Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (31-JUL-08,		 
GAO-08-860).							 
                                                                 
In fiscal year 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism		 
Partnership (TSCTP) was established to eliminate terrorist safe  
havens in northwest Africa by strengthening countries'		 
counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of	 
extremist ideology. Funds obligated for TSCTP in fiscal years	 
2005 through 2007 and committed for fiscal year 2008 by the	 
Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International	 
Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have	 
amounted to about $353 million for activities in nine partner	 
countries. In this report, GAO examines (1) the distribution of  
funds for TSCTP and the types of activities supported and (2) the
program's implementation, including the extent to which it is	 
guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy. GAO has reported 
previously on the need for a strategy that includes priorities	 
and milestones that can help agencies collaborate in combating	 
terrorism. GAO analyzed TSCTP-related documents and conducted	 
work in Mali, Morocco, and Mauritania.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-860 					        
    ACCNO:   A83230						        
  TITLE:     Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance	      
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership	 
     DATE:   07/31/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Combating terrorism				 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Federal aid for the humanities			 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Federal funds					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     Funds management					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International agreements				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Military training					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Public diplomacy					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Africa						 
	     Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism			 
	     Partnership					 
                                                                 

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GAO-08-860

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Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

July 2008: 

Combating Terrorism: 

Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership: 

GAO-08-860: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-860, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In fiscal year 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP) was established to eliminate terrorist safe havens in northwest 
Africa by strengthening countriesï¿½ counterterrorism capabilities and 
inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology. Funds obligated for TSCTP 
in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and committed for fiscal year 2008 by 
the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have amounted 
to about $353 million for activities in nine partner countries. In this 
report, GAO examines (1) the distribution of funds for TSCTP and the 
types of activities supported and (2) the programï¿½s implementation, 
including the extent to which it is guided by a comprehensive, 
integrated strategy. GAO has reported previously on the need for a 
strategy that includes priorities and milestones that can help agencies 
collaborate in combating terrorism. GAO analyzed TSCTP-related 
documents and conducted work in Mali, Morocco, and Mauritania. 

What GAO Found: 

In fiscal years 2005 through 2007, State, USAID, and DOD distributed 
about 74 percent of their obligations for TSCTP to Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger; about 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia; and about 8 percent to Nigeria and Senegal. The remaining 15 
percent was distributed through regional assistance, such as military 
exercises in multiple partner countries. The agencies expected to 
distribute about half of total funds committed for TSCTP for fiscal 
year 2008 to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and the remainder among 
the other countries. State, USAID, and DOD have supported a wide range 
of diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities aimed at 
strengthening partner countriesï¿½ counterterrorism capacity and 
inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology. For example, Stateï¿½the 
lead agency for TSCTPï¿½has hosted educational programs intended to 
marginalize violent extremists; USAID supported efforts to improve 
education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training in 
marksmanship and border patrol to the militaries of partner countries. 

Figure: Distribution of TSCTP Funds by Country and Region, Fiscal Years 
2005-2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Distribution of TSCTP Funds by Country and Region, Fiscal Years 2005-
2008: 

Country/Region: Chad/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $23 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $9 million; 
Total: $32 million. 

Country/Region: Mali/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $31 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million; 
Total: $37 million. 

Country/Region: Mauritania/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $18 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million; 
Total: $24 million. 

Country/Region: Niger/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $37 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $7 million; 
Total: $44 million. 

Country/Region: Algeria/Maghreb; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 
Total: $7 million. 

Country/Region: Morocco/Maghreb; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million; 
Total: $9 million. 

Country/Region: Tunisia/Maghreb; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: 0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $1 million; 
Total: $1 million. 

Country/Region: Senegal/Sub-Shara; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $9 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $3 million; 
Total: $12 million. 

Country/Region: Nigeria/Sub-Shara; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $5 million; 
Total: $8 million. 

Country/Region: Regional; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $22 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $10 million; 
Total: $30 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data. 

Note: Commitments shown for 2008 are based on State, USAID, and DOD 
estimates as of June 2008. 

[End of figure] 

Several factors have hampered the key agenciesï¿½ implementation of TSCTP 
activities, in some cases limiting their ability to collaborate in 
working to combat terrorism. First, the agencies lack a comprehensive, 
integrated strategy for their TSCTP activities, and the documents used 
in planning the activities do not prioritize proposed activities or 
identify milestones needed to measure progress or make improvements. 
Second, disagreements about whether State should have authority over 
DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in 
partner countries have led to DODï¿½s suspending some activities, for 
example, in Niger. Third, fluctuation in Stateï¿½s and USAIDï¿½s 
distribution of funds for TSCTP resulted in suspension of a peace-
building program in Mali. Fourth, although the agencies measure 
activitiesï¿½ outputs, such as the number of foreign military personnel 
trained, they do not measure their activitiesï¿½ outcomes in combating 
terrorismï¿½for instance, any decrease in extremism in the targeted 
countries. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State work with the heads of other 
partner agencies to develop a comprehensive strategy for TSCTP. GAO 
also recommends that the Secretaries of State and Defense issue joint 
guidance regarding DOD personnel operating in TSCTP partner countries. 
State and USAID concurred, and DOD partially concurred, with GAOï¿½s 
findings and recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-860]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Funds for TSCTP Were Distributed Primarily in the Sahel Region and 
Support a Range of Diplomacy, Development Assistance, and Military 
Activities: 

Several Challenges Have Hampered Implementation of TSCTP Activities: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Selected Accounts Used to Fund TSCTP Activities: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Northwestern African Countries Participating in Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership: 

Figure 2: Overview of Key Agencies Participating in TSCTP: 

Figure 3: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Year and Key Agency, 
2005-2008: 

Figure 4: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Country and Region, 2005-
2008: 

Figure 5: Overview of Key Agencies' TSCTP Activities: 

Figure 6: Students Receiving Instruction in a School in Mali: 

Figure 7: DOD Representative Trains African Military Units: 

Figure 8: DOD Representative Provides Humanitarian Assistance: 

Figure 9: Distribution of Funds for State and USAID TSCTP Activities by 
Country and Year, 2005-2007: 

Abbreviations: 

AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command: 

CAP: country action plan: 

COM: Chief of Mission: 

COCOM: Combatant Command: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOS: Department of State: 

ESF: Economic Support Funds: 

EUCOM: U.S. European Command: 

MSP: Mission Strategic Plan: 

OEF-TS: Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara: 

OSD: Office of Secretary Defense: 

PKO: Peacekeeping Operations: 

S/CT: State Coordinator for Counterterrorism: 

TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 31, 2008: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The growing presence of terrorist safe havens in northwestern Africa, 
as well as the region's vast ungoverned spaces, smuggling routes, 
porous borders, and fragile states, contributes to an environment 
vulnerable to the spread of violent extremist ideology. The affiliation 
of some terrorist groups in the region with Al Qaeda, as well as such 
groups' increased efforts to attract young recruits, has also prompted 
concern that the region could be used as a base for launching attacks 
against U.S. interests.[Footnote 1] Eliminating terrorist safe havens 
in ungoverned regions to prevent such attacks is a critical U.S. 
national security goal. 

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the primary 
vehicle of U.S. counterterrorism policy in northwestern Africa. 
Established in 2005,[Footnote 2] TSCTP is a multiyear, multiagency 
effort to support diplomacy, development assistance, and military 
activities aimed at strengthening country and regional counterterrorism 
capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.[Footnote 
3] TSCTP presently operates in nine partner countries--Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger in the Sahel region; Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia in the Maghreb region; and Nigeria and Senegal in the sub- 
Saharan region--and may include other countries in the future. Key 
agencies participating in TSCTP are the Department of State (State), 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the 
Department of Defense (DOD), with State's Bureau of African Affairs as 
the program lead. Since the program's inception, the key agencies' 
obligations and commitments[Footnote 4] for TSCTP have amounted to 
about $353 million, primarily for diplomacy, development assistance, 
and military activities, respectively.[Footnote 5] The Departments of 
the Treasury and Justice and several intelligence agencies also conduct 
limited counterterrorism activities in TSCTP partner countries. 
[Footnote 6] 

Given the U.S. government's interest in enhancing foreign governments' 
ability to combat terrorism, this report examines (1) the distribution 
of funds for TSCTP in 2005 through 2008 and the types of activities 
supported and (2) the program's implementation, including the extent to 
which it has been guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy. We 
have reported previously on the need for such a strategy, as well as 
other key elements, to enhance and sustain collaboration in large 
interagency efforts to combat terrorism.[Footnote 7] 

In conducting our work, we analyzed TSCTP policy, planning, budget, and 
programming documents provided by State, DOD, and USAID. We met with 
agency representatives, including officials in Washington, D.C. and at 
the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. In addition, we met 
with U.S. embassy, host nation government, and nongovernmental 
organization officials in Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania. In selecting 
the countries to visit, we considered the agencies' resource 
allocations in each country, the countries' geographic distribution, 
the number and duration of TSCTP activities in each country, and TSCTP 
representatives' recommendations. We requested that State, USAID, and 
DOD provide funding data by country and account; although there are 
some limitations in the ways these data were collected and maintained, 
we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable to meet the 
objectives of our report. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more 
detailed description of our scope and methodology. We plan to issue a 
classified annex to this report. 

Results in Brief: 

In 2005 through 2008, the key agencies distributed the majority of the 
obligated and committed resources to countries in the Sahel region, 
supporting a range of diplomacy, development assistance, and military 
activities. In 2005 through 2007, the agencies distributed about 74 
percent of approximately $230 million obligated to the four countries 
in the Sahel region, about 3 percent to the countries in the Maghreb 
region, and about 8 percent to the countries in the sub-Saharan region; 
the remaining 15 percent of the obligations was distributed through 
regional assistance, such as military exercises in multiple countries. 
As of June 2008, the agencies expected to distribute about half of 
approximately $123 million committed for TSCTP for 2008 to the Sahel 
countries and to distribute the remaining commitments among the Maghreb 
and Sub-Saharan countries and through regional assistance. The agencies 
have supported a wide range of activities related to diplomacy, 
development, and military assistance. For example, State has hosted 
educational and cultural exchange programs intended to isolate and 
marginalize violent extremists; USAID supported efforts to improve 
education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training in 
marksmanship and border patrol as well as distributed equipment such as 
vehicles to the militaries of TSCTP partner countries. 

Several challenges have hampered the key agencies' implementation of 
TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting their ability to collaborate 
in working to strengthen countries' counterterrorism capacity and 
inhibit the spread of extremist ideology. 

* No comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the 
program's implementation. The documents used in planning TSCTP 
activities lack key elements that we have found to be needed in 
strategies for large interagency programs, such as a clear definition 
of the program's goals and objectives and milestones linked to these 
objectives. State, USAID, and DOD have developed separate plans related 
to their respective TSCTP activities. However, while these plans 
reflect some interagency collaboration--for example, in assessing 
country needs for development assistance--the agencies' plans are 
focused on their respective missions and do not comprise an integrated 
strategy addressing TSCTP activities in all nine countries. 

* Disagreements about whether State should have authority over DOD 
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the 
partner countries has hampered implementation of some activities. The 
agencies agree that State is responsible for the security and 
coordination of all U.S. government executive branch personnel assigned 
to all diplomatic and consular posts abroad, except for personnel under 
the command of a U.S. military commander, and that DOD is responsible 
for all activities carried out by military personnel deployed by a 
combatant commander. However, in some partner countries, agency 
officials have disagreed about whether some DOD personnel carrying out 
TSCTP activities should be subject to State's authority. For example, 
in one country, State and DOD officials disagreed about the number of 
DOD personnel to be permitted in the country; this disagreement 
contributed to DOD's suspension of some of its activities. According to 
agency officials, such disagreements cannot be resolved at the country 
level and require higher-level guidance or intervention. 

* Fluctuation in the distribution of funds for TSCTP activities has 
limited USAID's implementation of its activities in Mali. USAID 
received funds for its TSCTP activities in Mali in 2005 and 2007, but 
not in 2006. Because it received no funds for 2006, the mission 
suspended a peace-building program in northern Mali. 

* The agencies have few common mechanisms for measuring their TSCTP 
activities' outcomes--that is, the results of the products and services 
delivered. The agencies have some indicators to measure their 
activities' outputs--that is, direct products and services--such as the 
number of foreign military personnel trained. However, they generally 
do not measure their activities' outcomes, such as any decrease in 
extremism in the targeted regions. According to State, USAID, and DOD 
officials, they are working to develop indicators to assess their 
activities' outcomes. 

To enhance U.S. agencies' ability to collaborate in strengthening 
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the 
spread of extremist ideology in northwest Africa, we recommend that the 
Secretary of State work through the Director of Foreign Assistance, who 
serves concurrently as USAID Administrator, to develop a comprehensive 
strategy for TSCTP in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and 
the Treasury, the U.S. Attorney General, and the heads of any other 
participating agencies. In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries 
of State and Defense issue joint guidance regarding DOD personnel 
temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner 
countries. 

Commenting on a draft of this report, State and USAID concurred, and 
DOD partially concurred, with our findings and recommendations (see 
app. III, IV, and V, respectively). Regarding our recommendation that 
State and DOD develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DOD 
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the 
partner countries, DOD commented that it believes sufficient guidance 
exists in U.S. government documents defining the agencies' respective 
authorities. We made some clarifications in response to DOD's comments 
but maintain that joint guidance is needed to resolve the agencies' 
existing disagreements over implementation of their authorities in some 
TSCTP countries. State, USAID, DOD, and the Department of Justice 
provided technical corrections, which we incorporated where 
appropriate. 

Background: 

Through TSCTP, the U.S. government aims to strengthen country and 
regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibit the spread of 
extremist ideology in northwest Africa. Since its launch in 2005, TSCTP 
has operated in nine countries (see fig. 1), and it may expand to 
include others. 

Figure 1: Northwestern African Countries Participating in Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of Northwestern Africa indicating the following 
countries that are participating in Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership: 

Algeria; 
Chad; 
Mali; 
Mauritania; 
Morocco; 
Niger; 
Nigeria; 
Senegal; 
Tunisia. 

Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data; Art Explosion 
(images). 

[End of figure] 

TSCTP was conceived as an interagency program, with State, USAID, and 
DOD primarily responsible for diplomacy, development assistance, and 
military activities, respectively, and with State as the program lead. 
In each country participating in the program, a country team led by, 
and under the authority of, the Ambassador coordinates the 
implementation of U.S. foreign assistance in the country, including 
TSCTP activities.[Footnote 8] The country teams include representatives 
from State, USAID, and DOD, among other agencies. Within State, the 
Bureau of African Affairs is the lead coordinator for TSCTP activities 
conducted by several bureaus,[Footnote 9] as shown in figure 2. USAID's 
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, in 
Washington, D.C., manages the agency's TSCTP activities with support 
from its regional office in Accra, Ghana, as well as USAID overseas 
mission offices in some TSCTP countries. DOD's Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) is responsible for coordinating the agency's TSCTP 
activities.[Footnote 10] In addition, DOD representatives under the 
authority of the department's U.S. European Command (EUCOM) participate 
with the country team in coordinating and implementing the agency's 
TSCTP military activities.[Footnote 11] 

Figure 2: Overview of Key Agencies Participating in TSCTP: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the key agencies participating in 
TSCTP, as follows: 

State Department (lead): 
Program planning: 
* Secretary of State; 
- Bureau of African Affairs; 
- Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; 
- Political-Military Affairs; 
- Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 
Program implementation at country level: 
* Ambassador - Chief of Mission (under Bureau of African Affairs); 
- Deputy Chief of mission; 
- Defense attachï¿½; 
- Political Military officer; 
- Public affairs officer; 
- USAID Officer; NGO's implementing partners; 
- Other country team members. 

Department of Defense: 
Program planning: 
* Secretary of Defense; 
- Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint staff; 
- European Command (Germany); SOCEUR. 
Program implementation at country level: 
* Other DOD TSCTP personnel (under European command); 
* Military Trainers (under SOCEUR); 
* Contractors supporting military activities (under SOCEUR). 

USAID: 
Program planning: 
* Director of Foreign Assistance/USAID Administrator; 
- Bureau for Africa; 
- Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. 

Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data; Art Explosion 
(images). 

[End of figure] 

In 2005 through 2007, the key agencies participating in TSCTP obligated 
about $230 million for TSCTP activities.[Footnote 12] For 2008, the 
agencies' commitments for TSCTP amounted to approximately $123 million. 
(See fig. 3.) TSCTP is not directly funded by Congress, but is funded 
at the agencies' discretion from various appropriation accounts, such 
as the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) fund; Economic Support Funds 
(ESF); the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related 
Programs; and Section 1206 and 1207 funds.[Footnote 13] (See app. II 
for more information about the agencies' funding for TSCTP.) 

Figure 3: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Year and Key Agency, 
2005-2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
DOD Obligations and commitments: $7 million; 
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $18 million. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
DOD Obligations and commitments: $39 million; 
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $10 million. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
DOD Obligations and commitments: $118 million; 
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $37 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
DOD Obligations and commitments: $92 million; 
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $31 million. 

Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data. 

Notes: 

The amounts shown include obligations for 2005-2007 and commitments for 
2008. Commitments shown for 2008 are based on agencies' projections as 
of June 2008. 

Because the Director of Foreign Assistance determines funding for both 
State and USAID, we have combined State's and USAID's TSCTP funding in 
this figure. In addition, funding that DOD provided to State and USAID 
from the Sections 1206 and 1207 accounts are included in the 
obligations and commitments shown for DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Funds for TSCTP Were Distributed Primarily in the Sahel Region and 
Support a Range of Diplomacy, Development Assistance, and Military 
Activities: 

The distribution of funds for TSCTP has varied among regions, with the 
majority of obligations in 2005 through 2007 distributed to the Sahel 
region. State, USAID, and DOD have supported a range of diplomacy, 
development assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening 
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the 
spread of extremist ideology. 

Distribution of TSCTP Obligations Has Focused on the Sahel Region: 

About 74 percent of the $230 million obligated for 2005 through 2007 
was distributed to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, in the Sahel 
region; about 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, in the 
Maghreb region; and about 8 percent to Nigeria and Senegal, in sub- 
Sahara. The remaining 15 percent of the obligations for 2005 through 
2007 was distributed through regional assistance, such as military 
exercises, to support TSCTP objectives in multiple countries. For 2008, 
as of June 2008, the agencies expected to distribute about 49 percent 
of total commitments for TSCTP to the countries of the Sahel region; 21 
percent to the countries of the Maghreb region; 13 percent to the Sub- 
Saharan countries; and 17 percent for regional assistance. (See fig. 
4.) 

Figure 4: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Country and Region, 2005-
2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Country/Region: Chad/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $23 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $9 million; 
Total: $32 million. 

Country/Region: Mali/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $31 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million; 
Total: $37 million. 

Country/Region: Mauritania/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $18 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million; 
Total: $24 million. 

Country/Region: Niger/Sahel; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $37 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $7 million; 
Total: $44 million. 

Country/Region: Algeria/Maghreb; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $1 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 
Total: $7 million. 

Country/Region: Morocco/Maghreb; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million; 
Total: $9 million. 

Country/Region: Tunisia/Maghreb; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: 0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $1 million; 
Total: $1 million. 

Country/Region: Senegal/Sub-Shara; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $9 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $3 million; 
Total: $12 million. 

Country/Region: Nigeria/Sub-Shara; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $5 million; 
Total: $8 million. 

Country/Region: Regional; 
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $22 million; 
Fiscal year 2008: $10 million; 
Total: $30 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data. 

Notes: 

The amounts shown represent the agencies' obligations for 2005-2007 and 
commitments for 2008. The commitments shown for 2008 are based on 
projections by State, USAID, and DOD as of June 2008. 

The obligated amount shown in the column labeled "Regional" was 
distributed through assistance efforts that support TSCTP objectives in 
multiple countries. 

In addition to the obligations shown, $147 million was obligated for 
program support costs for all TSCTP partner countries, including 
administrative and related personnel costs and air lift support. 

[End of figure] 

Agency officials indicated that the differences in the distribution of 
obligations and commitments for TSCTP partner countries of the Sahel 
and the Maghreb regions related, respectively, to countries' capacity 
to absorb the assistance and their willingness to receive it. In the 
Sahel, for example, the Nigerien military is fighting a rebellion in 
the northern part of the country and therefore has limited capacity to 
receive TSCTP military training, according to U.S. embassy officials in 
Niger. According to DOD officials, a lack of needed resources, such as 
jet fuel, also has limited the capacity of some countries in the Sahel 
to receive military training. In the Maghreb, the Algerian government 
has expressed unwillingness to receive TSCTP military training, 
according to embassy and State officials. 

U.S. Agencies Have Supported Diplomacy, Development Assistance, and 
Military Activities: 

The key agencies have supported various types of activities in support 
of TSCTP goals,[Footnote 14] with State primarily focused on diplomacy, 
USAID on development assistance, and DOD on military activities. Figure 
5 illustrates the types of TSCTP activities that each agency supports. 

Figure 5: Overview of Key Agencies' TSCTP Activities: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of three interlocking circles 
representing Key Agencies' TSCTP Activities and areas of overlap, as 
follows: 

State: 
* Diplomacy; 
- Embassy security and support; 
- Law enforcement counterterrorism training; 
- Public diplomacy (shared with DOD); 
- Support for vulnerable populations (shared with USAID). 

DOD: 
* Military; 
- Military counterterrorism training and equipping; 
- Intelligence training; 
- Military infrastructure; 
- Public diplomacy (shared with State); 
- Humanitarian assistance (shared with USAID). 

USAID: 
* Development; 
- Democracy and governance; 
- Economic growth; 
- Support for vulnerable populations (shared with State); 
- Humanitarian assistance (shared with DOD). 

Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

State's TSCTP Activities: 

State leads public diplomacy efforts, provides embassy security and 
support for TSCTP activities, and supports some counterterrorism 
training for law enforcement officers. Examples of State's TSCTP 
activities include the following: 

* Public diplomacy. State works to communicate messages among 
vulnerable populations to isolate and marginalize violent extremists. 
In addition, State works to foster a sense of common interests and 
values between Americans and people of different countries and 
cultures. For example, Morocco, Algeria, and Nigeria are all hosting 
educational and cultural exchange programs. 

* Embassy security and support. In some cases, State provides security, 
logistical, and personnel support services, as well as office space at 
U.S. embassies, to support DOD and USAID personnel implementing TSCTP 
activities. In addition, State serves as the lead in diplomatic 
discussions with host-country governments to facilitate TSCTP 
activities. 

* Law enforcement counterterrorism training. State's regional security 
officers oversee the training of friendly governments' civilian 
security and law enforcement personnel in police procedures that 
address terrorism. For example, in Niger, the police forces received 
training courses to help combat terrorism. In addition, State provides 
funding in support of mobile training and military intelligence 
conducted by DOD. 

USAID's TSCTP Activities: 

USAID supports development assistance intended to promote good 
governance, provides economic opportunities, and engages populations 
vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Examples of USAID's TSCTP 
activities include the following: 

* Democracy and governance. USAID supports efforts to improve 
communication, and improve education and health, to help promote 
legitimate authority in the region's vast, lightly-populated areas 
where government presence is minimal. For example, USAID provided 
training and support in democracy and governance for elected local 
officials in Chad and Niger in remote areas. In addition, in Mali, 
USAID supports basic education programs in schools to engage youths and 
promote messages of tolerance. (See fig. 6.) 

Figure 6: Students Receiving Instruction in a USAID-supported School in 
Mali: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of students receiving instruction in a USAID-supported 
school in Mali. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

* Economic growth. USAID supports alternatives to illicit activities, 
such as drug trafficking, trafficking in humans, and banditry that can 
provide financing for terrorist or extremist activities. For example, 
in Niger, USAID is working with the United Nations Development Program 
to reintegrate more than 3,000 ex-rebel fighters into civil society. 

* Support for vulnerable populations. USAID supports programs that 
encourage market-driven job training and job creation for youth through 
market-driven vocational education, microfinance apprenticeships, and 
coaching and mentoring. For example, USAID has provided rural radios to 
target vulnerable regions in Niger and Mali by broadcasting moderate 
views and providing information on government services. 

DOD's TSCTP Activities: 

DOD provides basic training and equipment to foreign militaries to 
combat terrorism, provides military infrastructure, conducts 
intelligence training, engages in some humanitarian assistance, and 
supports State's public diplomacy efforts. Examples of DOD's TSCTP 
activities include the following: 

* Military counterterrorism training and equipment. DOD provides basic 
training--for example, in marksmanship and border patrol--and 
distributes equipment such as vehicles to the militaries of partner 
countries.[Footnote 15] For instance, EUCOM conducts an annual military 
exercise to provide specialized counterterrorism training and to foster 
communication and cultural exchange between military counterparts. (See 
fig. 7.) 

Figure 7: DOD Representative Trains African Military Units: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of DOD representative training African Military Units. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

* Military infrastructure. DOD provides military infrastructure, such 
as storage and training facilities, and systems designed to foster 
communication and cultural exchanges between militaries. For example, 
DOD constructed a military training facility in northern Niger to 
enhance the capabilities of the military. 

* Intelligence training. DOD provides military intelligence training in 
partner countries to support military counterterrorism and border 
security operations. The training is intended to help build the 
countries' intelligence capacity and establish regional intelligence 
working groups. 

* Humanitarian assistance. DOD assists partner countries' 
infrastructure development and addresses humanitarian needs. For 
example, DOD helps to construct wells and schools and provides medical 
services to indigenous populations. In addition, DOD started a program 
in Mauritania to educate the local population in landmine awareness and 
risks. (See fig. 8.) 

Figure 8: DOD Representative Provides Humanitarian Assistance: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of DOD representative providing humanitarian assistance. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

* Public diplomacy. DOD works with State to support public diplomacy 
and information programs in partner countries. For example, DOD 
promoted governance activities such as a voter registration drive in 
Mauritania. DOD is also funding internet initiatives to foster 
communication between TSCTP country governments and among key agencies 
implementing TSCTP activities and to promote moderate political 
messages to the public in partner countries. Furthermore, DOD has 
worked in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania to help these 
countries minimize terrorist recruiting and influence. 

Several Challenges Have Hampered Implementation of TSCTP Activities: 

Several factors have hampered the key agencies' ability to 
collaboratively implement TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting 
their ability to achieve or assess progress in combating terrorism and 
inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.[Footnote 16] First, no 
comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the 
agencies' activities, and documents used in planning program activities 
have not included some elements that we have identified as needed in an 
interagency counterterrorism program's strategic plan. Second, despite 
some collaboration at the headquarters level, disagreement between 
State and DOD about whether State should have authority over DOD 
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the 
partner countries has contributed to the suspension of some of these 
activities. Third, fluctuation in the distribution of obligations for 
TSCTP in Mali resulted in the suspension of some program activities. 
Fourth, although the agencies have indicators to measure activities' 
direct results, the agencies have not yet developed the capability to 
measure and report on overall progress toward program goals. 

No Comprehensive Strategy Guides Implementation of TSCTP: 

The agencies lack a comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide their 
implementation of TSCTP. Our previous work has shown the importance, in 
particular, of developing a strategy that identifies goals, objectives, 
priorities, and milestones as well as resource needed for interagency 
efforts to combat terrorism. According to DOD and State officials, 
developing an interagency strategic plan has been identified as a 
priority at annual TSCTP conferences, including the most recent 
conference in March 2008;[Footnote 17] however, as of June 2008, the 
agencies had not developed such a strategy. 

State and DOD officials reported using two documents to plan their 
TSCTP activities: a 2004 document outlining a regional effort to 
counter terrorism in the Sahel and Maghreb and a 2005 document defining 
the program's purpose and projecting resource needs. The documents 
identify some agency activities related to the program's general 
purpose and acknowledge the agencies' primary responsibilities for 
these activities. However, the documents lack some key elements that we 
have previously found to be needed in a large, interagency effort's 
strategic plan. For example, the documents do not clearly articulate or 
list the program's goals; our review of these and other agency 
documents suggested goals that agency officials confirmed as those of 
TSCTP.[Footnote 18] In addition, the 2004 and 2005 TSCTP planning 
documents do not prioritize proposed activities or identify milestones 
that could be used to measure progress or make improvements. Moreover, 
the documents do not identify or provide guidance for selecting 
countries for the program; reassessing and adjusting program goals in 
response to any alterations in the level of threat; or determining when 
countries in the program no longer require assistance. In addition, the 
documents do not define the agency's specific roles with respect to 
achieving the program's goals. Further, the projections of resource 
needs have not been updated to account for variations in available 
funds given State's and USAID's 2-year budget cycle.[Footnote 19] 

State, USAID, and DOD have developed separate plans related to their 
respective TSCTP activities. Although these plans reflect some 
interagency collaboration, they do not provide an integrated, 
comprehensive approach to guide TSCTP overall. 

* At U.S. embassies, the country teams--led by the ambassador and 
including State, USAID, and DOD representatives--have developed 
bilateral country-level plans identifying embassy priorities and goals, 
known as mission strategic plans (MSP), for each of the partner 
countries. The nine MSPs for 2009 that we reviewed include 
counterterrorism objectives as priority goals, but none of the nine 
reflect detailed planning for TSCTP activities. State reported that it 
plans to develop country assistance strategies to coordinate all U.S. 
assistance in the partner countries, but no such strategies had been 
developed for the TSCTP partner countries as of June 2008. 

* USAID reported using a series of strategic assessments for the Sahel 
countries to identify development assistance activities that could 
support TSCTP. A USAID official stated that these assessments were 
developed in cooperation with DOD and U.S. embassies; however, the 
assessments address only USAID activities. Further, the USAID 
assessments focus only on the four countries in the Sahel--Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger--where USAID has provided substantial development 
assistance. 

* DOD has developed operational plans, known as country action plans 
(CAP), for TSCTP activities[Footnote 20] in each of the nine countries. 
The CAPs identify the objectives of proposed military activities for 
each country but also point to objectives outlined in State's MSPs. 
According to DOD officials, in 2007, EUCOM officials began traveling to 
TSCTP country teams to coordinate CAPs with the embassy mission teams 
in an effort to secure embassy support for planned TSCTP activities. 
However, the CAPs remain specific to DOD's military operations in each 
country. Moreover, as of June 2008, none of the nine partner countries' 
CAPs had been approved by the ambassadors in those countries, and only 
two country teams, Niger and Mauritania, had held country-level CAP 
discussions. According to a DOD official, in 2007, the Niger country 
team failed to reach agreement regarding the CAP. A State official 
noted that an April 2008 discussion of the Mauritania CAP helped to 
improve coordination among DOD and State officials. 

Disagreement on Authority over DOD Personnel Has Hampered Some TSCTP 
Activities: 

Although State, USAID, and DOD have undertaken efforts to collaborate 
in implementing TSCTP, disagreements about whether State should have 
authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP 
activities in the partner countries have hampered some TSCTP 
activities. Previously, we have found that for large-scale interagency 
efforts in which collaboration is essential, agencies should work 
together to define and agree on roles and responsibilities, including 
how the collaborative effort will be led. We have also found that--to 
enable a cohesive working relationship and create the mutual trust 
required to enhance and sustain the collaborative effort--agencies 
should establish compatible policies to operate across agency 
boundaries. 

The three agencies meet regularly to discuss TSCTP in Washington, D.C., 
and with DOD officials stationed at EUCOM in Germany, according to 
State and DOD officials. For example, agency representatives hold 
monthly video conferences to discuss TSCTP priorities and activities. 
In addition, an annual conference brings U.S. embassy officials from 
the partner countries, as well as from agency headquarters in 
Washington and from EUCOM, to discuss past, present, and future TSCTP 
operations. However, according to agency representatives, agreements 
reached at these meetings have not always been implemented in some 
partner countries. 

Written statements from State and DOD show disagreement about whether 
State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to 
conduct TSCTP activities in the partner countries. The agencies agree 
that State is responsible for the security and coordination of all U.S. 
government executive branch personnel assigned to all diplomatic and 
consular posts abroad, except for personnel under the command of a U.S. 
military commander, and that DOD is responsible for all activities 
carried out by military personnel deployed by a combatant commander. 
However, although acknowledging that DOD personnel[Footnote 21] who 
report to EUCOM are not directly subject to the embassy's authority, 
State asserts that, because these personnel seek clearance from the 
ambassador to enter the country to conduct TSCTP activities, they are 
subject to the ambassador's supervision while in the country. DOD 
asserts that because these personnel are under the EUCOM commander's 
direct authority, they are not under the ambassador's authority 
although they actively seek to coordinate with the ambassador. 

Several DOD officials told us that the disagreements about whether 
State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to 
conduct TSCTP activities have affected implementation of DOD's 
activities in Niger and Chad. In Niger, according to DOD officials, the 
agency suspended most of its TSCTP activities in 2007 after the 
Ambassador limited the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the 
country. State officials said that these limits were set in part 
because of embassy concerns about the country's fragile political 
environment as well as limited space and staff available to support DOD 
personnel deployed to TSCTP partner countries.[Footnote 22] In Chad, 
according to DOD officials, the ambassador recently called for a 
"strategic pause" in implementing TSCTP activities, stating the need to 
reassess available embassy personnel to support DOD activities in 
country.[Footnote 23] 

Disagreements between the agencies regarding authority over DOD 
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the 
partner countries cannot be officially resolved by the country teams, 
according to State and DOD officials. Lacking guidance from agency 
headquarters, country team officials have tried to establish agreements 
between State and DOD; for instance, DOD personnel have signed 
memorandums of understanding with some embassies to facilitate their 
TSCTP activities. However, some of these agreements were concluded 
without the consent of higher offices within DOD, such as the Office of 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and therefore are 
not considered valid by DOD. An embassy official in Mauritania recently 
requested higher-level guidance regarding authority over the DOD 
personnel who report to EUCOM. State officials noted that although the 
Bureau of African Affairs is the designated lead of TSCTP, the bureau 
official charged with TSCTP operations is subordinate in rank to the 
ambassadors of partner countries and therefore lacks sufficient 
authority to mediate the disagreements with DOD. DOD officials 
expressed concern that program activities may continue to be hampered 
if the agencies' disagreements are not resolved. 

Fluctuation in the Distribution of Funds Has Hampered Implementation: 

Fluctuation in the distribution of funds for TSCTP activities has 
hampered USAID's implementation of activities in Mali. Our previous 
work has shown that for large interagency counterterrorism efforts, 
agencies should identify resource needs and deploy available resources 
to address these needs. 

As figure 9 shows, the distribution of funds for State and USAID TSCTP 
activities has fluctuated over time in some countries, most 
significantly in Mali. 

Figure 9: Distribution of Funds for State and USAID TSCTP Activities by 
Country and Year, 2005-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Country/Region: Chad/Sahel; 
Fiscal year 2005: $2,780,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $2,990,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $2,895,000. 

Country/Region: Mali/Sahel; 
Fiscal year 2005: $2,330,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $550,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $13,570,000. 

Country/Region: Mauritania/Sahel; 
Fiscal year 2005: $2,620,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $58,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $6,200,000. 

Country/Region: Niger/Sahel; 
Fiscal year 2005: $3,220,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $4,340,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $5,372,000. 

Country/Region: Algeria/Maghreb; 
Fiscal year 2005: $417,876; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0. 

Country/Region: Morocco/Maghreb; 		
Fiscal year 2005: $1,550,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $463,381; 
Fiscal year 2007: $382,423. 

Country/Region: Tunisia/Maghreb; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $32,836; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0. 

Country/Region: Nigeria/Sub-Sahara; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $1,260,000. 

Country/Region: Senegal/Sub-Sahara; 
Fiscal year 2005: $397,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $1,160,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $3,970,000. 

Country/Region: Regional; 
Fiscal year 2005: $5,000,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $3,650,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. 

Note: Embassy officials in Mauritania stated that the reduced 
distribution of funds for 2006 primarily resulted from a U.S. decision 
to curtail its activities following a political coup in Mauritania in 
2005. 

[End of figure] 

According to a USAID official, the fluctuation in funds for Mali has 
made it difficult to plan over the medium to long term. Although USAID 
received the funds it had requested to support TSCTP activities in Mali 
for 2005 and 2007,[Footnote 24] it received no funds to obligate for 
TSCTP activities in Mali in 2006. Because it received no funds for 
2006, the mission suspended a peace-building program in northern Mali. 
USAID officials noted that the inability to continue these activities 
caused the Mali government to question somewhat the agency's commitment 
to conducting TSCTP activities in the country. 

Measurement of Progress toward TSCTP Goals Has Been Limited: 

Although the agencies have developed indicators to measure their TSCTP 
activities' outputs--their direct products and services--they have not 
developed common indicators to measure the activities' outcomes--the 
results of the products and services provided. Our previous work has 
shown that developing common mechanisms to evaluate outcomes is 
important to improving the effectiveness of large interagency efforts 
to combat terrorism. 

The agencies have developed performance indicators to measure their 
TSCTP activities' outputs. However, because of the lack of common 
indicators to measure their activities' outcomes, agency officials are 
limited in their ability to determine progress toward program goals and 
identify needed improvements.[Footnote 25] 

* U.S. embassies use performance indicators to measure the outputs of 
their counterterrorism activities and report on them annually to State 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. However, the embassies do not measure 
the outcomes of their TSCTP activities. 

* USAID works with organizations implementing its TSCTP activities to 
identify and establish performance indicators to measure the 
activities' outputs. 

* DOD uses indicators such as the amount of equipment provided and the 
number of foreign military personnel trained through TSCTP activities 
to measure the outputs of its TSCTP activities. In addition, DOD has 
conducted surveys to determine the effect of its activities on local 
populations' attitudes and perceptions. 

State, USAID, and DOD officials acknowledged the need for, and are 
working to develop, common indicators that demonstrate progress toward 
TSCTP goals. For example, to facilitate the development of indicators 
linked to the goal of inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology, 
USAID recently hired a contractor to identify the root causes of 
terrorism and extremism in Africa. State, USAID, and DOD officials 
stated that the results of the study could be useful in their efforts 
to develop common indicators of TSCTP activities' outcomes. However, 
agency officials noted the difficulty of measuring how certain 
activities, such as building wells or providing radios, may contribute 
to the achievement of TSCTP goals. 

A 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service acknowledges the 
difficulty of measuring progress in combating terrorism.[Footnote 26] 
The report notes that a common difficulty in demonstrating success in 
combating terrorism is an overreliance on quantitative data-- 
particularly those that may correlate with progress but not accurately 
measure it, such as the amount of money spent on counterterrorism 
efforts--without considering its qualitative significance. According to 
the report, an alternative for measuring progress in combating 
terrorism might involve analyzing data on the numbers, magnitude, 
impact and significance of terrorist incidents; public attitudes in 
targeted countries or regions; and trends in incidents, attitudes, and 
other factors over time. The report also notes that agencies' lack of 
common criteria, as well as uncertainty with respect to strategies and 
measurements, makes it difficult to describe and demonstrate progress. 

Conclusion: 

In supporting diplomacy, development assistance, and military 
activities aimed at strengthening country and regional counterterrorism 
capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology in 
northwest Africa, the key agencies implementing TSCTP have undertaken 
an important effort to meet U.S. national security goals. However, the 
lack of a comprehensive, integrated strategy that identifies program 
goals and objectives, defines agreed-on agency roles and 
responsibilities, and identifies resources needed to achieve the 
program goals may limit the agencies' ability to enhance and sustain 
this large-scale, interagency effort to combat terrorism. Moreover, 
without guidance from agency headquarters, continued disagreements 
about whether State should have authority over DOD personnel 
temporarily assigned to conduct TSTCP activities in the partner 
countries could further hamper TSCTP's implementation. In addition, 
fluctuation in the distribution of State's and USAID's obligations may 
continue to affect the implementation of TSCTP activities. Finally, 
without common indicators of their activities' outcomes, the agencies 
will continue to have limited ability to measure overall progress in 
combating terrorism. Given the growing threat of terrorism in northwest 
Africa, as well as the possibility of TSCTP's expansion to other 
countries and agencies, addressing these factors is essential to 
strengthening U.S. agencies' collaborative efforts to combat terrorism 
in the region. 

Recommendations: 

To enhance U.S. agencies' ability to collaborate in strengthening 
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the 
spread of extremist ideology in northwest Africa, we recommend that the 
Secretary of State work through the Director of Foreign Assistance, who 
serves concurrently as USAID Administrator, to develop a comprehensive 
strategy for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in 
conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury, the U.S. 
Attorney General, and the heads of any other partner agencies. The 
strategy should include clear goals, objectives, and milestones, 
including output and outcome indicators, and identify resources needed 
to achieve the program's goals. 

We also recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense develop and 
issue joint guidance with regard to DOD personnel temporarily assigned 
to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner countries. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

State, USAID, and DOD provided written comments about a draft of this 
report, which we have reproduced in appendixes III, IV, and V, 
respectively. In addition, State, USAID, DOD, and the Department of 
Justice provided technical corrections, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

State agreed with our report's findings and recommendations. State 
noted that our recommendation regarding the importance of a 
comprehensive TSCTP strategy is consistent with its view that the core 
strategy developed in 2005 would benefit from updates on issues such as 
the analysis of the counterterrorism challenge presented by the region, 
the funding levels and prioritization of available U.S. and non-U.S. 
resources, and the methodology used to evaluate program performance. 
State also commented that our report's recommendation concerning the 
importance of guidance on the appropriate integration of Department of 
Defense (DOD) personnel into the U.S. missions in TSCTP countries 
identifies an important issue. State observed that if a Chief of 
Mission and the area military commander are unable to reach agreement, 
they may refer the issue to the Secretaries of State and Defense for 
resolution. 

USAID likewise agreed with our findings and recommendations. USAID 
noted that our recommendations reinforce its efforts to encourage 
interagency collaboration and create efficiencies in implementation. 

DOD agreed with most of our findings and recommendations. However, DOD 
stated that it partially concurred with the recommendation regarding 
developing and issuing joint guidance with regard to DOD personnel 
temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner 
countries. Specifically, DOD believes that sufficient guidance exists 
in the government documents that define the authorities of DOD's 
Combatant Commander (COCOM) and State's Chief of Mission (COM). 
However, DOD noted that issuing joint guidance reflecting the 
implications of the shift to a greater DOD emphasis and support in 
shaping and deter operations would be helpful to both COCOMs and COMs 
in the TSCTP region. We added information about State's and DOD's 
authority in the report, but we maintain that joint guidance is needed 
to resolve existing disagreements over implementation of the agencies' 
respective authorities in some TSCTP countries. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies of available to others on request. 
In addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO's Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report examines (1) the distribution of funds for TSCTP in 2005 
through 2008 and the types of activities supported and (2) the 
program's implementation, including the extent to which it has been 
guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy. We performed our work 
from June 2007 through July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

In conducting our work, we interviewed representatives of the 
Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Justice, and the Treasury 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
Washington, D.C., and of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in 
Stuttgart, Germany. During site visits to three TSCTP partner 
countries, we visited a U.S.-funded military facility in Mali and we 
met with numerous Malian, Mauritanian, and Moroccan government and 
military officials. We also met with some nongovernmental organization 
representatives implementing TSCTP activities on behalf of the U.S. 
government. In selecting the countries we would visit, we considered 
the following criteria: funding allocations, geographic distribution, 
the number and duration of TSCTP activities in the country, and TSCTP 
representatives' recommendations. We also met with participants of the 
2008 Annual TSCTP conference hosted by EUCOM in Garmisch, Germany, in 
March 2008. 

To identify the agencies' obligations and commitments of funds for 
TSCTP for 2005 through 2008, we reviewed relevant laws that have 
appropriated funds for accounts supporting TSCTP. We asked State, DOD, 
and USAID officials to provide obligations for TSCTP activities by 
country and account for 2005 through 2007. We also received information 
on the agencies' commitments for TSCTP activities for 2008. We 
collected and reviewed the information and noted that there is no 
central repository for TSCTP funds, because the program is supported by 
funds from multiple accounts. Owing to the limitations of the data, we 
rounded the figures up to the nearest millions of dollars. We also 
reviewed and compared State, USAID, and DOD documents to verify the 
accuracy of the data provided by the agencies. Based on the checks 
performed and the assessment of the data, we believe that the data are 
sufficiently reliable to support general conclusions about State's and 
USAID's total obligations and commitments by year and also by country 
and are therefore sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. To identify the TSCTP activities implemented by U.S. government 
agencies, we collected and reviewed relevant documents from State, 
USAID, and DOD as well as the Department of the Treasury. We also 
interviewed relevant officials from the State, DOD, and USAID and the 
intelligence community. At State, we interviewed officials from the 
Bureau of African Affairs, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; we also met with officials from 
the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Office of 
the Foreign Assistance. At USAID, we met with officials from the Bureau 
for Africa. At DOD, we interviewed officials from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, U.S. Special Operations 
Command--Europe, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 

To examine the agencies' implementation of TSCTP, including the extent 
to which it has been guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy, we 
collected and reviewed U.S. government strategy documents and evaluated 
them against GAO-identified criteria for an interagency strategy. At 
the U.S. government level, we reviewed the National Security Strategy, 
the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and two key 
documents establishing the TSCTP. We also reviewed agencies' respective 
strategy documents. For State, we reviewed 2008 and 2009 Mission 
Strategic Plans (MSP) for all nine partner countries and the Country 
Reports on Terrorism. For DOD, we reviewed the Contingency Plan 
(CONPLAN) 7500, the OEF-TS Phase-2 Executive Order, and Country Action 
Plans (CAP) for some partner countries. For USAID, we reviewed USAID 
strategy documents, including the State-USAID Fiscal Year 2007-2012 
Strategic Plan and three USAID assessments for the Sahel countries. We 
also reviewed a draft USAID report on critical drivers underlying 
terrorism. To further identify aspects of TSCTP's implementation, we 
met with U.S. embassy staff, foreign government officials and NGO 
representatives in Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco. We also interviewed 
relevant U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C., and EUCOM in 
Stuttgart, Germany. Further, we met with participants attending the 
annual TSCTP conference in Garmisch, Germany, including EUCOM officials 
and U.S. Embassy officials from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, and Tunisia. To assess the disagreement between State and DOD 
related to the DOD personnel implementing TSCTP activities, we 
submitted questions requesting each agency's view regarding the chief 
of mission versus combatant command authorities at the embassy level. 
We received written responses from each agency and summarized these 
responses accordingly in our report. In addition, we plan to issue a 
classified annex to this report. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through July 2008, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Selected Accounts Used to Fund TSCTP Activities: 

State and USAID provide funding for TSCTP through the following key 
accounts: 

* Peacekeeping Operations - Provides assistance to friendly countries 
and international organizations for peacekeeping operations and other 
programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests 
of the United States. 

* Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs - 
Supports activities designed to enhance the antiterrorism skills of 
friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and 
counter terrorism. 

* Economic Support Funds - Supports assistance to countries in order to 
promote economic or political stability. 

* Development Assistance - Used to transfer financial resources to 
developing countries as well as to help countries solve development 
problems in accordance with a strategy that aims to insure wide 
participation of the poor in the benefits of development on a sustained 
basis. 

* Foreign Military Financing - Intended to promote U.S. national 
security by contributing to regional and global stability, 
strengthening military support for democratically-elected governments 
and containing transnational threats, including terrorism and 
trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons: 

DOD provides funding for TSCTP through the following key accounts: 

* Various Title X programs - Primary source of funding to support 
activities conducted by the armed forces, including training with 
foreign friendly forces. Federal law contains legal restrictions that 
require DOD to conduct activities solely with foreign military 
personnel and prohibit DOD from providing training to foreign law 
enforcement personnel or paramilitary units. 

* Section 1206 funds[Footnote 27] - DOD is authorized to conduct or 
support security assistance programs in foreign countries, using fiscal 
years 2006, 2007, and 2008 funds. These funds may be used by DOD with 
State's concurrence, to build the capacity of a foreign country's 
national military forces to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations or 
(2) participate in or support military and stability operations with 
the U.S. armed forces. These activities are jointly reviewed and 
approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State. 

* Section 1207/1210 funds[Footnote 28] - DOD is authorized to provide 
services to and transfer defense articles and funds to State for 
security, stability, and/or reconstruction to maintain peace and 
security in a foreign country. These activities are jointly reviewed 
and approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State. 

* Section 1208 funds - DOD is authorized to reimburse foreign forces, 
groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing 
military operations by U.S. special operations forces to combat 
terrorism. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

July 23, 2008: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating 
Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership," GAO Job Code 320506. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Daniel Epstein, Desk Officer, Bureau of African Affairs at (202) 736-
4435. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 

cc: GAO - Charles Johnson: 
AF - Jendayi Frazer: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Reports: 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (GAO-08-860, GAO Code 320506): 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report 
"Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership." 

We appreciate the GAO's recommendations for maximizing the potential of 
the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the courtesy 
and professionalism of the GAO staff during the review. We agree with 
the report's conclusion that "in supporting diplomacy, development 
assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening country and 
regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of 
extremist ideology of northwest Africa, the key agencies implementing 
TSCTP have undertaken an important effort to meet U.S. national 
security goals." Supporting the efforts of countries in North and West 
Africa to prevent the spread of terrorism and the imposition of 
extremist ideology in the region is an important USG priority. 

Most TSCTP partner countries are counted among the poorest countries in 
the world and currently lack the capacity to effectively combat this 
threat over the long-term. However, they have demonstrated critical 
political will to fight terrorism and will continue to benefit from 
U.S. assistance. The operation of TSCTP recognizes that a sustained 
interagency approach to counter-terrorism/counter-extremism is vital. 
The approach is designed to address immediate security challenges and 
assist countries in their long-term efforts to prevent terrorists from 
using the areas as sources of recruits, sanctuary, sustainment, and 
finance. The program's long-term objective is to make the area 
inhospitable to terrorists and those who want to promote extremism. 

The report's recommendation regarding the importance of a comprehensive 
TSCTP strategy is consistent with our view that the initiative would 
benefit from an update of the core strategy developed in 2005. The 
strategy provides a strong foundation for program implementation and 
would benefit from updates on such issues as the analysis of the 
counter-terrorism challenge presented by the region, the funding levels 
and prioritization of the USG and non-USG resources available and 
appropriate to respond to the challenges, and the methodology to 
evaluate program performance. Program implementation is guided by 
recognition that threats, requirements, and absorptive capacities vary 
widely among the TSCTP countries and our individual country engagement 
strategies are therefore tailored to respond to individual needs and 
opportunities. 

The report's recommendation concerning the importance of guidance on 
the appropriate integration of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel 
into the U.S. Missions in TSCTP countries identifies another important 
issue. Pursuant to the President's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of 
Mission (COMs), the COM has full responsibility for the direction, 
coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive 
branch employees in his or her country of assignment, regardless of 
their employment categories or location, except those under command of 
a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international 
organization. 

Most DOD personnel implementing TSCTP activities on a nonpermanent 
basis are under the command of the area military commander and thus, 
pursuant to the terms of the President's letter to COMs, do not 
directly fall under COM authority. In practice, however, these DOD 
personnel come under COM control at post: they seek clearance from the 
Ambassador to enter the country to conduct their activities, and while 
posted there they abide by COM rules and policies and are subject to 
the COM's supervision. DOD's common practice in TSCTP countries of 
deploying personnel for seriatim "enduring presence" extended tdy 
periods, however, creates positions considered "permanent" under 
Department policy. Like other permanent Mission positions, employees 
encumbering those positions should come under COM authority. If a COM 
and the area military commander are unable to reach agreement, they may 
refer the issue to the Secretaries of State and Defense for resolution.
[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW: 
Washington, DC 20523: 
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]: 

Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr., 
Director International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

July 24, 2008: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on 
the draft GAO report entitled Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to 
Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(GAO-08-860). 

USAID has been a committed partner in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP) from its inception. While this area of programming 
is not part of the traditional focus of reducing poverty, advancing 
democracy, building market economies, promoting security, responding to 
crises, and improving quality of life, USAID recognizes the strategic 
contribution that such assistance provides in addressing broader 
challenges. 

USAID appreciates the recommendations in the report that reinforce our 
efforts to encourage interagency collaboration and create efficiencies 
in implementation. For example, in the most recent TSCTP Interagency 
Conference, one of the key recommendations was to update the original 
planning documents from 2005. USAID is also moving forward with field 
testing of indicators to better determine if development activities 
affect the root causes of extremism in an Africa context. In terms of 
detailed technical comments, our staff provided technical comments to 
your staff earlier in the week by email. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this 
review. We look forward to receiving the final report once completed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Franklin Moore: 
Deputy Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Africa: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
International Security Affairs: 
2400 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2400: 

July 28, 2008: 

Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs & Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Johnson: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-08-860, "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance 
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership," dated 
July 9, 2008 (GAO Code 320506). 

The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and Defense develop 
and issue joint guidance with regard to DoD personnel conducting 
operations in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 
partner countries (Page 26/GAO Draft Report). 

DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. Sufficient guidance 
exists in governing statutes and directives that prescribe the 
authorities of the Combatant Commander (COCOM) and the Chief of Mission 
(COM) regarding deployed DoD personnel, including those participating 
in TSCTP efforts under Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-
TS). Examples include: 10 U.S.C. Section 164, 22 U.S.C. Section 
3902(a), 22 U.S.C. 3927, 22 U.S.C. 4802(c), the Foreign Affairs 
Handbook Volume 2, the Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 1, each COM Letter 
of Instruction from the President, and Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine 
for the Armed Forces of the United States," dated May 14, 2007 
(specifically in Chapters II and IV). However, issuing further guidance 
reflecting the implications of DoD's growing role in shaping and 
deterrence operations would be helpful to both COCOMs and COMs in the 
TSCTP region. [See comment 1] 

We understand that further analytic details regarding TSCTP, 
specifically addressing Department and Agency obligations in the 
context of the original strategic guidance and resource commitments, 
will be addressed in a follow-on classified annex. 

Specific DoD comments regarding GAO recommendations are contained in 
the attachment. 

My point of contact on this issue is Mr. Jeff McManus at commercial 
(703) 571-9398 or electronic mail address: [email protected]. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Theresa Whelan: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs: 

GAO Draft Report Dated July 9, 2008: 
GAO-08-860 (GAO CODE 320506): 

"Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed To Enhance Implementation Of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership" 

Department Of Defense Comments On The GAO Recommendations: 

General Comments: The report assesses the strategic objectives, 
resource obligations, and challenges faced by the U.S. departments and 
agencies in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The 
GAO states there is no comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide 
TSCTP implementation. The report outlines disagreements between State 
and DoD regarding what State's authority should be for some DoD 
personnel conducting TSCTP activities in some countries. The report 
states that fluctuations in the distribution of obligations for TSCTP 
activities have limited USAID's implementation of TSCTP. The report 
points out that the U.S. Government has few common mechanisms for 
measuring TSCTP activities' outcomes. 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and 
Defense develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DoD personnel 
conducting operations in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP) partner countries (Page 26/GAO Draft Report). 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. Sufficient guidance exists in governing 
statutes and directives that prescribe the authorities of the Combatant 
Commander (COCOM) and the Chief of Mission (COM) regarding deployed DoD 
personnel, including those participating in TSCTP efforts under 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). Examples include: 10 
U.S.C. Section 164, 22 U.S.C. Section 3902(a), 22 U.S.C. 3927, 22 
U.S.C. 4802(c), the Foreign Affairs Handbook Volume 2, the Foreign 
Affairs Manual Volume 1, each COM Letter of Instruction from the 
President, and Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of 
the United States, dated May 14, 2007 (specifically in Chapters II and 
IV). 

However, issuing further guidance reflecting the implications of DoD's 
growing role in shaping and deterrence operations would be helpful to 
both COCOMs and COMs in the TSCTP region. 

We understand that further analytic details regarding TSCTP, 
specifically addressing Department and Agency obligations in the 
context of the original strategic guidance and resource commitments, 
will be addressed in a follow-on classified annex. 

The following is GAO's comment from the Department of Defense's letter 
dated July 28, 2008. 

GAO Comment: 

1. DOD states that it partially concurs with our recommendation that 
State and DOD develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DOD 
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the 
partner countries. DOD believes that sufficient guidance exists in the 
government documents that define the authorities of DOD's Combatant 
Commander (COCOM) and State's Chief of Mission (COM). DOD also comments 
that issuing joint guidance reflecting the implications of the shift to 
a greater DOD emphasis and support in shaping and deter operations 
would be helpful to both COCOMs and COMs in the TSCTP region. In 
response to DOD's comments, we have cited both COCOM and COM 
authorities in the report. However, we maintain that joint guidance 
from State and DOD is needed to resolve existing disagreements over 
implementation of these authorities in some TSCTP countries. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Zina D. Merritt (Assistant Director), Ashley Alley, Nanette J. Barton, 
David Dornisch, Reid Lelong Lowe, and John F. Miller made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to 
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable 
Afghan National Security Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to 
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-622]. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs 
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-336]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 29, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist 
Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697]. Washington, 
D.C.: May 25, 2007. 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 
21, 2005. 

International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address 
Islamic Extremism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
852.Washington], D.C.: September 16, 2005. 

Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T]. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2004. 

Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to 
Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 
2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to 
Terrorism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For example, an Algerian terrorist group, formerly known as the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), merged with Al Qaeda in 
September 2006 and subsequently, in early 2007, changed its name to Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). 

[2] In this report, all years cited are fiscal years (Oct. 1-Sept. 30). 

[3] TSCTP, originally known as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Initiative, was developed as a follow-on to the Pan-Sahel Initiative, 
which provided basic military training and equipment to the militaries 
of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger from 2002 through 2004. 

[4] Obligations reflect a liability or binding agreement. Commitments 
are estimates or projections that may be used to project future 
obligations but are not based on a legal obligation. 

[5] From 2005 through 2007, the key agencies participating in TSCTP 
obligated about $230 million for TSCTP activities. For 2008, the 
agencies' commitments totaled approximately $123 million. 

[6] These agencies are considering increasing their TSCTP involvement 
in the future. 

[7] Our previous work has shown that the following practices can help 
agencies overcome barriers to interagency collaboration in large-scale 
efforts where such collaboration is essential: (1) develop a strategy 
with clearly defined goals and objectives, among other elements; (2) 
agree on roles and responsibilities and establish policies for 
operating across agency boundaries; (3) identify resource needs and 
deploy available resources; and (4) develop mechanisms to monitor, 
evaluate, and report on results. See page 46 of this report for a 
listing of our previous work. 

[8] Country teams in embassies are made up of key figures from the 
State Department and other agencies that work under the direction of 
the ambassador and meet regularly to share information and coordinate 
their actions. 

[9] Although State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is charged 
with developing coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad, S/ 
CT has not been charged with developing a strategy for TSCTP. 

[10] OSD's Office of African Affairs oversees DOD's TSCTP activities, 
provides policy and guidance to EUCOM, and interfaces with other U.S. 
agencies in TSCTP implementation. 

[11] EUCOM's Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) is DOD's 
component of TSCTP. In October 2008, execution authority for OEF-TS 
will transition from EUCOM to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). 

[12] See appendix I for a description of our methodology for obtaining 
these data and assessing their reliability. 

[13] Because no specific congressional authorization or appropriation 
exists for TSCTP, State, USAID, and DOD fund their TSCTP activities 
through multiple accounts. State requested funds for TSCTP as a line 
item in the 2009 Congressional Budget Justification; the request 
included funds for USAID, which is included in State's budgetary 
process. DOD has designated funds for TSCTP for 2008 through 2012, 
including funds from the Sections 1206 and 1207 accounts, which it 
provides to State and USAID. See appendix II for more information. 

[14] In addition to conducting TSCTP activities, each agency conducts 
other activities that support U.S. counterterrorism goals in northwest 
Africa. 

[15] Equipment is provided to militaries of TSCTP partner countries 
through State-funded programs and is distributed by DOD personnel in 
the partner countries. 

[16] Our previous work identified the following practices, among 
others, that can help agencies enhance and sustain large-scale efforts, 
such as counterterrorism programs, where interagency collaboration is 
essential: (1) establish a strategy that clearly defines goals, 
objectives, priorities, and milestones, among other elements; (2) 
define and agree on roles and responsibilities, including how the 
collaborative effort will be led, and establish compatible policies, 
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (3) 
identify resource needs and deploy available resources; and (4) develop 
mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results. See GAO, Results-Oriented 
Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration 
among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); Evaluation of 
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). See page 46 of this report for a listing of these 
products and other related GAO work. 

[17] State, USAID, and DOD rotate responsibility for hosting an annual 
TSCTP conference; DOD hosted the March 2008 conference in Germany. 

[18] After reviewing these and other agency documents and conferring 
with agency officials, we derived the following as TSCTP goals: (1) 
strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities; (2) enhancing and 
institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (3) 
denying support and sanctuary through strategically targeted 
development assistance; (4) promoting good governance; (5) discrediting 
terrorist ideology; and (6) reinforcing bilateral military ties. 

[19] State and USAID follow a 2-year budget process, in which bureaus' 
funding requests are submitted 2 years prior to appropriation and 
obligation of funds. 

[20] DOD also produces multiple plans to address the military goals and 
objectives for the Global and Regional War on Terror. 

[21] These DOD personnel do not include individuals already considered 
to be under embassy Chief of Missions' authority, such as Defense 
Attaches and Security Assistance Officers. 

[22] According to a DOD official, DOD personnel are not required to 
operate within a U.S. embassy compound, and in some countries, DOD has 
operations and facilities outside the embassies. 

[23] When a rebellion in Chad began, the embassy was evacuated and all 
U.S. government personnel were withdrawn. Since the evacuation of U.S. 
personnel from Chad, the embassy has reopened and plans for TSCTP 
activities are being reevaluated. 

[24] Some of the 2007 obligations for USAID's TSCTP activities in Mali 
were provided through the Section 1207 account, which allows DOD to 
transfer funds to State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization 
assistance in a foreign country. 

[25] Previously, we have found that federal agencies engaged in 
collaborative efforts need to create the means to monitor and evaluate 
their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. We also 
found that reporting on activities can help key decision makers within 
the agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, to obtain feedback 
for improving both policy and operational effectiveness. See GAO-06-15. 

[26] Congressional Research Service, Combating Terrorism: The Challenge 
of Measuring Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: 2007). 

[27] The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109- 
163, ï¿½ 1206, Jan. 6, 2006) authorized Section 1206 programs to be 
funded with funds from 2006 and 2007. The John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2007 (Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 1210, Oct. 17, 2006) 
extended this authorization to include funds from 2008. 

[28] The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109- 
163, ï¿½ 1207, Jan. 6, 2006) authorized Section 1207 funds and services 
to be provided through the end of 2007. Section 1210 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181 ï¿½ 1210, Jan. 
20, 2008) reauthorized and extended the program through 2008. 

[End of section] 

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