National Airspace System: DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely Have a 
Limited Effect on Reducing Delays during Summer 2008 Travel	 
Season (15-JUL-08, GAO-08-934T).				 
                                                                 
Flight delays and cancellations have plagued the U.S. aviation	 
system. According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), more
than one in four flights either arrived late or was canceled in  
2007--making it one of the worst years for delays in the last	 
decade. Delays and cancellations were particularly evident at	 
certain airports, especially the three New York metropolitan	 
commercial passenger airports--Newark Liberty International	 
(Newark), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and LaGuardia. To 
avoid a repeat of last summer's problems, DOT and the Federal	 
Aviation Administration (FAA) have worked with the aviation	 
industry over the past several months to develop and implement	 
several actions to reduce congestion and delays for the summer	 
2008 travel season. This testimony addresses (1) the trends in	 
the extent and principal sources of flight delays and		 
cancellations over the last 10 years, (2) the status of federal  
government actions to reduce flight delays and cancellations, and
(3) the extent to which these actions may reduce delays and	 
cancellations for the summer 2008 travel season. This statement  
is based on an analysis of DOT data on airline on-time		 
performance, a review of relevant documents and reports, and	 
interviews with officials from DOT, FAA, airport operators, and  
airlines, as well as aviation industry experts and associations. 
DOT and FAA provided technical comments which were incorporated  
as appropriate. 						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-934T					        
    ACCNO:   A82866						        
  TITLE:     National Airspace System: DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely
Have a Limited Effect on Reducing Delays during Summer 2008	 
Travel Season							 
     DATE:   07/15/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Air traffic control systems			 
	     Air transportation 				 
	     Aircraft						 
	     Airlines						 
	     Airports						 
	     Aviation						 
	     Commercial aviation				 
	     Data integrity					 
	     International airspace law 			 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Systems design					 
	     Travel						 
	     Weather						 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     John F. Kennedy International Airport		 
	     (NY)						 
                                                                 
	     LaGuardia International Airport (New		 
	     York, NY)						 
                                                                 
	     Newark International Airport (NJ)			 

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GAO-08-934T

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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security, 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10 a.m. EDT: 
Tuesday, July 15, 2008: 

National Airspace System: 

DOT and FAA Actions Will Likely Have a Limited Effect on Reducing 
Delays during Summer 2008 Travel Season: 

Statement of Susan Fleming, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-08-934T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-934T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on Aviation 
Operations, Safety, and Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Flight delays and cancellations have plagued the U.S. aviation system. 
According to the Department of Transportation (DOT), more than one in 
four flights either arrived late or was canceled in 2007ï¿½making it one 
of the worst years for delays in the last decade. Delays and 
cancellations were particularly evident at certain airports, especially 
the three New York metropolitan commercial passenger airportsï¿½Newark 
Liberty International (Newark), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), 
and LaGuardia. To avoid a repeat of last summerï¿½s problems, DOT and the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have worked with the aviation 
industry over the past several months to develop and implement several 
actions to reduce congestion and delays for the summer 2008 travel 
season. 

This testimony addresses (1) the trends in the extent and principal 
sources of flight delays and cancellations over the last 10 years, (2) 
the status of federal government actions to reduce flight delays and 
cancellations, and (3) the extent to which these actions may reduce 
delays and cancellations for the summer 2008 travel season. This 
statement is based on an analysis of DOT data on airline on-time 
performance, a review of relevant documents and reports, and interviews 
with officials from DOT, FAA, airport operators, and airlines, as well 
as aviation industry experts and associations. DOT and FAA provided 
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

DOT data show that flight delays and cancellations have increased 
nationwide and especially in the New York region; however, the data 
provide an incomplete picture of the source of delay. Since 1998, the 
total number of flight delays and cancellations nationwide has 
increased 62 percent, while the number of scheduled operations has 
increased about 38 percent. Flight delays and cancellations in the New 
York region are even more pronounced. Specifically, since 1998, the 
number of flight delays and cancellations in the New York region has 
increased about 111 percent, while the number of operations has 
increased about 57 percent. DOT data on the sources of delays provide 
an incomplete picture. For example, in 2007, late arriving aircraft 
accounted for 38 percent of delays nationwide, but this category 
indicates little about what caused the aircraft to arrive late, such as 
severe weather. 

To reduce delays and congestion beginning in summer 2008, DOT and FAA 
are implementing several actions that for the purposes of this review 
GAO is characterizing as capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand 
management policies (see table). Some of these actions are already in 
effect, such as 11 of the 17 short-term initiatives designed to improve 
capacity at the airport or system level and the hourly schedule caps on 
operations at the New York area airports. The other actions are being 
developed but are unlikely to be in effect by this summer. For example, 
DOT and FAA are soliciting comments on the proposed rule to establish 
slot auctions at JFK and Newark until July 21, 2008. 

DOTï¿½s and FAAï¿½s capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand management 
policies may help reduce delay, but the collective impact of these 
actions on reducing delay in 2008 is limited. For example, the benefit 
of the 17 initiativesï¿½which range from efforts to reduce excessive 
spacing on final approach before landing to new procedures for handling 
air traffic during severe weather conditionsï¿½is generally expected to 
come from the initiativesï¿½ combined incremental improvements over time 
and in certain situations. The demand management policies may have a 
more immediate but limited effect on delays since the caps at Newark 
and LaGuardia were set at a level that was generally designed to avoid 
an increase in delay over 2007 levels. For example, the caps at Newark 
are set at a level that that is not expected to bring a delay reduction 
as compared to delays in 2007. 

Table: Status of DOTï¿½s and FAAï¿½s Actions to Reduce Delays and 
Congestion: 

Actionï¿½capacity enhancing initiative: 
Status: 

Actionï¿½capacity enhancing initiative: 17 short-term operational and 
procedural initiatives; 
Status: 11 of 17 completed. 

Actionï¿½capacity enhancing initiative: Coordination for use of military 
airspace; 
Status: In progress. 

Actionï¿½capacity enhancing initiative: New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia 
airspace redesign; 
Status: Initiated, estimated completion 2012. 

Actionï¿½capacity enhancing initiative: New York Airspace Czar; 
Status: Appointed. 

Actionï¿½demand management policy: Orders limiting scheduled operations 
at New York airports; 
Status: In effect. 

Actionï¿½demand management policy: Proposed rules on slot auctions at New 
York airports; 
Status: DOT & FAA are seeking and reviewing comments. 

Actionï¿½demand management policy: Amendment to Airport Rates and Charges 
policy; 
Status: Final policy issued July 8, 2008. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOT and FAA actions. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the federal 
government's efforts to reduce aviation congestion and delays for this 
summer's travel season. In recent years, flight delays and 
cancellations have plagued the U.S. aviation system. According to the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), more than one in four flights 
either arrived late or were canceled in 2007, affecting approximately 
163 million passengers and making it one of the worst years for delays 
in the last decade. A recent report by the Senate Joint Economic 
Committee found that collectively, passengers were delayed 320 million 
hours in 2007 and estimated that domestic flight delays last year cost 
as much as $41 billion to the U.S. economy.[Footnote 1] Delays were 
particularly evident at certain airports, especially those in the New 
York region. For the past 10 years, the three principal New York 
metropolitan commercial passenger airports--Newark Liberty 
International (Newark), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and 
LaGuardia--have often ranked at or near the bottom of DOT's lists of 
airport on-time arrivals and departures. Since one-third of aircraft in 
the national airspace system move through the New York area at some 
point during a typical day, delays in this region can have a 
disproportionate impact on delays experienced throughout the rest of 
the system. 

Consumer complaints and media coverage of airline service problems, 
combined with congressional hearings on these issues, have recently put 
flight delays in the spotlight. Most aviation industry experts believe 
that substantial gains in reducing aviation congestion and delays can 
be achieved in the long term through investment in airport 
infrastructure, Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) 
technologies,[Footnote 2] and/or more efficient pricing of the nation's 
aviation infrastructure. However, to avoid a repeat of last summer's 
delays, DOT and its operating agency, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), have worked with the aviation industry since the 
fall of 2007 in an effort to develop and implement several near-term 
actions to reduce delays for the summer 2008 travel season. 

My testimony today addresses (1) the trends in the extent and principal 
sources of flight delays and cancellations over the last 10 years, (2) 
the status of federal government actions to reduce flight delays and 
cancellations by the summer of 2008, and (3) the extent to which these 
actions may reduce delays and cancellations for the summer 2008 travel 
season. To determine trends in the extent and sources of delays, we 
analyzed DOT data on airline on-time performance, including sources of 
delays, by airport and for the entire airspace system, for 1998 to 
2007.[Footnote 3] To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed 
agency officials about data quality control procedures, reviewed 
relevant documentation, and electronically tested the data to identify 
obvious problems with completeness or accuracy. We determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 
also reviewed relevant documents and reports and interviewed DOT and 
FAA officials, airport operators in Boston, New York, and Chicago, 
major commercial airlines, and aviation industry experts and 
associations on the status and potential impact of the federal 
government's actions to reduce delays. Although its scope covers the 
national airspace system as a whole, our work especially focuses on the 
New York region because of the New York area airports' persistent 
problems with flight delays and cancellations and the federal 
government's actions focused on reducing delays in this region. We 
conducted our work from December 2007 to July 2008 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the study to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our study objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

DOT data show that flight delays and cancellations have generally 
increased over the last decade, but the data provide an incomplete 
picture of the full extent and sources of delays. Since 1998, the 
number of airline flight delays and cancellations has increased about 
62 percent nationwide, while the number of scheduled operations has 
increased about 38 percent, according to DOT data.[Footnote 4] While 
flight delays occur throughout the entire national airspace system, the 
flight delay trends in New York area are even more pronounced. For 
example, since 1998, the number of flight delays and cancellations in 
the New York region has increased about 111 percent, while the number 
of operations has increased about 57 percent. Although DOT data provide 
information on trends in flight delays and cancellations, they do not 
show the full extent of delays and cancellations. For example, DOT data 
do not reflect passengers' experiences with missed connections 
resulting from delayed or oversold flights, because DOT tracks flight 
delays, not passenger delays. Additionally, DOT data provide some 
information on the source of delays, but they do not provide a complete 
picture. For example, according to DOT data, 38 percent of delays in 
2007 were assigned to the late arriving aircraft category, which means 
that the previous flight using the same aircraft arrived late, and 
caused the subsequent flight to depart late. However, this category 
does not provide the original source of delay for the late arriving 
aircraft, such as a severe weather condition. In the New York region, 
the data for 2007 show that national aviation system delays--a category 
that encompasses a broad set of circumstances, which are all attributed 
to FAA's ability to manage traffic at the airport or airspace level-- 
accounted for nearly 58 percent of all New York delays, as compared to 
approximately 28 percent systemwide. This disparity reflects the New 
York area's greater level of congestion as compared to the rest of the 
country. 

To address delay and cancellation problems beginning in summer 2008, 
DOT and FAA are implementing several actions intended to reduce delays 
that we have categorized as capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand 
management policies. Capacity-enhancing initiatives are intended to 
increase the efficiency of existing capacity by reducing delays and 
maximizing the number of takeoffs and landings at an airport, while 
demand management policies influence demand through administrative 
measures or economic incentives. Under capacity-enhancing initiatives, 
FAA has implemented 11 of its 17 short-term initiatives designed to 
better use existing capacity at the airport or system level; begun 
working to improve coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD) 
for the use of military airspace; initiated the first phase of the New 
York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia metropolitan area airspace redesign 
(New York-New Jersey-Philadelphia Airspace Redesign); and appointed a 
New York Airspace "Czar" to coordinate regional airspace issues and 
projects. DOT and FAA have also initiated several demand management 
policies--most notably, imposing new hourly schedule caps on operations 
at Newark and JFK, which join already existing caps at LaGuardia. Other 
demand management policies are either still in draft form or have just 
been issued, and therefore, are unlikely to be in effect by this 
summer. These policies include an amendment to the 1996 Policy 
Regarding the Establishment of Airport Rates and Charges (Rates and 
Charges policy)--which, among other things, clarifies the ability of 
airport operators to establish a two-part landing fee structure based 
on operations and aircraft weight--and proposed rules on "slot 
auctions" that would lease the majority of New York area airport 
operations (slots) to incumbent airlines and then would help to develop 
a market for those slots by annually auctioning a limited number of 
slot leases.[Footnote 5] 

Collectively, DOT's and FAA's capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand 
management policies will likely have a limited effect on reducing 
delays this summer compared to last year. DOT's and FAA's capacity- 
enhancing initiatives have the potential to reduce delays by improving 
the efficiency of existing capacity, but the effect will likely be 
fairly small. For example, the benefit of the 17 operational and 
procedural initiatives--which range from efforts to reduce excessive 
spacing on final approach before landing to new procedures for handling 
air traffic during severe weather conditions--is generally anticipated 
to come from the initiatives' combined incremental improvements over 
time and in certain situations.SEA#119036, p2, R2" DOT and FAA have not 
analyzed the potential near-term delay reduction benefit of the other 
capacity-enhancing initiatives, but airlines, airport operators, and 
aviation associations and experts that we spoke with expect these 
initiatives to have a fairly small impact on reducing delays for this 
summer. DOT's demand management policies--specifically, the hourly 
schedule caps at LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark--may have a more immediate, 
but still a limited, effect on reducing delays because the caps at 
Newark and LaGuardia were set at a level that was generally intended to 
avoid any worsening of delays over 2007 levels and the caps at JFK were 
set to get a 15 percent reduction in average departure delays over 2007 
levels. For example, Newark's cap of 81 hourly operations was set at a 
level to avoid delays beyond those experienced in 2007 but is not 
estimated to reduce delays from 2007 levels. Finally, other 
interrelated factors besides government actions, such as the financial 
state of the aviation industry, increasing jet fuel prices, and the 
downturn in the economy, could lead to fewer delays in 2008, but the 
effects of these factors on aviation congestion and delays are 
uncertain. DOT and FAA provided technical comments on the statement 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

The national airspace system is a complex, interconnected, and 
interdependent network of systems, procedures, facilities, aircraft, 
and people that must work together to ensure safe and efficient 
operations. DOT, FAA, airlines, and airports all affect the efficiency 
of national airspace system operations. DOT works with FAA to set 
policy and operating standards for all aircrafts and airports. As the 
agency responsible for managing the air traffic control system, FAA has 
the lead role in developing technological and other solutions to 
airspace issues. FAA also provides funding to airports. The funding 
that major airports receive from FAA to make improvements at the 
airports is conditioned on open and nondiscriminatory access to the 
airlines and other users,[Footnote 6] and the airlines are free to 
schedule operations at any time throughout the day, except at airports 
that are subject to limits on scheduled operations. The airlines can 
also affect the efficiency of the airspace system by the number and 
types of aircraft that they choose to operate. 

As we have previously reported, measuring the capacity of the airspace 
system and achieving its most efficient use are both difficult 
challenges because they depend on a number of interrelated factors. 
[Footnote 7] The capacity of the aviation system is not a simple 
measurable element--in addition to being related to airports' 
infrastructure, capacity is affected at any given time by such factors 
as weather conditions and airline flight schedules. For example, 
because some airports have parallel runways that are too close together 
for simultaneous operations in bad weather, the number of aircraft that 
can take off and land is reduced when weather conditions worsen. 
Achieving the most efficient use of the national airspace system is 
contingent on a number of factors, among them the procedures that FAA 
uses to manage traffic, how well FAA's air traffic control equipment 
performs, the proficiency of the controllers to efficiently use these 
procedures and equipment to manage traffic, and how much users are 
charged for the use of the airspace and airports. 

FAA has had a long history of attempting to address congestion by 
managing demand through administrative controls. FAA began establishing 
limits on the number of takeoffs and landings at five airports--Chicago 
O'Hare International, Newark, JFK, LaGuardia, and Washington Reagan 
National--in 1968. The High Density Rule, as it was known, instituted 
limits, or caps, on the number of takeoff and landings of the incumbent 
airlines serving each of the these airports.[Footnote 8] DOT lifted the 
restrictions at Newark in 1970, and in 2000, with the passage of the 
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century 
(AIR-21), caps on operations were to be eliminated at Chicago O'Hare by 
July 2002, and at LaGuardia and JFK by January 2007.[Footnote 9] AIR-21 
also immediately exempted certain types of aircraft from the caps, a 
change that resulted in unanticipated increases in demand, especially 
at LaGuardia. In 2000, airlines took advantage of AIR-21's small 
regional jet exemptions and rapidly initiated a large number of new 
flights to and from LaGuardia. FAA chose to impose a moratorium on 
additional flights at LaGuardia in November 2000 to limit delays and 
reduced flights at LaGuardia to a level consistent with the airport's 
capacity under optimal weather conditions. On the basis of this 
experience and FAA's inability to adopt a final congestion management 
rule for LaGuardia,[Footnote 10] FAA issued a December 2006 order to 
maintain the cap of 75 hourly scheduled operations at LaGuardia until a 
final rule can be adopted. Chicago O'Hare also experienced increased 
operations after its caps were eliminated, prompting FAA to again limit 
operations at the airport beginning in spring 2004 through a series of 
voluntary agreements and ending with a new rule in late summer 2006. 
These caps on Chicago O'Hare's operations are effective through October 
2008, which coincides with the scheduled opening of the airport's new 
runway in November 2008. 

In response to the near-record delays in summer 2007, which followed 
the expiration of the High Density Rule for the New York airports and 
increasing volumes of domestic air traffic, DOT convened a special 
aviation rulemaking committee (New York ARC) in the fall of 2007 
specifically to address delays and other airline service issues in the 
New York metropolitan area. The New York ARC, which consisted of 
stakeholders representing government, airlines, airports, general 
aviation users, and aviation consumers, was tasked with identifying 
available options for changing current policy and assessing the 
potential impacts of those changes on airlines, airports, and the 
traveling public. The New York ARC had three specific objectives: (1) 
to reduce congestion, (2) to allocate efficiently the scarce capacity 
of New York area airports, and (3) to minimize the disruption 
associated with implementing any of the suggested improvements. The New 
York ARC issued its findings and options for reducing congestion to the 
Secretary of Transportation in December 2007.[Footnote 11] One of the 
committee's working groups assessed 77 operational improvement 
initiatives for the New York area and identified key items to focus on 
within the list of 77, such as reducing excess spacing on final 
approach when landing. 

Data Show That Delays and Cancellations are Increasing, but Provide an 
Incomplete Picture of the Extent and Sources of Delays: 

Nationwide, according to DOT data the annual number of domestic airline 
flight delays and cancellations has increased about 62 percent (from 
1.2 million to 2.0 million), while the annual number of scheduled 
flights has increased about 38 percent (from 5.4 million to 7.5 
million) since 1998. In the New York area, the trend is even more 
pronounced, as the number of domestic flight delays and cancellations 
at the three main commercial airports has increased about 111 percent, 
while the number of domestic operations has increased about 57 percent 
since 1998. 

DOT statistics indicate that 2007 was the second worst year on record 
for U.S. airlines' on-time performance, and the trends in the 
percentage of flight delays and cancellations appear to be worsening. 
[Footnote 12] As shown in figure 1, about 20 percent of flights in the 
system were delayed and nearly 3 percent were canceled in 1998, 
compared to about 24 and 2 percent in 2007, respectively.[Footnote 13] 
The data also show that flight delays and cancellations have been 
steadily increasing since 2002, although the percentage of 
cancellations in 2007 is still lower than it was from 1998 through 
2001. However, cancellations have become more problematic in recent 
years as the airline industry is now operating with fewer empty seats 
on flights. As a result, passengers on canceled flights must wait 
longer to be rebooked, and in some cases may be forced to spend the 
night before resuming travel the next day. 

Figure 1: Trends in Percentage of Late Arriving and Canceled Flights-- 
Systemwide (1998-2007): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Year: 1998: 
Late arrivals: 19.9%; 
Canceled flights: 2.7%; 
Total: 22.6%. 

Year: 1999: 
Late arrivals: 20.9%; 
Canceled flights: 2.8%; 
Total: 23.7%. 

Year: 2000: 
Late arrivals: 23.9%; 
Canceled flights: 3.3%; 
Total: 27.2%. 

Year: 2001: 
Late arrivals: 18.5%; 
Canceled flights: 3.9%; 
Total: 22.4%. 

Year: 2002: 
Late arrivals: 16.5%; 
Canceled flights: 1.2%; 
Total: 17.7%. 

Year: 2003: 
Late arrivals: 16.3%; 
Canceled flights: 1.6%; 
Total: 17.9%. 

Year: 2004: 
Late arrivals: 19.9%; 
Canceled flights: 1.8%; 
Total: 21.7%. 

Year: 2005: 
Late arrivals: 20.5%; 
Canceled flights: 1.9%; 
Total: 22.4%. 

Year: 2006: 
Late arrivals: 22.6%; 
Canceled flights: 1.7%; 
Total: 24.3%. 

Year: 2007: 
Late arrivals: 24.2%; 
Canceled flights: 2.2%; 
Total: 26.4%. 

Source: DOT. 

[End of figure] 

Flights delays are also becoming longer. According to DOT data, the 
average length of a flight delay increased from more than 49 minutes in 
1998 to almost 56 minutes in 2007, an increase of nearly 14 percent 
throughout the system. Despite this relatively small increase in 
average flight delay length, far more flights were affected by long 
delays in 2007 than in 1998. For example, the number of flights delayed 
by 180 minutes or more increased from 25,726 flights in 1998 to 64,040 
flights in 2007, or about 150 percent. In addition, DOT's data indicate 
that the number of flights in which an aircraft has departed the gate, 
but remained for an hour or more on the ground awaiting departure, has 
increased over 151 percent since 1998.[Footnote 14] 

Because the entire airspace system is highly interdependent, delays at 
one airport may lead to delays rippling across the system and 
throughout the day. This delay propagation appears to be increasing and 
leading to more delays in the system overall. For example, researchers 
at George Mason University's Center for Air Transportation Systems have 
found that 46 percent of delays in the system in 2007 were caused by 
flight delays occurring earlier in the day. Flight delays in the New 
York metropolitan region also appear to have a disproportionate impact 
on delays experienced throughout the rest of the airspace system. 
During a typical day, approximately one-third of the aircrafts in the 
national airspace system move through the New York airspace. According 
to preliminary research conducted by the MITRE Corporation for FAA, an 
average of 40 percent of the flight delays in the system are from 
delays that originate in the New York metropolitan area.[Footnote 15] 

Compared to the rest of the country, where flight delays and 
cancellations have been steadily increasing, the magnitude and upward 
trend of the problem in the New York region is greater than the rest of 
the airspace system. For example, over a third of all flights in the 
New York metropolitan region in 2007 were delayed or canceled, 
according to DOT statistics.[Footnote 16] Figure 2 shows that the 
percentage of late arriving and canceled flights at each of the three 
major New York area airports was considerably higher than the 
systemwide averages. Since 2003, the percentage of late arriving and 
canceled flights has been increasing faster in the New York area than 
in the rest of the system. 

Figure 2: Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations at New 
York Airports compared to the Entire Airspace System (1998-2007): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Year: 1998; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 30%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 26%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 27%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 22.6%. 

Year: 1999; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 32%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 25%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 35%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 23.6%. 

Year: 2000; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 31%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 31%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 41%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 27.2%. 

Year: 2001; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 26%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 33%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 28%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 22.4%. 

Year: 2002; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 19%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 22%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 19%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 17.7%. 

Year: 2003; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 26%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 21%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 24%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 17.9%. 

Year: 2004; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 29%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 24%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 24%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 21.8%. 

Year: 2005; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 32%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 33%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 27%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 22.4%. 

Year: 2006; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 37%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 35%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 34%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 24.3%. 

Year: 2007; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, Newark: 37%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, JFK: 39%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, LaGuardia: 38%; 
Annual Percentage of Late Arrivals and Cancellations, System: 26.4%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOT data. 

Note: In this figure, the percentage of delays and cancellations has 
been combined. The system data include the three New York area 
airports. 

Since 1998, the New York area's three major airports have often been 
among the airports with the lowest on-time performance records. In 
2007, DOT reported that LaGuardia, Newark, and JFK had the lowest on- 
time performance rates among major domestic airports, followed by 
Chicago O'Hare International Airport, Philadelphia International 
Airport, and Boston Logan International Airport. Table 1 shows the 
ranking of major airports by the lowest on-time arrival performance in 
2007. 

Table 1: Ranking of Major Airports by Lowest On-Time Arrival 
Performance (2007): 

Ranking: 1; 
Airport: LaGuardia; 
Percentage on time: 58.48. 

Ranking: 2; 
Airport: Newark; 
Percentage on time: 59.45. 

Ranking: 3; 
Airport: JFK; 
Percentage on time: 62.84. 

Ranking: 4; 
Airport: Chicago O'Hare International; 
Percentage on time: 65.88. 

Ranking: 5; 
Airport: Philadelphia International; 
Percentage on time: 66.54. 

Ranking: 6; 
Airport: Boston Logan International; 
Percentage on time: 69.68. 

Ranking: 7; 
Airport: San Francisco International; 
Percentage on time: 69.75. 

Ranking: 8; 
Airport: Miami International; 
Percentage on time: 70.99. 

Ranking: 9; 
Airport: Charlotte Douglas International; 
Percentage on time: 71.30. 

Ranking: 10; 
Airport: Seattle-Tacoma International; 
Percentage on time: 71.43. 

All major airports average: 
Percentage on time: 73.03. 

Source: DOT. 

Note: "Major airports," as defined by DOT, consists of the 32 airports 
serving 1 percent or more of the airline industry's domestic scheduled 
service passengers. 

[End of table] 

While DOT data show that the trends in delays and cancellations are 
getting worse, current on-time performance data do not capture the full 
extent of delays and cancellations or the extent to which passengers' 
average travel times have increased in recent years. For example, 
airlines have, in many cases, opted to lengthen scheduled flight times 
to enhance on-time results, particularly along heavily congested and 
frequently delayed routes. DOT data do not account for the increased 
average flight times that are masked by these schedule changes. Also, 
available DOT data may not necessarily reflect passengers' experience 
of delay because DOT tracks flights, not passengers. Passengers can 
experience delays to their trips because of missed connections 
resulting from delayed or oversold flights or lengthy delays due to 
flight cancellations--elements that are not measured in current 
statistics. According to a recent study by George Mason University, 
roughly one in four passengers experienced a passenger trip delay in 
2007 and the average duration of delay experienced by these passengers 
was 1 hour 54 minutes, an increase of 24 minutes over 2006.[Footnote 
17] In addition, the study found that the average delay for passengers 
on canceled flights was 11 hours in 2007. Passenger delays are affected 
by record-level airline load factors (percentage of seats occupied on 
aircraft), which result in fewer available empty seats on subsequent 
flights for those passengers who experience canceled flights. According 
to DOT's Air Consumer Report, flight problems involving cancellations, 
delays, or missed connections were the number one consumer complaint in 
2007. 

DOT Data Provide an Incomplete Picture of the Sources of Delays: 

The data collected by DOT on the sources of delays provide information 
about where delays occur and what causes them, but the data are 
incomplete. The primary purposes for collecting these causal data are 
to inform the traveling public and categorize delays and cancellations 
so that the parties most capable of addressing the causes of delays and 
cancellations can take corrective action. Since 2003, airlines have 
reported the cause of delay to DOT in one of five broad categories: 
late arriving aircraft, airline, national aviation system, extreme 
weather, and security. 

* Late arriving aircraft means a previous flight using the same 
aircraft arrived late, causing the subsequent flight to depart late. In 
2007, approximately 38 percent of delays were assigned to this 
category. 

* Airline delays include any delay or cancellation that was within the 
control of the airlines, such as aircraft cleaning, baggage loading, 
crew issues, or maintenance. Roughly 29 percent of the delays in 2007 
were attributed to airline delays. 

* National aviation system delays and cancellations refer to a broad 
set of circumstances affecting airport operations, heavy traffic 
volume, and air traffic control. This category also includes any 
nonextreme weather condition that slows the operation of the system, 
such as wind or fog, but does not prevent flying. The national aviation 
system accounted for about 28 percent of delays in 2007. 

* Extreme weather includes serious weather conditions that prevent the 
operation of a flight. Examples of this kind of weather include 
tornadoes, snow storms, and hurricanes. In 2007, nearly 6 percent of 
delays were assigned to extreme weather.[Footnote 18] 

* Security accounted for less than 1 percent of delays in 2007. 
Examples of security delays include evacuation of an airport, 
reboarding due to a security breach, and long lines at the passenger 
screening areas. 

Since 2003, despite the increasing number of delays, there have been no 
significant changes in the trends of these sources of delay. Figure 3 
shows the DOT-reported sources of delay in 2007. 

Figure 3: DOT-Reported Sources of Delay--System, 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

DOT-Reported Sources of Delay--System, 2007: 
Late arriving aircraft: 38%; 
Airline: 29%; 
National Aviation System: 28%; 
Extreme weather: 6%; 
Security: 0.2%. 

Source: DOT. 

Note: Total may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

The distribution of delay by source is very different in New York than 
for the country as a whole and reflects the New York area's greater 
level of congestion. For example, national aviation system delays 
account for nearly 58 percent of all delays in New York as compared to 
approximately 28 percent for the country as a whole in 2007 (see fig. 
4). As noted earlier, the three major New York area airports have 
experienced more than a 50 percent increase in traffic levels since 
1998, while runway capacity at these airports has not changed. As a 
result, FAA must resort to a complement of traffic management 
initiatives, such as ground delay or flow control programs, which are 
used to restrict the flow of traffic and, accordingly, lead to 
delays[Footnote 19]. 

Figure 4: DOT-Reported Sources of Delay--Average of the Three New York 
Area Airports, 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

DOT-Reported Sources of Delay--Average of the Three New York Area 
Airports, 2007: 
National Aviation System: 58%; 
Late arriving aircraft: 24%; 
Airline: 14%; 
Extreme weather: 4%; 
Security: 0.1%. 

Source: DOT. 

Note: Total may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of figure] 

For several reasons, the data provide an incomplete picture of the 
underlying causes of delays. First, the DOT-reported categories are too 
broad to provide meaningful information on the root causes of delays. 
For example, delays attributed to the airlines could consist of causes 
such as a late crew, aircraft maintenance, or baggage loading, but 
these more specific causes are not captured in DOT data.[Footnote 20] 
Second, the largest source of systemwide delay--late arriving aircraft, 
which represents 38 percent of the total delay sources (as fig. 3 
shows)--masks the original source of delay. For example, the original 
source of delay for a late arriving aircraft may be the result of other 
sources--such as a severe weather condition, the airline, security, or 
the national airspace system--or a combination of one or more of these 
sources. Finally, the data do not capture what many economists believe 
is the fundamental cause of much of the flight delays--a mismatch 
between the demand for and capacity to provide aviation services. While 
the data provide airlines' view of the reason that particular flight 
segments were delayed, DOT does not report data on the extent to which 
flights are simply overscheduled in particular places at particular 
times relative to the capacity of the airports and air traffic control 
system to provide aviation services. The DOT Inspector General analyzed 
airline schedules at 15 airports and found that 6 of the airports had 
flights scheduled either at or over maximum airport capacity at peak 
hours of the day during the summer of 2007.[Footnote 21] When this is 
the case, assigning the cause of delay to one of the five DOT 
categories masks that the fundamental cause is this mismatch of demand 
for and supply of these services. 

DOT and FAA Are Implementing Actions Intended to Reduce Delays: 

DOT and FAA are implementing several actions intended to reduce flight 
delays beginning in summer 2008.[Footnote 22] Due to the high 
proportion of delays at the three major New York area airports and 
their effect on the rest of the airspace system, many of these actions 
are specifically designed to address congestion in the New York area. 
For purposes of our discussion, we grouped the various actions into one 
of two categories--capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand management 
policies--both of which are intended to reduce flight delays. Capacity-
enhancing initiatives are intended to increase the efficiency of 
existing capacity by reducing delay and maximizing the number of 
takeoffs and landings at an airport. By contrast, demand management 
policies influence demand through administrative measures or economic 
incentives. Some of these capacity-enhancing initiatives and demand 
management policies will be fully or partially implemented by summer 
2008, but others will not be completed or even initiated until later 
this year or beyond. 

DOT and FAA have announced multiple capacity-enhancing initiatives 
designed to reduce delays in the New York region for this summer and 
beyond. In general, adding substantial new airspace system capacity is 
costly and time consuming.[Footnote 23] Thus, in March 2007, DOT and 
FAA convened a workgroup that identified 17 short-term initiatives that 
better utilize existing capacity at the airport or system level through 
procedural and other changes in airport and airspace operations and 
could be completed by summer 2008. Eleven of the 17 short-term 
initiatives have been completed, and FAA plans to implement the 
remaining initiatives, which require more planning and coordination, by 
September 2008.[Footnote 24] See appendix I for a list of the 17 short-
term initiatives and their status. The initiatives range from new 
procedures and reroutes for handling air traffic during severe weather 
conditions to efforts to reduce excessive spacing on final approach 
before landing, and to an airspace flow program that allows New York 
departures to move more freely while delays are redistributed to 
airports within the region. In addition to the 17 short-term 
initiatives, other capacity-enhancing initiatives are under way. These 
include improving coordination with DOD for airlines' use of military 
airspace and redesigning the airspace around the New York, New Jersey 
and Philadelphia metropolitan area.[Footnote 25] FAA is in the process 
of drafting letters of agreement that would help establish more formal 
processes for communicating with DOD for the release of specific 
portions of military airspace on an as-needed basis. In December 2007, 
FAA initiated the first phase of the planned 5-year implementation of 
the airspace redesign, with new departure headings at Newark and 
Philadelphia airports.[Footnote 26] In April 2008, FAA appointed a New 
York Airspace "Czar"--whose official title is Director for the New York 
Area Program Integration Office--to coordinate regional airspace issues 
and projects. Table 2 lists the capacity-enhancing initiatives and 
their status. More detailed information on the actions--including 
descriptions, geographic focus, and status--can be found in appendix 
II. 

Table 2: Capacity-Enhancing Initiatives and Their Status: 

Capacity-enhancing initiatives: 

Action: 17 short-term initiatives; 
Status: 11 of 17 initiatives completed. 

Action: Coordination for use of military airspace; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia airspace redesign; 
Status: Initiated, estimated completion 2012. 

Action: New York Airspace Czar; 
Status: Appointed. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOT and FAA actions. 

[End of table] 

DOT and FAA have also introduced demand management policies--most 
notably, hourly schedule caps on takeoffs and landings at the three 
major New York area airports--to its pool of delay reduction efforts. 
DOT and FAA believe that caps on scheduled operations are necessary at 
some airports where available capacity cannot meet demand. The caps are 
currently in place to limit scheduled operations at all three major New 
York area airports, with hourly scheduled operations capped at 81 at 
both JFK and Newark, and at 75 at LaGuardia. The most recent caps at 
JFK and Newark are scheduled to be in place until October 
2009.[Footnote 27] At LaGuardia, a December 2006 order maintained caps 
that had been in place since November 2000. [Footnote 28] The 
institution of caps, however, does not necessarily mean that total 
operations at each of the three airports will decrease. For example, at 
JFK, the total number of daily scheduled operations will increase by 50 
flights per day over summer 2007 levels, when no caps were in place, 
but scheduled operations will be spaced more evenly throughout the day 
in an attempt to minimize peak period congestion. 

Two other demand management policies under way include an amendment to 
the Rates and Charges policy and proposed rules to establish slot 
auctions at all three New York area airports. The amendment to the 
Rates and Charges policy clarifies that airport operators may establish 
a two-part landing fee structure, consisting of both an operation 
charge and an aircraft weight-based charge, and include rule changes 
that would expand the costs congested airports could recoup through 
airfield charges.[Footnote 29] The proposed slot auctions for the three 
New York area airports would lease the majority of operations (takeoffs 
and landings, or slots) to incumbent operators and help develop a 
market by annually auctioning off leases for a limited number of slots 
during the first 5 years of the rule.[Footnote 30] 

These two demand management policies are being developed, but it is 
unlikely that they will be in effect by this summer. DOT and FAA just 
recently announced the final Rates and Charges policy amendment, so it 
is unlikely the policy will have an impact this summer. Furthermore, 
existing use and lease agreements between airlines and airport 
operators could prevent any changes to rates and charges for many 
years, until existing lease agreements expire. DOT and FAA are 
currently reviewing comments for the proposed rule to establish slot 
auctions at LaGuardia and will be collecting comments on the proposed 
rule to establish slot auctions at JFK and Newark until July 21, 2008; 
thus it is unlikely the final rules will be issued during the summer. 
Table 3 lists the demand management policies and their status. More 
detailed information on the actions--including descriptions, geographic 
focus, and status--can be found in appendix II. 

Table 3: Demand Management Policies and Their Status: 

Demand management policies: 

Action: Order limiting scheduled operations at JFK; 
Status: Caps in effect since March 30, 2008. 

Action: Order limiting scheduled operations at Newark; 
Status: Caps in effect since June 20, 2008. 

Action: Orders limiting scheduled operations at LaGuardia; 
Status: Caps in effect since December 2006. 

Action: Rulemaking on slot auctions--LaGuardia; 
Status: OT and FAA are reviewing comments. 

Action: Rulemaking on slot auctions--Newark, JFK; 
Status: DOT and FAA are seeking comments. 

Action: Amendment to Rates and Charges policy; 
Status: Final policy issued July 8, 2008. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOT and FAA actions. 

[End of table] 

DOT's and FAA's Actions May Help Reduce Delays, but the Extent of Delay 
Reduction in Summer 2008 Will Likely Be Limited: 

DOT's and FAA's capacity-enhancing initiatives have the potential to 
reduce congestion and thereby avoid delays, according to FAA and 
stakeholders we consulted, but the effect will likely be limited for 
the summer 2008 traveling season. DOT's and FAA's demand management 
policies--in particular, caps on scheduled operations at all three New 
York area airports--are expected to have some delay avoidance impact in 
the near term. DOT and FAA set the caps at Newark and LaGuardia at a 
level intended to avoid an increase in delays above that experienced in 
2007 and set the caps at JFK to generate a 15 percent reduction in 
average departure delays over 2007 levels. The projected impact of the 
various actions undertaken by DOT and FAA is also expected to be muted 
because several will not be in place until next year or beyond. 
Finally, other mitigating economic factors could lead to fewer 
operations in 2008, which might also lead to fewer delays. 

Although DOT and FAA have not analyzed the potential near-term benefit 
of the capacity-enhancing initiatives, FAA officials and stakeholders 
that we spoke with anticipate that the capacity-enhancing initiatives 
will generally have a positive, but fairly small, impact on reducing 
delays in the near term. For example, while FAA has not analyzed the 
estimated impact of the 17 short-term initiatives, aviation 
stakeholders, including airport operators, airlines, and aviation 
industry associations, believe that these initiatives will have a 
positive impact in summer of 2008. However, most think the initiatives--
when taken together--will result only in incremental improvements and 
in certain situations and alone will not provide sufficient near-term 
gains to accommodate the peak hour schedules at the New York area 
airports' current or forecast levels of demand. Furthermore, given that 
the final plan for coordinating the use of military airspace is still 
under development, the potential impact of this effort remains unknown. 
However, airlines agree that increasing use of military airspace 
through advanced coordination holds promise, and the release of 
military airspace over recent holiday weekends has been 
beneficial.[Footnote 31] Finally, although the impact of the newly 
appointed aviation czar is also unknown, some airlines and New York 
airport operators have supported the appointment of a czar, but also 
expressed concern that the czar, who is currently lacking a dedicated 
budget or staff, will not have sufficient authority to direct and 
coordinate delay reduction efforts across FAA and DOT offices. 

Of the capacity-enhancing initiatives, FAA has estimated the potential 
future delay reduction benefits of one--the New York-New Jersey- 
Philadelphia Airspace Redesign. FAA estimates that the airspace 
redesign will result in a 20 percent reduction in national airspace 
system delays for the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia study area 
airports as compared to taking no action. According to FAA, estimated 
delay reduction will vary by airport and will be achieved only once the 
redesign has been fully implemented. The airspace redesign, scheduled 
to be completed in 2012, is highly controversial because residents 
living in affected areas have raised concerns about potential increases 
in aircraft noise and other environmental effects. 

Demand management policies, which do not require long-term investments, 
will likely have a more immediate but similarly limited effect on 
relieving congestion and reducing delays. Because of increasing 
congestion at JFK and Newark, in the fall of 2007, FAA used models to 
analyze the airlines' proposed 2008 summer schedules and determine 
potential future delays at these airports and the effect of caps. 
[Footnote 32] The proposed summer schedules submitted by the airlines 
for these airports would have constituted substantial scheduling 
increases over summer 2007. On the basis of these proposed schedules, 
DOT and FAA set the caps at JFK at a level that is projected to 
decrease average departure delays by 15 percent over 2007 levels. 
However, the caps at LaGuardia and Newark are set at a level to avoid 
an increase in delays over 2007 levels. For example, at Newark, FAA 
estimates about a 23 percent reduction in the average delay per 
operation relative to a situation with no cap. Newark's caps were 
designed to ensure that delays did not get significantly worse in 2008 
based on the airlines' proposed summer schedules and the potential for 
increased operations diverted from JFK. Thus, the caps at Newark are 
not expected to bring a delay reduction benefit as compared to delays 
experienced in 2007. At LaGuardia, which already had caps in 2007, FAA 
estimated that the long-term implementation of caps would reduce delays 
by 32 percent as compared to no cap. 

Caps at the New York area airports will help the region avoid 
additional delays in the near term, but there are also policy trade- 
offs to consider. In general, FAA, airlines, and aviation experts have 
stated that when available capacity cannot meet demand, managing 
operations at the airport level is necessary to reduce congestion and 
limit delays in the short run. FAA noted that imposing caps is an 
effective, but not efficient, way to reduce delays. Airlines generally 
support caps as a short-term solution for addressing congestion at the 
New York airports because of the worsening delays at these airports. 
FAA stated that some airlines may support caps at airports they already 
serve because caps generally protect incumbent airlines and limit 
competition from airlines that are interested in beginning service at 
these airports (or new entrants). However, some airport operators 
strongly oppose flight caps because they state that caps could 
constrain the economic growth of the surrounding region. In addition, 
some airport operators and aviation experts are concerned that using 
caps as a long-term solution can mask the need for capacity 
enhancements and shift the focus away from important long-term 
solutions that may provide a more lasting solution to the delay 
problem. 

The proposed slot auction rules for the three major New York area 
airports are currently out for comment and will not be implemented by 
this summer, but even if they were in place, they would not directly 
reduce delays. DOT and FAA intend the slot auctions to help create a 
market for slots in the New York area that allows new entrants better 
access to the airports and encourage airlines currently holding slots 
to place a greater value on the use of their slots. By itself, a slot 
auction will not reduce delays. But DOT and FAA believe that by helping 
to reveal the economic value of slots, the policy may help to develop a 
more robust secondary market for slots, which will, in turn, lead to 
greater efficiency in their allocation and use. DOT and FAA believe 
that doing so may increase the size of aircraft used at the airports 
and thereby increase the number of passengers served. The proposed 
rules for the three New York area airports include different slot 
auction options. Only one of the two options for LaGuardia would have a 
direct delay reduction impact. Specifically, this option would require 
approximately 18 slots to be retired over 5 years, and would result in 
an estimated 1 minute of delay reduction for each takeoff and landing 
at the airport.[Footnote 33] One slot auction proposal for Newark and 
JFK would reallocate 10 percent of eligible capacity via annual 
auctions over 5 years, and FAA would retain the net auction proceeds 
for use on unspecified capacity improvements in the New York area. The 
second slot auction option at JFK would reallocate 20 percent of 
eligible slots over 5 years, and the net auction proceeds would be 
granted to the carrier whose previously held slots were auctioned. 
Under this option, carriers whose slots are returned for auction would 
not be allowed to bid on their own slots. Some airline officials and 
airport operators stated that airlines have made substantial 
investments at these airports that would be diminished if they lose 
operating rights. Airlines and New York airport operators strongly 
oppose the proposed slot auctions because they do not think that FAA 
has the legal authority to implement these auctions. 

The potential impact of the Rates and Charges policy--a policy that is 
unlikely to be implemented by this summer because the final notice was 
only announced on July 8, 2008--was not analyzed by DOT and FAA. 
However, DOT and FAA assert that, if implemented, the amendment to the 
Rates and Charges policy may help to reduce congestion, and thus delay, 
by encouraging airlines to use larger aircraft and schedule fewer 
operations during peak usage hours. Some airport operators support this 
policy because it provides them with more flexibility in setting 
landing fees and another option for addressing delays, but the extent 
to which airports can or will implement the policy is unknown. Some 
airlines, airport operators, and aviation experts assert that an 
airport's implementation of a two-part landing fee under the Rates and 
Charges policy may not reduce delays because the policy requires these 
fees to remain revenue neutral.[Footnote 34] In other words, for 
congested airports, the policy will not enable the differential between 
peak and off-peak prices to be large enough to change airline behavior 
while adhering to revenue neutrality. Some airlines and airport 
operators opposed the amendment because they think that it could 
discriminate against airlines whose fleets include mostly small 
aircraft because the amendment creates a fee differential for small to 
medium-sized aircraft while having a negligible effect on larger 
aircraft. Airlines and certain airport operators also expressed concern 
that under such a policy, service to small cities would be dropped 
because carriers would favor using larger aircraft to serve larger 
cities. Several airlines stated that the Rates and Charges policy does 
not address the bigger problem of lack of capacity in the airspace 
system. 

Finally, other interrelated factors beyond government initiatives, such 
as the financial state of the aviation industry, increasing jet fuel 
prices, and the downturn in the economy, may also result in fewer 
delays during 2008, but their impact is uncertain. The Air Transport 
Association expects a 1 percent reduction in the number of passengers 
for the summer 2008 travel season as compared to the 2007 summer travel 
season, and many airlines are planning more substantial reductions in 
capacity and schedules for the fall and winter 2008 seasons. Economic 
conditions, rising fuel costs, and airline initiated capacity cuts 
could affect demand for air travel or available capacity in the coming 
months. These factors also reduce congestion and, accordingly, delays 
and could make it difficult to determine how much of the delay 
reductions, if any, might be attributed to the capacity-enhancing 
initiatives or demand management policies planned for summer 2008. 

In closing, DOT and FAA should be commended for taking steps to reduce 
mounting flight delays and cancellations for the 2008 summer travel 
season. However, delays and cancellations this summer could still be 
significant given the likely limited impact of DOT's and FAA's actions. 
Capacity-enhancing initiatives can provide some limited benefit in the 
near term, but they do not fundamentally expand capacity. Demand 
management policies, especially those that artificially restrict 
demand--like schedule caps--may limit increases in delays, but should 
not be viewed as a meaningful or enduring solution to addressing the 
fundamental imbalances between the underlying demand for and supply of 
airspace capacity. The growing air traffic congestion and delay problem 
that we face in this country is the result of many factors, including 
airline practices, inadequate investment in airport and air traffic 
control infrastructure, and how aviation infrastructure is priced. 
Addressing this problem involves difficult choices, which affect the 
interests of passengers, airlines, airports, and local economies. If 
not addressed, congestion problems will intensify as the growth in 
demand is expected to increase over the next 10 years. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you or other members of the 
subcommittee may have. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Susan Fleming 
at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Individuals making key 
contributions to this testimony include Paul Aussendorf, Amy 
Abramowitz, William Bates, Jonathan Carver, Jay Cherlow, Lauren 
Calhoun, Delwen Jones, Heather Krause, Sara Ann Moessbauer, and Maria 
Wallace. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: New York Short-Term Initiatives: 

17 Short-Term Initiatives to Enhance Capacity in the New York Area: 

Action: 
1. John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)-Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) Daily Planning Teleconferences; 
Description: Daily planning teleconferences to provide a common 
situational awareness for customers--such as airlines, airport 
operators, the military, and general aviation--on the planned daily 
operations at JFK; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
2. Simultaneous Approaches to Runways 31L/R at JFK; 
Description: Simultaneous runway approaches to 31L/R will allow 
approximately 4 to 6 more aircraft to land on this runway configuration 
when weather conditions are classified as instrument meteorological 
conditions (IMC); 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
3. Accessing J134/J149 from Eliot Intersection (for use during Severe 
Weather Avoidance Programs); 
Description: When thunderstorms affect the west departure routes, 
aircraft will be rerouted using the Eliot departure fix. Benefits have 
not been identified, but are available for use as weather events 
dictate; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
4. Pass Back Departure Restrictions--700 mile restriction; 
Description: Pass back restrictions were removed on October 11, 2007, 
beyond 700 miles for traffic destined for the New York airports. 
Departure restrictions to airports often lead to delays as controllers 
have to wait to release aircraft. Eliminating this airport restriction 
and allowing en route controllers to build in the spacing improves 
airport efficiency; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
5. Excessive Spacing on Final Approach; 
Description: Briefings and trainings at major facilities are planned to 
speed implementation of changes associated with the "proximity event" 
category. Intent is to help educate controllers that reducing excessive 
spacing between aircraft on final approach can help reduce delay and 
should not be considered an error, because it does not pose a safety 
risk; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: 
6. Conditional Holding Patterns; 
Description: Under certain conditions, control of the holding pattern 
airspace will transfer from the New York Air Route Traffic Control 
Center (ZNY) to the New York TRACON (N90). This allows aircraft to 
transition out of the holding pattern using terminal separation 
standards (3 miles) as opposed to the en route separation standards (5 
miles)[A]; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: 
7. NY Area Severe Weather Avoidance Procedure Action Team Items--Route 
Availability Planning Tool (RAPT); 
Description: When affected by thunderstorms, controllers and traffic 
flow managers will use a weather forecasting technology to identify the 
availability of departure routes, and provide traffic management 
specialists with the ability to more quickly open and close routes and 
to reroute aircraft; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: 
8. Second J80 Airway; 
Description: Creating another westbound departure route parallel to J80 
has the potential to mitigate westbound delays from JFK; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
9. Resectorizing of New York ARTCC (ZNY) Sector 73; 
Description: A reallocation of the lower part of sector 73 at the New 
York Air Route Traffic Control Center will allow the remaining sector 
to focus on aircraft departing Philadelphia and New York; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
10. Moving J79 Boston (Logan Airport [BOS] Arrivals to the East); 
Description: Move current BOS arrivals via J79 to the east and reduce 
congestion at the MERIT departure fix; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: 
11. Moving Overflights in ZNY34; 
Description: Moving crossing traffic, or overflights, out of the way of 
New York departures, allowing for unrestricted climbs to requested 
altitude, and reducing delay by decreasing miles in trail for New York 
departures; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: 
12. Airspace Flow Program (AFP) for New York Departures; 
Description: Apply AFP technology to manage departures from the NY 
airports, such that NY airport departures would be allowed to freely 
flow and delayed flights would be redistributed to other peripheral 
airports; 
Status: In progress. 

Action: 
13. Severe Weather Avoidance Procedure (SWAP) Escape Routes; 
Description: SWAP escape routes in Canadian airspace are used and 
coordinated daily with Canada's civil air navigation services provider 
(NAV CANADA). Used mostly during the summer because of thunderstorms 
and winds in the United States; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
14. Deconflict Newark Airport (EWR) Arrivals Over SHAFF Intersection; 
Description: Allows for more efficient arrivals from the north into 
Newark by moving or eliminating crossing traffic. No added capacity 
benefits are expected. Do expect to get some added operational 
efficiency for aircraft while in the en route portion of flight; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
15. Simultaneous Visual Approaches to Runway 4L at EWR; 
Description: A procedure that allows for simultaneous arrivals on 
runways 4L and 4R, when weather permits; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
16. Caribbean Tactical Reroutes to EWR; 
Description: Traffic management procedure to allow EWR arrival aircraft 
to fly at higher altitudes and in a less circuitous route. No added 
capacity benefits are expected; 
Status: Completed. 

Action: 
17. EWR Runways 4R/29 Waiver; 
Description: Procedures currently allow for these runway configurations 
to be used in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). Waiver has been 
signed to allow arrivals to land on Runway 29 while landing on Runway 
4R; 
Status: Completed. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOT and FAA actions. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Status and Reported Benefits of Capacity-Enhancing 
Initiatives and Demand Management Policies: 

Capacity-Enhancing Initiatives: 

Action: 17 short-term initiatives; 
Description: The New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) 
recommended a list of 77 items for consideration and implementation in 
the New York area. From these, FAA identified 17 short-term initiatives 
for immediate action. 
Focus: NY region; 
Status: Eleven of the 17 short-term initiatives are currently complete. 
The others are planned for completion by the end of fiscal year 2008; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: Not analyzed but likely to be 
small. 

Action: Coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD) for use of 
military airspace; 
Description: FAA is working with DOD to explore the current use of 
special use airspace, develop proposals for increased civil use of 
military airspace, and evaluate letters of agreement that provide 
operational direction for the shared uses of special use airspace; 
Focus: East Coast; 
Status: FAA's efforts to standardize use of military airspace with DOD 
are ongoing and the outcome is uncertain; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: Final plan unknown, therefore 
benefit unknown. 

Action: New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia (NY/NJ/PHL) Airspace Redesign; 
Description: The Airspace Redesign of the NY/NJ/PHL metropolitan area 
involves changes to airspace configurations and air traffic management 
procedures. The selected alternative (Integrated Airspace Alternative 
with Integrated Control Complex) integrates the entire airspace with a 
common automation platform. Air traffic controllers can reduce aircraft 
separation rules from 5 to 3 nautical miles over a larger geographical 
area than the current airspace structure allows; 
Focus: NY region; 
Status: Implementation began on December 19, 2007, with the 
introduction of additional departure headings at Philadelphia 
International and Newark International airports. FAA has stated that it 
does not believe there will be additional changes implemented until 
fall 2008. Final implementation by 2012; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: When the redesign is fully 
implemented in 2012, FAA estimated a 20 percent reduction in national 
airspace system delay in the study area as compared to taking no 
action. Estimated arrival and departure delay reduction varies between 
airports. 

Action: New York Airspace Czar; 
Description: ARC participants agreed that appointing a New York 
aviation czar to coordinate regional airspace issues and all projects 
and initiatives addressing problems of congestion and delays in New 
York would be beneficial. As a result, the Director of the New York 
Integration Office position was created; 
Focus: NY region; 
Status: Marie Kennington-Gardiner has been appointed Director of the 
New York Integration Office; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: Unknown. 

Demand Management Policies: 

Action: Order limiting scheduled operations at John F. Kennedy 
International airport; 
Description: In January 2008, FAA issued an order setting a cap on the 
number of hourly operations at JFK. The order took effect March 30, 
2008, and will expire October 24, 2009; 
Focus: NY Region; 
Status: Operations are capped at 81 per hour; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: FAA estimates that caps would 
reduce average departure delays by 5.5 minutes, or 15 percent. The 
number of departure delays of 60 minutes or more would decrease 31 
percent. Based on proposed summer 2008 schedules, estimated delays 
could have increased by up to 150 percent. 

Action: Order limiting scheduled operations at Newark International 
airport; 
Description: In March 2008, FAA proposed an order to cap flights at 
Newark. The final order was issued on May 21, 2008, and takes effect on 
June 20, 2008, and expires October 24, 2009; 
Focus: NY Region; 
Status: Scheduled operations capped at 81 per hour by summer 2008; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: Slight reduction in arrival delays 
offset by slight increase in departure delays with no estimated net 
change in average delay between 2007 and 2008. The purpose is to keep 
delays from worsening at Newark in 2008 because of caps at. Based on 
proposed summer 2008 schedules, estimated arrival delays would increase 
by as much 50 percent in 2008 without the limits. 

Action: Orders limiting scheduled operations at LaGuardia (LGA); 
Description: In December 2006, FAA published a temporary order 
maintaining the same caps and exemptions in place since November 2000. 
In April 2008, FAA also published an order limiting unscheduled 
operations to 3 per hour; 
Focus: NY Region; 
Status: Scheduled operations will be capped at 75 per hour during 
summer 2008; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: FAA estimates 32 percent reduction 
in average delay as compared to no cap. As the caps were already in 
place, no new benefit is expected in summer 2008. 

Action: Supplemental rulemaking on slot auctions at LGA; 
Description: In April 2008, FAA issued a supplemental rulemaking to 
lease the majority of slots at the airport to the incumbent operators 
and to develop a market by annually auctioning off leases for a limited 
number of slots during the first 5 years of the rule. Two options to 
annually auction these slots were proposed; 
Focus: NY Region; 
Status: Comment period ended June 16, 2008. DOT is reviewing comments; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: Will depend on the option 
selected. Option 1 (slot retirement of 1.5 slots per year) estimated to 
result in 1 minute of average delay reduction. Option 2 does not retire 
slots. DOT believes the proposal will help reveal the economic value of 
slots, and may increase the size of aircraft used at the airports, and 
thereby increase the number of passengers served. 

Action: Proposed rulemaking on slot auctions at JFK and Newark; 
Description: In May 2008, FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to 
assign to existing operators the majority of slots at Newark and JFK, 
and create a market by annually auctioning off a limited number of 
slots in each of the first 5 years; 
Focus: NY Region; 
Status: In comment period until July 21, 2008; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: FAA states that the immediate 
impact will be to prevent a return to, or worsening of, the conditions 
and delay experienced during summer 2007. By itself, a slot auction 
will not reduce delays. However, DOT believes the proposal will help 
reveal the economic value of slots, and may increase the size of 
aircraft used at the airports, and thereby increase the number of 
passengers served. 

Action: Amendment to the Airport Rates and Charges policy; 
Description: Announced in July 2008, the policy clarifies the ability 
of airport operators to establish a two-part landing fee structure 
consisting of both an operation charge and a weight-based charge, 
giving airports the flexibility to vary charges based on the time of 
day and the volume of traffic. It also permits the operator of a 
congested airport to charge users a portion of the cost of airfield 
projects under construction and expands the authority of an operator of 
a congested airport to include in the airfield fees of congested 
airports a portion of the airfield fees of other underutilized airports 
owned and operated by the same proprietor; 
Focus: U.S.; 
Status: Final policy issued July 8, 2008; 
Reported delay reduction benefit[A]: Not assessed, it is unknown to 
what extent airports can or will implement this policy or the airlinesï¿½ 
response if it is implemented. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOT and FAA actions. 

[A] For some actions, DOT has stated additional benefits unrelated to 
delay reduction. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Senate Joint Economic Committee, Your Flight Has Been Delayed 
Again: Flight Delays Cost Passengers, Airlines and the U.S. Economy 
Billions. (Washington, D.C.: May 2008). 

[2] NextGen represents a transformation to a new air traffic control 
system that will use satellite-based technologies and new procedures to 
handle the increasing volume of air traffic while further improving 
safety and security. 

[3] 14 C.F.R. ï¿½ 234.4, "Reporting on on-time performance," requires 
domestic air carriers that account for at least 1 percent of domestic 
scheduled passenger revenues to submit scheduled domestic flight 
performance data to DOT. See 14 C.F.R. ï¿½ï¿½ 234.2, 234.3. The number of 
reporting carriers has varied from 10 in 1998 to 20 in 2007. According 
to DOT, the data represent about 70 percent of all scheduled departures 
while servicing about 90 percent of all domestic passengers. 

[4] DOT defines a delay as any flight that departs from or arrives at a 
gate 15 minutes or more after its scheduled gate departure or arrival 
time as shown in the airline's reservation system. 

[5] A slot equates to one takeoff or landing at the airport. 

[6] According to 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 47107, an airport that has received 
federal funding is required to be available for public use on 
reasonable conditions and without unjust discrimination. 

[7] GAO, Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA's Modernization Program in 
Reducing Delays and Congestion, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-01-725T] (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001), and National 
Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed Despite Recent 
Reduction in Flight Delays, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-185] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2001). 

[8] 33 Fed. Reg. 17896 (Dec. 3, 1968), 14 C.F.R. part 93, subpart K. 

[9] The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century (AIR-21), Pub. L. No. 106-181, Section 231, 114 Stat. 108, Apr. 
5, 2000. 

[10] Since the High Density Rule at LaGuardia was set to expire on 
January 1, 2007, in August 2006, FAA published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking proposing the continuation of the cap on hourly operations 
at the airport as well as a new method for allocating capacity. See 71 
Fed. Reg. 51360 (August 29, 2006). The industry's response to the 
proposed new allocation method was universally negative, and FAA was 
unable to complete its rulemaking in time for the expiration of the 
High Density Rule. 

[11] Aviation Rulemaking Committee, "New York Aviation Committee 
Report," December 2007, available at [hyperlink, 
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/FinalARCReport.pdf]. 

[12] As of December 2007, 18 U.S. airlines with at least 1 percent of 
total domestic scheduled service passenger revenues reported on-time 
performance data each month to DOT's Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics; two additional airlines voluntarily reported this 
information. A flight is counted as on time if it departed or arrived 
within 15 minutes of its scheduled gate departure or arrival times as 
shown in the airlines reservation system. All canceled and diverted 
flights count against the airlines' on-time performance. According to 
DOT, the on-time performance rate of 72.6 percent in 2000 was the worst 
rate for any year since 1995, when DOT began collecting comparable 
data. 

[13] In addition, a small percentage of domestic flights are diverted 
and land somewhere other than the scheduled destination. Diversions 
accounted for 0.23 percent of all flights in 2007, according to DOT 
data. 

[14] Effective October 1, 2008, DOT will require airlines to report 
additional data elements to provide consumers with a more accurate 
portrayal of arrival and tarmac delays. Currently, airlines report only 
the scheduled departure and arrival times and no actual times for 
canceled flights, which do not provide a complete picture of tarmac 
delays for flights that are canceled, diverted, or experience gate 
returns. Under the new rule, airlines will be required to report actual 
gate departure, total time away from the gate, and the longest single 
period away from the gate to close gaps in DOT's data. See 73 Fed. Reg. 
29426 (May 21, 2008) for the final rule. 

[15] According to the MITRE Corporation, the 40 percent figure was 
calculated using DOT data from January and July 2007 and FAA data from 
July 2007. 

[16] Additionally, flight delays and cancellations have been 
problematic at other major airports, including Chicago O'Hare 
International Airport and Boston Logan International Airport, among 
others. For example, according to DOT data, in 2007, 36 percent of 
flights were either delayed or canceled at Chicago O'Hare, while 31 
percent of flights were either delayed or canceled at Boston Logan. 

[17] George Mason University's passenger trip statistics are estimates 
based on DOT data and other sources, and represent the average amount 
of trip delay expected by passengers on a large sample of flights. See 
Lance Sherry and George Donahue, "U.S. Passenger Trip Delay Report," 
Center for Air Transportation Systems Research, George Mason 
University, April 2008, available at [hyperlink, 
http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu]. 

[18] Weather delays are captured in several categories, and according 
to DOT, a true picture of total weather-related delays requires several 
steps. First, DOT combines the extreme weather delays with weather 
delays from the aviation system category. Second, DOT performs a 
calculation to determine the weather-related delays included in the 
late arriving aircraft category. Airlines do not report the causes of 
the late arriving aircraft, but DOT makes an allocation using the 
proportion of weather-related delays and total flights in the other 
categories. Adding the weather-related delays to the extreme weather 
and aviation system weather categories results in weather's share of 
all flight delays. DOT estimates that about 44 percent of flights were 
delayed by weather in 2007. 

[19] FAA has traditionally used ground delay programs to control air 
traffic volume to airports where the projected traffic demand is 
expected to exceed the airport's capacity for a lengthy period of time. 
Under a ground delay program, FAA decreases the rate of incoming 
flights into an airport by holding a set of flights destined for that 
airport on the ground. According to FAA, the most common reason for the 
implementation of a ground stop or ground delay program is adverse 
weather. 

[20] GAO is currently conducting an analysis of crew scheduling 
problems and the extent to which they may lead to delayed or canceled 
flights. 

[21] DOT Inspector General. Status Report on Actions Underway to 
Address Flight Delays and Improve Airline Customer Service. CC-2008- 
058. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2008). 

[22] Other efforts are currently under way to improve the air travel 
experience for customers. For example, airlines and airport operators 
are working to develop plans to better coordinate procedures for 
responding to extended tarmac delays, and DOT formed a task force to 
explore these issues. Also, a new bumping rule was announced in April 
2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 21026 (April 18, 2008). The rule is not designed 
to reduce cancellations or delays, but rather, requires airlines to 
double the maximum compensation to those who are involuntarily bumped 
from their flight. 

[23] For example, NextGen improvements to the air traffic control 
system are estimated to cost $25 billion and will not be completed 
until 2025. Adding runway capacity at airports is also expensive and 
time consuming--for example, the third runway at Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport is estimated to cost $1.1 billion - $1.2 billion 
dollars and is scheduled to take at least 16 years to complete. 

[24] In addition to the short-term initiatives, FAA is working to 
implement the list of 77 initiatives adopted by the New York ARC. This 
list includes most of the 17 short-term initiatives. FAA reported that 
to date, 17 of the 77 initiatives have been completed, 30 are expected 
to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2008, and 40 should be 
completed by the end of fiscal year 2009. FAA noted that the remaining 
initiatives are longer term or are being analyzed for feasibility and 
establishing priorities. 

[25] GAO is currently conducting a review of the New York/New Jersey/ 
Philadelphia Metropolitan area airspace redesign and plans to issue a 
report in July 2008. According to FAA, the purpose of the airspace 
redesign is to increase the efficiency and reliability of the airspace 
structure and air traffic control system, thereby accommodating growth 
while enhancing safety and reducing delays in air travel. Thus, the 
airspace redesign is intended to increase the efficiency and 
reliability of the air traffic system, and is included as a capacity-
enhancing initiative for the purpose of this discussion. 

[26] FAA will increase the number of departure headings air traffic 
controllers can assign to aircraft during takeoffs, and adjust the 
routes air traffic controllers can assign aircraft during their final 
approach to an airport. 

[27] See 73 Fed. Reg. 3510 (January 18, 2008) for the final order on 
the caps at JFK and 73 Fed. Reg. 8737 (February 14, 2008) for an 
amendment correcting technical errors in this order. See 73 Fed. Reg. 
29550 (May 21, 2008) for the final order on the Newark caps. 

[28] 65 Fed. Reg. 69126 (Nov.15, 2000). This was extended through 
December 31, 2006. 70 Fed. Reg. 36998 (June 27, 2005). 71 Fed. Reg. 248 
(Dec. 27, 2006). 

[29] A final amendment to the Rates and Charges policy was issued on 
July 8, 2008, but as of July 11, 2008, it has not been published in the 
Federal Register. The proposed amendment can be found at 73 Fed. Reg. 
3310 (January 17, 2008). The amendment to the Rates and Charges policy 
adopts a definition for a congested airport that contains two 
categories of congested airports, one relating to existing congestion 
and the other to future congestion. In the amendment, DOT defines a 
congested airport first as an airport that accounted for at least 1 
percent of all delayed aircraft operations in the United States and at 
an airport listed in table 1 of the FAA's Airport Capacity Benchmark 
Report 2004, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. ï¿½ 47175. Second, DOT will 
consider an airport congested in the future if it is forecasted to meet 
a defined threshold level of congestion in the Future Airport Capacity 
Task 2 study, with the exception of those airports congested for the 
first time in 2025. DOT and FAA assert that airports already have the 
authority to adopt a two-part landing fee and the Rates and Charges 
policy clarifies this authority. 

[30] See 73 Fed. Reg. 20846 (April 17, 2008) for the supplemental 
rulemaking on slot auctions at LaGuardia. See 73 Fed. Reg. 29625 (May 
21, 2008) for the notice for proposed rulemaking on slot auctions at 
JFK and Newark. 

[31] FAA can currently use sections of military airspace on an as- 
needed basis and has had advanced coordination with DOD for use of 
military airspace over the Christmas and Thanksgiving travel season in 
2007 and again over the Memorial Day and Fourth of July weekends in 
2008. The current efforts under way are to further establish processes 
and procedures for advance coordination on a more regular basis. 

[32] FAA worked with the MITRE Corporation to develop models and 
capacity analyses to set capacity limits at each of the three major New 
York area airports. Since the expected delay reduction impact of a cap 
is dependent upon the level at which a cap is set, when setting a cap, 
policymakers face a tradeoff between how much delay they are willing to 
accept and the number of operations the airlines are allowed. For 
example, higher constraint levels allow more operations during good 
weather, but may significantly increase delays during inclement 
weather. 

[33] The second option for the LaGuardia slot auction does not retire 
any slots. As a result, this option does not result in a direct delay 
improvement. 

[34] The amendment to the Rates and Charges policy states that the 
revenue generated from the two-part landing fee structure is not to 
exceed the allowable costs of the airfield. In other words, any airport 
that implements the two-part landing fee would be required to structure 
the fees such that the total revenue raised is no more than the level 
of revenue that would have been raised under a simple weight-based 
landing fee. That is, the landing fee structure must be "revenue 
neutral." 

[End of section] 

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