INS solicitation asked for an aircraft
to cover as many contingencies as possible.
Missions include long periods of surveillance at
one location; surveillance over long distances at
minimum airspeeds; mountain operations; night
surveillance, using vision enhancement equipment;
and transportation of agents and/or mission
equipment to remote sites. Air operations are
conducted from sea level up to 5,500 feet and in
temperatures ranging from below freezing up to 120
degrees.
On January 16, 1997, the INS issued the
solicitation to procure a multipurpose helicopter
capable of operating in a wide range of Border
Patrol scenarios. The solicitation was for the
acquisition of up to 45 light observation
helicopters and associated spare parts, technical
support, and parts exchange and overhaul support.
The solicitation was issued under the commercial
items and negotiated procurement procedures of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation. The INS conducted
the competitive acquisition under formal source
selection procedures, including evaluation of
technical proposals (a component of which was a
flight evaluation of the helicopters themselves),
past performance, and price.
Under the solicitation, technical merit and past
performance were more important than price,
although slightly superior technical capability
and/or past performance would not justify a
significantly higher price. The INS would make
this assessment though a trade-off analysis that
compared the benefits of superior technical
capability and/or past performance with a higher
price. Price could become the determining factor
if proposals were judged equal and close to equal
for technical merit and past performance. Proposed
helicopters had to be the manufacturer's latest
model and had to be certified by the FAA by the
time of delivery.
The solicitation's statement of work contained
three minimum performance criteria. These were for
(1) a sustained high speed of 130 knots to reduce
response time; (2) the capability to operate at
high altitude at maximum gross weight3 (a minimum
of 6,000 feet); and (3) the capability of not less
than 2 hours continuous flight time (with
auxiliary fuel, 4 hours) at normal patrol
operating speeds (40 to 60 knots) and weight.
Desired (but not required) performance included
having helicopter noise levels that did not exceed
84 decibels.
In addition to required aircraft performance, the
solicitation specified certain weight and balance
requirements. Requirements included
� the maximum ability to load the aircraft's
cabin without having to move any aircraft
components or use any movable ballast to keep
within certified flight limitations; and
� a minimum capability of holding two pilots
and one crewmember, carrying the maximum amount of
fuel, and containing specialized equipment, such
as a forward-looking infrared unit.
The solicitation also specified that the interior
cabin configuration was required to have seating
for two pilots up front (with dual controls) and a
minimum of two passenger seats in the rear.
Desirable interior cabin features, included padded
seats and lumbar support for the pilots, and
maximum soundproofing to reduce pilot and
passenger fatigue and stress.
Evaluations Reduced Choice to Two Helicopter
Proposals
Eight proposals offering different helicopter
models were received from three companies in
response to the January 1997 solicitation for new
Border Patrol helicopters. One company, American
Eurocopter, dropped out of the competition in
March 1997. As part of the solicitation, the
Border Patrol conducted a precontract award flight
evaluation of six helicopters proposed by two
firms. Four helicopters were found to be
technically unacceptable (e.g.; for insufficient
space to carry mission equipment) and were
eliminated from further consideration. The two
remaining helicopter models were the McDonnell
Douglas Helicopter Systems MD 600N and the Bell
Textron 407. The McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Systems and the Bell Textron proposals, while both
initially received a marginal technical evaluation
rating, were considered as having a reasonable
chance of being awarded the contract.4
The precontract award flight evaluation resulted
in a tie between the MD 600N and the Bell 407-both
were rated in the "better" category during flight
tests.5 The MD 600N was noted as being strong and
as having good speed. Its unusual anti-torque
system was assessed as a definite plus from a
safety standpoint. The Bell 407 was noted for its
superb handling characteristics and ample power
for all Border Patrol mission requirements. The
Bell 407 ample crew and equipment space,
outstanding visibility and responsive controls
were also rated as strengths.
Evaluators noted weaknesses, however, in both
helicopters. The flight evaluation of the MD 600N
identified weaknesses that included (1) the
aircraft being hard to handle due to its size and
weight; (2) the interior space being cramped; (3)
the internal noise levels being high; and (4) the
aircraft having stiff controls. Specifically,
flight-test evaluators noted that during typical
low-level Border Patrol operations, the MD 600N
was hard to control due to its size and weight and
that the control forces required to be used by the
pilot for maneuvering the helicopter were extreme.
Evaluators also noted that these problems could
lead to pilot fatigue and stress that would be
detrimental to crew safety. Pilots conducting the
flight test noted that this condition "is
unacceptable for Border Patrol operations at low
level" and that a hydraulic system would help
considerably. Further, the evaluators noted that
the pilot and passenger cabins were small and
tight and that the cramped cockpit impeded the
pilot's freedom of movement during regular
missions and, even more so, during night
operations when either the forward-looking
infrared equipment or night vision goggles were
used.
Although not listed as a weakness, in their
description of the MD 600N flight evaluation,
evaluators stated that the manufacturer did not
provide them with enough data to determine whether
the aircraft could meet its endurance
requirements. The flight evaluation of the Bell
407 identified as a weakness, among other things,
that it did not meet the desired low noise levels
the Border Patrol was seeking.
Following this initial evaluation and discussions
with the government, McDonnell Douglas and Bell
Textron both submitted best and final offers.
Reviews of both offers by the technical evaluation
committee continued to list the same flight-
evaluation weaknesses noted earlier and did not
note any corrective actions by either offeror. The
technical evaluation committee noted, however,
that best and final offers for the McDonnell
Douglas and the Bell Textron proposals would meet
or exceed requirements for Border Patrol air
operations.
In selecting the MD 600N, the source selection
evaluation board stated that while the two
competitors essentially tied during the technical,
flight test, and past performance evaluations, the
MD 600N came in at a lower evaluated price than
the Bell 407. Further, a best value trade-off
analysis concluded that neither aircraft
demonstrated technical superiority of such value
as to warrant consideration of paying a premium
price. Based on a July 30, 1997, evaluation board
recommendation, the INS awarded the helicopter
contract to McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems
for the MD 600N because its proposal represented
the best value to the government.
Border Patrol Could Purchase Up to 34 More MD 600N
Helicopters
The Border Patrol purchased 11 MD 600N helicopters
for about $1.3 million each-and could order up to
34 more helicopters, at agreed to higher prices-in
the remaining 3 option years (2000 to 2002). An
INS official told us that the INS has asked the
Department of Justice, as part of it's fiscal year
2002 budget request, to include $13.5 million for
nine replacement helicopters at $1.5 million each
for the Border Patrol. The request does not
specify the type of helicopter but notes that it
will be a single-engine aircraft with a low-noise
signature capable of performing the Border
Patrol's air operations surveillance mission. The
Air Operations Chief told us that he would like to
replace the 30 OH-6A light observation helicopters
in the fleet with the multipurpose MD 600N.
Concerns About the Suitability of the MD 600N
Helicopter for Performing Multiple Missions
Border Patrol Air Operations officials told us
that they believe the MD 600N meets the
multimission capabilities specified in the
contract. According to the officials, the MD 600N
can (1) fly low and slow for patrol missions; (2)
fly high and fast for transporting passengers; and
(3) serve as a platform for mounting high-tech
equipment, such as vision-enhanced cameras or
FLIRs. However, most of the Border Patrol pilots
with MD 600N experience that we interviewed had
concerns about the multimission capabilities of
the helicopter, particularly its ability to fly
low and slow. Sector chiefs are also
reconsidering the multimission approach for future
helicopters.
Air Operations officials stated that there is
variation in the missions of the sectors.
Currently the sectors operate a variety of
aircraft, as was noted in table 1. The Air
Operations Deputy Chief stated that a standardized
fleet was desirable because it simplified the
process for providing parts, maintenance, training
and for other reasons.
Most of the pilots we interviewed agreed that a
significant amount of their sectors' work involved
flying at low speeds and altitudes performing
patrol missions and that the MD 600N was not
conducive to that type of flying. To effectively
accomplish their mission, the pilots in one sector
explained that they must fly low and slow to
detect and apprehend illegal aliens hiding in
canyons, bushes, and trees. These maneuvers cannot
be performed as effectively and safely in the MD
600N, according to these pilots, because the MD
600N should be flown higher and faster than other
aircraft to avoid the FAA-certified altitude and
speed combinations (avoidance area). This area is
where recovery from an engine failure might not be
successful. All aircraft have an area of
avoidance; however, the area is larger for the MD
600N than for the OH-6A and MD 500E helicopters
(see fig. 3).
Other types of Border Patrol missions may also be
limited based on MD 600N maximum weight and/or
aircraft balance limits.6 For example, using
Border Patrol software provided to us by Air
Operations to calculate weight and balance, we
found aircraft in Deming and El Paso would be
outside of acceptable ranges with a full tank of
fuel, a pilot, copilot, infrared night equipment
and an equipment operator. This capability was
listed as requirement in the Border Patrol's
solicitation for a multipurpose aircraft. Aircraft
in the other two sectors would be 20 pounds below
maximum weight if the unused rear seat was removed
for the mission.
Several pilots noted the MD 600N, as equipped by
the Border Patrol, is "nose-heavy." While flight
is possible outside of approved weight and balance
ranges, limits are established because an
overweight or unbalanced craft can't perform as
certified by the FAA. Thirty pounds of ballast, or
"dead weight," was permanently installed in the
tail of the Border Patrol's helicopters to try to
improve on the out-of-balance condition.7 An MDH
official noted that it is the 640 pounds of
equipment installed for the Border Patrol-most of
which is in the instrument panel-that caused the
imbalance. A captain for one of the local law
enforcement agencies also characterized the MD
600N as nose-heavy. The agency added ballast and
moved the radios and batteries to the rear of the
aircraft to compensate, according to the captain.
An MDH official said that this agency added almost
as much equipment to their aircraft as did the
Border Patrol.
Two Border Patrol pilots suggested that the MD
600N could be an acceptable aircraft for a desert
area with wide-open spaces suitable to high and
fast flying. However pilots working in the desert
do not believe the MD 600N is appropriate for
their circumstances because they also fly low and
slow. In addition, sand and dirt have caused
problems with the engine. A similar problem with
the OH-6A engine was handled by adding a filter,
according to the Air Operations Deputy Chief. He
stated that the Border Patrol plans to test a
filter for certification on the MD 600N in October
2000 that might alleviate the problem.
Two patrol agents in charge stated that the
variety of missions should be reflected in the
aircraft for each sector. One said that the "one
size fits all" (i.e., multimission) requirement
does not reflect sectors' different flying
environments. He does not feel that the missions
will be effectively and safely accomplished as
long as the policy is in effect. Another thought
that every sector should have a diverse fleet of
aircraft, including a few MD 600Ns for
transporting "VIPs" and agents or for performing
FLIR missions. He said that the bulk of the fleet
should be a smaller aircraft to perform the daily
Border Patrol missions.
Sector Management Questions Use of Multipurpose
Helicopter
The Chief of Air Operations and some sector chiefs
generally agreed that the MD 600N does provide the
Border Patrol with multiple capabilities. However,
given their experience to date that indicates the
MD 600N may be inappropriate for a large part of
their mission, sector chiefs are reconsidering
whether a multipurpose aircraft is the right
approach.
Border Patrol Air Operations officials stated that
they wanted to procure a helicopter that had
multimission capabilities. They concluded that the
MD 600N could fly low, slow or fast, and carry
passengers and high-tech equipment. It can perform
different missions, according to the officials, by
configuring each mission differently, depending on
the requirements. For example, for observation
missions, a single pilot with full fuel for
maximum flying hours would be possible. Or, to
transport several persons or load more equipment,
less fuel would be carried. According to the
officials, the MD 600N in its different
configurations was capable of performing
everything that the Border Patrol missions
require.
Several sector chiefs supported the MD 600Ns
ability to support multiple tasks, but they
questioned whether it was the right aircraft for
all Border Patrol missions. For example, one
sector chief, who was part of the MD 600N
procurement team, said the goal was to give pilots
the ability to support new technologies, such as
FLIR and the flexibility to be able to fly low if
necessary. The chief acknowledged and forwarded to
an INS Western Region official the pilot's
concerns about safety and handling but believes
that the pilots will become more comfortable
flying the MD 600N as they gain experience.
However, he stated that if pilots believed that
the equipment is a hindrance, then perhaps the
decision to purchase more of the MD 600Ns should
be reconsidered.
In another sector, the sector chief said that he
thought the MD 600N was a good aircraft because it
was quiet, and pilots liked how it handled in
smooth air. However, they have had problems with
the aircraft, as documented in several memos. The
sector chief had requested additional aircraft but
did not ask for MD 600Ns because he said that the
aircraft had been on the ground more than they had
been in the air in his sector. He said that he
does not want any more MD 600Ns in his sector and
recommended that the Border Patrol not purchase
any more MD 600Ns until the problems are fixed.
A third sector chief said that they occasionally
use the MD 600N for transporting agents in support
of other operations. He also said the helicopter
can get lower to see tracks. However, a memorandum
from the sector regarding acquiring additional MD
600Ns stated: "Presently, the MD-600N aircraft
that were acquired to replace the OH-6A
helicopters have a less than 48 percent
availability record. Additionally, the pilots in
all operating sectors have concerns about the
safety of the aircraft that are real and
documented." The memorandum further states that
many of the problems could have been avoided by
simply asking the various sector officials what
was needed for operational use in their areas.
The assistant sector chief in the fourth sector
with MD 600Ns reported that about 80 percent of
the sector's work was low flying patrol work but
that the MD 600N was not conducive to low flying.
In addition, the sector chief said that desert
conditions of the sector had caused problems for
the NOTAR tail fan and the automated engine
control system.
The poor reputation of the MD 600N has also
extended to sectors not flying the aircraft.
Sector chiefs were asked for feedback on the
contents of a May 2000 memorandum from Air
Operations to the Chief of the Border Patrol in
which more MD 600Ns were requested. One sector
chief slated to receive four aircraft, if more are
purchased, wrote emphatically that the sector
"does not request four (4) MD-600N helicopters."
Another sector that would be assigned two MD
600Ns, if more were bought, reported to Air
Operations that they did not believe the MD 600N
would be effective for them. The sector official
stated that they would prefer other aircraft.
While there was no consensus among managers about
the role of the MD 600N for the Border Patrol, the
multipurpose approach is being reconsidered.
According to the Deputy Chief of the Border
Patrol, a May 2000 sector-chief meeting included
the MD 600N as part of a discussion of the kind of
future fleet they envisioned. One sector chief at
the meeting said that the chiefs supported every
sector deciding what type of aircraft they needed,
based on the tasks for their particular sector,
rather than purchasing one multipurpose aircraft.
Many Border Patrol Pilots Lack Confidence in the
MD 600N Helicopter
Pilots in all four sectors with the MD 600N
reported a lack of confidence in the MD 600N
because of flight safety and performance concerns.
These concerns included a perceived lack of
ability to successfully recover from an engine
failure when flying at lower altitudes and speeds
(autorotation characteristics), problems with the
helicopter's electronic engine control system,
control cable defects and poor flight-handling
characteristics. Several pilots outside of the
Border Patrol also have had some of these
concerns. MDH officials stated that the
autorotation characteristics of the MD 600N were
approved by the FAA and that the problems with
aircraft components either had been or would soon
be addressed.
Concerns About Autorotation Characteristics
Most of the pilots we interviewed believed that
the autorotation characteristics of the MD 600N
are inappropriate for much of the flying performed
during Border Patrol air operations missions.
Autorotation is a pilot-recovery maneuver
performed in the event of an engine failure that
keeps the main rotor blades moving so that the
aircraft descent can be controlled. Aircraft
height and airspeed factors to be avoided during
autorotation are depicted as a height/velocity
curve.8 Pilots are instructed to avoid flying
within the curve area, but they are not prohibited
from doing so. Several pilots pointed out that the
curve for the MD 600N includes more area to avoid
than for some other Border Patrol helicopters,
such as the OH-6A and MD 500E models. The pilots
said they believed that because of the larger area
to avoid with the MD 600N and its higher rate of
descent, it would be more difficult to land safely
during autorotation than other model helicopters.
MDH officials stated that the pilots based their
concerns on a misunderstanding of the
height/velocity curve rather than on the
helicopter's operational characteristics.
According to MDH, the MD 600N's height/velocity
curve appears to cover more area because of more
stringent testing conditions used for establishing
the curve.9 However, we examined the
height/velocity curves for several helicopters
that were tested at or estimated for sea level.
The MD 600N height/velocity curve had a larger
area to avoid (see fig. 3). A senior FAA
certification official said that this is a valid
means for showing how different aircraft
height/velocity curves relate to the height and
airspeed of a typical Border Patrol mission.
Figure 3: Height/Velocity Curves for MD 500E, MD
600N, Bell 407, American Eurocopter AS 350, and
Hughes OH-6A
Note: H/V curve measured at or estimated for sea
level. Helicopter weights used for the curves are
3,000 pounds for the MD 500E; 4,100 pounds for MD
600N; 5,000 pounds for the Bell 407; 4,961 pounds
for the AS 350, and 2,550 for the OH-6A.
Conditions assumed are that the aircraft is
landing on a firm, level and smooth surface.
Source: GAO analysis of manufacturers' data.
An MDH official said they took a test pilot to one
sector to discuss the autorotation concerns with
Border Patrol pilots and provided additional
autorotation training to all Border Patrol sectors
with MD 600Ns, at company expense. Based on
feedback from Air Operations management to MDH, a
company official said he believes that many of the
concerns were addressed. MDH officials also said
they were testing a 1 to 2 degree change in the
angle of the rotor blades that will make the MD
600N easier to handle during autorotations. If
testing goes well, the change will be made at no
cost to customers, according to MDH officials. A
proposed stability augmentation system may provide
additional improvements, an MDH official said.
Several pilots also stated, however, that the
manner in which the MD 600N handles could make
successful autorotations more difficult, in part,
because it descends faster than other helicopters,
such as the OH-6A and MD 500E. According to an MDH
official, the rate of descent for the MD 500E is
1,600 to 2,200 feet per minute and the MD 600N
rate is 1,800 to 2,300 feet per minute or more.10
One training pilot said the aircraft can be safely
autorotated; but because it is heavier and has a
higher descent rate, there is little room for
error at the bottom of the descent. Pilots
simulate autorecovery during training in a MDH
aircraft at 3,400 pounds, according to an MDH
official, although the MD 600N is certified to
carry up to 4,100 pounds. Several pilots stated
that they did not believe this prepared them
adequately for an actual emergency. Pilots at two
of the three local law enforcement agencies we
visited also shared the perception of poor MD 600N
autorotation capabilities.
Engine Control System Problems
Many of the pilots also did not have confidence in
the electronic engine control system of the MD
600N because some of the parts have malfunctioned
and because of incidents in which they believed
that the system failed to operate properly. MDH
and Air Operations management said that they
believe that the problems have been repaired.
The engine control system for the MD 600N is a
Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC)
system composed of two parts, an electronic
control unit (ECU) and a hydromechanical unit
(HMU). The ECU uses sensors to signal to the HMU
how much fuel should be sent to the engine, based
on automated operations or on pilot commands. The
FADEC system can be switched to pilot operated
(manual) mode by the pilot or by the system itself
when the ECU cannot reliably gauge fuel
requirements. The Bell 407 and AS 350, similar
class helicopters, also have electronic engine
control systems.
Three Border Patrol sectors operating the MD 600N
reported problems with the FADEC system:
� Based on recurring FADEC failures in one
sector over a 4-month period, a pilot requested
that its MD 600N be grounded in June 1999. The
patrol agent in charge stated in a memorandum to
his sector chief that "Should we experience an ECU
failure at a low power setting while performing
enforcement operations at low altitudes the
outcome would be disastrous."11 The source of the
malfunctions was a problem known by MDH and its
engine subcontractor. MDH planned to upgrade the
MD 600Ns with a modified part when the components
were sent in for overhaul. The sector mechanic was
not given the modified part and FADEC problems
continued. In the instances of FADEC failures,
pilots were able to land the MD 600N safely
following emergency procedures. When the engine
manufacturer recognized the problem the upgraded
part was provided.
� According to an Air Operations memorandum,
FADEC problems in another sector in September 1999
were due to the same faulty part that caused
problems in the first sector, but quick pilot
action avoided any damage. After this incident,
all Border Patrol MD 600Ns were upgraded with the
new part.
� In the third sector, a reported FADEC problem
was evaluated, but it could not be duplicated or
substantiated by ground testing of the system.
Such incidents have reduced the confidence of
Border Patrol pilots in the aircraft. According
to the Deputy Chief of Air Operations, following
an ECU failure in one sector the pilot landed the
MD 600N in a field rather than fly back to the
airport. The Deputy stated that he had to fly to
the sector and recover the aircraft because the
pilots in the sector were afraid to do so. He
believes this illustrates how little pilots
understand the FADEC system, in spite of the
emphasis placed on training. Such failures are not
a life-threatening emergency, he said.
One of the three local law enforcement agencies we
visited had also experienced a problem with the
FADEC system on its MD 600N. During a critical
point in flight-takeoff at night-the power went to
a fixed-fuel mode, much like a gas pedal being
stuck at a high-power setting. The pilot recovered
from the situation without incident.
According to MDH correspondence, as one of the
first companies to integrate automated engine
controls into light single-engine helicopters,
some problems have occurred. The problems
identified by the Border Patrol applied to all
aircraft using a particular engine, including
those in Bell 407 helicopters. Six of the 28
service bulletins issued by MDH on the MD 600N
were related to FADEC operations. An MDH official
said MDH worked with the engine subcontractor to
resolve FADEC issues. All the HMU parts that were
upgraded were paid for under the manufacturer's
warranty. Since all MD 600Ns were upgraded with
the latest parts no additional FADEC problems with
the faulty subcomponent have occurred, according
to the Air Operations memorandum.
An MDH official said they recognized that there
was also a need for more training in emergency
procedures with the FADEC system. According to an
Air Operations memorandum and Air Operations
officials, all sectors were provided with
additional training to simulate FADEC
malfunctions. The time devoted to the FADEC system
in introductory training was increased; FADEC
emergency procedures were to be stressed in
semiannual training; and written instructions for
handling FADEC failures was to be sent to all
sectors.
Antitorque Problems
Many Border Patrol pilots stated that two related
problems have raised concerns about the
reliability of the MD 600N antitorque system: (1)
defective antitorque cable components and (2)
sticking or binding antitorque foot pedals. An MDH
official stated that MDH is replacing the
defective cable components with parts made under a
revised manufacturing process and is considering
how to fix the problem of the pedals sticking.
Concerns about the MD 600N antitorque cable
components were raised with the 1999 crash of a MD
520N helicopter12 and the subsequent reporting of
cracks and corrosion in cable controls on a number
of helicopters using the NOTAR technology. Several
Border Patrol pilots and mechanics expressed
concern because the same parts implicated in the
crash are also used on the MD 600N. As a result of
the crash, FAA and MDH issued mandatory
instructions to inspect and change cable control
parts on the MD 520N and MD 600N model
helicopters. An NTSB investigation of the accident
had not been completed; however, facts collected
to date indicated that two cable control parts on
the accident aircraft were damaged and cracked.
MDH paid for replacement of the cable control
parts at no cost. Of the 109 MDH customers that
confirmed their inspections to the company in
writing, 48 found cable control corrosion and
cracking. An MDH official said MDH believes the
cracking and corrosion problem was due to an
incorrect heat treatment for the parts. MDH has
revised the heat treating for the cables to
prevent cracking. The replacement parts have been
delivered to the Border Patrol, and MDH plans to
have new cables to all customers with NOTAR
technology helicopters by December 2000.
A second antitorque concern was raised in two
Border Patrol sectors that reported problems with
"stuck pedals." Pilots use the pedals to increase
or decrease the antitorque force from the NOTAR
tail and in making turns during hovers. The
problem reportedly occurs when a cable from the
pedals and its connecting part do not align
correctly and binds or sticks. Additional pilot
movements reportedly cause the pedals to return to
normal operation.
Mechanics in one sector were able to duplicate the
stuck pedal conditions. Mechanics in another
sector reported the problem to MDH and were
initially told that it was a "rigging"13 problem.
However, according to an Air Operations
memorandum, in both instances, the parts had not
been disturbed or "rigged" since the MD 600Ns were
received from MDH. An official at one local law
enforcement agency said the agency had identified
a way to prevent the pedals on its MD 600N from
sticking, while an official at another law
enforcement agency reportedly still had the
problem.
An MDH official said that MDH is still looking at
the stuck pedal issue. In one sector, MDH
authorized tying an aluminum splint around the
cables to prevent them from binding. This was
considered a short-term fix, the official stated,
and MDH is working with the cable vendor toward a
permanent solution by the end of calendar year
2000. The splint was removed at MDH direction when
the new cables were installed, according to a
sector mechanic.
Poor Flight Handling Characteristics
Poor flight handling characteristics of the MD
600N are key complaints of most Border Patrol
pilots. According to the pilots, heavy controls,
aircraft instability-particularly during wind
turbulence-and generally poor ergonomics make the
helicopter fatiguing to fly. An MDH official said
MDH has received this feedback from several other
MD 600N customers, and have proposed modifications
to relieve some of the pilot's concerns.
Pilots in all four Border Patrol sectors reported
that the MD 600N was heavy on the controls and
very fatiguing to fly. Pilots explained that it
requires a great deal of physical strength to
operate the controls and that they need to
constantly adjust the controls to fly "in trim."
The flight test for the MD 600N procurement
identified the same problem. The chair of the
technical evaluation committee reported to the INS
Source Selection Board that the MD 600N "control
forces required to maneuver the helicopter are
extreme. It is almost a necessity to use the trim
motor for every movement of the controls and this
increases the pilot's workload."
According to several pilots, the constant effort
to fly the MD 600N limits the amount of time to
about 2 hours that pilots can fly without taking a
break. This was confirmed by an MDH official, who
said that he had heard from other customers that 2
hours was about the maximum flight time without a
break. Air Operations officials said that some
Border Patrol pilots fly longer than 2 hours and
should be able to fly for 4 hours without a break
but could take one earlier if needed.
The heavy controls are not a new complaint, nor
unique to Border Patrol pilots. This problem was
identified by Border Patrol procurement test
pilots in their formal evaluation of aircraft
flight characteristics. FAA- certification test-
pilots for the MD 600N and pilots flying MD 600Ns
for a local law enforcement agency also told us
that controls were heavy. The Army tested a
version of NOTAR technology for its uses and
rejected it. One reason was due to poor handling
characteristics, according to the Test and
Evaluation Officer of the Army unit and the Army
evaluation report. The Army official said that the
aircraft the Army tested was very different from
the current MD 600N-which he has flown, but he
said that the handling characteristics were
similar. He said it took a lot of work to get the
helicopter to do what you wanted it to do.
In addition, many of the Border Patrol pilots said
that maintaining control of the MD 600N is
difficult under certain conditions, particularly
when it is windy. The Technical Evaluation Report
for the helicopter's procurement noted similar
problems. Although no overall MD 600N
deficiencies were noted, the report states "Flight
into high winds and gusts were tiring on the
pilot. The aircraft's flying tail means the
helicopter is extremely sensitive to both flight
control inputs and power changes making
coordinated flight difficult in high wind."
The Air Operations Deputy Chief stated that the MD
600N is certified as controllable for winds in
excess of 17 knots. This certification applies for
when the helicopter hovers. An FAA official said
that outside of hover conditions there is no
standard for stability, and approval is more
subjective. FAA-certification pilots said that
initially the aircraft directional control was not
acceptable because of its tendency to "yaw" or
turn to one side without pilot direction. A
"strake"14 was added to reduce this tendency.
According to Border Patrol pilots, the MD 600N
still tends to yaw at lower altitudes and speeds,
which are common on Border Patrol missions.15 At
high speeds and altitudes FAA certification pilots
reported that control was difficult, as did two
other pilots.
To respond to Border Patrol and other customers'
concerns about pilot fatigue and control
difficulties, MDH proposed three modifications:
1. Adjust the engine rotations per minute to
reduce the shake of the cyclic stick at ground
idle. MDH plans to finish with testing of the
change by December 2000 and believed that the
change can be made by the engine contractor
updating the FADEC software, at no cost to
customers.
2. Change the angle of the rotor wings to make
handling easier during autorotation maneuvers. MDH
said that it will test this change in August 2000.
If testing goes well, the change is to be
implemented at no cost to customers.
3. To improve stability, including during wind
gusts, MDH is adapting a stability augmentation
system used on the MD 520N for the MD 600N. The
system automates some of the control adjustments
needed to keep the helicopter operating in trim.
At least 30 Border Patrol pilots have tested a
system prototype and gave it high ratings for
improved stability and reducing the pilot workload
to keep the aircraft flying in trim.16 When testing
is complete, MDH will request FAA certification
for the change. As of September 2000, MDH had
planned to charge customers about $47,000 per
helicopter for the system and its installation.
Border Patrol officials plan to have the system
installed on all current and any future MD 600Ns.
In addition to the heavy controls, some pilots
said that the MD 600N is so uncomfortable that it
affects their ability to do their work. The pilots
said that after 2 hours, they must stop for a
break; and several said that they suffered from
pain in their knees, back, and buttocks caused by
uncomfortable seats. Some pilots reported using
cushions provided by Air Operations headquarters
or their own cushions to relieve some of the
discomfort. Several pilots also said that
visibility is limited because of the door frames,
particularly while using the cushions. They
reported that they must get in awkward positions
to look at objects below or behind them.
Figure 4: MD 600N Ergonomics
Source: GAO.
Air Operations officials agreed that the seats in
the MD 600N are uncomfortable. Pilots had said
they wanted padded seats, so the officials said
they asked for high-quality seats during the
procurement.17 Air Operations officials recently
took action to replace the seats provided under
the original procurement. Seats tested by Border
Patrol pilots during the flight evaluations for
the stability augmentation system have been
ordered and are being manufactured, as of
September 21, 2000, according to INS.
MD 600N Availability and Maintenance Concerns
A major concern of most sector chiefs and their
staffs was the significant amount of time in which
the MD 600N helicopters were unavailable for use
or "down." Air Operations records for December
1998 to March 2000 show that the 10 MD 600Ns
assigned to Border Patrol field operations were
unavailable, on average, over 50 percent of the
time.18 This downtime included any time that the
helicopters were not operational due to avionics
repair, maintenance, or while waiting for parts.
In comparison, the four Border Patrol Eurocopter
"A-Star" helicopters were down 28 percent of the
time during the same period. Reasons for the
downtime included delays in obtaining an engine
repair contract, slow manufacturer approval for
modifications, and parts availability.
Figure 5: Downtime for Border Patrol 600N
Helicopters
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol Air
Operations data.
The consequences of the MD 600N helicopters not
being available were greater in sectors without
other helicopters in their inventory. For example,
during our visits to two sectors, all six of the
MD 600Ns were unavailable. One of the sectors had
OH-6A helicopters for backup, but the other
sector's single backup OH-6A was awaiting an
engine, leaving the sector without any
helicopters. The patrol agent in charge said that
with no working helicopters, ground agents'
requests for assistance could not be supported,
including an incident where an agent was being
fired on by armed drug smugglers.
An Air Operations official said that specific
helicopters may have had problems that explained
why they were inoperable. The official stated
that, for example, two MD 600Ns were down due to
foreign object damage to the engines. The damage
was discovered in November 1999, but the
helicopters were not returned to service until
March and April 2000, respectively, because Air
Operations was without an engine repair contract
from October 1999 to June 2000. Emergency engine
repairs were requested in late November but not
authorized until mid-February 2000.
In response to our questions about MD 600N
availability, Air Operations officials directed a
review in one sector on availability and possible
reasons for delay. The resulting report stated
that for two aircraft they could find no
documentation justifying the reasons why they were
out of service for extended periods. Also,
concerns were raised that mechanics were charging
time to a designated aircraft in the sector's
fleet whether they were working on that particular
aircraft or not. The report noted that repairs and
incorrect part numbers caused some delays but did
not explain what appeared to be excessive
maintenance time.
A written response by the patrol agent in charge
from the sector reviewed disputed the findings of
the maintenance review, stating that the down time
of the aircraft is warranted due to untimely
provision of parts, repairs, and waiting for
authorizations to make modifications. For example,
according to the response, one aircraft was down
waiting for control stick modifications for many
weeks. The parts were sent to an MDH
subcontractor; and when the parts were returned,
they had to be sent back because the work was
incomplete. Regarding mechanic time charges, the
response agreed with the Air Operations
description of how mechanics accounted for their
time but pointed out that their accounting did not
differ for the MD 600N and other aircraft.
According to the response, excessive maintenance
time was where additional work was needed.
An MDH official also said that he was unaware of
any reason for the Border Patrol's MD 600Ns to be
sitting on the ground. In contrast to the Border
Patrol 's experience, the MDH official stated that
one local law enforcement agency has had no
problem with downtime for their two MD 600Ns.
Officials from that agency confirmed the MDH
statement and said that maintenance downtime for
their MD 600Ns is lower than they experienced with
their prior helicopters. An MDH official reported
that a simple analysis of their data showed that
parts for the MD 600N provided under warranty in
1999 took an average of 2 days to obtain.19 We were
unable to reconcile Air Operations and sector data
on the provision of parts not under warranty or
parts sent for repair.
However, Border Patrol mechanics in all four
sectors attribute excessive downtime for the MD
600N to a multitude of problems they have had with
the aircraft. For example, in a memorandum to the
chief patrol agent in one sector, a mechanic
described the problems with the MD 600N: "Since
the delivery of this aircraft we have continually
experienced serious malfunctions. Some of the more
recent malfunctions that come to mind would
include executing an emergency landing due to an
indication of an electrical fire, fuel found
leaking through a wiring harness, and severe
engine compressor erosion, with a repair cost in
excess of $74,000."
Scheduled maintenance has also taken longer than
the manufacturer's estimates, according to several
mechanics. MDH estimates for periodic inspections
do not account for the time needed for repairs,
parts replacement, or other work, explained one
patrol agent in charge. Pilots and mechanics in
three sectors said that when the MD 600Ns have
gone down for scheduled maintenance and are taken
apart, problems not expected have been found that
must be fixed before the aircraft are returned to
service. Several mechanics noted that without
strong technical support from MDH, they spend
considerable time troubleshooting. Maintenance
time is unusually high, even considering the
newness of the MD 600N, several mechanics stated.
One patrol agent in charge and mechanic agreed
with Air Operations officials that most parts in
stock were delivered quickly, they also said that
not all parts requested were delivered in a timely
manner. For example, in one sector a toggle switch
took 41 days to arrive.20 The Assistant Chief of
Air Operations agreed that this was excessive. Air
Operations could have authorized a local purchase
of the part, but did not do so despite calls from
the sector regarding the status of the part,
according to the sector's maintenance supervisor.
The Assistant Chief said that Air Operations may
not act right away when a part is requested. For
example, they might research the part or may wait
and order a number of parts at once. Sometimes it
can take a month to get a part, the Assistant
Chief said.
Mechanics in two sectors said that the time
necessary to have components repaired could also
be lengthy. For example, in one sector, a part was
leaking oil and was sent to MDH for repair. It was
over 2 months before the part was returned.
Another sector reported that 3 days into a routine
300 hour inspection, the horizontal stabilizer was
found to be damaged. It was submitted for repair
in mid-September 1999, and was not returned until
late December 1999. The Air Operations Deputy
Chief said that the cause of the damage was
investigated; and when new fiscal year funding was
received, the part was repaired.
Finally, mechanics in two sectors said that the
design of the helicopter makes working on it time
consuming because many repairs require that the
aircraft be taken apart. One mechanic stated, for
example, that often carpet must be pulled up,
seats removed, and the interior vinyl removed in
order for mechanics to access the aircraft's parts
for a 100-hour inspection. Helicopters by other
manufacturers, such as Bell, have their
transmissions and drive trains located externally
and would not need to have the interiors removed
for a routine inspection, he said. The interiors
have also experienced unusually high levels of
wear and tear because of the need to remove them,
one mechanic said.
Figure 6: Aircraft Repairs Often Require Interior
to Be Removed
Source: GAO Photo.
Technical Support Reported as Not Always Helpful
While mechanics in one sector praised MDH's
technical support for the MD 600N, saying that the
technical representative has made every effort to
accommodate them, the other three sectors voiced a
number of criticisms.
MDH officials and Air Operations management stated
that technical support and service for the MD 600N
suffered during the transitions from McDonnell
Douglas to Boeing and then to MDH. MDH officials
said that since then, they have made personnel
changes, retained many staff with MD 600N
experience, and have a representative devoted to
Border Patrol part requests. The company plans to
outsource work such as the fuselage, according to
an MDH official to improve the cost-effectiveness
of some parts. To improve the efficiency of
supplying parts, MDH has also begun to expand its
parts inventory. An MDH official said that he was
not aware of some of the problems expressed by
Border Patrol mechanics and said that MDH cannot
address concerns unless it hears about them.
Some improvements in customer service have been
noted; however, mechanics continued to report weak
technical support. One sector mechanic reported
that when a senior technical representative was
involved with a trim motor problem in July 2000,
the representative was very concerned with fixing
the problem and saw that it was resolved. However,
the same mechanic was called in June to repair a
MD 600N stranded in the field where it had landed
to assist agents with 14 illegal aliens. The
technical representative couldn't explain why
there was a problem or how to fix it, the mechanic
said. Eventually, the mechanics "hot wired" the
aircraft to bring it back to the hangar.
In another sector in June, 2000, structural cracks
and buckling in the airframe of an MD 600N
developed, according to a memorandum to the sector
chief. The sector mechanic said that MDH and Air
Operations officials suggested that he put a
"patch" on the area. The mechanic did not believe
this was appropriate and asked for MDH engineers
to document that such a repair would be
structurally sound. Repair instructions from MDH
were received on July 21, 2000. Air Operations
then decided that factory officials should
determine the cause of the crack, and it was
removed from the sector. A report from MDH on the
damage stated that a large depression/dent near
the crack was not considered typical and that a
visual examination of the area suggested damage
resulted from an impact of an external object. An
FAA-certified repair was completed by August 22,
2000, at the MDH factory. The patrol agent in
charge strongly disagreed with the
characterization of the damage. He noted that
several mechanics and pilots looked at the area
for damage before the helicopter was taken to the
factory; and none was evident except for the
buckling and cracks. A third sector also reported
similar dissatisfaction with MDH's technical
support.
Conclusions
Helicopters play an essential role in supporting
the Border Patrol's overall mission. The variety
of helicopters currently in the Border Patrol
fleet perform various missions that require long
periods of surveillance; mountain operations;
night surveillance, using vision enhancement
equipment; and high-speed transportation of agents
and/or equipment to remote sites. The bulk of
their work involves surveillance at low altitudes
and speeds. The majority of the Border Patrol's
helicopters, however, are over 35 years old.
The procurement of the MD 600N was based upon the
premise that one helicopter type would be
appropriate to meet a variety of air operations
needs in the various sectors. Only two of the six
aircraft originally considered were evaluated as
meeting the solicitation requirements for such a
multipurpose helicopter. While the MD 600N
technically meets the range of air operations
requirements, it may not be the best choice in
filling specific needs of each sector.
Border Patrol pilots, mechanics, and sector
managers lack confidence in the ability of the MD
600N to safely, efficiently, and reliably perform.
Pilots have experienced problems with the
electronic engine controls, antitorque cables, and
are concerned about their ability to safely
autorotate the aircraft. The MD 600N has proven
difficult to handle and fatiguing to
fly-weaknesses that were evident before the
aircraft was purchased. Mechanics document
numerous problems they have encountered in keeping
the aircraft operating. The aircraft have been
down, on average, half the time, and this is a
problem recognized by sector chiefs, pilots, and
mechanics.
Testing is under way for several MD 600N
modifications to improve the performance of the
aircraft. Most notably, the stability augmentation
system may greatly improve MD 600N stability and
reduce some pilot workload. Redesigned cables and
FADEC parts, the addition of an engine filter, and
new seats may also address some problems. However,
other issues remain. Whether the MD 600N is
suitable for meeting all mission
requirements-particularly for low speed and low
altitude work, remains a question. The
improvements also do not address pilot lack of
confidence in the safety of the aircraft and
limited aircraft availability.
Recommendations
We recommend that before any more MD600Ns are
purchased, the Commissioner of INS require Border
Patrol officials to address with MDH the safety,
handling, and availability issues raised by pilots
and mechanics. We also recommend that the
Commissioner require the Border Patrol reassess
its decision to purchase one multipurpose
helicopter to meet a variety of air operations
mission requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
INS' provided written comments on a draft of this
report. In its general comments, which are
included as appendix I, INS stated that it
concurred with our recommendations and that the
issues covered in our report were not unknown to
the program. With regard to the safety, handling,
and availability issues, INS stated that steps are
already being taken to ensure that these concerns
are fully addressed prior to additional aircraft
procurement. INS pointed out that it is testing a
stability augmentation system to ease pilot
workload concerns and to improve aircraft
handling. It is also providing a new seat to
increase pilot comfort, and is testing an engine
filter to improve aircraft performance under sandy
conditions. We believe these are steps taken in
the right direction. However, concerns surrounding
suitability of the aircraft for typical Border
Patrol missions and the availability of the
aircraft require further attention.
INS also agreed with our recommendation to
reassess the decision to purchase one multipurpose
helicopter to meet a variety of air operations
mission requirements. However, regarding the
sector-by-sector analysis of terrain, flying
conditions and mission requirements that we had
suggested in the draft report, INS said that the
analysis is part of its historical support
function. With its comments, INS provided
memorandums from 1994 and 1995 that showed that
each sector provided information to Air Operations
that helped to establish sector requirements.
These requirements included low and slow flight
operations, long-range and improved night
operations capabilities. Therefore, we have
modified our recommendation and various sections
of the report to reflect this information.
INS also provided specific and technical comments
that amplified points in its general comments.
Many of these comments took issue with our
findings relating to suitability, safety,
handling, comfort, and availability. Regarding
suitability of the aircraft to perform light duty
observation missions, INS stated the MD 600N is a
medium-sized aircraft that fulfills requirements
between the light observation OH-6A aircraft and
heavier duty aircraft. Further, INS stated that
three sizes of helicopters will be needed to meet
the mission requirements. INS said that the MD
600N has not replaced smaller aircraft and would
not do so as long as the smaller aircraft are
supportable. These statements are inconsistent
with INS' earlier positions. INS procurement
documents and budget requests show that (1) the MD
600N is a multipurpose aircraft capable of
operating in a wide range of Border Patrol
scenarios, including light observation missions
and (2) INS was anticipating procuring as many as
45 MD 600N helicopters to replace the majority of
the 57 helicopters currently in its fleet.
Further, a May 2000 memorandum from the Chief of
Air Operations stated that the MD 600N is intended
to replace the light observation OH-6A aircraft.
Nevertheless, if INS' comments reflect a change in
position, then these seem to be steps in the right
direction toward meeting our recommendation of
reassessing the decision to purchase one
multipurpose helicopter.
INS raised an issue concerning what portion of the
Border Patrol air mission involved low and slow
flying. It stated that a large percentage of its
current mission profile is in the light category
because over 60 percent of their current fleet are
light category aircraft that are capable of little
else. However, both Border Patrol pilots and
Border Patrol sector requirement memorandums
identify low and slow flying as a primary mission
requirement. Therefore, the Border Patrol needs
aircraft that are suitable for the low and slow
mission.
Regarding safety, most of INS' comments related to
a comparison of the height-velocity curves of the
MD 600N and those of other aircraft (see fig. 3).
INS stated that the figure portrays the MD 600N as
less safe because of its larger height-velocity
avoidance area (the combination of altitude and
airspeed where an autorotative landing might not
be safely made). Our portrayal was meant to show
where a typical mission falls in relation to the
avoidance areas of the different aircraft.
According to INS' Air Operations Manual,
operations in this area should be avoided or
limited to the minimal amount necessary to
complete operational maneuvers. Figure 3 shows
that a typical patrol mission falls entirely
within the MD 600N's avoidance area, but only
partially within this area for the other aircraft.
This is a valid means for comparison, according to
a senior FAA official, as is noted in our report.
INS commented that FAA certified the MD 600N as to
airworthiness and safety. Our report does not
question the aircraft certification. Rather, given
the fact that a typical mission profile requires
flying in the MD 600N's avoidance area, we
question the appropriateness of the MD 600N for
the work.
Concerning handling and comfort, INS noted that
several improvements are under way, such as the
addition of the stability augmentation system and
redesigned seats. They also provided information
showing that these improvements were well received
by the pilots that tested them. These improvements
are noted in our report. INS also took issue with
our characterization of the MD 600N as cramped and
uncomfortable and provided a comparison with the
other aircraft deemed acceptable in the
procurement competition. The cramped conditions
inside the aircraft, as described in our report,
were abstracted from formal procurement evaluation
documents prepared by Border Patrol pilots.
Cramped conditions were not attributed to the
other aircraft in the final competition.
Concerning availability, INS stated that our chart
showing the limited availability of the MD 600N is
misleading because 20 percent of the MD 600N fleet
(two aircraft) were unavailable for 5 months due
to engine repair contracting delays. We
acknowledged this point in the report.
Nevertheless, our analysis for the 18 months we
reviewed showed that the MD 600N fleet was not
available for field operations at least 50 percent
of the time. INS noted that the availability of
aircraft is an interdependent relationship of
maintenance performance by the sector, technical
support, and parts availability; and they will
continue to strive for excellence in each of these
areas.
INS also provided additional information, which we
have evaluated and included in the report, as
appropriate.
Copies of this report are being sent to Senators
Orrin G. Hatch and Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary; Representatives Henry J. Hyde and
John Conyers, Jr., Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member of the House Committee on the Judiciary;
Senators Ted Stevens and Robert Byrd, Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of the Senate
Appropriations Committee; Representatives C.W.
Bill Young and David Obey, Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member of the House Committee on
Appropriations; Senators Fred Thompson and Joseph
Lieberman, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee; and
Representatives Dan Burton and Henry Waxman,
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House
Government Reform Committee. We will also send
copies to the Honorable Janet Reno, the Attorney
General and the Honorable Doris Meissner,
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service and others upon request.
The major contributors to this report are
acknowledged in appendix II. If you or your staff
have any questions on this report, please call
Darryl Dutton on (213) 830-1000, or me on (202)
512-8777.
Sincerely yours,
Richard M. Stana
Associate Director
Administration of Justice Issues
_______________________________
1 Since the contract was signed, McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Systems has been sold twice. It was
first bought by the Boeing Company in 1997 and
later by MD Helicopters, Inc., in 1999.
2 Since the contract was signed, the civilian
helicopter line of McDonnell Douglas Helicopter
Systems has been sold twice. It was first bought
by the Boeing Company in 1997 and later by MD
Helicopters, Inc., in 1999.
3 Maximum gross weight includes accessories listed
in the statement of work, maximum fuel and
approximately 500 pounds of crew and equipment.
4 The general technical responses of both
proposals were rated as marginal due to technical
deficiencies and other noncompliance items that
were not related to the flight evaluation.
Specifically, the deficiencies were in the areas
of the maintenance plan, training plan, and
helicopter component parts. Upon review of the
proposals and the solicitation language, source
selection officials identified several areas where
it could relax or otherwise change its
requirements and still meet its mission and
operational needs. The selection officials
determined that it could amend the solicitation so
as to make both "marginal" proposals acceptable
and amended the solicitation accordingly. Both
McDonnell Douglas and Bell had outstanding past
performance.
5 A "better" determination means that the
competitor (1) meets all of the solicitation's
minimum requirements and exceeds many of the
requirements for a particular factor, subfactor,
or overall or (2) exceeds a small number of the
minimum requirements but does so to a significant
degree or in a valuable way.
6 The MD 600N is certified by the FAA to fly at a
maximum weight of up to 4,100 pounds at density
altitudes of 4,000 feet or below, and 3,850 pounds
for locations above 4,000 feet. Both the El Paso
sector its Deming station are above 4,000 feet.
For balance, the weight must be distributed within
a certain number of inches of the aircraft's
center of gravity.
7 An MDH official stated that the addition of
ballast is not unusual to compensate for the
weight of equipment added by users.
8 The chances of successfully completing an
autorotation are validated for a given height and
speed as part of the aircraft's FAA certification.
This ability differs for different aircraft and is
detailed in the craft's flight manual in a
height/velocity diagram. Air speed and altitude
combinations where autorotation success has not
been demonstrated are indicated as an area inside
the height/velocity curve.
9 The MD 600N was certified under part 27 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R. p. 27).
An MDH official stated FAR 27 requires testing to
be done at 7,000 feet, while the MD 500E model was
tested under an earlier regulation, that allows
testing to be done at sea level, where more of the
helicopter's weight is supported by denser air.
10 A memorandum from the Chief of Air Operations to
one sector chief provides data putting the MD 600N
rate of descent at 2,400 to 2,600 feet per minute.
Although the rates are acceptable, the document
notes that the descent rate is higher than past
models.
11 ECU failure is covered in the pilot flight
manual under Emergency and Malfunction Procedures.
According to the Air Operations Deputy Chief and
an MDH official, an ECU failure is a standard
procedure published in the pilot's flight manual
and taught to pilots during their transition
course, and there is no reason to believe it could
be disastrous.
12 The MD 520N is a smaller NOTAR helicopter
manufactured by MDH, Inc.
13 Rigging refers to the adjustments or settings on
different parts of the helicopter.
14 Described as a "bent piece of metal that runs
down the center line of the helicopter nose. The
Border Patrol has replaced this piece with a wire
strike protection kit that also serves the same
function as the strake.
15 The 600N flight manual warns: "An unanticipated
right yaw can occur when operating at low altitude
and low airspeed where a pilot, focusing his
attention on surface objects may be distracted
from the aerodynamic conditions affecting the
helicopter's attitude. If no directional or cyclic
control inputs are made, a nose down pitch and a
right roll may follow the right yaw."
16 One pilot's evaluation sheet stated: "Pilot
workload reduced enabling me to devote more
attention outside the aircraft to do mission."
17 The helicopter solicitation listed as a
desirable cabin feature for the offerer to include
pilot and copilot seats that are padded and have
lumbar support. The seats on the MD 600N are
padded but have no lumbar support.
18 The eleventh Border Patrol MD 600N is assigned
to Air Operations and is used mainly as a training
vehicle by instructor pilots. It does not fly
sector missions on a regular basis and has flown
fewer hours than the field helicopters. It was
unavailable about 25 percent of the time.
19 All warranties for the 11 Border Patrol aircraft
have expired, with the exception of specific parts
with warranty limits based on flight hours.
20 The part was requested under priority "03,"
which is for parts needed within a minimal time
and scheduled for delivery within 8 days.
Appendix I
Comments From the U.S. Department of Justice
Page 43 GAO/GGD-00-201 Border Patrol Helicopters
Appendix II
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 46 GAO/GGD-00-201 Border Patrol Helicopters
GAO Contacts
Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777
Darryl W. Dutton, (213) 830-1000
Acknowledgments
In addition to those named above, Monica Kelly,
Bunnie Lempesis, John P. Swain, Katherine M.
Raheb, Michael P. Dino, Ann H. Finley, and Adam
Vodraska made key contributions to this report.
*** End of Document ***