Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning  
for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq (10-SEP-08, GAO-08-930).
                                                                 
The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the	 
Department of Defense (DOD) refers to as "reposturing," will be a
massive and expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example,	 
there were about 173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about
$16.5 billion, that will need to be returned to the United	 
States. The redeployment process following Operation Desert Storm
in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at least 14 months. DOD	 
guidance emphasizes the importance of early planning for this	 
redeployment process. GAO performed this work under the 	 
Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined the (1) status of  
logistical planning for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq and	 
associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD established	 
roles and responsibilities for managing and executing retrograde 
from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to	 
consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and	 
interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the	 
United States and Kuwait.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-930 					        
    ACCNO:   A84112						        
  TITLE:     Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD   
Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq		 
     DATE:   09/10/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Equipment inventories				 
	     Equipment management				 
	     Federal property					 
	     Government owned equipment 			 
	     Iraq War and reconstruction			 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military bases					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Military materiel					 
	     Military policies					 
	     Military withdrawal				 
	     National defense operations			 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Property						 
	     Protective equipment				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Supply chain management				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Desert Storm					 
	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom			 
	     Iraq						 
	     Kuwait						 

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GAO-08-930

   

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2008: 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces 
from Iraq: 

Operational Iraqi Freedom: 

GAO-08-930: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-930, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the Department of 
Defense (DOD) refers to as ï¿½reposturing,ï¿½ will be a massive and 
expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example, there were about 
173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about $16.5 billion, that 
will need to be returned to the United States. The redeployment process 
following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at 
least 14 months. DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of early 
planning for this redeployment process. 

GAO performed this work under the Comptroller Generalï¿½s Authority. GAO 
examined the (1) status of logistical planning for reposturing U.S. 
forces from Iraq and associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD 
established roles and responsibilities for managing and executing 
retrograde from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to 
consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and 
interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the United 
States and Kuwait. 

What GAO Found: 

While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq is yet to be 
determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in 
fall 2007, and DOD began coordinating these individual planning efforts 
in May 2008 to develop a logistical framework based on three key 
assumptions. The result of this planning was an order published by 
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) that contained the process for 
reposturing units, materiel, and equipment and established working 
groups to continue the planning and seek solutions to emerging 
challenges. DODï¿½s three key assumptions are: (1) any reposturing 
initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments 
of conditions on the ground; (2) there will be sufficient lead time to 
refine reposture plans once an order with a specific timetable and 
force posture in Iraq is issued; and (3) the reposturing of forces will 
be deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 180-day process for units 
leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no more than 2.5 brigadesï¿½ worth 
of equipment and materiel out of Iraq each month. 

While efforts have been made to synchronize planning for reposturing, 
DOD, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the military services have not 
yet clearly established all of the roles and responsibilities for 
managing and executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from 
Iraq. Although CENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as 
executive agent for synchronizing retrograde of materiel and equipment 
from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or coordinated 
structure exists to account for the roles of the variety of teams and 
units engaged in retrograde operations. Until recently ARCENT did not 
have operational control over the two units responsible for 
retrograding the bulk of equipment in Iraq. 

We identified the following nine issues that DOD should consider as it 
develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq: 
(1) agreed-upon guidance for environmental cleanup and the disposition 
of property, which could affect the time and cost of closing bases in 
Iraq; (2) guidance and plans for the reposturing of contractors from 
Iraq; (3) accountability and disposition of contractor-managed 
government-owned property; (4) the possibility of restrictive 
conditions on the use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring 
countries; (5) availability of power-washing equipment and stands, 
called wash racks, and the number of customs inspectors in Kuwait; (6) 
capacity of military transports and convoy security assets, including 
limits on the main supply route; (7) increased demand for access to 
mental health care providers; (8) infrastructure requirements of 
returning units; and (9) requirements for training and equipment reset 
to restore readiness. DOD has begun to address these issues. 

While the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008 
directs DOD to brief the congressional defense committees on certain 
issues related to reposturing, DOD is not required to provide the 
specific information identified in our report. We believe that without 
more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not be able to 
effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to clarify the 
chain of command over logistical operations for retrograde of equipment 
and materiel. Also, Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to 
report specific details on the status of reposturing plans and how it 
intends to mitigate issues such as those we identify. DOD generally 
concurred with our recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-930]. For more 
information, contact William M. Solis at 202-512-8365 or [email protected] 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are 
Predicated on Three Key Assumptions: 

Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks 
Necessary Authority: 

Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: Department of Defense Classes of Supply: 

Appendix IV: Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams: 

Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model: 

Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater Provided 
Equipment: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template: 

Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment: 

Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and 
Redeployment, by Unit Type: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in 
Kuwait: 

Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government- 
Owned Property: 

Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks: 

Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack: 

Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided 
Equipment: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 10, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 100-hour war during which 
U.S. forces advanced approximately 190 miles into Iraq, it took some 14 
months to redeploy most of the deployed materiel and equipment out of 
the theater. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since 
that time the United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq, 
rotating forces into and out of the country in support of ongoing 
operations. As of April 26, 2008, there were approximately 149,400 
Department of Defense (DOD) contractors and, as of July 1, 2008, 
approximately 147,400 U.S. troops deployed in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. DOD officials reported that these forces were located on 
approximately 311 installations, matured during 5 years of operations, 
with some installations more than 500 miles from Kuwait. Most of the 
equipment used by U.S. troops in Iraq--approximately 80 percent 
according to DOD officials--is theater provided equipment, which is a 
pool of permanent stay behind equipment consisting of specific line 
items of modified table of organization and equipment property, issued 
Army prepositioned stocks, and items purchased specifically for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom that remains in Iraq. Although much of this 
equipment has remained in Iraq as units rotate in and out, significant 
amounts will be brought back to the United States if and when there is 
a decrease in the size of U.S. forces in Iraq. As of March 2008, this 
pool of theater provided equipment totaled approximately 173,000 major 
end items such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) 
and Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, worth approximately 
$16.5 billion. The retrograde process for returning these equipment 
items to the United States will be a massive and expensive effort. 

In January 2007, the president announced he would temporarily increase, 
or "surge," the U.S. force level in Iraq by an additional 5 brigades, 
bringing the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to 
20.[Footnote 1] The brigades were in place by June 2007 and began 
withdrawing in September 2007. In his April 2008 Report to Congress on 
the Situation in Iraq the commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), 
recommended that the drawdown from 20 to 15 brigade combat teams 
continue and that, upon the withdrawal of the last of these combat 
teams in July 2008, MNF-I undertake a 45-day period of consolidation 
and evaluation. At the end of that period, MNF-I would commence a 
process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over 
time, determine when it could make a recommendation for further 
reductions. In July 2008, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff stated that, based on what he observed during a recent trip to 
Iraq, he expects to be able to recommend further troop reductions to 
the President and Secretary of Defense in the fall of 2008. In 
addition, in June 2008 GAO also issued its own assessment of progress 
in Iraq and called for a new strategy given the changing 
conditions.[Footnote 2] Finally, the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006 (as amended by the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2008) requires the President to report to the 
Congress quarterly on U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq, 
including, to the extent practical, (1) an assessment of the levels of 
U.S. Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 6-month period following the 
date of the report, the missions to be undertaken by the Armed Forces 
in Iraq for such period, and the incremental costs or savings of any 
proposed changes to such levels or missions; and (2) a description of 
the range of conditions that could prompt changes to the levels of U.S. 
Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 6-month period following the date 
of the report or the missions to be undertaken by the Armed Forces in 
Iraq for such period, including the status of planning for such changes 
to the levels or missions of the Armed Forces in Iraq. Not later than 
30 days after submission of each subsequent report, appropriate senior 
DOD officials are required to brief the congressional committees on 
these same matters.[Footnote 3] 

While we have been monitoring the full range of challenges that DOD 
would likely face, both in Iraq and here in the United States, as it 
begins to draw down its forces in Iraq, this report is focused on the 
logistical organizations and processes that would support a drawdown 
from Iraq or, as DOD officials call it, a "reposturing" effort, 
especially the retrograde of materiel and equipment.[Footnote 4] Our 
analysis indicated that the redeployment of military personnel, 
although important, was not as complex, resource intensive, or time 
consuming.[Footnote 5] Because of the complexity of the issues and 
broad congressional interest and requests, we have been assessing DOD's 
planning for the reposturing effort since August 2007, under the 
authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own 
initiative. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the 
extent to which logistical planning for the reposturing of U.S. forces 
from Iraq has begun and the assumptions upon which it is based, and (2) 
DOD has established roles and responsibilities for managing and 
executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from Iraq. In 
addition, we identified several issues that DOD will need to consider 
as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from 
Iraq. 

To determine what planning has been done regarding the potential 
reposturing of forces from Iraq and upon what assumptions DOD has based 
its plans, we reviewed relevant documents, to include command briefings 
and in-progress reviews, orders, and staff analyses that we obtained 
from several DOD organizations including U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), MNF-I, and U.S. Army Central (ARCENT).[Footnote 6] We also 
interviewed officials who were directly involved in the logistical 
planning efforts to determine the status and scope of these efforts. We 
also traveled to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD officials from a 
variety of organizations who participated in a logistical summit held 
at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. We also obtained copies of the briefings and 
the logistical reposturing order that resulted from this summit. Based 
on these discussions as well as the documents we obtained, we were able 
to determine the assumptions upon which the planning effort was based. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and 
responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel 
and equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed briefings, e-mail 
correspondence, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections of 
the U.S. Code, and other data obtained from DOD organizations in both 
the United States and Kuwait. These officials provided us with 
information about the way the retrograde process is supposed to work as 
well as any challenges they have encountered. While in Kuwait, we also 
visited locations at which various aspects of the redeployment and 
retrograde process are performed and spoke with local commanders and on-
site supervisors about their experiences and challenges. 

During the course of this engagement we identified several issues that 
DOD will need to consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for 
reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. We identified these issues by 
reviewing our past work as well as documents we obtained from various 
defense commands and activities, including staff analyses, briefings, 
orders, doctrinal publications, and relevant laws and regulations. The 
officials we spoke with included commanders and staff officers who had 
direct knowledge of the issues we identified. Moreover, we visited 
several locations in both the United States and Kuwait where the issues 
we identified would have an impact and, while there, we discussed the 
possible ramifications of these issues with local DOD officials. 

We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I includes more 
detailed information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq has yet to be 
determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in 
fall 2007, and in May 2008 DOD began coordinating these individual 
planning efforts to develop a logistical framework based on three key 
assumptions. According to DOD officials, initial planning efforts were 
uncoordinated because the three organizations undertaking them--the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Army Materiel Command(AMC), and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army--conducted their planning effort 
on their own initiative and with little input from CENTCOM and MNF-I, 
the commands overseeing operations in Iraq. By late 2007, however, a 
move began to synchronize and coordinate the efforts of DOD 
organizations engaged in planning for a reposturing of U.S. forces in 
Iraq. This culminated in a May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan, 
Kuwait, and resulted in an order published by MNF-I that contained the 
process for the redeployment of units and retrograde of materiel and 
equipment. The order also established a working group chartered to 
continue the planning with an eye toward seeking solutions to 
challenges, including several of the challenges we discuss later in 
this report. DOD's planning efforts to date have been based on the 
following three key assumptions: 

* any reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of 
State assessments of conditions on the ground; 

* there will be sufficient lead time to refine reposture plans once an 
order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued; 
and: 

* the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated 
on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no 
more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq 
each month. 

Although efforts have begun to synchronize planning for reposturing, 
DOD, CENTCOM, and the military services have not clearly established 
roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of 
materiel and equipment from Iraq. Joint doctrine states that unity of 
command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, 
well-defined relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities 
and authorities. However, although CENTCOM has designated an executive 
agent for the synchronization of the retrograde of materiel and 
equipment from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or 
coordinated structure exists to account for the role of a variety of 
teams and units engaged in retrograde operations, such as the 
disposition of excess property and maintaining accountability of major 
end items like tanks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWV). This results in confusion and a lack of clarity on the ways 
those teams should be utilized. In addition, while the Army has 
designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of Army material 
and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT had no direct 
command authority over the two Army units responsible for the 
retrograde of the bulk of materiel and equipment in Iraq, a situation 
that resulted in inefficiency and significant amounts of materiel and 
equipment in Kuwait sitting idle and awaiting disposition instructions. 
Finally, another example of this lack of unity of command is that data 
systems used during the retrograde process are incompatible. Although a 
fix for this data system incompatibility has been identified, the fix 
has not yet been implemented. 

We identified several other issues that will affect the development of 
plans for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. Specifically, based on our 
discussion with DOD officials and analysis of planning efforts to date, 
the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's redeployment of equipment and 
people will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that 
address and include: 

* guidance for the management of hazardous materials and waste and the 
disposition of property, which could affect the time and cost of 
closing installations in Iraq; 

* guidance and plans for reposturing of contractors from Iraq; 

* accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government- 
owned property; 

* the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in 
Kuwait and other neighboring countries; 

* availability of wash racks and the number of customs inspectors in 
Kuwait; 

* capacity of military owned and operated transports and convoy 
security assets, including limits on the main supply route; 

* increased demand for access to mental health care providers; 

* infrastructure requirements of returning units; and: 

* requirements for training and equipment reset to restore readiness. 

DOD has begun to address these issues. For example, it is addressing 
the accountability of contractor-managed property and increasing the 
number of mental health providers. The National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires DOD to brief the congressional 
defense committees on certain matters that were to be addressed, to the 
extent practicable, in the President's report. These matters include an 
assessment of U.S. force levels required in Iraq, the missions they 
will undertake in Iraq, the incremental costs or savings of any 
proposed changes to such levels or missions, and a description of the 
range of conditions that could prompt changes to the levels of U.S. 
forces required in Iraq, including the status of planning for such 
changes to the levels or missions of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, 
certain issues we have identified above are not specifically covered by 
this requirement. [Footnote 7] We believe that more specific reporting 
from DOD on these issues and DOD's mitigation plans related to these 
issues will enable Congress to better exercise effective oversight of 
DOD's plans. 

In light of our observations, to ensure that DOD can efficiently and 
effectively retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM 
and the military departments, take steps to clarify a unified or 
coordinated chain of command over logistical operations in support of 
the retrograde effort. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense, 
in consultation with the military departments, correct the 
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain 
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in-transit. 
Further, to enhance its ability to exercise its oversight 
responsibilities, Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to modify 
its briefings submitted in accordance with the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to include specific details on 
the status of its reposturing planning and how it intends to mitigate 
issues such as those we identified in this report. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the second 
recommendation. The department also provided a number of general 
comments and technical comments that we considered and incorporated, as 
appropriate. The department's comments and our evaluation of those 
comments are discussed in detail in a later section of this report. A 
complete copy of DOD's written comments, including the department's 
general and technical comments and our evaluation of each of those 
comments, is included in appendix II. 

Background: 

According to DOD officials, U.S. forces in Iraq will not be "drawn 
down" but rather "repostured." MNF-I defines "resposture operations," a 
non-doctrinal term, as "the realignment of forces, basing, and 
resources to adjust to changes in the operating environment."[Footnote 
8] Joint doctrine, as outlined in DOD's joint publications for both 
operations and planning emphasizes the importance of end-state planning 
and planning for the termination of combat operations. Inherent in 
DOD's reposture planning is the concept of redeployment, which joint 
doctrine defines as "the transfer of forces and materiel to support 
another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return 
personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization 
stations for reintegration and/or out-processing."[Footnote 9] 
Associated with redeployment is another non-doctrinal concept-- 
retrograde.[Footnote 10] As of May 2008 there was no agreed-upon 
definition for retrograde as it applies to reposture planning. However, 
according to some of the proposed definitions the term generally refers 
to the evacuation of materiel and equipment from Iraq. Moreover, our 
analysis of DOD documents indicates that the terms "retrograde" and 
"redeployment" are often used interchangeably. For clarity we use the 
term "redeployment" to refer to the movement of units (including a 
unit's complement of personnel, equipment, and materiel) and 
"retrograde" when referring to the movement of materiel and equipment. 

Our analysis of previous GAO reports and testimonies on Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicated that retrograde of materiel 
and equipment would consume the most time and resources throughout the 
reposturing effort.[Footnote 11] Since the 1990s, we have identified 
DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area, because DOD has been 
unable to consistently meet its goal of delivering the "right items to 
the right places at the right time." Since 1991, we have issued a 
number of reports highlighting weaknesses in DOD's supply chain 
management throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 12] 

The logistics infrastructure that supports the redeployment and 
retrograde effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and 
complex, consisting of military organizations that operate in both Iraq 
and Kuwait, and it is through Kuwait's three seaports and two airports 
that the vast majority of U.S. forces, materiel, and equipment flow out 
of the theater of operations. Moreover, there are myriad logistics 
organizations in both Iraq and Kuwait that also support these 
operations, including elements CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command, 
DLA, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, AMC, U.S. Marine 
Corps Central Command, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Air 
Forces Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command Central. 

In this report we examine certain components of the logistics 
infrastructure that support the redeployment and retrograde effort as 
well as certain aspects of the redeployment and retrograde processes. 
To properly frame this discussion, however, it is necessary to have 
some sense of the size of the force in Iraq and the logistics 
activities in Kuwait that support the redeployment and retrograde of 
this force. (Figure 1 shows the locations of select installations in 
Iraq and key logistics activities in Kuwait.) For example, although 
public discussion of the size of the U.S. force in Iraq generally 
emphasizes the number of brigade combat teams, according to DOD 
officials as of May 2008 there were the equivalent of 47 brigades' 
worth of materiel and equipment in Iraq spread over some 311 
installations of varying size. The majority of this materiel and 
equipment, some 80 percent according to DOD officials, is theater 
provided equipment, approximately 582,000 pieces of equipment worth 
about $15.5 billion. Theater provided equipment is permanent stay 
behind equipment consisting of specific line items of modified table of 
organization and equipment property, issued Army prepositioned stocks, 
and items purchased specifically for Operations Iraqi Freedom that 
remain in Iraq. The 582,000 pieces of equipment include all the 
accountable line items on the property books for the theater provided 
equipment such as up-armored HMMWVs, Mine Resistant Armored Program 
Vehicles, other wheeled and tracked vehicles, generators, body armor, 
and technologies used to counter improvised explosive devices. In 
addition, as of summer 2007 there were more than 60,000 materiel 
containers in Iraq and over 127,000 short-tons of ammunition in Iraq 
and Kuwait. 

Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in 
Kuwait: 

This figure is a map of select installations in Iraq and key logistics 
activities in Kuwait. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO, Art Explosion, and GAO analysis of Stats and Stripes and 
DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are 
Predicated on Three Key Assumptions: 

While various individual defense commands began planning for the 
reposturing of postsurge forces from Iraq in the fall of 2007, those 
planning efforts were not coordinated until May 2008 and were based on 
three key assumptions. At the outset these planning efforts were 
uncoordinated and lacked a joint perspective. However, in late 2007, an 
effort was begun to synchronize the planning efforts of various DOD 
organizations as they related to reposture operations in the Iraqi 
theater of operations. The result of this effort was a series of 
logistics synchronization conferences as well as MNF-I's publication of 
a logistics reposture order in May 2008. 

Reposture Planning Began Fall 2007 but Initial Efforts Were 
Uncoordinated: 

In the fall of 2007 three DOD organizations--AMC, DLA, and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)--began separate planning 
initiatives designed to deal with issues relating to the retrograde of 
materiel and equipment from Iraq. As part of their planning processes, 
each of the three organizations established working groups or forums 
for subordinate entities to communicate about issues arising from their 
planning. Despite working on the same broad set of issues, however, 
there was little coordination among the three organizations. Moreover 
both CENTCOM, the combatant command whose area of responsibility 
includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-I, the headquarters responsible for 
operations in Iraq, provided little input and guidance to these 
efforts. 

Army Materiel Command officials told us that they issued a warning 
order on September 6, 2007, directing its subordinate units to be 
prepared to develop plans in support of the transition from current 
operations to the reduction of forces in Iraq. The warning order 
established a biweekly video teleconference, which first met on 
September 14, 2007, as a forum for all AMC units and staff to discuss 
upcoming requirements in support of Iraqi theater reposturing efforts. 
Moreover, the command also stood up a Theater Drawdown Working Group. 
The original intent of this working group was to conduct a mission 
analysis of what it would take to redeploy multiple brigade combat 
teams quickly; however, by November 2007 the working group became an 
umbrella organization that synchronized AMC's various planning efforts 
in support of a reposturing of forces from Iraq. Among the issues AMC 
and its subordinate organizations explored were the capacities of its 
depots, the disposition of excess equipment in the Iraqi theater of 
operations, additional resources that might be required in theater 
based on the pace of the unit redeployments, rebuilding Army 
Prepositioned Stocks in theater, AMC capabilities in theater to support 
the reposturing effort, identifying what AMC support was required for 
reducing the number of installations in theater, and identifying the 
need for changes in contracts or additional funding. 

According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, their agency 
established a Retrograde Task Force in September 2007 when it became 
clear that DOD was looking at the reposturing of forces in 
Iraq.[Footnote 13] The mission of the Retrograde Task Force was to plan 
and coordinate the execution of DLA actions in support of retrograde 
operations from Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was also to develop an 
integrated support plan for those operations by December 2007. The 
Retrograde Task Force canvassed DLA's customers--such as the military 
services, CENTCOM, and ARCENT--to gather data on their respective roles 
and responsibilities for a reposturing effort and conducted a mission 
analysis to coordinate and anticipate future DLA actions and identify 
gaps and seams in the overall retrograde effort. 

Headquarters, Department of the Army issued its guidance for the 
retrograde of materiel from the CENTCOM area of responsibilities on 
October 23, 2007. HQDA designated ARCENT as the Army's "lead element 
for retrograde" of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, 
but also stated that AMC is "responsible for executing HQDA retrograde 
policy." The order provided a set of business rules--by class of 
supply[Footnote 14]--that all Army units, commands, and agencies 
involved in the retrograde process in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility were to follow. It also provided disposition 
instructions for these classes of supply. Finally, the order also 
established a monthly video teleconference, hosted by the HQDA, G-4 
(Logistics), to provide a forum in which issues and obstacles affecting 
retrograde operations could be discussed. 

Although these DOD organizations made efforts to synchronize their 
planning--for example, both AMC and DLA participated in Headquarters, 
Department of the Army's monthly video teleconferences and DLA 
identified Service headquarters as "external links" to its Retrograde 
Task Force--there was, according to DOD officials, little coordination 
among the separate retrograde planning efforts. In particular, while 
AMC and HQDA focused solely on the retrograde of Army materiel and 
equipment, other DOD officials felt a joint approach headed by either 
the Joint Staff or CENTCOM was required. Moreover, CENTCOM and MNF-I 
provided little guidance; according to officials from CENTCOM, they 
were waiting on input from MNF-I while according to officials 
representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was "close hold" in 
that headquarters until after the MNF-I commander's congressional 
testimony in April 2008. 

Reposture Planning Coordinated by May 2008: 

The synchronization of planning efforts by various defense commands for 
reposturing of post-surge forces began in late 2007, but was not 
coordinated until May 2008. According to DOD officials, by late 2007 it 
had become clear that not only were the various reposturing planning 
efforts uncoordinated and lacking a joint focus, but the perspectives 
of organizations in the United States differed from those of 
organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. To rectify this, 
senior DLA officials met with their counterparts in CENTCOM and MNF-I 
to discuss means by which reposture planning could be better 
coordinated and more inclusive. Recognizing the added value of a more 
inclusive and coordinated planning effort, CENTCOM and MNF-I officials 
invited DLA to embed members of its Retrograde Task Force inside 
logistics organizations in Kuwait and Iraq. This action established an 
in-theater planning cell embedded in the organizations involved with 
logistical planning for reposturing within the Iraqi theater of 
operations. These organizations included MNF-I, Multi-National Corps, 
Iraq, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the CENTCOM 
Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, and the 401st and 402nd 
Army Field Support Brigades. 


As a result of these efforts, coordination among DOD organizations 
involved in redeployment and retrograde planning increased. For 
example, when representatives from DLA arrived in Iraq and Kuwait they 
discovered that CENTCOM and ARCENT were holding separate retrograde 
video teleconferences; these were eventually merged into one joint 
video teleconference. In addition, although the major focus had been on 
Army retrograde processes because the Army has the largest ground 
presence in the theater, once a coordinated reposture planning effort 
was undertaken other services got involved in the redeployment and 
retrograde planning process as well. 

The end result of the increased coordination and synchronized planning 
among the organizations involved with reposture planning for Iraq was a 
logistics summit held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, from May 4-9, 2008. At 
this summit the logistics processes for the retrograde of all classes 
of supply were synchronized, discussions about what to do with 
contractor-acquired, government-owned property were held, and general 
and flag officers were briefed. Representatives from CENTCOM, U.S. 
Transportation Command, DLA, MNF-I, MNC-I, ARCENT, the 1st Theater 
Sustainment Command, HQDA, and the Navy, Marine Corps, Special 
Operations, and Air Force component commands in theater attended the 
summit. Based on the summit, MNF-I finalized and published its 
overarching guidance for logistics reposturing operation on May 28, 
2008. This order defined retrograde disposition processes for each 
class of supply within the Iraqi theater of operations, codified a 180- 
day unit redeployment template, and addressed basing.[Footnote 15] 
Moreover, the order also established a Logistics Reposture Working 
Group[Footnote 16] and assigned the group three key tasks: 

* Analyze the allocation of resources available to execute the 
logistics reposturing processes to identify potential shortfalls and to 
address synchronization issues between various operational and 
strategic entities. 

* Review limitations, constraints, and risks associated with the 
logistics reposturing processes and develop mitigation measures. 

* Review after action report issues from unit redeployments and base 
reposturing in order to identify policy and procedural gaps and 
inconsistencies. 

Assumptions Guiding Reposture Planning: 

Based on GAO analysis as well as discussion with DOD officials, both 
the May 2008 conference and the subsequent logistics reposture order 
were based on three assumptions. The first is that any reposturing 
initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments 
of conditions of the ground. The second is that there will be 
sufficient lead time to refine the plans for reposturing once an order 
with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued. The 
third is that the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, 
predicated on a 180-day redeployment template for units leaving Iraq 
and a model that states the theater logistics infrastructure can 
sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more than a total of five 
brigades' worth of equipment and materiel in and out of Iraq, per 
month. 

The MNF-I 180-day template, summarized in table 1, details the actions 
U.S. Army and Marine Corps units must complete 180 days prior to the 
unit's available-to-load date.[Footnote 17] Twenty-two total 
organizations-17 separate theater entities plus 5 additional property 
and retrograde support teams-participate in this process.[Footnote 18] 

Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template: 

Number of days before departure: 180 to 160; 
Actions: ID types of equipment, request disposition and plan 
coordination with all retrograde teams. 

Number of days before departure: 150 to 100; 
Actions: Finalize any early reset plans, set deployment timeline. 

Number of days before departure: 100 to 80; 
Actions: Disposition instructions issued, request and authorize 
donation authority. 

Number of days before departure: 80 to 60; 
Actions: Schedule strategic transportation. 

Number of days before departure: 60 to 40; 
Actions: Order containers, dispose of excess supplies, develop detailed 
movement plan, schedule wash racks. 

Number of days before departure: 40 to 20; 
Actions: Move excess vehicles, validate movement of people. 

Number of days before departure: 20 to 0; 
Actions: Complete customs and agriculture inspections, move equipment 
from wash racks to sterile yard to marshaling yard to pier to ship. 

Source: GAO analysis based on MNF-I FRAGO 08-232. 

[End of table] 

In addition to the 180-day redeployment template, logistics planners in 
the Iraqi theater of operation assume the theater's logistics 
infrastructure can sustain a flow of approximately 2.5 brigades' worth 
of materiel and equipment into and out of Iraq each month based on a 
rate-of-flow model they have created. (See appendix V for a more 
detailed discussion of this model). This model takes into consideration 
historical property book data, the number of convoys that can be run 
each month, and the average time it takes a unit to clean its equipment 
and clear customs in Kuwait. However, according to DOD officials and 
GAO analysis, while this rate-of-flow model may be a useful planning 
tool, it should not be used to predict how long it would take to 
retrograde all the equipment and materiel in Iraq. One reason for this 
is the actual amount of equipment and materiel with which any one 
brigade will redeploy varies and these amounts directly affect the 
number of convoys required to move the unit and the amount of time it 
will take the unit to clean its equipment before it can be retrograded. 
For example, during the summer of 2008 the average heavy brigade combat 
team redeployed with significantly less equipment and materiel than 
projected in the model because the unit used a large amount of theater 
provided equipment that remained in Iraq when it redeployed. Moreover, 
GAO has identified several issues, explained in detail later in this 
report, that may affect both the volume and pace at which materiel and 
equipment can flow through the retrograde pipeline. Several of these 
issues are not currently accounted for by the model. 

Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks 
Necessary Authority: 

Despite recent initiatives to synchronize and coordinate the planning 
efforts of DOD organizations with regard to the reposturing of forces 
from Iraq, clear roles and responsibilities with regard to managing and 
executing the redeployment and retrograde process have not yet been 
established. According to joint doctrine, "unity of command must be 
maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined 
command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and 
authorities."[Footnote 19] Combatant commanders exercise "authoritative 
direction over logistics," and may organize logistics resources within 
theater according to operational needs.[Footnote 20] CENTCOM's 
retrograde order designates an executive agent for the synchronization 
of retrograde operations in Iraq. At the same time, because each 
military department has unique authorities and roles, including the 
requirement to provide logistical support to its own assigned forces, 
CENTCOM efforts to establish a truly unified command structure with 
respect to logistics may be complicated.[Footnote 21] With no unified 
or coordinated structure to account for the roles of the theater 
property and retrograde support teams that assist units with the 
retrograde of material and equipment, there is confusion and a lack of 
clarity about how these teams should be utilized. In addition, while 
the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of 
Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT 
did not have direct command authority over the two Army units in the 
theater responsible for retrograding the vast bulk of the equipment in 
Iraq. Because of this the retrograde process was inefficient and 
resulted in significant amounts of theater provided equipment sitting 
idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. Finally, based on GAO 
analysis, a significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command 
over the retrograde process is the use of incompatible data systems. 
Although a fix for this incompatibility has been identified, the 
implementation of the fix has not been enforced. 

No Single Organization Has Authority over Theater Property and 
Retrograde Support Teams: 

No single organization has command authority over all of the theater 
property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the redeployment 
and retrograde process. According to ARCENT, the lack of unity of 
command over these teams makes their use unclear and confusing. There 
are 10 theater property and retrograde support teams that assist units 
with redeployment and the retrograde of material and 
equipment.[Footnote 22] ARCENT has tactical control authority over only 
2 of these teams, the Mobile Redistribution Team and the Redistribution 
Property Assistance Team.[Footnote 23] The Mobile Redistribution Team 
assists redeploying units with identifying, documenting, and providing 
disposition instructions for excess supplies and repair parts in order 
to reintegrate required supplies into the distribution pipeline. The 
Redistribution Property Assistance Team is focused primarily on 
accountability, turn-in, and retrograde of theater provided equipment. 
Of the remaining 8 theater property and retrograde support teams, 2 
report to AMC, 2 report to MNC-I, and 1 each report to U.S. 
Transportation Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution 
Command, DLA, and the Marine Corps Logistics Command. Each of these 8 
teams also provides redeploying units with essential services and 
expertise. For example, the Joint Redeployment Support Team, which 
reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the mission of supplying 
customs, disposition, hazardous material, and transportation expertise 
to redeploying units and is to enable in-transit visibility over a 
unit's materiel and equipment from its forward operating base to the 
unit's home station or to an identified depot. Another team, the 
Inventory Property Assistance Team, reports to MNC-I. The Inventory 
Property Assistance Team's mission is to track material and equipment 
shortages and excesses for units in Iraq and, when a unit is 
redeploying, provide instructions for either the redistribution or 
retrograde of that unit's material and equipment. It has the added 
mission of conducting inventories during the closure of forward 
operating bases, conducting the transfer of government-furnished 
equipment,[Footnote 24] and conducting inventories of "found" equipment 
containers in Iraq. ARCENT has proposed a command structure within MNF- 
I and MNC-I to coordinate command and control over the assistance teams 
in order to better synchronize retrograde efforts in the theater, but 
as of May 2008 this structure has not been adopted. As a result, 
according to ARCENT, the use of the various teams during the retrograde 
process is both unclear and confusing. 

Until Recently No Theater Logistical Organization Had Command Authority 
over Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment in Theater: 

Until recently, there was no single theater logistical organization 
with command authority over the two units responsible for retrograding 
theater provided equipment, which accounts for 80 percent of the 
equipment in Iraq. As a result significant amounts of theater provided 
equipment were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition 
instructions. The two units responsible for retrograding theater 
provided equipment are the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in Iraq and 
the 401st Army Field Support Brigade in Kuwait. Together, these field 
support brigades relieve redeploying units of accountability for 
theater provided equipment, arrange for its transportation from Iraq to 
Kuwait, and process the equipment through the wash racks, customs, and 
on to its designated destination. According to emerging Army doctrine 
(currently in draft), when Army field support brigades are deployed in 
support of a contingency mission to an operational theater and when 
directed by higher authority, they will fall under the operational 
control of a theater or expeditionary sustainment command.[Footnote 25] 
According to joint doctrine,[Footnote 26] a theater sustainment command 
is the logistics command and control element assigned to the Army 
Service Component Command and is the single Army logistics headquarters 
in a theater of operations. Theater sustainment commands may also 
employ one or more expeditionary sustainment commands to aid them with 
command and control. 

Prior to June 2008 in the Iraqi theater of operations, neither ARCENT-
-CENTCOM's Army Service Component Command and Army's designated lead 
element for retrograde operations in the theater--nor ARCENT's 
subordinate theater and expeditionary sustainment commands had any 
direct command authority over the 401st or 402nd Army Field Support 
Brigades. Instead, higher headquarters for both the field support 
brigades was the Army Sustainment Command located at Rock Island 
Arsenal, Illinois.[Footnote 27] This command relationship appeared to 
be inconsistent with emerging Army doctrine and Joint doctrine, and 
HQDA had apparently denied ARCENT authority over all Army organizations 
in the CENTCOM AOR that support the retrograde process, including the 
401st and 402nd. In an effort to provide some in-theater oversight for 
the retrograde process, AMC has designated the ARCENT G-4 as the 
commander, Army Materiel Command, southwest Asia (AMC-SWA). However, 
like ARCENT and its theater and expeditionary sustainment commands, 
this commander had no direct command authority over the field support 
brigades whose actions he is charged to synchronize and oversee. 
Moreover, he did not have a staff to assist him in his duties aside 
from a chief of staff. According to CENTCOM officials, in June 2008 
CENTCOM designated ARCENT as having operational control over the 401ST 
Army Field Support Brigade and the 402ND Army Field Support Brigade. 
While CENTCOM's action may result in changes in the retrograde process 
for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait, we 
have not yet evaluated the effect of this change. 

Before this change occurred, the lack of unity of command made the 
process for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait 
inefficient and resulted in significant amounts of this equipment 
sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. This was 
because the headquarters with the authority to coordinate the theater 
provided equipment retrograde process (Army Sustainment Command) lacked 
visibility over the process while the headquarters with visibility over 
the process (AMC-SWA) lacked the command authority and the staff to 
coordinate the actions of the field support brigades that execute the 
process. For example, on May 16, 2008, 177 pieces of theater provided 
equipment rolling stock[Footnote 28] that were no longer needed in 
theater were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions, 
some since March 2008. Army Sustainment Command took no actions to 
rectify this situation and the commanding general, AMC-SWA, who is also 
the ARCENT G-4, did not have authority to direct that action be taken. 
Instead, he used his personal contacts with DOD officials in the United 
States to obtain the needed disposition instructions. Despite these 
actions, however, problems persisted with the retrograde process. For 
example, a DOD official in Kuwait provided documentation showing that 
over 2,100 non-rolling stock items of theater provided equipment-- 
including such items as 120mm mortars, gun mounts, radio sets, and 
generators--were also sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition 
instructions. 


Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or Lack the Authority to 
Enforce Improvements to the Retrograde Process: 

One significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command is that 
logistical organizations have not enforced or lack the authority to 
enforce improvements to a retrograde process that is slow and does not 
maintain in-transit visibility. ASC has identified a solution to the 
problem and ordered its implementation, but it has not enforced its 
order despite having the authority to do so. Until recently, ARCENT 
lacked the necessary authority over the field support brigades to 
enforce Army Sustainment Command's solution. As a result, significant 
stores of TPE that are no longer needed in theater are sitting idle in 
Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. 

Retrograde Process for Certain Theater Provided Equipment Is Slow and 
Does Not Maintain In-Transit Visibility: 

The current process for retrograding theater provided equipment no 
longer needed in Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit 
visibility.[Footnote 29] This is caused by the frequent manual 
manipulation of data. According to DOD's Supply Chain Materiel 
Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their 
materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable 
support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war using DOD 
standard data systems that provide timely, accurate in-transit asset 
information.[Footnote 30] 

Currently, when theater provided equipment moves to Kuwait the 401st 
Army Field Support Brigade undertakes two concurrent manual processes 
to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment. 
Accountability is established by manually entering equipment data into 
one system, while a second manual entry is made in a different system 
to provide visibility over each item by serial number. The visibility 
system, however, is a nonstandard Army information system. DOD guidance 
states that the DOD components should execute a supply chain strategy 
that promotes the use of shared common data and that wherever possible, 
adopt commercial data exchange and user interface standards and 
procedures while ensuring interoperability. 

Once accountability and visibility over theater provided equipment has 
been established, personnel from the 401st Army Field Support Brigade 
request disposition instructions. This labor-intensive manual process 
involves sending spreadsheets populated with equipment data from Kuwait 
to Army Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island, Illinois, and 
then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Command[Footnote 31] 
responsible for each particular item, which, in turn, sends disposition 
instructions back through this chain to the 401st. This process can 
take months because of the manual workarounds used to pass and 
manipulate the data. 

While equipment can be shipped once disposition instructions are 
received in Kuwait, in-transit visibility of the equipment is 
temporarily lost during shipment because the process used to direct 
shipment of the equipment--called Inter-Depot Transfer--bypasses the 
Global Transportation Network, DOD's system for providing near real- 
time in-transit visibility information. This lack of in-transit 
visibility is contrary to current DOD guidance that requires timely, 
accurate in-transit asset information be available to all users and 
logistics managers and in a standard format adequate to satisfy needs. 

The 401st Army Field Support Brigade uses another manual process to 
compensate for this lack of in-transit visibility by coordinating with 
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements at Kuwaiti ports 
in order to obtain final load manifests for each vessel. The manifest 
is forwarded to item managers in the United States so they can prepare 
to receive the equipment; however, manifest information does not reach 
the brigade until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail. 

Army Sustainment Command has stated that "the current process usedï¿½to 
manage and obtain disposition is slow and cumbersome with a high 
potential to be overwhelmed if reposturing is accelerated." In addition 
to the more than 2,100 pieces of nonrolling stock TPE awaiting 
dispositions instructions cited above--some reportedly for years--a DOD 
official stated that in the past rolling stock has been sitting idle in 
Kuwait for anywhere from 3 to 9 months. 

Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or Lack the Authority to 
Enforce Compliance with Orders to Implement Improvements to the 
Retrograde Process: 

Although Army Sustainment Command has issued an order outlining changes 
to the retrograde process that corrects the problems we have 
identified, neither of the field support brigades in the Iraqi theater 
of operations have followed it. In April 2008, Army Sustainment Command 
issued an order directing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support 
Brigades to use Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced transactions to 
transfer equipment between Iraq and Kuwait in order to maintain 
accountability and visibility.[Footnote 32] Moreover, the order 
directed that disposition instructions for all theater provided 
equipment not required in theater should be requested through the 
Standard Army Retail Supply System.[Footnote 33] According to a DOD 
official this will allow the automated request of disposition 
instructions, thereby reducing the time necessary to receive the 
instructions. Moreover, the system will provide data to the Global 
Transportation Network, thereby improving in-transit visibility over 
equipment. However, for reasons that were not made clear, this order 
has not been implemented and Army Sustainment Command has not compelled 
the field support brigades to comply. 

In January 2008, ARCENT, as the lead agent for retrograde, requested 
that Headquarters, Department of the Army delegate to ARCENT more 
authority over the retrograde process. Specifically, according to 
ARCENT officials, ARCENT requested that it be given authority to 
determine and issue disposition instructions and that it be given 
authority to direct all Army organizations in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility that support the retrograde process. As of May 2008, 
ARCENT had not received these authorities. Until recently, ARCENT had 
no authority to direct the field support brigades to comply with Army 
Sustainment Command's order to fix the data incompatibility problem in 
theater. While CENTCOM's action designating ARCENT as having 
operational control over the support brigades may result in changes in 
the disposition instruction process, we have not yet evaluated the 
effect of this command change. 

Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning: 

We identified nine issues that will affect the development of plans for 
reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. These nine issues are discussed, in 
detail, in the following sections. Although the pace and overall extent 
of a potential reposturing are uncertain, DOD has begun to address 
these issues. While DOD officials are not required to report specific 
information about these nine issues or possible mitigation plans 
related to these issues, as part of the briefings they are required to 
provide to the congressional defense committees,[Footnote 34] we 
believe that without more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not 
be able to effectively exercise oversight responsibilities of DOD's 
plans. 

Time and Cost Estimates for Base Closures in Iraq: 

According to ARCENT officials, closing or handing over U.S. 
installations in Iraq will be time-consuming and costly, although time 
and costs are difficult to estimate without a bilateral agreement 
addressing base closures. As of May 31, 2008, 311 U.S. installations in 
Iraq will have to be closed or turned over to the Iraqis during a 
reposturing effort, depending on the scope of U.S. reposturing. 
According to ARCENT officials, experience has shown it takes 1 to 2 
months to close the smallest platoon-or company-size installations, 
which contain between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However, 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq has never closed an installation the size of 
complex installations such as Balad Air Force Base, which contains 
approximately 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 years, making 
accurate predictions about the time it will take to close them 
difficult. ARCENT officials estimate it could take longer than 18 
months to close a base of that size, likening the process to shutting 
down and moving a small U.S. city. 

According to DOD officials, time and costs are difficult to estimate 
without an agreement between the United States and Iraq on base 
closure, especially with regard to guidance of the management of 
hazardous materials and waste and the transfer of personal 
property.[Footnote 35] ARCENT officials stated that both issues are 
traditionally addressed in Status of Forces Agreements; however, as of 
July 18, 2008, the United States and Iraq do not have such an 
agreement.[Footnote 36] Hence, although CENTCOM guidance states that 
the base commander is responsible for the removal or remediation of all 
hazardous materials and waste, ARCENT officials stated that base 
commanders do not know to what extent they must remediate the waste, 
and therefore may have difficulty estimating the time and cost of 
cleaning installations. In addition, according to ARCENT officials, 
absent an agreement with Iraq on the disposition of personal property, 
"all bunkers, trenches, fighting positions, and force protection 
barriersï¿½ will be removed" in accordance with CENTCOM policy. 

ARCENT officials asserted that, absent a bilateral agreement with Iraq 
addressing the base closure or hand-over process, the U.S. will have to 
negotiate the terms of closure for each base individually, which could 
potentially slow the base closing process. For example, ARCENT 
officials noted that since the owners or lessees of the land on which 
the installations currently reside include the Iraqi Ministries of 
Interior, Defense, and Justice, and other Iraqi national government 
entities as well as private individuals, property transfers would be 
complicated and time consuming. Moreover, ARCENT officials stated that 
in the absence of a bilateral agreement that provides guidance for the 
management of hazardous waste and materials, it is normal practice to 
follow the established guidelines for this management, which generally 
are more stringent and therefore potentially more costly and time 
consuming. 

Uncertainties Regarding Plans for Contractors: 

From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the reposturing of U.S. 
forces in Iraq did not include a theater-wide plan for the reposturing 
of contractors. According to MNF-I's May 2008 logistics reposture 
order, logistics planners were to coordinate with the Defense 
Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) to identify contractual issues 
associated with logistics reposture operations. But as of June 2008, 
DCMA officials stated that they were not aware of a theater-wide plan 
for the reposturing of contractors. In fact, according to DOD 
officials, CENTCOM contracting planners did not begin participating in 
planning for the reposturing operations until July 2008. 

While there is no theater-wide plan, since May 2008 Army LOGCAP 
officials have been participating in theater-wide logistics reposturing 
planning. Reposture planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it 
is the largest logistical support contract in Iraq. According to a DOD 
official, examples of such participation include LOGCAP personnel 
attending a series of logistics conferences held at Camp Arifjan, 
Kuwait in May 2008, working with logistics reposture planning teams in 
MNF-I and MNC-I, and participating in the Logistics Reposture Working 
Group. However, according to a DOD official responsible for 
coordinating LOGCAP planning efforts with reposturing planning efforts, 
challenges remain in the planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP 
contractor personnel. For instance, decisions about reposturing of 
these contractors are often made before requirements have been clearly 
identified and DOD officials responsible for planning the reposturing 
of these contractors do not receive timely and accurate information 
from the customers or units using these contracts. 

Accountability and Disposition of Contractor-Managed Government-Owned 
Property: 

Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S. 
government property under the control of contractors may present 
challenges to reposturing from Iraq. According to Defense Contract 
Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of 
contractor-managed government-owned property[Footnote 37] in Iraq. 
According to the same officials, the largest portion of all contractor- 
managed government-owned property in Iraq, $3.37 billion, falls under 
the LOGCAP, an Army program to provide contracted resources to support 
U.S. contingency operations. Examples of LOGCAP equipment include 
laundry and bath facilities, food service, sanitation, housing, 
maintenance, transportation, construction, and power generation and 
distribution. According to Defense Contract Management Agency 
officials, non-LOGCAP contractor-managed government-owned property 
falls into four main categories. These are the Air Force Contract 
Augmentation Program, selective programs under DOD's Joint Contracting 
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, programs run by the Gulf Region Division of 
the Army Corps of Engineers, and hundreds of smaller programs run by 
individual U.S. government agencies. Defense Contract Management Agency 
officials reported that property in these four categories includes, but 
is not limited to, plant equipment and materiel to support various 
reconstruction efforts like the Iraqi Department of Public Works. 

Several DOD organizations have already begun planning for the 
disposition of excess contractor-managed government-owned property from 
Iraq.[Footnote 38] For example, in October 2007, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness increased the 
donation threshold for all excess U.S.-owned personal property in Iraq 
from $5,000 to $10,000[Footnote 39] and delegated this donation 
authority to MNF-I. According to DOD officials, in June 2008, the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel readiness 
increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as donation 
authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq from 
$10,000 to $15,000. In addition, in 2007 the Army published guidelines 
for the retrograde of contractor-acquired government-owned property 
from CENTCOM's area of responsibility.[Footnote 40] The Army followed 
this up in December 2007 with a business case analysis of the effective 
disposition of contractor-acquired government-owned property and a 
conference in May 2008 during which it updated and developed polices 
and processes for maintaining accountability over this 
property.[Footnote 41] The Army's analysis indicates that approximately 
85 percent of all contractor-acquired government-owned property in Iraq 
should be transferred,[Footnote 42] sold, or scrapped in Iraq once it 
is declared excess,[Footnote 43] while the remaining 15 percent can be 
sold or reused elsewhere. Finally, in its Logistics Reposture Guidance, 
MNF-I established policies and procedures for disposing of contractor- 
managed government-owned property in Iraq. This process is shown in 
figure 2 below. 

Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government- 
Owned Property: 

This figure is a flowchart illustrating the MNF-I process for disposing 
of contractor-managed government-owned property. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

Despite the above efforts, however, three challenges exist to 
maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of 
contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. The first 
challenge is determining the original or fair-market value of 
contractor-managed government-owned property and determining any 
security restrictions on its disposition. According to MNF-I, the 
failure to sort and identify U.S. government materiel in Iraq has 
already resulted in the retrograding of items that are unserviceable, 
are still needed in theater, or are uneconomical to retrograde. 
Moreover, according to the Department of the Army's business case 
analysis, the LOGCAP property book kept by the prime contractor had 
numerous omissions, and many items were not properly listed, creating 
doubt about the inventory's accuracy. Without accurate accountability 
of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, the U.S. 
government may fail to realize all possible financial and practical 
gains from this property. 

The second challenge facing DOD, according to Defense Contract 
Management Agency officials, is the time-consuming and labor-intensive 
task of accounting for and determining the disposition of contractor- 
managed government-owned property. According to MNF-I, before 
contractor-managed government-owned property can be disposed of it must 
be transferred from the contractor's records to a military unit's 
property book. However, officials from the Defense Contracting 
Management Agency stated that contractors and government officials must 
perform a joint inventory of all property before it is transferred. 
Defense Contract Management Agency officials assert that completing 
this inventory will require planning, travel to storage locations, and 
the physical staging of property for easier counting, all of which are 
time consuming. Moreover, the same officials stated that security 
concerns have previously hindered their ability to travel to all 
inventory locations. According to AMC, if the security situation 
inhibits contractors from moving equipment, the contractors can abandon 
the equipment to U.S. forces that will then be responsible for its 
disposition. Defense Contract Management Agency officials stated that 
without adequate time and resources to plan and execute a thorough 
inventory of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, the 
risks of losing accountability over this property will increase. 

The third challenge is that DLA may not have sufficient data to 
adequately plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and 
Marketing Offices in theater.[Footnote 44] MNF-I policy states that 
contractor-managed government-owned property that is excess to 
government requirements, and is not donated to the Iraqi government, 
will be disposed of at DLA facilities. To prepare for this, DLA 
officials attached to MNF-I told us they spent 3 months performing a 
detailed analysis of how much equipment will end up at these facilities 
in theater. Despite these efforts, however, there are six factors that 
may affect DLA's ability to accumulate sufficient data to adequately 
plan capacity needs at DLA's disposal facilities. 

* LOGCAP inventory accuracy. A Department of the Army business case 
analysis stated that problems with the LOGCAP property book created 
doubt about the inventory's accuracy. While according to an Army 
official the LOGCAP prime contractor is currently performing an 
inventory of all of its property in Iraq, the process is adding new 
items to their property books, making older property estimates 
outdated. 

* Lack of property disposal estimates. According to DOD officials, MNF- 
I requested but never received the services' estimates of what they 
anticipate sending to the disposal facilities. 

* Lack of property book data. According to DOD officials, MNF-I did not 
receive property books from the Army Corps of Engineers and only 
received partial information from the Air Force Contract Augmentation 
Program. 

* Lack of visibility over non-DOD property. According to Defense 
Contract Management Agency officials, it is difficult to determine how 
much equipment is managed by contractors under the hundreds of smaller 
programs run by individual U.S. government agencies. 

* Lack of individual item accountability. According to DOD officials, 
many of the systems used to account for contractor-managed government- 
owned property only track types of items, but not necessarily the 
individual items themselves, making detailed estimates difficult. 

* Insufficient training. According to DOD officials, some retrograde 
process teams sent to aid redeploying units have not had sufficient 
training, causing them to send unnecessary property to disposal 
facilities. 

DLA has implemented other initiatives to mitigate and prepare for 
increased operations at the disposal facilities. For example, DLA 
fielded individuals to accompany a key retrograde assistance team to 
prevent unnecessary equipment from ending up at these facilities and, 
according to DLA officials, in one instance they successfully rerouted 
194 of 200 containers, reducing the chance of double-handling this 
property. However, without a comprehensive picture of all property in 
theater, DLA may not be able to fully prepare its disposal facilities 
for the contractor-managed government-owned property that will flow to 
them, particularly in the event of a full-scale reposturing. 

Use of Facilities in Kuwait and Other Neighboring Countries: 

The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel 
retrograded as part of any reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq would 
be governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as 
well as restrictions on the use of those facilities. According to DOD 
officials, Kuwait is the main point of exit for all personnel, 
equipment, and materiel in Iraq. At present there are three U.S. bases 
and five Kuwait facilities that the United States is using to support 
operations in Iraq, including retrograde and redeployment operations. 
The U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the use of these 
facilities. According to DOD officials, any reposturing effort must 
take into consideration the terms of the Defense Cooperation Agreement 
and ongoing negotiations related to that agreement, particularly given 
that in their view, the government of Kuwait desires to limit the size 
of the U.S. footprint in Kuwait. DOD has explored alternative routes 
and ports through which to redeploy units and retrograde equipment and 
material but these, too, are constrained because of capacity and other 
considerations. For example, in February 2008 the Marine Corps began 
testing the feasibility of using an alternate port in the region for 
redeployment and retrograde operations.[Footnote 45] However, Marine 
Corps officials stated that though the tests have been successful, at 
present the country in which that port is located only allows the 
transport of containerized cargo through its territory and will not 
permit U.S. military security detachments to escort the cargo. As a 
result of these restrictions, Marine Corps officials reported they 
could retrograde only 20 to 30 percent of their nonsensitive materiel 
and equipment in Iraq through this port. ARCENT officials are also 
studying the feasibility of using two other alternate ports in the 
region. However, according to ARCENT documents, one port has limited 
utility as a retrograde port because the shallow draft of the harbor 
makes its unsuitable for larger ships, the port's facilities are in 
need of significant renovation, and local security at the port is 
questionable. The third port is limited to containerized cargo as well 
as being limited by the amount of cargo traffic that can travel along 
the port's approach roads. 

Availability of Wash Racks and Customs Personnel: 

Limits on the availability of wash racks in Kuwait and a limited number 
of customs inspectors comprise another constraint on the pace at which 
retrograde operations can be effected. Prior to returning to the United 
States all materiel and equipment must be cleaned to U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) standards. These standards are outlined in The Armed 
Forces Pest Management Board Technical Guide No. 31, which states that 
"USDA inspection standards only allow a thin film of road dust on 
vehicles and equipment arriving at the CONUS [continental United 
States] final port of entry," which DOD officials interpret to mean 
that materiel and equipment cannot have even a "pinchable" amount of 
dirt. To meet these standards of cleanliness, DOD officials stated that 
all vehicles returning to the United States are pressure washed. This 
involves, first, removing the vehicle's secondary equipment and any add-
on armor. Next, the vehicle moves to a wash rack where the pressure 
washing occurs. For larger vehicles, such as tanks, Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles, and M88 recovery vehicles this can take anywhere from 40 to 
80 hours (larger vehicles must also have their engines removed and the 
engine compartment cleaned as well). Smaller vehicles, such as HMMWVs, 
take anywhere from 4 to 8 hours. 

At present there are 211 wash racks available for use by U.S. forces in 
Kuwait, 81 at Camp Arifjan and another 130 at Kuwait Naval 
Base.[Footnote 46] According to DOD officials, the wash racks at Camp 
Arifjan operate 24 hours a day. However, wash rack operations at Kuwait 
Naval Base are subject to occasional work stoppages and other 
restrictions. For example, when ammunition is being loaded or unloaded 
at the naval base, wash rack operations there are suspended for safety 
reasons. According to DOD officials, at present this only occurs for 6 
days each quarter, but if the retrograde of ammunition were accelerated 
this could occur more often. Moreover, theater provided equipment, 
which is washed by contracted third-country nationals, cannot be washed 
at Kuwait Naval Base because of security concerns. And of the 130 wash 
racks at the naval base, only 100 are useable for the cleaning of 
equipment because the remaining 30 lack the necessary filters that 
separate contaminates from the wash water. 

Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks: 

This figure is a photograph of Bradley fighting vehicles on wash racks. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack: 

This figure is a photograph of HMMWV on a wash rack. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

After being washed, vehicles are inspected by military personnel who 
have been specially trained and certified by the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection Agency. These customs inspectors ensure that before 
any vehicle or piece of equipment is placed in a sterile lot, the last 
stop before it boards transport for return to the United States, it 
meets USDA standards of cleanliness. In Kuwait, these trained 
inspectors are provided by the U.S. Navy. Navy officials have stated 
that at present there is no shortage of trained and certified customs 
inspectors in Kuwait given the current throughput of retrograding 
material and equipment. However, other DOD officials have noted that 
were the pace of retrograde increased, more customs inspectors would be 
necessary. They also stated that absent an increase in the number of 
inspectors, otherwise clean vehicles would be delayed from entering the 
sterile lot and would therefore require additional cleaning to meet 
customs standards of cleanliness. In turn, this could cause a backlog 
of vehicles and materiel in Kuwait. 

Availability of Transportation and Security Assets and Route 
Restrictions: 

The availability in theater of military owned and operated heavy 
equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined with limits 
on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of materiel out of 
Iraq. According to DOD officials, two types of heavy equipment 
transports (HET) support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of 
operations: commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored 
military transports with military crews. Both types of transport are 
used to haul vehicles like tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and HMMWVs 
over long distances.[Footnote 47] They also carry containers. 

According to DOD officials, there are sufficient quantities of civilian 
HETs in the Iraqi theater of operations. However, one factor affecting 
the frequency with which convoys can be mounted is the availability of 
military HETs and convoy security assets. According to officials from 
the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, most convoys comprise both 
civilian and military HETs, with the latter being interspersed 
throughout the convoy to facilitate control and security. Any increase 
in the number of civilian HETs without a corresponding increase in the 
number of military HETs, they maintain, increases the risk of 
accidents. However, DOD officials have reported shortages of military 
HETs in theater. In addition, officials from the 1st Theater 
Sustainment Command stated that each convoy is accompanied by a mounted 
security detachment. According to ARCENT officials, the availability of 
these convoy security assets could also inhibit the flow of materiel 
out of Iraq by decreasing the frequency with which convoys can be 
mounted. 

One other factor that could inhibit the rate by which units can be 
redeployed and material and equipment retrograded out of Iraq into 
Kuwait is the capacity of the primary supply route. Prior to May 2007, 
U.S. convoys used a six-lane concrete highway. However, according to 
III Corps officials, the government of Kuwait funded the construction 
of an alternate route that opened in May 2007. These officials 
explained that the new route is not wide enough to handle two-way HET 
traffic and is deteriorating. III Corps officials stated that, because 
of this, the flow of convoys north and south along the newer route must 
be staggered, which further limits the number and frequency of 
retrograde convoys. Moreover, according to DOD officials under all but 
the most extreme reposturing scenarios, substantial numbers of convoys 
will need to continue flowing north to resupply Coalition forces in 
Iraq. 

Home Station Issues: 

During our visits to units and installations in the United States as 
well as conversations with DOD officials, we became aware of several 
issues that could challenge units once they have returned to their home 
stations. Although these issues need to be explored further, they are 
included in this report because of their potential impact. These issues 
are: 

* A lack of sufficient numbers of mental health professionals to care 
for returning service members and their families. According to Army 
officials and GAO analysis there is already a deficiency in the number 
of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental 
health problems being reported by service members and their families. 
The Army has already taken steps to meet this challenge through hiring 
and contracting for additional mental health care professionals to meet 
the rising demand, but they report that there remains a dearth of 
qualified mental health professionals to provide the requisite care for 
service members and their families. 

* A lack of sufficient infrastructure. According to Army officials 
there is already insufficient infrastructure such as barracks, 
administrative and headquarters buildings, motor pools, and maintenance 
and training areas on several installations. This is due to the "Grow 
the Army" initiative which has increased the number of brigade combat 
teams in the Army since the beginning of the war in Iraq. As a result, 
some installations have more Army units assigned to them than there are 
facilities to support. Currently, the Army is able to mitigate this 
challenge because a certain number of units are always deployed. This 
allows the Army to use the same facilities for more than one unit. 
However, installation management officials are concerned that in the 
event of a major reposturing of units out of Iraq and the concomitant 
return of Army units to their home stations there will not be enough 
room to accommodate all of the equipment, unit headquarters staff, and 
soldiers stationed at an installation. 

* Needed future investments in training and equipment. According to 
recent testimony by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, 
resetting the force so that it is capable of "full spectrum operations" 
will require substantial future investments in time, money, and 
resources. This point was underscored for us during discussions with 
officials from the 1st Cavalry Division that had recently returned from 
Iraq. They told us that it would not be until 6 to 9 months after 
returning from Iraq that their brigade combat teams would have the 
necessary equipment with which to train. 

Lastly, though DOD is not required to report on the specific issues we 
identify in this report or possible mitigation plans related to these 
issues as part of the briefings they are required to provide to the 
congressional defense committees, we believe that without such specific 
information Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its 
oversight responsibilities and stewardship over DOD. 

Conclusions: 

Although DOD began in May 2008 to coordinate its planning for the 
reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq among its various relevant 
commands and organizations, it has not adequately delineated roles and 
responsibilities for the execution of the associated retrograde 
process. Specifically, although CENTCOM has designated an executive 
agent for the synchronization of retrograde operations in the theater, 
no unified or coordinated chain of command exists to account for the 
roles played by a variety of teams engaged in retrograde operations. In 
addition, while the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for 
retrograde of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until 
recently ARCENT had no command authority over the two Army units 
responsible for the retrograde of the bulk of material and equipment in 
Iraq. Instead, there are a variety of organizations, some in theater 
and others in the United States, that exercise influence over the 
retrograde process, either directly or through subordinate 
organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. The resulting lack of 
a unified or coordinated command structure is not only inconsistent 
with joint doctrine, but also increases confusion and causes 
inefficiencies in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of 
identified mitigation initiatives. 

In addition, we identified several other issues that DOD will need to 
consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. 
forces from Iraq to support future U.S objectives and strategy. While 
DOD has begun to address these issues, none of them have been fully 
addressed. Moreover, because Congress will have a role in funding and 
overseeing the reposturing effort, it is important that the Congress be 
informed of these issues since they will likely affect DOD's overall 
reposturing costs and execution. While DOD is required to brief the 
congressional defense committees on certain issues related to 
reposturing, it is not required to provide the specific information 
identified in our report. We believe that without such information, 
Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its oversight 
responsibilities and assess the extent to which DOD's plans are 
effective, efficient, and well-coordinated. 

Recommendations: 

To ensure that DOD can efficiently and effectively retrograde its 
materiel and equipment from Iraq, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, 
take steps to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations 
in support of the retrograde effort. These steps should address not 
only the Army field support brigades but also the theater property and 
retrograde support teams. We also recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the 
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain 
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To enhance its ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities, 
Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to include in its briefings 
submitted in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, specific details on the status of its reposturing 
planning and how it intends to mitigate specific reposturing issues, 
including those we identified in this report, as well as other 
challenges the department envisions as it proceeds with its reposturing 
efforts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 
with our two recommendations. Specifically, the department partially 
concurred with our first recommendation and fully concurred with our 
second recommendation. DOD also commented that from the time we began 
this review to the completion of our data collection, the operational 
environment in theater has changed, processes have been modified, and 
actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns identified in our 
draft report. We recognize in our report that the operational 
environment has changed over time and that DOD has recently modified 
some processes and taken actions to enhance its planning for the 
reposturing of forces from Iraq. However, as discussed below, we 
continue to believe that DOD needs to take additional actions to 
implement our recommendations and improve the efficiency of its 
retrograde process. 

In response to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, 
in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, take steps 
to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations in support 
of the retrograde effort, DOD stated that the current retrograde 
command and control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive 
results. DOD further commented that CENTCOM has designated the U.S. 
Army Central Command (ARCENT) as the executive agent for the retrograde 
process, and that ARCENT also has operational control of the two Army 
Field Sustainment Brigades we discuss in the report. DOD believes that 
the established liaison and supporting/supported relationships by 
retrograde support teams are achieving unity of effort in retrograding 
theater property through the regular Logistics Reposture Working Groups 
where collaboration and coordination occur. DOD further commented that, 
for a longer term solution, CENTCOM is taking steps to refine and 
solidify a theater logistics command and control structure from its 
current construct to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under 
the CENTCOM Commander. DOD stated that its plan for this new command is 
phased, conditions-based, and its execution will be coordinated within 
the overall theater posture process with appropriate DOD agencies and 
the military services. We support DOD's and CENTCOM's long-term plan to 
refine and solidify its command and control structure for managing and 
executing the retrograde process. In addition, we are aware that 
subsequent to completing our audit work in Kuwait and drafting our 
report, CENTCOM refined the logistical command and control structure by 
placing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades under the 
operational control of the commanding general, Army Materiel Command, 
Southwest Asia. Although we have not had the opportunity to evaluate 
the effect of this new command arrangement, we believe it to be a 
significant step toward the attainment of unity of command over the 
theater provided equipment retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not 
implemented a similar action with regard to the command and control of 
the ten theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate 
the redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this 
lack of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and 
responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and 
materiel unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe 
that DOD, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, 
needs to immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity 
regarding the command and control of the various commands and support 
teams that support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait. 

DOD fully concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary 
of Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the 
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain 
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD 
commented that it is actively assessing various data systems used to 
maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while in transit. 

DOD also provided a number of general and technical comments which we 
have incorporated in the report as appropriate. A complete copy of 
DOD's written comments, including the department's general and 
technical comments and our evaluation of each of those comments, is 
included in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also 
make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report 
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who 
made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis: 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
begun logistical planning for the reposturing of forces from Iraq and 
upon what assumptions it based its plans, we reviewed relevant 
briefings, orders, and staff analyses relating to the logistical 
planning effort and discussed the effort with DOD officials who were 
directly involved. We met with many of these individuals several times 
over the course of this engagement either in person, telephonically, or 
by video teleconference. As a result, we were able to obtain updated 
information that allowed us to discuss the means by which the 
logistical planning effort evolved over time. We also obtained copies 
of the briefings presented during the May 2008 logistical summit held 
at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, as well as a copy of the logistical 
reposturing order that resulted from that summit, and met with many of 
the senior DOD officials who participated in that summit. The documents 
we obtained and officials we spoke with were from U.S. Transportation 
Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command; Multinational 
Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command,; 
Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; 
U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan, 
Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; U.S. Army Forces 
Command; Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Headquarters, III 
Corps; and the 1st Theater Support Command. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and 
responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel 
and equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed documents from and 
interviewed officials in the organizations that were either directly 
responsible for the retrograde process or that negotiated the process. 
We also reviewed relevant DOD regulations and joint and Army doctrine 
publications. To determine how the retrograde process was actually 
executed we obtained documents and interviewed officials from 
Multinational Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel 
Command, to include the commanding general, Army Material Command, 
Southwest Asia; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, 
U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia, 
and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; 
Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; the 1st Theater Support 
Command; and the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades. To gain 
insight on the experience of units that had passed through the 
retrograde process we obtained documents and interviewed officials from 
III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, both at Fort Hood, Texas, and 
the II Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

During the course of this engagement we became aware of several 
challenges that could have an impact on the resposturing of U.S. forces 
from Iraq and have included a discussion of these challenges in this 
report in order to provide Congress with information it needs to 
effectively carry out its oversight functions. We based our discussion 
of those issues on documents we obtained and interviews with officials 
from Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps; 
U.S. Central Command; U.S. Transportation Command; U.S. Joint Forces 
Command; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command; III Corps 
and Fort Hood, Texas; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; 
Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Army Central at both 
Fort McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and 1st Theater 
Support Command. 

We have also provided in this report several challenges facing units 
once they have returned to their home stations. As with the challenges 
above, we became aware of these issues during the course of our 
engagement. Although these issues need to be explored further, they are 
included in this report because of the impact they could have on the 
morale and welfare of service members and their families and the 
potential costs and challenges associated with rebuilding unit 
readiness. We became aware of these issues following discussions with 
officials from U.S. Army Forces Command; Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management; U.S. Army Medical Command; U.S. Army 
Installation Management Command; the U.S. Army Surgeon General's 
Office; III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas; the 1st Cavalry Division; and 
Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force. 

From the fall of 2007 through the spring of 2008, we also made several 
attempts to visit Iraq to speak with officials from Multinational Force-
Iraq, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and various organizations involved with 
the logistical aspects of reposturing. But for reasons that are not 
entirely clear, DOD stated that it was unable to accommodate these 
visits. However, we were able to mitigate our inability to visit Iraq 
by: 

* interviewing officials with knowledge of the logistical aspects of 
reposturing who had recently returned from tours on the MNF-I or MNC-I 
staffs; 

* visiting Headquarters, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, after it 
returned from its block leave following its return from Iraq, where III 
Corps served as Headquarters, Multinational Corps-Iraq; 

* interviewing officials from organizations stationed in Iraq who were 
in Kuwait during our visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and: 

* submitting lists of questions through U.S. Central Command for 
organizations in Iraq. 

Although we were not always able to obtain full answers to our list of 
questions, based on our analysis of the information we were able to 
obtain we determined that we had sufficient information to substantiate 
our findings. 

We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
2400 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2400: 

International Security Affairs: 

Mr. William A. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 3, 2008: 

Dear Mr. Solis:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-930, "Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. 
Forces from Iraq," dated August 8, 2008 (GAO Code 351092). 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report and your 
effort to enhance the retrograde process from Iraq. From the period 
that GAO began its research until its data collection concluded, the 
operational environment in theater has changed, processes have been 
modified and set, and actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns 
identified in the draft report. Below are the Department's comments on 
the draft report's recommendations. 

Recommendation 1: To ensure that DoD can efficiently and effectively 
retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with U.S. Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) and the military departments, take steps to clarify the 
chain of command over logistical operations in support of the 
retrograde effort. These steps should address both the theater property 
and retrograde support teams and the Army field support brigades. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The current retrograde command and 
control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive results. 
USCENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as the executive 
agent for retrograde process. ARCENT also has operational control 
(OPCON) of the two Army Field Sustainment Brigades of concern in the 
draft report. Established liaison and supporting/supported 
relationships by retrograde support teams are achieving unity of effort 
in retrograding theater property through regular Logistics Reposture 
Working Groups where collaboration and coordination occur. 

For a longer term solution, USCENTCOM is also taking steps to refine 
and solidify a theater logistics command and control structure from its 
current construct to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under 
the CENTCOM Commander. The plan is phased, conditions-based, and its 
execution will be coordinated within the overall theater posture 
process with appropriate DoD agencies and the Services. 

Recommendation 2: GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the military departments, correct the incompatibility 
weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain visibility over 
equipment and materiel while they are in transit. 

DoD Response: Concur. DoD acknowledges the focus of this draft report 
has been on Army systems. DoD is actively assessing various data 
systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while 
in transit. Attached are additional detailed comments and corrections. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Christopher C. Straub: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East: 

Attachments: 
As stated.

Draft GAO Report ï¿½Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed To Enhance DOD
Planning For Reposturing Of U.S. Forces From Iraq,ï¿½ Dated August 8, 
2008: 

GAO CODE 351092/GAO-08-930: 

General Comments On The Draft Report: 

* Current retrograde efforts. As of August 2008, during fiscal year 
2008, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) has retrograded over 7,000 major end 
items back to CONUS. U.S. Marine Central is also successfully 
retrograding end items for reset. Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), 
through Defense Reutilization and Market Services in theater, has 
disposed of 175 million pounds of scrap metal. Through its 
transportation priority program, U.S. Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM) has saved the Army over 40% in shipping costs by using 
empty cargo aircraft backhaul capability. 

See comment 1. 

* Chain of command for logistics operations in support of retrograde. 
Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) has not been assigned from 
USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has designated ARCENT as the executive agent for 
logistics reposture/retrograde. In the Iraqi theater, MultiNational 
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) has established processes and procedures for 
addressing theater logistics issues. These lines of operations include 
basing, unit redeployment, and materiel disposition. Unity of effort is 
accomplished by working groups that have been established to 
collaborate and coordinate with joint stakeholders and partners. 
(Services, USCENTCOM, DLA, USTRANSCOM). For example, both MNF-I and 
MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) have established Logistics Reposture 
Working Groups. They are enduring forums that meet regularly with all 
the key logistics organizations in Iraq and Kuwait to address 
respective strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues. 
Two of the key documents are the MNF-I FRAGO 08-232 and draft MNC-I 
FRAGO that establish redeployment timelines. 

See comment 2. 

* Retrograde Support Teams are specifically addressed within these unit 
redeployment timelines. Each of the assistance teams have specific 
missions based on guidance and direction from parent commands and from 
operational commands in theater. Each assistance team is synchronized 
within the redeployment timeline and brings its own set of expertise to 
facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts. 

See comment 3. 

* Theater Property and Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) - The 
majority of equipment is organizational and will retrograde as a unit 
responsibility. Army Materiel Commandï¿½s (AMC) forward Field Support 
Brigades are responsible for retrograde of excess theater provided 
equipment and assuming control of organizational equipment directed for 
sustainment-level reset. 

See comment 4. 

* In transit visibility of materiel - For Army systems, AMC, with its 
subordinate commands and the various headquarters in theater, is 
actively working to establish a Reposturing Common Operating Picture 
(RCOP) to mitigate the cited incompatibility weaknesses in the various 
data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel 
while in transit. While significant challenges in this process remain, 
AMC has already identified system interfaces to be used. Moreover, a 
RCOP Working Group will meet regularly to establish the necessary 
systems interfaces and address procedures used for accountability, 
transportation scheduling and documentation, and equipment in-transit 
visibility. In addition to these efforts, USCENTCOM J4 has joined with 
JFCOM J9 to identify distribution/in-transit visibility requirements, 
processes and capability gaps to the Joint Staff J4 to support the 
development of in-transit visibility capabilities for Joint Logistics 
Organizations within Global Combat Support System ï¿½ Joint (GCSS-J). 

See comment 5. 

1. Highlight Page, second paragraph. We recommend rewording of the 
first four lines of this paragraph to more accurately portray what has 
occurred since May 2008. As noted from page 15, the draft clearly 
states representatives from throughout the logistics community and 
theater met as a result of the increased coordination and synchronized 
planning, and the outcome was the MNF-I publication of its overarching 
guidance for the logistics reposturing. 

See comment 6. 

2. Pages 1, 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 25, 26, 33. There are several references 
to ï¿½basesï¿½ throughout the report, especially linked to the number 311. 
This does not accurately characterize the force laydown in Iraq. The 
word ï¿½basesï¿½ should be replaced by ï¿½locationsï¿½ in most cases to reflect 
the true nature of the places used by U.S. forces. 

See comment 7. 

3. Page 1. The draft report states, ï¿½as of July 2008, this pool of 
theater provided equipment totaled approximately 582,000 individual 
pieces worth about $15.5 billion.ï¿½ Army G8 reports that, for Class VII 
items in Iraq only, a property book pull from the end of March 2008, 
used in a J8/OSD Study, found 173,000 items (Class VII only) worth 
approximately $16.5 billion. 

See comment 8. 

4. Page 2. Recommend deletion of the sentence: ï¿½In addition, in June 
2008, GAO also issued an assessment of progress in Iraq and called for 
DOD and the DOS to develop an updated strategy given the changing 
conditions.ï¿½ This sentence is not relevant to the GAOï¿½s objectives for 
this engagement, and the referenced GAO reportï¿½s conclusions were 
rebutted by DoD. 

See comment 9. 

5. Pages 1-3. Discussions regarding the National Defense Authorization 
Act for 2008 appear as a distraction from the draft report and its 
overall conclusions. 

See comment 10. 

6. Page 5. First paragraph, please add: ï¿½Army Headquarters G-4 began 
hosting retrograde video teleconferences (VTCs) in June 2006 and moved 
to monthly VTCs in August 2007. The purpose of the VTCs was to 
synchronize retrograde planning efforts. DLA and AMC participated in 
the VTCs. Starting in October 2007, Army Headquarters G-4 expanded the 
Retrograde Task Force to include OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and USTRANSCOM, NG, and OCAR. 

See comment 11. 

7. Page 7. Concerning capacity of military transports and convoy 
security assets and limits on the main supply route, we partially 
concur. We concur with the draft GAO report that sufficient commercial 
heavy equipment transports (HET) assets exists in theater to augment 
military HET assets for redeployment operations. Additionally, other 
transports such as flatbeds and lowboys, can move all but the heaviest 
equipment, reducing the need for HET transports. However, we partially 
concur with the statement regarding limits on convoy security assets. 
While convoy security requirements stretch resources, approved 
commercial security firms can be contracted to provide additional 
security teams that can be used for sustainment missions, freeing up 
military escort teams to support redeployment. Additionally the 
military has an active program that eliminates the requirement to 
provide security for low priority materials, thereby freeing up more 
military escort teams. If necessary, military units can provide 
security for their own assets as they redeploy. We concur with the GAO 
statement regarding insufficiency of mass redeployments through Kuwait, 
and DoD is actively engaged in increasing the availability and capacity 
of redeployment of assets through alternative ports in Jordan and 
Turkey, as well as Iraqï¿½s own major port, Umm Qasr. Efforts are also 
underway to make greater use of the Iraq railroad and Iraqi 
Transportation Network, which will have the potential to move 
significant amounts of cargo to points near redeployment ports. 

See comment 12. 

8. Page 7, 37-38. Concerning the increased demand for access to mental 
healthcare providers, the draft GAO report states, ï¿½According to Army 
officials and GAO analysis, there is already a shortfall in the number 
of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental 
health problems being reported by service members and their families.ï¿½ 
We concur and note: MNF-I CJ1/4/8 Surgeon is following established 
procedures to ensure all service members take Post Deployment Health 
Assessments 30 days prior to redeploying. Service members are required 
to take another Post Deployment Health Assessment 90-120 days after 
returning to CONUS and home station. These surveys are essential to 
monitor mental health throughout DoD. In addition, teams of mental 
health professionals conduct surveys in theater to keep commanders 
apprised on issues of mental health. 

See comment 13. 

9. Page 12. The report states that ï¿½Despite working on the same broad 
set of issues, however, there was little coordination and communication 
among the three organizations. Moreover, both USCENTCOM, the combatant 
command whose area of responsibility includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-
I, the headquarters responsible for operations in Iraq, provided little 
input and guidance to these planning efforts.ï¿½ Recommend delete above 
statement and change statement to read: ï¿½The coordination was 
maintained at an informal liaison level.ï¿½ The Army Sustainment Command 
(ASC) liaison officer at USCENTCOM J4 worked with ASC and USCENTCOM J4 
to prepare the command for future reposture/retrograde efforts in July 
and August 2007. This assisted in preparing AMCï¿½s warning order. 

See comment 14. 

10. Page 15. Recommend adding the following: ï¿½The MNF-I Logistics 
Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with all the key logistics 
organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It meets monthly and 
addresses strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues. 
It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) or Operational 
Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics related issues.ï¿½ 

See comment 15. 

11. Page 15. The MNF-I FRAGO on Logistics Reposture Guidance not only 
addresses Materiel Disposition and Unit Redeployment, but also 
addresses basing. Recommend adding the following: ï¿½Basing options 
include a baseï¿½s closure, a transfer to the Government of Iraq, or a 
ï¿½shrink and shareï¿½ of a base where both Iraqis and Coalition forces 
collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship.ï¿½ 

See comment 16. 

12. Page 17. Regarding unity of command, although the command and 
control is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control system, 
it is the theater process by which units have redeployed successfully 
since the beginning of OIF. It requires constant management, interface, 
and decision making across all levels of logistics. Deliberate/advance 
planning, communication via liaison officers, and collaboration are all 
essential to making the process function. 

See comment 17. 

13. Pages 6-7. We recommend deleting the footnote attached to the 
standards for environmental management and guidance for the disposition 
of property. Additionally, MNF-I has procedures in place regarding 
environmental management and base closure/return. 

See comment 18. 

14. Page 6-7. In addition, MNF-I, working with MNC-I, has a base 
closure/return plan in place that has been used successfully in the 
past and is currently being refined as we engage more with the GoI on 
closures/returns and property transfers (real property and personal 
property). A Combined Basing Board is now in the planning phases and 
will involve the Iraqi Government for decisions on base 
closures/return/property transfers once a site has been nominated by 
Coalition forces to close/return. MNF-I, in conjunction with MNC-I, is 
working to limit the current environmental management requirement. 
Although time and cost of environmental management will be difficult to 
assess, progress is being made to reduce this. Examples include: 

See comment 19. 

- There are 17 operational incinerators in Iraq, with 23 under 
construction or funded, which will reduce cost/time of burn pit 
management. 

- MNF-I anticipated a $54 million contract award date of September 1, 
2008 for five Hazardous Waste Disposal Centers, which will also reduce 
cost/time of environmental management. 

15. Summary, 3rd paragraph. Delete ï¿½agreed upon standards for 
environmental cleanup andï¿½ 

See comment 20. 

16. Page 7. 1st bullet. Delete ï¿½standards for environmental cleanup 
and.ï¿½ 

See comment 21. 

17. Page 7. Delete footnote 7. 

See comment 22. 

18. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Delete ï¿½environmental 
clean up and.ï¿½ 

See comment 23. 

19. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete ï¿½both issues areï¿½ 
and insert ï¿½this issue is.ï¿½ 

See comment 24. 

20. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the fourth sentence. 

See comment 25. 

21. Page 27, 1st paragraph. Delete the last sentence (beginning with 
ï¿½Moreoverï¿½). 

See comment 26. 

22. Comment on Environmental Remediation (Comments 13-21 above). The 
draft report makes several assertions, both directly and by 
implication, relating to environmental remediation that are not 
accurate. The statements are also conclusory without supporting 
information. It is the longstanding policy of the Department of Defense 
that it does not engage in environmental remediation for the purpose of 
returning an installation to the host nation. Likewise, it is the 
longstanding policy of the Department of Defense that it does not 
engage in environmental remediation after return of an installation, 
other than in very limited circumstances where the remediation effort 
began prior to the decision to return and is already underway. See, 
e.g., DoD Instruction 4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DoD 
Activities Overseas, and DoD Instruction 4165.69, Realignment of DoD 
Sites Overseas. 

It is relatively rare that a Status of Forces Agreement addresses the 
issue of environmental remediation and, without exception, none provide 
ï¿½standardsï¿½ for such remediation. This is consistent with the 
Departmentï¿½s policy that such remediation will not be conducted by the 
United States, other than pursuant to DoDI 4715.8. The issue of 
environmental remediation at installations outside the United States 
has been the subject of negotiations at numerous locations. To the 
extent that the United States ï¿½paysï¿½ for such remediation after return, 
it is through the mechanism of reducing the residual value payment to 
reflect the cost of cleanup. Since the residual value payment reflects 
the current value, it is perfectly consistent with standard real estate 
assessment practice to consider the cost of any required environmental 
remediation as a deduction from total value. In fact, the requirements 
of DoDI 4165.69 to perform a baseline survey is designed to facilitate 
an informed discussion of the residual value in relation to any 
required environmental remediation. 

The Department of Defense conducts environmental remediation at its 
locations outside of the United States for the purpose of protecting 
our personnel (and visitors) located on our installations. Such 
remediation is not conducted to comply with, e.g., the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, which 
has no extraterritorial application. Such remediation is only conducted 
to address known imminent and substantial endangerments. What 
constitutes a known imminent and substantial endangerment is wholly 
dependent on the specific factual situation and is not amenable to the 
setting of general ï¿½standardsï¿½ as is the case in the United States. 
Unless the United States has agreed to be bound by host nation law, 
which has not happened in the area of environmental remediation, there 
is no legal ï¿½standardï¿½ to be applied for purposes of environmental 
remediation of installations being used by United States forces. 

It should also be noted that it is not uncommon for United States 
forces to be stationed on real property that is already contaminated by 
prior users. Such contamination frequently is discovered only after 
occupancy, particularly with regard to locations occupied during combat 
operations where there is rarely time or resources to conduct an 
environmental survey. 

These comments should not be read as asserting that the Department 
expects to simply abandon hazardous materials when departing a site in 
a foreign location. It is also longstanding Departmental policy to 
handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner that conforms to 
practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given the 
circumstances. For instance, a site should not have solid waste 
(refuse) scattered around and, to the extent it does, the waste should 
be cleaned up prior to departure. Hazardous materials should be 
retrograded. Hazardous wastes should be disposed of by proper disposal 
or treatment when generated. These are standard practices required by 
existing policy and procedures. 

The draft reportï¿½s assertions regarding establishing standards for 
environmental remediation are based on flawed assumptions and a 
misunderstanding of Department policy and practices worldwide. 

23. Comment on Environmental Management. Change ï¿½environmental cleanupï¿½ 
and ï¿½cleanupï¿½ wherever they appear to ï¿½environmental managementï¿½ and 
ï¿½managementï¿½ as the case may be. The situations being addressed, e.g., 
reducing burn pit volume by use of incinerators, is a management 
function, not cleanup function. Cleanup would be removal of 
contamination such as a chemical plume under the surface. Proper 
disposition of waste in a burn pit is actually an environmental 
management function (ï¿½complianceï¿½ function). To avoid possible 
misunderstanding, the term ï¿½cleanupï¿½ should only be used when referring 
to remediation, not to disposing of waste. 

See comment 28. 

24. Page 11. Delete ï¿½FOB McKenzieï¿½. It has been closed. 

See comment 29. 

25. Page 18. Regarding assistance teams, each of the assistance teams 
have specific missions based on guidance and direction from parent 
commands and from operational commands here in theater. Each assistance 
team is synchronized within the redeployment timeline and brings its 
own set of expertise to facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts 
at specific dates. 

See comment 30. 

26. Page 18-19. Regarding base closure, MNF-I is in the process of 
establishing a Combined Basing Plan and Process. An Operational 
Planning Team will conduct a mission analysis to close, transfer, or 
share Coalition forces bases, and integrate and collaborate their 
efforts with the Government of Iraq. 

See comment 31. 

27. Page 18, 19, 51. Change Redistribution Property Accountability 
Teams to Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPAT). 

See comment 32. 

28. Page 18. Delete. ï¿½No single organization has authority over Theater 
Property and Retrograde Support Teams.ï¿½ Replace with: ï¿½AMC has 
Authority over Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams.ï¿½ The 
402nd AFSB under the Army Sustainment Command/AMC is the C2 for all 
RPATs in Iraq. They also control RFATs (Redistribution Fly-away 
Assistance Teams), which remotely go where a permanent RPAT site is not 
located. 

See comment 33. 

29. Page 20. Delete: ï¿½No Theater Logistical Organization has Command 
Authority over Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment 
in Theater.ï¿½ Replace with: ï¿½AMC has Command Authority over most units 
responsible for the retrograde of equipment in Theater.ï¿½ The 402nd AFSB 
is responsible for retrograde in Iraq and the 401st AFSB is responsible 
for retrograde in Kuwait. All of these units fall under AMC/ASC and the 
AMC Forward Commanding General is also the ARCENT/CFLCC C4. 

See comment 34. 

30. Page 19. The report states ï¿½For example, the Joint Redeployment 
Support Team, which reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the 
mission of supplying customs, disposition, hazardous material, and 
transportation expertise to redeploying units and is to enable in-
transit visibility over a unitï¿½s materiel and equipment from its FOB to 
the unitï¿½s home station or to an identified depot.ï¿½ Comment: This 
statement implies that the JRST is executing its mission in the Iraq 
Theater of Operations. The concept of using JRSTs has not been executed 
because the capability already exists in theater with the Deployment 
Support Brigade. We recommend deleting this sentence. 

See comment 35. 

31. Pages 22-25. The section titled ï¿½Logistical Organizations Have Not 
Enforced or Lack the Authority to Enforce Improvements to the 
Retrograde Process (to include Appendix VI)ï¿½ is not accurate. Recommend 
the entire section and Appendix be deleted from the GAO report. The 
correct automation flow is attached. 

See comment 36. 

* All items retrograded from Iraq have Radio Frequency Identification 
Device (RFID) tags attached; RFID tags provide in-transit visibility 
via an in transit visibility (ITV) system. The accountable record and 
visibility system used for this process is Standard Depot System (SDS), 
which is a standard wholesale system used by the Army. USCENTCOMï¿½s RFID 
database can view the exact location of any item with an attached RFID 
tag at any time. 

* The description of the process in this section of the GAO report is 
incorrect. Below is the correct process for accountability and 
visibility from the war fighter to AMC: 

- Unit creates Army Reset Management Tool (ARMT) plan in Logistics 
Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET. 

- Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to 
life cycle management command (LCMC) for decision and disposition 
(DISPO). 

- If equipment meets RESET criteria, LCMC enters what depot to ship to. 

- Equipment is electronically transferred from PBUSE (Property Book 
Unit Supply Enhanced) to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System) via 
interface. 

- AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via interface. 

- Site generates Excel spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain 
Inter-Depot Transfer (IDT) from Iraq to Kuwait. 

- Upon receipt of IDT, it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID 
Tag. 

* SDS is a standard accountability system as is Standard Army Retail 
Supply System (SARSS), and neither system tracks by serial number 
except for weapons and sensitive items. The Army War Reserve Deployment 
System (AWRDS) is used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS. 
AWRDS has automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and 
PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced) the retail system. 

* AWRDS creates the document needed to provide the LCMC with a list of 
items that require disposition. SARSS can produce an automated request 
for disposition, but it still requires manual intervention by the LCMC 
item managers to provide disposition. The reason this is manual is the 
LCMC must determine where to send items for repair-based on available 
work load. This process takes 72 stateside work hours to complete. 

* There is no loss of visibility of items being shipped out of Kuwait 
because the Global Transportation Network (GTN) has visibility of the 
RFID tags that are installed on all equipment. The IDT creates an 
automated Pre-Positioned Materiel Receipt Document (PMRD) on the 
gaining depotï¿½s SDS. 

* Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping manifest, it is not 
required because all of the information on the items is available 
through GTN. 

* The OPORD addressed in this section was published and released on 18 
Apr 08 without proper coordination. Upon receipt of the OPORD, the 
401st AFSB, 402nd AFSB, and LOGSA Commanders raised numerous concerns 
with using SARSS. During a teleconference between ASC and the 
commanders, the decision was made to put the OPORD on hold until a 
decision by the ASC commanding general (CG) could be made. The ASC CG 
tasked ASC Field Support to work jointly with LOGSA, AMC, LCMCï¿½s, 401st 
AFSB, and 402nd AFSB to review the proposed processes and resolve the 
concerns. On 23 Jul 08 a decision was made by the ASC CG to continue to 
use SDS and AWRDS, and a FRAGO was published to the OPORD. 

32. Page 23, 4th paragraph. We recommend rewording of this paragraph 
for clarity. In addition, that fact that the manifest does not reach 
the 401st until 24-48 hours after sail really is not an issue since the 
motor vessel will take at least three weeks to reach CONUS, leaving 
time for the CONUS teams to prepare to receive the materiel. 

See comment 37. 

33. Pages 25-6, final paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after 
ï¿½costlyï¿½ and strike the rest of the sentence. 

See comment 38. 

34. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after 
ï¿½estimateï¿½ and strike the rest of the sentence. 

See comment 39. 

35. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the second sentence. 

See comment 40. 

36. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete ï¿½absent an agreement with Iraq 
on the disposition of personal propertyï¿½ and substitute therefore 
ï¿½absent a legal basis for turnover and agreement by Iraq to take 
possession.ï¿½ 

See comment 41. 

37. Page 26, final paragraph. Delete the first sentence. 

See comment 42. 

38. Page 26, final paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete ï¿½For example.ï¿½ 

See comment 43. 

39. Comments on SOFA (Comments 33-38 above). The draft report makes 
several assertions, both directly and by implication, relating to what 
is typically addressed in status of forces agreements (SOFA), and 
regarding what will or should be contained in a bilateral agreement 
with Iraq. The statements are inaccurate and misleading. SOFAs are the 
product of bilateral negotiations. Therefore, no two are the same, nor 
do any two contain the same provisions. In particular, ï¿½base closuresï¿½ 
are not typically addressed in a SOFA (or related access agreement). A 
ï¿½typicalï¿½ SOFA (or access agreement) might address the following: 1) 
DoD access to government-owned property, 2) DoD authorization to make 
improvements to such property, 3) DoDï¿½s obligation to return the 
property, once no longer needed,; and, 4) consultation with the host 
nation at the time such property is returned regarding compensation for 
the residual value of any DoD-funded improvements to the property. It 
is relatively rare that a SOFA (or access agreement) will address in 
any detail the issue of ï¿½base closureï¿½ or estimates of costs of such 
closures or property returns. It also is noteworthy that SOFAs (and 
access agreements) are typically negotiated during peace time, and 
before DoD has any sizable presence and/or has been granted use of 
government property in the host nation. Bilateral agreements with Iraq 
are currently under negotiation. It would be inappropriate to speculate 
what might or should be in those agreements in this report. Finally, 
there is no legal requirement for ï¿½an agreement with Iraq on the 
disposition of personal property.ï¿½ 

See comment 44. 

See comment 45. 

40. Page 27. Regarding, ï¿½Joint doctrine states that detailed planning 
should be done for contracting support and contractor integration to 
ensure that contractor support is fully integrated and on par with 
forces planning. Such planning should identify sources of supplies and 
services from civilian sources and integrate them with operational 
requirements,ï¿½ we partially concur with this statement. Joint doctrine 
regarding contract support and contractor integration is insufficient. 
The Joint Staff J4 is presently addressing this issue by developing 
Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support), which 
combatant commands, to include USCENTCOM, reviewed and commented on. 
This joint publication, when released, will present new doctrinal 
concepts that provide much improved guidance for integrating contract 
support and management of contractors into military plans. DoD 
contracting personnel generally are not planners, and DoD lacks 
sufficient operational contract support planners to ensure contract 
support and contractor integration is effectively represented in plans. 
In December 2007, OSD began to address this issue by providing joint 
operational contract support planners (JOCSPs) to each of the combatant 
commands, including USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has two JOCSPs that are 
reviewing concept plans (CONPLANS) and preparing Annex Wï¿½s (Contract 
Support Integration Plan). In fact, USCENTCOM JOCSPs have been tasked 
by the Joint Staff J4 to develop an Annex W planning template for all 
of DoDï¿½s combatant commands. This template will eventually be 
incorporated into JOPES and future editions of the JP 4-10 by the Joint 
Staff. Recommend changing statement to read as: ï¿½Previous joint 
doctrine did not effectively provide guidance regarding contract 
support and contractor integration. However, DoD is addressing this 
with Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support). DoD 
contracting personnel are generally not experienced planners and 
combatant commands did not effectively integrate contract support and 
contractor integration into military plans. However, OSD recently 
addressed this issue by providing combatant commands with Joint 
Operational Contract Support Planners (JOCSPs). JOCSPs are developing 
contractor support integration plans and contractor management plans, 
and integrating them into the combatant commands plans.ï¿½ 

41. Page 28-33. Regarding guidance and plans for reposture of 
contractors from Iraq, the draft GAO report states ï¿½As of July 2008, 
reposture planning did not include a theater-wide plan for the 
reposture of approximately 149,400 contractors in Iraq, more than half 
of whom (58%) were U.S. citizens or third country nationals. Reposture 
planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it is the largest 
logistical support contract in Iraq. However, challenges remain in the 
planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP contractor personnel.ï¿½ We 
partially concur and provide the following: 

* The LOGCAP contractor (KBR) has base closing Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) that will follow MNF-I and MNC-I base closure planning 
and includes plans for contractor personnel. KBRï¿½s SOP has been 
developed from previous base closings and updated with lessons learned. 

* For planning integration, LOGCAP forward Liaison office (LNO) 
maintains a military officer at the Colonel level who focuses on MNF-I 
reposture planning groups; there is also a LNO in MNC-I C4 who 
facilitates theater reposture planning. 

* For accountability, the LOGCAP contractor force protection issue is 
calculated throughout the reposture process as troop strengths are 
phased from the base. 

See comment 46. 

42. Concerning accountability and disposition of contractor managed 
government owned property, GAO states ï¿½According to DOD officials, the 
largest portion of all CMGO property in Iraq, $3.37 billion (96%) falls 
under LOGCAP. The Armyï¿½s analysis indicates that approximately 85% of 
all CMGO property in Iraq will be transferred, sold, or scrapped in 
Iraq when U.S. forces reposture, while the remaining 15% can be sold or 
reused elsewhere. Three challenges remain: the need to determine FMV of 
CMGO and resolving any security restrictions, the time consuming & 
labor intensive task of accounting for and determining disposition of 
CMGO - transfer from contractor to military records, joint inventories, 
and DLA may not have sufficient data to adequately plan capacity at 
theater DRMOs).ï¿½ We concur and provide the following: MNF-I FRAGO 08-
232 published in May 08 includes CMGO property in its materiel 
disposition process, a CMGO FRAGO and MNC-I C4 FRAGO provides 
amplifying guidance on CMGO property, and while accountability of 
property is an on-going issue, progress is being made in improving the 
process and identifying excess materiel and equipment for reposture. 
DLA is also conducting on-site surveys of its four DRMO sites in Iraq, 
and it is included in the deliberate planning with reference to base 
closure and transfer. 

See comment 47. 

43. Page 29. Recommend adding the following sentences in quotes as an 
update to donation threshold authority. Several DoD organizations have 
already begun planning for the disposition of excess contractor-managed 
property from Iraq. For example, in October 2007, DoD increased the 
donation threshold for all excess U.S. owned personal property in Iraq 
from $5,000 to $10,000 and delegated this donation authority to MNF-I. 
Add the following: ï¿½In June 2008, DoD (DUSD, Logistics and Materiel 
Readiness) increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as 
donation authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq 
from $10,000 to $15,000. This DoD memo is a tiered authority which 
provides commanders greater flexibility and more decision-making 
capability at their respective levels.ï¿½ 

See comment 48. 

44. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the arrow labeled ï¿½saleï¿½ and 
pointed to ï¿½DRMSï¿½ be deleted. If an item is slated for sale or 
prepositioned stock, the sale will not cause the item to go the DRMS. 

See comment 49. 

45. Page 30, Figure 2. If an ï¿½over $5000ï¿½ item is not needed by 
military or contractors globally, there is an arrow showing it going to 
DRMS. However, the policy provides that before such an item would go to 
DRMS, an attempt will be made to donate the item to the Government of 
Iraq. This step needs to be included and shown in Figure 2. 

See comment 50. 

Figure: 

This figure illustrates a DOD proposed change to figure 2. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

46. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the box labeled ï¿½MNC-I determines 
othersï¿½ needs in theaterï¿½ should be rewritten to state ï¿½MNF-I/MNC-I 
team determines othersï¿½ needs in theater.ï¿½ 

See comment 51. 

47. Page 31. The report states that ï¿½DoD officials assert that 
completing this inventory will require planning, travel to storage 
locations, and physically staging the property for easier counting, 
which is time consuming.ï¿½ However, the policy assumes that the 
inventory will take place where the property is and that property will 
not be moved and stored solely to enable inventory and counting 
actions. The policy does not envision movement and storage for counting 
and, in fact, specifies a streamlined process (i.e. early donations of 
low value items) to aid in minimizing time requirements. We partially 
concur that, in general, the task will be time consuming and labor 
intensive even without the additional movement and storage being 
asserted. While a move for counting may on occasion be necessary, 
depending on the number of days allowed to clear a base, it is expected 
to be the exception and not the rule. 

See comment 52. 

48. Page 53, paragraph 1. Entire statement is inaccurate: Please see 
attached slides. Below is the process for accountability and visibility 
from the War Fighter to AMC: 

1. Unit creates ARMT (Army Reset Management Tool) plan in Logistics 
Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET. 

2. Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to 
the Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) for decision and disposition. 

3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to. 

4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply 
Enhanced) electronically to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System) 
via interface. 

5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for Standard Depot System (SDS) 
electronically via interface. 

6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain IDT 
Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait. 

7. Upon receipt of IDT it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID 
Tag. 

SDS is a standard accountability system, as is SARSS, and neither 
system tracks by serial number except for weapons and sensitive items. 
AWRDS is used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS. AWRDS has 
automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and PBUSE 
(Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced), the retail system. 

See comment 53. 

49. Page 54, paragraph 1. The AWRDS creates the document needed to 
provide the LCMC with a list of items that require disposition. SARSS 
can produce an automated request for disposition, but it still requires 
manual intervention by the LCMC item managers to provide disposition. 
The reason this is manual is the LCMC must determine where to send 
items for repair based on available work load. This process takes 72 
stateside work hours to complete. 

See comment 54. 

50. Page 54, paragraph 2. Visibility over the items being shipped out 
of Kuwait is never lost, as the Global Transportation Network has 
visibility of the RFID tags that are installed on all equipment. The 
IDT (Inter-Depot-Transfer) creates an automated PMRD (Pre-Positioned 
Materiel Receipt Document) on the gaining depots SDS. 

See comment 55. 

51. Page 54, paragraph 3. Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping 
manifest, this is not required, as all of the information on the items 
is available through GTN. 

See comment 56. 

52. As a general comment, the Department has an exiting data sharing 
strategy (DoD Directive 8320.02, December 2, 2004) that provides policy 
responsibility to implement data sharing throughout the Department of 
Defense. Communities of interest, which have cross cutting data sharing 
interests, should be established when there is a need and should be 
used to implement viable solutions for data sharing strategies and 
solutions for their functional areas. 

See comment 57. 

Figure: Retrograde Process Flow Using SDS/AWRDS: 

This figure is a DOD flowchart showing retrograde process flow using 
SDS/AWRDS. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Retrograde Process Flow as Designed(Continued): 

1. Unit creates ARMT plan in LIW nominating equipment for RESET. 

2. LOGSA sends ARMT data electronically to LCMC for decision and DISPO. 

3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to. 

4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE electronically to AWRDS via 
interface. 

5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via 
interface. 

6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtainIDT 
Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait.7.Upon receipt of IDT it is 
processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID Tag.

GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments: 

Comment 1: We recognize DOD's retrograde efforts as of August 2008. No 
change required. 

Comment 2: We are aware that subsequent to completing our audit work in 
Kuwait and drafting our report, CENTCOM refined the logistical command 
and control structure in June 2008 by placing the 401st and 402nd Army 
Field Support Brigades under the operational control of the commanding 
general, Army Materiel Command, Southwest Asia. Although we have not 
had the opportunity to evaluate the effect of this new command 
arrangement, we believe it to be a significant step toward the 
attainment of unity of command over the theater provided equipment 
retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not implemented a similar 
action with regard to the command and control of the eight of the ten 
theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the 
redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this lack 
of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and 
responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and 
materiel unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe 
that DOD, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, 
needs to immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity 
regarding the command and control of the various commands and teams 
that support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait. 

Comment 3: As we discussed in this report, five of the ten theater 
property and retrograde support teams assist units during the 
redeployment and retrograde process and in our report we briefly 
outline some of the actions for which they provide assistance in 
accordance with MNF-I's 180-day redeployment template (see table 1 of 
this report and the accompanying narrative). In addition, we provide 
more detail on each of the team's missions and higher headquarters in 
appendix IV of this report. No change required. 

Comment 4: DOD commented that "The majority of equipment is 
organizational and will retrograde as a unit responsibility." However, 
according to DOD officials we interviewed during this engagement, and 
who have direct oversight over the property books, the majority of 
equipment in Iraq, some 80 percent, is theater provided equipment. No 
change required. 

Comment 5: We recognize DOD is making efforts to improve In-transit 
visibility of materiel. No change required. 

Comment 6: See comment 2. No change required. 

Comment 7: Except where required for purposes of clarity and accuracy 
we have substituted the word "installation" or "installations" for 
"base" or "location." 

Comment 8: Based upon subsequent analysis and communication with 
subject matter experts, we updated the information in this paragraph to 
reflect new data. 

Comment 9: Although DOD disagreed with GAO's recommendation in the 
report in question, the intent of this reference is to provide for the 
reader a broader context in which the present report should be 
considered. 

Comment 10: The purpose of the discussion regarding the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 is to provide background 
information about DOD's reporting requirements and to demonstrate that, 
given the challenges to reposturing outlined in this report, Congress 
might elect to modify those reporting requirements. 

Comment 11: During the course of this engagement we met with 
representatives from a variety of organizations in order to determine 
the extent to which DOD has begun its logistical planning for the 
reposturing of forces from Iraq (see appendix I, scope and 
methodology). Although it is possible that some preliminary discussions 
regarding reposturing, redeployment, or retrograde operations may have 
occurred prior to the time outlined in this report, based on our 
meetings with DOD officials, the documents they provided us, and our 
analysis we determined that planning for the reposturing of post-surge 
forces from Iraq began in the fall of 2007 and that those planning 
efforts were not coordinated until May 2008. No change required. 

Comment 12: According to Army officials responsible for planning and 
executing convoy operations in Iraq and Kuwait, the number of HETs, 
convoy security assets, and crews to operate these assets were factors 
that limit the number of convoys that can be run given standard 
operating procedures current as of June 2008. The existence of 
potential mitigation strategies-such as using private security 
contractors, eliminating the requirement to provide security for low 
priority materials, and military units providing their own security- 
does not change the fact that the factors we outlined in this report 
remain limiting factors. No change required. 

Comment 13: We recognize DOD's interests to increase mental health 
surveillance for returning service members. No change required. 

Comment 14: We met with representatives from a variety of organizations 
several times over the course of this engagement either in person, 
telephonically, or by video teleconference (see appendix I, scope and 
methodology). As a result, we were able to obtain updated information 
that allowed us to discuss the means by which the logistical planning 
effort evolved over time. Based on these interviews and the information 
and documents we obtained during these meetings, our analysis indicates 
that despite working on the same broad set of issues, until late 2007 
there was little coordination among Army Materiel Command, the Defense 
Logistics Agency, and Headquarters, Department of the Army. Moreover, 
according to CENTCOM officials, with whom we met in February 2008, 
they, too, were waiting on input from MNF-I, and, according to 
officials representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was "close 
hold" in that headquarters until after the MNF-I commander's 
congressional testimony in April 2008. 

Comment 15: To provide more details and context to the discussion, we 
changed the text to incorporate DOD's additional information. 

Comment 16: See comment 15. 

Comment 17: We agree that the logistical command and control 
arrangement is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control 
system. However, based on our analysis of joint doctrine and 
information obtained from officials in the organizations that were 
either directly responsible for the retrograde process or that 
negotiated the process, we determined that the resulting lack of a 
unified or coordinated command structure is not only inconsistent with 
joint doctrine, it also increases confusion and causes inefficiencies 
in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of identified 
mitigation initiatives. No change required. 

Comment 18: For purposes of clarity, we deleted the footnote. As 
discussed in this report, CENTCOM has procedures in place regarding 
environmental management and property disposition during base closure/ 
return. Furthermore, as we explain in this report, according to DOD 
officials responsible for executing environmental management and base 
closure/return in Iraq, these officials had not, as of May 2008, 
received guidance detailed enough to predict the time and cost 
requirements of executing the environmental management and property 
disposition tasks that may be associated with base closure/return. See 
also comment 27. 

Comment 19: See comment 18. 

Comment 20: We believe that DOD comments 20 and 21 are duplicate 
comments, no change required; see comment 21. 

Comment 21: We changed "standards" to "guidance." See comment 27. 

Comment 22: As DOD suggested, we deleted the footnote. See comment 18. 

Comment 23: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning the 
potential environmental management of installations in Iraq that may be 
closed as a result of reposturing. No change required. 

Comment 24: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning for both 
the potential disposition of personal property located on installations 
in Iraq and the potential environmental management of these 
installations. No change required. 

Comment 25: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the 
potential disposition of personal property located on installations in 
Iraq. 

Comment 26: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the 
potential environmental management of installations in Iraq. No change 
required. 

Comment 27: We disagree with DOD's comments that we made incorrect 
assertions about environmental remediation, that we made flawed 
assumptions regarding remediation, or that we have a misunderstanding 
of the department's policies and practices. GAO is not making specific 
assertions regarding these issues. Rather, we are reporting that, as of 
May 2008, Army officials responsible for planning for logistical 
reposturing operations were considering these issues and that these 
considerations affected their planning. The information in this section 
accurately reflects May 2008 statements made by the Army officials 
responsible for both planning and executing environmental remediation 
operations in Iraq. 

Moreover, according to CENTCOM guidance all hazardous material and 
waste is to be removed or remediated from installations in Iraq used by 
U.S. forces. In May 2008, ARCENT officials responsible for planning the 
potential environmental management of installations in Iraq stated that 
they had not received sufficiently specific guidance from their higher 
headquarters with regard to environmental remediation on installations 
in Iraq that may be closed as a result of reposturing. While they 
expected such guidance to be part of a future bilateral agreement 
between the U.S. and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current 
planning purposes was the set of standards used in the U.S. for similar 
types of remediation practices. These officials explained that, in the 
absence of such guidance guidance, it is common practice to use such 
U.S. standards when planning and executing environmental remediation of 
foreign installations used by U.S. forces. This explanation is 
confirmed by DOD's comment that "It is also longstanding Departmental 
policy to handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner that 
conforms to practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given 
the circumstances." These Army officials also explained that until they 
received such guidance on environmental remediation, they may have 
difficulty estimating the time and cost of cleaning these 
installations. In another comment on this report, DOD concurs, stating 
that the "time and cost of environmental management [of installations 
in Iraq] will be difficult to assess." 

In regard to language used in the report, we have changed some terms 
for the purposes of clarity. We have changed "standards" to "guidance" 
and "status of forces agreements" to "bilateral agreements," where 
appropriate. 

Comment 28: We changed "environmental cleanup" and "cleanup" to 
"management," where appropriate. See comment 27. 

Comment 29: We updated figure 1 accordingly. 

Comment 30: See comment 3. 

Comment 31: See comment 18. 

Comment 32: According to Annex D of MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, summary 
attached as Appendix IV of this report, RPAT(s) stands for 
Redistribution Property Assistance Team(s). No change required. 

Comment 33: DOD maintains that Army Materiel Command has authority over 
theater property and retrograde support teams and lists one such team 
for which this is the case. We agree that AMC exercises command 
authority over two of these teams. However, according to documents 
obtained from ARCENT and MNF-I, there are ten such teams and command 
authority over these teams is distributed among various organizations 
(see appendix IV of this report). No change required. 

Comment 34: See comment 2. 

Comment 35: DOD contends that our statement about the Joint 
Redeployment Support Team implies that the team is executing its 
mission in the Iraqi theater of operations and that the concept of 
using this team has not been executed because the capability already 
exists in theater with the Deployment Support Brigade. However, in a 
briefing given during the May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan, 
Kuwait, ARCENT listed the Joint Redeployment Support Team as a team 
available to assist units and commanders with redeployment and 
retrograde of materiel and equipment, despite the fact that at the time 
of the briefing the team had not yet been sourced with personnel. In 
addition, in its Logistics Reposture Guidance (MNF-I FRAGO 08-232) MNF- 
I makes specific mention of the use of this team as it relates to 
redeployment and retrograde operations and delineates the specific 
mission for which this team is responsible (see appendix IV). In 
neither case is there any mention of the Deployment Support Brigade 
undertaking the mission outlined for the Joint Redeployment Support 
Team. No change required. 

Comment 36: GAO has recently reported that DOD's Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) system is an emerging technology and continues to 
experience many implementation challenges. While not the focus of this 
report, DOD continues to experience issues with rates of error in the 
reading of RFID tags even while mandating the increased use of the 
tags. However, at this time, GAO does not believe that RFID is a 
reliable means for ensuring visibility over in-transit equipment and 
materiel. 

We also recognize DOD's efforts to improve the in-transit visibility of 
supplies. Yet, the description of the retrograde process for theater 
provided equipment contained in this report is based on GAO's site 
visit to Kuwait in May 2008. The description was validated by the 
responsible subject matter experts at the 401st Army Field Support 
Brigade as accurately depicting the systems used to manage the 
equipment as well as the difficulties encountered during shipment. In 
addition, official emails and tracking documents indicated that 
significant amounts of equipment were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting 
disposition instructions. Moreover, in DOD's official comments to this 
report, they concur with our recommendation to correct the 
incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain 
visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD's 
general comments indicate that the process has changed and they 
provided us with a map of their proposed process as well as the July 
23, 2008, order directing the use of Standard Depot System and Army War 
Reserve Deployment System to resolve issues with maintaining 
accountability and visibility and reducing the time for disposition 
instructions. However, this order will not be implemented until 8 
September, 2008 and we have not yet been able to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the new process. No changes required. 

Comment 37: See comment 36. 

Comment 38: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by Army officials responsible for both planning and 
executing installation hand-over operations. No change required. 

Comment 39: According to CENTCOM policy, all bunkers, trenches, 
fighting positions, and force protection barriers are considered to be 
personal property and will be removed from installations. Additionally, 
in May 2008, DOD officials responsible for planning for the potential 
disposition of such property located on installations in Iraq stated 
that while they expected more specific guidance on the disposition of 
personal property to be part of a future bilateral agreement between 
the U.S. and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current 
planning purposes was CENTCOM's policy. These DOD officials also 
explained that until they received more specific guidance on the 
disposition of such personal property, they may have difficulty 
estimating the time and cost of disposition. See also comment 27. No 
change required. 

Comment 40: See comment 27. 

Comment 41: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the 
disposition of personal property from installations. No change 
required. 

Comment 42: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the 
potential disposition of personal property located on installations in 
Iraq and the potential environmental remediation on these 
installations. No change required. 

Comment 43: See comment 42. 

Comment 44: See comment 24. In addition, with regard to the discussion 
of bilateral agreements, our report accurately reflects May 2008 
statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the 
potential disposition of personal property located on installations in 
Iraq and the potential environmental remediation on these 
installations. Moreover, GAO is not speculating on the potential 
existence or contents of any bilateral agreement(s) between the U.S. 
and Iraq, or any potential legal requirement for such an agreement. 
Rather, we are reporting that, as of May 2008, Army officials 
responsible for planning for logistical reposturing operations were 
considering that such an agreement(s) may exist in the future and that 
these considerations affected their planning. No change required. 

Comment 45: We concur with DOD's assessment that CENTCOM did not 
effectively integrate contract support and contractor integration into 
its planning efforts for the logistics of reposturing. We also 
acknowledge that developing Joint Publication 4-10 and providing 
combatant commands with Joint Operational Contract Support Planners 
(JOCSPs) indicate potential progress in addressing the current 
challenges that CENTCOM faces in regard to effectively integrating 
contract support and contractor integration into its planning efforts. 
However, GAO has investigated neither the potential implementation of 4-
10 nor the activities of CENTCOM's JOCSPs and thus cannot assess 
whether progress has been made in this area, or adopt the text 
suggested by CENTCOM. It is important to note that the paragraph DOD 
cites in this comment has changed due to subsequent communication 
between GAO and DOD subject matter experts. However, there is no change 
required in response to DOD's comment. 

Comment 46: It is important to note that the paragraph DOD quotes in 
its comment has changed due to subsequent communication between GAO and 
DOD subject matter experts. However, we have three responses to this 
DOD comment. First, KBR is the LOGCAP contractor. Thus, while a KBR 
base-closure SOP may be useful in LOGCAP reposturing planning, its 
existence does not address the lack of theater-wide reposturing 
planning. The later is CENTCOM's responsibility, not KBR's. Second, the 
LOGCAP program has had these two positions involved in reposturing 
planning since the Spring of 2008. While this coordination is 
facilitating LOGCAP reposturing planning, the challenges explained in 
our report existed despite this coordination. Third, our report did not 
address the specific issue of contractor force protection and so we 
cannot assess the significance of such a calculation. There is no 
change required in response to DOD's comment. 

Comment 47: We acknowledge DOD's concurrence. No change required. 

Comment 48: Based upon additional information provided by DOD, we added 
the first sentence. However, we were not able to assess whether the 
memo is a "tiered authority which provides commanders greater 
flexibility and more decision making capability at their respective 
levels." We therefore did not add the second sentence. 

Comment 49: For clarity purposes, we changed figure 2. 

Comment 50: See comment 49. 

Comment 51: See comment 49. 

Comment 52: In this sentence, "travel" refers to officials traveling to 
sites in order to complete inventories, not to the travel of property. 
No change required. 

Comment 53: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 54: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 55: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 56: See comment 36. No change required. 

Comment 57: We recognize DOD's existing data sharing strategy provides 
policy responsibility to implement data sharing through the department. 
No change required. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III Department of Defense Classes of Supply: 

Class of Supply: Class I; 
Name: Subsistence; 
Explanation: Class I is subsistence materiel ranging from military-
specification rations to commercial food items. 

Class of Supply: Class II; 
Name: Clothing, Individual Equipment, and Tools; 
Explanation: Class II is composed of organizational clothing and 
individual equipment, such as tentage and individual weapons; 
consumable items such as tools and administrative and housekeeping 
supplies; and industrial supplies such as cable, rope, screws, and 
bolts. 

Class of Supply: Class III; 
Name: Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL); 
Explanation: Class III Includes bulk and packaged POL; hydraulic and 
insulating oils, preservatives, bulk chemical products, coolants, 
deicing and antifreeze compounds, and components and additives of such 
products; and liquid and compressed gases, natural gas, coal, and 
electricity. Bulk fuel, the major Class III commodity, is propulsion 
fuel for aircraft, ships, and vehicles. 

Class of Supply: Class IV; 
Name: Construction Materiel; 
Explanation: Class IV includes all construction raw materials and 
fortification and barrier items such as lumber, wire, and sandbags. 

Class of Supply: Class V; 
Name: Ammunition; 
Explanation: Class V materiel consists of munitions of all types; 
bullets and projectiles, bombs, explosives, land mines, fuses, 
detonators, pyrotechnics, propellants, and their associated items. 

Class of Supply: Class VI; 
Name: Personal Demand Items; 
Explanation: Class VI materiel includes various nonmilitary health, 
comfort, and recreational items procured and managed by the Service 
exchanges, as well as Service morale, welfare, and recreation 
organizations. 

Class of Supply: Class VII; 
Name: Major End Items; 
Explanation: Class VII is composed of major war fighting equipment that 
constitutes the combat forces. Class VII includes ships, aircraft, 
missiles, tanks, launchers, and vehicles that are normally procured by 
the individual Service acquisition commands as part of major 
acquisition programs. 

Class of Supply: Class VIII; 
Name: Medical Materiel; 
Explanation: Class VIII consists of pharmaceutical, medical and 
surgical supplies and materiel, and medical equipment, including 
medical-specific repair parts, medical gases, blood, and blood 
products. 

Class of Supply: Class IX; 
Name: Repair Parts; 
Explanation: Class IX includes all repair parts, except medical 
equipment parts. 

Class of Supply: Class X; 
Name: Materiel for Nonmilitary Programs; 
Explanation: Class X items support nonmilitary programs such as 
economic and agricultural development, civic action, and various relief 
and education programs. Class X also includes any items that are not 
included under other classes. 

Source: Joint Publication 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams: 

Team: Materiel Redistribution Team (MRT); 
Mission: Conducts identification, documentation, and coordinates 
disposition and movement of excess class II, III(P), IV, VIII, and IX; 
Higher HQ and C2: Direct Support to 316th Expeditionary Support 
Command; under tactical control of ARCENT through Task Force 586*. 

Team: Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT); 
Mission: Facilitates the expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII 
Theater Provided Equipment (TPE), improves property accountability, and 
enables asset visibility of the received equipment; 
Higher HQ and C2: Direct Support to 402nd Army Field Support Brigade; 
under tactical control of ARCENT through Task Force 586*. 

Team: Defense Remediation Team (DRT); 
Mission: Assists units in sorting and creating documentation for 
property during shipment and turn-in to a Defense Reutilization 
Marketing Office; 
Higher HQ and C2: Defense Logistics Agency through the Defense 
Reutilization and Marketing Services Officer-in-Charge - Iraq. 

Team: Deployment and Distribution Support Team (DDST); 
Mission: Provides units in Iraq with Unit Movement Officer refresher 
course. Assists in building movement plans for organizational and RESET 
equipment, hazardous material documentation, blocking and bracing, and 
container safety inspections; 
Higher HQ and C2: Surface Deployment and Distribution Command through 
the 840th Deployment Distribution Support Battalion. 

Team: Joint Redeployment Support Team (JRST); 
Mission: Facilitates the return of forces in order to reset combat 
capability for future operations. Combines and synchronizes the efforts 
of the other support teams to prepare accurate Joint Planning and 
Execution System data; 
Higher HQ and C2: U.S. Transportation Command. 

Team: Inventory Property Assistance Team (IPAT); 
Mission: Tracks shortages and excess. Manages and maintains "virtual 
warehouses." Provides redistribution instructions and tracks 
redistribution; tracks operational needs statement, joint urgent 
operational needs statements and solutions for them; 
Higher HQ and C2: Multi-National Corps-Iraq. 

Team: Organizational Property Assistance Team (OPAT); 
Mission: Coordinates for redistribution and facilitates the transfer of 
Department of the Army G3 (Operations) designated TPE and manages 
Category V listing published by DA; 
Higher HQ and C2: Theater Property Book Officer (2nd Battalion, 402nd 
Army Field Support Brigade). 

Team: Reset Team; 
Mission: Provides unit training on Department of the Army/Army Materiel 
Command RESET program and Automated RESET Management Tool; 
Higher HQ and C2: Army Material Command through the Army Sustainment 
Command and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in 
Iraq. 

Team: Reset Fly Away Team (RFAT); 
Mission: Expedites RESET planning and shipping of Life Cycle Management 
Command specific priority RESET equipment; 
Higher HQ and C2: Army Material Command through the Army Sustainment 
Command and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in 
Iraq. 

Team: Marine LOGCOM Retrograde Team (LRT); 
Mission: Receives, stores, and prepares for shipment and redistributes 
excess principle end items to fill home station equipment shortfalls or 
to depots to be repaired for further redistribution to the operating 
forces; 
Higher HQ and C2: Marine Corps Logistics Command (Forward). 

Source: GAO analysis of Multi-National Forces-Iraq data. 

[A] The MRTs and RPATs have a complex command. Both of these teams are 
sourced with Air Force Personnel under Task Force 586, an Air Force 
headquarters. However, both teams are under the tactical control of 
ARCENT, which exercises that tactical control through Task Force 586. 
Moreover, because the RPAT is in direct support to the 402nd Army Field 
Support Brigade in Iraq, Army Materiel Command also has some control 
over this asset which it exercises through its subordinate command, 
Army Sustainment Command. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model: 

Department of Defense (DOD) officials have developed a model that 
approximates the volume of equipment and materiel that can flow through 
the Iraqi theater of operations logistics infrastructure and the rate 
at which that infrastructure can sustain this flow.[Footnote 48] In 
summary, the model states the theater logistics infrastructure can 
sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more than a total of five 
brigades' worth of equipment and materiel in and out of Iraq per month. 
Specifically, DOD has modeled two scenarios (see table 2, below). In 
the first, the deployment and retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and 
materiel are prioritized. In the second scenario, the deployment and 
retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and materiel are balanced with the 
retrograde of non-unit stocks, such as containers of supplies. In both 
scenarios, the 1st Theater Support Command can sustain the delivery of 
a certain amount of Class I (food, water) and Class III-B (packaged 
petroleum products such as motor oil) to forces in Iraq. 

Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment: 

Support logistics activity: Sustainment of Forces in Iraq; 
Scenario one[A]: 7 sustainment convoys to and returning from Iraq, per 
day; 
Scenario Two[B]: 7 sustainment convoys to and returning from Iraq, per 
day. 

Support logistics activity: Deploying Unit Equipment, Materiel; 
Scenario one[A]: 2.5 brigade equivalents,; 
per month; 
Scenario Two[B]: 2.0 brigade equivalents,; per month. 

Support logistics activity: Redeploying TPE, or Unit Equipment, 
Materiel; 
Scenario one[A]: 2.5 brigade equivalents,; per month; 
Scenario Two[B]: 2.0 brigade equivalents,; per month. 

Support logistics activity: Redeploying Non-Unit Theater Stocks; 
Scenario one[A]: None; 
Scenario Two[B]: 1.0 brigade equivalent, per month. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] Scenario one prioritizes the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of 
theater provided equipment, unit equipment, and materiel. 

[B] Scenario two balances the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of 
theater provide equipment, unit equipment, and materiel with non-unit 
theater stocks. 

[End of table] 

According to DOD officials and documents, the model is based on three 
types of brigades: heavy or Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT/SBCT); 
infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT); and separate brigades (BDE SEP). 
For each brigade type DOD planners compiled unit property book data, 
added an additional 20 percent to the equipment totals to account for 
theater provided equipment, and then used the resulting brigade types 
in detailed planning for key phases of the redeployment and retrograde 
process such as convoy and wash rack operations. According to DOD 
officials, in this manner they were able to approximate the 
redeployment and retrograde requirements and time frames for each type 
brigade. For example, the model assumes that a heavy or Stryker brigade 
combat team has almost twice the number of vehicles found in a separate 
brigade, and thus, requires almost 25 percent more convoys to 
retrograde these vehicles and almost double the amount of time on the 
wash racks. 

Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and 
Redeployment, by Unit Type: 

Planning factors; 
Unit type: HBCT / SBCT; 
IBCT; 
BDE SEP. 

Vehicles in Unit; 
Unit type: 1,600; 1,240; 830. 

TEU (containers) in unit; Unit type: 170; 220; 270. 

Convoy packages; Unit type: 46; 42; 37. 

Wash rack days; Unit type: 7; 5.5; 4. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table] 

According to DOD officials, the predictive power of the rate-of-flow 
model is limited, and thus, it should not be used to calculate the 
minimum amount of time required to redeploy the total amount of 
equipment currently in Iraq. They explained that while the model 
assumes units are redeploying with a full set of equipment, the actual 
amount of equipment and materiel that needs to be transported, cleaned, 
inspected, and loaded onto ships will vary with each unit moving 
through the system. This means that in any given period of time, the 
actual amount of equipment and materiel being redeployed may be 
different than the amounts assumed in the model. For example, according 
to DOD officials, in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 the theater 
logistical infrastructure was able to deploy an average of two brigades 
into Iraq and redeploy an average of three brigades out of Iraq each 
month. In addition, DOD officials have stated that during a period 
lasting about 1 month--from late November 2008 to early January 2009-- 
four units will redeploy. They explained that this is possible because 
two of the units are leaving Iraq with only containers and the other 
two are redeploying with relatively little of their own equipment, 
having used mostly TPE while in theater. These two examples indicate 
that while the theater throughput model may provide planners with an 
estimate of the theater's deployment and redeployment/retrograde 
capacity, the model should not be used to predict the number of actual 
units that can redeploy during any 1 month period. 

Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater Provided 
Equipment: 

The current process for retrograding certain excess theater provided 
equipment (TPE) from Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit 
visibility. This is caused by the frequent manual manipulation of data. 
According to Department of Defense's (DOS's) Supply Chain Materiel 
Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their 
materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable 
support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war.[Footnote 
49] In addition, DOD components are required to implement material 
management functions using commercial, off-the-shelf items or DOD 
standard data systems, as well as ensure timely, accurate in-transit 
asset information and maintain visibility and accountability over items 
in the pipeline.[Footnote 50] Moreover, DOD components should implement 
and maintain supply chain material management systems to provide a 
timely and complete process.[Footnote 51] 

Figure 5 below describes the physical and data networks for Class VII 
TPE--including manual data transfers and key organizations--involved in 
the process. 

Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided 
Equipment: 

This figure is a flowchart showing the process for retrograding class 
VII theater provided equipment. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Currently, when Class VII theater provided equipment is transferred 
from the owning unit to one of the Retrograde Property Assistance 
Teams[Footnote 52] supporting the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade 
(AFSB) in Iraq, the accountability data for the equipment are 
transferred from the unit to the 402nd AFSB using the Army's Property 
Book Unit Supply Enhanced system[Footnote 53] as shown in figure 5. 
Once the equipment moves to Kuwait, however, the 401st AFSB, which 
receives the equipment, must undertake two concurrent manual processes 
to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment. 
Accountability is established by manually entering equipment data into 
the Standard Depot System (SDS). However, SDS tracks equipment by the 
total number of items, not individual serial numbers. Hence a second 
manual entry is made into the Army War Reserve Depot System (AWRDS) to 
provide visibility over each item by serial number. AWRDS--a non- 
standard Army information management system--was originally designed to 
provide visibility over Army pre-positioned equipment sets, but it has 
been modified to support SDS.[Footnote 54] This is contrary to DOD 
guidance that accountability and visibility should be established using 
standard data systems that share data. 

Once accountability and visibility over the theater provided equipment 
have been established, brigade personnel request disposition 
instructions. This labor-intensive manual process involves sending 
spreadsheets populated with equipment data from Kuwait to Army 
Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and 
then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Commands[Footnote 55] 
responsible for each particular item who, in turn, send disposition 
instructions back through this chain to the 401st AFSB. This process 
can take months or years because of the manual workarounds used to pass 
and manipulate the data. 

Once disposition instructions are received in Kuwait, equipment can be 
shipped; however in-transit visibility of the equipment is temporarily 
lost. When disposition instructions for a certain item of TPE are 
received, that item drops from the AWRDS database and uses a process 
called Inter-Depot Transfer to manage shipment of that item. By 
dropping the item from AWRDS, however, the 401st AFSB loses visibility 
over the item, because Inter-Depot Transfers are not entered into the 
Global Transportation Network, DOD's system for providing near real- 
time in-transit visibility information. This lack of in-transit 
visibility is contrary to current DOD guidelines to maintain timely, 
accurate visibility over items in the distribution pipeline. 

The 401st AFSB uses another manual process to compensate for this by 
coordinating with Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements 
at Kuwaiti ports in order to obtain final load manifests for each 
vessel. The manifest is then forwarded to the appropriate Life Cycle 
Management Command in the United States so that item managers there can 
prepare for the receipt of the equipment; however this information does 
not reach the 401st AFSB until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, David A. Schmitt, Assistant 
Director; Guy A. Lofaro, Analyst in Charge; John Lee; Katherine Lenane; 
Gregory Marchand; John J. Marzullo; Tristan T. To; Christopher Turner; 
Cheryl Weissman, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

FOOTNOTES: 

[1] This figure includes Army brigade combat teams and equivalent 
Marine Corps organizations. 

[2] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report: 
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, GAO-08-837 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 23, 2008). 

[3] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, ï¿½ 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1223 
(2008)). 

[4] We focused our review primarily on the Army because it has the 
largest logistical footprint in Iraq. The majority of units, materiel, 
and equipment in the Iraqi theater belong to the Army with relatively 
few additional services' units, materiel, and equipment. Marine Corps 
officials told us that the Marines will use Army logistics systems and 
pipeline to enter and exit the Iraqi theater. In addition, DOD 
officials have stated that the Air force and Navy have negligible 
logistical footprints in Iraq. 

[5] Discussion with DOD officials in Kuwait indicated that the capacity 
of the base infrastructure in Kuwait to temporarily house and out- 
process personnel could be rapidly expanded with 30 days notice. 
Moreover, during unit redeployments the majority of personnel from each 
redeploying unit are quickly moved to the United States, leaving only a 
small stay-behind detachment to manage the retrograde of unit 
equipment. 

[6] For a listing of all the organizations visited during the course of 
this engagement see app. I. 

[7] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, ï¿½ 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1223 
(2008)). 

[8] Annex E to MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, Logistics Reposture Guidance (May 
28, 2008). 

[9] Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (May 30, 2008). 

[10] The terms "retrograde movement," "retrograde operation," and 
"retrograde personnel" are doctrinal terms defined in JP 1-02. However, 
these definitions do not apply to the way in which the term 
"retrograde" is being used by logistics planners with regard to the 
reposture planning. 

[11] See GAO Operation Desert Storm: DOD's Funding Actions Relating to 
Leftover Inventories, GAO/NSIAD-93-143FS (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 
1993); Materiel Disposal: Alleged Improper Disposition and Destruction 
of Serviceable Materiel and Supplies in Saudi Arabia, GAO/NSIAD-93-139R 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 1993); Operation Desert Storm: Lack of 
Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992); and Desert Shield/Storm Logistics: 
Observations by U.S. Military Personnel, GAO/NSIAD-92-26 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 13, 1991). 

[12] See GAO, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Reports and Testimonies: 
1991-93, GAO/NSIAD-94-134W (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1994); Defense 
Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics 
Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); and Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve 
the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future 
Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

[13] According to DLA officials, although organization of the 
Retrograde Task Force began in late summer 2007, the Retrograde Task 
Force was not officially active until September 10, 2007. 

[14] DOD classes of supply, and what is included in each class of 
supply, are laid out in app. III of this report. 

[15] Basing options include a base's closure, a transfer to the 
government of Iraq, or a "shrink and share" of a base where both Iraqis 
and Coalition forces collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship. 

[16] The Logistics Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with 
all key legistics organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It 
meets monthly and addresses strategic, operational, and theater-level 
logistics issues. It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility or 
Operational Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics-related 
issues. 

[17] The available-to-load date is the period of time in which a unit's 
materiel and equipment is ready to be loaded at a sea or airport. 

[18] See App. IV for a list of the support teams and their higher 
headquarters. 

[19] Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, IV-19 (May 14, 2007). 

[20] Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, V-2 (July 18, 2008). 

[21] Joint Publication 4-0 notes that "the joint logistician will 
rarely have unity of joint logistics command, and subsequently control 
of joint logistics is more challenging." 

[22] See App. IV for a complete list of the theater property and 
retrograde support teams. 

[23] ARCENT has tactical control over Task Force 586, which is the 
headquarters that controls these units. This allows ARCENT to control 
and direct these assets through Task Force 586. However, Army Materiel 
Command also exercises some control over the RPAT because the RPAT 
supports the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade, over which AMC has 
command authority through its subordinate command, Army Sustainment 
Command. 

[24] Government-furnished equipment is equipment provided to a 
contractor for use in fulfilling the terms of a contract. This 
equipment is maintained by the contractor and returned to the 
government at the contract's conclusion and/or termination. 

[25] FM 4-93.41, Army Field Support Brigade Operations, Initial Draft, 
(May 1, 2008). 

[26] JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008). 

[27] Army Sustainment Command is a subordinate organization to Army 
Materiel Command and is responsible for field support, materiel 
management, contingency contracting, and Army pre-positioned stocks. 

[28] Class VII Items are further divided into rolling stock and 
nonrolling stock. Rolling stock includes wheeled vehicles, tracked 
combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked construction equipment, trailers, 
semitrailers, and standard trailer-mounted equipment such as 
generators. Nonrolling stock includes all class VII items not 
classified as rolling stock. 

[29] A detailed explanation of the systems and organization involved in 
this process is contained in App.VI. 

[30] See DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation Chapter 1, DOD 
4140.1-R, ï¿½ C1.3.1.1; ï¿½ C1.3.1, ï¿½ C1.3.2 and ï¿½ C5.8, (May 23, 2003). 

[31] The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands, 
each of which is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are: 
Aviation and Missile, Chemical Materials Agency, Communications- 
Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tank-automotive & 
Armaments Command. 

[32] Army Sustainment Command Operations Order 30-08, Retrograde of 
Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) (Apr. 18, 2008). 

[33] The Standard Army Retail Supply System is a Combat Service Support 
peacetime and wartime logistics Standard Army Management Information 
System that (1) performs the supply functions of ordering, receiving, 
storing, and issuing supplies; (2) supports supply management functions 
such as excess disposition and redistribution; and (3) offers improved 
communications and advanced automation functionality. One of its 
benefits is providing asset visibility at the Brigade Combat Team, 
Corps, theater, and national levels. 

[34] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-163, ï¿½ 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½ 1223 
(2008)). 

[35] MNF-I defines personal property as any property than can be moved 
and reused without significant refurbishment or degradation from its 
intended purpose. Personal property includes government property (those 
items owned by services and components) and items owned by individuals. 
Examples include re-locatable buildings, window air conditioning units 
(not to include split air conditioning unit), generators, desks, 
chairs, computers, office supplies, cots, foot lockers, and clothing. 

[36] As of July 18, 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments were still 
negotiating the terms of their bilateral agreement, although the exact 
nature of the agreement was still being negotiated. 

[37] For simplicity, we use the term contractor-managed government- 
owned property to incorporate all items which the contractor manages 
expressly to perform under the contract, including items given to the 
contractor by the government (government-furnished equipment), or 
acquired/fabricated by the contractor. 

[38] Excess contractor-managed government-owned property is a subset of 
foreign excess personal property, which is defined as U.S.-owned 
personal property located outside of the United States that is excess 
to government needs. 

[39] The October 2007 memo increasing donation authority to $10,000 
updated an August 4, 2006, DOD memo based on the Defense Reutilization 
and Marketing Service's cost-benefit analysis dated June 9, 2006, which 
estimated the cost at which care and handling of an item exceeds the 
proceeds from its sale. 

[40] Headquarter, Department of the Army, HQDA Materiel Retrograde 
Policy; (October 23, 2007). 

[41] According to an Army official, this analysis included property 
acquired/fabricated by the contractor, but not government-furnished 
equipment. Consequently, the analysis included much, but not all 
contractor-managed government-owned property. 

[42] The property can be transferred to other military units or 
contractors in theater, the government of Iraq, or other military units 
or contractors around the world. 

[43] The Army's analysis considers this property to be (1) uneconomical 
to return to the United States or (2) prohibited from return to the 
United States given policy, regulations, or agreements. 

[44] DLA runs four Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices in Iraq 
and one in Kuwait, which are responsible for disposing of surplus DOD 
property through reutilization, transfer, donation, and sale. The sale 
of this surplus property is accomplished by awarding contracts to 
vendors that in turn resell the property. 

[45] The Marines have previously used this alternate port to resupply 
its forces in western Iraq. 

[46] DOD officials stated that an additional 20 wash racks should be 
operational at Camp Buehring by August 2008; we were not able to 
confirm this. 

[47] According to DOD officials, although it is possible to self-deploy 
vehicles from Iraq to Kuwait (i.e., drive them out under their own 
power), the resulting wear and tear on a vehicle makes this an 
unattractive alternative. Hence, when possible, vehicles are 
transported out of Iraq on heavy equipment transports. 

[48] GAO did not verify the accuracy of this model. 

[49] DOD 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation 
Chapter 1, ï¿½ C1.3.1.1, (May 23, 2003). 

[50] See DOD 4140.1-R, ï¿½ C1.3.1, ï¿½ C1.3.2 and ï¿½ C5.8. 

[51] See DOD 4140.1-R, ï¿½ C7.1. 

[52] The Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPATs) facilitate the 
expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII, theater provided equipment 
(TPE), improve property accountability, and enable asset visibility of 
the received equipment. RPATs operate at six permanent locations 
throughout the theater Area of Operations (AO) to accomplish this 
mission. 

[53] Army documents stated that the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced 
is the Army's Web-based property accountability system that provides 
real-time total asset visibility throughout all levels of Army 
management and secures transfers to the Standard Army Retail Supply 
System. Additionally, it is a Standard Army Information Management 
System. 

[54] Army documents state that Standard Army Management Information 
Systems provide a seamless and inoperable network of logistics systems 
using integrated communication tools. 

[55] The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands, 
each of which is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are: 
Aviation and Missile, Chemical Materials Agency, Communications- 
Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tank-automotive & 
Armaments Command. 

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