Air Force Procurement: Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest		 
(10-JUL-08, GAO-08-991T).					 
                                                                 
The Boeing Company protested the award of a contract to Northrop 
Grumman Systems Corporation by the Department of the Air Force	 
for KC-X aerial refueling tankers. Boeing challenged the Air	 
Force's technical and cost evaluations, conduct of discussions,  
and source selection decision. Because Boeing competed for the	 
contract, it is an interested party for purposes of filing a	 
protest. Under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, GAO is
required to consider protests of contract awards filed by	 
interested parties. In deciding protests, GAO makes a		 
determination of whether the agency's actions complied with	 
procurement statutes and regulations.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-991T					        
    ACCNO:   A82777						        
  TITLE:     Air Force Procurement: Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest   
     DATE:   07/10/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Air Force procurement				 
	     Bid evaluation protests				 
	     Bid protest regulations				 
	     Contract award protests				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Department of Defense contractors			 
	     Equipment contracts				 
	     Evaluation criteria				 
	     Improper award of contract 			 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Procurement regulations				 
	     Solicitation specifications			 
	     Source selection					 
	     Specifications protests				 
	     Technical proposal evaluation			 
	     Bid protest costs					 
	     Air Force KC-X Aerial Tanker Replacement		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     KC-10 Aircraft					 
	     KC-135 Aircraft					 

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GAO-08-991T

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Testimony before the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, July 10, 2008:

Air Force Procurement:

Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest:

Statement of Daniel I. Gordon, Deputy General Counsel:

GAO-08-991T: 

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-08-991T, a testimony to the Air and Land Forces 
Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 

GAO's Role Under The Competition in Contracting Act: 

The Boeing Company protested the award of a contract to Northrop 
Grumman Systems Corporation by the Department of the Air Force for KC-X 
aerial refueling tankers. Boeing challenged the Air Forceï¿½s technical 
and cost evaluations, conduct of discussions, and source selection 
decision. Because Boeing competed for the contract, it is an interested 
party for purposes of filing a protest. Under the Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984, GAO is required to consider protests of 
contract awards filed by interested parties. In deciding protests, GAO 
makes a determination of whether the agencyï¿½s actions complied with 
procurement statutes and regulations.

GAO's Findings:

Review of the extensive record, including a hearing, led GAO to 
conclude that the Air Force had made a number of significant errors 
that could have affected the outcome of what was a close competition 
between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The errors included not assessing 
the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation 
rules and criteria identified in the solicitation, not having 
documentation to support certain aspects of the evaluation, conducting 
unequal and misleading discussions with Boeing, and having errors or 
unsupported conclusions in the cost evaluation. Accordingly, GAO 
sustained Boeingï¿½s protest.

The redacted decision is at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.htm]. 

What GAO Recommends:

In its decision, GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions 
with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised 
proposals, and make a new source selection decision, consistent with 
GAOï¿½s decision. GAO further recommends that, if the Air Force believed 
that the solicitation does not adequately state its needs, the agency 
should amend the solicitation prior to conducting further discussions 
with the offerors. GAO recommends that if Boeingï¿½s proposal is 
ultimately selected for award, the Air Force should terminate the 
contract awarded to Northrop Grumman. 

To view the full product, click on [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-991T]. For more information, contact Daniel I. Gordon 
at (202) 512-8219 or [email protected] or Michael R. Golden at (202) 512-
8233, [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the June 18, 
2008 decision of GAO in response to The Boeing Company's protest of the 
Air Force's award of the aerial refueling tanker contract.

GAO has been deciding bid protests since the 1920s. The Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) now provides specific statutory 
authority for our bid protest function. The Act codified GAO's role as 
a quasi-judicial forum to provide an objective, independent, and 
impartial process for the resolution of disputes concerning the awards 
of federal contracts. We handle protests following the procedures set 
out in the Bid Protest Regulations in Part 21 of Title 4 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. We conduct outreach and exchange views with the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian agencies on a regular basis 
with regard to best practices and lessons learned from our bid protest 
decisions.

In Fiscal Year 2007, we received nearly 1,300 bid protests challenging 
procurements across the federal government. GAO received between 700 
and 775 protests of DoD procurements over each of the past 5 years. 
Because there are often multiple protests of a single procurement 
action, we would estimate that 750 protests would involve approximately 
500 defense procurements--out of the many tens of thousands of defense 
procurement actions that could be protested each year. Bid protest 
statistics and a detailed breakdown by DoD components are included in 
our appendices to this statement.

The bid protest process is a legal one, and both the process and the 
resulting product differ from those associated with the reports that 
GAO issues in connection with its program audits and reviews. Protests 
are handled solely by GAO's Office of General Counsel (OGC), not by its 
audit teams. In developing the record, OGC provides all protest 
parties--the protester, the awardee, and the contracting agency--an 
opportunity to present their positions. In some cases, OGC conducts a 
hearing to further develop the record. Under CICA, as amended, we have 
100 calendar days to decide a protest.

The product of a protest before GAO--our legal decision--does not 
address broad programmatic issues such as whether or not a weapons 
program is being managed effectively or consistent with best practices. 
Instead, a bid protest decision addresses specific allegations 
challenging particular procurement actions as contrary to procurement 
laws, regulations and the evaluation scheme set forth in the 
solicitation. We sustain a protest when we find that the procuring 
agency has not complied with procurement laws, regulations, and the 
solicitation's evaluation scheme, and that this prejudiced the 
protester's chances of winning the contract.

With that background, my testimony today will summarize our recently 
issued decision in the Boeing protest of the Air Force's award of a 
contract to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation. The tanker 
procurement is a large and complex one, and Boeing advanced numerous 
protest grounds, which required us to use almost all of the 100 
calendar days allowed by CICA to resolve the protest. In this regard, 
Boeing supplemented its initial protest seven times, raising more than 
20 main challenges to the agency's evaluation and source selection.

Our review of the record led us to conclude that the Air Force had made 
a number of significant errors that could have affected the outcome of 
what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. We 
therefore sustained Boeing's protest. We also denied a number of 
Boeing's challenges to the award to Northrop Grumman, because we found 
that the record did not provide us with a basis to conclude that the 
agency had violated the legal requirements with respect to those 
challenges.

Several other points should be noted. First, our protest decision does 
not reflect any view on the merits of Boeing's and Northrop Grumman's 
proposed tankers or the firms' proposals. Judgments about which company 
will more successfully meet the Air Force's needs are for the Air 
Force, not GAO, to make. Second, bias, undue influence or other 
intentional wrongdoing was not alleged by Boeing in its protest, nor 
did GAO see any evidence of such intentional wrongful conduct by the 
Air Force in this procurement. Third, this statement is based on the 
public version of our decision. A limited amount of information that is 
proprietary to the parties or source selection sensitive has been 
redacted from the decision, but none of the redacted information is 
critical to understanding the decision. Finally, we made a number of 
recommendations to the Air Force in sustaining the protest. By statute, 
the Air Force has 60 days to inform our Office of the Air Force's 
actions in response to our recommendations. We recognize that acquiring 
new aerial refueling tankers is a critical need for the Air Force and 
the nation. We think that it is important that the Air Force act with 
all due dispatch to correct the procurement flaws indicated in our 
decision and to move forward to meet the agency's mission needs.

Background:

Aerial refueling is a key element supporting the effectiveness of DoD's 
air power in military operations and is, as such, an important 
component of national security. The Air Force's tanker fleet, 
consisting of the medium-sized KC-135 and larger KC-10, is old; the KC- 
135 aircraft currently has an average age of 46 years and is the oldest 
combat weapon system in the agency's inventory. To begin replacing the 
aging refueling tanker fleet, the Air Force established a three-pronged 
approach under which it intended to first conduct a procurement to 
replace the older KC-135 tankers, while maintaining the remaining KC- 
135 and KC-10 tankers; the first procurement, which is the acquisition 
that is the subject of our decision, was identified by the Air Force as 
the KC-X procurement or program.

Although the Air Force intends to ultimately procure up to 179 KC-X 
aircraft, the agency's solicitation that led to the contract award at 
issue here provided for an initial contract for system development and 
demonstration of the KC-X aircraft and procurement of up to 80 
aircraft. The solicitation provided that award of the contract would be 
on a "best value" basis, and stated a detailed evaluation scheme that 
identified technical and cost factors and their relative weights. With 
respect to the cost factor, the solicitation provided that the Air 
Force would calculate a "most probable life cycle cost" estimate for 
each offeror's proposal, including military construction and fuel 
costs. In addition, the solicitation provided a detailed system 
requirements document that identified minimum requirements (called key 
performance parameter thresholds) that offerors must satisfy to receive 
award. The solicitation also identified desired features and 
performance characteristics of the aircraft (which the solicitation 
identified, in certain cases, as "objectives" that offerors were 
encouraged, but were not required, to provide).

The Air Force received proposals and conducted numerous rounds of 
negotiations with Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The agency selected 
Northrop Grumman's proposal for award on February 29, 2008, and Boeing 
filed its protest with our Office on March 11. In accordance with our 
Bid Protest Regulations, we obtained a report from the Air Force and 
comments on that report from Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The 
documentary record produced by the Air Force in this protest was 
voluminous and complex. Our Office also conducted a 5-day hearing to 
receive testimony from a number of Air Force witnesses to complete and 
explain the record. Neither Boeing nor Northrop Grumman produced any 
witnesses at the hearing, although each was invited to do so. Following 
the hearing, we received further comments from the parties, addressing 
the hearing testimony as well as all other aspects of the record.

The Legal Standard:

Procuring agencies are obligated to conduct proposal evaluations in 
accordance with the evaluation scheme set forth in the solicitation. 
Such proposal evaluation judgments are by their nature often 
subjective; nevertheless, the exercise of these judgments in the 
evaluation of proposals must be reasonable and must bear a rational 
relationship to the announced criteria upon which the successful 
competitor is to be selected. In order for GAO to perform a meaningful 
review, the protest record must contain adequate documentation showing 
the bases for the agency's evaluation conclusions and source selection 
decision.

In negotiated procurements, when procuring agencies conduct discussions 
with offerors with respect to their proposals, the discussions must be 
meaningful and fair, and they must not be misleading.

Judgments about which offeror will most successfully meet governmental 
needs are for the procuring agencies. Our protest decisions are limited 
to the record we develop, shaped by the allegations raised by the 
protester and the responses put forward by the agency and awardee, and 
measured against the criteria established for the procurement by 
applicable statutes, regulations, and the agency's solicitation.

GAO's Review of the Record:

As discussed above, each of the parties--the Air Force, Boeing, and 
Northrop Grumman--had a full and complete opportunity to submit 
argument and evidence for the record. The documentary evidence in the 
record was voluminous. From our review of the record, including the 
hearing testimony of 11 Air Force witnesses, GAO found a number of 
significant errors in the Air Force's technical and cost evaluation and 
that the agency conducted misleading and unequal discussions with 
Boeing.

First, we found that, although the solicitation identified the relative 
order of importance of the requirements and features of the aircraft 
solicited by the Air Force, the record did not show that the Air Force, 
in its evaluation and source selection decision, applied the identified 
relative weighting in assessing the merits of the firms' proposals. In 
comparing Boeing's assessed advantages against Northrop Grumman's 
assessed advantages, the Air Force did not account for the fact that 
many of Boeing's assessed advantages were derived from requirements and 
features of the aircraft which the solicitation identified as being 
more important than those from which Northrop Grumman's assessed 
advantages were derived. Moreover, the solicitation requested that 
offerors propose to satisfy as many of the solicitation's desired 
aircraft features and performance as possible, but the record did not 
show that the Air Force in its evaluation or source selection decision 
credited Boeing with satisfying far more of these features and 
functions than did Northrop Grumman.

Second, we found that a key discriminator relied upon by the Air Force 
in its selection of Northrop Grumman's proposal for award was not 
consistent with the terms of the solicitation. Specifically, the Air 
Force credited Northrop Grumman for proposing to exceed a solicitation 
key performance parameter objective for fuel offload versus unrefueled 
range (that is, the amount of fuel a tanker could offload to a receiver 
aircraft at a given distance of flight by the tanker without itself 
refueling) to a greater extent than Boeing proposed, but the 
solicitation plainly provided that no consideration would be given for 
proposing to exceed key performance parameter objectives.

Third, we found that the record did not show that the Air Force 
reasonably determined that Northrop Grumman's proposed aircraft could 
refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing, tanker-compatible aircraft 
using current Air Force procedures, as was required by the 
solicitation. During the procurement, the Air Force twice informed 
Northrop Grumman that the proposed maximum operating velocity for that 
firm's proposed aircraft would not be sufficient under current Air 
Force procedures to achieve overrun speeds for various Air Force 
aircraft. (In aerial refueling operations, if a receiver aircraft 
overruns the tanker during the final phase of rendezvous, the tanker 
and receiver pilots are directed to adjust to specified overrun speeds, 
and after overtaking the receiver aircraft, the tanker will decelerate 
to a refueling airspeed.) In response to the Air Force's concerns, 
Northrop Grumman promised a solution to allow its aircraft to achieve 
the required overrun speeds. The record did not show that the Air Force 
reasonably evaluated the capability of Northrop Grumman's proposed 
aircraft to achieve the necessary overrun speed in accordance with 
current Air Force procedures.

In addition, we found that the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate 
the capability of Northrop Grumman's proposed aircraft to initiate 
emergency breakaway procedures, consistent with current Air Force 
procedures, with respect to a current fixed-wing, tanker-compatible Air 
Force aircraft. A breakaway maneuver is an emergency procedure that is 
done when any tanker or receiver aircraft crewmember perceives an 
unsafe condition that requires immediate separation of the aircraft. In 
such a situation, the tanker pilot is directed to accelerate, and if 
necessary to also climb, to achieve separation from the receiver 
aircraft.

Fourth, we found that the Air Force conducted misleading and unequal 
discussions with Boeing. The agency informed Boeing during the 
procurement that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter 
objective relating to operational utility. Later, the Air Force decided 
that Boeing had not fully satisfied this particular objective, but did 
not tell Boeing this, which would have afforded Boeing the opportunity 
to further address this. GAO concluded that it was improper for the Air 
Force, after informing Boeing that it had fully met this objective, to 
change this evaluation conclusion without providing Boeing the 
opportunity to address this requirement in discussions. In contrast, 
Northrop Grumman, whose proposal was evaluated as only partially 
meeting this requirement, received continued discussions addressing 
this same matter during the procurement.

Fifth, GAO found that the Air Force improperly accepted Northrop 
Grumman's proposal, even though that firm took exception to a material 
solicitation requirement. Specifically, the solicitation required 
offerors to plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic 
depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-
rate production aircraft. Northrop Grumman was informed several times 
by the Air Force that the firm had not committed to the required 2-year 
timeframe, but Northrop Grumman refused to commit to the required 
schedule. GAO concluded that Northrop Grumman's refusal to do so could 
not considered an "administrative oversight" as was found by the Air 
Force in its evaluation.

Sixth, we found that the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate military 
construction costs in evaluating the firms' cost proposals. The 
solicitation provided that the Air Force would calculate a most 
probable life cycle cost estimate for each offeror. A most probable 
life cycle cost estimate reflects the agency's independent estimate of 
all contract, budgetary, and other government costs associated with all 
phases of the aircraft's life cycle from system development and 
demonstration through production and deployment and operations and 
support; military construction costs were specifically identified as a 
cost that the agency would evaluate in calculating the firms' most 
probable life cycle costs. Because the agency believed that its 
anticipated requirements could not be reasonably ascertained, the Air 
Force established a notional (hypothetical) plan, identifying a number 
of different types of airbases, to provide for a common basis for 
evaluating military construction costs. GAO found that, in addition to 
four errors related to military construction costs that the Air Force 
conceded during the protest, the record otherwise showed that the 
agency's military construction cost evaluation was flawed, because the 
agency's evaluation did not account for the offerors' specific 
proposals and because the record did not otherwise support the 
reasonableness of the agency's notional plan.

Seventh, we found that the Air Force improperly increased Boeing's 
estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm's 
most probable life cycle cost. Specifically, the Air Force assigned a 
moderate risk to Boeing's system development and demonstration costs, 
because, despite several efforts to obtain support from Boeing for its 
proposed non-recurring engineering costs, Boeing had not sufficiently 
supported its estimate. Although we found the Air Force's assignment of 
a moderate cost risk reasonable, GAO also found that the Air Force 
unreasonably increased Boeing's estimated non-recurring engineering 
costs in calculating the firm's most probable life cycle cost where the 
Air Force did not find that Boeing's estimated costs were unrealistic 
or not probable.

Finally, GAO found unreasonable the Air Force's use of a simulation 
model to determine the amount by which Boeing's non-recurring 
engineering costs should be increased in calculating that firm's most 
probable life cycle cost. Although such simulation models can be useful 
evaluation tools, here the Air Force used as data inputs in the model 
the percentage of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an 
overall program level, and there was no indication that these inputs 
would be a reliable predictor of anticipated growth in Boeing's non-
recurring engineering costs.

There were two other aspects of the Air Force's evaluation that GAO 
found troubling, but which did not factor into our sustaining the 
protest. Specifically, GAO received much argument and hearing testimony 
addressing the Air Force's evaluation of the fuel costs associated with 
the firms' proposed aircraft, and the record indicated that the agency 
did not do much more than assess whether the offerors' proposed fuel 
burn rates (gallons of fuel burned per hour) were reasonable. The 
record also showed that even a small increase in the amount of fuel 
that is burned per hour by a particular aircraft would have a dramatic 
impact on the overall fuel costs. Although we did not sustain Boeing's 
challenge to the Air Force's evaluation of the firms' respective fuel 
burn rates, we suggested that this was a matter that the agency may 
wish to review to ascertain whether a more detailed analysis of the 
fuel costs was appropriate.

Similarly, the Air Force evaluated a weakness for Northrop Grumman's 
boom approach but concluded that this evaluated concern posed a low 
schedule or cost risk. Because the record did not contain any 
documentation explaining why the Air Force's evaluated concern with 
Northrop Grumman's proposed boom design represented low risk, we 
received hearing testimony addressing the agency's evaluation. Although 
the record, including the hearing testimony, indicated that some 
analyses of the impact of the agency's evaluated concerns with Northrop 
Grumman's boom may have been performed, little detail was provided. 
Here too, we did not find a sufficient basis in the record to sustain 
Boeing's challenge, but suggested that this was another matter that the 
agency may wish to review further.

In sum, GAO concluded from its review of the record that the Air Force 
had made a number of significant errors that could have affected the 
outcome of what was a close competition between Boeing and Northrop 
Grumman. Accordingly, GAO sustained Boeing's protest. GAO also denied a 
number of Boeing's challenges to the award to Northrop Grumman, because 
the record did not provide a basis to conclude that the agency had 
violated the legal requirements with respect to those challenges.

Our Recommendations:

GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, 
obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a 
new source selection decision, consistent with this decision. If the 
Air Force believes that the solicitation does not adequately state its 
needs, the agency should amend the solicitation prior to conducting 
further discussions with the offerors. If Boeing's proposal is selected 
for award, the Air Force should terminate the contract awarded to 
Northrop Grumman. GAO also recommended that Boeing be reimbursed the 
reasonable costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees.

Mr. Chairman this concludes our prepared statement. I would be happy to 
respond to any questions regarding our bid protest decision that you or 
other Members of the subcommittee may have.

[End of section]

Appendix I: Statistics for All GAO Bid Protests:

2004-2008 Statistics for All GAO Bid Protests: 

Fiscal Year: 2004; 
Total Cases[A]: 1354; 
Dismissals[A]: 989; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 365; 
Sustained[A]: 75.

Fiscal Year: 2005; 
Total Cases[A]: 1262; 
Dismissals[A]: 956; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 306; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 71.

Fiscal Year: 2006; 
Total Cases[A]: 1223; 
Dismissals[A]: 974; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 249; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 72.

Fiscal Year: 2007; 
Total Cases[A]: 1277; 
Dismissals[A]: 942; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 335; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 91.

Fiscal Year: 2008[B]; 
Total Cases[A]: 1071; 
Dismissals[A]: 845; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 226; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 49.

[A] These figures represent the number of protests. Often there are 
multiple protests filed for a single procurement action.

[B] These figures cover the period between October 1, 2007 to June 27, 
2008. 

[End of table] 

[End of section]

Appendix II: 2004-08 Statistics for GAO Bid Protests Involving DOD 
Components:

2004 DOD Component Statistics: 
Component: Air Force; 
Total Cases[A]: 132; 
Dismissals[A]: 84; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 48; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 3.

2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army; 
Total Cases[A]: 324; 
Dismissals[A]: 245; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 79; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 18.

2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Total Cases[A]: 115; 
Dismissals[A]: 103; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 12; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.

2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps; 
Total Cases[A]: 14; 
Dismissals[A]: 10; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 4; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 3.

2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy; 
Total Cases[A]: 112; 
Dismissals[A]: 64; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 48;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 11.

2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous); 
Total Cases[A]: 34; 
Dismissals[A]: 12; 2004 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 22; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.

2004 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense - Total; 
Total Cases[A]: 731; 
Dismissals[A]: 518; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 213; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 36. 

[End of table]

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Air Force; 
Total Cases[A]: 127; 
Dismissals[A]: 93; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 34; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 13.

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army; 
Total Cases[A]: 282; 
Dismissals[A]: 223; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 59;
Protests: Sustained[A]: 7.

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Total Cases[A]: 121; 
Dismissals[A]: 108; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 13; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps; 
Total Cases[A]: 12; 
Dismissals[A]: 4; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 8; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy; 
Total Cases[A]: 135; 
Dismissals[A]: 105; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 30; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 5.

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous); 
Total Cases[A]: 29;
Dismissals[A]: 19; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 10; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 2.

2005 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense -Total; 
Total Cases[A]: 706; 
Dismissals[A]: 552; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 154; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 28.

[End of table]

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Air Force; 
Total Cases[A]: 148; 
Dismissals[A]: 105; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 43; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 13.

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army; 
Total Cases[A]: 334; 
Dismissals[A]: 277; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 57; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 12.

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Total Cases[A]: 70; 
Dismissals[A]: 62; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 8; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 3.

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps; 
Total Cases[A]: 32; 
Dismissals[A]: 29; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 3; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy; 
Total Cases[A]: 101; 
Dismissals[A]: 73; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 28; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 4.

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous); 
Total Cases[A]: 54; 
Dismissals[A]: 42; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 12; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 5.

2006 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Total; 
Total Cases[A]: 739; 
Dismissals[A]: 588; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 151; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 38.

[End of table]

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Air Force; 
Total Cases[A]: 136; 
Dismissals[A]: 103; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 33; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 16.

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Army; 
Total Cases[A]: 323; 
Dismissals[A]: 242; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 81; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 22.

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Total Cases[A]: 97; 
Dismissals[A]: 80; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 17; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Marine Corps; 
Total Cases[A]: 20; 
Dismissals[A]: 18; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 2; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Navy; 
Total Cases[A]: 129; 
Dismissals[A]: 96; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 33; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 8.

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous); 
Total Cases[A]: 70; 
Dismissals[A]: 36; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 34; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 16.

2007 DOD Component Statistics: Component: Defense Total; 
Total Cases[A]: 775; 
Dismissals[A]: 575; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 200; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 62.

[End of table]

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Air Force; 
Total Cases[A]: 122; 
Dismissals[A]: 101; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 21; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 9.

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Army; 
Total Cases[A]: 309; 
Dismissals[A]: 247; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 62; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 9.

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Total Cases[A]: 57; 
Dismissals[A]: 50; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 7; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 1.

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Marine Corps; 
Total Cases[A]: 11; 
Dismissals[A]: 10; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 1; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Navy; 
Total Cases[A]: 93; 
Dismissals[A]: 61; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 32; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 8.

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: DOD (Miscellaneous); 
Total Cases[A]: 38; 
Dismissals[A]: 36; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 2; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 0.

2008 DOD Component Statistics[B]: Component: Defense Total; 
Total Cases[A]: 630; 
Dismissals[A]: 505; 
Merit Results[A]: (Sustain + Deny): 125; 
Protests: Sustained[A]: 27.

[A] These figures represent the number of protests. Often there are 
multiple protests filed for a single procurement action.

[B] These figures cover the period between October 1, 2007 to June 27, 
2008. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

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