Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination (Letter
Report, 03/29/2000, GAO/GGD-00-106).

Virtually all the results that the federal government hopes to achieve
require the coordinated effort of two or more agencies. This shared
responsibility is the result of several factors, including the piecemeal
evolution of federal programs and the complexity of public needs. GAO's
work has shown repeatedly that mission fragmentation and overlap are
widespread in the government and that crosscutting program efforts are
poorly coordinated. Without such coordination, scarce funds are wasted,
program customers are confused and frustrated, and the overall
effectiveness of federal programs is undermined. This report (1)
provides an overview of programs in which GAO identified mission
fragmentation and overlap in 1998 and 1999; (2) discusses barriers to
interagency coordination cited in GAO reports issued during the past
decade; and (3) summarizes potential strategies for improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of crosscutting programs.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GGD-00-106
     TITLE:  Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination
      DATE:  03/29/2000
   SUBJECT:  Strategic planning
	     Agency missions
	     Interagency relations
	     Performance measures
	     Program evaluation
	     Redundancy
IDENTIFIER:  GPRA
	     Government Performance and Results Act

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GAO/GGD-00-106

United States General Accounting Office
GAO

Report to the Honorable

Fred Thompson, Chairman

Committee on Governmental Affairs

U.S. Senate

March 2000

GAO/GGD-00-106

MANAGING FOR RESULTS
Barriers to Interagency Coordination

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B-284984

Page 13GAO/GGD-00-106 Barriers to Interagency Coor
dination
B-284984

     March 29, 2000

The Honorable Fred Thompson
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
 
Dear Mr. Chairman:

Virtually all the results that the federal
government strives to achieve require the
concerted and coordinated efforts of two or more
agencies. This shared responsibility is an
outgrowth of several factors, including the
piecemeal evolution of federal programs and
service delivery efforts and the complexity of
public needs that require several agencies to
contribute resources and expertise to address
these needs.

This report is based upon our prior work
concerning the federal government's management of
crosscutting program activities and updates our
report entitled Managing for Results: Using the
Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and
Program Overlap.1 Our work has repeatedly shown
that mission fragmentation and program overlap are
widespread in the federal government and that
crosscutting program efforts are not well
coordinated. It also has shown the importance of
coordinating these programs. Without such
coordination, scarce funds are wasted, program
customers are confused and frustrated, and the
overall effectiveness of the federal effort is
limited.

In this report, we (1) provide an overview of
programs in which we identified mission
fragmentation and overlap in 1998 and 1999; (2)
discuss barriers to interagency coordination
identified in our prior work issued over the last
decade; and (3) summarize, on the basis of that
work, potential approaches for improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of crosscutting
programs.

To update our report on fragmentation and overlap,
we reviewed our reports issued in 1998 and 1999.
We also analyzed coordination problems and
potential approaches to address those problems
that were identified in our reports issued within
the last decade. For this report, we defined
interagency coordination to include coordination
of crosscutting programs among agencies within
large departments, such as the Forest Service and
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
within the Department of Agriculture (USDA), as
well as coordination across departmental
jurisdictions.

We conducted this review between August 1999 and
February 2000 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Because it
was based on our previously published reports, we
did not seek agency comments on a draft of this
report.

Results in Brief
Our work has repeatedly shown that mission
fragmentation and program overlap are widespread
in the federal government. In 1998 and 1999, we
found that this situation existed in 12 federal
mission areas,2 ranging from agriculture to
natural resources and environment. We also
identified, in 1998 and 1999, 8 new areas of
program overlap, including 50 programs for the
homeless that were administered by 8 federal
agencies. These programs provided services for the
homeless that appeared to be similar. For example,
23 programs operated by 4 agencies offered housing
services, and 26 programs administered by 6
agencies offered food and nutrition services.
Although our work indicates that the potential for
inefficiency and waste exists, it also shows
areas, such as counterterrorism, where the
intentional participation by multiple agencies may
be a reasonable response to a complex public
problem. In either situation, implementation of
federal crosscutting programs is often
characterized by numerous individual agency
efforts that are implemented with little apparent
regard for the presence of efforts of related
activities.

Not surprisingly, decisionmakers and managers are
finding that achieving results on public problems
increasingly calls for effective interagency
coordination. However, our work also has shown
that agencies encounter a range of barriers when
they attempt such coordination. One such barrier
concerns missions that are not mutually
reinforcing or that may even conflict, making
reaching a consensus on strategies and priorities
difficult. Another significant barrier to
interagency coordination is agencies' concerns
about protecting jurisdiction over missions and
control over resources. Because of these kinds of
concerns, the Army, Air Force, and Navy have
resisted any efforts to consolidate the services'
medical departments into a single health agency.
Finally, interagency coordination is often
hindered by incompatible procedures, processes,
data, and computer systems. In a previous report,
for example, we discussed how the lack of
consistent data on federal wetlands programs
implemented by different agencies prevented the
government from measuring progress toward
achieving the governmentwide goal of no net loss
of the nation's wetlands.3

In our past work, we have offered several possible
approaches for better managing crosscutting
programs-such as improved coordination,
integration, and consolidation-to ensure that
crosscutting goals are consistent, program efforts
are mutually reinforcing, and, where appropriate,
common or complementary performance measures are
used as a basis for management. One of our oft-
cited proposals is to consolidate the fragmented
federal system to ensure the safety and quality of
food. Perhaps most importantly, however, we have
stated that the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA) could provide the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), agencies, and
Congress with a structured framework for
addressing crosscutting program efforts.

OMB, for example, could use the governmentwide
performance plan, which is a key component of this
framework, to integrate expected agency-level
performance. It could also be used to more clearly
relate and address the contributions of
alternative federal strategies. Agencies, in turn,
could use the annual performance planning cycle
and subsequent annual performance reports to
highlight crosscutting program efforts and to
provide evidence of the coordination of those
efforts.

If GPRA is successfully implemented, OMB's
governmentwide performance plan and the agencies'
annual performance plans and subsequent
performance reports should provide Congress with
new information on federal program efforts,
including crosscutting programs. Congress then
could use this information to identify agencies
and programs addressing similar missions. Once
these programs are identified, Congress can
consider the associated policy, management, and
performance implications of crosscutting programs
as part of its oversight over the executive
branch.

Background
As we enter the 21st century, government
decisionmakers and managers in various governments
around the world are finding that achieving
results on public issues increasingly requires
coordinated responses from numerous public and
private entities. In response to this
interconnection, as well as other public
management challenges, those governments have
implemented major public sector management reform
initiatives. Performance-based management, the
unifying theme of these reform initiatives, seeks
to shift the focus of government performance and
accountability from a focus on activities to a
focus on the results of those activities.

In the United States, GPRA is a key part of the
legislative framework for shifting the focus of
the federal government from a preoccupation with
activities to results. GPRA requires the President
to include with his annual budget submission a
federal government performance plan. Congress
intended this plan to provide a "single cohesive
picture of the annual performance goals for the
fiscal year."4 Under the Act, executive branch
departments and agencies are to prepare multiyear
strategic plans and annual performance plans. The
Act also requires agencies to submit annual
program performance reports, with the first report
covering fiscal year 1999 to be issued by March
31, 2000.

Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap Are
Widespread
In our prior work, we identified widespread
mission fragmentation and program overlap in the
federal government. The broad scope of this
fragmentation and overlap-ranging from social
programs to defense efforts-indicates the inherent
complexity of national problems that the federal
government traditionally has addressed in a
piecemeal approach. Table 1 highlights the areas
of fragmentation and overlap that we have
identified in our work through 1999.

Table 1:  Areas of Potential Fragmentation and
Overlap
Mission areas             Programs
Agriculture               Food safety
Commerce and housing      Financial institution
credit                    regulation
Community and regional    Community development
development               Economic development
                         Emergency preparedness
                         Housing
                         Rural development
Education, training,      Early childhood programs
employment, and social    Employment training
services                  Student aid
General science, space,   High performance
and technology            computing
                         National laboratories
                         Research and development
                         facilities
                         Small business innovation
                         research
General government        Federal statistical
                         agencies
Health                    Long-term care
                         Substance abuse
                         Nuclear health and safety
                         Telemedicine
                         Teen pregnancy prevention
Income security           Child care
                         Welfare and related
                         programs
                         Youth programs
                         Homelessness programs
                         Programs for people with
                         disabilities
Defense                   Guided weapon systems
                         Telecommunications
                         Military health care
                         Satellite control systems
                         Nonmedical chemical and
                         biological
                         research and development
International affairs     Educational programs
                         Policy formulation and
                         implementation
Law enforcement           Border inspections
                         Drug control
                         Investigative authority
                         Drug trafficking
                         Combating terrorism
Natural resources and     Federal land management
environment               International
                         environmental programs
                         Hazardous waste cleanup
                         Water quality
Note: This table has been updated to reflect work
we completed since our report, Managing for
Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-
146, Aug. 29, 1997), was issued.
Source: GAO analysis.

Fragmentation and Overlap Continue to Be a Problem
In reviewing our reports issued in 1999 and 1998,
we found that mission fragmentation and program
overlap continue to be a problem in the federal
government. Several social programs, such as
housing for the homeless and assistance to the
disabled, were added to our list of fragmented
missions and overlapping program areas. We also
identified fragmentation and overlap in defense-
related activities, including the Department of
Defense's (DOD) acquisition of guided weapon
systems. The following summaries discuss
fragmentation and overlap problems in eight new
program areas. These program areas are included in
table 1.

Programs for the Homeless
We recently reported that 50 programs administered
by 8 federal agencies could provide services for
the homeless. Of these 50 programs, 16 programs
with over $1.2 billion in obligations for fiscal
year 1997 were focused on helping only the
homeless. The remaining 34 programs, with about
$215 billion in obligations for fiscal year 1997,
were focused on helping low-income people in
general, including the homeless.5

Both types of programs provided an array of
services, such as housing, health care, job
training, and transportation, which are needed to
assist the homeless. In some cases, multiple
agencies provided services that appeared to be
similar. For example, we found that 23 programs
operated by 4 agencies offered housing services,
and 26 programs administered by 6 agencies offered
food and nutrition services.

Assistance for People With Disabilities
Similar to federal assistance for the homeless,
two groups of federal programs provided assistance
to individuals with disabilities. The first group
used various definitions of disabilities as a
central criterion for eligibility and consisted of
30 programs with estimated expenditures totaling
$110 billion in fiscal year 1999. The second group
used disability as one of many potential criteria
for program participation and consisted of 40
programs, including Medicare and Medicaid, for
which age, income, or both also served as bases
for eligibility.6 In an earlier report, we stated
that because services often were not coordinated
among agency programs, people with disabilities
might receive duplicate services or face service
gaps.7

Teen Pregnancy Prevention
We found that the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) had 27 different programs and
services that supported efforts to prevent teen
pregnancy, and 8 other agencies provided funding
for programs that supported such efforts. HHS
identified at least $164 million in funding for
those efforts in fiscal year 1997, and Congress
authorized an additional $50 million for
abstinence education in fiscal year 1998. However,
teen pregnancy prevention programs' shares of
funding from various funding streams, such as
Medicaid and block grants, could not be isolated
because of the flexibility on spending decisions
given to the states. In our Performance and
Accountability Series, we said that with so many
stakeholders involved, interagency coordination
had become increasingly necessary and complex.8

DOD Acquisition Program for Guided Weapons
The military services and agencies often have made
decisions on the basis of their unique
requirements that in the aggregate can lead to
overlap or duplication across DOD. For example, we
reported in 1998 that the services had a
proliferation of acquisition programs for guided
weapons for deep attack missions.9 The services
planned to make a large investment-about $16.6
billion (constant dollars) over the next 10
years-on these acquisition programs. We reported
that the individual acquisition decisions of the
services would result in a doubling of the
inventory of guided weapons that may not be needed
to meet the U.S. national objectives. Furthermore,
the services missed several opportunities to
consolidate programs that were designed to be used
for similar purposes and in similar ways.10

DOD Acquisition Program for Telecommunications
     In another report, we said that the military
services and defense agencies had long procured
and operated multiple long-haul telecommunications
systems to meet their individual mission needs. As
a result, DOD's communications environment has
been fragmented and redundant. This environment
consisted of at least 87 independent networks that
supported a variety of long-haul
telecommunications requirements. The services
reported costs on 68 of the networks as totaling
more than $89 million annually. Yet, DOD lacked
basic management controls to ensure that it could
achieve its goal for an interoperable and cost-
effective telecommunications environment, and it
also lacked a foundation to identify redundant
networks.11

Military Health Care
DOD's military health care system costs about $16
billion annually, with about $12 billion incurred
for about 580 treatment facilities. We found that
although efforts to coordinate had occurred, the
services had not systematically collaborated in
seeking the most cost-effective placement and use
of medical resources. For example, in the
Washington, D.C., area, three large medical
centers-Walter Reed, Bethesda, and Malcolm
Grow-were in close proximity. These facilities
provided duplicative services and, in some cases,
lacked sufficient workload. However, we noted that
it was not possible to fully address the need for
or the appropriate size of military treatment
facilities in Washington, D.C., or elsewhere
because DOD and the services lacked an overall
strategy for determining and allocating medical
resources within the military health care system.12

DOD and the services recently took action to
develop such a strategy. However, officials who
are responsible for developing a comprehensive
strategy for ensuring that resources are allocated
for the right amounts to the right locations will
face many obstacles. Historically, the services
have had enough resources to maintain separate
health care systems and overlapping capabilities
during peacetime. Consequently, they generally do
not take into account other services' resources
when making allocation decisions. The Army, Air
Force, and Navy also have resisted any efforts to
consolidate the services' medical departments into
a single health agency. Each believed that it had
unique medical needs and activities and thus
fought to maintain its own health system. As a
result, over the years, formal interservice
management efforts have been limited and, today,
remain difficult to achieve.

Satellite Control Systems
Federal defense, intelligence, and civil agencies
operate separate satellite control systems to
ensure that satellites reach their planned orbits
and perform their intended missions while in
orbit. We have reported that these agencies were
spending several hundred million dollars a year to
control their satellites or missions, were
planning to upgrade their satellite control
systems, and did not have the necessary impetus or
direction for more efficient use of the nation's
satellite control resources.13

In 1996, DOD was directed to coordinate with other
departments and agencies, as appropriate, to
foster the integration and interoperability of
satellite control for all federal space
activities. As of early 1999, we reported that DOD
had taken limited action to foster such
integration and interoperability. In addition, a
group established in 1998 had not been successful
in stopping agencies from planning for satellite
control capabilities on an independent basis.

Nonmedical Chemical and Biological Defense
Technologies
DOD, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
within DOD, the Department of Energy, and an
interagency working group administer four federal
programs for research and development of
nonmedical chemical and biological defense
technologies. These technologies include
technologies for detecting, identifying,
protecting against, or decontaminating personnel
and equipment. We noted that coordination was
important because all four programs conducted
research and development in similar areas and
pursued many of the same capabilities. However,
the basic information that was needed to compare
specific goals and objectives of the various
program activities to better assess whether
overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for
collaboration did not exist.14

Barriers Agencies Face When Trying To Coordinate
Crosscutting Programs
Despite the importance of coordinating
crosscutting program efforts, nonexistent or weak
coordination of those efforts has been a long-
standing problem in the federal government and has
proven to be difficult to resolve. On the basis of
our past work, we identified several barriers that
challenge agencies as they attempt to better
coordinate crosscutting program efforts.

Competing Missions and Unclear Roles Make
Interagency Coordination Difficult
Agency missions that have evolved over time often
have conflicting objectives that reflect different
aspects of complex public problems. This makes
interagency coordination both more necessary and
more difficult. Such difficulties are compounded
when clear lines of responsibility and
accountability for crosscutting program efforts
are absent.

One example of the incremental evolution of
programs is the federal government's approach to
managing federal lands and their natural
resources. At the end of the 19th century, after a
century of conveying or selling new territorial
lands, Congress began to establish the existing
framework for managing the remaining federal
lands. This framework consists of a complex
collection of agencies and laws that have been set
up to sustain or increase commodity production and
provide for other uses of federal land, such as
recreation, while protecting the natural resources
for future generations.

Because of concerns over declining ecological
conditions, and sustainability of natural
resources, many federal agency officials,
scientists, and natural resource policy analysts
have advocated a new, broader approach to managing
the nation's lands and natural resources called
"ecosystem management." Virtually all analysts of
ecosystem management noted that the approach will
require unparalleled coordination of activities
among federal agencies managing lands in the same
ecosystem. However, we reported that such
coordination will be hampered by disparate
missions that are rooted in various laws.15

In our work on the Forest Service's decisionmaking
process, we noted that the land management
agencies' disparate missions and responsibilities
resulted in differing evaluations of environmental
effects and risks.16 This, in turn, could lead to
disagreements among agencies on whether and how
the requirements of environmental laws and
regulations can best be met. We found, for
example, that the Forest Service may be willing to
accept a greater level of risk to the recovery of
a threatened or endangered species under its
multiple-use and sustained-yield mandates17 than
would the Fish and Wildlife Service or the
National Marine Fisheries Service, both of which
are charged unambiguously with conserving and
protecting species threatened with extinction. As
illustration, disagreements among these agencies
over protecting the spawning habitat of salmon in
the Pacific Northwest and protecting endangered
species' habitat in the Tongass National Forest in
Alaska have resulted in delays in the Forest
Service's plans and projects.

Even where missions appear to be mutually
reinforcing, conflicts that inhibit interagency
coordination can arise when agencies are concerned
about maintaining jurisdiction over their missions
and the associated resources. As was discussed
earlier, DOD is challenged by the need to overcome
interservice rivalries so that it can modernize
its health care system.18

The lack of clear lines of authority, coupled with
disparate missions, compounds the difficulty
agencies have in developing a coordinated approach
to public problems. For example, at least 12
federal entities had some responsibility for
addressing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures of other countries.19 In 1997, we reported
that no one entity was clearly assigned the role
of directing and coordinating overall federal
efforts for those measures. Without clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, it could be
difficult to determine which entity should lead
federal efforts to address an individual SPS
measure. For example, it was not clear which
agency among the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) and multiple USDA agencies
were leading federal efforts to address a Chinese
ban on U. S. wheat products found to contain a
type of fungus.20

Trade and regulatory authorities had conflicting
perspectives on how SPS measures should be
addressed that were based on their agencies'
missions and their differing professional
orientations. In addition to uncertainty over
roles and responsibilities, USTR and the multiple
USDA agencies also held different opinions about
whether the U.S. strategy to address the Chinese
ban should focus on technical or trade policy. In
addition, some trade authorities said that
regulatory authorities seemed to lack a sense of
urgency regarding trade matters and were willing
to engage in technical discussions for many months
or years. They also expressed concerns that
regulatory authorities lacked negotiating
expertise, which sometimes precluded them from
obtaining the most advantageous result for U.S.
industry. In turn, some regulatory authorities
expressed frustration that trade authorities did
not seem to understand that deliberate and lengthy
technical and scientific processes were often
necessary to adequately and properly address
foreign regulatory authorities' concerns about
U.S. products.

Clearly articulating roles and responsibilities,
however, does not necessarily eliminate
coordination problems. U.S. policy on combating
terrorism, which has been evolving since the
1970s, has been formalized by a series of
directives from the President and implementing
guidance. These directives assign roles and
enumerate responsibilities for various federal
agencies and establish interagency support teams.21

Although in 1995 lead agencies were directed to
develop interagency guidance for both domestic and
international counterterrorism operations, they
have been unable to complete this guidance. For
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
has not coordinated the proposed Domestic
Guidelines with the Department of the Treasury,
although Treasury could have a significant role in
an actual terrorist incident. By omitting
Treasury, the FBI was excluding key agencies with
counterterrorism roles, including the Secret
Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms; and the Customs Service.

Similarly, the State Department was unable to
complete interagency guidance on international
counterterrorism operations. This guidance was to
outline procedures for deploying interagency
foreign emergency support teams and coordinating
federal operations overseas. However, the State
Department could not reach agreement with Justice
and the FBI on procedures for arresting terrorists
overseas. In response to our recommendation that
these agencies resolve their differences, the
State Department dropped all discussion of this
important interagency topic from the guidance in
an effort to get this guidance completed. As of
March 2000, the guidance was in the final
coordination stage.

Incompatible Procedures, Processes, Data, and
Systems
Other critical stumbling blocks to interagency
coordination are incompatible procedures,
processes, data, and computer systems. In 1994, we
reported that conflicts in eligibility standards
limited the ability of state and local
administrators to use common forms for multiple
federal employment training programs because
eligibility requirements were not standardized
across programs. For example, the term
"economically disadvantaged" lacked
standardization among those programs. As a result,
a member of a family of four with an income of
$20,040 would be considered "disadvantaged," thus
eligible for services from one program. However,
the same $20,040 income exceeds another program's
definition of disadvantaged, making the family
member ineligible for services from that program.22

In the same report, we also discussed how
different annual operating cycles for planning
processes hampered the ability of program
administrators to jointly plan program efforts to
ensure that participants receive the services they
needed. We noted that 16 employment training
programs targeted youth and that these programs
had four different operating cycles. Some programs
servicing the same target population would have
completed their planning process and begun
operations on January 1, while other programs
would not complete their planning until the
following July. As a result, we reported that
administrators might not be able to coordinate
their plans to ensure that the resources needed to
serve their clients were available.

The lack of comparable data that are based on
standards and common definitions also can make
attempts to bridge agency boundaries difficult.
For example, agencies involved in wetlands-related
activities-at least 36-used such terms as
protection, restoration, rehabilitation,
improvement, enhancement, and creation
inconsistently in describing and reporting on
their accomplishments. Because of the lack of
consistent and reliable data on the status of
wetlands, agencies disputed the accuracy of each
other's data. Moreover, as of 1998, the agencies'
report practices did not permit the actual
accomplishments of the agencies-that is, the
number of acres restored, enhanced, or otherwise
improved-to be determined in a consistent way
across the federal government.23

Since 1989, several interagency groups, which were
established to better coordinate federal wetlands
programs, have unsuccessfully attempted to improve
wetland data. Although the administration
announced new efforts to improve data, the lack of
consistent data continues to prevent the federal
government from measuring agencies' progress
toward achieving the governmentwide goal of no net
loss of the nation's remaining wetlands.

Finally, incompatible computer networks and
management information systems can be a critical
technological barrier to interagency coordination.
In 1995, we reported that USDA's agencies had
hundreds of incompatible networks and systems that
were built over time and that hindered
departmentwide information sharing. 24 Although
USDA had a pressing need to overcome this problem,
its agencies were spending hundreds of millions of
dollars continuing to develop their own networks
that overlapped and perpetuated long-standing
information problems. Also, because some new
agency networks connected many of the same
locations, USDA risked wasting money on the
purchase of redundant communications networks and
services.

Legal Barriers
Approaches for Improving the Management of
Crosscutting Programs
A number of different approaches for improving the
management of crosscutting programs-that is,
ensuring that goals are consistent, program
efforts are mutually reinforcing, and, where
appropriate, common or complementary performance
measures are developed-is evident from our prior
work. On the basis of this work, we have suggested
that GPRA can provide a systematic means for
rationalizing crosscutting efforts. We also have
offered possible approaches to coordination
problems in specific crosscutting programs. These
approaches include establishing better
coordination mechanisms, integrating service
delivery, and consolidating programs.

GPRA Holds Potential to Address Crosscutting
Programs
GPRA offers a structured and governmentwide
framework for addressing crosscutting programs.25
This framework could be used by OMB, agencies, and
Congress to better ensure that the programs are
being effectively coordinated. For example, we
have reported that the governmentwide performance
plan, prepared by OMB on the basis of agencies'
performance plans, offers perhaps the best
opportunity to present and integrate expected
agency-level performance and to more clearly
relate and address the contributions of
alternative federal strategies for common
performance goals. To take advantage of this
opportunity, OMB should pay particular attention
to whether agencies are adequately addressing
crosscutting program efforts in their performance
plans.

In our assessments of progress made in
implementing GPRA, we pointed out ways in which
agencies could use strategic and performance
planning cycles to address crosscutting programs.
For example, the act's emphasis on results-based
measures as part of the annual performance
planning process should lead to more explicit
discussion concerning the contributions and
accomplishments of agencies' efforts. As agencies
work with OMB to develop their strategic and
annual performance plans, they could consider the
extent to which programs need to be coordinated.
Agencies could also use the GPRA planning
processes to consider whether agency goals are
complementary and common performance measures are
needed.

The issuance of the first performance reports at
the end of March 2000 represents a new and
potentially more substantive stage in the
implementation of GPRA. Through these reports,
Congress and the executive branch could
systematically assess agencies' actual performance
on a governmentwide basis and consider steps that
could be taken to improve performance and reduce
costs of crosscutting programs.

These reports, coupled with the governmentwide
performance plan and the agencies' annual
performance plans, should provide Congress with a
wealth of information on agencies' missions,
goals, strategies, resources, and results. Then,
Congress could use this information to identify
agencies and programs addressing similar missions.
Once these programs are identified, Congress could
consider the associated policy, management, and
performance implications of crosscutting programs
as part of its oversight over the executive
branch.

To take full advantage of this wealth of
information, Congress might want to consider
developing oversight mechanisms that allow it to
more systematically articulate performance goals
for the broad missions of government, assess
alternative strategies that offer the most promise
for achieving those goals, and focus its oversight
on the most serious and systemic weaknesses and
risks. As we recently testified, one possible
mechanism could involve modifying the current
budget resolution to include a performance
component.26 Already organized by budget function,
similar to the program performance section of the
President's governmentwide performance plan, the
budget resolution could be adapted to permit
Congress to respond to, and present a coordinated
congressional perspective on, the President's
governmentwide performance plan. For example, the
"views and estimates" provided by authorization
and appropriation committees as part of the
process to develop the budget resolution could be
expanded to include their perspectives on priority
performance issues within their areas of
jurisdiction.

In addition, through the efforts of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs and others, crosscutting
performance concerns, such as those discussed in
this report, could be identified for targeted
congressional attention. Obviously, a
"congressional performance resolution" linked to
the budget resolution is only one approach to
achieve the objective of enhancing congressional
oversight on the most pressing crosscutting
performance and management issues.

Approaches for Addressing Select Crosscutting
Programs
Beyond the general opportunities provided by GPRA,
we have offered other potential approaches for
improving the management of individual
crosscutting program efforts. We have offered
those approaches on the basis of our analysis of
the coordination problem and each effort's
circumstances. These approaches range from
establishing linkages among agencies through
better coordination to reducing the need for
coordination through consolidation of multiple
agency efforts. Determining which approach, if
any, is appropriate for a given crosscutting
effort is ultimately an exercise in political
choice that involves consideration of the unique
policy, program, and operational environment of
that effort.

In some reports, we said that the development of
coordination mechanisms, such as long-term
planning and priority setting, could be used to
create interagency program linkages. In one
report, we noted that, for several decades, HHS
has provided special transportation services.27
Similarly, the Department of Transportation
awarded grants to local transit operators to
provide assistance for general public
transportation, such as buses, and for meeting the
special needs of elderly individuals and
individuals with disabilities. These agencies,
which invested a total of over $6 billion in
fiscal year 1998 for transportation services,
often failed to complement each other's programs
because of a lack of coordination. Consequently,
we said that some clients might be left unserved
or underserved, while transportation providers
serving other clients might have excess capacity.

To remedy this situation, HHS and Transportation
signed an agreement in October 1986 that
established a joint Coordinating Council on Human
Services Transportation. The Council was to
coordinate related programs at the federal level
wherever possible and to promote coordination at
the state and local levels.

However, because its efforts had been erratic and
slow to produce results, we recommended, in 1999,
that the Council improve transportation
coordination through better strategic and
implementation planning that set priorities and
assigned specific responsibilities. We added that
the planning efforts should also (1) make sure
that transportation coordinating planning efforts
under development reinforce one another,
(2) assess barriers to coordination, and (3) make
information on coordination barriers and
strategies to overcome the barriers readily
available.

In our 1998 report on child labor in agriculture,
we suggested that follow-through with existing
coordinating mechanisms was needed.28 Recognizing
that the patchwork of workforce protections was
dependent upon effective coordination, the
Department of Labor established coordination
procedures. These procedures included referring
potential cases to, conducting joint inspections
with, and exchanging information with key federal
enforcement agencies. However, in 1998, we found
that the procedures were not always being followed
and Labor, in many cases, had no controls in place
to alert it to any coordination problems. We noted
that the lack of coordination could result in
farmworkers' children working in violation of the
law.

Another approach to rationalizing crosscutting
programs is to move beyond coordination to the
integration of service delivery. We recently
reported that despite federal policies, most
children receiving federal health care assistance
had not been screened for lead poisoning. We said
that improved coordination for this assistance was
one way to increase the number of low-income
children being screened for this serious health
threat. Since research has shown that
underimmunized populations and populations most at
risk of lead poisoning are often the same, we
recommended that HHS consider integrating lead
screening with other preventive health care for
children. We further recommended that one possible
candidate for such an arrangement might be the
USDA's Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants, and Children. 29 As a first step in
addressing our recommendations, HHS has developed
a working group to develop and implement an
initiative to address the issues we raised in this
report, including establishing partnerships with
other federally funded programs that are
administered by the states.

Finally, our work also suggested that, where
appropriate, program consolidation offered the
potential to reduce costs and improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of federal
crosscutting efforts-especially when programs with
similar objectives and clientele were brought
together and unplanned fragmentation and overlap
were reduced. We have long proposed as a candidate
for reorganization the federal system that is to
ensure the safety and quality of the nation's food
system.30 Our work found that this system-at a cost
of over $1 billion a year-is inefficient and
hinders the government's efforts to effectively
protect consumers from unsafe food.

An oft-cited example of fragmentation in the
federal food safety effort is that, on one hand,
USDA is responsible for inspecting food plants
that produce open-faced meat sandwiches and pizzas
with meat toppings.  On the other hand, HHS' Food
and Drug Administration is responsible for
inspecting food plants that produce traditional
meat sandwiches and nonmeat pizzas.

Our work also suggests that efficiencies might be
gained by consolidating some of the 117 federal
programs serving at-risk and delinquent youth in
fiscal year 1998 into a smaller set of programs.
We reported in 1996 that it might be more
efficient to have one program, administered by a
single federal office, cover a particular
service/target group combination. However, we also
reported deciding what, if anything, should be
done to reform the system would require
consideration of how individual programs currently
operate, with special attention to how
consolidation could reduce overall administrative
costs. It would require careful thought about what
such a system should look like and how it should
function, including its scope, design, goals, and
strategies.31

Conclusions
Our previous work has identified widespread
mission fragmentation and program overlap in the
federal government. Since our 1997 report on
fragmentation and overlap was issued, we
identified additional examples of fragmentation
and overlap, including social programs for the
homeless and DOD's development and acquisition of
weapon systems. This fragmentation and overlap
underscores how important it is that the federal
government develop the capacity to more
effectively coordinate crosscutting program
efforts and to identify and eliminate those
programs where redundancy does not serve public
policy.

Our work also indicates that coordinating
crosscutting programs will be a persistent
challenge for executive branch agencies. In
addressing these challenges, agencies will need to
overcome barriers, such as disparate missions and
incompatible procedures, processes, data, and
computer systems.

Although we have offered various specific
approaches-such as setting up interagency
coordination mechanisms, integrating service
delivery, and consolidating programs-for
rationalizing crosscutting programs, we believe
that GPRA provides a general, systematic approach
for ensuring that agencies' goals and strategies
are mutually reinforcing. The act's requirements
for strategic and performance planning as well as
performance reporting provide agencies and OMB
with opportunities to address fragmentation and
overlap. OMB could use the governmentwide
performance plan, which is to be based on agency
performance plans, to more directly address
crosscutting programs. While preparing this plan,
OMB could integrate expected agency-level
performance and more clearly relate and address
the contributions of alternative federal
strategies to common performance goals.
Furthermore, as agencies work with OMB to develop
their annual performance plans, they could
consider the extent to which goals are
complementary and the need for common performance
measures. Finally, OMB and agencies could use the
annual performance reporting process to show how
the goals were met and, if unmet, what actions,
plans, and schedules agencies have developed, or
could develop, to meet those goals.

In addition, the governmentwide performance plan
and annual performance reports could set the stage
for a more integrated and focused dialogue between
Congress and the administration about priorities
and how agencies interact in implementing those
priorities. Congress could use this dialogue to
help identify crosscutting program efforts where a
consensus exists on how to address fragmentation
and overlap. This consensus may lead to statutory
reform for new approaches for interagency
coordination that integrate or consolidate federal
programs or that eliminate unneeded programs.
Congress could also use performance information to
better inform policy debate and program oversight
when dialogue does not lead to consensus.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator
Joseph I. Lieberman, Representative Dan Burton,
and Representative Henry A. Waxman in their
respective capacities as the Ranking Minority
Member of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Chairman of the House Committee on
Government Reform, and Ranking Minority Member of
the House Committee on Government Reform. We are
also sending copies to the Honorable Jacob J. Lew,
Director of OMB, and will make copies available to
others on request.

If you have any questions about this report,
please contact me or Donna Byers, Evaluator-in-
Charge, at (202) 512-8676.

Sincerely yours,

J. Christopher Mihm
Associate Director, Federal Management
  and Workforce Issues

_______________________________
1See Managing for Results: Using the Results Act
to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program
Overlap (GAO/AIMD-97-146, Aug. 29, 1997) for a
general discussion of fragmentation and overlap.
Examples of our work addressing specific
crosscutting programs include: Adults with Severe
Disabilities: Federal and State Approaches for
Personal Care and Other Services (GAO/HEHS-99-101,
May 14, 1999); and Weapons Acquisitions: Guided
Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed (GAO/NSIAD-99-
32, Dec. 9, 1998).
2Historically, national mission areas have been
described by a classification system called budget
functions. Budget functions were developed as a
means to classify budgetary resources on a
governmentwide basis and are, by intention, very
broad. Currently, there are 17 budget functions,
including such mission areas as international
affairs and income security.
3 Wetlands Overview: Problems With Acreage Data
Persist (GAO/RCED-98-150, July 1, 1998).
4Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States
Senate, S. Rpt. No. 58, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. p. 27
(1993). For an assessment, see The Results Act:
Assessment of the Governmentwide Performance Plan
for Fiscal Year 1999 (GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-159, Sept.
8, 1998).
5Homelessness: Coordination and Evaluation of
Programs Are Essential (GAO/RCED-99-49, Feb. 26,
1999).
6GAO/HEHS-99-101.
7 People with Disabilities: Federal Programs Could
Work Together More Efficiently to Promote
Employment (GAO/HEHS-96-126, Sept. 3, 1996).
8Teen Pregnancy: State and Federal Efforts to
Implement Prevention Programs and Measure Their
Effectiveness (GAO/HEHS-99-4, Nov. 30, 1998) and
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of Health and Human Services (GAO/OCG-
99-7, January 1999).
9Deep attack missions are operations carried out
beyond the areas where friendly ground forces
operate.
10GAO/NSIAD-99-32.
11Defense Networks: Management Information
Shortfalls Hinder Defense Efforts to Meet DISN
Goals (GAO/AIMD-98-202, July 30, 1998).
12Defense Health Care: Tri-Service Strategy Needed
to Justify Medical Resources for Readiness and
Peacetime Care (GAO/HEHS-00-10, Nov. 3, 1999).
13Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DOD to
Implement Space Policy and Integrate Capabilities
(GAO/NSIAD-99-81, May 17, 1999).
14Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of
Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R & D Programs
(GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999).
15Ecosystem Management: Additional Actions Needed
to Adequately Test a Promising Approach (GAO/RCED-
94-111, Aug. 16, 1994).
16Forest Service Decision-Making: A Framework for
Improving Performance (GAO/RCED-97-71, Apr. 29,
1997).
17Under the multiple-use principle, the Forest
Service must plan for six renewable surface
uses-outdoor recreation, rangeland, timber,
watersheds and water flows, wilderness, and
wildlife and fish. Under the sustained-yield
principle, the agency is to manage its lands to
provide high levels of all of these uses to
current users while sustaining undiminished the
lands' ability to produce these uses for future
generations.
18GAO/HEHS-00-10.
19Certain foreign sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, which are designed to reduce the risk of
diseases and pests to humans, animals, and plants,
may prohibit U.S. agricultural products from
entering foreign markets and constrain the growth
of U.S. agricultural exports.
20Agricultural Exports: U.S. Needs a More
Integrated Approach to Address
Sanitary/Phytosanitary Issues (GAO/NSIAD-98-32,
Dec. 11, 1997).
21Combating Terrorism: Issues To Be Resolved to
Improve Counterterrorism Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-
135, May 13, 1999).
22See Multiple Employment Training Programs:
Conflicting Requirements Hamper Delivery of
Services (GAO/HEHS-94-78, Jan. 28, 1994). The
Workforce Investment Act of 1998 began to overhaul
and streamline the nation's federally funded
employment training system. The legislation
included many actions we had recommended,
including standardizing definitions and
establishing common performance measures, but
implementation remains problematic. We currently
have ongoing work to, among other things, identify
challenges states face in implementing an
integrated federal training system.
23GAO/RCED-98-150.
24USDA Telecommunications: Better Management and
Network Planning Could Save Millions (GAO/AIMD-95-
203, Sept. 22, 1995).
25See Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Help
Congressional Decisionmaking and Strengthen
Oversight (GAO/T-GGD-00-95, Mar. 22, 2000);
Managing for Results: Agencies' Annual Plans Can
Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges
(GAO/GGD-98-44, Jan. 30, 1998); Managing for
Results: An Agenda To Improve the Usefulness of
Agencies Annual Performance Plans (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-
228; Sept. 8, 1998) and Managing for Results:
Opportunities for Continued Improvements in
Agencies' Performance Plans (GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-215,
July 20, 1999).
26GAO/T-GGD-00-95.
27Transportation Coordination: Benefits and
Barriers Exist, and Planning Efforts Progress
Slowly (GAO/RCED-00-1, Oct. 22, 1999).
28Child Labor In Agriculture: Changes Needed to
Better Protect Health and Educational
Opportunities (GAO/HEHS-98-193, Aug. 21, 1998).
29Lead Poisoning: Federal Health Care Programs Are
Not Effectively Reaching At-Risk Children
(GAO/HEHS-99-18, Jan. 15, 1999).
30Food Safety: Opportunities to Redirect Federal
Resources and Funds Can Enhance Effectiveness
(GAO/RCED-98-224, Aug. 6, 1998) and Food Safety
and Quality: Uniform, Risk-based Inspection System
Needed to Ensure Safe Food Supply (GAO/RCED-92-
152, June 26, 1992).
31See At-Risk and Delinquent Youths: Fiscal Year
1998 Programs (GAO/HEHS-99-88R, Mar. 30, 1999); At-
Risk and Delinquent Youth: Multiple Programs Lack
Coordinated Federal Effort (GAO/T-HEHS-98-38, Nov.
5, 1997); At-Risk and Delinquent Youth: Fiscal
Year 1996 Programs (GAO/HEHS-97-211R, Sept. 2,
1997); and At-Risk and Delinquent Youth: Multiple
Federal Programs Raise Efficiency Questions
(GAO/HEHS-96-34, Mar. 6, 1996).
*** End of document ***