Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic	 
Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear	 
Detection Architecture (16-JUL-08, GAO-08-999T).		 
                                                                 
In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland
Security to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local	 
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and abroad. DNDO
was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of 
Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), an enhanced	 
global nuclear detection architecture--an integrated system of	 
radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. DNDO  
implements the domestic portion of the architecture, while DOD,  
DOE, and State are responsible for related programs outside the  
U.S. This testimony provides preliminary observations based on	 
ongoing work addressing (1) the status of DNDO's efforts to	 
develop a global nuclear detection architecture, (2) the	 
challenges DNDO and other federal agencies face in implementing  
the architecture, and (3) the costs of the programs that	 
constitute the architecture. This statement draws on prior GAO	 
reviews of programs constituting the architecture, and GAO's work
on strategic planning						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-999T					        
    ACCNO:   A82890						        
  TITLE:     Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the       
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global  
Nuclear Detection Architecture					 
     DATE:   07/16/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Architects 					 
	     Border security					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost control					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Future budget projections				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Nuclear materials					 
	     Nuclear radiation monitoring			 
	     Nuclear weapons					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Radiation monitoring				 
	     Radioactive materials				 
	     Research programs					 
	     Smuggling						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems integration				 
	     Program costs					 
	     program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 

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GAO-08-999T

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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Wednesday, July 16, 2008: 

Nuclear Detection: 

Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's 
Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: 

Statement of David C. Maurer, Acting Director Natural Resources and 
Environment: 

GAO-08-999T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-999T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland 
Security to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to 
combat nuclear smuggling domestically and abroad. DNDO was directed to 
develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy 
(DOE), and State (State), an enhanced global nuclear detection 
architectureï¿½an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and 
interdiction activities. DNDO implements the domestic portion of the 
architecture, while DOD, DOE, and State are responsible for related 
programs outside the U.S. 

This testimony provides preliminary observations based on ongoing work 
addressing (1) the status of DNDOï¿½s efforts to develop a global nuclear 
detection architecture, (2) the challenges DNDO and other federal 
agencies face in implementing the architecture, and (3) the costs of 
the programs that constitute the architecture. This statement draws on 
prior GAO reviews of programs constituting the architecture, and GAOï¿½s 
work on strategic planning. 

What GAO Found: 

According to GAOï¿½s preliminary work to date, DNDO has taken steps to 
develop a global nuclear detection architecture but lacks an 
overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more 
comprehensive architecture. Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial 
architecture after coordinating with DOD, DOE, and State to identify 74 
federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological 
material. DNDO has also identified gaps in the architecture, such as 
land border crossings into the United States between formal points of 
entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation. 
Although DNDO has started to develop programs to address these gaps, it 
has not yet developed an overarching strategic plan to guide its 
transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive 
architecture. For example, such a plan would define across the entire 
architecture how DNDO would achieve and monitor its goal of detecting 
the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential 
smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in 
between points of entry. The plan would also define the steps and 
resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and 
provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals. 

DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, 
technological, and management challenges. First, prior GAO reports have 
demonstrated that U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas 
have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have not been 
effectively coordinated, although there have been some improvements in 
this area. Second, detection technology has limitations and cannot 
detect and identify all radiological and nuclear materials. For 
example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield 
radiological materials so that it evades detection. Third, DNDO faces 
challenges in managing implementation of the architecture. DNDO has 
been charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs 
implemented by other agencies. This responsibility poses a challenge 
for DNDO in ensuring that the individual programs within the global 
architecture are effectively integrated and coordinated to maximize the 
detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear material. 

According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal 
year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection 
architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, $1.1 billion was budgeted for 
programs to combat nuclear smuggling internationally; $220 million was 
devoted to programs to support the detection of radiological and 
nuclear material at the U.S. border; $900 million funded security and 
detection activities within the United States; and approximately $575 
million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities. The 
future costs for DNDO and other federal agencies to address the gaps 
identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in 
these amounts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DNDO develop, in coordination with DOD, DOE, and 
State, a strategic plan to guide agency efforts to develop a more 
comprehensive architecture. In commenting on a draft of this statement, 
DNDO concurred with this recommendation. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-999T]. For more information, 
contact David Maurer at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our preliminary work for 
several members of Congress on the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's 
(DNDO) efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture-- 
essentially, an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and 
interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign 
countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Preventing 
terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry out an 
attack in the United States is a top national priority. Since the 
events of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that 
terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon 
into the United States. If terrorists were to carry out such an attack, 
the consequences could be devastating to our national interests. 

In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing DNDO, 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to enhance and 
coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological 
and nuclear attacks.[Footnote 1] Congress subsequently passed the SAFE 
Port Act of 2006, which established DNDO in statute.[Footnote 2] Among 
other things, DNDO must develop, in coordination with the departments 
of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), an enhanced global 
nuclear detection architecture. DNDO is explicitly charged with 
implementing the domestic portion (at the U.S. border and within the 
United States) of the architecture and with coordinating the nuclear 
detection efforts of federal, state, and local governments. It is also 
responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation 
detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal 
agencies. The directive and the SAFE Port Act also reaffirmed that DOD, 
DOE, and State are responsible for programs to combat radiological and 
nuclear smuggling outside the United States. 

Over the past few months, we have been examining the steps that DNDO 
has taken to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Our work 
is ongoing and our statement today will provide preliminary 
observations on DNDO's effort. Specifically, our statement will discuss 
(1) the status of DNDO's efforts to develop a global nuclear detection 
architecture, (2) the challenges DNDO and the other federal agencies 
face in implementing the architecture, and (3) the costs of the current 
and proposed programs that constitute the global nuclear detection 
architecture. We plan to issue our final report in January 2009. 

To begin addressing these objectives, we interviewed officials from 
DNDO about steps taken to develop and improve upon the existing 
architecture. We reviewed and analyzed documents DNDO used to help 
create the baseline, or initial, architecture, as well as studies on 
gaps identified in the architecture.[Footnote 3] We interviewed agency 
officials from DOD, DOE, and State who manage programs that are part of 
the architecture to get their perspectives on challenges faced in 
implementing the architecture. In addition, we interviewed subject 
matter experts from the academic and nonprofit sectors, as well as 
representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to 
gain their perspective on efforts to develop and implement the 
architecture. We have conducted our work to date in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

According to our preliminary work to date, DNDO has taken steps to 
develop a global nuclear detection architecture, but it lacks an 
overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more 
comprehensive architecture. Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial 
architecture after coordinating with, among others, DOD, DOE, and 
State, to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear 
or radiological material. Many of these programs predate the 
establishment of DNDO. These programs cover all of the layers of 
detection, including securing special nuclear and radiological 
materials at their source in foreign countries and in the United States 
as well as detecting these materials at U.S. borders or within the 
United States. DNDO has also collaborated with other federal agencies, 
such as DOD, DOE, and State, to (1) identify gaps in the initial 
architecture, such as land borders between ports of entry, small 
maritime vessels, and international general aviation, and (2) develop 
programs to address these gaps. For example, DNDO has a joint project 
underway with the Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of 
Border Patrol to assess the feasibility of equipping border patrol 
agents with portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment along 
the U.S. border. Although these efforts to address recognized gaps in 
the architecture are necessary first steps, DNDO has not developed an 
overarching strategic plan that will guide its transition from the 
initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture. Such a plan 
would define across the entire architecture how, for example, DNDO will 
achieve its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear 
materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime 
craft or land borders in between ports of entry. This plan would also 
define the steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive 
architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals, 
such as enhancing detection along borders. 

DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, 
technological, and management challenges in developing a more 
comprehensive detection architecture. First, prior GAO reports have 
demonstrated that critical, long-standing U.S.-funded radiological 
detection programs overseas--which are a critical component of the 
architecture--have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have 
not been effectively coordinated. Although coordination among the 
agencies has improved, as a chain is only as strong as its weakest 
link, challenges in any of the programs that constitute the 
architecture may ultimately limit its overall effectiveness. Second, 
detection technology has limitations and is currently unable to detect 
and identify all smuggled radiological and nuclear materials. For 
example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield 
radiological materials so that it evades detection. We have also 
previously raised concerns about DNDO's efforts to develop a new 
generation of radiation detection equipment. Furthermore, while 
radiation detection equipment is an important part of the architecture, 
combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that also 
includes proper training and intelligence gathering on smuggling 
operations. Third, DNDO faces challenges in managing the implementation 
of the architecture. DNDO has been charged with developing an 
architecture that is dependent on programs implemented by other 
agencies. Ensuring that these individual programs within the 
architecture are effectively integrated poses a challenge for DNDO. In 
addition, the majority of the employees in DNDO's architecture office 
are on detail from other federal agencies or are contractors. While 
this staffing approach taps expertise across several agencies, 
detailees return to their home organizations after a relatively short 
time and in some cases there have been delays in filling these 
vacancies. As a result, this turnover may limit the retention and depth 
of institutional memory. 

According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal 
year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection 
architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, approximately $1.1 billion was 
budgeted for programs designed to combat nuclear smuggling and secure 
materials internationally. Approximately $220 million was devoted to 
programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material 
at the U.S. border; and an additional $900 million funded security and 
detection activities within the United States. Finally, approximately 
$575 million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities that 
support many different layers of the architecture, such as those 
focused on research and development or technical support to users of 
the detection equipment. In addition to these programs, DNDO and other 
federal agencies are pursuing future initiatives to address the gaps 
identified in the initial architecture. The costs to implement and 
sustain these and other future programs and equipment are not yet known 
or included in these figures. We are in the process of reviewing this 
cost information and will provide more detailed analysis in our final 
report. 

Background: 

According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed 
incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving 
nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases 
involved weapons-usable material--plutonium and highly enriched uranium 
(HEU)--that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also 
reported that 124 cases involved materials that could be used to 
produce a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive 
material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Past confirmed incidents of illicit 
trafficking in HEU and plutonium involved seizures of kilogram 
quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material but most have involved 
very small quantities. In some of these cases, it is possible that the 
seized material was a sample of larger quantities available for illegal 
purchase. IAEA concluded that these materials pose a continuous 
potential security threat to the international community, including the 
United States. 

Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety 
of ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried 
in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected 
border. In response to these threats, U.S. agencies, including DHS, 
DOD, DOE, and State, implemented programs to combat nuclear smuggling 
in foreign countries and the United States. DOD, DOE, and State fund, 
manage, and implement the global nuclear detection architecture's 
international programs. Many international detection programs were 
operating for several years before DNDO was created. For example, DOE's 
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, initiated in 
1995, provides support to the Russian Federation and other countries of 
concern to secure nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at 
risk of theft of diversion. In addition, during the 1990s, the United 
States began deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in 
countries of the former Soviet Union. DOD's Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program launched a variety of programs in the early 
1990s to help address proliferation concerns in the former Soviet 
Union, including helping secure Russian nuclear weapons. Two other DOD 
programs have provided radiation portal monitors, handheld equipment, 
and radiation detection training to countries in the former Soviet 
Union and in Eastern Europe. Similarly, State programs have provided 
detection equipment and training to numerous countries. DHS, in 
conjunction with other federal, state, and local agencies, is 
responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the United States and 
has provided radiation detection equipment, including portal monitors, 
personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and radioactive isotope 
identifiers at U.S. ports of entry. 

All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to 
detect and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear 
smuggling is difficult because there are many sources of radiation that 
are legal and not harmful when used as intended. These materials can 
trigger alarms--known as nuisance alarms--that may be indistinguishable 
in some cases from alarms that could sound in the event of a true case 
of nuclear smuggling. Nuisance alarms can be caused by patients who 
have recently had cancer treatments; a wide range of cargo with 
naturally occurring radiation (e.g., fertilizer, ceramics, and food 
products) and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use in 
medicine and industry. 

DNDO Has Begun to Develop Programs to Enhance the Initial Architecture, 
but It Lacks an Overarching Strategic Plan for Achieving Future 
Architecture Improvements: 

In October 2005, a few months after its inception, DNDO completed its 
initial inventory of federal programs associated with detecting the 
illicit transport of radiological and nuclear materials. As part of 
this effort, DNDO defined the architecture's general approach: a 
multilayered detection framework of radiation detection equipment and 
interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign 
countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. DNDO, in 
collaboration with other federal agencies, such as DOD, DOE, and State, 
analyzed the gaps in current planning and deployment strategies to 
determine the ability of individual layers of the architecture to 
successfully prevent illicit movement of radiological or nuclear 
materials or devices. DNDO identified several gap areas with respect to 
detecting potential nuclear smuggling, such as (1) land border 
crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, (2) 
small maritime craft (any vessel less than 300 gross tons) that enter 
the United States, and (3) international general aviation. 

In November 2006, DNDO completed a more detailed analysis of programs 
in the initial architecture. DNDO identified 72 programs across the 
federal government that focused on combating radiological and nuclear 
smuggling and nuclear security and it discussed these programs in depth 
by layer. The analysis also included a discussion of the current and 
anticipated budgets associated with each of these programs and each of 
the layers. In June 2008, DNDO released the Joint Annual Interagency 
Review of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. This report 
provides an updated analysis of the architecture by layer of defense 
and a discussion of the 74 programs now associated with each of the 
layers, as well as an estimate of the total budgets by layer. 

To address the gaps identified in the domestic portions of the 
architecture, DNDO has initiated pilot programs to address primary 
areas of concern or potential vulnerability. For example: 

* For the land border in between ports of entry, DNDO and CBP are 
studying the feasibility of equipping CBP border patrol agents with 
portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment along the U.S. 
border. 

* For small marine vessels, DNDO is working with the Coast Guard to 
develop and expand the coverage of radiological and nuclear detection 
capabilities that can be specifically applied in a maritime 
environment. 

* For international general aviation, DNDO is working with CBP, the 
Transportation Security Administration, and other agencies to develop 
and implement radiological and nuclear detection capabilities to scan 
international general aviation flights to the United States for 
possible illicit radiological or nuclear materials. 

To date, we have received briefings on each of these programs from 
DNDO, but we have not yet fully reviewed how they are being 
implemented. We will examine each of these more closely during the 
course of our review. 

Our preliminary observation is that DNDO's pilot programs appear to be 
a step in the right direction for improving the current architecture. 
However, these efforts to address gaps are not being undertaken within 
the larger context of an overarching strategic plan. While each agency 
that has a role in the architecture may have its own planning 
documents, DNDO has not produced an overarching strategic plan that can 
guide its efforts to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive 
global nuclear detection architecture. Our past work has discussed the 
importance of strategic planning.[Footnote 4] Specifically, we have 
reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be 
accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each 
objective, ensure that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives 
is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress 
and identify needed improvements. For example, such a plan would define 
how DNDO will achieve and monitor the goal of detecting the movement of 
radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, 
such as small maritime craft or land borders in between ports of entry. 
Moreover, this plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures 
to guide the improvement of the architecture and coordinate the 
activities of the participating agencies. 

DNDO and Other Agencies Face Coordination, Technological, and 
Management Challenges: 

DNDO and other agencies face a number of challenges in developing a 
global nuclear detection architecture, including (1) coordinating 
detection efforts across federal, state, and local agencies and with 
other nations, (2) dealing with the limitations of detection 
technology, and (3) managing the implementation of the architecture. 

Federal Agencies Have Experienced Difficulties Coordinating Radiation 
Detection Efforts: 

Our past work on key aspects of international and domestic programs 
that are part of the architecture have identified a number of 
weaknesses. In order for the architecture to be effective, all parts 
need to be well thought out, managed, and coordinated. As a chain is 
only as strong as its weakest link, limitations in any of the programs 
that constitute the architecture may ultimately limit its 
effectiveness. Specifically, in past work, we have identified the 
following difficulties that federal agencies have had coordinating and 
implementing radiation detection efforts. 

* We reported that DOD, DOE, and State had not coordinated their 
approaches to enhance other countries' border crossing.[Footnote 5] 
Specifically, radiation portal monitors that State installed in more 
than 20 countries are less sophisticated than those DOD and DOE 
installed. As a result, some border crossings where U.S. agencies had 
installed radiation detection equipment were more vulnerable to nuclear 
smuggling than others.[Footnote 6] Since issuing our report, a 
governmentwide plan encompassing U.S. efforts to combat nuclear 
smuggling in other countries has been developed; duplicative programs 
have been consolidated; and coordination among the agencies, although 
still a concern, has improved. 

* In 2005, we reported that there is no governmentwide guidance for 
border security programs that delineates agencies' roles and 
responsibilities, establishes regular information sharing, and defines 
procedures for resolving interagency disputes.[Footnote 7] In the 
absence of guidance for coordination, officials in some agencies 
questioned other agencies' roles and responsibilities. 

* More recently, in 2008, we found that levels of collaboration between 
U.S. and host government officials varied at some seaports 
participating in DHS's Container Security Initiative (CSI).[Footnote 8] 
In addition, we identified hurdles to cooperation between CSI teams and 
their counterparts in the host government, such as a host country's 
legal restrictions that CBP officials said prevent CSI teams from 
observing examinations. 

Furthermore, many international nuclear detection programs rely heavily 
on the host country to maintain and operate the equipment. We have 
reported that in some instances this reliance has been problematic. For 
example: 

* About half of the portal monitors provided to one country in the 
former Soviet Union were never installed or were not operational. In 
additional, mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment 
furnished by State have limited usefulness because they cannot operate 
effectively in cold climates or are otherwise not suitable for 
conditions in some countries.[Footnote 9] 

* Once the equipment is deployed, the United States has limited control 
over it, as we have previously reported.[Footnote 10] Specifically, 
once DOE finishes installing radiation equipment at a port and passes 
control of the equipment to the host government, the United States no 
longer controls the equipment's specific settings or its use by foreign 
customs officials. Settings can be changed, which may decreased the 
probability that the equipment will detect nuclear material. 

Within the U.S. borders, DNDO faces coordination challenges and will 
need to ensure that the problems with nuclear detection programs 
overseas are not repeated domestically. Many pilot programs DNDO is 
developing to address gaps in the architecture will rely heavily on 
other agencies to implement them. For example, DNDO is working closely 
with the Coast Guard and other federal agencies to implement DNDO's 
maritime initiatives to enhance detection of radiological and nuclear 
materials on small vessels. However, maritime jurisdictional 
responsibilities and activities are shared among federal, state, 
regional, and local governments. As a result, DNDO will need to closely 
coordinate activities related to detecting radiological and nuclear 
materials with these entities, as well as ensure that users are 
adequately trained and technical support is available. DNDO officials 
told us they are closely coordinating with other agencies, and our work 
to assess this coordination is still underway. We will continue to 
explore these coordination activities and challenges as we continue our 
review. 

Limitations in Detection Technology Hamper the Architecture's 
Effectiveness: 

The ability to detect radiological and nuclear materials is a critical 
component of the global nuclear detection architecture; however, 
current technology may not able to detect and identify all smuggled 
radiological and nuclear materials. In our past work, we found 
limitations with radiation detection equipment.[Footnote 11] For 
example: 

* In a report on preventing nuclear smuggling, we found that a cargo 
container containing a radioactive source was not detected as it passed 
through radiation detection equipment that DOE had installed at a 
foreign seaport because the radiation emitted from the container was 
shielded by a large amount of scrap metal. Additionally, detecting 
actual cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material 
is complicated: one of the materials of greatest concern in terms of 
proliferation--highly enriched uranium--is among the most difficult 
materials to detect because of its relatively low level of 
radioactivity. 

* We reported that current portal monitors deployed at U.S. borders can 
detect the presence of radiation but cannot distinguish between 
harmless radiological materials, such as ceramic tiles, fertilizer, and 
bananas, and dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and 
uranium. DNDO is currently testing a new generation of portal monitors. 
We have raised continuing concerns about DNDO's efforts to develop and 
test these advanced portal monitors.[Footnote 12] We currently have 
additional work underway examining the current round of testing and 
expect to report on our findings in September 2008. 

* Environmental conditions can affect radiation detection equipment's 
performance and sustainability, as we also have previously reported. 
For example, wind disturbances can vibrate the equipment and interfere 
with its ability to detect radiation. In addition, sea spray may 
corrode radiation detection equipment and its components that are 
operated in ports or near water. Its corrosive nature, combined with 
other conditions such as coral in the water, can accelerate the 
degradation of equipment. 

It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one 
of the tools that customs inspectors and border guards must use to 
combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an 
integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training, and 
intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. In the past, most known 
interdictions of weapons-useable nuclear materials have resulted from 
police investigations rather than by radiation detection equipment 
installed at border crossings. 

DNDO Faces Challenges in Managing the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture: 

The task DNDO has been given--developing an architecture to keep 
radiological and nuclear materials from entering the country--is a 
complex and large undertaking. DNDO has been charged with developing an 
architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. 
This lack of control over these programs poses a challenge for DNDO in 
ensuring that all individual programs within the global nuclear 
detection architecture will be effectively integrated. Moreover, 
implementing and sustaining the architecture requires adequate 
resources and capabilities to meet needed commitments. However, the 
majority of the employees in DNDO's architecture office are detailees 
on rotation from other federal agencies or are contractors. This type 
of staffing approach allows DNDO to tap into other agencies' expertise 
in radiological and nuclear detection. However, officials told us that 
staff turnover may limit the retention and depth of institutional 
memory since detailees return to their home organizations after a 
relatively short time. In some cases, there have been delays in filling 
these vacancies. We will continue to examine this potential resource 
challenge as we complete our work. 

In spite of these challenges, DNDO's efforts to develop a global 
nuclear detection architecture have yielded some benefits, according to 
DOD, DOE, and State officials. For example, an official from the State 
Department told us that DNDO is working through State's Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that 
other nations can use to establish their own nuclear detection 
architectures and recently sponsored a related workshop. In addition, 
DOE officials said that DNDO's actions have helped broaden their 
perspective on the deployment of radiation detection equipment 
overseas. Previously, the U.S. government had been more focused on 
placing fixed detectors at particular sites, but as a result of DNDO's 
efforts to identify gaps in the global detection network, DOE has begun 
to work with law enforcement officials in other countries to improve 
detection capabilities for the land in between ports of entry. Finally, 
DNDO, DOD, DOE, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
for Science and Technology are now formally collaborating on nuclear 
detection research and development and they have signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) to guide these efforts. The MOU will integrate 
research and development programs by, for example, providing open 
access to research findings in order to leverage this knowledge and to 
reduce conflict between different agency programs. In addition, the MOU 
encourages joint funding of programs and projects and calls on the 
agencies to coordinate their research and development plans. In our 
ongoing work, we will examine DNDO's progress in carrying through on 
these initiatives. 

Approximately $2.8 Billion in Fiscal Year 2007 Funded Programs 
Associated with Detecting the Transport of Radiological and Nuclear 
Weapons or Materials: 

DNDO reported that approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal 
year 2007 for 74 programs focused on preventing and detecting the 
illicit transport of radiological or nuclear materials.[Footnote 13] 
These programs were primarily administered by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State 
and spanned all layers of the global nuclear detection architecture. 
Specifically: 

* $1.1 billion funded 28 programs focused on the international aspects 
of the architecture; 

* $221 million funded 9 programs to support detection of radiological 
and nuclear material at the U.S. border; 

* $918 million funded 16 programs dedicated to detecting and securing 
radiological or nuclear materials within the U.S. borders; and: 

* $577 million funded 34 cross-cutting programs that support many 
different layers of the architecture by, for example, research and 
development or technical support to users of the detection equipment. 

The fiscal year 2007 budget of $2.8 billion will not sustain the 
architecture over the long term because additional programs and 
equipment will be implemented to address the gaps. For example, this 
amount does not include the cost estimates related to acquiring and 
deploying the next generation of advanced portal monitors that are 
currently being tested. In addition, DNDO is just beginning new efforts 
to mitigate gaps in the architecture and budget estimates for these 
activities are limited. We are in the process of reviewing this cost 
information and will provide more detailed analysis in our final 
report. 

Conclusions: 

DNDO has been given an important and complex task--develop a global 
nuclear detection architecture to combat nuclear smuggling and keep 
radiological and nuclear weapons or materials from entering the United 
States. This undertaking involves coordinating a vast array of programs 
and technological resources that are managed by many different agencies 
and span the globe. Since its creation 3 years ago, DNDO has 
conceptually mapped the current architecture and identified how it 
would like the architecture to evolve in the near term. While DNDO's 
vision of a more comprehensive architecture is laudable, to achieve 
this goal, it will need to address a number of key challenges including 
building close coordination and cooperation among the various agencies 
involved and developing and deploying more advanced radiation detection 
technology. Although DNDO has taken some steps to achieve these ends, 
it has not done so within the larger context of an overarching 
strategic plan with clearly established goals, responsibilities, 
priorities, resource needs, and mechanisms for assessing progress along 
the way. Developing and implementing a global nuclear detection 
architecture will likely take several years, cost billions of dollars, 
and rely on the expertise and resources of agencies and programs across 
the government. Moving forward, DNDO should work closely with its 
counterparts within DHS, as well as at other departments, to develop a 
comprehensive strategic plan that helps safeguard the investments made 
to date, more closely links future goals with the resources necessary 
to achieve those goals, and enhance the architecture's ability to 
operate in a more cohesive and integrated fashion. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the 
Secretary of State, develop a strategic plan to guide the development 
of a more comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture. Such a 
plan should (1) clearly define objectives to be accomplished, (2) 
identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) 
identify the funding necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) 
employ monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and 
identify needed improvements. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of the information in this testimony to DNDO. DNDO 
provided oral comments on the draft, concurred with our 
recommendations, and provided technical comments, which we incorporated 
as appropriate. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We will continue 
our review and plan to issue a report in early 2009. I would be pleased 
to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee have 
at this time. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 
512-3841 or [email protected]. Glen Levis, Assistant Director, Elizabeth 
Erdmann, Rachel Girshick, Sandra Kerr, and Tommy Williams made key 
contributions to this statement. Additional assistance was provided by 
Omari Norman and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this statement. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 / National Security 
Presidential Directive 43, Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005. 

[2] 6 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 591-596a. 

[3] To assess DNDO's efforts to develop the architecture, we are in the 
process of comparing DNDO's planning practices with those that we have 
found to be effective in developing enterprise architectures. An 
enterprise architecture is a tool, or blueprint, for understanding and 
planning complex systems. GAO has developed an Enterprise Architecture 
Management Maturity Framework. This framework outlines steps toward 
achieving a stable and mature process for managing the development, 
maintenance, and implementation of enterprise architectures. See GAO, 
Information Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving 
Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G 
(Washington, D.C.: April 2003). 

[4] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance 
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That 
Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-
06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); GAO, Combating Terrorism: 
Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-03-519T 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively 
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 
(Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

[5] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation 
Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries, GAO-05-
840T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005). 

[6] Portal monitors installed by State do not have the ability to 
detect neutron radiation, which translates into a decreased ability of 
those monitors to be able to detect plutonium, one of the nuclear 
materials of greatest proliferation concern. 

[7] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need 
Better Integration, GAO-05-157 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005). 

[8] GAO, Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at 
Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and 
Performance Measures Are Needed, GAO-08-187 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 
2008). 

[9] GAO-05-840T. 

[10] GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress 
in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority 
Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

[11] GAO-05-375. 

[12] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to 
Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection 
Equipment, GAO-07-1247T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007). 

[13] The total number of programs reported by DNDO as being related to 
the architecture is 74. However, the sum of the programs by layer is 
more than 74 because some programs are relevant to more than one layer 
of detection. 

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