Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department's		 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not	 
Systematically Assess Outcomes (04-JUN-08, GAO-08-875T).	 
                                                                 
The Department of State's (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 
program's objectives are to provide partner nations with	 
counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, 
and increase respect for human rights. State's Office of the	 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance 
and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism,  
Assistance (DS/T/ATA), manages program operations. GAO assessed  
(1) State's guidance for determining ATA priorities, (2) how	 
State coordinates ATA with other counterterrorism programs, (3)  
the extent State established ATA program goals and measures, and 
(4) State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. This  
statement is based on a February 2008, GAO report titled	 
Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program	 
Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of	 
Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-875T					        
    ACCNO:   A82256						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department's     
Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not	 
Systematically Assess Outcomes					 
     DATE:   06/04/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Antiterrorism					 
	     Combating terrorism				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Federal aid programs				 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International agreements				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 

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GAO-08-875T

This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-875T 
entitled 'Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department's 
Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not 
Systematically Assess Outcomes' which was released on June 4, 2008. 

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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 4, 2008: 

Combating Terrorism: 

Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is 
Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes: 

Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director: International 
Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-08-875T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-875T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Stateï¿½s (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 
programï¿½s objectives are to provide partner nations with 
counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and 
increase respect for human rights. Stateï¿½s Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism, Assistance (DS/T/ATA), 
manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) Stateï¿½s guidance for 
determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other 
counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program 
goals and measures, and (4) Stateï¿½s reporting on U.S. counterterrorism 
assistance. This statement is based on a February 2008, GAO report 
titled Combating Terrorism: State Departmentï¿½s Antiterrorism Program 
Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, 
GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

What GAO Found: 

S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program 
recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically align ATA 
assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism 
needs. S/CT provided policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly 
meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list did not 
provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, 
objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not 
consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews 
to plan assistance. 

S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with 
other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held 
interagency meetings with officials from the Department of State, 
Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-
level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any 
significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international 
counterterrorism efforts. 

State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for 
the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess 
the outcomes and, as a result, could not determine the effectiveness of 
program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal 
focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear measures of sustainability 
or integrated sustainability into program planning. 

State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad was 
incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT had not provided a congressionally 
mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance 
related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, 
S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program, 
such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Moreover, 
these reports contained inaccurate program information. Additionally, 
the reports lacked comprehensive information of the results on program 
assistance that would be useful to Congress. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In its report, GAO suggested that Congress reconsider the requirement 
that State prepare an annual report on U.S. counterterrorism 
assistance. GAO also recommended that State review its use of needs 
assessments, and measures for assessing the ATA program. State 
generally agreed with the recommendations regarding the ATA program, 
and supported the matter GAO suggested for congressional consideration. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-875T]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

June 4, 2008: 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the results of GAO's examination of 
the Department of State's (State) antiterrorism assistance (ATA) 
program.[Footnote 1] Our work focused primarily on the time period from 
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, although we included more recent 
data where available. 

State's ATA program has assumed an increasingly important role in U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts, and is a key mechanism in State's efforts to 
help foreign nations improve their ability to combat terrorism. ATA's 
legislatively mandated[Footnote 2] objectives are to (1) enhance the 
antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing 
counterterrorism training and equipment; (2) improve bilateral ties 
with partner nations by offering assistance; and (3) increase respect 
for human rights by sharing modern, humane and effective antiterrorism 
techniques with foreign civil authorities. Funding for ATA has 
increased over fourfold in recent years--from $38 million in fiscal 
year 2001 to almost $171 million in fiscal year 2007. Over the period, 
State provided counterterrorism assistance to nearly 100 countries. 
Much of this assistance is equipment and counterterrorism training 
provided in the country by trainers on temporary duty, as well as six 
programs, which use permanent, in-country training facilities. 

Within State, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is charged 
with the overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources) 
and coordination of the U.S. government's counterterrorism 
activities.[Footnote 3] The broadly mandated[Footnote 4] role of the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ 
T/ATA),[Footnote 5] includes implementing security programs to protect 
diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission on security matters. 

Today, I will discuss (1) State's guidance for determining country 
recipients and types of counterterrorism assistance to provide; (2) how 
State coordinates ATA with other U.S. government counterterrorism 
programs; (3) the extent to which State establishes clear ATA goals, 
and measures sustainability of program outcomes; and (4) State's 
reporting on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. Over the 
course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed State planning, funding, 
and reporting documents concerning ATA. We interviewed officials from 
State's offices in Washington, D.C., including ATA program managers 
responsible for each of the six in-country programs--Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines--and visited 
four of the six in-country programs.[Footnote 6] In these countries, we 
reviewed country-specific program documents, and interviewed ATA in- 
country program managers, course instructors, and other contractors; 
U.S. embassy officials responsible for managing counterterrorism 
assistance and activities; and partner nation government officials. We 
also observed various types of ATA training and equipment that were 
provided to partner nation security units. 

We conducted our work for the ATA report from November 2006 through 
January 2008 and, for purposes of this statement, we updated certain 
data in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

At the time of our review, S/CT provided minimal guidance to help 
determine ATA priorities and ensure that assistance provided supports 
broader U.S. policy goals. In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not 
systematically use country-specific needs assessments and program 
reviews to plan what types of assistance to provide partner nations in 
accordance with State policy guidance. 

* S/CT provided a tiered list of priority countries for policy guidance 
to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings. However, this list did not 
provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, 
objectives, or training priorities that DS/T/ATA could use to implement 
a country-specific counterterrorism program and ensure that assistance 
provided is consistent with U.S. policy objectives. As a result, 
neither S/CT nor DS/T/ATA could ensure that program assistance provided 
to specific countries supports broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals. 
In addition, some countries not on the tiered list received assistance 
because of unanticipated circumstances, such as an increase in the U.S. 
government's diplomatic or political interest in a country. 

* S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not consistently use country-specific needs 
assessments and program reviews to plan what types of assistance to 
provide to partner nations. In the five countries receiving the largest 
amounts of program assistance since fiscal year 2002, we found that 
program managers did not use the assessments as the basis for 
developing ATA country-specific plans. According to State policy 
documents, the assessments are to guide ATA resource decisions and form 
the basis of country-specific assistance plans. However, the 
assessments included broad-ranging recommendations for counterterrorism 
assistance, but they generally did not prioritize assistance to be 
provided. Consequently, the assessments did not consistently provide a 
basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a partner 
nation's greatest counterterrorism need. 

S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate ATA with other U.S. 
international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held biweekly 
interagency meetings with officials from the Departments of State, 
Defense, Justice, Treasury, and other agencies as well as ambassador- 
level regional strategic coordinating meetings in order to help 
coordinate all U.S. government international counterterrorism training 
assistance and avoid duplication of efforts. Based on our review of 
program documents and interviews and meetings with counterterrorism 
officials in the four countries we visited, we did not find any 
significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international 
counterterrorism efforts. 

State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for 
ATA, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the outcomes 
of program assistance. Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents 
listed sustainability--that is, enabling partner nations to achieve 
advanced counterterrorism capabilities and maintain them--as a key 
intended program outcome. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear 
measures of sustainability, and had not integrated sustainability into 
program planning. As a result, State could not determine the 
effectiveness of program assistance or assess the extent to which ATA 
was meeting its longer-term, congressionally mandated objectives. 

S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated report to Congress on 
U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international 
terrorism since 1996.[Footnote 7] After 1996, S/CT has only submitted 
to Congress annual reports prepared by DS/T/ATA on just the ATA 
program. Moreover, we found that the ATA annual reports contained 
inaccuracies, such as the number of students trained and courses 
offered. Additionally, the ATA annual reports lacked comprehensive 
information on the results of program assistance that would be useful 
to Congress in evaluating the effectiveness of the program. 

Given changes in the overall scope and nature of U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance and the fact that State had not submitted 
the mandated report on such matters since 1996, we included a matter 
for congressional consideration regarding the legislative requirement 
for State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. 
Additionally, to ensure that ATA, as a key element of State's broader 
international counterterrorism efforts, is focused on improving partner 
nations' counterterrorism capabilities and aligned with overall U.S. 
counterterrorism policy goals, we recommended that the Secretary of 
State improve internal program guidance. We made other recommendations 
to help S/CT and DS/T/ATA more effectively link assistance needs to 
resource allocations and better assess program outcomes. 

Background: 

Congress authorized State's ATA program in 1983 through the Foreign 
Assistance Act.[Footnote 8] According to the legislation the purpose of 
ATA is "(1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries 
by providing training and equipment to deter and counter terrorism; (2) 
to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly 
governments by offering concrete assistance in this area of great 
mutual concern; and (3) to increase respect for human rights by sharing 
with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective 
antiterrorism techniques." 

ATA Program Assistance: 

ATA offers a wide range of counterterrorism assistance to partner 
nations, but most assistance consists of (1) training courses on 
tactical and strategic counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of 
counterterrorism equipment, such as small arms, bomb detection 
equipment, vehicles, and computers. ATA curricula and training focus on 
enhancing critical counterterrorism capabilities, which cover issues 
such as crisis management and response, cyberterrorism, dignitary 
protection, and related areas. According to DS/T/ATA, all its courses 
emphasize law enforcement under the rule of law and sound human rights 
practices. 

ATA Program Funding: 

ATA is State's largest counterterrorism program, and receives 
appropriations under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, 
and Related Programs account. Fiscal year 2002 appropriations for ATA 
increased to about $158 million--over six times the level of funding 
appropriated in fiscal year 2000. Appropriations have fluctuated since 
fiscal year 2002, but increased to almost $171 million in fiscal year 
2007. From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, program assistance for the top 10 
recipients of ATA allocations ranged from about $11 million to about 
$78 million. The top 10 recipients represented about 57 percent of ATA 
funding allocated for training and training-related activities over the 
6-year period. ATA funding for the other 89 partner nations that 
received assistance during this period ranged from $9,000 to about 
$10.7 million. 

ATA Program Management: 

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the head of S/CT, is 
statutorily[Footnote 9] charged with the overall supervision (including 
policy oversight of resources) and coordination of the U.S. 
government's counterterrorism activities. The broadly mandated[Footnote 
10] role of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the head 
of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, includes implementing security 
programs to protect diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission 
on security matters. Specific roles and responsibilities for S/CT and 
DS/T/ATA regarding ATA are described in a 1991 internal policy guidance 
memorandum, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986,[Footnote 11] 
and incorporated into State's Foreign Affairs Manual.[Footnote 12] 

S/CT is responsible for leading the initial assessment of a partner 
nation's counterterrorism needs, and DS/T/ATA is responsible for 
developing annual, country-specific plans. Under current program 
operations, DS/T/ATA conducts an initial assessment of a new 
participant nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and conducts 
subsequent assessments--referred to as program reviews--every 2 to 3 
years thereafter. In general, the needs assessments include input from 
the embassy teams, but the assessments themselves are conducted by 
technical experts contracted by DS/T/ATA. According to DS/T/ATA, the 
purpose of the needs assessment and program review process is to 
determine the forms of assistance for a partner nation to detect, 
deter, deny, and defeat terrorism; and to evaluate program 
effectiveness. 

State's Implementation of ATA Lacks Guidance and Use of Country Needs 
Assessments: 

S/CT provides minimal policy guidance to DS/T/ATA to help determine 
assistance priorities and ensure that it supports broader U.S. policy 
goals. In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use 
country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan what 
types of assistance to provide partner nations in accordance with State 
policy guidance. The assessments we reviewed had weaknesses and 
inconsistencies. 

S/CT Provides a Tiered Country List, but Little Additional Policy 
Guidance: 

According to State officials, S/CT places countries on a tiered list in 
one of four priority categories based on criteria that address several 
factors, including country-specific threats and the level and depth of 
diplomatic and political engagement in a country. State officials 
indicated that other factors also may be considered in determining 
whether and where a country is placed on the list, such as the presence 
of a U.S. military base or a planned international sporting or cultural 
event with U.S. participation. Since 2006, S/CT has reviewed and 
discussed the tiered list--including changes, additions, or deletions-
-with DS/T/ATA during quarterly meetings. In addition to the quarterly 
meetings, an S/CT official told us that they had established a series 
of regional roundtable discussions in 2006 between S/CT regional 
subject experts and DS/T/ATA counterparts. According to the S/CT 
official, the roundtables were intended as a means of identifying 
priority countries and their counterterrorism needs for purposes of 
developing budget requests. 

S/CT provides little guidance to DS/T/ATA beyond the tiered list, 
although the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum states that S/CT's 
written policy guidance for the program should include suggested 
country training priorities. While S/CT provides some additional 
guidance to DS/T/ATA during quarterly meetings and on other occasions, 
DS/T/ATA officials in headquarters and the field stated they received 
little or no guidance from S/CT beyond the tiered list. As a result, 
neither S/CT nor DS/T/ATA could ensure that program assistance provided 
to specific countries supports broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals. 

Other factors beyond S/CT's tiered list of countries, such as 
unforeseen events or new governmental initiatives, also influence which 
countries receive program assistance. We found that 10 countries on the 
tiered list did not receive ATA assistance in fiscal year 2007, while 
13 countries not on the tiered list received approximately $3.2 
million. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials stated that assistance does not 
always align with the tiered list because U.S. foreign policy 
objectives sometimes cause State, in consultation with the President's 
National Security Council, to provide assistance to a non-tiered-list 
country. 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Systematically Align Program Assistance with 
Counterterrorism Needs: 

According to the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum and DS/T/ATA 
standard operations procedures, ATA country-specific needs assessments 
and program reviews are intended to guide program management and 
planning. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the 
assessments to determine what types of assistance to provide to partner 
nations or develop ATA country-specific plans. Although the 1991 State 
policy memorandum states that S/CT should lead the assessment efforts, 
a senior S/CT official stated that S/CT lacks the capacity to do so. As 
a result, DS/T/ATA has led interagency assessment teams in recent 
years, but the assessments and recommendations for types of assistance 
to be provided may not fully reflect S/CT policy guidance concerning 
overall U.S. counterterrorism priorities. 

DS/T/ATA Did Not Consistently Use Country Needs Assessments: 

DS/T/ATA officials responsible for five of the top six recipients of 
ATA support--Colombia, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines 
[Footnote 13]--did not consistently use ATA country needs assessments 
and program reviews in making program decisions or to create annual 
country assistance plans. In some instances, DS/T/ATA officials 
responsible for in-country programs had not seen the latest assessments 
for their respective countries, and some said that the assessments they 
had reviewed were either not useful or that they were used for 
informational purposes only. 

* The Regional Security Officer, Deputy Regional Security Officer, and 
DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Kenya had not seen any of the assessments 
that had been conducted for the country since 2000. Although the in- 
country program manager for Kenya was familiar with the assessments 
from her work in a previous position with DS/T/ATA, she stated that in 
general, the assessments were not very useful for determining what type 
of assistance to provide. She said that the initial needs assessment 
for Kenya failed to adequately consider local needs and capacity. 

* The Regional Security Officer and Assistant Regional Security Officer 
for Indonesia stated they had not seen the latest assessment for the 
country. The DS/T/ATA program manager for Indonesia said that he 
recalled using one of the assessments as a "frame of reference" in 
making program and resource decisions. The in-country program manager 
also recalled seeing one of the assessments, but stated that he did not 
find the assessment useful given the changing terrorist landscape; 
therefore, he did not share it with his staff. 

* The DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Pakistan stated that decisions on 
the types of assistance to provide in Pakistan were based primarily on 
the knowledge and experience of in-country staff regarding partner 
nation needs, rather than the needs assessments or program reviews. He 
added that he did not find the assessments useful, as the issues 
identified in the latest (2004) assessment for the country were 
outdated. 

Needs Assessments Generally Lacked Prioritized Recommendations and Were 
Inconsistent: 

We reviewed 12 of the 21 ATA country-specific needs assessments and 
program reviews[Footnote 14] that, according to ATA annual reports, DS/ 
T/ATA conducted between 2000 and 2007 for five of the six in-country 
programs.[Footnote 15] The assessments and reviews generally included a 
range of recommendations for counterterrorism assistance, but did not 
prioritize assistance to be provided or include specific timeframes for 
implementation. Consequently, the assessments did not consistently 
provide a basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a 
partner nation's greatest counterterrorism assistance need. Only two of 
the assessments--a 2000 needs assessment for Indonesia and a 2003 
assessment for Kenya--prioritized the recommendations, although a 2004 
assessment for Pakistan and a 2005 assessment for the Philippines 
listed one or two recommendations as priority ATA efforts. In addition, 
the information included in the assessments was not consistent and 
varied in linking recommendations to capabilities. Of the 12 
assessments we reviewed: 

* Nine included narrative on a range of counterterrorism capabilities, 
such as border security and explosives detection, but the number of 
capabilities assessed ranged from 5 to 25. 

* Only four of the assessments that assessed more than one capability 
linked recommendations provided to the relevant capabilities. 

* Six included capability ratings, but the types of ratings used 
varied. For example, a 2003 assessment for Colombia rated eight 
capabilities from 1 through 5, but the 2004 assessment rated 24 
capabilities, using poor, low, fair, or good. 

* Two used a format that DS/T/ATA began implementing in 2001. The 
assessments following the new format generally included consistent 
types of information and clearly linked recommendations provided to an 
assessment of 25 counterterrorism capabilities. However, they did not 
prioritize recommendations or include specific timeframes for 
implementing the recommendations. 

Country Assistance Plans Were Not Used or Were Not Linked to Needs 
Assessments: 

Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that DS/T/ATA should 
create annual country assistance plans that specify training objectives 
and assistance to be provided based upon the needs assessments and 
program reviews, we found that S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically 
use the assessments to create annual plans for the five in-country 
programs. DS/T/ATA officials we interviewed regarding the five in- 
country programs stated that in lieu of relying on the assessments or 
country assistance plans, program and resource decisions were primarily 
made by DS/T/ATA officials in the field based on their knowledge and 
experience regarding partner nation needs. Some DS/T/ATA officials said 
they did not find the country assistance plans useful. The program 
manager for Pakistan stated that he used the country assistance plan as 
a guide, but found that it did not respond to changing needs in the 
country. The ATA program manager for Kenya said that he had not seen a 
country assistance plan for that country. 

We requested ATA country assistance plans conducted during fiscal years 
2000-2006 for the five in-country programs included in our review, but 
S/CT and DS/T/ATA only provided three plans completed for three of the 
five countries. Of these, we found that the plans did not link planned 
activities to recommendations provided in the needs assessments and 
program reviews. For example, the plan for the Philippines included a 
brief reference to a 2005 needs assessment, but the plan did not 
identify which recommendations from the 2005 assessment were intended 
to be addressed by current or planned efforts. 

S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program 
Assistance: 

S/CT has mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. 
government international counterterrorism training assistance and to 
help avoid duplication of efforts. S/CT chairs biweekly interagency 
working group meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group's 
Training Assistance Subgroup[Footnote 16] to provide a forum for high- 
level information sharing and discussion among U.S. agencies 
implementing international counterterrorism efforts.[Footnote 17] S/CT 
also established the Regional Strategic Initiative in 2006 to 
coordinate regional counterterrorism efforts and strategy. S/CT 
described the Regional Strategic Initiative as a series of regionally 
based, interagency meetings hosted by U.S. embassies to identify key 
regional counterterrorism issues and develop a strategic approach to 
addressing them, among other goals. 

In the four countries we visited, we did not find any significant 
duplication or overlap among U.S. agencies' country-specific training 
programs aimed at combating terrorism. Officials we met with in each of 
these countries noted that they participated in various embassy working 
group meetings, such as Counterterrorism Working Group and Law 
Enforcement Working Group meetings, during which relevant agencies 
shared information regarding operations and activities at post. DS/T/ 
ATA officials also coordinated ATA with other counterterrorism efforts 
through daily informal communication among cognizant officials in the 
countries we visited. 

State Had Made Progress in Establishing ATA Goals, but S/CT and DS/T/ 
ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability: 

In response to concerns that ATA lacked elements of adequate strategic 
planning and performance measurement, State took action to define goals 
and measures related to the program's mandated objectives. S/CT and DS/ 
T/ATA, however, did not systematically assess sustainability--that is, 
the extent to which assistance has enabled partner nations to achieve 
and maintain advanced counterterrorism capabilities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA 
lacked clear measures and processes for assessing sustainability, and 
program managers did not consistently include sustainability in ATA 
planning. 

State Recently Established ATA Goals and Measures, and Emphasizes 
Sustaining Partner Nations' Counterterrorism Capabilities: 

State did not have measurable performance goals and outcomes related to 
the mandated objectives for ATA prior to fiscal year 2003, but has 
recently made some progress to address the deficiency, which had been 
noted in reports by State's Office of Inspector General. Similarly, 
State developed specific goals and measures for each of the program's 
mandated objectives in response to a 2003 Office of Management and 
Budget assessment. 

Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents, including department 
and bureau-level performance plans, have stated that enabling partner 
nations to achieve advanced and sustainable counterterrorism 
capabilities is a key outcome. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials further 
confirmed that sustainability is the principal intended outcome and 
focus of program assistance. In support of these efforts, DS/T/ATA 
appointed a Sustainment Manager in November 2006 to, among other 
things, coordinate with other DS/T/ATA divisions to develop 
recommendations and plans to assist partner nations in developing 
sustainable counterterrorism capabilities. 

S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability of Capabilities: 

Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes, 
State had not developed clear measures and a process for assessing 
sustainability and had not integrated the concept into program 
planning. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993[Footnote 
18] requires agencies in charge of U.S. government programs and 
activities to identify goals and report on the degree to which goals 
are met. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials noted the difficulty in developing 
direct quantitative measures of ATA outcomes related to partner 
nations' counterterrorism capabilities. Our past work also has stressed 
the importance of establishing program goals, objectives, priorities, 
milestones, and measures to use in monitoring performance and assessing 
outcomes as critical elements of program management and effective 
resource allocation.[Footnote 19] 

We found that the measure for ATA's principal intended program outcome 
of sustainability is not clear. In its fiscal year 2007 Joint 
Performance Summary, State reported results and future year targets for 
the number of countries that had achieved an advanced, sustainable 
level of counterterrorism capability. According to the document, 
partner nations that achieve a sustainable level of counterterrorism 
would graduate from the program and no longer receive program 
assistance. However, program officials in S/CT and DS/T/ATA directly 
responsible for overseeing ATA were not aware that the Joint 
Performance Summary listed numerical targets and past results for the 
number of partner nations that had achieved sustainability, and could 
not provide an explanation of how State assessed the results. DS/T/ 
ATA's Sustainment Manager also could not explain how State established 
and assessed the numerical targets in the reports. The Sustainment 
Manager further noted that, to his knowledge, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not 
yet developed systematic measures of sustainability. 

DS/T/ATA's mechanism for evaluating partner nation capabilities did not 
include guidance or specific measures to assess sustainability. 
According to program guidance and DS/T/ATA officials, needs assessments 
and program reviews are intended to establish a baseline of a partner 
nation's counterterrorism capabilities and quantify progress through 
subsequent reviews. DS/T/ATA officials also asserted that the process 
is intended to measure the results of program assistance. However, the 
process did not explicitly address sustainability, and provided no 
specific information or instruction regarding how reviewers are to 
assess sustainability. Moreover, the process focused on assessing a 
partner nation's overall counterterrorism capabilities, but did not 
specifically measure the results of program assistance. 

DS/T/ATA had not systematically integrated sustainability into country- 
specific assistance plans, and we found a lack of consensus among 
program officials about how to address the issue. In-country program 
managers, embassy officials, instructors, and partner nation officials 
we interviewed held disparate views on how to define sustainability 
across all ATA participant countries, and many were not aware that 
sustainability was the intended outcome. Several program officials 
stated that graduating a country and withdrawing or significantly 
reducing program assistance could result in a rapid decline in the 
partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and could undermine 
other program objectives, such as improving bilateral relations. 
Further, although State has listed sustainability in State-level 
planning documents since 2006, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not issued 
guidance on incorporating sustainability into country-specific 
planning, and none of the country assistance plans we reviewed 
consistently addressed the outcome. As a result, the plans did not 
include measurable annual objectives targeted at enabling the partner 
nation to achieve sustainability. For example, Colombia's assistance 
plan listed transferring responsibility for the antikidnapping training 
to the Colombian government and described planned activities to achieve 
that goal. However, the plan did not include measurable objectives to 
determine whether activities achieved intended results. 

State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been 
Incomplete and Inaccurate: 

Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional 
mandate[Footnote 20] to report to Congress on U.S. international 
counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, State's annual reports on 
ATA contained inaccurate data regarding basic program information, did 
not provide systematic assessments of program results, and lacked other 
information necessary to evaluate program effectiveness. 

S/CT Has Not Prepared a Mandated Report: 

In 1985, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act requiring the 
Secretary of State to report on all assistance related to international 
terrorism provided by the U.S. government during the preceding fiscal 
year.[Footnote 21] Since 1996, State has submitted ATA annual reports 
rather than the broader report required by the statute. 

A S/CT official noted confusion within State over what the statute 
required and he asserted that the ATA annual report, which is prepared 
by DS/T/ATA, and State's annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism" 
report[Footnote 22] were sufficiently responsive to congressional 
needs. He further noted that, in his view, it would be extremely 
difficult for State to compile and report on all U.S. government 
terrorism assistance activities, especially given the significant 
growth of agencies' programs since 2001. Officials in State's Bureau of 
Legislative Affairs indicated that, to their knowledge, they had never 
received an inquiry from congressional staff about the missing reports. 

ATA Annual Reports Contain Inaccuracies: 

Recent ATA annual reports have contained inaccurate data relating to 
basic program information on numbers of students trained and courses 
offered. For example, 

* Afghanistan. According to annual reports for fiscal years 2002 to 
2005, 15 Afghan students were trained as part of a single training 
event over the 4-year period. DS/T/ATA subsequently provided us data 
for fiscal year 2005, which corrected the participation total in that 
year from 15 participants in 1 training event to 1,516 participants in 
12 training events. 

* Pakistan. According to the fiscal year 2005 ATA annual report, ATA 
delivered 17 courses to 335 participants in Pakistan. Supporting tables 
in the same report listed 13 courses provided to 283 participants, and 
a summary report provided to us by DS/T/ATA reported 13 courses 
provided to 250 course participants. 

DS/T/ATA officials acknowledged the discrepancies and noted that 
similar inaccuracies could be presumed for prior years and for other 
partner nations. The officials indicated that inaccuracies and 
omissions in reports of the training participants and events were due 
to a lack of internal policies and procedures for recording and 
reporting program data. In the absence of documented policies and 
procedures, staff developed various individual processes for collecting 
the information that resulted in flawed data reporting. Additionally, 
DS/T/ATA officials told us that its inadequate information management 
system and a lack of consistent data collection procedures also 
contributed to inaccurate reporting. 

ATA Annual Reports Lack Performance and Other Useful Program 
Information: 

We reviewed ATA annual reports for fiscal years 1997 through 2005, and 
found that the reports varied widely in terms of content, scope, and 
format. Moreover, the annual reports did not contain systematic 
assessments of program performance or consistent information on program 
activity, such as number and type of courses delivered, types of 
equipment provided, and budget activity associated with program 
operations. In general, the reports contained varying levels of detail 
on program activity, and provided only anecdotal examples of program 
successes, from a variety of sources, including U.S. embassy officials, 
ATA instructors, and partner nation officials. DS/T/ATA program 
officials charged with compiling the annual reports for the past 3 
fiscal years noted that DS/T/ATA did not have guidance on the scope, 
content, or format for the reports. 

Conclusions: 

Although ATA plays a central role in State's broader effort to fight 
international terrorism, deficiencies in how the program is guided, 
managed, implemented, and assessed could limit the program's 
effectiveness. Specifically, minimal guidance from S/CT makes it 
difficult to determine the extent to which program assistance directly 
supports broader U.S. counterterrorism policy goals. Additionally, 
deficiencies with DS/T/ATA's needs assessments and program reviews may 
limit their utility as a tool for planning assistance and prioritizing 
among several partner nations' counterterrorism needs. As a result, the 
assessments and reviews are not systematically linked to resource 
allocation decisions, which may limit the program's ability to improve 
partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities. 

Although State has made some progress in attempting to evaluate and 
quantitatively measure program performance, ATA still lacks a clearly 
defined, systematic assessment and reporting of outcomes, which makes 
it difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the program. 
This deficiency, along with State's noncompliance with mandated 
reporting requirements, has resulted in Congress having limited and 
incomplete information on U.S. international counterterrorism 
assistance and ATA efforts. Such information is necessary to determine 
the most effective types of assistance the U.S. government can provide 
to partner nations in support of the U.S. national security goal of 
countering terrorism abroad. 

In our February 2008 report, we suggested that Congress should 
reconsider the requirement that the Secretary of State provide an 
annual report on the nature and amount of U.S. government 
counterterrorism assistance provided abroad, given the broad changes in 
the scope and nature of U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad in 
conjunction with the fact that the report has not been submitted since 
1996. 

We also recommended that the Secretary of State take the following four 
actions: 

1. Revisit and revise internal guidance (the 1991 State policy 
memorandum and Foreign Affairs Manual, in particular) to ensure that 
the roles and responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA are still relevant 
and better enable State to determine which countries should receive 
assistance and what type, and allocate limited ATA resources. 

2. Ensure that needs assessments and program reviews are both useful 
and linked to ATA resource decisions and development of country-
specific assistance plans. 

3. Establish clearer measures of sustainability, and refocus the 
process for assessing the sustainability of partner nations' 
counterterrorism capabilities. The revised evaluation process should 
include not only an overall assessment of partner nation 
counterterrorism capabilities, but also provide guidance for assessing 
the specific outcomes of ATA. 

4. Comply with the congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S. 
international counterterrorism assistance. 

In commenting on our report, State agreed overall with our principal 
findings and recommendations to improve its ATA program guidance, the 
needs assessment and program review process, and its assessments of ATA 
program outcomes. State noted that the report highlighted the 
difficulties in assessing the benefits of developing and improving long-
term antiterrorism and law enforcement relationships with foreign 
governments. State also outlined a number of ongoing and planned 
initiatives to address our recommendations. As noted in our report, we 
will follow up with State to ensure that these initiatives have been 
completed, as planned. 

Although State supported the matter we suggested for congressional 
consideration, it did not specifically address our recommendation that 
it comply with the congressional mandate to report on U.S. 
counterterrorism assistance. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael 
Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]. Albert H. Huntington, 
III, Assistant Director; Matthew E. Helm; Elisabeth R. Helmer; and 
Emily Rachman made key contributions in preparing this statement. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program 
Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-336] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008). 

[2] 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 2349aa, 2349aa-1. 

[3] 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2651a. 

[4] State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an 
outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 
1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, ï¿½ï¿½ 104-105). 

[5] ATA is part of a training directorate within Diplomatic Security 
comprised of the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, the Office of 
Training and Performance Support, and the Office of Mobile Security 
Training. 

[6] We visited Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines. These 
four countries comprised about 55 percent of total ATA funding for 
training and training-related activities in fiscal year 2006, and about 
43 percent of funding in fiscal year 2007. 

[7] 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2349aa-7 (requiring the Secretary of State to report 
annually on the amount and nature of all assistance provided by the 
U.S. government related to international terrorism). 

[8] Pub. L. No. 87-195, Pt. II, ï¿½571, as added by Pub. L. No. 98-151, 
ï¿½101(b)(2), 97 Stat. 972 (1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2349a). 

[9] 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2651a. 

[10] State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an 
outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 
1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, ï¿½ï¿½ 104-105). 

[11] Pub. L. No. 99-399, ï¿½ï¿½ 104-105. 

[12] The general responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA regarding the 
ATA program are described in the 2007 U.S. Department of State Foreign 
Affairs Manual, Volume 1-Organization and Functions, 1 FAM 022.5 and 1 
FAM 262.3-1. 

[13] Each of these countries received a range of ATA training and other 
assistance through an in-country presence. The sixth in-country 
program, Afghanistan, also received significant program assistance 
during this period. But, according to DS/T/ATA officials, the 
Afghanistan in-country program focuses principally on training and 
monitoring a Presidential Protective Service. 

[14] DS/T/ATA was unable to provide nine assessments that were 
reportedly conducted for four of these countries between 2002 and 2007. 
According to DS/T/ATA officials, they were either unable to locate 
these assessments, written reports on the assessment visits were not 
completed, or the annual reports stating that they had been completed 
were inaccurate. 

[15] We did not include the ATA in-country program in Afghanistan in 
this analysis because the scope of the program is narrowly focused on 
presidential protection training. 

[16] The Training Assistance Subgroup includes representatives from the 
Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, 
and other agencies. 

[17] The Counterterrorism Security Group is chaired by the National 
Security Council and is intended to serve as a means for U.S. agencies 
to share information and coordinate the response to terrorist threats 
against U.S. interests domestically and abroad. 

[18] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 287-88 (1993). 

[19] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives 
to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute 
Terrorists, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2007). 

[20] 22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2349aa-7. 

[21] Pub. L. No. 99-83, Title V, ï¿½ 502, 99 Stat. 220 (codified at 22 
U.S.C. ï¿½ 2349aa-7). 

[22] S/CT prepares this annual report, which is required by a separate 
statute (22 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2656f(a)). The report primarily describes 
international terrorist activity. 

[End of section] 

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