    Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning
    for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq (10-SEP-08, GAO-08-930).

    The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the
    Department of Defense (DOD) refers to as "reposturing," will be a
    massive and expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example,
    there were about 173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about
    $16.5 billion, that will need to be returned to the United
    States. The redeployment process following Operation Desert Storm
    in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at least 14 months. DOD
    guidance emphasizes the importance of early planning for this
    redeployment process. GAO performed this work under the
    Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined the (1) status of
    logistical planning for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq and
    associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD established
    roles and responsibilities for managing and executing retrograde
    from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to
    consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and
    interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the
    United States and Kuwait.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-930
        ACCNO:   A84112
      TITLE:     Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD
    Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq
         DATE:   09/10/2008
      SUBJECT:   Defense capabilities
    	     Defense cost control
    	     Defense operations
    	     Equipment inventories
    	     Equipment management
    	     Federal property
    	     Government owned equipment
    	     Iraq War and reconstruction
    	     Logistics
    	     Military bases
    	     Military forces
    	     Military inventories
    	     Military materiel
    	     Military policies
    	     Military withdrawal
    	     National defense operations
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Program management
    	     Property
    	     Protective equipment
    	     Reporting requirements
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Supply chain management
    	     Program implementation
    	     Desert Storm
    	     DOD Operation Iraqi Freedom
    	     Iraq
    	     Kuwait

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    GAO-08-930

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    Report to Congressional Committees:

    United States Government Accountability Office:

    GAO:

    September 2008:

    Operation Iraqi Freedom:

    Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces
    from Iraq:

    Operational Iraqi Freedom:

    GAO-08-930:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-930, a report to congressional committees.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    The redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq, a process the Department of
    Defense (DOD) refers to as �reposturing,� will be a massive and
    expensive effort. As of March 2008, for example, there were about
    173,000 pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth about $16.5 billion, that
    will need to be returned to the United States. The redeployment process
    following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a much shorter war, lasted at
    least 14 months. DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of early
    planning for this redeployment process.

    GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General�s Authority. GAO
    examined the (1) status of logistical planning for reposturing U.S.
    forces from Iraq and associated assumptions and (2) extent to which DOD
    established roles and responsibilities for managing and executing
    retrograde from Iraq. GAO also identified issues that DOD will need to
    consider in its reposture planning. GAO reviewed documents and
    interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the United
    States and Kuwait.

    What GAO Found:

    While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq is yet to be
    determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in
    fall 2007, and DOD began coordinating these individual planning efforts
    in May 2008 to develop a logistical framework based on three key
    assumptions. The result of this planning was an order published by
    Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) that contained the process for
    reposturing units, materiel, and equipment and established working
    groups to continue the planning and seek solutions to emerging
    challenges. DOD�s three key assumptions are: (1) any reposturing
    initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments
    of conditions on the ground; (2) there will be sufficient lead time to
    refine reposture plans once an order with a specific timetable and
    force posture in Iraq is issued; and (3) the reposturing of forces will
    be deliberate and gradual, predicated on a 180-day process for units
    leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no more than 2.5 brigades� worth
    of equipment and materiel out of Iraq each month.

    While efforts have been made to synchronize planning for reposturing,
    DOD, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and the military services have not
    yet clearly established all of the roles and responsibilities for
    managing and executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from
    Iraq. Although CENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as
    executive agent for synchronizing retrograde of materiel and equipment
    from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or coordinated
    structure exists to account for the roles of the variety of teams and
    units engaged in retrograde operations. Until recently ARCENT did not
    have operational control over the two units responsible for
    retrograding the bulk of equipment in Iraq.

    We identified the following nine issues that DOD should consider as it
    develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq:
    (1) agreed-upon guidance for environmental cleanup and the disposition
    of property, which could affect the time and cost of closing bases in
    Iraq; (2) guidance and plans for the reposturing of contractors from
    Iraq; (3) accountability and disposition of contractor-managed
    government-owned property; (4) the possibility of restrictive
    conditions on the use of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring
    countries; (5) availability of power-washing equipment and stands,
    called wash racks, and the number of customs inspectors in Kuwait; (6)
    capacity of military transports and convoy security assets, including
    limits on the main supply route; (7) increased demand for access to
    mental health care providers; (8) infrastructure requirements of
    returning units; and (9) requirements for training and equipment reset
    to restore readiness. DOD has begun to address these issues.

    While the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008
    directs DOD to brief the congressional defense committees on certain
    issues related to reposturing, DOD is not required to provide the
    specific information identified in our report. We believe that without
    more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not be able to
    effectively exercise its oversight responsibilities.

    What GAO Recommends:

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take steps to clarify the
    chain of command over logistical operations for retrograde of equipment
    and materiel. Also, Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to
    report specific details on the status of reposturing plans and how it
    intends to mitigate issues such as those we identify. DOD generally
    concurred with our recommendations.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-930]. For more
    information, contact William M. Solis at 202-512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are
    Predicated on Three Key Assumptions:

    Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks
    Necessary Authority:

    Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning:

    Conclusions:

    Recommendations:

    Matter for Congressional Consideration:

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

    Appendix III: Department of Defense Classes of Supply:

    Appendix IV: Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams:

    Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model:

    Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater Provided
    Equipment:

    Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    Tables:

    Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template:

    Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment:

    Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and
    Redeployment, by Unit Type:

    Figures:

    Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in
    Kuwait:

    Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government-
    Owned Property:

    Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks:

    Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack:

    Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided
    Equipment:

    United States Government Accountability Office:

    Washington, DC 20548:

    September 10, 2008:

    Congressional Committees:

    Following Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 100-hour war during which
    U.S. forces advanced approximately 190 miles into Iraq, it took some 14
    months to redeploy most of the deployed materiel and equipment out of
    the theater. Operation Iraqi Freedom began in March 2003, and since
    that time the United States has maintained a sizeable presence in Iraq,
    rotating forces into and out of the country in support of ongoing
    operations. As of April 26, 2008, there were approximately 149,400
    Department of Defense (DOD) contractors and, as of July 1, 2008,
    approximately 147,400 U.S. troops deployed in support of Operation
    Iraqi Freedom. DOD officials reported that these forces were located on
    approximately 311 installations, matured during 5 years of operations,
    with some installations more than 500 miles from Kuwait. Most of the
    equipment used by U.S. troops in Iraq--approximately 80 percent
    according to DOD officials--is theater provided equipment, which is a
    pool of permanent stay behind equipment consisting of specific line
    items of modified table of organization and equipment property, issued
    Army prepositioned stocks, and items purchased specifically for
    Operation Iraqi Freedom that remains in Iraq. Although much of this
    equipment has remained in Iraq as units rotate in and out, significant
    amounts will be brought back to the United States if and when there is
    a decrease in the size of U.S. forces in Iraq. As of March 2008, this
    pool of theater provided equipment totaled approximately 173,000 major
    end items such as High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
    and Mine Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicles, worth approximately
    $16.5 billion. The retrograde process for returning these equipment
    items to the United States will be a massive and expensive effort.

    In January 2007, the president announced he would temporarily increase,
    or "surge," the U.S. force level in Iraq by an additional 5 brigades,
    bringing the total number of brigade combat teams in Iraq to
    20.[Footnote 1] The brigades were in place by June 2007 and began
    withdrawing in September 2007. In his April 2008 Report to Congress on
    the Situation in Iraq the commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
    recommended that the drawdown from 20 to 15 brigade combat teams
    continue and that, upon the withdrawal of the last of these combat
    teams in July 2008, MNF-I undertake a 45-day period of consolidation
    and evaluation. At the end of that period, MNF-I would commence a
    process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and, over
    time, determine when it could make a recommendation for further
    reductions. In July 2008, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff stated that, based on what he observed during a recent trip to
    Iraq, he expects to be able to recommend further troop reductions to
    the President and Secretary of Defense in the fall of 2008. In
    addition, in June 2008 GAO also issued its own assessment of progress
    in Iraq and called for a new strategy given the changing
    conditions.[Footnote 2] Finally, the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2006 (as amended by the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2008) requires the President to report to the
    Congress quarterly on U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq,
    including, to the extent practical, (1) an assessment of the levels of
    U.S. Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 6-month period following the
    date of the report, the missions to be undertaken by the Armed Forces
    in Iraq for such period, and the incremental costs or savings of any
    proposed changes to such levels or missions; and (2) a description of
    the range of conditions that could prompt changes to the levels of U.S.
    Armed Forces required in Iraq for the 6-month period following the date
    of the report or the missions to be undertaken by the Armed Forces in
    Iraq for such period, including the status of planning for such changes
    to the levels or missions of the Armed Forces in Iraq. Not later than
    30 days after submission of each subsequent report, appropriate senior
    DOD officials are required to brief the congressional committees on
    these same matters.[Footnote 3]

    While we have been monitoring the full range of challenges that DOD
    would likely face, both in Iraq and here in the United States, as it
    begins to draw down its forces in Iraq, this report is focused on the
    logistical organizations and processes that would support a drawdown
    from Iraq or, as DOD officials call it, a "reposturing" effort,
    especially the retrograde of materiel and equipment.[Footnote 4] Our
    analysis indicated that the redeployment of military personnel,
    although important, was not as complex, resource intensive, or time
    consuming.[Footnote 5] Because of the complexity of the issues and
    broad congressional interest and requests, we have been assessing DOD's
    planning for the reposturing effort since August 2007, under the
    authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations at his own
    initiative. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the
    extent to which logistical planning for the reposturing of U.S. forces
    from Iraq has begun and the assumptions upon which it is based, and (2)
    DOD has established roles and responsibilities for managing and
    executing the retrograde of materiel and equipment from Iraq. In
    addition, we identified several issues that DOD will need to consider
    as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S. forces from
    Iraq.

    To determine what planning has been done regarding the potential
    reposturing of forces from Iraq and upon what assumptions DOD has based
    its plans, we reviewed relevant documents, to include command briefings
    and in-progress reviews, orders, and staff analyses that we obtained
    from several DOD organizations including U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM), MNF-I, and U.S. Army Central (ARCENT).[Footnote 6] We also
    interviewed officials who were directly involved in the logistical
    planning efforts to determine the status and scope of these efforts. We
    also traveled to Kuwait in May 2008 and met with DOD officials from a
    variety of organizations who participated in a logistical summit held
    at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. We also obtained copies of the briefings and
    the logistical reposturing order that resulted from this summit. Based
    on these discussions as well as the documents we obtained, we were able
    to determine the assumptions upon which the planning effort was based.

    To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and
    responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel
    and equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed briefings, e-mail
    correspondence, orders, joint and Army doctrine, relevant sections of
    the U.S. Code, and other data obtained from DOD organizations in both
    the United States and Kuwait. These officials provided us with
    information about the way the retrograde process is supposed to work as
    well as any challenges they have encountered. While in Kuwait, we also
    visited locations at which various aspects of the redeployment and
    retrograde process are performed and spoke with local commanders and on-
    site supervisors about their experiences and challenges.

    During the course of this engagement we identified several issues that
    DOD will need to consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for
    reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. We identified these issues by
    reviewing our past work as well as documents we obtained from various
    defense commands and activities, including staff analyses, briefings,
    orders, doctrinal publications, and relevant laws and regulations. The
    officials we spoke with included commanders and staff officers who had
    direct knowledge of the issues we identified. Moreover, we visited
    several locations in both the United States and Kuwait where the issues
    we identified would have an impact and, while there, we discussed the
    possible ramifications of these issues with local DOD officials.

    We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I includes more
    detailed information on our scope and methodology.

    Results in Brief:

    While the pace and overall extent of reposturing in Iraq has yet to be
    determined, various defense commands began planning for reposturing in
    fall 2007, and in May 2008 DOD began coordinating these individual
    planning efforts to develop a logistical framework based on three key
    assumptions. According to DOD officials, initial planning efforts were
    uncoordinated because the three organizations undertaking them--the
    Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Army Materiel Command(AMC), and
    Headquarters, Department of the Army--conducted their planning effort
    on their own initiative and with little input from CENTCOM and MNF-I,
    the commands overseeing operations in Iraq. By late 2007, however, a
    move began to synchronize and coordinate the efforts of DOD
    organizations engaged in planning for a reposturing of U.S. forces in
    Iraq. This culminated in a May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan,
    Kuwait, and resulted in an order published by MNF-I that contained the
    process for the redeployment of units and retrograde of materiel and
    equipment. The order also established a working group chartered to
    continue the planning with an eye toward seeking solutions to
    challenges, including several of the challenges we discuss later in
    this report. DOD's planning efforts to date have been based on the
    following three key assumptions:

    * any reposturing initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of
    State assessments of conditions on the ground;

    * there will be sufficient lead time to refine reposture plans once an
    order with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued;
    and:

    * the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual, predicated
    on a 180-day process for units leaving Iraq and a sustained flow of no
    more than 2.5 brigades' worth of equipment and materiel out of Iraq
    each month.

    Although efforts have begun to synchronize planning for reposturing,
    DOD, CENTCOM, and the military services have not clearly established
    roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of
    materiel and equipment from Iraq. Joint doctrine states that unity of
    command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of command,
    well-defined relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities
    and authorities. However, although CENTCOM has designated an executive
    agent for the synchronization of the retrograde of materiel and
    equipment from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified or
    coordinated structure exists to account for the role of a variety of
    teams and units engaged in retrograde operations, such as the
    disposition of excess property and maintaining accountability of major
    end items like tanks and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
    (HMMWV). This results in confusion and a lack of clarity on the ways
    those teams should be utilized. In addition, while the Army has
    designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of Army material
    and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT had no direct
    command authority over the two Army units responsible for the
    retrograde of the bulk of materiel and equipment in Iraq, a situation
    that resulted in inefficiency and significant amounts of materiel and
    equipment in Kuwait sitting idle and awaiting disposition instructions.
    Finally, another example of this lack of unity of command is that data
    systems used during the retrograde process are incompatible. Although a
    fix for this data system incompatibility has been identified, the fix
    has not yet been implemented.

    We identified several other issues that will affect the development of
    plans for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. Specifically, based on our
    discussion with DOD officials and analysis of planning efforts to date,
    the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD's redeployment of equipment and
    people will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that
    address and include:

    * guidance for the management of hazardous materials and waste and the
    disposition of property, which could affect the time and cost of
    closing installations in Iraq;

    * guidance and plans for reposturing of contractors from Iraq;

    * accountability and disposition of contractor-managed government-
    owned property;

    * the possibility of restrictive conditions on the use of facilities in
    Kuwait and other neighboring countries;

    * availability of wash racks and the number of customs inspectors in
    Kuwait;

    * capacity of military owned and operated transports and convoy
    security assets, including limits on the main supply route;

    * increased demand for access to mental health care providers;

    * infrastructure requirements of returning units; and:

    * requirements for training and equipment reset to restore readiness.

    DOD has begun to address these issues. For example, it is addressing
    the accountability of contractor-managed property and increasing the
    number of mental health providers. The National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires DOD to brief the congressional
    defense committees on certain matters that were to be addressed, to the
    extent practicable, in the President's report. These matters include an
    assessment of U.S. force levels required in Iraq, the missions they
    will undertake in Iraq, the incremental costs or savings of any
    proposed changes to such levels or missions, and a description of the
    range of conditions that could prompt changes to the levels of U.S.
    forces required in Iraq, including the status of planning for such
    changes to the levels or missions of U.S. forces in Iraq. However,
    certain issues we have identified above are not specifically covered by
    this requirement. [Footnote 7] We believe that more specific reporting
    from DOD on these issues and DOD's mitigation plans related to these
    issues will enable Congress to better exercise effective oversight of
    DOD's plans.

    In light of our observations, to ensure that DOD can efficiently and
    effectively retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, we
    recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM
    and the military departments, take steps to clarify a unified or
    coordinated chain of command over logistical operations in support of
    the retrograde effort. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense,
    in consultation with the military departments, correct the
    incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
    visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in-transit.
    Further, to enhance its ability to exercise its oversight
    responsibilities, Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to modify
    its briefings submitted in accordance with the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to include specific details on
    the status of its reposturing planning and how it intends to mitigate
    issues such as those we identified in this report.

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
    with the first recommendation and fully concurred with the second
    recommendation. The department also provided a number of general
    comments and technical comments that we considered and incorporated, as
    appropriate. The department's comments and our evaluation of those
    comments are discussed in detail in a later section of this report. A
    complete copy of DOD's written comments, including the department's
    general and technical comments and our evaluation of each of those
    comments, is included in appendix II.

    Background:

    According to DOD officials, U.S. forces in Iraq will not be "drawn
    down" but rather "repostured." MNF-I defines "resposture operations," a
    non-doctrinal term, as "the realignment of forces, basing, and
    resources to adjust to changes in the operating environment."[Footnote
    8] Joint doctrine, as outlined in DOD's joint publications for both
    operations and planning emphasizes the importance of end-state planning
    and planning for the termination of combat operations. Inherent in
    DOD's reposture planning is the concept of redeployment, which joint
    doctrine defines as "the transfer of forces and materiel to support
    another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return
    personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization
    stations for reintegration and/or out-processing."[Footnote 9]
    Associated with redeployment is another non-doctrinal concept--
    retrograde.[Footnote 10] As of May 2008 there was no agreed-upon
    definition for retrograde as it applies to reposture planning. However,
    according to some of the proposed definitions the term generally refers
    to the evacuation of materiel and equipment from Iraq. Moreover, our
    analysis of DOD documents indicates that the terms "retrograde" and
    "redeployment" are often used interchangeably. For clarity we use the
    term "redeployment" to refer to the movement of units (including a
    unit's complement of personnel, equipment, and materiel) and
    "retrograde" when referring to the movement of materiel and equipment.

    Our analysis of previous GAO reports and testimonies on Operations
    Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicated that retrograde of materiel
    and equipment would consume the most time and resources throughout the
    reposturing effort.[Footnote 11] Since the 1990s, we have identified
    DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area, because DOD has been
    unable to consistently meet its goal of delivering the "right items to
    the right places at the right time." Since 1991, we have issued a
    number of reports highlighting weaknesses in DOD's supply chain
    management throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and
    Operation Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 12]

    The logistics infrastructure that supports the redeployment and
    retrograde effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and
    complex, consisting of military organizations that operate in both Iraq
    and Kuwait, and it is through Kuwait's three seaports and two airports
    that the vast majority of U.S. forces, materiel, and equipment flow out
    of the theater of operations. Moreover, there are myriad logistics
    organizations in both Iraq and Kuwait that also support these
    operations, including elements CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command,
    DLA, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, AMC, U.S. Marine
    Corps Central Command, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Air
    Forces Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command Central.

    In this report we examine certain components of the logistics
    infrastructure that support the redeployment and retrograde effort as
    well as certain aspects of the redeployment and retrograde processes.
    To properly frame this discussion, however, it is necessary to have
    some sense of the size of the force in Iraq and the logistics
    activities in Kuwait that support the redeployment and retrograde of
    this force. (Figure 1 shows the locations of select installations in
    Iraq and key logistics activities in Kuwait.) For example, although
    public discussion of the size of the U.S. force in Iraq generally
    emphasizes the number of brigade combat teams, according to DOD
    officials as of May 2008 there were the equivalent of 47 brigades'
    worth of materiel and equipment in Iraq spread over some 311
    installations of varying size. The majority of this materiel and
    equipment, some 80 percent according to DOD officials, is theater
    provided equipment, approximately 582,000 pieces of equipment worth
    about $15.5 billion. Theater provided equipment is permanent stay
    behind equipment consisting of specific line items of modified table of
    organization and equipment property, issued Army prepositioned stocks,
    and items purchased specifically for Operations Iraqi Freedom that
    remain in Iraq. The 582,000 pieces of equipment include all the
    accountable line items on the property books for the theater provided
    equipment such as up-armored HMMWVs, Mine Resistant Armored Program
    Vehicles, other wheeled and tracked vehicles, generators, body armor,
    and technologies used to counter improvised explosive devices. In
    addition, as of summer 2007 there were more than 60,000 materiel
    containers in Iraq and over 127,000 short-tons of ammunition in Iraq
    and Kuwait.

    Figure 1: Select Installations in Iraq and Key Logistics Activities in
    Kuwait:

    This figure is a map of select installations in Iraq and key logistics
    activities in Kuwait.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: GAO, Art Explosion, and GAO analysis of Stats and Stripes and
    DOD data.

    [End of figure]

    Planning Efforts, Begun in Fall 2007 and Coordinated in 2008, Are
    Predicated on Three Key Assumptions:

    While various individual defense commands began planning for the
    reposturing of postsurge forces from Iraq in the fall of 2007, those
    planning efforts were not coordinated until May 2008 and were based on
    three key assumptions. At the outset these planning efforts were
    uncoordinated and lacked a joint perspective. However, in late 2007, an
    effort was begun to synchronize the planning efforts of various DOD
    organizations as they related to reposture operations in the Iraqi
    theater of operations. The result of this effort was a series of
    logistics synchronization conferences as well as MNF-I's publication of
    a logistics reposture order in May 2008.

    Reposture Planning Began Fall 2007 but Initial Efforts Were
    Uncoordinated:

    In the fall of 2007 three DOD organizations--AMC, DLA, and
    Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)--began separate planning
    initiatives designed to deal with issues relating to the retrograde of
    materiel and equipment from Iraq. As part of their planning processes,
    each of the three organizations established working groups or forums
    for subordinate entities to communicate about issues arising from their
    planning. Despite working on the same broad set of issues, however,
    there was little coordination among the three organizations. Moreover
    both CENTCOM, the combatant command whose area of responsibility
    includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-I, the headquarters responsible for
    operations in Iraq, provided little input and guidance to these
    efforts.

    Army Materiel Command officials told us that they issued a warning
    order on September 6, 2007, directing its subordinate units to be
    prepared to develop plans in support of the transition from current
    operations to the reduction of forces in Iraq. The warning order
    established a biweekly video teleconference, which first met on
    September 14, 2007, as a forum for all AMC units and staff to discuss
    upcoming requirements in support of Iraqi theater reposturing efforts.
    Moreover, the command also stood up a Theater Drawdown Working Group.
    The original intent of this working group was to conduct a mission
    analysis of what it would take to redeploy multiple brigade combat
    teams quickly; however, by November 2007 the working group became an
    umbrella organization that synchronized AMC's various planning efforts
    in support of a reposturing of forces from Iraq. Among the issues AMC
    and its subordinate organizations explored were the capacities of its
    depots, the disposition of excess equipment in the Iraqi theater of
    operations, additional resources that might be required in theater
    based on the pace of the unit redeployments, rebuilding Army
    Prepositioned Stocks in theater, AMC capabilities in theater to support
    the reposturing effort, identifying what AMC support was required for
    reducing the number of installations in theater, and identifying the
    need for changes in contracts or additional funding.

    According to Defense Logistics Agency officials, their agency
    established a Retrograde Task Force in September 2007 when it became
    clear that DOD was looking at the reposturing of forces in
    Iraq.[Footnote 13] The mission of the Retrograde Task Force was to plan
    and coordinate the execution of DLA actions in support of retrograde
    operations from Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was also to develop an
    integrated support plan for those operations by December 2007. The
    Retrograde Task Force canvassed DLA's customers--such as the military
    services, CENTCOM, and ARCENT--to gather data on their respective roles
    and responsibilities for a reposturing effort and conducted a mission
    analysis to coordinate and anticipate future DLA actions and identify
    gaps and seams in the overall retrograde effort.

    Headquarters, Department of the Army issued its guidance for the
    retrograde of materiel from the CENTCOM area of responsibilities on
    October 23, 2007. HQDA designated ARCENT as the Army's "lead element
    for retrograde" of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR,
    but also stated that AMC is "responsible for executing HQDA retrograde
    policy." The order provided a set of business rules--by class of
    supply[Footnote 14]--that all Army units, commands, and agencies
    involved in the retrograde process in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility were to follow. It also provided disposition
    instructions for these classes of supply. Finally, the order also
    established a monthly video teleconference, hosted by the HQDA, G-4
    (Logistics), to provide a forum in which issues and obstacles affecting
    retrograde operations could be discussed.

    Although these DOD organizations made efforts to synchronize their
    planning--for example, both AMC and DLA participated in Headquarters,
    Department of the Army's monthly video teleconferences and DLA
    identified Service headquarters as "external links" to its Retrograde
    Task Force--there was, according to DOD officials, little coordination
    among the separate retrograde planning efforts. In particular, while
    AMC and HQDA focused solely on the retrograde of Army materiel and
    equipment, other DOD officials felt a joint approach headed by either
    the Joint Staff or CENTCOM was required. Moreover, CENTCOM and MNF-I
    provided little guidance; according to officials from CENTCOM, they
    were waiting on input from MNF-I while according to officials
    representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was "close hold" in
    that headquarters until after the MNF-I commander's congressional
    testimony in April 2008.

    Reposture Planning Coordinated by May 2008:

    The synchronization of planning efforts by various defense commands for
    reposturing of post-surge forces began in late 2007, but was not
    coordinated until May 2008. According to DOD officials, by late 2007 it
    had become clear that not only were the various reposturing planning
    efforts uncoordinated and lacking a joint focus, but the perspectives
    of organizations in the United States differed from those of
    organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. To rectify this,
    senior DLA officials met with their counterparts in CENTCOM and MNF-I
    to discuss means by which reposture planning could be better
    coordinated and more inclusive. Recognizing the added value of a more
    inclusive and coordinated planning effort, CENTCOM and MNF-I officials
    invited DLA to embed members of its Retrograde Task Force inside
    logistics organizations in Kuwait and Iraq. This action established an
    in-theater planning cell embedded in the organizations involved with
    logistical planning for reposturing within the Iraqi theater of
    operations. These organizations included MNF-I, Multi-National Corps,
    Iraq, ARCENT, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the CENTCOM
    Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, and the 401st and 402nd
    Army Field Support Brigades.

    As a result of these efforts, coordination among DOD organizations
    involved in redeployment and retrograde planning increased. For
    example, when representatives from DLA arrived in Iraq and Kuwait they
    discovered that CENTCOM and ARCENT were holding separate retrograde
    video teleconferences; these were eventually merged into one joint
    video teleconference. In addition, although the major focus had been on
    Army retrograde processes because the Army has the largest ground
    presence in the theater, once a coordinated reposture planning effort
    was undertaken other services got involved in the redeployment and
    retrograde planning process as well.

    The end result of the increased coordination and synchronized planning
    among the organizations involved with reposture planning for Iraq was a
    logistics summit held at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, from May 4-9, 2008. At
    this summit the logistics processes for the retrograde of all classes
    of supply were synchronized, discussions about what to do with
    contractor-acquired, government-owned property were held, and general
    and flag officers were briefed. Representatives from CENTCOM, U.S.
    Transportation Command, DLA, MNF-I, MNC-I, ARCENT, the 1st Theater
    Sustainment Command, HQDA, and the Navy, Marine Corps, Special
    Operations, and Air Force component commands in theater attended the
    summit. Based on the summit, MNF-I finalized and published its
    overarching guidance for logistics reposturing operation on May 28,
    2008. This order defined retrograde disposition processes for each
    class of supply within the Iraqi theater of operations, codified a 180-
    day unit redeployment template, and addressed basing.[Footnote 15]
    Moreover, the order also established a Logistics Reposture Working
    Group[Footnote 16] and assigned the group three key tasks:

    * Analyze the allocation of resources available to execute the
    logistics reposturing processes to identify potential shortfalls and to
    address synchronization issues between various operational and
    strategic entities.

    * Review limitations, constraints, and risks associated with the
    logistics reposturing processes and develop mitigation measures.

    * Review after action report issues from unit redeployments and base
    reposturing in order to identify policy and procedural gaps and
    inconsistencies.

    Assumptions Guiding Reposture Planning:

    Based on GAO analysis as well as discussion with DOD officials, both
    the May 2008 conference and the subsequent logistics reposture order
    were based on three assumptions. The first is that any reposturing
    initiative will be based on MNF-I and Department of State assessments
    of conditions of the ground. The second is that there will be
    sufficient lead time to refine the plans for reposturing once an order
    with a specific timetable and force posture in Iraq is issued. The
    third is that the reposturing of forces will be deliberate and gradual,
    predicated on a 180-day redeployment template for units leaving Iraq
    and a model that states the theater logistics infrastructure can
    sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more than a total of five
    brigades' worth of equipment and materiel in and out of Iraq, per
    month.

    The MNF-I 180-day template, summarized in table 1, details the actions
    U.S. Army and Marine Corps units must complete 180 days prior to the
    unit's available-to-load date.[Footnote 17] Twenty-two total
    organizations-17 separate theater entities plus 5 additional property
    and retrograde support teams-participate in this process.[Footnote 18]

    Table 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq 180-day Template:

    Number of days before departure: 180 to 160;
    Actions: ID types of equipment, request disposition and plan
    coordination with all retrograde teams.

    Number of days before departure: 150 to 100;
    Actions: Finalize any early reset plans, set deployment timeline.

    Number of days before departure: 100 to 80;
    Actions: Disposition instructions issued, request and authorize
    donation authority.

    Number of days before departure: 80 to 60;
    Actions: Schedule strategic transportation.

    Number of days before departure: 60 to 40;
    Actions: Order containers, dispose of excess supplies, develop detailed
    movement plan, schedule wash racks.

    Number of days before departure: 40 to 20;
    Actions: Move excess vehicles, validate movement of people.

    Number of days before departure: 20 to 0;
    Actions: Complete customs and agriculture inspections, move equipment
    from wash racks to sterile yard to marshaling yard to pier to ship.

    Source: GAO analysis based on MNF-I FRAGO 08-232.

    [End of table]

    In addition to the 180-day redeployment template, logistics planners in
    the Iraqi theater of operation assume the theater's logistics
    infrastructure can sustain a flow of approximately 2.5 brigades' worth
    of materiel and equipment into and out of Iraq each month based on a
    rate-of-flow model they have created. (See appendix V for a more
    detailed discussion of this model). This model takes into consideration
    historical property book data, the number of convoys that can be run
    each month, and the average time it takes a unit to clean its equipment
    and clear customs in Kuwait. However, according to DOD officials and
    GAO analysis, while this rate-of-flow model may be a useful planning
    tool, it should not be used to predict how long it would take to
    retrograde all the equipment and materiel in Iraq. One reason for this
    is the actual amount of equipment and materiel with which any one
    brigade will redeploy varies and these amounts directly affect the
    number of convoys required to move the unit and the amount of time it
    will take the unit to clean its equipment before it can be retrograded.
    For example, during the summer of 2008 the average heavy brigade combat
    team redeployed with significantly less equipment and materiel than
    projected in the model because the unit used a large amount of theater
    provided equipment that remained in Iraq when it redeployed. Moreover,
    GAO has identified several issues, explained in detail later in this
    report, that may affect both the volume and pace at which materiel and
    equipment can flow through the retrograde pipeline. Several of these
    issues are not currently accounted for by the model.

    Executive Agent for Retrograde of Materiel and Equipment Lacks
    Necessary Authority:

    Despite recent initiatives to synchronize and coordinate the planning
    efforts of DOD organizations with regard to the reposturing of forces
    from Iraq, clear roles and responsibilities with regard to managing and
    executing the redeployment and retrograde process have not yet been
    established. According to joint doctrine, "unity of command must be
    maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined
    command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and
    authorities."[Footnote 19] Combatant commanders exercise "authoritative
    direction over logistics," and may organize logistics resources within
    theater according to operational needs.[Footnote 20] CENTCOM's
    retrograde order designates an executive agent for the synchronization
    of retrograde operations in Iraq. At the same time, because each
    military department has unique authorities and roles, including the
    requirement to provide logistical support to its own assigned forces,
    CENTCOM efforts to establish a truly unified command structure with
    respect to logistics may be complicated.[Footnote 21] With no unified
    or coordinated structure to account for the roles of the theater
    property and retrograde support teams that assist units with the
    retrograde of material and equipment, there is confusion and a lack of
    clarity about how these teams should be utilized. In addition, while
    the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for retrograde of
    Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until recently ARCENT
    did not have direct command authority over the two Army units in the
    theater responsible for retrograding the vast bulk of the equipment in
    Iraq. Because of this the retrograde process was inefficient and
    resulted in significant amounts of theater provided equipment sitting
    idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. Finally, based on GAO
    analysis, a significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command
    over the retrograde process is the use of incompatible data systems.
    Although a fix for this incompatibility has been identified, the
    implementation of the fix has not been enforced.

    No Single Organization Has Authority over Theater Property and
    Retrograde Support Teams:

    No single organization has command authority over all of the theater
    property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the redeployment
    and retrograde process. According to ARCENT, the lack of unity of
    command over these teams makes their use unclear and confusing. There
    are 10 theater property and retrograde support teams that assist units
    with redeployment and the retrograde of material and
    equipment.[Footnote 22] ARCENT has tactical control authority over only
    2 of these teams, the Mobile Redistribution Team and the Redistribution
    Property Assistance Team.[Footnote 23] The Mobile Redistribution Team
    assists redeploying units with identifying, documenting, and providing
    disposition instructions for excess supplies and repair parts in order
    to reintegrate required supplies into the distribution pipeline. The
    Redistribution Property Assistance Team is focused primarily on
    accountability, turn-in, and retrograde of theater provided equipment.
    Of the remaining 8 theater property and retrograde support teams, 2
    report to AMC, 2 report to MNC-I, and 1 each report to U.S.
    Transportation Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution
    Command, DLA, and the Marine Corps Logistics Command. Each of these 8
    teams also provides redeploying units with essential services and
    expertise. For example, the Joint Redeployment Support Team, which
    reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the mission of supplying
    customs, disposition, hazardous material, and transportation expertise
    to redeploying units and is to enable in-transit visibility over a
    unit's materiel and equipment from its forward operating base to the
    unit's home station or to an identified depot. Another team, the
    Inventory Property Assistance Team, reports to MNC-I. The Inventory
    Property Assistance Team's mission is to track material and equipment
    shortages and excesses for units in Iraq and, when a unit is
    redeploying, provide instructions for either the redistribution or
    retrograde of that unit's material and equipment. It has the added
    mission of conducting inventories during the closure of forward
    operating bases, conducting the transfer of government-furnished
    equipment,[Footnote 24] and conducting inventories of "found" equipment
    containers in Iraq. ARCENT has proposed a command structure within MNF-
    I and MNC-I to coordinate command and control over the assistance teams
    in order to better synchronize retrograde efforts in the theater, but
    as of May 2008 this structure has not been adopted. As a result,
    according to ARCENT, the use of the various teams during the retrograde
    process is both unclear and confusing.

    Until Recently No Theater Logistical Organization Had Command Authority
    over Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment in Theater:

    Until recently, there was no single theater logistical organization
    with command authority over the two units responsible for retrograding
    theater provided equipment, which accounts for 80 percent of the
    equipment in Iraq. As a result significant amounts of theater provided
    equipment were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition
    instructions. The two units responsible for retrograding theater
    provided equipment are the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in Iraq and
    the 401st Army Field Support Brigade in Kuwait. Together, these field
    support brigades relieve redeploying units of accountability for
    theater provided equipment, arrange for its transportation from Iraq to
    Kuwait, and process the equipment through the wash racks, customs, and
    on to its designated destination. According to emerging Army doctrine
    (currently in draft), when Army field support brigades are deployed in
    support of a contingency mission to an operational theater and when
    directed by higher authority, they will fall under the operational
    control of a theater or expeditionary sustainment command.[Footnote 25]
    According to joint doctrine,[Footnote 26] a theater sustainment command
    is the logistics command and control element assigned to the Army
    Service Component Command and is the single Army logistics headquarters
    in a theater of operations. Theater sustainment commands may also
    employ one or more expeditionary sustainment commands to aid them with
    command and control.

    Prior to June 2008 in the Iraqi theater of operations, neither ARCENT-
    -CENTCOM's Army Service Component Command and Army's designated lead
    element for retrograde operations in the theater--nor ARCENT's
    subordinate theater and expeditionary sustainment commands had any
    direct command authority over the 401st or 402nd Army Field Support
    Brigades. Instead, higher headquarters for both the field support
    brigades was the Army Sustainment Command located at Rock Island
    Arsenal, Illinois.[Footnote 27] This command relationship appeared to
    be inconsistent with emerging Army doctrine and Joint doctrine, and
    HQDA had apparently denied ARCENT authority over all Army organizations
    in the CENTCOM AOR that support the retrograde process, including the
    401st and 402nd. In an effort to provide some in-theater oversight for
    the retrograde process, AMC has designated the ARCENT G-4 as the
    commander, Army Materiel Command, southwest Asia (AMC-SWA). However,
    like ARCENT and its theater and expeditionary sustainment commands,
    this commander had no direct command authority over the field support
    brigades whose actions he is charged to synchronize and oversee.
    Moreover, he did not have a staff to assist him in his duties aside
    from a chief of staff. According to CENTCOM officials, in June 2008
    CENTCOM designated ARCENT as having operational control over the 401ST
    Army Field Support Brigade and the 402ND Army Field Support Brigade.
    While CENTCOM's action may result in changes in the retrograde process
    for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait, we
    have not yet evaluated the effect of this change.

    Before this change occurred, the lack of unity of command made the
    process for transferring theater provided equipment from Iraq to Kuwait
    inefficient and resulted in significant amounts of this equipment
    sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions. This was
    because the headquarters with the authority to coordinate the theater
    provided equipment retrograde process (Army Sustainment Command) lacked
    visibility over the process while the headquarters with visibility over
    the process (AMC-SWA) lacked the command authority and the staff to
    coordinate the actions of the field support brigades that execute the
    process. For example, on May 16, 2008, 177 pieces of theater provided
    equipment rolling stock[Footnote 28] that were no longer needed in
    theater were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions,
    some since March 2008. Army Sustainment Command took no actions to
    rectify this situation and the commanding general, AMC-SWA, who is also
    the ARCENT G-4, did not have authority to direct that action be taken.
    Instead, he used his personal contacts with DOD officials in the United
    States to obtain the needed disposition instructions. Despite these
    actions, however, problems persisted with the retrograde process. For
    example, a DOD official in Kuwait provided documentation showing that
    over 2,100 non-rolling stock items of theater provided equipment--
    including such items as 120mm mortars, gun mounts, radio sets, and
    generators--were also sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting disposition
    instructions.

    Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or Lack the Authority to
    Enforce Improvements to the Retrograde Process:

    One significant manifestation of the lack of unity of command is that
    logistical organizations have not enforced or lack the authority to
    enforce improvements to a retrograde process that is slow and does not
    maintain in-transit visibility. ASC has identified a solution to the
    problem and ordered its implementation, but it has not enforced its
    order despite having the authority to do so. Until recently, ARCENT
    lacked the necessary authority over the field support brigades to
    enforce Army Sustainment Command's solution. As a result, significant
    stores of TPE that are no longer needed in theater are sitting idle in
    Kuwait awaiting disposition instructions.

    Retrograde Process for Certain Theater Provided Equipment Is Slow and
    Does Not Maintain In-Transit Visibility:

    The current process for retrograding theater provided equipment no
    longer needed in Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit
    visibility.[Footnote 29] This is caused by the frequent manual
    manipulation of data. According to DOD's Supply Chain Materiel
    Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their
    materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable
    support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war using DOD
    standard data systems that provide timely, accurate in-transit asset
    information.[Footnote 30]

    Currently, when theater provided equipment moves to Kuwait the 401st
    Army Field Support Brigade undertakes two concurrent manual processes
    to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment.
    Accountability is established by manually entering equipment data into
    one system, while a second manual entry is made in a different system
    to provide visibility over each item by serial number. The visibility
    system, however, is a nonstandard Army information system. DOD guidance
    states that the DOD components should execute a supply chain strategy
    that promotes the use of shared common data and that wherever possible,
    adopt commercial data exchange and user interface standards and
    procedures while ensuring interoperability.

    Once accountability and visibility over theater provided equipment has
    been established, personnel from the 401st Army Field Support Brigade
    request disposition instructions. This labor-intensive manual process
    involves sending spreadsheets populated with equipment data from Kuwait
    to Army Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island, Illinois, and
    then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Command[Footnote 31]
    responsible for each particular item, which, in turn, sends disposition
    instructions back through this chain to the 401st. This process can
    take months because of the manual workarounds used to pass and
    manipulate the data.

    While equipment can be shipped once disposition instructions are
    received in Kuwait, in-transit visibility of the equipment is
    temporarily lost during shipment because the process used to direct
    shipment of the equipment--called Inter-Depot Transfer--bypasses the
    Global Transportation Network, DOD's system for providing near real-
    time in-transit visibility information. This lack of in-transit
    visibility is contrary to current DOD guidance that requires timely,
    accurate in-transit asset information be available to all users and
    logistics managers and in a standard format adequate to satisfy needs.

    The 401st Army Field Support Brigade uses another manual process to
    compensate for this lack of in-transit visibility by coordinating with
    Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements at Kuwaiti ports
    in order to obtain final load manifests for each vessel. The manifest
    is forwarded to item managers in the United States so they can prepare
    to receive the equipment; however, manifest information does not reach
    the brigade until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail.

    Army Sustainment Command has stated that "the current process used�to
    manage and obtain disposition is slow and cumbersome with a high
    potential to be overwhelmed if reposturing is accelerated." In addition
    to the more than 2,100 pieces of nonrolling stock TPE awaiting
    dispositions instructions cited above--some reportedly for years--a DOD
    official stated that in the past rolling stock has been sitting idle in
    Kuwait for anywhere from 3 to 9 months.

    Logistical Organizations Have Not Enforced or Lack the Authority to
    Enforce Compliance with Orders to Implement Improvements to the
    Retrograde Process:

    Although Army Sustainment Command has issued an order outlining changes
    to the retrograde process that corrects the problems we have
    identified, neither of the field support brigades in the Iraqi theater
    of operations have followed it. In April 2008, Army Sustainment Command
    issued an order directing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support
    Brigades to use Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced transactions to
    transfer equipment between Iraq and Kuwait in order to maintain
    accountability and visibility.[Footnote 32] Moreover, the order
    directed that disposition instructions for all theater provided
    equipment not required in theater should be requested through the
    Standard Army Retail Supply System.[Footnote 33] According to a DOD
    official this will allow the automated request of disposition
    instructions, thereby reducing the time necessary to receive the
    instructions. Moreover, the system will provide data to the Global
    Transportation Network, thereby improving in-transit visibility over
    equipment. However, for reasons that were not made clear, this order
    has not been implemented and Army Sustainment Command has not compelled
    the field support brigades to comply.

    In January 2008, ARCENT, as the lead agent for retrograde, requested
    that Headquarters, Department of the Army delegate to ARCENT more
    authority over the retrograde process. Specifically, according to
    ARCENT officials, ARCENT requested that it be given authority to
    determine and issue disposition instructions and that it be given
    authority to direct all Army organizations in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility that support the retrograde process. As of May 2008,
    ARCENT had not received these authorities. Until recently, ARCENT had
    no authority to direct the field support brigades to comply with Army
    Sustainment Command's order to fix the data incompatibility problem in
    theater. While CENTCOM's action designating ARCENT as having
    operational control over the support brigades may result in changes in
    the disposition instruction process, we have not yet evaluated the
    effect of this command change.

    Issues That DOD Needs to Consider in Its Reposture Planning:

    We identified nine issues that will affect the development of plans for
    reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq. These nine issues are discussed, in
    detail, in the following sections. Although the pace and overall extent
    of a potential reposturing are uncertain, DOD has begun to address
    these issues. While DOD officials are not required to report specific
    information about these nine issues or possible mitigation plans
    related to these issues, as part of the briefings they are required to
    provide to the congressional defense committees,[Footnote 34] we
    believe that without more specific reporting from DOD, Congress may not
    be able to effectively exercise oversight responsibilities of DOD's
    plans.

    Time and Cost Estimates for Base Closures in Iraq:

    According to ARCENT officials, closing or handing over U.S.
    installations in Iraq will be time-consuming and costly, although time
    and costs are difficult to estimate without a bilateral agreement
    addressing base closures. As of May 31, 2008, 311 U.S. installations in
    Iraq will have to be closed or turned over to the Iraqis during a
    reposturing effort, depending on the scope of U.S. reposturing.
    According to ARCENT officials, experience has shown it takes 1 to 2
    months to close the smallest platoon-or company-size installations,
    which contain between 16 and 200 combat soldiers or marines. However,
    Multi-National Corps-Iraq has never closed an installation the size of
    complex installations such as Balad Air Force Base, which contains
    approximately 24,000 inhabitants and has matured over 5 years, making
    accurate predictions about the time it will take to close them
    difficult. ARCENT officials estimate it could take longer than 18
    months to close a base of that size, likening the process to shutting
    down and moving a small U.S. city.

    According to DOD officials, time and costs are difficult to estimate
    without an agreement between the United States and Iraq on base
    closure, especially with regard to guidance of the management of
    hazardous materials and waste and the transfer of personal
    property.[Footnote 35] ARCENT officials stated that both issues are
    traditionally addressed in Status of Forces Agreements; however, as of
    July 18, 2008, the United States and Iraq do not have such an
    agreement.[Footnote 36] Hence, although CENTCOM guidance states that
    the base commander is responsible for the removal or remediation of all
    hazardous materials and waste, ARCENT officials stated that base
    commanders do not know to what extent they must remediate the waste,
    and therefore may have difficulty estimating the time and cost of
    cleaning installations. In addition, according to ARCENT officials,
    absent an agreement with Iraq on the disposition of personal property,
    "all bunkers, trenches, fighting positions, and force protection
    barriers� will be removed" in accordance with CENTCOM policy.

    ARCENT officials asserted that, absent a bilateral agreement with Iraq
    addressing the base closure or hand-over process, the U.S. will have to
    negotiate the terms of closure for each base individually, which could
    potentially slow the base closing process. For example, ARCENT
    officials noted that since the owners or lessees of the land on which
    the installations currently reside include the Iraqi Ministries of
    Interior, Defense, and Justice, and other Iraqi national government
    entities as well as private individuals, property transfers would be
    complicated and time consuming. Moreover, ARCENT officials stated that
    in the absence of a bilateral agreement that provides guidance for the
    management of hazardous waste and materials, it is normal practice to
    follow the established guidelines for this management, which generally
    are more stringent and therefore potentially more costly and time
    consuming.

    Uncertainties Regarding Plans for Contractors:

    From late 2007 through July 2008, planning for the reposturing of U.S.
    forces in Iraq did not include a theater-wide plan for the reposturing
    of contractors. According to MNF-I's May 2008 logistics reposture
    order, logistics planners were to coordinate with the Defense
    Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) to identify contractual issues
    associated with logistics reposture operations. But as of June 2008,
    DCMA officials stated that they were not aware of a theater-wide plan
    for the reposturing of contractors. In fact, according to DOD
    officials, CENTCOM contracting planners did not begin participating in
    planning for the reposturing operations until July 2008.

    While there is no theater-wide plan, since May 2008 Army LOGCAP
    officials have been participating in theater-wide logistics reposturing
    planning. Reposture planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it
    is the largest logistical support contract in Iraq. According to a DOD
    official, examples of such participation include LOGCAP personnel
    attending a series of logistics conferences held at Camp Arifjan,
    Kuwait in May 2008, working with logistics reposture planning teams in
    MNF-I and MNC-I, and participating in the Logistics Reposture Working
    Group. However, according to a DOD official responsible for
    coordinating LOGCAP planning efforts with reposturing planning efforts,
    challenges remain in the planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP
    contractor personnel. For instance, decisions about reposturing of
    these contractors are often made before requirements have been clearly
    identified and DOD officials responsible for planning the reposturing
    of these contractors do not receive timely and accurate information
    from the customers or units using these contracts.

    Accountability and Disposition of Contractor-Managed Government-Owned
    Property:

    Maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of U.S.
    government property under the control of contractors may present
    challenges to reposturing from Iraq. According to Defense Contract
    Management Agency officials, there is at least $3.5 billion worth of
    contractor-managed government-owned property[Footnote 37] in Iraq.
    According to the same officials, the largest portion of all contractor-
    managed government-owned property in Iraq, $3.37 billion, falls under
    the LOGCAP, an Army program to provide contracted resources to support
    U.S. contingency operations. Examples of LOGCAP equipment include
    laundry and bath facilities, food service, sanitation, housing,
    maintenance, transportation, construction, and power generation and
    distribution. According to Defense Contract Management Agency
    officials, non-LOGCAP contractor-managed government-owned property
    falls into four main categories. These are the Air Force Contract
    Augmentation Program, selective programs under DOD's Joint Contracting
    Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, programs run by the Gulf Region Division of
    the Army Corps of Engineers, and hundreds of smaller programs run by
    individual U.S. government agencies. Defense Contract Management Agency
    officials reported that property in these four categories includes, but
    is not limited to, plant equipment and materiel to support various
    reconstruction efforts like the Iraqi Department of Public Works.

    Several DOD organizations have already begun planning for the
    disposition of excess contractor-managed government-owned property from
    Iraq.[Footnote 38] For example, in October 2007, the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness increased the
    donation threshold for all excess U.S.-owned personal property in Iraq
    from $5,000 to $10,000[Footnote 39] and delegated this donation
    authority to MNF-I. According to DOD officials, in June 2008, the
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel readiness
    increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as donation
    authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq from
    $10,000 to $15,000. In addition, in 2007 the Army published guidelines
    for the retrograde of contractor-acquired government-owned property
    from CENTCOM's area of responsibility.[Footnote 40] The Army followed
    this up in December 2007 with a business case analysis of the effective
    disposition of contractor-acquired government-owned property and a
    conference in May 2008 during which it updated and developed polices
    and processes for maintaining accountability over this
    property.[Footnote 41] The Army's analysis indicates that approximately
    85 percent of all contractor-acquired government-owned property in Iraq
    should be transferred,[Footnote 42] sold, or scrapped in Iraq once it
    is declared excess,[Footnote 43] while the remaining 15 percent can be
    sold or reused elsewhere. Finally, in its Logistics Reposture Guidance,
    MNF-I established policies and procedures for disposing of contractor-
    managed government-owned property in Iraq. This process is shown in
    figure 2 below.

    Figure 2: MNF-I Process for Disposing of Contractor-Managed Government-
    Owned Property:

    This figure is a flowchart illustrating the MNF-I process for disposing
    of contractor-managed government-owned property.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

    [End of figure]

    Despite the above efforts, however, three challenges exist to
    maintaining accountability for and managing the disposition of
    contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq. The first
    challenge is determining the original or fair-market value of
    contractor-managed government-owned property and determining any
    security restrictions on its disposition. According to MNF-I, the
    failure to sort and identify U.S. government materiel in Iraq has
    already resulted in the retrograding of items that are unserviceable,
    are still needed in theater, or are uneconomical to retrograde.
    Moreover, according to the Department of the Army's business case
    analysis, the LOGCAP property book kept by the prime contractor had
    numerous omissions, and many items were not properly listed, creating
    doubt about the inventory's accuracy. Without accurate accountability
    of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, the U.S.
    government may fail to realize all possible financial and practical
    gains from this property.

    The second challenge facing DOD, according to Defense Contract
    Management Agency officials, is the time-consuming and labor-intensive
    task of accounting for and determining the disposition of contractor-
    managed government-owned property. According to MNF-I, before
    contractor-managed government-owned property can be disposed of it must
    be transferred from the contractor's records to a military unit's
    property book. However, officials from the Defense Contracting
    Management Agency stated that contractors and government officials must
    perform a joint inventory of all property before it is transferred.
    Defense Contract Management Agency officials assert that completing
    this inventory will require planning, travel to storage locations, and
    the physical staging of property for easier counting, all of which are
    time consuming. Moreover, the same officials stated that security
    concerns have previously hindered their ability to travel to all
    inventory locations. According to AMC, if the security situation
    inhibits contractors from moving equipment, the contractors can abandon
    the equipment to U.S. forces that will then be responsible for its
    disposition. Defense Contract Management Agency officials stated that
    without adequate time and resources to plan and execute a thorough
    inventory of contractor-managed government-owned property in Iraq, the
    risks of losing accountability over this property will increase.

    The third challenge is that DLA may not have sufficient data to
    adequately plan capacity needs at the Defense Reutilization and
    Marketing Offices in theater.[Footnote 44] MNF-I policy states that
    contractor-managed government-owned property that is excess to
    government requirements, and is not donated to the Iraqi government,
    will be disposed of at DLA facilities. To prepare for this, DLA
    officials attached to MNF-I told us they spent 3 months performing a
    detailed analysis of how much equipment will end up at these facilities
    in theater. Despite these efforts, however, there are six factors that
    may affect DLA's ability to accumulate sufficient data to adequately
    plan capacity needs at DLA's disposal facilities.

    * LOGCAP inventory accuracy. A Department of the Army business case
    analysis stated that problems with the LOGCAP property book created
    doubt about the inventory's accuracy. While according to an Army
    official the LOGCAP prime contractor is currently performing an
    inventory of all of its property in Iraq, the process is adding new
    items to their property books, making older property estimates
    outdated.

    * Lack of property disposal estimates. According to DOD officials, MNF-
    I requested but never received the services' estimates of what they
    anticipate sending to the disposal facilities.

    * Lack of property book data. According to DOD officials, MNF-I did not
    receive property books from the Army Corps of Engineers and only
    received partial information from the Air Force Contract Augmentation
    Program.

    * Lack of visibility over non-DOD property. According to Defense
    Contract Management Agency officials, it is difficult to determine how
    much equipment is managed by contractors under the hundreds of smaller
    programs run by individual U.S. government agencies.

    * Lack of individual item accountability. According to DOD officials,
    many of the systems used to account for contractor-managed government-
    owned property only track types of items, but not necessarily the
    individual items themselves, making detailed estimates difficult.

    * Insufficient training. According to DOD officials, some retrograde
    process teams sent to aid redeploying units have not had sufficient
    training, causing them to send unnecessary property to disposal
    facilities.

    DLA has implemented other initiatives to mitigate and prepare for
    increased operations at the disposal facilities. For example, DLA
    fielded individuals to accompany a key retrograde assistance team to
    prevent unnecessary equipment from ending up at these facilities and,
    according to DLA officials, in one instance they successfully rerouted
    194 of 200 containers, reducing the chance of double-handling this
    property. However, without a comprehensive picture of all property in
    theater, DLA may not be able to fully prepare its disposal facilities
    for the contractor-managed government-owned property that will flow to
    them, particularly in the event of a full-scale reposturing.

    Use of Facilities in Kuwait and Other Neighboring Countries:

    The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel
    retrograded as part of any reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq would
    be governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as
    well as restrictions on the use of those facilities. According to DOD
    officials, Kuwait is the main point of exit for all personnel,
    equipment, and materiel in Iraq. At present there are three U.S. bases
    and five Kuwait facilities that the United States is using to support
    operations in Iraq, including retrograde and redeployment operations.
    The U.S.-Kuwait Defense Cooperation Agreement governs the use of these
    facilities. According to DOD officials, any reposturing effort must
    take into consideration the terms of the Defense Cooperation Agreement
    and ongoing negotiations related to that agreement, particularly given
    that in their view, the government of Kuwait desires to limit the size
    of the U.S. footprint in Kuwait. DOD has explored alternative routes
    and ports through which to redeploy units and retrograde equipment and
    material but these, too, are constrained because of capacity and other
    considerations. For example, in February 2008 the Marine Corps began
    testing the feasibility of using an alternate port in the region for
    redeployment and retrograde operations.[Footnote 45] However, Marine
    Corps officials stated that though the tests have been successful, at
    present the country in which that port is located only allows the
    transport of containerized cargo through its territory and will not
    permit U.S. military security detachments to escort the cargo. As a
    result of these restrictions, Marine Corps officials reported they
    could retrograde only 20 to 30 percent of their nonsensitive materiel
    and equipment in Iraq through this port. ARCENT officials are also
    studying the feasibility of using two other alternate ports in the
    region. However, according to ARCENT documents, one port has limited
    utility as a retrograde port because the shallow draft of the harbor
    makes its unsuitable for larger ships, the port's facilities are in
    need of significant renovation, and local security at the port is
    questionable. The third port is limited to containerized cargo as well
    as being limited by the amount of cargo traffic that can travel along
    the port's approach roads.

    Availability of Wash Racks and Customs Personnel:

    Limits on the availability of wash racks in Kuwait and a limited number
    of customs inspectors comprise another constraint on the pace at which
    retrograde operations can be effected. Prior to returning to the United
    States all materiel and equipment must be cleaned to U.S. Department of
    Agriculture (USDA) standards. These standards are outlined in The Armed
    Forces Pest Management Board Technical Guide No. 31, which states that
    "USDA inspection standards only allow a thin film of road dust on
    vehicles and equipment arriving at the CONUS [continental United
    States] final port of entry," which DOD officials interpret to mean
    that materiel and equipment cannot have even a "pinchable" amount of
    dirt. To meet these standards of cleanliness, DOD officials stated that
    all vehicles returning to the United States are pressure washed. This
    involves, first, removing the vehicle's secondary equipment and any add-
    on armor. Next, the vehicle moves to a wash rack where the pressure
    washing occurs. For larger vehicles, such as tanks, Bradley Fighting
    Vehicles, and M88 recovery vehicles this can take anywhere from 40 to
    80 hours (larger vehicles must also have their engines removed and the
    engine compartment cleaned as well). Smaller vehicles, such as HMMWVs,
    take anywhere from 4 to 8 hours.

    At present there are 211 wash racks available for use by U.S. forces in
    Kuwait, 81 at Camp Arifjan and another 130 at Kuwait Naval
    Base.[Footnote 46] According to DOD officials, the wash racks at Camp
    Arifjan operate 24 hours a day. However, wash rack operations at Kuwait
    Naval Base are subject to occasional work stoppages and other
    restrictions. For example, when ammunition is being loaded or unloaded
    at the naval base, wash rack operations there are suspended for safety
    reasons. According to DOD officials, at present this only occurs for 6
    days each quarter, but if the retrograde of ammunition were accelerated
    this could occur more often. Moreover, theater provided equipment,
    which is washed by contracted third-country nationals, cannot be washed
    at Kuwait Naval Base because of security concerns. And of the 130 wash
    racks at the naval base, only 100 are useable for the cleaning of
    equipment because the remaining 30 lack the necessary filters that
    separate contaminates from the wash water.

    Figure 3: Bradley Fighting Vehicles at Wash Racks:

    This figure is a photograph of Bradley fighting vehicles on wash racks.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: DOD.

    [End of figure]

    Figure 4: HMMWV on Wash Rack:

    This figure is a photograph of HMMWV on a wash rack.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: DOD.

    [End of figure]

    After being washed, vehicles are inspected by military personnel who
    have been specially trained and certified by the U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection Agency. These customs inspectors ensure that before
    any vehicle or piece of equipment is placed in a sterile lot, the last
    stop before it boards transport for return to the United States, it
    meets USDA standards of cleanliness. In Kuwait, these trained
    inspectors are provided by the U.S. Navy. Navy officials have stated
    that at present there is no shortage of trained and certified customs
    inspectors in Kuwait given the current throughput of retrograding
    material and equipment. However, other DOD officials have noted that
    were the pace of retrograde increased, more customs inspectors would be
    necessary. They also stated that absent an increase in the number of
    inspectors, otherwise clean vehicles would be delayed from entering the
    sterile lot and would therefore require additional cleaning to meet
    customs standards of cleanliness. In turn, this could cause a backlog
    of vehicles and materiel in Kuwait.

    Availability of Transportation and Security Assets and Route
    Restrictions:

    The availability in theater of military owned and operated heavy
    equipment transports and convoy security assets, combined with limits
    on the primary supply route, could inhibit the flow of materiel out of
    Iraq. According to DOD officials, two types of heavy equipment
    transports (HET) support U.S. forces in the Iraqi theater of
    operations: commercially contracted unarmored transports and armored
    military transports with military crews. Both types of transport are
    used to haul vehicles like tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and HMMWVs
    over long distances.[Footnote 47] They also carry containers.

    According to DOD officials, there are sufficient quantities of civilian
    HETs in the Iraqi theater of operations. However, one factor affecting
    the frequency with which convoys can be mounted is the availability of
    military HETs and convoy security assets. According to officials from
    the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, most convoys comprise both
    civilian and military HETs, with the latter being interspersed
    throughout the convoy to facilitate control and security. Any increase
    in the number of civilian HETs without a corresponding increase in the
    number of military HETs, they maintain, increases the risk of
    accidents. However, DOD officials have reported shortages of military
    HETs in theater. In addition, officials from the 1st Theater
    Sustainment Command stated that each convoy is accompanied by a mounted
    security detachment. According to ARCENT officials, the availability of
    these convoy security assets could also inhibit the flow of materiel
    out of Iraq by decreasing the frequency with which convoys can be
    mounted.

    One other factor that could inhibit the rate by which units can be
    redeployed and material and equipment retrograded out of Iraq into
    Kuwait is the capacity of the primary supply route. Prior to May 2007,
    U.S. convoys used a six-lane concrete highway. However, according to
    III Corps officials, the government of Kuwait funded the construction
    of an alternate route that opened in May 2007. These officials
    explained that the new route is not wide enough to handle two-way HET
    traffic and is deteriorating. III Corps officials stated that, because
    of this, the flow of convoys north and south along the newer route must
    be staggered, which further limits the number and frequency of
    retrograde convoys. Moreover, according to DOD officials under all but
    the most extreme reposturing scenarios, substantial numbers of convoys
    will need to continue flowing north to resupply Coalition forces in
    Iraq.

    Home Station Issues:

    During our visits to units and installations in the United States as
    well as conversations with DOD officials, we became aware of several
    issues that could challenge units once they have returned to their home
    stations. Although these issues need to be explored further, they are
    included in this report because of their potential impact. These issues
    are:

    * A lack of sufficient numbers of mental health professionals to care
    for returning service members and their families. According to Army
    officials and GAO analysis there is already a deficiency in the number
    of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental
    health problems being reported by service members and their families.
    The Army has already taken steps to meet this challenge through hiring
    and contracting for additional mental health care professionals to meet
    the rising demand, but they report that there remains a dearth of
    qualified mental health professionals to provide the requisite care for
    service members and their families.

    * A lack of sufficient infrastructure. According to Army officials
    there is already insufficient infrastructure such as barracks,
    administrative and headquarters buildings, motor pools, and maintenance
    and training areas on several installations. This is due to the "Grow
    the Army" initiative which has increased the number of brigade combat
    teams in the Army since the beginning of the war in Iraq. As a result,
    some installations have more Army units assigned to them than there are
    facilities to support. Currently, the Army is able to mitigate this
    challenge because a certain number of units are always deployed. This
    allows the Army to use the same facilities for more than one unit.
    However, installation management officials are concerned that in the
    event of a major reposturing of units out of Iraq and the concomitant
    return of Army units to their home stations there will not be enough
    room to accommodate all of the equipment, unit headquarters staff, and
    soldiers stationed at an installation.

    * Needed future investments in training and equipment. According to
    recent testimony by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army,
    resetting the force so that it is capable of "full spectrum operations"
    will require substantial future investments in time, money, and
    resources. This point was underscored for us during discussions with
    officials from the 1st Cavalry Division that had recently returned from
    Iraq. They told us that it would not be until 6 to 9 months after
    returning from Iraq that their brigade combat teams would have the
    necessary equipment with which to train.

    Lastly, though DOD is not required to report on the specific issues we
    identify in this report or possible mitigation plans related to these
    issues as part of the briefings they are required to provide to the
    congressional defense committees, we believe that without such specific
    information Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its
    oversight responsibilities and stewardship over DOD.

    Conclusions:

    Although DOD began in May 2008 to coordinate its planning for the
    reposturing of U.S. forces from Iraq among its various relevant
    commands and organizations, it has not adequately delineated roles and
    responsibilities for the execution of the associated retrograde
    process. Specifically, although CENTCOM has designated an executive
    agent for the synchronization of retrograde operations in the theater,
    no unified or coordinated chain of command exists to account for the
    roles played by a variety of teams engaged in retrograde operations. In
    addition, while the Army has designated ARCENT as its lead element for
    retrograde of Army material and equipment from the CENTCOM AOR, until
    recently ARCENT had no command authority over the two Army units
    responsible for the retrograde of the bulk of material and equipment in
    Iraq. Instead, there are a variety of organizations, some in theater
    and others in the United States, that exercise influence over the
    retrograde process, either directly or through subordinate
    organizations in the Iraqi theater of operations. The resulting lack of
    a unified or coordinated command structure is not only inconsistent
    with joint doctrine, but also increases confusion and causes
    inefficiencies in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of
    identified mitigation initiatives.

    In addition, we identified several other issues that DOD will need to
    consider as it develops a comprehensive plan for reposturing U.S.
    forces from Iraq to support future U.S objectives and strategy. While
    DOD has begun to address these issues, none of them have been fully
    addressed. Moreover, because Congress will have a role in funding and
    overseeing the reposturing effort, it is important that the Congress be
    informed of these issues since they will likely affect DOD's overall
    reposturing costs and execution. While DOD is required to brief the
    congressional defense committees on certain issues related to
    reposturing, it is not required to provide the specific information
    identified in our report. We believe that without such information,
    Congress may not be able to effectively exercise its oversight
    responsibilities and assess the extent to which DOD's plans are
    effective, efficient, and well-coordinated.

    Recommendations:

    To ensure that DOD can efficiently and effectively retrograde its
    materiel and equipment from Iraq, we recommend that the Secretary of
    Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
    take steps to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations
    in support of the retrograde effort. These steps should address not
    only the Army field support brigades but also the theater property and
    retrograde support teams. We also recommend that the Secretary of
    Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the
    incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
    visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit.

    Matter for Congressional Consideration:

    To enhance its ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities,
    Congress may wish to consider directing DOD to include in its briefings
    submitted in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2008, specific details on the status of its reposturing
    planning and how it intends to mitigate specific reposturing issues,
    including those we identified in this report, as well as other
    challenges the department envisions as it proceeds with its reposturing
    efforts.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

    In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
    with our two recommendations. Specifically, the department partially
    concurred with our first recommendation and fully concurred with our
    second recommendation. DOD also commented that from the time we began
    this review to the completion of our data collection, the operational
    environment in theater has changed, processes have been modified, and
    actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns identified in our
    draft report. We recognize in our report that the operational
    environment has changed over time and that DOD has recently modified
    some processes and taken actions to enhance its planning for the
    reposturing of forces from Iraq. However, as discussed below, we
    continue to believe that DOD needs to take additional actions to
    implement our recommendations and improve the efficiency of its
    retrograde process.

    In response to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense,
    in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments, take steps
    to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations in support
    of the retrograde effort, DOD stated that the current retrograde
    command and control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive
    results. DOD further commented that CENTCOM has designated the U.S.
    Army Central Command (ARCENT) as the executive agent for the retrograde
    process, and that ARCENT also has operational control of the two Army
    Field Sustainment Brigades we discuss in the report. DOD believes that
    the established liaison and supporting/supported relationships by
    retrograde support teams are achieving unity of effort in retrograding
    theater property through the regular Logistics Reposture Working Groups
    where collaboration and coordination occur. DOD further commented that,
    for a longer term solution, CENTCOM is taking steps to refine and
    solidify a theater logistics command and control structure from its
    current construct to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under
    the CENTCOM Commander. DOD stated that its plan for this new command is
    phased, conditions-based, and its execution will be coordinated within
    the overall theater posture process with appropriate DOD agencies and
    the military services. We support DOD's and CENTCOM's long-term plan to
    refine and solidify its command and control structure for managing and
    executing the retrograde process. In addition, we are aware that
    subsequent to completing our audit work in Kuwait and drafting our
    report, CENTCOM refined the logistical command and control structure by
    placing the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades under the
    operational control of the commanding general, Army Materiel Command,
    Southwest Asia. Although we have not had the opportunity to evaluate
    the effect of this new command arrangement, we believe it to be a
    significant step toward the attainment of unity of command over the
    theater provided equipment retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not
    implemented a similar action with regard to the command and control of
    the ten theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate
    the redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this
    lack of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and
    responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and
    materiel unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe
    that DOD, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
    needs to immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity
    regarding the command and control of the various commands and support
    teams that support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait.

    DOD fully concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary
    of Defense, in consultation with the military departments, correct the
    incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
    visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD
    commented that it is actively assessing various data systems used to
    maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while in transit.

    DOD also provided a number of general and technical comments which we
    have incorporated in the report as appropriate. A complete copy of
    DOD's written comments, including the department's general and
    technical comments and our evaluation of each of those comments, is
    included in appendix II.

    We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
    committees; Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
    and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also
    make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report
    will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov].

    Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in
    this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
    Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
    Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who
    made key contributions to this report are listed in Appendix VII.

    Signed by:

    William M. Solis:

    Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

    List of Congressional Committees:

    The Honorable Carl Levin:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable John McCain:
    Ranking Member:
    Committee on Armed Services:
    United States Senate:

    The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable Thad Cochran:
    Ranking Member:
    Committee on Appropriations:
    Subcommittee on Defense:
    United States Senate:

    The Honorable Ike Skelton:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
    Ranking Member:
    Committee on Armed Services:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable John P. Murtha:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
    Ranking Member:
    Committee on Appropriations:
    Subcommittee on Defense:
    House of Representatives:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

    To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has
    begun logistical planning for the reposturing of forces from Iraq and
    upon what assumptions it based its plans, we reviewed relevant
    briefings, orders, and staff analyses relating to the logistical
    planning effort and discussed the effort with DOD officials who were
    directly involved. We met with many of these individuals several times
    over the course of this engagement either in person, telephonically, or
    by video teleconference. As a result, we were able to obtain updated
    information that allowed us to discuss the means by which the
    logistical planning effort evolved over time. We also obtained copies
    of the briefings presented during the May 2008 logistical summit held
    at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, as well as a copy of the logistical
    reposturing order that resulted from that summit, and met with many of
    the senior DOD officials who participated in that summit. The documents
    we obtained and officials we spoke with were from U.S. Transportation
    Command; U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Central Command; Multinational
    Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command,;
    Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps;
    U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan,
    Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central; U.S. Army Forces
    Command; Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; Headquarters, III
    Corps; and the 1st Theater Support Command.

    To determine the extent to which DOD has established roles and
    responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of materiel
    and equipment from Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed documents from and
    interviewed officials in the organizations that were either directly
    responsible for the retrograde process or that negotiated the process.
    We also reviewed relevant DOD regulations and joint and Army doctrine
    publications. To determine how the retrograde process was actually
    executed we obtained documents and interviewed officials from
    Multinational Force-Iraq; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel
    Command, to include the commanding general, Army Material Command,
    Southwest Asia; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters,
    U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Army Central at both Fort McPherson, Georgia,
    and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central;
    Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; the 1st Theater Support
    Command; and the 401st and 402nd Army Field Support Brigades. To gain
    insight on the experience of units that had passed through the
    retrograde process we obtained documents and interviewed officials from
    III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, both at Fort Hood, Texas, and
    the II Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

    During the course of this engagement we became aware of several
    challenges that could have an impact on the resposturing of U.S. forces
    from Iraq and have included a discussion of these challenges in this
    report in order to provide Congress with information it needs to
    effectively carry out its oversight functions. We based our discussion
    of those issues on documents we obtained and interviews with officials
    from Headquarters, Department of the Army; Headquarters, Marine Corps;
    U.S. Central Command; U.S. Transportation Command; U.S. Joint Forces
    Command; the Defense Logistics Agency; Army Materiel Command; III Corps
    and Fort Hood, Texas; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Central;
    Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Army Central at both
    Fort McPherson, Georgia, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and 1st Theater
    Support Command.

    We have also provided in this report several challenges facing units
    once they have returned to their home stations. As with the challenges
    above, we became aware of these issues during the course of our
    engagement. Although these issues need to be explored further, they are
    included in this report because of the impact they could have on the
    morale and welfare of service members and their families and the
    potential costs and challenges associated with rebuilding unit
    readiness. We became aware of these issues following discussions with
    officials from U.S. Army Forces Command; Assistant Chief of Staff for
    Installation Management; U.S. Army Medical Command; U.S. Army
    Installation Management Command; the U.S. Army Surgeon General's
    Office; III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas; the 1st Cavalry Division; and
    Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force.

    From the fall of 2007 through the spring of 2008, we also made several
    attempts to visit Iraq to speak with officials from Multinational Force-
    Iraq, Multinational Corps-Iraq, and various organizations involved with
    the logistical aspects of reposturing. But for reasons that are not
    entirely clear, DOD stated that it was unable to accommodate these
    visits. However, we were able to mitigate our inability to visit Iraq
    by:

    * interviewing officials with knowledge of the logistical aspects of
    reposturing who had recently returned from tours on the MNF-I or MNC-I
    staffs;

    * visiting Headquarters, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, after it
    returned from its block leave following its return from Iraq, where III
    Corps served as Headquarters, Multinational Corps-Iraq;

    * interviewing officials from organizations stationed in Iraq who were
    in Kuwait during our visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; and:

    * submitting lists of questions through U.S. Central Command for
    organizations in Iraq.

    Although we were not always able to obtain full answers to our list of
    questions, based on our analysis of the information we were able to
    obtain we determined that we had sufficient information to substantiate
    our findings.

    We conducted our audit from August 2007 through August 2008 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.

    [End of section]

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
    2400 Defense Pentagon:
    Washington, DC 20301-2400:

    International Security Affairs:

    Mr. William A. Solis:
    Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street N.W.:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    September 3, 2008:

    Dear Mr. Solis:

    This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-930, "Operation Iraqi
    Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DoD Planning for Reposturing of U.S.
    Forces from Iraq," dated August 8, 2008 (GAO Code 351092).

    Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report and your
    effort to enhance the retrograde process from Iraq. From the period
    that GAO began its research until its data collection concluded, the
    operational environment in theater has changed, processes have been
    modified and set, and actions have been taken to mitigate the concerns
    identified in the draft report. Below are the Department's comments on
    the draft report's recommendations.

    Recommendation 1: To ensure that DoD can efficiently and effectively
    retrograde its materiel and equipment from Iraq, GAO recommends that
    the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with U.S. Central Command
    (USCENTCOM) and the military departments, take steps to clarify the
    chain of command over logistical operations in support of the
    retrograde effort. These steps should address both the theater property
    and retrograde support teams and the Army field support brigades.

    DoD Response: Partially concur. The current retrograde command and
    control achieves unity of effort and is producing positive results.
    USCENTCOM has designated U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) as the executive
    agent for retrograde process. ARCENT also has operational control
    (OPCON) of the two Army Field Sustainment Brigades of concern in the
    draft report. Established liaison and supporting/supported
    relationships by retrograde support teams are achieving unity of effort
    in retrograding theater property through regular Logistics Reposture
    Working Groups where collaboration and coordination occur.

    For a longer term solution, USCENTCOM is also taking steps to refine
    and solidify a theater logistics command and control structure from its
    current construct to a Joint Task Force Theater Logistics Command under
    the CENTCOM Commander. The plan is phased, conditions-based, and its
    execution will be coordinated within the overall theater posture
    process with appropriate DoD agencies and the Services.

    Recommendation 2: GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
    consultation with the military departments, correct the incompatibility
    weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain visibility over
    equipment and materiel while they are in transit.

    DoD Response: Concur. DoD acknowledges the focus of this draft report
    has been on Army systems. DoD is actively assessing various data
    systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while
    in transit. Attached are additional detailed comments and corrections.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by:

    Christopher C. Straub:
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East:

    Attachments:
    As stated.

    Draft GAO Report �Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed To Enhance DOD
    Planning For Reposturing Of U.S. Forces From Iraq,� Dated August 8,
    2008:

    GAO CODE 351092/GAO-08-930:

    General Comments On The Draft Report:

    * Current retrograde efforts. As of August 2008, during fiscal year
    2008, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) has retrograded over 7,000 major end
    items back to CONUS. U.S. Marine Central is also successfully
    retrograding end items for reset. Defense Logistic Agency (DLA),
    through Defense Reutilization and Market Services in theater, has
    disposed of 175 million pounds of scrap metal. Through its
    transportation priority program, U.S. Transportation Command
    (USTRANSCOM) has saved the Army over 40% in shipping costs by using
    empty cargo aircraft backhaul capability.

    See comment 1.

    * Chain of command for logistics operations in support of retrograde.
    Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) has not been assigned from
    USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has designated ARCENT as the executive agent for
    logistics reposture/retrograde. In the Iraqi theater, MultiNational
    Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) has established processes and procedures for
    addressing theater logistics issues. These lines of operations include
    basing, unit redeployment, and materiel disposition. Unity of effort is
    accomplished by working groups that have been established to
    collaborate and coordinate with joint stakeholders and partners.
    (Services, USCENTCOM, DLA, USTRANSCOM). For example, both MNF-I and
    MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) have established Logistics Reposture
    Working Groups. They are enduring forums that meet regularly with all
    the key logistics organizations in Iraq and Kuwait to address
    respective strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues.
    Two of the key documents are the MNF-I FRAGO 08-232 and draft MNC-I
    FRAGO that establish redeployment timelines.

    See comment 2.

    * Retrograde Support Teams are specifically addressed within these unit
    redeployment timelines. Each of the assistance teams have specific
    missions based on guidance and direction from parent commands and from
    operational commands in theater. Each assistance team is synchronized
    within the redeployment timeline and brings its own set of expertise to
    facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts.

    See comment 3.

    * Theater Property and Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) - The
    majority of equipment is organizational and will retrograde as a unit
    responsibility. Army Materiel Command�s (AMC) forward Field Support
    Brigades are responsible for retrograde of excess theater provided
    equipment and assuming control of organizational equipment directed for
    sustainment-level reset.

    See comment 4.

    * In transit visibility of materiel - For Army systems, AMC, with its
    subordinate commands and the various headquarters in theater, is
    actively working to establish a Reposturing Common Operating Picture
    (RCOP) to mitigate the cited incompatibility weaknesses in the various
    data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel
    while in transit. While significant challenges in this process remain,
    AMC has already identified system interfaces to be used. Moreover, a
    RCOP Working Group will meet regularly to establish the necessary
    systems interfaces and address procedures used for accountability,
    transportation scheduling and documentation, and equipment in-transit
    visibility. In addition to these efforts, USCENTCOM J4 has joined with
    JFCOM J9 to identify distribution/in-transit visibility requirements,
    processes and capability gaps to the Joint Staff J4 to support the
    development of in-transit visibility capabilities for Joint Logistics
    Organizations within Global Combat Support System � Joint (GCSS-J).

    See comment 5.

    1. Highlight Page, second paragraph. We recommend rewording of the
    first four lines of this paragraph to more accurately portray what has
    occurred since May 2008. As noted from page 15, the draft clearly
    states representatives from throughout the logistics community and
    theater met as a result of the increased coordination and synchronized
    planning, and the outcome was the MNF-I publication of its overarching
    guidance for the logistics reposturing.

    See comment 6.

    2. Pages 1, 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 25, 26, 33. There are several references
    to �bases� throughout the report, especially linked to the number 311.
    This does not accurately characterize the force laydown in Iraq. The
    word �bases� should be replaced by �locations� in most cases to reflect
    the true nature of the places used by U.S. forces.

    See comment 7.

    3. Page 1. The draft report states, �as of July 2008, this pool of
    theater provided equipment totaled approximately 582,000 individual
    pieces worth about $15.5 billion.� Army G8 reports that, for Class VII
    items in Iraq only, a property book pull from the end of March 2008,
    used in a J8/OSD Study, found 173,000 items (Class VII only) worth
    approximately $16.5 billion.

    See comment 8.

    4. Page 2. Recommend deletion of the sentence: �In addition, in June
    2008, GAO also issued an assessment of progress in Iraq and called for
    DOD and the DOS to develop an updated strategy given the changing
    conditions.� This sentence is not relevant to the GAO�s objectives for
    this engagement, and the referenced GAO report�s conclusions were
    rebutted by DoD.

    See comment 9.

    5. Pages 1-3. Discussions regarding the National Defense Authorization
    Act for 2008 appear as a distraction from the draft report and its
    overall conclusions.

    See comment 10.

    6. Page 5. First paragraph, please add: �Army Headquarters G-4 began
    hosting retrograde video teleconferences (VTCs) in June 2006 and moved
    to monthly VTCs in August 2007. The purpose of the VTCs was to
    synchronize retrograde planning efforts. DLA and AMC participated in
    the VTCs. Starting in October 2007, Army Headquarters G-4 expanded the
    Retrograde Task Force to include OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, Marine
    Corps, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and USTRANSCOM, NG, and OCAR.

    See comment 11.

    7. Page 7. Concerning capacity of military transports and convoy
    security assets and limits on the main supply route, we partially
    concur. We concur with the draft GAO report that sufficient commercial
    heavy equipment transports (HET) assets exists in theater to augment
    military HET assets for redeployment operations. Additionally, other
    transports such as flatbeds and lowboys, can move all but the heaviest
    equipment, reducing the need for HET transports. However, we partially
    concur with the statement regarding limits on convoy security assets.
    While convoy security requirements stretch resources, approved
    commercial security firms can be contracted to provide additional
    security teams that can be used for sustainment missions, freeing up
    military escort teams to support redeployment. Additionally the
    military has an active program that eliminates the requirement to
    provide security for low priority materials, thereby freeing up more
    military escort teams. If necessary, military units can provide
    security for their own assets as they redeploy. We concur with the GAO
    statement regarding insufficiency of mass redeployments through Kuwait,
    and DoD is actively engaged in increasing the availability and capacity
    of redeployment of assets through alternative ports in Jordan and
    Turkey, as well as Iraq�s own major port, Umm Qasr. Efforts are also
    underway to make greater use of the Iraq railroad and Iraqi
    Transportation Network, which will have the potential to move
    significant amounts of cargo to points near redeployment ports.

    See comment 12.

    8. Page 7, 37-38. Concerning the increased demand for access to mental
    healthcare providers, the draft GAO report states, �According to Army
    officials and GAO analysis, there is already a shortfall in the number
    of mental health providers given the rise in the number of mental
    health problems being reported by service members and their families.�
    We concur and note: MNF-I CJ1/4/8 Surgeon is following established
    procedures to ensure all service members take Post Deployment Health
    Assessments 30 days prior to redeploying. Service members are required
    to take another Post Deployment Health Assessment 90-120 days after
    returning to CONUS and home station. These surveys are essential to
    monitor mental health throughout DoD. In addition, teams of mental
    health professionals conduct surveys in theater to keep commanders
    apprised on issues of mental health.

    See comment 13.

    9. Page 12. The report states that �Despite working on the same broad
    set of issues, however, there was little coordination and communication
    among the three organizations. Moreover, both USCENTCOM, the combatant
    command whose area of responsibility includes Iraq and Kuwait, and MNF-
    I, the headquarters responsible for operations in Iraq, provided little
    input and guidance to these planning efforts.� Recommend delete above
    statement and change statement to read: �The coordination was
    maintained at an informal liaison level.� The Army Sustainment Command
    (ASC) liaison officer at USCENTCOM J4 worked with ASC and USCENTCOM J4
    to prepare the command for future reposture/retrograde efforts in July
    and August 2007. This assisted in preparing AMC�s warning order.

    See comment 14.

    10. Page 15. Recommend adding the following: �The MNF-I Logistics
    Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with all the key logistics
    organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It meets monthly and
    addresses strategic, operational, and theater level logistics issues.
    It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) or Operational
    Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics related issues.�

    See comment 15.

    11. Page 15. The MNF-I FRAGO on Logistics Reposture Guidance not only
    addresses Materiel Disposition and Unit Redeployment, but also
    addresses basing. Recommend adding the following: �Basing options
    include a base�s closure, a transfer to the Government of Iraq, or a
    �shrink and share� of a base where both Iraqis and Coalition forces
    collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship.�

    See comment 16.

    12. Page 17. Regarding unity of command, although the command and
    control is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control system,
    it is the theater process by which units have redeployed successfully
    since the beginning of OIF. It requires constant management, interface,
    and decision making across all levels of logistics. Deliberate/advance
    planning, communication via liaison officers, and collaboration are all
    essential to making the process function.

    See comment 17.

    13. Pages 6-7. We recommend deleting the footnote attached to the
    standards for environmental management and guidance for the disposition
    of property. Additionally, MNF-I has procedures in place regarding
    environmental management and base closure/return.

    See comment 18.

    14. Page 6-7. In addition, MNF-I, working with MNC-I, has a base
    closure/return plan in place that has been used successfully in the
    past and is currently being refined as we engage more with the GoI on
    closures/returns and property transfers (real property and personal
    property). A Combined Basing Board is now in the planning phases and
    will involve the Iraqi Government for decisions on base
    closures/return/property transfers once a site has been nominated by
    Coalition forces to close/return. MNF-I, in conjunction with MNC-I, is
    working to limit the current environmental management requirement.
    Although time and cost of environmental management will be difficult to
    assess, progress is being made to reduce this. Examples include:

    See comment 19.

    - There are 17 operational incinerators in Iraq, with 23 under
    construction or funded, which will reduce cost/time of burn pit
    management.

    - MNF-I anticipated a $54 million contract award date of September 1,
    2008 for five Hazardous Waste Disposal Centers, which will also reduce
    cost/time of environmental management.

    15. Summary, 3rd paragraph. Delete �agreed upon standards for
    environmental cleanup and�

    See comment 20.

    16. Page 7. 1st bullet. Delete �standards for environmental cleanup
    and.�

    See comment 21.

    17. Page 7. Delete footnote 7.

    See comment 22.

    18. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Delete �environmental
    clean up and.�

    See comment 23.

    19. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete �both issues are�
    and insert �this issue is.�

    See comment 24.

    20. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the fourth sentence.

    See comment 25.

    21. Page 27, 1st paragraph. Delete the last sentence (beginning with
    �Moreover�).

    See comment 26.

    22. Comment on Environmental Remediation (Comments 13-21 above). The
    draft report makes several assertions, both directly and by
    implication, relating to environmental remediation that are not
    accurate. The statements are also conclusory without supporting
    information. It is the longstanding policy of the Department of Defense
    that it does not engage in environmental remediation for the purpose of
    returning an installation to the host nation. Likewise, it is the
    longstanding policy of the Department of Defense that it does not
    engage in environmental remediation after return of an installation,
    other than in very limited circumstances where the remediation effort
    began prior to the decision to return and is already underway. See,
    e.g., DoD Instruction 4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DoD
    Activities Overseas, and DoD Instruction 4165.69, Realignment of DoD
    Sites Overseas.

    It is relatively rare that a Status of Forces Agreement addresses the
    issue of environmental remediation and, without exception, none provide
    �standards� for such remediation. This is consistent with the
    Department�s policy that such remediation will not be conducted by the
    United States, other than pursuant to DoDI 4715.8. The issue of
    environmental remediation at installations outside the United States
    has been the subject of negotiations at numerous locations. To the
    extent that the United States �pays� for such remediation after return,
    it is through the mechanism of reducing the residual value payment to
    reflect the cost of cleanup. Since the residual value payment reflects
    the current value, it is perfectly consistent with standard real estate
    assessment practice to consider the cost of any required environmental
    remediation as a deduction from total value. In fact, the requirements
    of DoDI 4165.69 to perform a baseline survey is designed to facilitate
    an informed discussion of the residual value in relation to any
    required environmental remediation.

    The Department of Defense conducts environmental remediation at its
    locations outside of the United States for the purpose of protecting
    our personnel (and visitors) located on our installations. Such
    remediation is not conducted to comply with, e.g., the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, which
    has no extraterritorial application. Such remediation is only conducted
    to address known imminent and substantial endangerments. What
    constitutes a known imminent and substantial endangerment is wholly
    dependent on the specific factual situation and is not amenable to the
    setting of general �standards� as is the case in the United States.
    Unless the United States has agreed to be bound by host nation law,
    which has not happened in the area of environmental remediation, there
    is no legal �standard� to be applied for purposes of environmental
    remediation of installations being used by United States forces.

    It should also be noted that it is not uncommon for United States
    forces to be stationed on real property that is already contaminated by
    prior users. Such contamination frequently is discovered only after
    occupancy, particularly with regard to locations occupied during combat
    operations where there is rarely time or resources to conduct an
    environmental survey.

    These comments should not be read as asserting that the Department
    expects to simply abandon hazardous materials when departing a site in
    a foreign location. It is also longstanding Departmental policy to
    handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner that conforms to
    practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given the
    circumstances. For instance, a site should not have solid waste
    (refuse) scattered around and, to the extent it does, the waste should
    be cleaned up prior to departure. Hazardous materials should be
    retrograded. Hazardous wastes should be disposed of by proper disposal
    or treatment when generated. These are standard practices required by
    existing policy and procedures.

    The draft report�s assertions regarding establishing standards for
    environmental remediation are based on flawed assumptions and a
    misunderstanding of Department policy and practices worldwide.

    23. Comment on Environmental Management. Change �environmental cleanup�
    and �cleanup� wherever they appear to �environmental management� and
    �management� as the case may be. The situations being addressed, e.g.,
    reducing burn pit volume by use of incinerators, is a management
    function, not cleanup function. Cleanup would be removal of
    contamination such as a chemical plume under the surface. Proper
    disposition of waste in a burn pit is actually an environmental
    management function (�compliance� function). To avoid possible
    misunderstanding, the term �cleanup� should only be used when referring
    to remediation, not to disposing of waste.

    See comment 28.

    24. Page 11. Delete �FOB McKenzie�. It has been closed.

    See comment 29.

    25. Page 18. Regarding assistance teams, each of the assistance teams
    have specific missions based on guidance and direction from parent
    commands and from operational commands here in theater. Each assistance
    team is synchronized within the redeployment timeline and brings its
    own set of expertise to facilitate in retrograde and reposture efforts
    at specific dates.

    See comment 30.

    26. Page 18-19. Regarding base closure, MNF-I is in the process of
    establishing a Combined Basing Plan and Process. An Operational
    Planning Team will conduct a mission analysis to close, transfer, or
    share Coalition forces bases, and integrate and collaborate their
    efforts with the Government of Iraq.

    See comment 31.

    27. Page 18, 19, 51. Change Redistribution Property Accountability
    Teams to Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPAT).

    See comment 32.

    28. Page 18. Delete. �No single organization has authority over Theater
    Property and Retrograde Support Teams.� Replace with: �AMC has
    Authority over Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams.� The
    402nd AFSB under the Army Sustainment Command/AMC is the C2 for all
    RPATs in Iraq. They also control RFATs (Redistribution Fly-away
    Assistance Teams), which remotely go where a permanent RPAT site is not
    located.

    See comment 33.

    29. Page 20. Delete: �No Theater Logistical Organization has Command
    Authority over Units Responsible for the Retrograde of Most Equipment
    in Theater.� Replace with: �AMC has Command Authority over most units
    responsible for the retrograde of equipment in Theater.� The 402nd AFSB
    is responsible for retrograde in Iraq and the 401st AFSB is responsible
    for retrograde in Kuwait. All of these units fall under AMC/ASC and the
    AMC Forward Commanding General is also the ARCENT/CFLCC C4.

    See comment 34.

    30. Page 19. The report states �For example, the Joint Redeployment
    Support Team, which reports to U.S. Transportation Command, has the
    mission of supplying customs, disposition, hazardous material, and
    transportation expertise to redeploying units and is to enable in-
    transit visibility over a unit�s materiel and equipment from its FOB to
    the unit�s home station or to an identified depot.� Comment: This
    statement implies that the JRST is executing its mission in the Iraq
    Theater of Operations. The concept of using JRSTs has not been executed
    because the capability already exists in theater with the Deployment
    Support Brigade. We recommend deleting this sentence.

    See comment 35.

    31. Pages 22-25. The section titled �Logistical Organizations Have Not
    Enforced or Lack the Authority to Enforce Improvements to the
    Retrograde Process (to include Appendix VI)� is not accurate. Recommend
    the entire section and Appendix be deleted from the GAO report. The
    correct automation flow is attached.

    See comment 36.

    * All items retrograded from Iraq have Radio Frequency Identification
    Device (RFID) tags attached; RFID tags provide in-transit visibility
    via an in transit visibility (ITV) system. The accountable record and
    visibility system used for this process is Standard Depot System (SDS),
    which is a standard wholesale system used by the Army. USCENTCOM�s RFID
    database can view the exact location of any item with an attached RFID
    tag at any time.

    * The description of the process in this section of the GAO report is
    incorrect. Below is the correct process for accountability and
    visibility from the war fighter to AMC:

    - Unit creates Army Reset Management Tool (ARMT) plan in Logistics
    Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET.

    - Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to
    life cycle management command (LCMC) for decision and disposition
    (DISPO).

    - If equipment meets RESET criteria, LCMC enters what depot to ship to.

    - Equipment is electronically transferred from PBUSE (Property Book
    Unit Supply Enhanced) to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System) via
    interface.

    - AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via interface.

    - Site generates Excel spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain
    Inter-Depot Transfer (IDT) from Iraq to Kuwait.

    - Upon receipt of IDT, it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID
    Tag.

    * SDS is a standard accountability system as is Standard Army Retail
    Supply System (SARSS), and neither system tracks by serial number
    except for weapons and sensitive items. The Army War Reserve Deployment
    System (AWRDS) is used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS.
    AWRDS has automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and
    PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced) the retail system.

    * AWRDS creates the document needed to provide the LCMC with a list of
    items that require disposition. SARSS can produce an automated request
    for disposition, but it still requires manual intervention by the LCMC
    item managers to provide disposition. The reason this is manual is the
    LCMC must determine where to send items for repair-based on available
    work load. This process takes 72 stateside work hours to complete.

    * There is no loss of visibility of items being shipped out of Kuwait
    because the Global Transportation Network (GTN) has visibility of the
    RFID tags that are installed on all equipment. The IDT creates an
    automated Pre-Positioned Materiel Receipt Document (PMRD) on the
    gaining depot�s SDS.

    * Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping manifest, it is not
    required because all of the information on the items is available
    through GTN.

    * The OPORD addressed in this section was published and released on 18
    Apr 08 without proper coordination. Upon receipt of the OPORD, the
    401st AFSB, 402nd AFSB, and LOGSA Commanders raised numerous concerns
    with using SARSS. During a teleconference between ASC and the
    commanders, the decision was made to put the OPORD on hold until a
    decision by the ASC commanding general (CG) could be made. The ASC CG
    tasked ASC Field Support to work jointly with LOGSA, AMC, LCMC�s, 401st
    AFSB, and 402nd AFSB to review the proposed processes and resolve the
    concerns. On 23 Jul 08 a decision was made by the ASC CG to continue to
    use SDS and AWRDS, and a FRAGO was published to the OPORD.

    32. Page 23, 4th paragraph. We recommend rewording of this paragraph
    for clarity. In addition, that fact that the manifest does not reach
    the 401st until 24-48 hours after sail really is not an issue since the
    motor vessel will take at least three weeks to reach CONUS, leaving
    time for the CONUS teams to prepare to receive the materiel.

    See comment 37.

    33. Pages 25-6, final paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after
    �costly� and strike the rest of the sentence.

    See comment 38.

    34. Page 26, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence. Insert a period after
    �estimate� and strike the rest of the sentence.

    See comment 39.

    35. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete the second sentence.

    See comment 40.

    36. Page 26, 1st full paragraph. Delete �absent an agreement with Iraq
    on the disposition of personal property� and substitute therefore
    �absent a legal basis for turnover and agreement by Iraq to take
    possession.�

    See comment 41.

    37. Page 26, final paragraph. Delete the first sentence.

    See comment 42.

    38. Page 26, final paragraph, 2nd sentence. Delete �For example.�

    See comment 43.

    39. Comments on SOFA (Comments 33-38 above). The draft report makes
    several assertions, both directly and by implication, relating to what
    is typically addressed in status of forces agreements (SOFA), and
    regarding what will or should be contained in a bilateral agreement
    with Iraq. The statements are inaccurate and misleading. SOFAs are the
    product of bilateral negotiations. Therefore, no two are the same, nor
    do any two contain the same provisions. In particular, �base closures�
    are not typically addressed in a SOFA (or related access agreement). A
    �typical� SOFA (or access agreement) might address the following: 1)
    DoD access to government-owned property, 2) DoD authorization to make
    improvements to such property, 3) DoD�s obligation to return the
    property, once no longer needed,; and, 4) consultation with the host
    nation at the time such property is returned regarding compensation for
    the residual value of any DoD-funded improvements to the property. It
    is relatively rare that a SOFA (or access agreement) will address in
    any detail the issue of �base closure� or estimates of costs of such
    closures or property returns. It also is noteworthy that SOFAs (and
    access agreements) are typically negotiated during peace time, and
    before DoD has any sizable presence and/or has been granted use of
    government property in the host nation. Bilateral agreements with Iraq
    are currently under negotiation. It would be inappropriate to speculate
    what might or should be in those agreements in this report. Finally,
    there is no legal requirement for �an agreement with Iraq on the
    disposition of personal property.�

    See comment 44.

    See comment 45.

    40. Page 27. Regarding, �Joint doctrine states that detailed planning
    should be done for contracting support and contractor integration to
    ensure that contractor support is fully integrated and on par with
    forces planning. Such planning should identify sources of supplies and
    services from civilian sources and integrate them with operational
    requirements,� we partially concur with this statement. Joint doctrine
    regarding contract support and contractor integration is insufficient.
    The Joint Staff J4 is presently addressing this issue by developing
    Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support), which
    combatant commands, to include USCENTCOM, reviewed and commented on.
    This joint publication, when released, will present new doctrinal
    concepts that provide much improved guidance for integrating contract
    support and management of contractors into military plans. DoD
    contracting personnel generally are not planners, and DoD lacks
    sufficient operational contract support planners to ensure contract
    support and contractor integration is effectively represented in plans.
    In December 2007, OSD began to address this issue by providing joint
    operational contract support planners (JOCSPs) to each of the combatant
    commands, including USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM has two JOCSPs that are
    reviewing concept plans (CONPLANS) and preparing Annex W�s (Contract
    Support Integration Plan). In fact, USCENTCOM JOCSPs have been tasked
    by the Joint Staff J4 to develop an Annex W planning template for all
    of DoD�s combatant commands. This template will eventually be
    incorporated into JOPES and future editions of the JP 4-10 by the Joint
    Staff. Recommend changing statement to read as: �Previous joint
    doctrine did not effectively provide guidance regarding contract
    support and contractor integration. However, DoD is addressing this
    with Joint Publication 4-10 (Joint Operational Contract Support). DoD
    contracting personnel are generally not experienced planners and
    combatant commands did not effectively integrate contract support and
    contractor integration into military plans. However, OSD recently
    addressed this issue by providing combatant commands with Joint
    Operational Contract Support Planners (JOCSPs). JOCSPs are developing
    contractor support integration plans and contractor management plans,
    and integrating them into the combatant commands plans.�

    41. Page 28-33. Regarding guidance and plans for reposture of
    contractors from Iraq, the draft GAO report states �As of July 2008,
    reposture planning did not include a theater-wide plan for the
    reposture of approximately 149,400 contractors in Iraq, more than half
    of whom (58%) were U.S. citizens or third country nationals. Reposture
    planning for LOGCAP is significant, given that it is the largest
    logistical support contract in Iraq. However, challenges remain in the
    planning for the reposturing of LOGCAP contractor personnel.� We
    partially concur and provide the following:

    * The LOGCAP contractor (KBR) has base closing Standard Operating
    Procedures (SOP) that will follow MNF-I and MNC-I base closure planning
    and includes plans for contractor personnel. KBR�s SOP has been
    developed from previous base closings and updated with lessons learned.

    * For planning integration, LOGCAP forward Liaison office (LNO)
    maintains a military officer at the Colonel level who focuses on MNF-I
    reposture planning groups; there is also a LNO in MNC-I C4 who
    facilitates theater reposture planning.

    * For accountability, the LOGCAP contractor force protection issue is
    calculated throughout the reposture process as troop strengths are
    phased from the base.

    See comment 46.

    42. Concerning accountability and disposition of contractor managed
    government owned property, GAO states �According to DOD officials, the
    largest portion of all CMGO property in Iraq, $3.37 billion (96%) falls
    under LOGCAP. The Army�s analysis indicates that approximately 85% of
    all CMGO property in Iraq will be transferred, sold, or scrapped in
    Iraq when U.S. forces reposture, while the remaining 15% can be sold or
    reused elsewhere. Three challenges remain: the need to determine FMV of
    CMGO and resolving any security restrictions, the time consuming &
    labor intensive task of accounting for and determining disposition of
    CMGO - transfer from contractor to military records, joint inventories,
    and DLA may not have sufficient data to adequately plan capacity at
    theater DRMOs).� We concur and provide the following: MNF-I FRAGO 08-
    232 published in May 08 includes CMGO property in its materiel
    disposition process, a CMGO FRAGO and MNC-I C4 FRAGO provides
    amplifying guidance on CMGO property, and while accountability of
    property is an on-going issue, progress is being made in improving the
    process and identifying excess materiel and equipment for reposture.
    DLA is also conducting on-site surveys of its four DRMO sites in Iraq,
    and it is included in the deliberate planning with reference to base
    closure and transfer.

    See comment 47.

    43. Page 29. Recommend adding the following sentences in quotes as an
    update to donation threshold authority. Several DoD organizations have
    already begun planning for the disposition of excess contractor-managed
    property from Iraq. For example, in October 2007, DoD increased the
    donation threshold for all excess U.S. owned personal property in Iraq
    from $5,000 to $10,000 and delegated this donation authority to MNF-I.
    Add the following: �In June 2008, DoD (DUSD, Logistics and Materiel
    Readiness) increased the authority to transfer (formerly known as
    donation authority) for all U.S.-owned excess personal property in Iraq
    from $10,000 to $15,000. This DoD memo is a tiered authority which
    provides commanders greater flexibility and more decision-making
    capability at their respective levels.�

    See comment 48.

    44. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the arrow labeled �sale� and
    pointed to �DRMS� be deleted. If an item is slated for sale or
    prepositioned stock, the sale will not cause the item to go the DRMS.

    See comment 49.

    45. Page 30, Figure 2. If an �over $5000� item is not needed by
    military or contractors globally, there is an arrow showing it going to
    DRMS. However, the policy provides that before such an item would go to
    DRMS, an attempt will be made to donate the item to the Government of
    Iraq. This step needs to be included and shown in Figure 2.

    See comment 50.

    Figure:

    This figure illustrates a DOD proposed change to figure 2.

    [See PDF for image]

    [End of figure]

    46. Page 30, Figure 2. Recommend that the box labeled �MNC-I determines
    others� needs in theater� should be rewritten to state �MNF-I/MNC-I
    team determines others� needs in theater.�

    See comment 51.

    47. Page 31. The report states that �DoD officials assert that
    completing this inventory will require planning, travel to storage
    locations, and physically staging the property for easier counting,
    which is time consuming.� However, the policy assumes that the
    inventory will take place where the property is and that property will
    not be moved and stored solely to enable inventory and counting
    actions. The policy does not envision movement and storage for counting
    and, in fact, specifies a streamlined process (i.e. early donations of
    low value items) to aid in minimizing time requirements. We partially
    concur that, in general, the task will be time consuming and labor
    intensive even without the additional movement and storage being
    asserted. While a move for counting may on occasion be necessary,
    depending on the number of days allowed to clear a base, it is expected
    to be the exception and not the rule.

    See comment 52.

    48. Page 53, paragraph 1. Entire statement is inaccurate: Please see
    attached slides. Below is the process for accountability and visibility
    from the War Fighter to AMC:

    1. Unit creates ARMT (Army Reset Management Tool) plan in Logistics
    Information Warehouse (LIW) nominating equipment for RESET.

    2. Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) sends ARMT data electronically to
    the Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) for decision and disposition.

    3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to.

    4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE (Property Book Unit Supply
    Enhanced) electronically to AWRDS (Army War Reserve Deployment System)
    via interface.

    5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for Standard Depot System (SDS)
    electronically via interface.

    6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtain IDT
    Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait.

    7. Upon receipt of IDT it is processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID
    Tag.

    SDS is a standard accountability system, as is SARSS, and neither
    system tracks by serial number except for weapons and sensitive items.
    AWRDS is used to track the serial number in tandem with SDS. AWRDS has
    automated interfaces with SDS, the wholesale system, and PBUSE
    (Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced), the retail system.

    See comment 53.

    49. Page 54, paragraph 1. The AWRDS creates the document needed to
    provide the LCMC with a list of items that require disposition. SARSS
    can produce an automated request for disposition, but it still requires
    manual intervention by the LCMC item managers to provide disposition.
    The reason this is manual is the LCMC must determine where to send
    items for repair based on available work load. This process takes 72
    stateside work hours to complete.

    See comment 54.

    50. Page 54, paragraph 2. Visibility over the items being shipped out
    of Kuwait is never lost, as the Global Transportation Network has
    visibility of the RFID tags that are installed on all equipment. The
    IDT (Inter-Depot-Transfer) creates an automated PMRD (Pre-Positioned
    Materiel Receipt Document) on the gaining depots SDS.

    See comment 55.

    51. Page 54, paragraph 3. Although the 401st AFSB obtains the shipping
    manifest, this is not required, as all of the information on the items
    is available through GTN.

    See comment 56.

    52. As a general comment, the Department has an exiting data sharing
    strategy (DoD Directive 8320.02, December 2, 2004) that provides policy
    responsibility to implement data sharing throughout the Department of
    Defense. Communities of interest, which have cross cutting data sharing
    interests, should be established when there is a need and should be
    used to implement viable solutions for data sharing strategies and
    solutions for their functional areas.

    See comment 57.

    Figure: Retrograde Process Flow Using SDS/AWRDS:

    This figure is a DOD flowchart showing retrograde process flow using
    SDS/AWRDS.

    [See PDF for image]

    [End of figure]

    Retrograde Process Flow as Designed(Continued):

    1. Unit creates ARMT plan in LIW nominating equipment for RESET.

    2. LOGSA sends ARMT data electronically to LCMC for decision and DISPO.

    3. If Equipment meets RESET criteria LCMC enters what depot to ship to.

    4. Equipment is transferred from PBUSE electronically to AWRDS via
    interface.

    5. AWRDS generates a D6A (receipt) for SDS electronically via
    interface.

    6. Site generates Excel Spreadsheet of equipment for LCMC to obtainIDT
    Inter Depot Transfer) from Iraq to Kuwait.7.Upon receipt of IDT it is
    processed in SDS, and AWRDS creates RFID Tag.

    GAO's Responses to DOD's Technical Comments:

    Comment 1: We recognize DOD's retrograde efforts as of August 2008. No
    change required.

    Comment 2: We are aware that subsequent to completing our audit work in
    Kuwait and drafting our report, CENTCOM refined the logistical command
    and control structure in June 2008 by placing the 401st and 402nd Army
    Field Support Brigades under the operational control of the commanding
    general, Army Materiel Command, Southwest Asia. Although we have not
    had the opportunity to evaluate the effect of this new command
    arrangement, we believe it to be a significant step toward the
    attainment of unity of command over the theater provided equipment
    retrograde process. However, CENTCOM has not implemented a similar
    action with regard to the command and control of the eight of the ten
    theater property and retrograde support teams that facilitate the
    redeployment and retrograde processes. According to ARCENT, this lack
    of unity of command over these teams makes their roles and
    responsibilities as they relate to the retrograde of equipment and
    materiel unclear and confusing. As a result, we continue to believe
    that DOD, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
    needs to immediately address the current confusion and lack of clarity
    regarding the command and control of the various commands and teams
    that support the retrograde operations in Iraq and Kuwait.

    Comment 3: As we discussed in this report, five of the ten theater
    property and retrograde support teams assist units during the
    redeployment and retrograde process and in our report we briefly
    outline some of the actions for which they provide assistance in
    accordance with MNF-I's 180-day redeployment template (see table 1 of
    this report and the accompanying narrative). In addition, we provide
    more detail on each of the team's missions and higher headquarters in
    appendix IV of this report. No change required.

    Comment 4: DOD commented that "The majority of equipment is
    organizational and will retrograde as a unit responsibility." However,
    according to DOD officials we interviewed during this engagement, and
    who have direct oversight over the property books, the majority of
    equipment in Iraq, some 80 percent, is theater provided equipment. No
    change required.

    Comment 5: We recognize DOD is making efforts to improve In-transit
    visibility of materiel. No change required.

    Comment 6: See comment 2. No change required.

    Comment 7: Except where required for purposes of clarity and accuracy
    we have substituted the word "installation" or "installations" for
    "base" or "location."

    Comment 8: Based upon subsequent analysis and communication with
    subject matter experts, we updated the information in this paragraph to
    reflect new data.

    Comment 9: Although DOD disagreed with GAO's recommendation in the
    report in question, the intent of this reference is to provide for the
    reader a broader context in which the present report should be
    considered.

    Comment 10: The purpose of the discussion regarding the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 is to provide background
    information about DOD's reporting requirements and to demonstrate that,
    given the challenges to reposturing outlined in this report, Congress
    might elect to modify those reporting requirements.

    Comment 11: During the course of this engagement we met with
    representatives from a variety of organizations in order to determine
    the extent to which DOD has begun its logistical planning for the
    reposturing of forces from Iraq (see appendix I, scope and
    methodology). Although it is possible that some preliminary discussions
    regarding reposturing, redeployment, or retrograde operations may have
    occurred prior to the time outlined in this report, based on our
    meetings with DOD officials, the documents they provided us, and our
    analysis we determined that planning for the reposturing of post-surge
    forces from Iraq began in the fall of 2007 and that those planning
    efforts were not coordinated until May 2008. No change required.

    Comment 12: According to Army officials responsible for planning and
    executing convoy operations in Iraq and Kuwait, the number of HETs,
    convoy security assets, and crews to operate these assets were factors
    that limit the number of convoys that can be run given standard
    operating procedures current as of June 2008. The existence of
    potential mitigation strategies-such as using private security
    contractors, eliminating the requirement to provide security for low
    priority materials, and military units providing their own security-
    does not change the fact that the factors we outlined in this report
    remain limiting factors. No change required.

    Comment 13: We recognize DOD's interests to increase mental health
    surveillance for returning service members. No change required.

    Comment 14: We met with representatives from a variety of organizations
    several times over the course of this engagement either in person,
    telephonically, or by video teleconference (see appendix I, scope and
    methodology). As a result, we were able to obtain updated information
    that allowed us to discuss the means by which the logistical planning
    effort evolved over time. Based on these interviews and the information
    and documents we obtained during these meetings, our analysis indicates
    that despite working on the same broad set of issues, until late 2007
    there was little coordination among Army Materiel Command, the Defense
    Logistics Agency, and Headquarters, Department of the Army. Moreover,
    according to CENTCOM officials, with whom we met in February 2008,
    they, too, were waiting on input from MNF-I, and, according to
    officials representing MNF-I, all discussion of reposturing was "close
    hold" in that headquarters until after the MNF-I commander's
    congressional testimony in April 2008.

    Comment 15: To provide more details and context to the discussion, we
    changed the text to incorporate DOD's additional information.

    Comment 16: See comment 15.

    Comment 17: We agree that the logistical command and control
    arrangement is not a text book joint doctrinal command and control
    system. However, based on our analysis of joint doctrine and
    information obtained from officials in the organizations that were
    either directly responsible for the retrograde process or that
    negotiated the process, we determined that the resulting lack of a
    unified or coordinated command structure is not only inconsistent with
    joint doctrine, it also increases confusion and causes inefficiencies
    in the retrograde process and inhibits the adoption of identified
    mitigation initiatives. No change required.

    Comment 18: For purposes of clarity, we deleted the footnote. As
    discussed in this report, CENTCOM has procedures in place regarding
    environmental management and property disposition during base closure/
    return. Furthermore, as we explain in this report, according to DOD
    officials responsible for executing environmental management and base
    closure/return in Iraq, these officials had not, as of May 2008,
    received guidance detailed enough to predict the time and cost
    requirements of executing the environmental management and property
    disposition tasks that may be associated with base closure/return. See
    also comment 27.

    Comment 19: See comment 18.

    Comment 20: We believe that DOD comments 20 and 21 are duplicate
    comments, no change required; see comment 21.

    Comment 21: We changed "standards" to "guidance." See comment 27.

    Comment 22: As DOD suggested, we deleted the footnote. See comment 18.

    Comment 23: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning the
    potential environmental management of installations in Iraq that may be
    closed as a result of reposturing. No change required.

    Comment 24: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by ARCENT officials responsible for planning for both
    the potential disposition of personal property located on installations
    in Iraq and the potential environmental management of these
    installations. No change required.

    Comment 25: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the
    potential disposition of personal property located on installations in
    Iraq.

    Comment 26: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the
    potential environmental management of installations in Iraq. No change
    required.

    Comment 27: We disagree with DOD's comments that we made incorrect
    assertions about environmental remediation, that we made flawed
    assumptions regarding remediation, or that we have a misunderstanding
    of the department's policies and practices. GAO is not making specific
    assertions regarding these issues. Rather, we are reporting that, as of
    May 2008, Army officials responsible for planning for logistical
    reposturing operations were considering these issues and that these
    considerations affected their planning. The information in this section
    accurately reflects May 2008 statements made by the Army officials
    responsible for both planning and executing environmental remediation
    operations in Iraq.

    Moreover, according to CENTCOM guidance all hazardous material and
    waste is to be removed or remediated from installations in Iraq used by
    U.S. forces. In May 2008, ARCENT officials responsible for planning the
    potential environmental management of installations in Iraq stated that
    they had not received sufficiently specific guidance from their higher
    headquarters with regard to environmental remediation on installations
    in Iraq that may be closed as a result of reposturing. While they
    expected such guidance to be part of a future bilateral agreement
    between the U.S. and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current
    planning purposes was the set of standards used in the U.S. for similar
    types of remediation practices. These officials explained that, in the
    absence of such guidance guidance, it is common practice to use such
    U.S. standards when planning and executing environmental remediation of
    foreign installations used by U.S. forces. This explanation is
    confirmed by DOD's comment that "It is also longstanding Departmental
    policy to handle hazardous materials and waste in a manner that
    conforms to practice in the United States, to the extent feasible given
    the circumstances." These Army officials also explained that until they
    received such guidance on environmental remediation, they may have
    difficulty estimating the time and cost of cleaning these
    installations. In another comment on this report, DOD concurs, stating
    that the "time and cost of environmental management [of installations
    in Iraq] will be difficult to assess."

    In regard to language used in the report, we have changed some terms
    for the purposes of clarity. We have changed "standards" to "guidance"
    and "status of forces agreements" to "bilateral agreements," where
    appropriate.

    Comment 28: We changed "environmental cleanup" and "cleanup" to
    "management," where appropriate. See comment 27.

    Comment 29: We updated figure 1 accordingly.

    Comment 30: See comment 3.

    Comment 31: See comment 18.

    Comment 32: According to Annex D of MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, summary
    attached as Appendix IV of this report, RPAT(s) stands for
    Redistribution Property Assistance Team(s). No change required.

    Comment 33: DOD maintains that Army Materiel Command has authority over
    theater property and retrograde support teams and lists one such team
    for which this is the case. We agree that AMC exercises command
    authority over two of these teams. However, according to documents
    obtained from ARCENT and MNF-I, there are ten such teams and command
    authority over these teams is distributed among various organizations
    (see appendix IV of this report). No change required.

    Comment 34: See comment 2.

    Comment 35: DOD contends that our statement about the Joint
    Redeployment Support Team implies that the team is executing its
    mission in the Iraqi theater of operations and that the concept of
    using this team has not been executed because the capability already
    exists in theater with the Deployment Support Brigade. However, in a
    briefing given during the May 2008 logistics summit at Camp Arifjan,
    Kuwait, ARCENT listed the Joint Redeployment Support Team as a team
    available to assist units and commanders with redeployment and
    retrograde of materiel and equipment, despite the fact that at the time
    of the briefing the team had not yet been sourced with personnel. In
    addition, in its Logistics Reposture Guidance (MNF-I FRAGO 08-232) MNF-
    I makes specific mention of the use of this team as it relates to
    redeployment and retrograde operations and delineates the specific
    mission for which this team is responsible (see appendix IV). In
    neither case is there any mention of the Deployment Support Brigade
    undertaking the mission outlined for the Joint Redeployment Support
    Team. No change required.

    Comment 36: GAO has recently reported that DOD's Radio Frequency
    Identification (RFID) system is an emerging technology and continues to
    experience many implementation challenges. While not the focus of this
    report, DOD continues to experience issues with rates of error in the
    reading of RFID tags even while mandating the increased use of the
    tags. However, at this time, GAO does not believe that RFID is a
    reliable means for ensuring visibility over in-transit equipment and
    materiel.

    We also recognize DOD's efforts to improve the in-transit visibility of
    supplies. Yet, the description of the retrograde process for theater
    provided equipment contained in this report is based on GAO's site
    visit to Kuwait in May 2008. The description was validated by the
    responsible subject matter experts at the 401st Army Field Support
    Brigade as accurately depicting the systems used to manage the
    equipment as well as the difficulties encountered during shipment. In
    addition, official emails and tracking documents indicated that
    significant amounts of equipment were sitting idle in Kuwait awaiting
    disposition instructions. Moreover, in DOD's official comments to this
    report, they concur with our recommendation to correct the
    incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems used to maintain
    visibility over equipment and materiel while they are in transit. DOD's
    general comments indicate that the process has changed and they
    provided us with a map of their proposed process as well as the July
    23, 2008, order directing the use of Standard Depot System and Army War
    Reserve Deployment System to resolve issues with maintaining
    accountability and visibility and reducing the time for disposition
    instructions. However, this order will not be implemented until 8
    September, 2008 and we have not yet been able to evaluate the
    effectiveness of the new process. No changes required.

    Comment 37: See comment 36.

    Comment 38: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by Army officials responsible for both planning and
    executing installation hand-over operations. No change required.

    Comment 39: According to CENTCOM policy, all bunkers, trenches,
    fighting positions, and force protection barriers are considered to be
    personal property and will be removed from installations. Additionally,
    in May 2008, DOD officials responsible for planning for the potential
    disposition of such property located on installations in Iraq stated
    that while they expected more specific guidance on the disposition of
    personal property to be part of a future bilateral agreement between
    the U.S. and Iraq, the only guidance they could use for current
    planning purposes was CENTCOM's policy. These DOD officials also
    explained that until they received more specific guidance on the
    disposition of such personal property, they may have difficulty
    estimating the time and cost of disposition. See also comment 27. No
    change required.

    Comment 40: See comment 27.

    Comment 41: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for the
    disposition of personal property from installations. No change
    required.

    Comment 42: The sentence in question accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the
    potential disposition of personal property located on installations in
    Iraq and the potential environmental remediation on these
    installations. No change required.

    Comment 43: See comment 42.

    Comment 44: See comment 24. In addition, with regard to the discussion
    of bilateral agreements, our report accurately reflects May 2008
    statements made by DOD officials responsible for planning for both the
    potential disposition of personal property located on installations in
    Iraq and the potential environmental remediation on these
    installations. Moreover, GAO is not speculating on the potential
    existence or contents of any bilateral agreement(s) between the U.S.
    and Iraq, or any potential legal requirement for such an agreement.
    Rather, we are reporting that, as of May 2008, Army officials
    responsible for planning for logistical reposturing operations were
    considering that such an agreement(s) may exist in the future and that
    these considerations affected their planning. No change required.

    Comment 45: We concur with DOD's assessment that CENTCOM did not
    effectively integrate contract support and contractor integration into
    its planning efforts for the logistics of reposturing. We also
    acknowledge that developing Joint Publication 4-10 and providing
    combatant commands with Joint Operational Contract Support Planners
    (JOCSPs) indicate potential progress in addressing the current
    challenges that CENTCOM faces in regard to effectively integrating
    contract support and contractor integration into its planning efforts.
    However, GAO has investigated neither the potential implementation of 4-
    10 nor the activities of CENTCOM's JOCSPs and thus cannot assess
    whether progress has been made in this area, or adopt the text
    suggested by CENTCOM. It is important to note that the paragraph DOD
    cites in this comment has changed due to subsequent communication
    between GAO and DOD subject matter experts. However, there is no change
    required in response to DOD's comment.

    Comment 46: It is important to note that the paragraph DOD quotes in
    its comment has changed due to subsequent communication between GAO and
    DOD subject matter experts. However, we have three responses to this
    DOD comment. First, KBR is the LOGCAP contractor. Thus, while a KBR
    base-closure SOP may be useful in LOGCAP reposturing planning, its
    existence does not address the lack of theater-wide reposturing
    planning. The later is CENTCOM's responsibility, not KBR's. Second, the
    LOGCAP program has had these two positions involved in reposturing
    planning since the Spring of 2008. While this coordination is
    facilitating LOGCAP reposturing planning, the challenges explained in
    our report existed despite this coordination. Third, our report did not
    address the specific issue of contractor force protection and so we
    cannot assess the significance of such a calculation. There is no
    change required in response to DOD's comment.

    Comment 47: We acknowledge DOD's concurrence. No change required.

    Comment 48: Based upon additional information provided by DOD, we added
    the first sentence. However, we were not able to assess whether the
    memo is a "tiered authority which provides commanders greater
    flexibility and more decision making capability at their respective
    levels." We therefore did not add the second sentence.

    Comment 49: For clarity purposes, we changed figure 2.

    Comment 50: See comment 49.

    Comment 51: See comment 49.

    Comment 52: In this sentence, "travel" refers to officials traveling to
    sites in order to complete inventories, not to the travel of property.
    No change required.

    Comment 53: See comment 36. No change required.

    Comment 54: See comment 36. No change required.

    Comment 55: See comment 36. No change required.

    Comment 56: See comment 36. No change required.

    Comment 57: We recognize DOD's existing data sharing strategy provides
    policy responsibility to implement data sharing through the department.
    No change required.

    [End of section]

    Appendix III Department of Defense Classes of Supply:

    Class of Supply: Class I;
    Name: Subsistence;
    Explanation: Class I is subsistence materiel ranging from military-
    specification rations to commercial food items.

    Class of Supply: Class II;
    Name: Clothing, Individual Equipment, and Tools;
    Explanation: Class II is composed of organizational clothing and
    individual equipment, such as tentage and individual weapons;
    consumable items such as tools and administrative and housekeeping
    supplies; and industrial supplies such as cable, rope, screws, and
    bolts.

    Class of Supply: Class III;
    Name: Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL);
    Explanation: Class III Includes bulk and packaged POL; hydraulic and
    insulating oils, preservatives, bulk chemical products, coolants,
    deicing and antifreeze compounds, and components and additives of such
    products; and liquid and compressed gases, natural gas, coal, and
    electricity. Bulk fuel, the major Class III commodity, is propulsion
    fuel for aircraft, ships, and vehicles.

    Class of Supply: Class IV;
    Name: Construction Materiel;
    Explanation: Class IV includes all construction raw materials and
    fortification and barrier items such as lumber, wire, and sandbags.

    Class of Supply: Class V;
    Name: Ammunition;
    Explanation: Class V materiel consists of munitions of all types;
    bullets and projectiles, bombs, explosives, land mines, fuses,
    detonators, pyrotechnics, propellants, and their associated items.

    Class of Supply: Class VI;
    Name: Personal Demand Items;
    Explanation: Class VI materiel includes various nonmilitary health,
    comfort, and recreational items procured and managed by the Service
    exchanges, as well as Service morale, welfare, and recreation
    organizations.

    Class of Supply: Class VII;
    Name: Major End Items;
    Explanation: Class VII is composed of major war fighting equipment that
    constitutes the combat forces. Class VII includes ships, aircraft,
    missiles, tanks, launchers, and vehicles that are normally procured by
    the individual Service acquisition commands as part of major
    acquisition programs.

    Class of Supply: Class VIII;
    Name: Medical Materiel;
    Explanation: Class VIII consists of pharmaceutical, medical and
    surgical supplies and materiel, and medical equipment, including
    medical-specific repair parts, medical gases, blood, and blood
    products.

    Class of Supply: Class IX;
    Name: Repair Parts;
    Explanation: Class IX includes all repair parts, except medical
    equipment parts.

    Class of Supply: Class X;
    Name: Materiel for Nonmilitary Programs;
    Explanation: Class X items support nonmilitary programs such as
    economic and agricultural development, civic action, and various relief
    and education programs. Class X also includes any items that are not
    included under other classes.

    Source: Joint Publication 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.

    [End of table]

    [End of section]

    Appendix IV: Theater Property and Retrograde Support Teams:

    Team: Materiel Redistribution Team (MRT);
    Mission: Conducts identification, documentation, and coordinates
    disposition and movement of excess class II, III(P), IV, VIII, and IX;
    Higher HQ and C2: Direct Support to 316th Expeditionary Support
    Command; under tactical control of ARCENT through Task Force 586*.

    Team: Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT);
    Mission: Facilitates the expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII
    Theater Provided Equipment (TPE), improves property accountability, and
    enables asset visibility of the received equipment;
    Higher HQ and C2: Direct Support to 402nd Army Field Support Brigade;
    under tactical control of ARCENT through Task Force 586*.

    Team: Defense Remediation Team (DRT);
    Mission: Assists units in sorting and creating documentation for
    property during shipment and turn-in to a Defense Reutilization
    Marketing Office;
    Higher HQ and C2: Defense Logistics Agency through the Defense
    Reutilization and Marketing Services Officer-in-Charge - Iraq.

    Team: Deployment and Distribution Support Team (DDST);
    Mission: Provides units in Iraq with Unit Movement Officer refresher
    course. Assists in building movement plans for organizational and RESET
    equipment, hazardous material documentation, blocking and bracing, and
    container safety inspections;
    Higher HQ and C2: Surface Deployment and Distribution Command through
    the 840th Deployment Distribution Support Battalion.

    Team: Joint Redeployment Support Team (JRST);
    Mission: Facilitates the return of forces in order to reset combat
    capability for future operations. Combines and synchronizes the efforts
    of the other support teams to prepare accurate Joint Planning and
    Execution System data;
    Higher HQ and C2: U.S. Transportation Command.

    Team: Inventory Property Assistance Team (IPAT);
    Mission: Tracks shortages and excess. Manages and maintains "virtual
    warehouses." Provides redistribution instructions and tracks
    redistribution; tracks operational needs statement, joint urgent
    operational needs statements and solutions for them;
    Higher HQ and C2: Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

    Team: Organizational Property Assistance Team (OPAT);
    Mission: Coordinates for redistribution and facilitates the transfer of
    Department of the Army G3 (Operations) designated TPE and manages
    Category V listing published by DA;
    Higher HQ and C2: Theater Property Book Officer (2nd Battalion, 402nd
    Army Field Support Brigade).

    Team: Reset Team;
    Mission: Provides unit training on Department of the Army/Army Materiel
    Command RESET program and Automated RESET Management Tool;
    Higher HQ and C2: Army Material Command through the Army Sustainment
    Command and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in
    Iraq.

    Team: Reset Fly Away Team (RFAT);
    Mission: Expedites RESET planning and shipping of Life Cycle Management
    Command specific priority RESET equipment;
    Higher HQ and C2: Army Material Command through the Army Sustainment
    Command and the 2nd Battalion, 402nd Army Field Support Brigade in
    Iraq.

    Team: Marine LOGCOM Retrograde Team (LRT);
    Mission: Receives, stores, and prepares for shipment and redistributes
    excess principle end items to fill home station equipment shortfalls or
    to depots to be repaired for further redistribution to the operating
    forces;
    Higher HQ and C2: Marine Corps Logistics Command (Forward).

    Source: GAO analysis of Multi-National Forces-Iraq data.

    [A] The MRTs and RPATs have a complex command. Both of these teams are
    sourced with Air Force Personnel under Task Force 586, an Air Force
    headquarters. However, both teams are under the tactical control of
    ARCENT, which exercises that tactical control through Task Force 586.
    Moreover, because the RPAT is in direct support to the 402nd Army Field
    Support Brigade in Iraq, Army Materiel Command also has some control
    over this asset which it exercises through its subordinate command,
    Army Sustainment Command.

    [End of table]

    [End of section]

    Appendix V: Theater Logistical Infrastructure Throughput Model:

    Department of Defense (DOD) officials have developed a model that
    approximates the volume of equipment and materiel that can flow through
    the Iraqi theater of operations logistics infrastructure and the rate
    at which that infrastructure can sustain this flow.[Footnote 48] In
    summary, the model states the theater logistics infrastructure can
    sustain the deployment and redeployment of no more than a total of five
    brigades' worth of equipment and materiel in and out of Iraq per month.
    Specifically, DOD has modeled two scenarios (see table 2, below). In
    the first, the deployment and retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and
    materiel are prioritized. In the second scenario, the deployment and
    retrograde of TPE and unit equipment and materiel are balanced with the
    retrograde of non-unit stocks, such as containers of supplies. In both
    scenarios, the 1st Theater Support Command can sustain the delivery of
    a certain amount of Class I (food, water) and Class III-B (packaged
    petroleum products such as motor oil) to forces in Iraq.

    Table 2: Planning Scenarios for Sustained Deployment and Redeployment:

    Support logistics activity: Sustainment of Forces in Iraq;
    Scenario one[A]: 7 sustainment convoys to and returning from Iraq, per
    day;
    Scenario Two[B]: 7 sustainment convoys to and returning from Iraq, per
    day.

    Support logistics activity: Deploying Unit Equipment, Materiel;
    Scenario one[A]: 2.5 brigade equivalents,;
    per month;
    Scenario Two[B]: 2.0 brigade equivalents,; per month.

    Support logistics activity: Redeploying TPE, or Unit Equipment,
    Materiel;
    Scenario one[A]: 2.5 brigade equivalents,; per month;
    Scenario Two[B]: 2.0 brigade equivalents,; per month.

    Support logistics activity: Redeploying Non-Unit Theater Stocks;
    Scenario one[A]: None;
    Scenario Two[B]: 1.0 brigade equivalent, per month.

    Source: GAO analysis.

    [A] Scenario one prioritizes the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of
    theater provided equipment, unit equipment, and materiel.

    [B] Scenario two balances the simultaneous deploy/redeploy flow of
    theater provide equipment, unit equipment, and materiel with non-unit
    theater stocks.

    [End of table]

    According to DOD officials and documents, the model is based on three
    types of brigades: heavy or Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT/SBCT);
    infantry brigade combat teams (IBCT); and separate brigades (BDE SEP).
    For each brigade type DOD planners compiled unit property book data,
    added an additional 20 percent to the equipment totals to account for
    theater provided equipment, and then used the resulting brigade types
    in detailed planning for key phases of the redeployment and retrograde
    process such as convoy and wash rack operations. According to DOD
    officials, in this manner they were able to approximate the
    redeployment and retrograde requirements and time frames for each type
    brigade. For example, the model assumes that a heavy or Stryker brigade
    combat team has almost twice the number of vehicles found in a separate
    brigade, and thus, requires almost 25 percent more convoys to
    retrograde these vehicles and almost double the amount of time on the
    wash racks.

    Table 3: Key Planning Factors for Sustained Deployment and
    Redeployment, by Unit Type:

    Planning factors;
    Unit type: HBCT / SBCT;
    IBCT;
    BDE SEP.

    Vehicles in Unit;
    Unit type: 1,600; 1,240; 830.

    TEU (containers) in unit; Unit type: 170; 220; 270.

    Convoy packages; Unit type: 46; 42; 37.

    Wash rack days; Unit type: 7; 5.5; 4.

    Source: GAO analysis.

    [End of table]

    According to DOD officials, the predictive power of the rate-of-flow
    model is limited, and thus, it should not be used to calculate the
    minimum amount of time required to redeploy the total amount of
    equipment currently in Iraq. They explained that while the model
    assumes units are redeploying with a full set of equipment, the actual
    amount of equipment and materiel that needs to be transported, cleaned,
    inspected, and loaded onto ships will vary with each unit moving
    through the system. This means that in any given period of time, the
    actual amount of equipment and materiel being redeployed may be
    different than the amounts assumed in the model. For example, according
    to DOD officials, in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 the theater
    logistical infrastructure was able to deploy an average of two brigades
    into Iraq and redeploy an average of three brigades out of Iraq each
    month. In addition, DOD officials have stated that during a period
    lasting about 1 month--from late November 2008 to early January 2009--
    four units will redeploy. They explained that this is possible because
    two of the units are leaving Iraq with only containers and the other
    two are redeploying with relatively little of their own equipment,
    having used mostly TPE while in theater. These two examples indicate
    that while the theater throughput model may provide planners with an
    estimate of the theater's deployment and redeployment/retrograde
    capacity, the model should not be used to predict the number of actual
    units that can redeploy during any 1 month period.

    Appendix VI: Detailed Process for Shipping Excess Theater Provided
    Equipment:

    The current process for retrograding certain excess theater provided
    equipment (TPE) from Iraq is lengthy and does not maintain in-transit
    visibility. This is caused by the frequent manual manipulation of data.
    According to Department of Defense's (DOS's) Supply Chain Materiel
    Management Regulation, all DOD components shall structure their
    materiel management to provide responsive, consistent, and reliable
    support to the warfighter (customer) during peacetime and war.[Footnote
    49] In addition, DOD components are required to implement material
    management functions using commercial, off-the-shelf items or DOD
    standard data systems, as well as ensure timely, accurate in-transit
    asset information and maintain visibility and accountability over items
    in the pipeline.[Footnote 50] Moreover, DOD components should implement
    and maintain supply chain material management systems to provide a
    timely and complete process.[Footnote 51]

    Figure 5 below describes the physical and data networks for Class VII
    TPE--including manual data transfers and key organizations--involved in
    the process.

    Figure 5: Process for Retrograding Class VII Theater Provided
    Equipment:

    This figure is a flowchart showing the process for retrograding class
    VII theater provided equipment.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

    [End of figure]

    Currently, when Class VII theater provided equipment is transferred
    from the owning unit to one of the Retrograde Property Assistance
    Teams[Footnote 52] supporting the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade
    (AFSB) in Iraq, the accountability data for the equipment are
    transferred from the unit to the 402nd AFSB using the Army's Property
    Book Unit Supply Enhanced system[Footnote 53] as shown in figure 5.
    Once the equipment moves to Kuwait, however, the 401st AFSB, which
    receives the equipment, must undertake two concurrent manual processes
    to establish accountability and visibility for the equipment.
    Accountability is established by manually entering equipment data into
    the Standard Depot System (SDS). However, SDS tracks equipment by the
    total number of items, not individual serial numbers. Hence a second
    manual entry is made into the Army War Reserve Depot System (AWRDS) to
    provide visibility over each item by serial number. AWRDS--a non-
    standard Army information management system--was originally designed to
    provide visibility over Army pre-positioned equipment sets, but it has
    been modified to support SDS.[Footnote 54] This is contrary to DOD
    guidance that accountability and visibility should be established using
    standard data systems that share data.

    Once accountability and visibility over the theater provided equipment
    have been established, brigade personnel request disposition
    instructions. This labor-intensive manual process involves sending
    spreadsheets populated with equipment data from Kuwait to Army
    Sustainment Command headquarters in Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and
    then on to the specific Life Cycle Management Commands[Footnote 55]
    responsible for each particular item who, in turn, send disposition
    instructions back through this chain to the 401st AFSB. This process
    can take months or years because of the manual workarounds used to pass
    and manipulate the data.

    Once disposition instructions are received in Kuwait, equipment can be
    shipped; however in-transit visibility of the equipment is temporarily
    lost. When disposition instructions for a certain item of TPE are
    received, that item drops from the AWRDS database and uses a process
    called Inter-Depot Transfer to manage shipment of that item. By
    dropping the item from AWRDS, however, the 401st AFSB loses visibility
    over the item, because Inter-Depot Transfers are not entered into the
    Global Transportation Network, DOD's system for providing near real-
    time in-transit visibility information. This lack of in-transit
    visibility is contrary to current DOD guidelines to maintain timely,
    accurate visibility over items in the distribution pipeline.

    The 401st AFSB uses another manual process to compensate for this by
    coordinating with Surface Deployment and Distribution Command elements
    at Kuwaiti ports in order to obtain final load manifests for each
    vessel. The manifest is then forwarded to the appropriate Life Cycle
    Management Command in the United States so that item managers there can
    prepare for the receipt of the equipment; however this information does
    not reach the 401st AFSB until 24 to 48 hours after a vessel sets sail.

    [End of section]

    Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:

    Acknowledgments:

    In addition to the contact named above, David A. Schmitt, Assistant
    Director; Guy A. Lofaro, Analyst in Charge; John Lee; Katherine Lenane;
    Gregory Marchand; John J. Marzullo; Tristan T. To; Christopher Turner;
    Cheryl Weissman, and Kristy Williams made key contributions to this
    report.

    [End of section]

    FOOTNOTES:

    [1] This figure includes Army brigade combat teams and equivalent
    Marine Corps organizations.

    [2] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Progress Report:
    Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, GAO-08-837 (Washington, D.C.:
    June 23, 2008).

    [3] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
    No. 109-163, � 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1223
    (2008)).

    [4] We focused our review primarily on the Army because it has the
    largest logistical footprint in Iraq. The majority of units, materiel,
    and equipment in the Iraqi theater belong to the Army with relatively
    few additional services' units, materiel, and equipment. Marine Corps
    officials told us that the Marines will use Army logistics systems and
    pipeline to enter and exit the Iraqi theater. In addition, DOD
    officials have stated that the Air force and Navy have negligible
    logistical footprints in Iraq.

    [5] Discussion with DOD officials in Kuwait indicated that the capacity
    of the base infrastructure in Kuwait to temporarily house and out-
    process personnel could be rapidly expanded with 30 days notice.
    Moreover, during unit redeployments the majority of personnel from each
    redeploying unit are quickly moved to the United States, leaving only a
    small stay-behind detachment to manage the retrograde of unit
    equipment.

    [6] For a listing of all the organizations visited during the course of
    this engagement see app. I.

    [7] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
    No. 109-163, � 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1223
    (2008)).

    [8] Annex E to MNF-I FRAGO 08-232, Logistics Reposture Guidance (May
    28, 2008).

    [9] Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated
    Terms (May 30, 2008).

    [10] The terms "retrograde movement," "retrograde operation," and
    "retrograde personnel" are doctrinal terms defined in JP 1-02. However,
    these definitions do not apply to the way in which the term
    "retrograde" is being used by logistics planners with regard to the
    reposture planning.

    [11] See GAO Operation Desert Storm: DOD's Funding Actions Relating to
    Leftover Inventories, GAO/NSIAD-93-143FS (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26,
    1993); Materiel Disposal: Alleged Improper Disposition and Destruction
    of Serviceable Materiel and Supplies in Saudi Arabia, GAO/NSIAD-93-139R
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 1993); Operation Desert Storm: Lack of
    Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992); and Desert Shield/Storm Logistics:
    Observations by U.S. Military Personnel, GAO/NSIAD-92-26 (Washington,
    D.C.: Nov. 13, 1991).

    [12] See GAO, Desert Shield and Desert Storm Reports and Testimonies:
    1991-93, GAO/NSIAD-94-134W (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1994); Defense
    Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics
    Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington,
    D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003); and Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve
    the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future
    Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).

    [13] According to DLA officials, although organization of the
    Retrograde Task Force began in late summer 2007, the Retrograde Task
    Force was not officially active until September 10, 2007.

    [14] DOD classes of supply, and what is included in each class of
    supply, are laid out in app. III of this report.

    [15] Basing options include a base's closure, a transfer to the
    government of Iraq, or a "shrink and share" of a base where both Iraqis
    and Coalition forces collocate in a landlord-tenant relationship.

    [16] The Logistics Reposture Working Group is an enduring forum with
    all key legistics organizations in the Iraq and Kuwait theater. It
    meets monthly and addresses strategic, operational, and theater-level
    logistics issues. It assigns Offices of Primary Responsibility or
    Operational Planning Teams to develop solutions to logistics-related
    issues.

    [17] The available-to-load date is the period of time in which a unit's
    materiel and equipment is ready to be loaded at a sea or airport.

    [18] See App. IV for a list of the support teams and their higher
    headquarters.

    [19] Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
    States, IV-19 (May 14, 2007).

    [20] Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, V-2 (July 18, 2008).

    [21] Joint Publication 4-0 notes that "the joint logistician will
    rarely have unity of joint logistics command, and subsequently control
    of joint logistics is more challenging."

    [22] See App. IV for a complete list of the theater property and
    retrograde support teams.

    [23] ARCENT has tactical control over Task Force 586, which is the
    headquarters that controls these units. This allows ARCENT to control
    and direct these assets through Task Force 586. However, Army Materiel
    Command also exercises some control over the RPAT because the RPAT
    supports the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade, over which AMC has
    command authority through its subordinate command, Army Sustainment
    Command.

    [24] Government-furnished equipment is equipment provided to a
    contractor for use in fulfilling the terms of a contract. This
    equipment is maintained by the contractor and returned to the
    government at the contract's conclusion and/or termination.

    [25] FM 4-93.41, Army Field Support Brigade Operations, Initial Draft,
    (May 1, 2008).

    [26] JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008).

    [27] Army Sustainment Command is a subordinate organization to Army
    Materiel Command and is responsible for field support, materiel
    management, contingency contracting, and Army pre-positioned stocks.

    [28] Class VII Items are further divided into rolling stock and
    nonrolling stock. Rolling stock includes wheeled vehicles, tracked
    combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked construction equipment, trailers,
    semitrailers, and standard trailer-mounted equipment such as
    generators. Nonrolling stock includes all class VII items not
    classified as rolling stock.

    [29] A detailed explanation of the systems and organization involved in
    this process is contained in App.VI.

    [30] See DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation Chapter 1, DOD
    4140.1-R, � C1.3.1.1; � C1.3.1, � C1.3.2 and � C5.8, (May 23, 2003).

    [31] The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands,
    each of which is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are:
    Aviation and Missile, Chemical Materials Agency, Communications-
    Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tank-automotive &
    Armaments Command.

    [32] Army Sustainment Command Operations Order 30-08, Retrograde of
    Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) (Apr. 18, 2008).

    [33] The Standard Army Retail Supply System is a Combat Service Support
    peacetime and wartime logistics Standard Army Management Information
    System that (1) performs the supply functions of ordering, receiving,
    storing, and issuing supplies; (2) supports supply management functions
    such as excess disposition and redistribution; and (3) offers improved
    communications and advanced automation functionality. One of its
    benefits is providing asset visibility at the Brigade Combat Team,
    Corps, theater, and national levels.

    [34] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
    No. 109-163, � 1227 (2006) (as amended by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, � 1223
    (2008)).

    [35] MNF-I defines personal property as any property than can be moved
    and reused without significant refurbishment or degradation from its
    intended purpose. Personal property includes government property (those
    items owned by services and components) and items owned by individuals.
    Examples include re-locatable buildings, window air conditioning units
    (not to include split air conditioning unit), generators, desks,
    chairs, computers, office supplies, cots, foot lockers, and clothing.

    [36] As of July 18, 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments were still
    negotiating the terms of their bilateral agreement, although the exact
    nature of the agreement was still being negotiated.

    [37] For simplicity, we use the term contractor-managed government-
    owned property to incorporate all items which the contractor manages
    expressly to perform under the contract, including items given to the
    contractor by the government (government-furnished equipment), or
    acquired/fabricated by the contractor.

    [38] Excess contractor-managed government-owned property is a subset of
    foreign excess personal property, which is defined as U.S.-owned
    personal property located outside of the United States that is excess
    to government needs.

    [39] The October 2007 memo increasing donation authority to $10,000
    updated an August 4, 2006, DOD memo based on the Defense Reutilization
    and Marketing Service's cost-benefit analysis dated June 9, 2006, which
    estimated the cost at which care and handling of an item exceeds the
    proceeds from its sale.

    [40] Headquarter, Department of the Army, HQDA Materiel Retrograde
    Policy; (October 23, 2007).

    [41] According to an Army official, this analysis included property
    acquired/fabricated by the contractor, but not government-furnished
    equipment. Consequently, the analysis included much, but not all
    contractor-managed government-owned property.

    [42] The property can be transferred to other military units or
    contractors in theater, the government of Iraq, or other military units
    or contractors around the world.

    [43] The Army's analysis considers this property to be (1) uneconomical
    to return to the United States or (2) prohibited from return to the
    United States given policy, regulations, or agreements.

    [44] DLA runs four Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices in Iraq
    and one in Kuwait, which are responsible for disposing of surplus DOD
    property through reutilization, transfer, donation, and sale. The sale
    of this surplus property is accomplished by awarding contracts to
    vendors that in turn resell the property.

    [45] The Marines have previously used this alternate port to resupply
    its forces in western Iraq.

    [46] DOD officials stated that an additional 20 wash racks should be
    operational at Camp Buehring by August 2008; we were not able to
    confirm this.

    [47] According to DOD officials, although it is possible to self-deploy
    vehicles from Iraq to Kuwait (i.e., drive them out under their own
    power), the resulting wear and tear on a vehicle makes this an
    unattractive alternative. Hence, when possible, vehicles are
    transported out of Iraq on heavy equipment transports.

    [48] GAO did not verify the accuracy of this model.

    [49] DOD 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation
    Chapter 1, � C1.3.1.1, (May 23, 2003).

    [50] See DOD 4140.1-R, � C1.3.1, � C1.3.2 and � C5.8.

    [51] See DOD 4140.1-R, � C7.1.

    [52] The Retrograde Property Assistance Teams (RPATs) facilitate the
    expedient turn-in of all excess Class VII, theater provided equipment
    (TPE), improve property accountability, and enable asset visibility of
    the received equipment. RPATs operate at six permanent locations
    throughout the theater Area of Operations (AO) to accomplish this
    mission.

    [53] Army documents stated that the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced
    is the Army's Web-based property accountability system that provides
    real-time total asset visibility throughout all levels of Army
    management and secures transfers to the Standard Army Retail Supply
    System. Additionally, it is a Standard Army Information Management
    System.

    [54] Army documents state that Standard Army Management Information
    Systems provide a seamless and inoperable network of logistics systems
    using integrated communication tools.

    [55] The Army Materiel Command has five Life Cycle Management Commands,
    each of which is responsible for certain types of equipment. They are:
    Aviation and Missile, Chemical Materials Agency, Communications-
    Electronics, Joint Munitions & Lethality, and Tank-automotive &
    Armaments Command.

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