Human Rights: U.S. Government's Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse 
of Household Workers by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be 
Strengthened (29-JUL-08, GAO-08-892).				 
                                                                 
In 2007, the Department of State (State) reported that some	 
foreign diplomats may be abusing the household workers they	 
brought to the United States on A-3 or G-5 visas. GAO was asked  
to (1) determine the number of A-3 or G-5 visa holders who have  
alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity since 2000, (2) 
review the U.S. government's process for investigating these	 
allegations, and (3) assess how State ensures that its policies  
for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are implemented correctly and	 
consistently. GAO analyzed documents, interviewed officials, and 
conducted fieldwork at four consular posts that issue large	 
numbers of A-3 or G-5 visas.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-892 					        
    ACCNO:   A83117						        
  TITLE:     Human Rights: U.S. Government's Efforts to Address       
Alleged Abuse of Household Workers by Foreign Diplomats with	 
Immunity Could Be Strengthened					 
     DATE:   07/29/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Civil rights					 
	     Crimes against humanity				 
	     Diplomatic privilege and immunities		 
	     Diplomats						 
	     Employee rights					 
	     Employees						 
	     Employment 					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Human rights violations				 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Investigations by federal agencies 		 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Minimum wage rates 				 
	     Program abuses					 
	     Risk factors					 
	     Risk management					 
	     State employees					 
	     Visas						 
	     Abuse						 
	     Policies and procedures				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-892

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to [email protected]. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, Committee on 
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

July 2008: 

Human Rights: 

U.S. Government's Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse of Household Workers 
by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be Strengthened: 

Human Rights: 

GAO-08-892: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-892, a report to the Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and the Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2007, the Department of State (State) reported that some foreign 
diplomats may be abusing the household workers they brought to the 
United States on A-3 or G-5 visas. GAO was asked to (1) determine the 
number of A-3 or G-5 visa holders who have alleged abuse by foreign 
diplomats with immunity since 2000, (2) review the U.S. governmentï¿½s 
process for investigating these allegations, and (3) assess how State 
ensures that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are implemented 
correctly and consistently. GAO analyzed documents, interviewed 
officials, and conducted fieldwork at four consular posts that issue 
large numbers of A-3 or G-5 visas. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO identified 42 household workers with A-3 or G-5 visas who alleged 
that they were abused by foreign diplomats with immunity from 2000 
through 2008, but the total number is likely higher. The total number 
of alleged incidents since 2000 is likely higher for four reasons: 
household workersï¿½ fear of contacting law enforcement, nongovernmental 
organizationsï¿½ protection of victim confidentiality, limited 
information on some cases handled by the U.S. government, and federal 
agenciesï¿½ challenges identifying cases. For example, State has several 
offices that receive allegations of abuse by foreign diplomats, but no 
single office maintains information on all allegations. 

The U.S. governmentï¿½s process for investigating alleged abuse of 
household workers by foreign diplomats is complicated by three factors. 
First, immunity can pose constraints for law enforcement in collecting 
evidence. Second, the status of foreign diplomats can heighten their 
workersï¿½ sense of vulnerability, causing the workers to fear 
cooperating with investigators. Third, the length of time it takes to 
obtain a legal opinion from State on the permissibility of using 
certain investigative techniques can hamper investigations. According 
to State, although some techniques are clearly prohibited by 
international law (such as searching certain diplomatsï¿½ residences), 
the permissibility of others under international law is less clear. In 
advising on the use of investigative techniques, State considers legal 
and policy issues, such as reciprocityï¿½assessing how U.S. diplomats 
abroad might be affected by actions taken toward a foreign diplomat on 
U.S. soil. State may ask Justice to provide information to help 
determine the permissibility of certain techniques, but the process of 
obtaining this information can be difficult and time consuming for 
Justice. Although both State and Justice have discussed creating a 
process to avoid delays, no formal actions have, thus far, been taken 
to establish one. 

Weaknesses exist in Stateï¿½s process for ensuring correct and consistent 
implementation of policies and procedures for issuing A-3 and G-5 
visas. GAOï¿½s review of employment contracts submitted at four consular 
posts by A-3 and G-5 visa applicants showed that they often did not 
include Stateï¿½s required components, such as a guarantee of the minimum 
or prevailing wage. GAO also found that officers at the four posts were 
unclear about or unfamiliar with certain aspects of Stateï¿½s guidance. 
Few of the officers were aware that they should inform A-3 and G-5 visa 
applicants of their rights under U.S. law during their interview. Some 
officers at the four posts also were uncertain about the reasons for 
refusing A-3 or G-5 visas. State is considering adding provisions to 
its guidance that would more clearly stipulate reasons for refusing 
these visas, such as if an A-3 or G-5 applicant seeks to work for a 
foreign diplomat who is linked to a pattern of employee disappearance, 
abuse allegations, or other irregularities. However, State has not 
reached internal agreement on these provisions and has set no timetable 
for doing so. State headquarters officials said they rely on individual 
posts to monitor implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and 
procedures and do not routinely assess postsï¿½ compliance. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State (1) collect and main records 
on allegations of household worker abuse by foreign diplomats, (2) 
establish a system alerting consular officers to seek guidance before 
issuing an A-3 or G-5 visa to an individual applying to work for a 
foreign diplomat who may have abused workers, and (3) spot-check 
compliance with A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures. GAO also 
recommends that the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the 
Attorney General outline a process for determining which specific 
techniques can be used when investigating foreign diplomats. State and 
the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security concurred with the 
recommendations addressed to them. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-892]. For more information, 
contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

42 A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders Have Alleged Abuse Since 2000; Total Number 
of Alleged Incidents Is Likely Higher: 

Three Factors Complicate Investigations of Abuse by Foreign Diplomats: 

Weaknesses Exist in Implementation and Oversight of A-3 and G-5 Visa 
Policies and Procedures: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: U.S. Government Agencies' Primary Responsibilities Related 
to Foreign Diplomats and A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders: 

Appendix III: Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from 
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Relevant Responsibilities of State Department Bureaus and 
Offices: 

Table 2: Federal Departments with Primary Investigative and 
Prosecutorial Responsibilities: 

Table 3: Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from 
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Number of A3 and G-5 Visas Issued Abroad, Fiscal Years 2000 
to 2007: 

Figure 2: Overseas Posts that Issued the Most A-3 and G-5 Visas, Fiscal 
Years 2000 to 2007: 

Abbreviations: 

AUSA: Assistant United States Attorney: 

CIS: Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

CRT/CS: Civil Rights Division/Criminal Section: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Homeland Security: Department of Homeland Security: 

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

Justice: Department of Justice: 

Labor: Department of Labor: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

State: Department of State: 

TOMIS: The Office of Foreign Missions Information System: 

USUN: U.S. Mission to the United Nations: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

July 29, 2008: 

The Honorable Richard Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Coburn, MD: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law: 
Committee on Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

In June 2007, the Department of State (State) noted in its annual 
Trafficking in Persons report that some foreign diplomats[Footnote 1] 
may have abused individuals they had brought to the United States to 
work in their households. State again highlighted this problem in a 
July 2007 note to all Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in the United 
States, stating that it had recently learned of a number of allegations 
of trafficking in persons[Footnote 2] with respect to household 
workers, including allegations of involuntary servitude and physical 
abuse. A few of these cases have garnered congressional and media 
attention, particularly because the accused foreign diplomats held full 
diplomatic immunity[Footnote 3] and thus could not be prosecuted in 
U.S. courts. For example, in 2002, a household worker accused her 
employers, a high-ranking diplomat and his wife, of verbally, 
physically, and sexually abusing her. She also alleged that they 
required her to work 16 to 17-hour days without any payment and 
prohibited her from leaving the home unaccompanied. She filed a civil 
lawsuit against her employers, but because they held full diplomatic 
immunity, the case was dismissed. The diplomat and his wife have since 
left the United States.[Footnote 4] While this alleged incident 
involved a potential violation of U.S. antitrafficking laws, abuse 
allegations by household workers against foreign diplomats have ranged 
from potential wage and hour violations to involuntary servitude. For 
the purposes of this report, we will use the term abuse to include all 
such allegations. 

Most of the household workers brought to the United States by foreign 
diplomats arrive with A-3 visas--as employees of officials from foreign 
embassies, consulates, or governments--or with G-5 visas--as employees 
of foreign officials for international organizations, such as the 
United Nations or the World Bank.[Footnote 5] On average, almost 3,500 
individuals enter the United States each year on A-3 and G-5 visas. 
Several U.S. government agencies are involved in efforts to respond to 
alleged abuse of these visa holders. State grants A-3 and G-5 visas, 
issues guidance on diplomatic law, and maintains official records 
regarding the status and immunity level of foreign diplomats in the 
United States, among other things. The Department of Justice (Justice) 
investigates trafficking allegations and prosecutes violations of 
criminal statutes. The Department of Homeland Security (Homeland 
Security) investigates trafficking allegations and grants T visas to 
some trafficking victims. These visas allow victims to remain in the 
United States for up to 4 years, file for permanent residence, and 
receive certain government services through the Department of Health 
and Human Services. The Department of Labor (Labor) investigates 
allegations of wage and hour violations. 

In response to your request, we (1) sought to determine how many A-3 
and G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with 
immunity since 2000, (2) reviewed the U.S. government's process for 
investigating abuse allegations involving foreign diplomats with 
immunity, and (3) described and assessed how State ensures correct and 
consistent implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures. 

To determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by 
foreign diplomats with immunity, we interviewed U.S. government 
officials and analyzed data provided by these officials on alleged 
incidents that they have handled. We requested data on alleged 
incidents that occurred from calendar years 2000 through 2008. We also 
met with representatives of 10 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
that provide services to alleged victims of abuse by foreign diplomats 
and analyzed data they provided on allegations. In addition, we 
conducted legal research to identify relevant civil lawsuits. To review 
the U.S. government's process for investigating allegations, we 
analyzed State's policies for handling allegations of criminal activity 
by foreign diplomats and interviewed U.S. government officials. To 
describe and assess how State ensures correct and consistent 
implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures, we analyzed 
State's guidance and requirements for adjudicating these visas, and 
interviewed State officials. We also met with consular officers and 
reviewed A-3 and G-5 visa files at the U.S. embassies in Peru, the 
Philippines, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. We assessed the reliability of 
data analyzed and found them to be sufficiently reliable for purposes 
of this report. We conducted this performance audit between October 
2007 and July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
(App. I provides a detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and 
methodology.) 

Results in Brief: 

We identified 42 distinct A-3 and G-5 visa holders who alleged that 
they were abused by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity from 
2000 through 2008, but the total number of alleged incidents is likely 
higher. The 42 alleged incidents we confirmed include those identified 
by federal agencies, NGOs, and legal sources, such as Westlaw. Ten of 
these alleged incidents resulted in federal human trafficking 
investigations, most of which remain open. In one instance, Justice 
determined through its investigation that, absent immunity, it would 
indict the foreign diplomat's wife. However, the diplomat's home 
government declined to waive the wife's immunity; thus, Justice could 
not indict. The diplomat and his wife subsequently left the United 
States. The total number of alleged incidents of household worker abuse 
by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity is likely higher than 
the 42 distinct alleged incidents we have identified for four reasons: 
household workers' fear of contacting law enforcement authorities, 
NGOs' need to maintain client confidentiality, limited information on 
some allegations handled by the U.S. government, and federal agencies' 
difficulties in tracking household worker abuse allegations and 
investigations involving foreign diplomats. For example, the Foreign 
Affairs Manual [Footnote 6] states that several offices and bureaus 
within State will provide the Office of Protocol and the Office of the 
Legal Adviser with reports on all cases that come to their attention, 
but we found that these offices were not aware of all cases that had 
been handled by the department. In addition, law enforcement agencies 
were unable to search their case management databases for 
investigations involving foreign diplomats because these databases are 
not designed to track investigations in this manner. 

The U.S. government's process for investigating allegations of abuse by 
foreign diplomats is complicated by three factors: (1) constraints 
imposed by immunity, (2) household workers' heightened vulnerabilities 
due to their employers' status, and (3) the length of time it takes for 
Justice to obtain State's opinion on the use of certain investigative 
techniques in trafficking investigations involving individuals with 
varying degrees of immunity and inviolability. Law enforcement's 
ability to investigate foreign diplomats is limited, particularly if 
the subject has full immunity or inviolable premises are involved. 
Diplomats with full immunity have the highest degree of privileges and 
immunities. They are considered "personally inviolable" and cannot be 
detained. In addition, their residences are inviolable and cannot be 
entered or searched without their consent. These limitations are 
particularly challenging because abuse of household workers typically 
takes place in the employer's residence and often is not witnessed by 
individuals outside the employer's family. Furthermore, the victims may 
not cooperate out of fear that the employers will use their political 
status and connections to harm them or their families or that they will 
be deported if they leave their employment situations. Finally, while 
Justice consults with State to identify investigative techniques that 
can be used when foreign diplomats have immunity, some recent 
consultations have taken several months because, according to State and 
Justice officials, they raised unprecedented questions. Law enforcement 
officials told us that these lengthy consultations can hamper 
investigations. Justice would like for State to clarify which 
techniques are not legally permissible when the subject of the 
investigation has full or partial immunity but, according to State 
officials, State prefers to handle these investigations on a case-by- 
case basis so that it can consider fully the legal and policy 
implications of each case. State considers the extent to which its 
opinion on the permissibility of a given technique could be defended 
legally. State also reviews each case through the lens of reciprocity-
-assessing how U.S. diplomats abroad might be affected by actions taken 
toward a foreign diplomat on U.S. soil. While Justice and State agree 
that it would be helpful to outline an interagency process for 
communicating in a timely manner about the use of investigative 
techniques in these cases, they have, thus far, not taken any formal 
steps to create one. 

At the four consular posts we visited, we found weaknesses in State's 
process for ensuring that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas 
are implemented correctly and consistently, and some consular officers 
were unfamiliar with or unclear about aspects of guidance relating to 
these visas. Our review of employment contracts submitted by A-3 and G- 
5 visa applicants at the posts we visited showed that, in many cases, 
they did not include some or all of the criteria required in the 
Foreign Affairs Manual, such as a guarantee that the employee will 
receive the minimum or prevailing wage (whichever is greater).[Footnote 
7] Some consular officers we spoke with also were unaware of or unclear 
about aspects of State's general guidance on A-3 and G-5 visas. For 
example, several consular officers did not know that, according to 
State guidance, they should keep electronically scanned copies of the 
employment contracts on file. Consular officers also were uncertain 
about the reasons for refusing A-3 or G-5 visas. State's guidance 
directs consular officers to determine that A-3 and G-5 visa applicants 
are entering into true employer-employee relationships, in accordance 
with required terms of their personal employment contracts, but does 
not explicitly state whether concerns about abuse or mistreatment are 
sufficient grounds on which to refuse an A-3 or G-5 visa. At one post, 
officers told us that they can refuse an A-3 or G-5 visa if they 
believe that the worker may not be treated well. However, officers at 
two other posts said that it can be very difficult to refuse an A-3 or 
G-5 visa, even if they believe that the worker will be underpaid or 
treated poorly, particularly if they lack hard evidence that an 
applicant has been or could be mistreated. State headquarters officials 
currently do not alert consular officers if they have information 
linking a particular foreign diplomat to a pattern of abuse 
allegations. State is considering steps to clarify its guidance, such 
as directing consular officers to refuse A-3 or G-5 visas if there is a 
pattern of past alleged abuse by a particular diplomat, but has not set 
a time frame for doing so. In addition, State headquarters does not 
exercise oversight by periodically assessing compliance with A-3 and G- 
5 visa policies and procedures, but instead relies on individual posts 
to do so. 

In this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State (1) emphasize 
to the relevant bureaus and offices the importance of the Foreign 
Affairs Manual requirement to report all cases that come to their 
attention and create a system for collecting and maintaining records on 
these cases, (2) work with the Attorney General of the United States 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish an interagency 
process outlining agreed-upon policies and time frames for determining 
which investigative techniques can be used in trafficking 
investigations involving foreign diplomats, (3) establish a system 
alerting consular officers to seek guidance from State headquarters 
before issuing A-3 or G-5 visas to applicants whose prospective 
employers may have abused their household workers in the past, and (4) 
enhance oversight by establishing a monitoring system to spot-check 
compliance with A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures. 

The Departments of State and Justice provided written comments on a 
draft of our report, which are reprinted in appendixes IV and V, 
respectively. 

State concurred with all four of our recommendations. Regarding the 
first recommendation, State indicated that it will emphasize to the 
relevant bureaus and offices the importance of reporting promptly and 
fully all cases of alleged abuse. State also noted that the Office of 
Protocol has begun creating a system for collecting and maintaining 
centralized records on these cases. With regard to our second 
recommendation, State noted that it will be useful to establish a 
process to address novel and difficult questions regarding 
investigative techniques. In response to our third recommendation, 
State said that it will proactively "watch-list" known abusers in its 
Consular Lookout and Support System and will soon provide consular 
officers improved information regarding A-3 and G-5 cases. Finally, 
State acknowledged the need for better compliance with A-3 and G-5 visa 
policies and procedures and agreed to consider our fourth 
recommendation to spot-check compliance from headquarters. 

Justice agreed with our findings and concurred with our second 
recommendation, noting that agreeing upon time frames for deciding on 
the use of investigative techniques is particularly important. 

In addition, State, Justice, and Homeland Security provided technical 
comments on a draft of our report, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. For example, Homeland Security asked to be included in our 
second recommendation, which initially was directed to the Secretary of 
State and the Attorney General. We agreed to amend the recommendation 
accordingly. 

The Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services chose not to 
comment on the draft report. 

Background: 

Each year, State issues A-3 and G-5 visas to individuals whose 
employers are foreign diplomats on official purposes in the United 
States.[Footnote 8] Most of these individuals are hired to work for 
foreign diplomats in the District of Columbia, Maryland, New York, or 
Virginia. For fiscal years 2000 through 2007, 207 U.S. embassies and 
consular posts overseas issued 10,386 A-3 visas and 7,522 G-5 visas. 
The number of A-3 visas decreased[Footnote 9] during this period by 
about 56 percent--from 1,780 in fiscal year 2000 to 999 in fiscal year 
2007--and the number of G-5 visas issued increased by 21 percent--from 
877 in fiscal year 2000 to 1,057 in fiscal year 2007 (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Number of A3 and G-5 Visas Issued Abroad, Fiscal Years 2000 
to 2007: 

This figure is a combination of two bar graphs showing the number of A3 
and G-5 visas issued abroad, fiscal years 2000 to 2007. The X axis 
represents the fiscal year, and the Y axis on one graph represents the 
number of A-3 visas and on the other graph represents number of G-5 
visas issued. 

Graph #1: 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,780. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,549. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,308. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,253. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,255. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,227. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 1,015. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Number of A-3 visas issued: 999. 

Graph #2: 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 877. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 865. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 729. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 1,115. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 946. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 997. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 936. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Number of G-5 visas issued: 1,057. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2 shows the 10 posts that issued the most A-3 and G-5 visas, 
combined, for fiscal years 2000 through 2007. These 10 posts issued 40 
percent of the total number of A-3 and G-5 visas issued during this 
period. Manila issued the most A-3 and G-5 visas, accounting for almost 
10 percent of the total number of these visas issued overseas during 
this period. 

Figure 2: Overseas Posts that Issued the Most A-3 and G-5 Visas, Fiscal 
Years 2000 to 2007. 

This figure is a graph of overseas posts that issued the most A-3 and G-
5 visas, fiscal years 2000 to 2007. The X axis represents the post, and 
the Y axis represents the A-3 and G-5 issued. 

Manila, Philippines; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 9.9%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 1,775; 
G-5 visas issued: 904; 
A-3 visas issued: 871. 

Lima, Peru; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 5.3%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 956; 
G-5 visas issued: 675; 
A-3 visas issued: 281. 

Jakarta, Indonesia; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 5.1%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 910; 
G-5 visas issued: 173; 
A-3 visas issued: 737. 

Bogota, Columbia; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 4.3%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 778; 
G-5 visas issued: 36; 
A-3 visas issued: 742. 

Casablanca, Morocco; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 3.0%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 531; 
G-5 visas issued: 322; 
A-3 visas issued: 209. 

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 2.9%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 528; 
G-5 visas issued: 206; 
A-3 visas issued: 322. 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 2.8%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 509; 
G-5 visas issued: 22; 
A-3 visas issued: 487. 

Doha, Qatar; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 2.0%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 502; 
G-5 visas issued: 38; 
A-3 visas issued: 464. 

Mexico City, Mexico; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 2.0%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 367; 
G-5 visas issued: 108; 
A-3 visas issued: 259. 

Colombo, Sri Lanka; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 2.0%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 355; 
G-5 visas issued: 211; 
A-3 visas issued: 144. 

Total for these posts; 
Percentage of total at overseas posts: 40.3%; 
A-3 and G-5 total visas issued: 7,211; 
G-5 visas issued: 2,695; 
A-3 visas issued: 4,516. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. laws provide certain protections for household workers, including 
individuals brought to the United States on A-3 or G-5 visas, and 
State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor work to respond to 
allegations of abuse, exploitation, or trafficking of household workers 
by foreign diplomats. (App. II lists the relevant offices within these 
departments and their respective responsibilities.) The U.S. government 
considers involuntary servitude of household workers, as defined under 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, to be a severe form of 
trafficking in persons and a serious criminal offense. Specifically, 
the act defines severe forms of trafficking in persons, in part, as the 
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or maintaining of a 
person for labor or services through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, 
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Victims of severe forms of 
trafficking are offered certain accommodations under the act. Household 
workers also are subject to U.S. laws and covered by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, which is the law governing minimum wages and overtime 
pay. Homeland Security can provide special accommodations to 
individuals who show that their employers have abused, exploited, or 
trafficked them, allowing the workers to legally remain in the United 
States. These accommodations are continued presence[Footnote 10]-- 
which permits an alien to be present legally in the United States and 
to seek work during the investigation--and T nonimmigrant 
status[Footnote 11]--which permits a visa holder to remain in the 
United States for up to 4 years, file for adjustment of status to 
lawful permanent residence, and apply for benefits from the U.S. 
government such as food stamps and medical assistance. If they leave 
their employment situation without either of these accommodations, A-3 
and G-5 visa holders lose their legal immigration status and could be 
deported. 

Under international and domestic law, the U.S. government, including 
its law enforcement authorities, extends privileges and immunities to 
certain foreign diplomats.[Footnote 12] Employers of A-3 and G-5 visa 
holders may be entitled to some degree of immunity (full or partial) or 
may have no immunity at all. An employer with full diplomatic immunity 
is generally immune from civil or criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
Certain employers with partial or "official acts" immunity, such as 
most individuals employed by international organizations, are immune 
from civil or criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts for conduct 
performed under their official duties or functions. State and the 
United Nations publish lists of current foreign diplomats who hold 
diplomatic rank[Footnote 13] on their Web sites. Appendix III 
identifies the respective privileges and immunities to which various 
categories of foreign diplomats are entitled. 

42 A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders Have Alleged Abuse Since 2000; Total Number 
of Alleged Incidents Is Likely Higher: 

We identified 42 individual A-3 and G-5 visa holders who have alleged 
abuse by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity in the United 
States from 2000 through June 2008. However, the total number of 
alleged incidents is likely to be higher for four reasons: household 
workers' fear of contacting law enforcement authorities, NGOs' 
protection of victim confidentiality, limited information on some 
allegations handled by the U.S. government, and federal departments' 
difficulties in tracking household worker abuse allegations and 
investigations involving foreign diplomats. 

GAO Identified 42 A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders Who Have Alleged Abuse Since 
2000: 

We identified 42 distinct A-3 or G-5 visa holders who, since 2000, have 
alleged that foreign diplomats[Footnote 14] with some level of immunity 
abused them.[Footnote 15] We confirmed that 17 of the incidents alleged 
by these A-3 or G-5 visa holders were handled by federal 
agencies.[Footnote 16] These 17 incidents[Footnote 17] can be 
categorized as follows: 

ï¿½ 10 alleged incidents of human trafficking, which resulted in eight 
human trafficking investigations;[Footnote 18] 

* one investigation of alleged visa fraud;[Footnote 19] 

* one investigation of an alleged wage and hour violation; and: 

* five alleged incidents identified by State, some of which may have 
resulted in investigations, including: 

- one human trafficking allegation; 

* two allegations of physical or verbal abuse; and: 

* two alleged wage and hour violations. 

Most of the human trafficking investigations remain open. However, in 
one of the human trafficking investigations, Justice determined that, 
absent immunity, it would indict the foreign diplomat's wife. State 
requested that the diplomat's home government waive immunity, which 
would allow Justice to indict her. However, the diplomat's home 
government declined to waive immunity; thus, Justice could not indict. 
The diplomat and his wife subsequently left the United States, and 
Justice has since closed this case. 

We identified the remaining 25 distinct alleged incidents through legal 
sources, such as Westlaw, and interviews with NGOs who provided 
services to the alleged victims, such as assistance in applying for T 
visas and filing lawsuits against their employers. According to NGOs, 4 
of these 25 alleged victims applied for and received T visas. In 
addition, we determined that civil suits were filed in 9 of these 25 
alleged incidents. In most of these lawsuits, household workers sought, 
in part, to recoup unpaid wages. According to NGOs, the courts 
dismissed three of the nine lawsuits on the basis that the foreign 
diplomats had immunity.[Footnote 20] Of the remaining six lawsuits, 
NGOs indicated that five were settled out of court, and one resulted in 
a default judgment because the defendants failed to respond. Although 
we could not confirm that any of these 25 alleged incidents were 
investigated or handled by the U.S. government, NGOs told us that they 
reported 12 of them to federal agencies. They did not report the other 
13 alleged incidents. 

Number of Alleged Incidents Likely Higher Than the 42 We Identified: 

The total number of alleged incidents of household employee abuse by 
foreign diplomats with some level of immunity is likely to exceed the 
total we have identified for four reasons. First, as we have previously 
reported, trafficking victims are a hidden population because 
trafficking is a clandestine activity.[Footnote 21] Trafficking victims 
often are in a precarious position and may be unwilling or unable to 
report to, or seek help from, relevant authorities. Moreover, the 
Department of Health and Human Services reported that victims live 
daily with inhumane treatment, physical and mental abuse, and threats 
to themselves or their families back home. Victims of human trafficking 
may fear or distrust the government and police because they are afraid 
of being deported or because they come from countries where law 
enforcement is corrupt and feared. In such circumstances, reporting to 
the police or seeking help elsewhere requires courage and knowledge of 
local conditions, which the victims might not have. In addition, some 
victims may not be permitted to leave their employers' residences, 
which makes it much more difficult to report their abuse to 
authorities. 

Second, NGOs have provided services to alleged victims who did not want 
to be identified or who did not want to identify their employers. NGOs 
we contacted told us that, since 2000, they have received allegations 
from 66 A-3 or G-5 visa holders stating that they were abused by their 
employers. However, in 31 of these alleged incidents, the worker and 
the diplomat involved were not identified either because the worker was 
too afraid to reveal his or her identity or because the organization 
agreed to protect the client's confidentiality. 

Third, because of federal agencies' need to protect sensitive 
information, we received limited data on some alleged incidents handled 
by the U.S. government, and thus did not include those incidents in our 
total count. In most instances, federal agencies did not reveal the 
names or countries of origin of the worker and foreign diplomat 
involved in alleged incidents they had investigated or otherwise 
handled. It is law enforcement policy not to disclose details of 
ongoing criminal investigations. Without this information, however, we 
could not fully reflect federal agencies' data in our overall count of 
alleged incidents without potentially double counting ones that had 
already been reported to us by NGOs. For example, although Justice told 
us of 19 human trafficking investigations involving foreign diplomats 
with immunity, we could only confirm that 8 of them were included in 
our count of 42 distinct alleged incidents. Justice officials also told 
us that there are likely multiple victims in some of the 19 trafficking 
investigations they reported to us. Furthermore, while Homeland 
Security identified nine A-3 and G-5 visa holders who received T visas 
from Homeland Security's Citizenship and Immigration Services, we did 
not learn the names of their employers, and therefore could not confirm 
if they held immunity. 

Fourth, federal officials said they could not determine definitively 
the total number of alleged incidents they had handled and could only 
estimate that number by reviewing specific case files and consulting 
with knowledgeable staff. Officials had difficulty identifying all 
alleged incidents or investigations in their records or databases for 
several reasons as explained below: 

* Justice, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Diplomatic Security 
officials could not identify all investigations because their databases 
are not designed or meant to facilitate searches based on 
characteristics of the alleged perpetrators, such as whether they are 
foreign diplomats. 

* Justice officials told us that the ongoing investigations they 
identified, primarily by canvassing knowledgeable staff, only went back 
as far as May 2005. 

* In addition, Immigration and Customs Enforcement could not identify 
investigations before 2003, because it had difficulties capturing 
trafficking-in-persons data prior to its creation as part of Homeland 
Security in that year.[Footnote 22] 

* State has several offices that receive allegations of abuse by 
foreign diplomats, but no single office maintains information on all 
allegations. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, the Office of 
Protocol establishes and maintains complete records of each reported 
case that comes to its attention in which a foreign diplomat with 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction has been accused of a crime in the 
United States. State defines "accused of a crime" to mean cases in 
which Justice has determined that, absent immunity, it would seek to 
indict. Therefore, although the Office of Protocol receives reports of 
allegations from other federal agencies,[Footnote 23] other State 
bureaus and offices, and some NGOs, it does not systematically maintain 
records on other ongoing criminal investigations, civil lawsuits that 
have been filed, or any other allegations. Moreover, the Foreign 
Affairs Manual indicates that State's Bureau of International 
Organizations, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), each 
regional bureau, and Diplomatic Security will provide the Office of 
Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser with reports on all cases 
that come to their attention. However, there is no mechanism to ensure 
that these reports are referred to and recorded by the Office of 
Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser. We found that the Office 
of Protocol was unaware of cases that USUN had handled, and the Office 
of Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser were unaware of all 
cases that Diplomatic Security had handled. 

* While Labor's system tracks the 30,000 to 40,000 investigations of 
alleged wage and hour violations it conducts each year, it does not 
specifically identify those involving foreign diplomats. In addition, 
although Justice and Homeland Security officials told us they have 
referred allegations of wage and hour violations to Labor, they could 
not identify the specific allegations. Labor officials told us that 
they were aware only of one investigation of an alleged wage and hour 
violation, but that policy is for field offices to inform headquarters 
of any allegations of wage and hour violations received involving 
foreign diplomats. 

Three Factors Complicate Investigations of Abuse by Foreign Diplomats: 

The U.S. government's process of investigating foreign diplomats for 
alleged abuse is complicated by three factors--(1) constraints posed by 
immunity, (2) household workers' heightened vulnerabilities due to 
their employers' status, and (3) the length of time it takes for 
Justice to obtain State's opinion on the use of specific investigative 
techniques in trafficking investigations. 

Immunity Poses Constraints for Investigations: 

When investigating foreign diplomats with immunity, law enforcement 
agents face constraints that become particularly pronounced when the 
alleged crime has taken place in the diplomat's residence. 
Investigators' options are most limited when a diplomat has full 
immunity and is considered to have personal inviolability or when the 
diplomat's residence is considered inviolable. Diplomats who are 
personally inviolable cannot be detained, and property that is 
considered inviolable (including vehicles and residences) cannot be 
entered or searched without the diplomats' consent. Although the 
residences of foreign diplomats with partial immunity may be searched, 
these diplomats cannot be obliged to give evidence concerning matters 
related to their official duties. 

Officials at Justice, Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) told us that these limitations pose particular 
problems when the allegation involves abuse of a household employee 
because the worker's mistreatment often occurs in the employer's 
residence and is not witnessed by individuals outside the employer's 
family. For example, a Justice official told us that these allegations 
can be among the most difficult to investigate and prosecute because it 
is hard for investigators to gather enough corroborating evidence. 
Investigators are prohibited from observing working and living 
conditions in the home absent the diplomat's consent, and possible 
witnesses often include the diplomat's family, who also may have 
immunity. Instead, investigators often have to rely primarily on 
interviewing the victim and talking to neighbors who may have observed 
interactions between the diplomat and the household employee. In some 
instances, the evidence collected through these methods is considered 
insufficient to pursue prosecution. These constraints resulted in at 
least one instance in which law enforcement officials closed an 
investigation for lack of sufficient evidence after they determined 
that constraints posed by immunity prevented investigators from talking 
to witnesses inside a foreign diplomat's home. 

Diplomats' Status Heightens Workers' Vulnerabilities: 

The status of foreign diplomats under investigation can heighten their 
household workers' sense of vulnerability. For example, household 
workers may be intimidated by their employers' wealth, political 
connections, or prominent positions in society. One Justice official 
told us that abusive situations involving foreign diplomats' household 
workers have a striking power imbalance because workers often are poor, 
uneducated, and fear retaliation, not only against themselves but also 
against family members in their home country. This fear can inhibit 
household workers from cooperating with investigations, further 
limiting the investigators' options for collecting evidence. NGOs told 
us that foreign diplomats have used immunity as a weapon to frighten 
their household workers and discourage them from escaping or taking 
actions to improve their situation. Workers have alleged that their 
employers threatened their family members back home, told them they 
would be deported if they did not do as they were instructed, and 
stated they could treat them as they chose because immunity allows them 
to do so with impunity. As reported above, we also learned from some 
NGOs of a number of allegations of household worker abuse by foreign 
diplomats that were not reported to the U.S. government because the 
workers were too afraid of potential consequences. In these instances, 
an investigation could not even be initiated. 

Lengthy Process for Determining the Permissibility of Using 
Investigative Techniques Can Hamper Trafficking Investigations: 

Justice requests State's advice on how diplomatic immunity impacts the 
legal permissibility of using certain investigative techniques, but the 
time-consuming process of obtaining State's opinion can hamper 
investigations. When Justice receives an allegation that a foreign 
diplomat has abused a household worker, it reviews the facts and 
determines if they merit opening a trafficking investigation. If 
Justice decides to open an investigation (or learns that Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement or the FBI has opened a new investigation), it 
contacts State to (1) confirm the diplomat's identity and level of 
immunity; (2) determine how State wants to be kept informed of the 
investigation; and (3) obtain State's opinion, if necessary, on the use 
of certain investigative techniques. State officials said that there is 
no formal requirement for Justice to consult with them on whether 
certain investigative techniques are permissible, but that it is 
appropriate and they welcome Justice to do so. According to Justice, 
because U.S. courts take into account State's interpretation of 
international treaties and conventions, Justice requests State's legal 
interpretation on these matters. Although certain techniques, such as 
searching the residence of a diplomat who has full immunity and 
inviolability without the diplomat's consent, are clearly prohibited, 
other techniques may touch the diplomat's "sphere of privacy." 
According to State officials, the permissibility of these techniques 
under international law is less clear.[Footnote 24] 

While State can readily confirm a diplomat's identity, State's process 
of advising on which investigative techniques are legally permissible 
has, in some instances involving unprecedented circumstances, taken 
several months. In one instance, a victim agreed to a specific 
investigative technique that could have allowed Justice to collect 
important evidence. The victim's lawyers postponed filing a civil suit 
on her behalf to avoid alerting the diplomat involved that he was under 
investigation. State spent 6 months deliberating the issue, but did not 
advise Justice on whether use of this technique was legally 
permissible. Justice did not use the technique, the victim's lawyers 
eventually filed suit, and the criminal investigation remains open. In 
other instances, State has asked Justice to provide specific 
information that it believes could help it formulate an opinion on 
whether use of the technique is legally permissible. According to a 
Justice official, obtaining some of this information can be difficult 
and time-consuming. Both Justice and State officials agreed that when 
the issue at hand is relatively straightforward, they reach agreement 
quickly. 

According to State, its internal process of reaching an opinion on the 
legal advisability of investigative techniques can be time-consuming 
because State takes both legal and policy considerations into account 
when considering the advisability of using investigative techniques 
that fall into the "gray area." For example, the involvement of foreign 
diplomats can raise sensitivities for the U.S. government. State may 
need to consider reciprocity, such as how use of a specific technique 
might affect treatment of U.S. diplomats abroad. Similarly, if the 
foreign diplomat's country is a close ally of the United States, State 
also will assess how relations with that country might be affected by 
use of the investigative technique. The process of addressing these 
questions through State's supervisory chain of command, which can go 
above the Assistant Secretary level, if necessary, is lengthy, 
according to State officials. Once State makes a final determination, a 
State official conveys to a Justice official the department's opinion 
on use of the investigative technique in the specific case. This 
opinion covers both State's legal determination and any policy concerns 
the department may have. For example, a State official might say that 
the department could probably defend the use of a technique legally, 
but it would raise serious reciprocity concerns. 

According to Justice, State's policy considerations do not affect its 
trafficking investigations, but the length of State's deliberative 
process in determining what is legally permissible can hamper them. The 
investigative techniques in question are, according to Justice 
officials, among the most useful for gathering corroborating evidence, 
but they are unlikely to succeed unless they are implemented quickly. 
As one Justice official explained, "time is the enemy of successful 
investigations," meaning that the longer it takes to get approval from 
State, the greater the likelihood that the investigation will be 
compromised. For example, the subjects might learn that they are under 
investigation or they might leave the United States for their next 
assignment, further limiting the opportunity to collect evidence. 
Homeland Security officials also told us that any delays are 
detrimental to the preservation and collection of physical and 
testimonial evidence. 

To expedite the investigative process, Justice officials said that it 
would be helpful for State to provide them with a list of investigative 
techniques that, in State's view, are not legally permissible when the 
subject of the investigation has full or partial immunity. However, 
State prefers to continue handling these investigations on a case-by-
case basis. State officials explained that, while they could make a 
list of techniques that are clearly acceptable (such as asking the 
diplomat to agree to an interview) or prohibited (such as searching the 
residence of a diplomat with full immunity and inviolability), they 
would rather not indicate the legal permissibility of other, less clear-
cut techniques because they want to be able to consider both the legal 
and policy implications of each case. However, these officials added 
that they are aware of the need to provide a more timely response to 
Justice. Officials from both agencies told us they are considering 
developing an interagency process that would outline time frames for 
discussing the use of investigative techniques, but they have, thus 
far, not taken any formal actions toward creating one. 

Weaknesses Exist in Implementation and Oversight of A-3 and G-5 Visa 
Policies and Procedures: 

At the four consular posts we visited, we found weaknesses in State's 
process for ensuring that its policies for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas 
are implemented correctly and consistently, and some consular officers 
were unfamiliar with or unclear about aspects of guidance relating to 
these visas. Although State headquarters issues A-3 and G-5 policies 
and procedures, it relies on individual posts to ensure they are 
implemented correctly and consistently and has not instituted a process 
to spot-check compliance. 

GAO Found Weaknesses in the Implementation of A-3 and G-5 Visa 
Policies: 

Through our fieldwork, we identified instances in which A-3 and G-5 
policies were not implemented correctly and consistently. State 
requires that A-3 and G-5 visa applicants submit employment contracts 
signed by both the employer and employee that include: 

* a guarantee that the employee will be compensated at the state or 
federal minimum wage or prevailing wage, whichever is greater; 

* a statement by the employee that he or she will not accept any other 
employment while working for the employer; 

* a statement by the employer that he or she will not withhold the 
passport of the employee; and: 

* a statement indicating that both parties understand that the employee 
cannot be required to remain on the premises after working hours 
without compensation. 

However, the contracts we reviewed[Footnote 25] did not include at 
least one of State's requirements 71 percent of the time at one post, 
35 percent at the second, 23 percent at the third, and 6 percent at the 
fourth.[Footnote 26] 

* In some cases, the contracts were clearly deficient in one or more 
areas. For example, one contract we reviewed showed that the employee 
would receive $5 per hour (below the minimum wage) and that the 
employee would reimburse her employer for items received. This 
particular contract also did not include a statement that the employee 
could not be required to remain on the premises after working hours 
without compensation. 

* In other cases, the contracts included statements that appeared to 
comply with State's requirements, but also contained information that 
contradicted these statements. For example, some contracts stated that 
"the normal working hours of the second party [employee] shall be at 
the prevailing wage for a 40 hours [sic] week." However, these 
contracts also showed that the employees would be paid well below the 
prevailing wage for their occupation and intended destination. 

Our review of employment contracts revealed other shortcomings and 
raised questions about whether the employee would be paid fairly. 

* A-3 and G-5 visa applicants must submit contracts in English and a 
language understood by the applicants to demonstrate they understand 
their duties and rights regarding salary and working conditions. 
However, at one post where consular officers told us that A-3 and G-5 
visa applicants rarely speak or read English, none of the contracts we 
reviewed was in a language other than English.[Footnote 27] 

* We identified some contracts where the employee would be paid 
overtime "in accordance with [the foreign diplomat's home] embassy 
regulations." 

* In another contract, the employee's overtime hourly rate was lower 
than her wage for normal working hours. 

Some Consular Officers Unfamiliar with or Unclear about Aspects of A-3 
and G-5 Policies and Procedures: 

At the four posts we visited, we also found that some consular officers 
were unfamiliar with or unclear about certain aspects of State's 
guidance on A-3 and G-5 visas. 

Requiring a Diplomatic Note: 

According to State's guidance, A-3 and G-5 visa applications must be 
accompanied by a diplomatic note from the appropriate foreign mission 
or international organization that identifies the applicant's employer 
and confirms the employer's official A or G status. Some consular 
officers overseas told us that they believed a note was not required if 
they could identify the employer and confirm his or her status through 
The Office of Foreign Missions Information System (TOMIS), a database 
of foreign diplomats posted to the United States, which, according to 
the Foreign Affairs Manual, can be a useful tool for consular officers 
to confirm a diplomat's status. However, senior consular officials at 
State headquarters told us that TOMIS may contain inaccurate or 
outdated information and confirmed that a diplomatic note was in fact 
required. 

Informing A-3 and G-5 Visa Applicants of Their Rights: 

State's guidance also includes provisions encouraging consular officers 
to help educate A-3 and G-5 visa applicants about their rights under 
U.S. laws, but some officers we spoke with were unaware of these 
provisions. Consular officers are required to interview all A-3 and G- 
5 visa applicants. State recommends that officers use the interview to 
advise applicants in a language they understand that the U.S. 
government considers involuntary servitude of household workers to be a 
severe form of trafficking in persons and a serious criminal offense 
and that victims of involuntary servitude are offered protection under 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Officers are encouraged to make 
A-3 and G-5 applicants aware that the telephone number for police and 
emergency services is 911, and that there is a telephone hotline for 
reporting abuse of household workers and other trafficking-related 
crimes.[Footnote 28] State also reminds consular posts that an 
antitrafficking brochure titled "Be Smart, Be Safe" is available as a 
handout to household worker applicants. However, while several officers 
said they try to explain to A-3 and G-5 visa applicants that they have 
rights under U.S. laws, the officers also were unaware of the telephone 
hotline, State's advice to refer workers to 911, or the brochure. None 
of the posts we visited made copies of the "Be Smart, Be Safe" brochure 
available to visa applicants, although two of them had created one-page 
informational handouts for A-3 and G-5 visa applicants.[Footnote 29] At 
one of these posts, officers generally did not speak with applicants 
about their rights but instead relied on giving them the one-page 
handout. NGOs and alleged victims we spoke with told us that measures 
to educate A-3 and G-5 visa applicants are important. For example, one 
alleged victim said that U.S. embassies abroad should tell domestic 
workers coming to the United States that they have rights because, in 
her experience, one of the ways that employers abuse their workers is 
to tell them that they are still under the laws of their home country. 
She added that, specifically, embassies should give A-3 and G-5 visa 
applicants information about whom to contact if they experience 
physical or psychological abuse. Another worker, whose employer was 
investigated and sent home for allegedly trafficking household workers, 
told her attorneys that she knew to seek help because a consular 
officer had told her about her rights under U.S. law when she applied 
for her A-3 visa. 

Scanning Employment Contracts: 

Another area of the guidance that posts we visited were largely unaware 
of was the March 2007 direction from State headquarters to 
electronically scan copies of A-3 and G-5 employment contracts into the 
Consular Consolidated Database, which contains information on visa 
applicants. Two of the posts we visited had not scanned any of their 
contracts into the database, one had scanned about half of the 
contracts we reviewed, and the remaining one had only scanned a few. A 
State official in Washington explained that scanning documents is 
useful because, in cases of alleged abuse, accessing a copy of the 
contract provides evidence that the diplomat had agreed to provide 
better working conditions.[Footnote 30] NGOs also emphasized the 
importance of being able to access employment contracts. For example, 
an NGO told us that in one case, a foreign diplomat gave his worker a 
contract to present when applying for a G-5 visa that said that she 
would receive $1,200 per month, but gave her a different contract when 
she arrived in the United States that said she would receive only $425 
per month. The organization is now trying to locate a copy of the 
original contract. 

Criteria for Refusing A-3 and G-5 Visas: 

Finally, consular officers at the posts we visited were uncertain about 
the reasons for which they could refuse A-3 and G-5 visas. State's 
guidance directs consular officers to determine that A-3 and G-5 visa 
applicants are entering into true employer-employee relationships, in 
accordance with required terms of their personal employment contracts. 
However, it does not explicitly state if concerns about abuse or 
mistreatment are sufficient grounds on which to refuse an A-3 or G-5 
visa. At one post we visited, consular officers told us they were 
comfortable refusing these visas, particularly if there were 
indications that the worker might not be treated well. They might 
refuse the visa if the applicant was under age 18 or if the employer 
resisted requests by the consular officers to interview the applicant 
alone. In an attempt to ensure better treatment of household workers, 
that post instituted a policy of preferring individuals to have worked 
for the sponsoring diplomat for 1 year before applying for an A-3 
visa.[Footnote 31] While the consular officers at this post said they 
believed they had considerable latitude to refuse A-3 or G-5 visas, 
other officers we spoke with said that they did not. For example, the 
Deputy Chief of Mission at one post told us that he "wished he could 
refuse more A-3 and G-5 visas," but that he was unsure of consular 
officers' ability to deny A-3 and G-5 visa applicants. Several consular 
officers echoed these comments, noting that, without hard evidence that 
an applicant has been or could be mistreated, it is difficult to deny 
an A-3 or G-5 visa. For example, a consular officer at one post we 
visited told us that, in one case, she was concerned that the applicant 
had never met her employer, but her supervisors told her that as long 
as the applicant had a valid employment contract, she had to issue the 
visa. 

State is considering steps to address confusion about refusing A-3 and 
G-5 visas, but has not taken actions to implement them. Consular 
officials in Washington told us that, while it is appropriate and even 
expected for consular officers to refuse A-3 and G-5 visas if they 
believe that visa applicants may be abused by their prospective 
employers, the officers have "little to go on beyond the contract" and 
it is impossible to refuse a visa based on something that has not 
happened or will not happen for another 6 months. State is considering 
adding specific provisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual outlining 
certain circumstances in which these visas should be denied. These 
provisions might place a heavier burden on lower-ranking foreign 
diplomats to document sufficient means to employ household staff under 
the contractual requirements stipulated for A-3 and G-5 visas. The 
provisions also might result in refusal of an A-3 or G-5 visa if a 
particular diplomat is linked to a pattern of employee disappearance, 
abuse allegations, or other irregularities. A State official told us 
the department is drafting possible language for these additional 
provisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual, but officials have not 
reached internal agreement on final language and have no timetable for 
doing so. In addition, officials in State headquarters do not currently 
alert consular officers if they have information that could help in the 
adjudication of an A-3 or G-5 visa based on a pattern of employee 
disappearance, abuse allegations, or other irregularities because that 
information is not included in State's databases. For example, 
headquarters does not alert consular officers to seek guidance if a 
foreign diplomat is under investigation for trafficking or if a foreign 
diplomat has employed anyone who subsequently received a T visa. 

State Headquarters Does Not Routinely Assess Compliance with A-3 and G- 
5 Visa Policies and Procedures: 

Consular officials in Washington told us they rely on individual posts 
to ensure correct and consistent implementation of A- 3 and G-5 
policies and procedures and do not independently monitor compliance on 
a routine basis. Supervisory officials at consular posts abroad review 
a selection of visas that were issued or refused at that post each day. 
The reviews these officials conduct may cover some of the A-3 and G-5 
visas that were adjudicated, but not all of them. Furthermore, 
officials conduct these reviews through the Consular Consolidated 
Database, so they are unlikely to review supporting documents for A-3 
and G-5 visas, such as employment contracts and diplomatic notes, which 
we found were usually not scanned into the database. Consular officials 
at State headquarters told us they provide advice to individual posts 
on an as-needed basis, but generally rely on supervisory reviews to 
ensure compliance with State policies and procedures because it is not 
their role or responsibility to oversee the consular posts in this 
regard.[Footnote 32] As such, they do not routinely and independently 
monitor compliance with A-3 and G-5 policies and procedures. 

The people who come to the United States on A-3 and G-5 visas are among 
the most vulnerable who enter our borders legally. They are often poor, 
uneducated, and unfamiliar with their rights under U.S. law. If they 
find themselves in an abusive situation, their ability to hold their 
employers accountable can be limited, particularly if their employers 
hold full diplomatic immunity and inviolability. Although State has 
expressed concerns that some foreign diplomats may be abusing their 
household workers, it has not systematically collected and maintained 
information on cases of alleged abuse that have come to its attention. 
In addition, State has not always ensured that the visa policies and 
procedures in place to provide protections for these most vulnerable 
individuals have been correctly and consistently implemented, such as 
the policy requiring certain elements within these workers' employment 
contracts. Furthermore, if officials at State headquarters have 
information linking a particular diplomat to a pattern of employee 
disappearance, abuse allegations, or other irregularities, they do not 
routinely alert consular officers to seek guidance. Finally, the U.S. 
government's process for investigating trafficking of household workers 
by foreign diplomats has, in some instances, been hampered by delays in 
coordination between State and Justice on the use of investigative 
techniques. In addressing these problems, the U.S. government can 
strengthen its commitment to combating human trafficking within the 
United States. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the U.S. government's process for preventing and responding 
to allegations of household employee abuse by foreign diplomats, we are 
making four recommendations. 

1. To ensure that the Office of Protocol and the Office of the Legal 
Adviser are aware of all cases involving alleged abuse of household 
workers by foreign diplomats that have come to the attention of the 
department, we recommend that the Secretary of State (1) emphasize to 
the relevant bureaus and offices the importance of the Foreign Affairs 
Manual requirement to report all cases that come to their attention and 
(2) direct the Office of Protocol and the Office of the Legal Adviser 
to create a system for collecting and maintaining records on these 
cases. 

2. To assist in timely handling of future investigations, we recommend 
that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security establish an interagency process outlining agreed-
upon policies and time frames for determining which investigative 
techniques can be used in trafficking investigations involving foreign 
diplomats. 

3. We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Office of Protocol and the 
Office of the Legal Adviser, to establish a system alerting consular 
officers to seek guidance from State headquarters before issuing A-3 or 
G-5 visas to applicants whose prospective employers may have abused 
their household workers in the past. For example, if State headquarters 
is aware that a foreign diplomat is under investigation for alleged 
human trafficking, it could place an alert in the system advising 
consular officers to request guidance should an individual apply for an 
A-3 or G-5 visa to work for that diplomat. 

4. To better ensure correct and consistent implementation of A- 3 and G-
5 visa policies and procedures, particularly those that outline 
requirements for employment contracts, we recommend that the Secretary 
of State enhance oversight by establishing a system to spot-check 
compliance with these policies and procedures. This spot-check system 
would allow headquarters to assess compliance without dedicating the 
resources needed to review all A-3 and G-5 visas issued in a given year 
and could be targeted at posts that issue high numbers of A-3 or G-5 
visas or that have identified difficulties interpreting guidance on 
these visas classes. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, 
Justice, Homeland Security, Labor, and Health and Human Services for 
their comments. State and Justice provided written comments on the 
draft, which we have reprinted in appendixes IV and V, respectively. 

State agreed with all four of our recommendations. Regarding the first 
recommendation, State indicated that it will emphasize to the relevant 
bureaus and offices the importance of reporting promptly and fully all 
cases of alleged abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats. State 
also noted that the Office of Protocol is now creating a system for 
collecting and maintaining centralized records on these cases that 
would allow for ready access to records of cases that involve 
individuals with immunity. Regarding our second recommendation, State 
said that, while most investigations go forward without consultations 
on investigative techniques, it will be useful to establish a process 
to address novel and difficult questions regarding investigative 
techniques. In response to our third recommendation, State said that it 
will place known abusers of household workers in the Consular Lookout 
and Support System, a database designed to screen visa applicants and 
maintain watch lists. State will also upgrade consular officers' access 
to TOMIS to provide improved information regarding A- 3 and G-5 cases. 
State responded to our last recommendation by acknowledging the need 
for better compliance with policies and procedures to ensure that A-3 
and G-5 employment contracts contain all required elements and are 
electronically scanned for future reference in case of alleged abuse. 
State reiterated that it is primarily the responsibility of senior 
consular managers at posts to ensure compliance with visa adjudication 
procedures and practices in their consular sections, but added that it 
will consider and review whether spot-checking compliance from 
headquarters is appropriate and consistent with judicious use of 
limited resources. As indicated in our fourth recommendation, we 
believe that spot-checking is important for enhancing oversight and 
could be targeted in such a way as to minimize use of resources. 

Justice generally agreed with our findings, particularly our finding 
that obstacles to investigating allegations of household worker abuse 
are compounded when employers have diplomatic immunity. Justice also 
concurred with our second recommendation, highlighting the importance 
of agreeing upon time frames for determining which investigative 
techniques can be used, so that criminal investigations are not 
compromised. 

State, Justice, and Homeland Security provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated as appropriate. For example, Homeland Security 
asked to be included in the second recommendation, which was initially 
directed to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. 
Specifically, Homeland Security officials stated that Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement should participate in the recommended interagency 
process because the introduction of persons into the United States for 
the purpose of exploitation is a primary law enforcement responsibility 
and area of expertise of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We agreed 
to include the Secretary of Homeland Security in the second 
recommendation. 

The Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services did not provide 
comments on the draft report. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of 
Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. Contact points for our 
offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Thomas Melito: 

Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) seek to determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa 
holders have alleged abuse by foreign diplomats with immunity since 
2000, (2) review the U.S. government's process for investigating abuse 
allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, and (3) describe 
and assess how State ensures correct and consistent implementation of A-
3 and G-5 visa polices and procedures. In this report, we define abuse 
to include illegal activities ranging from wage and hour violations to 
human trafficking. 

To determine how many A-3 and G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse by 
foreign diplomats from 2000 (when the U.S. government enacted the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act) through June 2008, we collected 
data, interviewed officials from four U.S. government agencies and 10 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and searched legal databases, such 
as Westlaw, to identify civil lawsuits. 

* At the Department of State (State), we met with officials from the 
Office of the Legal Adviser, Office of the Chief of Protocol, 
Diplomatic Security Service, Office of Foreign Missions, Bureau of 
International Organizations Affairs, United States Mission to the 
United Nations (USUN), Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, and Bureau of African Affairs. 

* At the Department of Justice (Justice), we met with officials from 
the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Prosecution Unit within the Civil 
Rights Division/Criminal Section (CRT/CS), Executive Office for United 
States Attorneys, headquarters and field offices of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), and one local Assistant United States 
Attorney's (AUSA) Office. 

* At the Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security), we met 
with officials from Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking Unit and Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(CIS). 

* At the Department of Labor (Labor) we met with officials from the 
Employment Standard Administration's Wage and Hour Division 
headquarters office and its New York City district office. 

* We identified and met with 10 NGOs that have provided legal services 
to A-3 and G-5 visa holders through analysis of civil lawsuits filed on 
behalf of A-3 and G-5 visa holders, referrals from NGOs, and a review 
of past and recent media reports. These 10 NGOs have a broad range of 
experience and expertise on cases involving victims of household worker 
abuse and are all located in the Washington, D.C., and New York 
regions. 

State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor provided data on the 
number of incidents they have handled by canvassing current staff and 
reviewing specific case files. To avoid double-counting the number of 
these alleged incidents, we asked the departments to verify with each 
other the number of investigations in which they had participated. 
Homeland Security also provided us with the number of individuals who 
had received T visas and identified themselves as A-3 or G-5 visa 
holders on their T visa applications. We counted NGO-alleged incidents 
if we could determine the name of the diplomat involved and confirm 
that he or she held immunity or if we received enough information from 
a law enforcement source to ensure that a diplomat with immunity was 
involved and that the alleged incident was not duplicative with any 
other incident. Therefore, we believe that the data we obtained from 
federal agencies and the NGOs are sufficiently reliable for reporting 
the minimum number of incidents of alleged abuse of A-3 and G-5 visa 
holders by their employers since 2000. 

To review the U.S. government's process for investigating abuse 
allegations involving foreign diplomats with immunity, we reviewed 
State documents including the Foreign Affairs Manual, cables sent to 
consular officers on A-3 and G-5 visas, "Diplomatic and Consular 
Immunity Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities," 
diplomatic notes to Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in the United States 
regarding conduct of diplomatic agents in the United States, USUN's 
diplomatic notes to Permanent Missions and Permanent Observer Offices, 
and State's 2007 document to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
entitled "State's Initiatives to Promote Fair Treatment of Domestic 
Workers by Diplomatic Personnel." We also interviewed officials from 
State's Office of the Chief of Protocol, Office of the Legal Adviser, 
Diplomatic Security Service, USUN, and Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons. Because federal law enforcement agencies have 
no written policies or procedures specifically regarding abuse of 
household workers by foreign diplomats, we relied on testimonial 
evidence to determine their processes for handling alleged abuse of 
household workers by foreign diplomats. We interviewed law enforcement 
officials from Justice including the FBI, the Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Prosecution Unit within CRT/CS, and one AUSA Office. We 
also met with officials at the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit 
within ICE. We interviewed one of the two U.S. Attorneys assigned to 
prosecute two relevant cases. The second prosecutor did not comment 
about the case, given the early stage of the review. At Labor we 
reviewed a document describing the agency's policy regarding household 
workers employed by foreign nationals titled "Domestic Service Workers 
Employed by Foreign Nationals," and interviewed officials at the Wage 
and Hour Division headquarters office and the Office of Enforcement 
Policy and the New York City District Office. We also analyzed key 
sections of international conventions, acts, and agreements on immunity 
to describe in general terms the different levels of immunity and the 
protections accorded under each one, specifically with regard to 
investigations of alleged abuse or trafficking of household workers by 
foreign diplomats. Finally, we interviewed NGOs and three alleged 
victims of abuse by foreign diplomats. 

To describe and assess how State ensures correct and consistent 
implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa polices and procedures, we reviewed 
documents, analyzed data provided to us by State, and interviewed State 
officials in Washington, D.C; New York; Lima, Peru; Manila, 
Philippines; Doha, Qatar; and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. We reviewed the 
Foreign Affairs Manual, State's circular notes, training and guidance 
materials for consular officers, and guidance for visa applicants on 
State's public Web site and consular posts' Web sites. We interviewed 
officials from State's headquarters, including Consular Affairs and the 
Office of the Chief of Protocol. We also interviewed consular officers 
and reviewed A-3 and G-5 applications at four consular posts: Lima, 
Peru; Manila, Philippines; Doha, Qatar; and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In 
selecting these four consular posts, we analyzed data provided to us by 
Consular Affairs on A-3 and G-5 visas issued for fiscal years 2000 
through 2007. Each of the 4 posts is among the 10 that issued the most 
A-3 and G-5 visas, combined, during this time period. Together these 
four posts account for about 22 percent of all A-3 and G-5 visas issued 
abroad since 2000. The U.S. embassy in Manila issued more A-3 and G-5 
visas from fiscal year 2000 through 2007 than any other overseas post. 
The total number of A-3 and G-5 visas issued in Manila accounts for 
almost 10 percent of all A-3 and G-5 visas issued during this period. 
The U.S. embassy in Lima issued the second highest number of A-3 and G- 
5 visas, about 5 percent of the total, and the U.S. embassies in Riyadh 
and Qatar followed closely behind Lima, with about 4 percent and 3 
percent, respectively, of all A-3 and G-5 visas issued during this 
period. 

As part of our site visits or through telephone interviews, we 
interviewed consular officers to determine the steps State's Bureau of 
Consular Affairs has taken to ensure that State's policies and 
procedures for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas are implemented correctly and 
consistently. To examine the procedures for issuing A-3 and G-5 visas, 
we reviewed documents describing the requirements that household 
workers and U.S. consular officers should meet during the visa 
application process. We did not review or evaluate consular officers' 
decisions to refuse or issue visas. We worked with State officials to 
identify documentation that we could review both at consular posts and 
in Washington, D.C. 

To determine the extent to which A-3 and G-5 applications met 
documentation requirements, we developed a checklist of State's 
requirements for A-3 and G-5 visa applicants and then assessed 
applications at each post against this checklist, reconciling any 
differences in our assessments. For one of the four posts, we were able 
to review all available documentation for A-3 and G-5 visas adjudicated 
since March 1, 2007. (We selected this date because State issued 
updated guidance to posts on the A-3 and G-5 visa class in March 2007.) 
For the other three posts, we were able to review only a sample of 
available files and documentation. Although the cases we reviewed from 
these posts are not generalizable, we reviewed a randomly selected set 
of cases to minimize any selection bias. Below is a more detailed 
explanation of our methodology for selecting and reviewing files from 
each post: 

* In Lima, Peru, we reviewed 87 A-3 and G-5 visa files that had been 
adjudicated between March 1, 2007, and February 26, 2008, and that had 
a paper copy of the employment contract, the diplomatic note, or both. 
While 53 additional A-3 and G-5 application files were not available 
for our review in Lima, Consular Affairs in Washington, D.C., later 
agreed to search the Consular Consolidated Database to determine 
whether any documents for these 53 files had been scanned into it. 
These officials also searched the database for scans of accompanying 
documents for any of the 87 files in Lima for which we had seen only 
one of the required documents. (For example, if we saw only a 
diplomatic note in a given file, we asked if the related employment 
contract had been scanned into the database.) The officials determined 
that documents that we had not reviewed, related to 2 of the 87 files 
in Lima, had been scanned into the database. They also determined that 
one or both of the required documents for 5 of the 53 files that were 
not available for review at post had been scanned into the database. We 
did not review these seven files. 

* In Manila, Philippines, we reviewed 61 A-3 and G-5 visa application 
files from December 1, 2007, to March 15, 2008, including all available 
documentation. Due to physical space constraints, this post only 
maintains 3 months of visa applications on file. In addition, the post 
had not been scanning employment contracts or diplomatic notes into the 
Consular Consolidated Database, so we were unable to review any files 
earlier than December 2007. 

* For Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, we reviewed a total of 25 A-3 or G-5 visa 
files. At post, we reviewed two application files, including all 
documentation available for these A-3 or G-5 visa applications. 
Although we had requested to review all files available since March 1, 
2007, consular officials in Washington, D.C., instructed the post to 
allow us to review files only if the particular case was mentioned in 
the course of interviews at posts. These officials later agreed to 
provide us redacted copies of 25 percent (or 23) of the A-3 and G-5 
visa files from the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh between March 1, 2007 and 
February 29, 2008. We randomly selected these 23 files and reviewed 
them in Washington. 

* In Doha, Qatar, we reviewed all 56 A-3 and G-5 visa application files 
that were adjudicated between March 1, 2007, and February 28, 2008, 
including all documentation available. 

Although we were unable to review all requested A-3 and G-5 visa files 
at the posts we visited, the information we obtained was sufficient for 
addressing our third objective. 

We conducted this performance audit between October 2007 and July 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: U.S. Government Agencies' Primary Responsibilities Related 
to Foreign Diplomats and A-3 and G-5 Visa Holders: 

We analyzed State's roles and responsibilities related to A-3 and G-5 
visa holders, as well as foreign diplomats, and identified key State 
offices and bureaus involved in these matters. Table 1 summarizes our 
analysis. 

Table 1: Relevant Responsibilities of State Department Bureaus and 
Offices: 

Office: Office of the Chief of Protocol, Diplomatic Affairs Division; 
Responsibility: * Accredits diplomatic agents and consular officers of 
foreign governments in the United States; 
* Maintains the official records regarding the status and immunity 
level of all diplomatic and consular officers; 
* Makes available to the public the Diplomatic List and Foreign 
Consular Offices in the United States; 
* Submits State's annual report to the Secretary of State and Congress 
entitled Report on Criminal [and Civil] Cases Involving Immunity. 

Office: Bureau of Consular Affairs; 
Responsibility: * Issues policy, guidance, and training to consular 
officers on the adjudication of A-3 and G-5 visas. 

Office: U.S. embassies and consulates; 
Responsibility: * Adjudicates A- 3 and G-5 nonimmigrant visa 
applications (reviews documents and interviews visa applicant and, 
possibly, employer). 

Office: Office of the Legal Adviser, Consular Affairs; 
Responsibility: 
* Provides legal advice and representation in relation to the 
performance of consular functions by State (including adjudication and 
revocation of visas and passports). 

Office: Office of the Legal Adviser, Diplomatic Law and Litigation; 
Responsibility: * Advises law enforcement authorities on diplomatic and 
consular immunity. 

Office: Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; 
Responsibility: * Encourages partnerships and leads the coordination of 
antitrafficking efforts both worldwide and domestically; 
* Consults with nongovernmental organizations and affected victims of 
trafficking. 

Office: United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN); 
Responsibility: * Facilitates and evaluates registration and 
accreditation of individuals accredited by the United Nations; 
* Communicates with the UN Protocol and Liaison Service for full 
listing in the publicly available Blue Book of the missions' diplomatic 
personnel and their spouses. 

Office: Bureau of International Organizations; 
Responsibility: * Receives allegations of abuse by UN diplomats from 
USUN; 
* Works in cooperation with the USUN and Office of the Legal Adviser, 
Diplomatic Law on allegations of abuse by UN diplomats. 

Source: GAO analysis of State documents and interviews. 

[End of table] 

We also analyzed various federal agencies' role in investigating and 
prosecuting federal law violations related to abuse of household 
workers by foreign diplomats with some level of immunity. Table 2 
summarizes our analysis. 

Table 2: Federal Departments with Primary Investigative and 
Prosecutorial Responsibilities: 

Investigative and prosecutorial departments: Justice; 
Office: Civil Rights Division/Criminal Section, Human Trafficking 
Prosecution Unit; 
Responsibility: * Receives allegations that a crime has occurred; 
* Refers cases to lead investigative agency, if the agency has not 
already begun an investigation; 
* Prosecutes trafficking crimes in conjunction with the U.S. attorney 
for the relevant jurisdiction. 

Investigative and prosecutorial departments: Justice; 
Office: Federal Bureau of Investigation; 
Responsibility: * Investigates trafficking crimes. 

Investigative and prosecutorial departments: Justice; 
Office: U.S. Attorneys; 
Responsibility: * Prosecutes trafficking cases in their geographic 
jurisdiction in conjunction with the Human Trafficking Prosecution 
Unit. 

Investigative and prosecutorial departments: Homeland Security; 
Office: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Unit; 
Responsibility: * Investigates human trafficking crimes and provides 
short-term immigration relief to alien victims (continued presence). 

Investigative and prosecutorial departments: State; 
Office: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Service, Criminal Investigation 
Division; 
Responsibility: * Investigates passport violations and visa fraud, 
which may be in connection with other serious crimes such as 
trafficking. 

Investigative and prosecutorial departments: Labor; 
Office: Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division; 
Responsibility: * Maintains policy on wage and hour investigations 
involving foreign nationals attached to a foreign embassy, consulate, 
or international organization; 
* Notifies State of these investigations. 

Supporting departments: State; 
Office: Office of the Legal Adviser, Diplomatic Law and Litigation; 
Responsibility: * Advises law enforcement authorities on diplomatic and 
consular immunity. 

Supporting departments: State; 
Office: Office of the Chief of Protocol; 
Responsibility: * Refers alleged criminal violations to law enforcement 
authorities. 

Supporting departments: Homeland Security; 
Office: Citizenship and Immigration Services; 
Responsibility: * Processes and approves T nonimmigrant status for 
alien victims of trafficking; 
* Processes short-term immigration relief for alien victims (continued 
presence). 

Supporting departments: Health and Human Services; 
Office: [Empty]; 
Responsibility: * Oversees administration of benefits to T nonimmigrant 
status visa recipients. 

Source: GAO analysis of Justice, Homeland Security, State, Labor, and 
Health and Human Services documents and interviews. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from 
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction: 

We analyzed key sections of international conventions, acts, and 
agreements on immunity to describe in general terms the different 
levels of immunity and the protections accorded under each one, 
specifically as they relate to investigations of alleged abuse of 
household workers by foreign diplomats. We also consulted with the 
Department of State on our analysis, which is summarized in table 3. 
This table represents only a general description of these privileges 
and immunities and, as indicated in the notes following the table, 
exceptions may apply for each general category. 

Table 3: Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities from 
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction: 

Category: Diplomatic agent[A](E.G., ambassadors and other diplomatic 
officers); 
May be arrested or detained: No[B]; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: No; 
May be prosecuted: No; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes[C]; 
Recognized family member: Same as sponsor (full immunity and 
inviolability). 

Category: Member of administrative and technical staff[C](E.G., 
secretaries, certain] in clerical managers, office managers, and 
certain security personnel); 
May be arrested or detained: No[B]; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: No; 
May be prosecuted: No; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in the course 
of their official duties. Otherwise, no; 
Recognized family member: Same as sponsor. Since family members have no 
official duties to perform, they enjoy no immunity from civil 
jurisdiction. 

Category: Service staff[D](E.G., drivers, cleaners, and building and 
maintenance workers); 
May be arrested or detained: Yes; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: Yes; 
May be prosecuted: No, for official acts. Otherwise yes; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in course of 
their duties. Otherwise, no; 
Recognized family member: No immunity or inviolability. 

Category: Career consular officers[A,D]; 
May be arrested or detained: No, except for a felony and pursuant to a 
warrant; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: Yes[E]; 
May be prosecuted: No, for official acts. Otherwise, yes; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in the 
exercise of consular functions.[F] Otherwise, no; 
Recognized family member: No immunity or inviolability. 

Category: Honorary consular officers (e.g., American citizens or 
permanent resident aliens who perform consular services on a part-time 
basis.); 
May be arrested or detained: Yes; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: Yes; 
May be prosecuted: No, for official acts. Otherwise, yes; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in the 
exercise of consular functions.[F] Otherwise, no; 
Recognized family member: No immunity or inviolability. 

Category: Consular employees[D] (e.g., those who perform the 
administrative and technical support services for the consular post); 
May be arrested or detained: Yes; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: Yes; 
May be prosecuted: No, for official acts. Otherwise, yes; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in the 
exercise of consular functions.[F] Otherwise, no; 
Recognized family member: No immunity or inviolability. 

Category: International organizations staff[G]; 
May be arrested or detained: Yes[G]; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: Yes[G]; 
May be prosecuted: No, for official acts. Otherwise, yes.[G]; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in the 
exercise of their official duties. Otherwise, no.[G]; 
Recognized family member: No immunity or inviolability.[G]. 

Category: Diplomatic-level staff of missions to international 
organizations; 
May be arrested or detained: No[B]; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: No; 
May be prosecuted: No; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes[C]; 
Recognized family member: Same as sponsor (full immunity and 
inviolability). 

Category: Support staff of missions to international organizations; 
May be arrested or detained: Yes; 
Residence may be entered subject to law enforcement procedures 
generally applicable to U.S. residences: Yes; 
May be prosecuted: No, for official acts. Otherwise, yes; 
Immunity from civil jurisdiction: Yes, for acts performed in the 
exercise of their official duties. Otherwise, no; 
Recognized family member: No immunity or inviolability. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] The Department of State, as a matter of policy, does not normally 
accept as bilateral diplomatic agents or as career consular officers 
U.S. nationals or legal permanent residents of the United States. 
Family members of diplomatic agents enjoy no privileges and immunities 
if they are U.S. nationals. Members of the administrative and technical 
staff (including their families) and members of the service staff enjoy 
no privileges and immunities if they are U.S. nationals, legal 
permanent residents, or foreign nationals permanently residing in the 
United States. 

[B] Reasonable constraints, however, may be applied in emergency 
circumstances,e.g., self-defense, public safety, or the prevention of 
serious, violent criminal acts. 

[C] Certain exceptions apply under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations. Immunity from civil and administrative 
jurisdiction does not apply in the following circumstances: (1) a real 
action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory 
of the receiving state unless the diplomatic agent holds it on behalf 
of the sending state for the purpose of the mission; (2) an action 
relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as 
executor, administrator, heir, or legatee as a private person and not 
on behalf of the sending state; (3) an action relating to any 
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent 
in the receiving state outside his official functions. 

[D] This table presents general rules. Employees of certain foreign 
countries may enjoy higher levels of privileges and immunities on the 
basis of special bilateral agreements. 

[E] Note that consular residences are sometimes located within the 
official consular premises. In such cases, only the official office 
space is protected from police entry unless a bilateral agreement 
provides additional protection for consular residences. 

[F] This immunity does not apply in respect of a civil action either 
(1) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or 
employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an 
agent of the sending state; or (2) by a third party for damage arising 
from an accident in the receiving state caused by a vehicle, vessel, or 
aircraft. See Article 43 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations. 

[G] A small number of senior officers are entitled to be treated 
identically to "diplomatic agents." 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

July 11, 2008: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Human 
Rights: U.S. Government's Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse of Household 
Workers by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be Strengthened," GAO 
Job Code 320533. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Chenobia Calhoun, Office of Protocol at 202-647-1727, David Tyler, 
Bureau of Consular Affairs at 202-663-1155 and Susan Benda, Office of 
the Legal Adviser at 202-647-1074. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 
cc: GAO ï¿½ Al Huntington: 
S/OPR, CA/FO and L: 
State/OIG ï¿½ Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Human Rights: U.S. Government's Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse of 
Household Workers by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be 
Strengthened: 

(GAO-08-892, GAO Code 320533): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAO's 
draft report entitled "Human Rights: US. Government's Efforts to 
Address Alleged Abuse of Household Workers by Foreign Diplomats with 
Immunity Could Be Strengthened." 

The GAO report recommends the following to the Secretary of State: 

Recommendation 1: To ensure that the Office of Protocol and the Office 
of the Legal Advisor are aware of all cases involving alleged abuse of 
household workers by foreign diplomats that have come to the attention 
of the department, we recommend that the Secretary of State (1) 
emphasize to the relevant bureaus and offices the importance of the 
Foreign Affairs Manual's requirement to report all cases that come to 
their attention and (2) direct the Office of Protocol and the Office of 
the Legal Advisor to create a system for collecting and maintaining 
records on these cases. 

Response: The Department will emphasize to the relevant bureaus and 
offices the importance of reporting promptly and fully all cases of 
alleged abuse of household workers by foreign diplomats. The Office of 
Protocol is creating a system for collecting and maintaining 
centralized records on these cases that would allow for ready access to 
records of cases that involve individuals with immunity. The records 
would include the name of the employer and the employee, the nature of 
the allegation and the lever of immunity of the employer. 

Recommendation 2: To assist in timely handling of future 
investigations, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General establish an interagency process, outlining agreed 
upon policies, including timeframes, for determining which 
investigative techniques can be used in trafficking investigations 
involving foreign diplomats. 

Response: The Department acknowledges that it would be useful to 
establish an agreed-upon interagency process to address trafficking and 
other investigations involving foreign diplomats, including a manner 
for timely communicating about the use of investigative techniques in 
these cases. While most investigations go forward without consultations 
on investigative techniques and, the Department generally answers 
promptly, the Department believes it will be useful to work with the 
Department of Justice to establish such a process to address novel and 
difficult questions regarding investigative techniques. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Office of Protocol 
and the Office of the Legal Adviser, to establish a system alerting 
consular officers to seek guidance from State headquarters before 
issuing A-3 or G-5 visas to applicants whose prospective employers may 
have abused their household workers in the past. For example, if State 
headquarters is aware that a foreign diplomat is under investigation 
for alleged human trafficking, it could place an alert in the system 
advising consular officers to request guidance should an individual 
apply for an A- 3 or G-5 visa to work for that diplomat. 

Response: The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs current 
visa name- check systems, including the Consular Lookout and Support 
System (CLASS) and Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), are designed 
to effectively screen applicants and maintain complete watch lists, and 
we will proactively watch-list known abusers in CLASS. With the 
deployment of the electronic visa application under the Consular 
Electronic Application Center (CEAC), the Visa Office will look for 
further opportunities to evaluate employers with the help of 
automation. The Department's Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) has a 
separate database system known as "The Office of Foreign Missions 
Information System" (TOMIS), which is used to track diplomats and 
international organization staff duly accredited in the United States. 
Currently, consular officers in the field and Washington have access to 
TOMIS. OFM will soon upgrade consular access to TOMIS to provide 
improved information regarding A-3 and G-5 cases, including sponsor's 
status in the United States. TOMIS provides an excellent vehicle for 
thorough checks of A-3 and G-5 visa applicants. 

Recommendation 4: To better ensure correct and consistent 
implementation of A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures, 
particularly those that outline requirement for employment contracts, 
we recommend that the Secretary of State enhance oversight by 
establishing a system to spot-check compliance with these policies and 
procedures. This spot-check system would allow headquarters to assess 
compliance without dedicating the resources needed to review all A-3 
and G-5 visas issued in a given year and could be targeted at posts 
that issue high numbers of A-3 or G-5 visas or that have identified 
difficulties interpreting guidance on these visa classes. 

Response: We acknowledge the need for better compliance with policies 
and procedures to ensure that employment contracts contain all required 
elements and that all contracts are scanned into our system for future 
reference in case of alleged abuse. We are developing additional 
guidance on this issue for inclusion in the Foreign Affairs Manual 
(FAM), and as soon as this guidance is available for publication, we 
will remind posts of all requirements with regard to A-3 and G-5 visa 
adjudication. The amended FAM notes containing this guidance will also 
provide a clearer description of the circumstances establishing reason 
for a consular officer to believe that the employer is not in a 
position to pay the prevailing wage or may be otherwise abusing an 
employee such that the officer should refuse an A-3 or G-5visa to the 
employee. 

Under current policies and controls, it is primarily the responsibility 
of senior consular managers at posts to ensure compliance with visa 
adjudication procedures and practices in their consular sections, and 
we will remind consular managers of the need to pay particular 
attention to A-3 and G-5 visa processes. As far as spot- checking from 
headquarters, the Bureau of Consular Affairs will take this under 
consideration and review whether such an approach is appropriate and 
consistent with judicious use of limited resources. As we move ahead 
towards an all- electronic visa application process, development of 
which is well underway, there will be greater opportunities to review 
and screen visa applications from our domestic operations facilities 
prior to the visa interview at post. This type of review is already 
occurring for temporary worker visas, and the concept may eventually be 
extended to reviewing other visa categories and prerequisite documents 
such as employment contracts. This approach promises to increase 
standardization and consistency worldwide for all types of visas, 
including the specific categories addressed in this report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

U.S. Department of Justice: 
Civil Rights Division: 
Office of the Assistant Attorney General: 
Washington, D.C. 20530: 

July 11, 2008: 

Thomas Melito: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Melito: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the final draft of the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled "Human Rights: 
US. Government's Efforts to Address Alleged Abuse of Household Workers 
by Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be Strengthened, GAO-08-892." 
This draft report was reviewed by the Department of Justice's 
components that participated in the review. This letter constitutes the 
Department's formal comments. I request that the GAO include this 
letter in the final report. The Department's technical comments were 
provided under separate cover. 

The report defines "alleged abuse" of household workers broadly, to 
include not only allegations of human trafficking, but also allegations 
of wage and hour violations and other misconduct. The Department of 
Justice takes allegations of human trafficking very seriously, and 
these prosecutions are a priority of the Department. In the last seven 
fiscal years, the Civil Rights Division, in conjunction with the U.S. 
Attorneys' Offices, has increased by nearly seven- fold the number of 
human trafficking cases filed in court as compared to the previous 
seven fiscal years. In FY 2007, the Department obtained a record number 
of convictions in human trafficking prosecutions. Since 2005, the 
Department has investigated 19 alleged cases of human trafficking by 
persons with diplomatic immunity, with many of these cases involving 
multiple subjects and victims. Many of these investigations are 
ongoing, and one of these investigations has resulted in the Department 
of Justice notifying the Department of State that, but for the 
subject's immunity, the Department of Justice would seek an indictment 
of the subject. 

As this report notes, human trafficking investigations and prosecutions 
are very complex in general, and investigations of forced household 
labor are particularly challenging because the victims are isolated in 
private homes, are fearful of retaliation in their home country, and 
are often members of vulnerable populations who are unfamiliar with our 
legal system or the rights and services available to them. As the 
report finds, these obstacles to investigating allegations of forced 
household labor are compounded when subjects have diplomatic immunity, 
which impacts our ability to conduct certain valuable investigative 
techniques that, in other cases, have served to corroborate allegations 
of forced labor. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice is committed 
to conducting complete and thorough investigations of all allegations. 

Recommendation that the Attorney General and the Secretary of State 
Establish an Interagency Process Outlining Agreed Upon Policies, 
Including Timeframes, For Determining Which Investigative Techniques 
Can Be Used In Trafficking Investigations Involving Foreign Diplomats: 

The Department of Justice does not object to this recommendation. As 
the report notes, the Department of Justice and the Department of State 
are already engaging in regular collaborative meetings in an effort to 
address the impact of diplomatic immunity on human trafficking 
investigations on a case-by-case basis. Further meetings should assist 
both Departments in understanding the legal framework for analyzing the 
impact of diplomatic immunity on certain investigative techniques and 
improve our ability to expediently determine which investigative 
techniques are legally permissible. The Department of Justice also 
supports the report's recommendation that any agreed upon policies for 
resolving these issues include timeframes that ensure deliberations and 
decisions on these investigative issues are resolved expediently so as 
not to compromise the criminal investigation. 

The Department of Justice notes, however, that despite the significant 
increase in the trafficking caseload since 2001 using existing 
resources, additional resources are needed if we are to continue our 
successful investigation and prosecution of human trafficking crimes 
and to further our collaborative efforts with the Department of State 
and our other partners. 

The extensive effort that your staff has put into this report and the 
opportunity to work with them on this important issue are appreciated. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Grace Chung Becker: 

Acting Assistant Attorney General: 

cc: Ms. Cheryl Goodman: 
Assistant Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601, or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Cheryl Goodman, Assistant 
Director; Elizabeth Singer; Sylvia Bascopï¿½; Mary Moutsos; Debbie Chung; 
Terry Richardson; Ray Rodriguez; Jim Strus; and Mattias Fenton made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For the purposes of this report, the term "foreign diplomats" is 
defined to include members of diplomatic missions (diplomatic agents, 
administrative and technical staff, and service staff), individuals 
assigned to consular posts (consular officers, consular employees, and 
honorary consuls), and employees of international organizations or 
members of national missions to such international organizations. 

[2] Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, victims of severe 
forms of trafficking are defined, in part, as persons subject to the 
recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of 
persons for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion, for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, 
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. Congress enacted the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act (Public L. No. 106-386) in 2000 and reauthorized 
and amended this act in 2003 and again in 2005 (Public L. Nos. 108-193 
and 109-164). 

[3] Foreign diplomats may be entitled to some degree of immunity (full 
or partial) or may have no immunity at all. Foreign diplomats' property 
also may be inviolable, meaning that it cannot be entered or searched 
without the diplomats' consent. See app. III for more information on 
the respective privileges and immunities to which various categories of 
foreign diplomats are entitled. 

[4] In 2006, the woman's lawyers filed a new lawsuit on her behalf, 
arguing that because the diplomat and his wife have left the United 
States, they no longer hold criminal and civil immunity for activities 
unrelated to their official acts. That litigation is pending. 

[5] Foreign officials for international organizations may be employees 
of these organizations or members of diplomatic missions to the 
organizations. In addition, if a foreign diplomat is traveling to the 
United States on unofficial business, his or her household workers may 
receive B-1 visas. 

[6] The Foreign Affairs Manual is a State publication that outlines 
guidance and requirements for State Department employees. 

[7] The federal minimum wage was recently increased to $6.55 per hour. 
Many states also have minimum wage laws. In cases where an employee is 
subject to both the state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee 
is entitled to the higher of the two minimum wages. The prevailing wage 
rate is defined as the average wage paid to similarly employed workers 
in the requested occupation in the area of intended employment. 

[8] An employer must be entitled to an A-1 or A-2 nonimmigrant visa 
classification in order to bring individuals under A-3 visa status to 
the United States to work in his or her home. An employer must be 
entitled to a G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 nonimmigrant visa classification in 
order to bring individuals under G-5 visa status to the United States 
to work in his or her home. (See Immigration and Nationality Act, as 
amended, ï¿½101(a)(15)(A)(iii) and ï¿½101(a)(15)(G)(v)). As a matter of 
policy, A-3 and G-5 visas are issued for a maximum period of 24 months, 
or less, if called for by the reciprocity schedule of the country 
concerned. In addition, the validity of an A-3 or G-5 visa may not 
exceed the validity of the employer's visa. 

[9] The number of A-3 visa applications also declined during this 
period. State officials told us they could not attribute any policy 
changes, procedural reasons, or particular events to the decline in A- 
3 visa issuances. 

[10] Continued presence is granted to trafficking victims in accordance 
with Section 107(c)(3) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 
Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Part 1100.35, Homeland Security has the authority 
to grant continued presence to victims of severe forms of trafficking 
who are potential witnesses to such trafficking in order to ensure 
prosecution of those responsible. 

[11] T nonimmigrant status is granted for victims of trafficking under 
INA Sec. 101(a)(15)(T). To qualify for a T visa, a victim must be 
present in the United States, American Samoa, or the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands as a result of trafficking. The individual 
also must be a victim of a severe form of trafficking who would suffer 
extreme hardship upon removal and has complied with any reasonable 
request for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of human 
trafficking. The victim does not need to comply with requests for 
assistance in investigations and prosecutions if he or she is less than 
18 years old. 

[12] The United States has entered into a number of treaties that 
afford immunities. These treaties include the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S., 6820, the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. 7502, and the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America 
Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, 21 U.S.T. 1418, as 
well as bilateral agreements with certain countries. The U.S. Congress 
also enacted legislation, the International Organizations Immunities 
Act (22 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 288 et seq.), to extend certain privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities to international organizations and their 
employees. 

[13] State's Office of Protocol makes available the following online 
publications: Diplomatic List ([hyperlink, 
http://www.state.gov/s/cpr/rls/dpl/]), which lists members of the 
diplomatic staff who have diplomatic rank and their spouses, and 
Foreign Consular Offices ([hyperlink, 
http://www.state.gov/s/cpr/rls/fco/]), which lists recognized consular 
officers in the United States. The United Nations publishes lists of 
diplomatic members and their spouses through an online publication 
known as the Blue Book ([hyperlink, 
http://missions.un.int/protocol/bluebook.html]). 

[14] 32.5 percent of these foreign diplomats came from Africa, 30 
percent from the Near East, 20 percent from the Western Hemisphere, 15 
percent from Asia, and 2.5 percent from Europe. 

[15] We only counted cases if we could determine the name of the 
diplomat involved and confirm that he or she held immunity, or if we 
received enough information from a law enforcement source to ensure 
that a diplomat with immunity was involved and that the case was not 
duplicative with any other case. Because GAO is not a law enforcement 
agency, we did not independently assess the credibility of these 
alleged incidents. 

[16] Some allegations may be handled by both the U.S. government and an 
NGO. To avoid double counting the total number of allegations, we 
report each allegation under only one source. For example, if the U.S. 
government opened an investigation after receiving an allegation from 
an NGO, we included the case in our count of allegations handled by 
federal agencies, rather than in our count of allegations handled by 
NGOs. 

[17] Each alleged incident may involve several instances of alleged 
abuse. For example, one alleged incident may involve different forms of 
abuse (such as verbal and physical abuse), as well as multiple 
instances of the same type of abuse. 

[18] One of these investigations was opened in response to three 
separate allegations against the same foreign diplomat. In addition, 
civil suits were filed in three of these eight investigations. Justice 
officials told us that they have opened 19 trafficking investigations 
involving foreign diplomats with immunity since 2005. We confirmed that 
8 of them were included in our count of 42 distinct alleged incidents. 

[19] In this incident, a foreign diplomat brought an individual to the 
United States on an A-3 visa and then transferred her to his relatives, 
who allegedly abused her. 

[20] In one of these cases, the judgment was later reversed on appeal, 
when the appellate court, in part, determined that the diplomat's 
employment of a household worker was not an act performed in the 
exercise of his consular functions and therefore he was not entitled to 
claim immunity under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 

[21] GAO, Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting 
Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad, GAO-06-825 
(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2006). See also GAO, Human Trafficking: 
Monitoring and Evaluation of International Projects Are Limited, but 
Experts Suggest Improvements, GAO-07-1034 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 
2007). 

[22] GAO, Human Trafficking: A Strategic Framework Could Help Enhance 
the Interagency Collaboration Needed to Effectively Combat Trafficking 
Crimes, GAO-07-915 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007). 

[23] Justice officials routinely report human trafficking 
investigations involving foreign diplomats to State's Office of the 
Legal Adviser. According to an official with the Office of the Legal 
Adviser, these reports are passed on to the Office of Protocol. 

[24] We do not identify these techniques in this report because Justice 
and Homeland Security consider this information to be law-enforcement 
sensitive. 

[25] We requested to review all employment contracts submitted by A-3 
and G-5 visa applicants since March 2007 at the four consular posts we 
visited. We chose this date because State issued updated guidance to 
posts on A-3 and G-5 visas at that time. However, for reasons outlined 
in app. I, we were unable to review all relevant contracts at three of 
the four posts. For these three posts, we reviewed a random sample of 
cases to minimize any biases in selection of cases for review. We 
reviewed 45 contracts at the first post, 20 at the second, 57 at the 
third, and 16 at the fourth. 

[26] This post has created a template employment contract for A-3 and 
G- 5 visa applicants that meets State's requirements and is available 
on its Web site. 

[27] It is possible that a contract in a language familiar to the 
applicant was presented at the interview, but was not maintained on 
file at the consular post. However, consular officers at this post did 
not express familiarity with the requirement that A-3 and G-5 visa 
applicants present contracts in a language that they understand and one 
officer told us that A-3 and G-5 contracts are always in English. 

[28] The guidance refers consular officers to the trafficking hotline 
operated by the Department of Health and Human Services--1 (888) 373- 
7888. Justice also operates a trafficking hotline, which some NGOs have 
called on behalf of foreign diplomats' household workers. This toll- 
free hotline is 1 (888) 428-7581. 

[29] One of the handouts directs applicants to the "Be Smart, Be Safe" 
brochure on State's Web site. However, neither of the handouts is as 
thorough as State's brochure in explaining what trafficking is, how to 
avoid becoming a trafficking victim, and how to get help if needed. 

[30] According to State officials, accessing a copy of the contract is 
also useful because its scanned image may provide criminal 
investigators with evidence of visa fraud, as the issuance of the 
relevant A-3 or G-5 visa was based on the contract. 

[31] Consular officials in Washington told us that instituting this 
type of policy is not appropriate. 

[32] Although State has instituted Consular Management Assessment Teams 
to review select consular posts for, among other things, training and 
knowledge of consular functions, supervisory reviews of daily 
adjudications, and other visa issues, these teams are focused primarily 
on preventing visa malfeasance and are, therefore, unlikely to assess 
posts' compliance with A-3 and G-5 visa policies and procedures. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.  

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates."  

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to:  

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:  

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061:  

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:  

Contact:  

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: [email protected]: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:  

Congressional Relations:  

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:  

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

*** End of document. ***