Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan	 
Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed	 
Plan to Help Ensure Accountability (18-JUN-08, GAO-08-883T).	 
                                                                 
Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support	 
from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts  
to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable 
of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat	 
insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) 
U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect
the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S.	 
efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing	 
and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which 
comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This	 
statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled	 
Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed 
to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain	 
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, 
D.C.: June 18, 2008).						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-883T					        
    ACCNO:   A82407						        
  TITLE:     Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable    
Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated,	 
Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability			 
     DATE:   06/18/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Employee training					 
	     Force planning					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military assistance			 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel retention			 
	     Military training					 
	     Mission budgeting					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Police training					 
	     Risk factors					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Afghan National Police				 
	     Afghan National Security Forces			 
	     Afghanistan					 

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GAO-08-883T

   

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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 
Wednesday, June 18, 2008: 

Afghanistan Security: 

U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges 
and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability: 

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-08-883T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-883T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the 
Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the 
Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule 
of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other 
activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a 
capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable 
ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, 
detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National 
Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report 
titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed 
to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable 
Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 
2008). 

What GAO Found: 

Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an 
investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is 
assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over 
three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest 
capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in 
number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability 
of this number. 

Table: Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008: 

Number of ANP units: 433; 
Fully Capable: 0; 
Capable with Coalition Support: 12 (3%); 
Partially Capable: 18 (4%); 
Not Capable: 334 (77%); 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting: 69 (16%). 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[End of table] 

Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces. 
First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. 
efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are 
on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with 
equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult 
working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and 
consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by 
insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and, 
in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District 
Developmentï¿½an effort to train the police as unitsï¿½to address them. 
This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in 
police mentors may put the effort at risk. 

Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a 
2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and 
State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and 
sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense 
produced a 5-page document intended to address GAOï¿½s 2005 
recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or 
involve the participation of Stateï¿½Defenseï¿½s partner in training the 
ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence 
of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and 
responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and 
State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police. 
Defenseï¿½s 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no 
interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing 
the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current 
ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 
2008. In addition, Defenseï¿½s 5-page document lacks a sustainment 
strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is 
difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue 
providing funding and other resources for this important mission. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To help ensure coordination and accountability of U.S. efforts to build 
a capable ANSF and facilitate assessment of progress, GAO has 
encouraged Congress to consider conditioning a portion of future 
appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan. Defense 
disagreed with conditioning future funding and State expressed similar 
concerns. GAO maintains that further action is needed to ensure 
completion of a coordinated, detailed plan. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-883T]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to assist in the 
development of Afghan National Police (ANP) forces and the 
establishment of rule of law in Afghanistan. My testimony is based on 
our concurrently issued report[Footnote 1] regarding U.S. efforts to 
develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which consist of 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the ANP. According to Defense, an 
improved police force is vital to stabilizing and maintaining security 
throughout Afghanistan. U.S. support for the ANP began in 2002 and 
increased significantly in 2005 in response to deteriorating security 
in Afghanistan and concerns that ANP development was proceeding too 
slowly. U.S. activities currently include manning, training, and 
equipping of police forces as well as efforts to reform the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior, which oversees the ANP.[Footnote 2] 

My testimony today focuses on (1) U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP 
forces; (2) challenges that affect the development of capable ANP 
forces; and (3) our analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, 
detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF, including the 
ANP. Over the course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed Defense 
reporting and planning documents. In addition, we interviewed cognizant 
Defense, State, and contractor officials in Washington, D.C., as well 
as in Kabul, Afghanistan, where we also met with Afghan government 
officials. We also visited an equipment warehouse and police training 
facilities. 

We conducted our work for the concurrently issued report from March 
2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

Since 2002, the United States has provided about $6.2 billion[Footnote 
3] to train and equip the ANP. However, as of April 2008, no police 
unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Over 
three-fourths of the police units were assessed as not capable--the 
lowest capability rating Defense assigns to units that have been 
formed. As of the same date, the ANP had reportedly grown in number to 
nearly 80,000--about 97 percent of the force's end-strength of 82,000. 
However, the extent to which the ANP has truly grown is questionable 
given concerns that have been raised by Defense about the reliability 
of police manning figures. 

Building a capable ANP requires manning, training, and equipping 
forces; however, several challenges have impeded U.S. efforts to build 
a capable ANP. 

* The shortage of police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to conduct 
training, evaluation, and verification that police are on duty. 
[Footnote 4] As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of 
required military mentors were present in Afghanistan.[Footnote 5] 
According to Defense, the shortfall in military mentors is due to the 
higher priority assigned to deployments of U.S. military personnel 
elsewhere, particularly Iraq. 

* The ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages 
and quality. As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types 
of police equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, 
radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed 
concerns about the quality and usability of thousands of weapons 
donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 
1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through 
donation was of good quality. In addition, distribution of hundreds of 
equipment items on hand has been delayed due to limited police ability 
to account for equipment provided to them. 

* The ANP faces a difficult working environment. For example, although 
a working judiciary is a prerequisite for effective policing, State 
noted that much of Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice 
sector. In addition, police in the field face consistent problems with 
pay, corruption, and attacks. 

In November 2007, Defense began a new initiative called Focused 
District Development to address some of these concerns. Under this 
initiative, the entire police force of a district is withdrawn to train 
as a unit--similar to the way Defense trains the Afghan army--and 
receive all authorized equipment. We have not fully assessed this new 
initiative; however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put 
this effort at risk. 

Despite our 2005 recommendation and a 2008 congressional mandate, 
Defense and State have yet to develop a coordinated, detailed plan with 
milestones for completing and sustaining the Afghan police and army 
forces. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to meet 
our 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the 
role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in 
training the ANP. Further, State has not developed a plan of its own. 
In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly states the 
various agencies' roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command 
exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of 
civilian mentors training the police. 

Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no 
interim milestones that would enable assessment of progress made in 
developing the ANP. While Defense maintains that its monthly status 
reports allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack 
the interim milestones and end dates needed to determine if U.S. 
efforts are on track. Similarly, although Defense's newly adopted 
Focused District Development initiative involves considerable resources 
and is projected to last until 2012 at a minimum, Defense has not 
identified interim milestones or a consistent end date by which to 
gauge the progress of this new effort. Without interim milestones 
against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if current ANP 
status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. 

In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. 
U.S. officials have stated that until Afghan revenues increase 
substantially, the international community will likely need to assist 
in paying sustainability costs. Defense officials in Washington have 
not indicated how long and in what ways the U.S. government expects to 
continue assisting the ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining 
the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may 
need to continue providing funding and other resources for this 
important mission. 

To help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts to build a capable ANSF 
and facilitate assessment of progress, we included a matter for 
congressional consideration in our report issued concurrently with this 
testimony encouraging Congress to consider conditioning a portion of 
future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan to 
develop the ANSF. Defense disagreed with our matter for congressional 
consideration, stating that current guidance provided to the field is 
sufficient to implement a successful program to train and equip the 
ANSF. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future 
appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to 
believe that a coordinated, detailed plan is essential to helping 
ensure accountability for U.S. investments and facilitating assessment 
of progress. 

Background: 

Afghanistan's security institutions, including its police and 
judiciary, were severely damaged prior to the U.S. and coalition 
overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. Reconstitution of the ANP 
formally began in February 2002 when donor nations agreed to establish 
a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member professional police service 
committed to the rule of law. Germany volunteered to lead the police 
reform effort; however, due, in part, to Afghanistan's pressing 
security needs and concerns that the German training program was moving 
too slowly, the United States expanded its role in the police training 
effort in 2005--including involvement, for the first time, of the U.S. 
Department of Defense, as well as increased funding.[Footnote 6] In May 
2007, the Afghan government and its international partners approved an 
interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, 
to be reviewed every 6 months. The force structure for the police 
includes Ministry of Interior headquarters and administrative staff, 
uniformed police personnel, and several specialized police units. (See 
app. I for further details on the force structure and functions of the 
ANP.) 

In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to 
protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, 
control national borders, and reduce the level of domestic and 
international organized crime, among other activities. Also, the 
deterioration in Afghanistan's security situation since 2005 has led to 
increased ANP involvement in counterinsurgency operations, resulting in 
additional training in weapons and survival skills and 
counterinsurgency tactics. 

U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by 
Defense through its Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A), with support from State, which provides policy guidance to 
the effort and oversight of civilian contractors implementing police 
training courses. The primary U.S. contractor involved in training the 
ANP is DynCorp International. 

From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to 
train and equip the ANSF, including about $6.2 billion for the ANP (see 
table 1). Over 40 percent (about $2.7 billion) of funds for training 
and equipping the ANP were provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort 
to accelerate ANP development and enhance its capability in response to 
increased levels of violence and insurgent activity. 

Table 1: Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan 
National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008: 

Assistance program: Afghan Police; Dollars in millions: 
FY 2002: $25.5 million; 
FY 2003: $5.0 million; 
FY 2004: $223.9 million; 
FY 2005: $837.9 million; 
FY 2006: $1,299.8 million; 
FY 2007: $2,701.2 million; 
FY 2008 request[A]: $1,105.6 million; 
Total: $6,198.8 million. 

Sources: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. 

Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State 
sources. In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, these sources included Afghan 
Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, and 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics 
funding. 

[A] Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $342 million that has been 
appropriated and approximately $764 million that has been requested. 

[End of table] 

Defense has developed criteria--called capability milestones (CM)--to 
assess police and army capability. The table below provides 
descriptions of the capability milestones. 

Table 2: Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces: 

Capability milestone: CM1; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the 
situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or 
international community. 

Capability milestone: CM2; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine 
assistance from, or reliance on, international community support. 

Capability milestone: CM3; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but 
still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international 
community support. 

Capability milestone: CM4; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational 
mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake 
portions of its operational mission but only with significant 
assistance from, and reliance on, international community support. 

Source: CSTC-A. 

[End of table] 

Most Afghan National Police Units Are Rated as Not Capable of 
Performing Their Mission: 

After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting 
indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was 
assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and more than three-
fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see 
table 3).[Footnote 7] Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent 
(296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police 
battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent of the 
ANP's authorized end-strength, were rated as not capable.[Footnote 8] 

Table 3: Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008: 

Police units: Uniformed Police Districts (365); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 6; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 6; 
CM4 Not Capable: 296; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 57. 


Police units: Border Police Battalions (33); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 0; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 0; 
CM4 Not Capable: 33; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 0. 

Police units: Civil Order Police Battalions (20); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 6; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 2; 
CM4 Not Capable: 2; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 10. 

Police units: Counter Narcotics Police Units (15); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 0; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 10; 
CM4 Not Capable: 3; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 2. 

Police units: Number of ANP units (433); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Coalition Support: 12 (3%); 
CM3 Partially Capable: 18 (4%); 
CM4 Not Capable: 334 (77%); 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 69 (16%). 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[A] A uniformed police district that is categorized as "not formed or 
not reporting" has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police 
battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as 
"not formed or not reporting" is a planned unit or in training. 

[End of table] 

Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as 
capable of leading operations with coalition support, and the other 6 
as partially capable. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent 
(18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 
3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with 
coalition support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the 
expected date for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is 
December 2012. However, the benchmark set by the Afghan government and 
the international community for establishing police forces that can 
effectively meet Afghanistan's security needs is the end of 2010. 

Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify: 

Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 
police had been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000. This is an 
increase of more than double the approximately 35,000 we reported as 
trained as of January 2005. Despite this reported increase in police 
manning, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the police 
force has grown. As we noted in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of 
Interior produces the number of police assigned and the reliability of 
these numbers has been questioned. A Defense census undertaken since 
our May 2007 report to check the reliability of ministry payroll 
records raises additional concerns about numbers of police reportedly 
assigned. In September 2007, Defense reported that it was unable to 
verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed 
police and more than 10 percent of the border police listed on the 
ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense's 
census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot 
be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of 
Defense's census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly 
80,000 number of police reportedly assigned. 

Several Challenges Impede Development of Capable Police Forces: 

Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force. 
These include (1) shortages in the police mentors needed to provide 
training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty; (2) 
shortfalls in several types of equipment that Defense considers 
critical; (3) a weak judicial system; and (4) consistent problems with 
police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Recognizing these 
challenges to ANP development, Defense began a new initiative in 
November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police--the largest 
component of the Afghan police. Although this effort is too new to 
fully assess, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the 
initiative at risk. 

Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and 
Verification of Police on Duty: 

According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police 
mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training 
and evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. Police mentor 
teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law 
enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide 
training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the 
civilian mentors. As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 
2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to 
this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement 
of available civilian mentors is constrained.[Footnote 9] According to 
Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due 
to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel 
elsewhere, particularly Iraq. 

Defense officials identified the continuing shortfall in police mentors 
as an impediment to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan police in three 
areas. First, senior Defense officials, including the commanding 
general of CSTC-A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in police mentors 
has been the primary obstacle to providing the field-based training 
necessary to develop a fully capable police force. Second, while 
Defense recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be used by 
mentors to evaluate police capability and identify areas in need of 
further attention, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor coverage 
as a significant challenge to using this tool. Third, the shortage of 
available police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number 
of Afghan police on duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could 
not verify whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of 
Afghanistan's 34 provinces due to the lack of mentors. Without 
sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based training and 
evaluation and verify police manning, the development of fully capable, 
fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed. 

Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and 
Quality: 

As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police 
equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and 
body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns with the 
quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. 
For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 
50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good 
quality (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Donated Rifles of Variable Quality: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of donated rifles of variable quality. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp 
civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment- 
related challenges and other logistical difficulties.[Footnote 10] 
Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained 
instances of police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or 
quantity or facing problems with facilities or supplies. In addition, 
81 percent (42 of 52) of weekly reports contained examples of limited 
police ability to account for the equipment provided to them.[Footnote 
11] In July 2007, CSTC-A initiated efforts to train the police in basic 
supply and property accountability procedures. According to CSTC-A, 
equipment is no longer being issued to police districts unless the 
districts' property officers are first trained. For example, according 
to Defense, more than 1,500 trucks have been on hand and ready for 
issue since late 2007 (see fig. 2), but the Afghan Minister of Interior 
has delayed distribution of these vehicles until adequate 
accountability procedures are established in the target districts. 

Figure 2: Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of trucks awaiting distribution to ANP. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and 
Attacks: 

Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of 
law is a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005, we 
reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the Afghan 
judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to enforce 
judicial rulings. Our 2005 report also noted that overall justice 
sector reform was underfunded and understaffed. Subsequently, we 
reported in 2006 and 2007 that rebuilding the Afghan judicial sector 
lagged behind the other four security pillars--army, police, combating 
drugs, and disarmament.[Footnote 12] According to State, much of 
Afghanistan continues to lack a functioning justice system. In 
addition, according to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law 
is being implemented across Afghanistan inhibits effective community 
policing. 

Furthermore, our analysis of DynCorp's weekly progress reports from 
2007 indicates that police in the field also face persistent problems 
with pay, corruption, and attacks (see table 4).[Footnote 13] 

Table 4: Examples and Frequency of Problems Faced by ANP Relating to 
Pay, Corruption, and Attacks: 

Issue: Pay; 
Selected examples of problems cited: 
* Police not being paid for several months; 
* Police receiving incomplete pay; 
* Police quitting due to pay-related problems; 
* Remote location of payment sites leading police to spend part of pay 
on transportation; 
Frequency of related problems: 94 percent (49 of 52 weekly reports). 

Issue: Corruption; 
Selected examples of problems cited: 
* Police personnel providing weapons or defecting to the Taliban; 
* High-ranking officials engaging in bribery or misconduct; 
* Police collecting unauthorized "tolls" from drivers; 
Frequency of related problems: 87 percent (45 of 52 weekly reports). 

Issue: Attacks; 
Selected examples of problems cited: 
* Police targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive 
devices; 
* Police stations overrun by insurgent forces; 
* Dangerous working conditions causing difficulties in retaining or 
recruiting police; 
Frequency of related problems: 85 percent (44 of 52 weekly reports). 

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided to State by DynCorp. 

Note: Examples provided are illustrative only and do not constitute the 
entirety of problems that we found. 

[End of table] 

New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor 
Coverage Is a Risk Factor: 

Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new 
initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to 
address them. According to Defense documentation, the objective of this 
initiative is to focus resources on reforming the uniformed police--the 
largest component of the ANP--as the key to the overall reform of the 
ANP. [Footnote 14] Under this initiative, the entire police force of a 
district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training 
center for 8 weeks to train as a unit--similar to how Defense trains 
the Afghan army--and receive all authorized equipment while their 
district is covered by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 
a specialized police force trained and equipped to counter civil unrest 
and lawlessness.[Footnote 15] The police force then returns to its 
district, where a dedicated police mentor team provides follow-on 
training and closely monitors the police for at least 60 days. Defense 
expects to be able to reconstitute about 5 to 10 districts at a time, 
with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. Overall, 
according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to complete 
the initiative. 

Defense documentation indicates that no districts had completed an 
entire Focused District Development cycle as of April 2008. Until an 
entire cycle is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the 
initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may complicate 
efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies 
sufficient police mentor teams as the most important requirement for 
successful reform. However, according to the commanding general of CSTC-
A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors available to work with newly 
trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative. In 
addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor 
shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to 
provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted. 

Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for 
Completing and Sustaining the ANSF: 

In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF 
that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving 
stated objectives and a sustainability strategy. Despite the 
concurrence of both agencies with our recommendation, Defense and State 
have not completed a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and 
sustaining the ANSF. In the absence of such a plan, coordination 
difficulties have occurred and progress is difficult to assess. In 
2008, Congress mandated that the President, acting through the 
Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on progress toward 
security and stability in Afghanistan, including a comprehensive and 
long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF.[Footnote 16] 
Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long-term 
detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF.[Footnote 17] The first 
submission of each of these reports was due at the end of April 2008, 
but neither has yet been provided to Congress. 

Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a 
Coordinated Plan: 

In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according 
to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO's 2005 recommendation for 
detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and 
State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not 
identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also 
did not contribute to the development of this document and has not 
developed a plan of its own. In the absence of such a plan, 
coordination has been a problem. For example, DynCorp stated that a 
dual chain of command between Defense and State has affected the 
efforts of civilian mentors in multiple ways, such as by producing 
conflicting guidance and complicating reporting, placement of 
personnel, the use of facilities, and training and mentoring 
activities. Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general 
highlighted the same challenge over a year ago. While Defense and State 
have both cited improvements in coordination since our August 2007 
visit to Afghanistan, a coordinated plan that clearly states the 
various agencies' roles and responsibilities would nonetheless be 
beneficial given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff. For 
example, Defense officials told us that CSTC-A staff typically serve 
tours of 1 year or less and often have no period of overlap with 
outgoing officials during which to gain knowledge about their new 
positions. Given such turnover and loss of institutional knowledge, a 
coordinated, detailed plan that clearly identifies the agencies 
involved in developing the ANP and their respective roles and 
responsibilities could help incoming personnel become familiarized with 
their new duties. 

Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress: 

Defense's 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 
recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones 
that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. 
Furthermore, while Defense maintains that the monthly status reports it 
produces allow progress to be monitored, these status reports also lack 
the interim milestones needed to determine if the program is on track. 
For instance, Defense status reports as of April 2008 note that no ANP 
units (0 of 433) are rated as fully capable and 3 percent (12 of 433) 
are capable of leading operations with coalition support. Without 
interim milestones against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to 
know if this status represents what the United States intended to 
achieve after 3 years of increased efforts and an investment of more 
than $6 billion in the program. 

Defense's monthly status reports also lack consistent end dates. In 
particular, completion dates cited in Defense status reports have 
shifted numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, 
the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly 
status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated 
from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month 
period when the completion date was reported as "to be determined." 

Similarly, although Defense's newly adopted Focused District 
Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves 
considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a 
minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort 
are identified in Defense's 5-page document, monthly status reports, or 
briefings that outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones 
and a consistent end date for Focused District Development, it will be 
difficult to determine if this ambitious new effort is progressing as 
intended. Furthermore, without an end date and milestones for the U.S. 
effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to 
determine how long the United States may need to continue providing 
funding and other resources for this important mission--one that U.S. 
military officials stated may extend beyond a decade. 

Defense Document Lacks Sustainment Strategy: 

Defense's 5-page document developed in response to our 2005 
recommendation does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the 
ANSF. Defense currently estimates that approximately $1 billion a year 
will be needed to sustain the ANP, and expects the sustainment 
transition to begin in fiscal year 2009. However, despite the estimate 
of U.S. military officials in Afghanistan that U.S. involvement in 
training and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade, neither 
Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts 
beyond 2013. 

U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase 
substantially, the international community would likely need to assist 
in paying sustainability costs. At present, Afghanistan is unable to 
support the recurring costs of its security forces, such as salaries, 
equipment replacement, and facilities maintenance, without substantial 
foreign assistance. According to Defense and State, sustainment costs 
will be transitioned to the government of Afghanistan commensurate with 
the nation's economic capacity, and the United States and the 
international community will need to assist Afghanistan in developing 
revenues. Defense officials in Washington have not indicated how long 
and in what ways the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the 
ANSF. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is 
difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue 
providing funding and other resources for this important mission. 

Conclusion: 

Establishing capable Afghan police is critical to improving security in 
Afghanistan. The United States has invested more than $6 billion since 
2002 to develop the ANP, but no police forces are assessed as fully 
capable of conducting their primary mission. As such, interagency 
coordination, assessment of progress, and estimation of long-term costs 
are particularly important given that Defense has begun a new 
initiative that is expected to last at least 4 to 5 years and military 
officials estimate that U.S. involvement in developing the ANP could 
exceed a decade. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines 
agency roles and responsibilities, lists clear milestones for achieving 
stated objectives, and includes a sustainment strategy may improve 
coordination and would enable assessment of progress and estimation of 
costs. However, despite our prior recommendation and a mandate from 
Congress that a plan be developed, Defense and State have not done so. 
Until a coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue 
to lack visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of 
completing this mission--information that is essential to holding the 
performing agencies accountable. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Because Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed 
plan, we state in our concurrently issued report that Congress should 
consider conditioning a portion of future appropriations related to 
training and equipping the ANSF on completion of a coordinated, 
detailed plan. This plan should include, among other things, clearly 
defined objectives and performance measures, clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, milestones for achieving these objectives, future 
funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results 
achieved, including plans for transitioning responsibilities to 
Afghanistan. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In response to our concurrently issued report, Defense disagreed that 
Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future 
appropriations on completion of a detailed plan to develop the ANSF, 
stating that current guidance provided by State and Defense to the 
field is sufficient to implement a successful program to train and 
equip the ANSF. State also expressed concerns about conditioning future 
appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. We continue to 
believe that a coordinated, detailed plan that outlines agency roles 
and responsibilities and includes clear milestones is essential to 
ensuring accountability of U.S. efforts and facilitating assessment of 
progress. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael 
Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331, or [email protected]. Other 
contributors to this statement were Hynek Kalkus (Assistant Director), 
Elizabeth Guran, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Elizabeth Repko, Al Huntington, 
Lynn Cothern, Cindy Gilbert, and Mark Dowling. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National 
Police: 

The Afghan National Police (ANP) currently consists of six authorized 
components under the Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the 
largest of these six components, report to the police commanders of 
each Afghan province. Provincial commanders report to one of five 
regional commanders, who report back to the Ministry of Interior. The 
other five authorized components of the ANP all report directly to the 
ministry (see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: ANP Chain of Command: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an organizational chart depicting the following 
information: 

ANP Chain of Command: 

Ministry of Interior: 
* Border Police; 
* Civil Order Police; 
* Criminal Investigation Police; 
* Counter Narcotics Police; 
* Counter Terrorism Police; 
* Regional Commanders: 
- Provincial Commanders; 
- Uniformed Police. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. 

[End of figure] 

Table 5 provides further detail on the Ministry of Interior and the 
various components of the ANP that it oversees. 

Table 5: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National 
Police: 

Component: Ministry of Interior; 
Description: Department of the Government of Afghanistan responsible 
for the protection of the country's international borders and the 
enforcement of the rule of law. 

Component: Afghan Uniformed Police; 
Description: Police assigned to police districts and provincial and 
regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic 
duties, and general policing. 

Component: Afghan Border Police; 
Description: Provide broad law enforcement capability at international 
borders and entry points. 

Component: Afghan National Civil Order Police; 
Description: Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter 
civil unrest and lawlessness. 

Component: Criminal Investigative Division; 
Description: Lead investigative agency for investigations of national 
interest, those with international links, and those concerned with 
organized and white-collar crime. 

Component: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan; 
Description: Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing 
narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan. 

Component: Counter Terrorism Police; 
Description: Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat 
terrorism and insurgency. 

Component: Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs 
Police; 
Description: No longer authorized. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be 
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain 
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June 
18, 2008). 

[2] GAO is currently performing a detailed review of U.S. efforts to 
reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. This report 
is currently planned for release in early 2009. 

[3] This figure includes $342 million appropriated and $764 million 
requested in fiscal year 2008. 

[4] In this testimony, personnel who train Afghan police in the field 
are collectively referred to as mentors. U.S. military personnel who 
train Afghan police in the field are referred to as military mentors, 
while contractors who train Afghan police in the field are referred to 
as civilian mentors. 

[5] As of the same date, about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the 
authorized number of civilian mentors were present in country. 

[6] Defense also leads U.S. efforts to develop capable ANA forces. 

[7] CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units, 
which include uniformed police districts, civil order and border police 
battalions, and counter narcotics police units. 

[8] This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense 
assessed as not formed or not reporting. 

[9] Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around 
Afghanistan to conduct mentoring operations is difficult due to the 
size of the country and the lack of roads. GAO is currently completing 
a review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in Afghanistan. This 
report is due to be released in July 2008. 

[10] We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable 
to provide a complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances 
discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the 
first time they appeared. 

[11] GAO is currently performing a detailed review of the 
accountability of lethal equipment provided to the ANSF. This report is 
currently planned for release in early 2009. 

[12] GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, 
Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
15, 2006); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP]. 

[13] The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and 
retaining and recruiting police were other top issues identified in our 
analysis. These topics are discussed in our concurrently issued report. 

[14] Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also 
eventually be reconstituted through the Focused District Development 
initiative; however, according to a Defense official, it is uncertain 
when such efforts will begin. 

[15] Defense documents indicate that, in addition to being trained, a 
district police force undergoing Focused District Development will also 
have corrupt leaders replaced by nationally vetted ones, receive new 
salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates, and have electronic 
funds transfer accounts established. Defense also has identified the 
development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of the Focused 
District Development initiative but anticipates limited integration of 
rule of law reform into the initiative until summer 2008. 

[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
110-181, sec. 1230. 

[17] Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231. 

[End of section] 

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