Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to Guidance Would	 
Improve DOD's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the		 
Availability of Critical Transportation Assets (15-AUG-08,	 
GAO-08-851).							 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Critical 
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of	 
mission-critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air 
transportation assets to carry out its missions. GAO was asked to
evaluate (1) the extent to which the U.S. Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM) has identified, prioritized, and assessed critical	 
transportation assets; (2) the extent to which DOD installation  
personnel have taken actions to help assure the availability of  
critical transportation assets, both within and independent of	 
DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical transportation asset	 
assurance. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 22 critical	 
transportation assets, reviewed relevant DOD guidance and	 
documents, and interviewed cognizant officials. 		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-851 					        
    ACCNO:   A83566						        
  TITLE:     Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to Guidance   
Would Improve DOD's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the	 
Availability of Critical Transportation Assets			 
     DATE:   08/15/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Air transportation 				 
	     Assets						 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Critical infrastructure				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Military facilities				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Transportation					 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Program costs					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Defense Critical Infrastructure Program		 

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GAO-08-851

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

August 2008: 

Defense Critical Infrastructure: 

Adherence to Guidance Would Improve DOD's Approach to Identifying and 
Assuring the Availability of Critical Transportation Assets: 

Defense Critical Infrastructure: 

GAO-08-851: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-851, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Critical 
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-
critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air transportation 
assets to carry out its missions. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the 
extent to which the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has 
identified, prioritized, and assessed critical transportation assets; 
(2) the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken actions 
to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets, both 
within and independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical 
transportation asset assurance. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 
22 critical transportation assets, reviewed relevant DOD guidance and 
documents, and interviewed cognizant officials. 

What GAO Found: 

TRANSCOM has taken some actions to identify, prioritize, and assess its 
critical transportation assets but, according to officials from the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americasï¿½ Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]), its methodology for doing so, 
until recently, has been inconsistent with the intent of DODï¿½s various 
DCIP guidance and with the approach adopted by some of the other 
combatant commands and military services. TRANSCOM considers entire 
installationsï¿½military air bases, seaports, and commercial airportsï¿½as 
critical assets, rather than identifying assets with greater 
specificity, such as individual runways, navigation aids, and fuel 
storage facilities. This methodology diminishes the reliability of the 
critical transportation asset list, a condition that impedes DODï¿½s 
ability to prioritize its critical assets departmentwide and 
effectively target spending on risk-reduction efforts. Further, 
TRANSCOM was using its vulnerability assessments to identify specific 
critical transportation assets on the installations. This practice 
conflicts with DODï¿½s DCIP guidance not to use vulnerability assessments 
to identify critical assets. Though TRANSCOM officials stated that they 
now plan to discontinue this practice, they were unable to provide 
ASD(HD&ASA) or GAO with any documentation to confirm that this decision 
had occurred officially. Further, TRANSCOMï¿½s memorandum of 
understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation 
subject matter experts on the Joint Staffï¿½s vulnerability assessments 
with a DCIP module is still in draft. In May 2008, TRANSCOM officials 
told GAO that they now plan to use the draft DCIP critical asset 
identification process to reevaluate its 300 identified critical 
transportation assets; however, a timeline to complete this has not yet 
been determined. 

DOD installation personnel at the 22 sites GAO visited have taken 
actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation 
assets; however, these actions have routinely occurred independent of 
DCIP. Consequently, they do not consider the full spectrum of threats 
and hazards and they tend to focus on preventing mass personnel 
casualties instead of critical asset assurance. DCIPï¿½s impact at the 
installations where the assets are located was negligible because of 
the lack of service-specific guidance. This gap in guidance hinders 
installation personnelï¿½s ability to make informed risk management 
decisions based on asset criticality. Coordination efforts between 
installation personnel and non-DOD owners of critical transportation 
assets and supporting public works infrastructure were substantial, but 
have been focused on the protection of people and not on asset 
assurance. 

DOD has allocated approximately $283 million for DCIP from fiscal years 
2004 to 2008, including $8.6 million to TRANSCOM for its combatant 
command and defense sector responsibilities. Critical infrastructure 
assurance efforts also have been funded through other DOD complementary 
programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and through foreign 
government contributions. Although existing DCIP funding does not 
include funding for remediating asset vulnerabilities, remediation has 
been funded from these other sources. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends TRANSCOM (1) implement established criteria to identify 
critical transportation assets, and develop a timeline for doing so, 
(2) discontinue its use of vulnerability assessments as its primary 
tool for identifying its critical assets, and (3) finalize an agreement 
with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation experts on Joint 
Staff DCIP vulnerability assessments, and that the military services 
develop and implement service-specific DCIP guidance. DOD partially 
concurred with the recommendations. GAO modified one recommendation on 
vulnerability assessments, in response to agency comments. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-851]. For more information, 
contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

TRANSCOM Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Critical 
Transportation Assets Have Been Inconsistent with Guidance: 

Most Installations Took Some Steps to Assure the Availability of 
Critical Transportation and Public Works Assets but Were Unaware of 
Asset Criticality and Lacked a DCIP Focus: 

Critical Transportation Asset Assurance Has Received Some Funding 
through DCIP and Has Benefited from Other Sources of Funding: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Table: 

Table 1: Number of Critical Transportation Assets Selected by Asset 
Category and Geographic Combatant Command Area of Responsibility: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility: 

Figure 2: DOD Guidance for Risk Management: 

Figure 3: TRANSCOM's Efforts Prior to Implementing DCIP's Asset 
Identification Process: 

Figure 4: Representative Types of Critical Transportation Assets: 

Figure 5: TRANSCOM's DCIP Funding Trend, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2013: 

Figure 6: GAO Critical Transportation Asset Selection Methodology: 

Abbreviations: 

ASD(HD&ASA): Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs: 

DCIP: Defense Critical Infrastructure Program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

TRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

August 14, 2008: 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable W. Todd Akin: 
House of Representatives: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a global network of critical 
surface, sea, and air transportation infrastructure--such as roads, 
railways, seaports, military air bases, and commercial airports--to 
carry out its missions. The incapacitation or destruction of one or 
more of the assets constituting this network of critical infrastructure 
could have a debilitating effect on DOD's ability to project, support, 
and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DOD's critical 
transportation infrastructure is owned by both DOD and non-DOD 
entities, including private companies, state and local governments, and 
foreign governments. Because of its importance to DOD operations, this 
critical infrastructure represents an attractive target to adversaries, 
and may also be vulnerable to a host of natural disasters and 
accidents. DOD has recognized and emphasized the importance of assuring 
the availability of mission-critical infrastructure in the most recent 
versions of the National Military Strategy[Footnote 1] and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 2] Critical assets in the 
Transportation Defense Sector depend on public works infrastructure 
that provides the utilities needed for many transportation critical 
assets to remain operational.[Footnote 3] To identify and help assure 
the availability of mission-critical infrastructure, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security 
Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) was assigned responsibility for the risk-based 
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) in September 2003. 
ASD(HD&ASA) subsequently issued guidance in August 2005 articulating 
the roles and responsibilities for DOD organizations involved in the 
program.[Footnote 4] 

Under DCIP, DOD created 10 functionally based defense sectors and 
designated a Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agent (sector lead 
agent) for each sector.[Footnote 5] The U.S. Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM) is the sector lead agent for the Transportation Defense 
Sector. DOD Directive 3020.40 assigns the sector lead agent 
responsibility for, in collaboration with other DCIP stakeholders, 
identifying the interdependencies among infrastructure that crosses DOD 
sector boundaries, and for maintaining a characterization of sector 
support functions, systems, assets, and dependencies as they relate to 
identified operational capabilities and assets. Because TRANSCOM also 
is a combatant command, it is responsible for preventing and mitigating 
the loss of DOD-owned critical assets, within its assigned area of 
responsibility, and for coordinating with the military services and 
other sector lead agents in identifying and assessing critical assets. 
In addition to DCIP, DOD has established several other complementary 
programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, that predate DCIP but 
contribute indirectly to the protection and assurance of critical 
assets. 

You requested that we review a number of issues related to DOD's 
mission-critical infrastructure. To date, we have issued four reports 
in response to that request. Our first report examined the extent to 
which DOD has developed a comprehensive management plan for DCIP and 
the actions needed to identify, prioritize, and assess defense critical 
infrastructure.[Footnote 6] The second report examined DOD's efforts to 
implement a risk management approach for defense industrial base 
critical assets.[Footnote 7] The third report examined the extent to 
which DOD included highly sensitive assets in its critical 
infrastructure program.[Footnote 8] Finally, the fourth report focused 
on threats and vulnerabilities affecting intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance operations at Creech Air Force Base, 
Nevada.[Footnote 9] As agreed with your offices, we plan to issue two 
additional reports later this year. The first report evaluates DOD's 
efforts to assure the availability of critical infrastructure in the 
Space; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and Global 
Information Grid Defense Sectors.[Footnote 10] The other report 
examines the extent to which DOD has trained key personnel and 
developed expertise to assist DOD organizations across five defense 
sectors in assuring the availability of critical infrastructure and has 
incorporated the assurance of critical infrastructure into exercises. 

In 2007, we reported that DCIP implementation at the department, 
military service, and combatant command headquarters levels was 
relatively immature.[Footnote 11] To understand what impact this was 
having on the availability of mission-essential transportation and 
supporting public works assets,[Footnote 12] this report focuses on DOD 
and non-DOD (i.e., foreign) installations where the critical 
transportation assets are located. Specifically, we evaluated (1) the 
extent to which TRANSCOM has identified, prioritized, and assessed its 
critical transportation assets; (2) the extent to which DOD 
installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the 
availability of critical transportation assets, both within and 
independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical transportation 
asset assurance. 

Critical asset tiers: 

Tier 1--An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could 
result in mission (or function) failure at the DOD, military 
department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or 
defense infrastructure sector level. 

Tier 2--An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could 
result in mission (or function) degradation at the DOD, military 
department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or 
defense infrastructure sector level. 

Tier 3--An asset the loss, incapacitation, or disruption of which could 
result in mission (or function) failure below the military department, 
combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or defense 
infrastructure sector level. 

We drew a nonprobability sample[Footnote 13] of critical transportation 
assets in the United States and abroad, using draft critical asset 
lists developed by the Joint Staff, each of the four military services, 
and TRANSCOM. We selected assets based on (1) overlap among the various 
critical asset lists; (2) geographic dispersion among geographic 
combatant commands' areas of responsibility; (3) representation from 
each military service; and (4) representation in the three asset 
categories--air bases, seaports, and commercial airports--TRANSCOM 
identified in the continental United States, and in the European, 
Middle Eastern, and Pacific regions. Through this methodology, we 
selected 22 assets for review, including two of the four Tier 1 
critical transportation assets.[Footnote 14] Tier 1 assets represent 
those assets that are most critical for carrying out combatant command 
missions. 

Figure 1 shows the areas of responsibility for each geographic 
combatant command. 

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility: 

This figure is a map of the combatant commands' areas of 
responsibility. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data. 

[A] The state of Alaska is assigned to the U.S. Northern Command's area 
of responsibility. Forces based in Alaska, however, may be assigned to 
multiple commands. 

[B] The U.S. Africa Command was officially established in October 2007 
with a goal to reach full operational capability as a geographic 
combatant command by September 30, 2008, assuming responsibility for 
U.S. military activities in Africa. 

[End of figure] 

Further, we assessed relevant planning documents, including continuity 
of operations and emergency management plans for assets we selected for 
review and for the associated public works assets that support them. We 
reviewed Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments that 
focus on critical infrastructure, when available, for those DOD and 
foreign installations we visited. Also, we analyzed relevant Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), military service, and combatant command 
guidance and funding data. Within DOD, we interviewed officials from 
OSD, the Joint Staff, defense agencies, the military services, 
combatant commands, subcomponent commands, sector lead agents, and 
installation-level organizations in the United States and abroad. In 
addition, we interviewed officials at the Department of Homeland 
Security, at three U.S. embassies and three commercial airports; host 
nation officials; and officials in both the private sector and 
academia. (Throughout this unclassified report, we do not identify 
specific assets, their locations or installations, or combatant command 
or others' missions that the assets support because that information is 
classified.) We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 through 
July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. To assess 
the reliability of data, we interviewed appropriate officials and 
reviewed relevant documentation. We found the data provided by DOD to 
be sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and extent of the 
DCIP funding. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology 
is provided in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Although TRANSCOM has taken some actions to identify, prioritize, and 
assess its critical transportation assets, its methodology for doing 
so, until recently, has been, according to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, 
inconsistent with the intent of DCIP guidance and with the approach 
adopted by some of the other combatant commands and military services. 
TRANSCOM has identified entire installations--military air bases, 
seaports, and commercial airports--as critical assets, rather than 
identifying critical assets with greater specificity, such as 
individual runways, navigation aids, and fuel storage facilities. 
TRANSCOM officials identified entire installations based on their 
interpretation of the definition of an asset as outlined in DOD 
Directive 3020.40 and because these types of installations constitute 
the worldwide Defense Transportation System necessary to carry out 
TRANSCOM's missions. This methodology of identifying critical assets 
diminishes the reliability of the critical transportation asset list, a 
condition that impedes DOD's ability to prioritize its critical assets 
and effectively target spending for risk reduction efforts. TRANSCOM 
was using its Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments 
to identify specific critical transportation assets on the 
installations, a practice that conflicts with DOD's DCIP guidance not 
to use vulnerability assessments for this purpose. Though TRANSCOM 
officials stated that they now plan to discontinue this practice, they 
were unable to provide ASD(HD&ASA) or us with any documentation to 
confirm that this decision had occurred officially. Further, TRANSCOM's 
memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as 
transportation subject matter experts on the Joint Staff's 
vulnerability assessments with a DCIP module is still in draft. In May 
2008, TRANSCOM officials told us that they now plan to use the draft 
DCIP critical asset identification process to reevaluate its critical 
transportation assets. TRANSCOM officials believe that this will result 
in a "significant reduction" in the number of assets it identifies as 
critical; however, TRANSCOM has not yet set a timeline to begin and 
complete this reevaluation. 

DOD installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the 
availability of critical transportation assets. However, because the 
vast majority of these actions have occurred outside of DCIP, their 
actions do not consider the full spectrum of threats and hazards, and 
tend to focus on preventing mass personnel casualties instead of 
assuring asset availability. Although DOD established DCIP to help 
assure the availability of critical infrastructure--including 
transportation assets--departmentwide, DCIP's impact at the 22 
installations we visited where the assets were located was negligible. 
For 18 of the 22 critical transportation assets we examined, we found 
that (1) installation personnel were often unaware of the criticality 
of their assets for TRANSCOM's missions and (2) coordination efforts 
between installation personnel and DOD and non-DOD owners of critical 
transportation assets and their supporting public works infrastructure 
were substantial, but again tended to focus on the protection of people 
and not on ensuring the availability of critical assets. DCIP guidance 
instructs the military departments to allocate resources for an 
organizational program supporting DCIP, including the implementation of 
risk management decisions. Further, it requires combatant commands to 
coordinate with other combatant commands, the military services, and 
sector lead agents in identifying and assessing critical assets and 
associated infrastructure interdependencies and to act to prevent or 
mitigate loss or degradation of critical assets. However, at 20 of the 
22 installations we visited, critical assets were not incorporated into 
installations' emergency management, continuity of operations, or risk 
management plans. Further, installation personnel attributed their 
unfamiliarity with DCIP to the military services not yet having issued 
DCIP implementing guidance as well as the frequent rotations of 
installation commanders. As a result, this gap hindered installation 
personnel's ability to make informed risk management decisions, such as 
remediation priorities, because installation personnel at the sites we 
visited were not aware of what assets were more critical than others. 

DOD has allocated approximately $283 million in budgeted and 
supplemental appropriations for critical asset assurance through DCIP 
from fiscal years 2004 to 2008, including about $8.6 million to 
TRANSCOM. DCIP guidance requires combatant commands and sector lead 
agents to provide adequate resources to implement their DCIP 
responsibilities. To this end, TRANSCOM has allocated approximately 
$5.7 million for its combatant command DCIP responsibilities and $2.9 
million for its Transportation Defense Sector DCIP responsibilities 
during this 5-year period to identify and assess its critical assets. 
Additionally, asset owners have funded critical asset initiatives 
through other DOD programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, as well 
as benefited from funding from foreign government payments in countries 
where DOD has identified critical transportation assets. Although 
existing DCIP funding does not include funding for remediation of 
critical asset vulnerabilities, some remediation has occurred through 
these other complementary programs. 

We are recommending that TRANSCOM fully implement the criteria, 
methodology, and process in the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification 
Process manual to reevaluate and update the identification of all 
critical transportation assets, and develop a timeline for doing so; 
discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its critical assets; 
and finalize the memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to 
enable TRANSCOM transportation subject matter experts to participate in 
the DCIP module of a Joint Staff vulnerability assessment. Also, we are 
recommending that the military departments develop and implement 
service-specific guidance based on published DOD DCIP guidance. 

GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD in July 2008 with three 
draft recommendations for its review and comment. In written comments 
on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our 
recommendations. Based on DOD's agency comments, we modified one 
recommendation (making it two recommendations rather than one) to 
reflect the distinction between the separate issues of finalizing the 
memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff and discontinuing the 
use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments as the 
primary tool to identify critical assets. Also, TRANSCOM and U.S. 
Central Command provided us with technical comments, which we 
incorporated in the report as appropriate. DOD's response is reprinted 
in appendix II. 

Background: 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,[Footnote 15] issued in 
December 2003, designates the Secretary of Homeland Security as the 
principal federal official responsible for leading, integrating, and 
coordinating the overall national effort to protect the nation's 
critical infrastructure and key resources. Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 also requires all federal departments and 
agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of 
critical infrastructure and key resources from terrorist attacks. 
ASD(HD&ASA), within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, serves as the principal civilian advisor and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the principal military advisor to 
the Secretary of Defense on critical infrastructure protection. 

The Transportation Defense Sector is made up of a worldwide network of 
DOD and non-DOD surface, sea, and air assets that the U.S. military 
relies on to move personnel and equipment. Currently, the 
Transportation Defense Sector consists of 300 critical air bases, 
seaports, and commercial airports worldwide and owned by DOD, other 
U.S. governmental organizations, private companies, and foreign 
governments. According to TRANSCOM officials, the Transportation 
Defense Sector is highly resilient because of significant redundancy 
among the various modes of transportation, particularly as it relates 
to surface transportation. For example, the size and capabilities of 
the U.S. rail and highway networks afford ability to reroute shipments 
via alternate roads and rail lines in the event of disruptions, a key 
reason why surface transportation assets were not identified as 
critical. 

In addition to DCIP, DOD has established other complementary programs 
that help assure critical assets, including the Antiterrorism 
Program[Footnote 16] and the Defense Continuity Program.[Footnote 17] 
The Antiterrorism Program is intended to establish protection standards 
for DOD assets against terrorist attacks. The Defense Continuity 
Program is intended to ensure that DOD mission-essential functions 
continue under all circumstances, such as a man-made or natural 
disaster. DCIP supports a risk-management process that seeks to ensure 
defense critical infrastructure availability. The risk-management 
process is comprised of a risk assessment component that identifies 
critical assets and infrastructure interdependencies that support DOD 
missions. Applicable follow-on threat and vulnerability assessments are 
then conducted on those assets to complete the risk assessment. The 
risk response component ensures that limited resources are optimally 
allocated towards those assets deemed most important to overall mission 
success for DOD, and for which it has been determined that the 
identified level of risk is unacceptable. 

Several DOD organizations have key roles in helping assure the 
availability of DOD's transportation critical assets. The military 
services, defense agencies, and the combatant commands are responsible, 
in coordination with the sector lead agents, for identifying and 
assessing critical assets. The military departments, in their role as 
executive agent for the combatant commands, provide funding and 
resources for combatant command critical infrastructure programs. DOD 
Directive 3020.40 also states that sector lead agents are responsible 
for collaborating with other defense sector lead agents and DOD DCIP 
stakeholders to identify cross-sector interdependencies. 

TRANSCOM Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Critical 
Transportation Assets Have Been Inconsistent with Guidance: 

According to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, TRANSCOM's methodology for 
identifying, prioritizing, and assessing its critical transportation 
assets is inconsistent with the intent of DOD's DCIP guidance and with 
the approach adopted by some of the other combatant commands and 
military services. TRANSCOM officials stated in May 2008 that they now 
plan to leverage the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process 
manual to reevaluate its currently identified critical transportation 
assets; however, a timeline to complete this reevaluation has not yet 
been established. Further, until recently, TRANSCOM relied on its 
vulnerability assessments to identify critical transportation assets, 
an action that also conflicted with established DOD guidance and 
practice. While TRANSCOM officials stated that they will discontinue 
the use of vulnerability assessment for identification purposes, they 
were unable to provide any documentation to ASD(HD&ASA) or us to 
confirm this decision officially. Moreover, its memorandum of 
understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation 
subject matter experts on Joint Staff DCIP vulnerability assessments is 
still in draft. 

TRANSCOM's Asset Identification Efforts Are Inconsistent with Intent of 
DCIP Guidance and Practice: 

At the time of our review, TRANSCOM had identified 300 Tier 1 and Tier 
2 critical transportation assets linked to its global mobility mission. 
TRANSCOM officials told us that they identified larger systems of 
assets--categorized as air bases, seaports, and commercial airports-- 
based on their interpretation of the definition of an asset as outlined 
in DOD Directive 3020.40.[Footnote 18] TRANSCOM officials explained 
that these types of installations are part of its worldwide Defense 
Transportation System that is necessary to carry out TRANSCOM's 
missions. This broad list of assets has been submitted to the Joint 
Staff for inclusion in DOD's overall draft critical asset list. Because 
of TRANSCOM's interpretation of the guidance, its critical asset list 
lacks the specificity of the critical asset lists prepared by some of 
the other combatant commands and military services. Moreover, according 
to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, TRANSCOM's decision to identify entire 
installations was inconsistent with the intent of DCIP guidance. While 
TRANSCOM is not the only combatant command or military service to 
identify an entire installation as critical, it is the only 
organization that has done so for its entire list. DOD guidance 
requires combatant commands to first identify their missions, the 
critical assets that support those missions, and the threats and 
hazards to those critical assets, and then assess the vulnerability of 
the critical assets to the threats and hazards identified (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: DOD Guidance for Risk Management[Footnote 19] 

This figure is a flow chart showing the steps of DOD guidance for risk 
management. 

Step 1: Identify Combatant Command Missions; 
Step 2: Identify Critical Assets; 
Step 3: Identify Threats and Hazards to Critical Assets; 
Step 4: Conduct Vulnerability. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

TRANSCOM skips steps two and three listed in figure 2 and instead has 
been using Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments to 
identify specific critical assets. According to TRANSCOM officials, the 
identification of threats and hazards to critical assets (step 3) is 
incorporated in the conduct of vulnerability assessments (step 4), 
since Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments 
specifically address vulnerability to all threats and hazards. 

ASD(HD&ASA) officials stated that when they began developing an overall 
DOD critical asset list, they told the combatant commands and military 
services that stopping the identification process for critical assets 
at the installation level is insufficient for the purposes of DCIP. As 
a result of continued submission of entire installations as critical 
assets, ASD(HD&ASA) published in March 2008 the Strategy for Defense 
Critical Infrastructure[Footnote 20] to reiterate the need for greater 
specificity in critical asset identification. Further, ASD(HD&ASA) is 
developing the DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, which 
is still in draft, but also notes that stopping the asset 
identification process at the system level (e.g., an air base, seaport, 
or commercial airport) does not meet the needs of DCIP, and that rarely 
is an entire system essential to mission success. For example, it is 
insufficient to identify an air base as a critical asset; rather, more 
specific assets, such as a runway, should be identified as appropriate. 
Figure 3 illustrates the DCIP critical asset identification process and 
where TRANSCOM's previous efforts have stopped. 

Figure 3: TRANSCOM's Efforts Prior to Implementing DCIP's Asset 
Identification Process: 

This figure is a flowchart of TRANSCOM's efforts prior to implementing 
DCIP's asset identification process. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

TRANSCOM officials stated that because the DOD Critical Asset 
Identification Process manual was still in draft, they had initially 
chosen not to implement its contents until its formal publication. 
According to TRANSCOM officials, beginning in May 2008, TRANSCOM began 
the process to develop coordination methods to facilitate the use of 
the criteria in the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process 
manual for the identification and validation of assets prior to 
submitting them to the Joint Staff. TRANSCOM has recognized that this 
process will require time to complete a meaningful critical 
transportation asset list; however, a timeline to complete this process 
has not yet been established. 

Complicating the process of identifying and prioritizing critical 
assets has been TRANSCOM's use of Transportation Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessments. Though contrary to DCIP guidance,[Footnote 
21] TRANSCOM has been using its vulnerability assessments to identify 
specific critical assets rather than using the process outlined in DCIP 
guidance to identify specific critical assets. As a result, TRANSCOM 
officials could not tell us what specific transportation assets at a 
given site were critical, stating that in the absence of a 
Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment it could be, 
though not necessarily, assumed that what was identified as critical at 
one location might be critical at another. For example, if a 
Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment identified 
specific critical assets (such as a runway, navigation aids, or a fuel 
depot) at an air base as critical, it could be reasonably assumed that 
the same assets would probably be critical at other air bases. However, 
while TRANSCOM officials have stated that they will discontinue the use 
of vulnerability assessment for identification purposes, they were 
unable to provide any documentation to ASD(HD&ASA) or us to confirm 
this decision officially. Additionally, TRANSCOM's memorandum of 
understanding with the Joint Staff to serve as transportation subject 
matter experts for the enhanced DCIP module to the Joint Staff's 
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment when transportation assets are 
assessed remains in draft. 

At the behest of ASD(HD&ASA) in 2006, the Joint Staff began the process 
of creating a list of Tier 1 critical assets based on assets nominated 
and submitted by DOD organizations, including the combatant commands 
and the military services using DCIP-approved criteria. The Joint 
Staff's list has gone through several iterations and a subset of Tier 1 
critical assets, known as Defense Critical Assets, will be selected by 
ASD(HD&ASA).[Footnote 22] These Defense Critical Assets are of such 
extraordinary importance to DOD operations in peace, crisis, and war 
that their incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, 
debilitating effect on the ability of DOD to fulfill its missions. 
TRANSCOM has not yet established a timeline to reevaluate critical 
transportation assets using the approved DCIP methodology. Until this 
reevaluation is completed, ASD(HD&ASA)'s ability to formulate a 
comprehensive Defense Critical Asset list that includes transportation 
assets and effectively targets spending for risk reduction efforts will 
be impeded. 

Figure 4 illustrates the types of specific critical transportation 
assets that TRANSCOM could identify below the installation (air base, 
seaport, and commercial airport) level. 

Figure 4: Representative Types of Critical Transportation Assets: 

This figure is a combination of four pictures showing types of critical 
transportation assets. 

The pictures are of: 

Cargo handling equipment at a U.S. air base; 
Fuel transfer pipeline; 
A refueling pier critical to sealift port operations; 
and Mobile control tower; a backup capability for continuity of air 
operations. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

TRANSCOM plans to reevaluate its critical asset list using the DCIP- 
approved criteria, which is expected to result in a "significant 
reduction" of critical transportation assets. 

Most Installations Took Some Steps to Assure the Availability of 
Critical Transportation and Public Works Assets but Were Unaware of 
Asset Criticality and Lacked a DCIP Focus: 

Although DOD established DCIP to help assure the availability of 
mission-critical infrastructure--including transportation assets-- 
installation personnel were often unfamiliar with DCIP and unaware of 
the critical role specific transportation assets play in TRANSCOM's 
missions. This lack of awareness contributed to a singular focus on 
protecting personnel and did not consider mission-critical assets. 

Installation Officials Often Are Unaware of Asset Criticality: 

Installation officials responsible for critical transportation assets 
at the 22 sites we visited were often unaware of asset criticality 
because they were unfamiliar with DCIP and thus DCIP's impact at these 
installations was negligible. While some efforts have been made to 
coordinate with both DOD and non-DOD entities, including the private 
sector, state and local governments, and foreign governments to assure 
the availability of critical transportation assets at home and abroad, 
these coordination efforts have been conducted despite a lack of 
service-specific DCIP implementation guidance. According to officials 
at 17 of the 22 installations we visited, efforts at installations have 
mostly focused on protecting people through such actions as 
antiterrorism protection rather than focusing on specific mission- 
critical transportation assets. 

At 18 of the 22 installations we visited, we found numerous 
complementary programs, such as the Antiterrorism and Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive Programs; 
and continuity of operations and emergency management planning. 
Officials responsible for assuring the availability of critical 
transportation assets at 20 of the 22 installations we visited, told us 
that they had not heard of DCIP prior to our visit because (1) there is 
an absence of service-specific guidance that explains how to implement 
DCIP and (2) the frequent rotation of installation commanders 
(typically every 2 years), which can limit leadership continuity over 
DCIP at the installation level. Officials at 16 of the 22 installations 
we visited told us that they would have more vigorously advocated for 
resources to fund protection of critical assets had they been aware of 
an asset's criticality to TRANSCOM's mission. Without service-specific 
guidance to ensure that mission-critical assets are being protected, 
installations rely on other complementary programs in lieu of the all- 
hazards approach[Footnote 23] that DCIP requires. 

Installation Coordination Efforts Have Been Extensive, but Often Do Not 
Focus on the Assurance of Mission-Critical Assets: 

Nearly all of the installations (18 of 22) we visited had coordinated 
with both DOD and non-DOD entities, including the private sector, state 
and local governments, and foreign governments to help assure the 
availability of critical transportation assets at home and abroad. 
However, these coordination efforts have been performed independent of 
DCIP and, therefore, focus on protecting people and not on assuring the 
availability of mission-critical transportation assets. DOD DCIP 
guidance requires the combatant commands to coordinate with one another 
and with the military services and sector lead agents to identify and 
assess critical assets. At 21 of the 22 sites we visited, installation 
officials had taken steps to coordinate such efforts with DOD 
organizations on the installation and/or with the private sector, state 
and local communities, or with host nation officials. For example, at 
one air base we visited in Europe, installation officials conducted 
joint security patrols with host nation military officials and trained 
jointly with military and civilian firefighting personnel. Further, at 
10 DOD installations we visited in the Pacific region, installation 
officials routinely coordinated with state, local, and foreign 
governments on emergency management planning or scenarios, such as 
typhoons and earthquakes. Such coordination efforts, however, do not 
directly assure the availability of specific critical assets in the 
wake of a natural or man-made disaster. 

Installations Have Taken Steps to Mitigate the Potential Disruption of 
Public Works: 

To mitigate public works disruptions, personnel at 18 of the 22 
installations we visited were coordinating with DOD organizations on 
the installation, as well as local, state, or host nation officials. 
Specifically, these installations had developed resiliency in 
supporting public works infrastructure, such as fuel and electric power 
sources, so that critical transportation assets remained operational in 
the event of an installation-wide disruption. For example, 18 of these 
installations have developed backup or alternative capabilities to 
mitigate the loss of electricity and fuel. For 17 of the 22 critical 
transportation assets we visited, installation personnel were 
coordinating with DOD tenant organizations on the installation and with 
host governments to maintain and sustain public works support for its 
assets located on the facility. Most of the installations we visited 
(17 of 22) had emergency management plans and continuity of operations 
plans that accounted for the loss or degradation of supporting public 
works infrastructure located on or within the installation, although 
none of the plans specifically identified the critical transportation 
assets as high-priority assets vis-ï¿½-vis the installation's other 
assets. We also found that installation personnel at 18 of the 22 
locations we visited frequently tested and maintained backup fuel and 
electric power sources and often included them in their emergency 
management planning exercises. Seventeen of these installations had 
developed prioritized facilities lists to determine which facilities or 
assets would receive priority for power restoration when power to the 
installation was interrupted. 

Critical Transportation Asset Assurance Has Received Some Funding 
through DCIP and Has Benefited from Other Sources of Funding: 

DOD has allocated approximately $283.3 million for critical asset 
assurance through DCIP from fiscal years 2004 to 2008. DCIP guidance 
requires combatant commands and sector lead agents to provide adequate 
resources to implement their DCIP responsibilities. TRANSCOM has 
received approximately $8.6 million over this period to carry out its 
DCIP responsibilities, both as a combatant command and as a sector lead 
agent for the Transportation Defense Sector. In addition to these 
funds, critical transportation assets also have benefited indirectly 
from other DOD programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and from 
funding from foreign governments in countries where the United States 
maintains a military presence. 

Of the $8.6 million TRANSCOM has received in total DCIP funding from 
fiscal years 2004 to 2008, approximately $5.7 million has been used for 
carrying out its combatant command responsibilities and approximately 
$2.9 million has been used for implementing its transportation defense 
sector responsibilities. 

TRANSCOM, which is funded by the Air Force, as TRANSCOM's executive 
agent, has requested DCIP funding for fiscal years 2009 to 2013 
totaling $9.4 million for its combatant command responsibilities and 
$4.1 million[Footnote 24] for its defense sector responsibilities. 
Although the Air Force has not established a dedicated funding account 
for DCIP for itself,[Footnote 25] according to TRANSCOM officials, the 
Air Force has budgeted DCIP funding for TRANSCOM to perform its 
combatant command and defense sector responsibilities. Figure 5 depicts 
TRANSCOM's DCIP allocated and planned funding for its combatant command 
and defense sector responsibilities from fiscal years 2004 to 2013. 

Figure 5: TRANSCOM's DCIP Funding Trend, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2013: 

This figure is a combination line graph showing TRANSCOM's DCIP funding 
trend, fiscal years 2004 to 2013. The X axis represents the fiscal 
year, and the Y axis represents the dollars (in millions). The lines 
represent the sector allocated, which becomes sector budgeted. The 
other line represents and turns to TRANSCOM budgeted. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Sector allocated: [Empty]; 
TRANSCOM allocated: 2.2. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Sector allocated: 0.552; 
TRANSCOM allocated: 0.552. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Sector allocated: 0.413; 
TRANSCOM allocated: 0.631. 

Fiscal year: 2007 
Sector allocated: 0.413; 
TRANSCOM allocated: 0.631. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Sector budgeted: 1.5; 
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.7. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Sector budgeted: 1.2; 
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.8. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Sector budgeted: 0.72; 
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.8. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Sector budgeted: 0.72; 
TRANSCOM budgeted: 1.8. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Sector budgeted: 0.72; 
TRANSCOM budgeted: 2. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Sector budgeted: 0.72; 
TRANSCOM budgeted: 2. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Sector-specific funding data are unavailable for fiscal year 2004. 

[End of figure] 

The assurance of critical transportation assets also benefits, 
indirectly, from other DOD sources, such as the Antiterrorism Program 
and the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund. Among other 
things, the Antiterrorism Program provides a source of funding for 
installations to remediate vulnerabilities to transportation assets. 
Typically, remediation actions, such as improved security at entry 
control points or the hardening of a building to withstand an explosive 
blast, are done to counter a perceived terrorist threat--and do not 
explicitly consider other threats and hazards. Nonetheless, critical 
assets located within the installation or within a hardened building 
will benefit as a result of these other efforts. Further, the Combating 
Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides another mechanism to fund 
antiterrorism measures, which tangentially affects the assurance of 
critical transportation assets. 

In addition to other DOD programs, foreign countries that host the U.S. 
military fund initiatives that indirectly help assure critical 
transportation assets. For example, U.S. embassy officials estimate 
that one country we visited in U.S. Central Command's area of 
responsibility provides over $1 billion annually and one country we 
visited in U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility contributes 
about $4.1 billion annually in support of the U.S. military presence in 
its country. In both instances, a portion of the funding contributed by 
these countries is used to safeguard installations containing critical 
transportation assets. 

Conclusions: 

Until now, TRANSCOM's practice of designating entire air bases, 
seaports, and commercial airports as critical transportation assets has 
been inconsistent with DCIP guidance and the approach adopted by some 
of the other combatant commands and military services to identify 
specific mission-critical assets. Recently, however, TRANSCOM decided 
to discontinue its current critical asset identification process in 
favor of the draft critical asset identification methodology. 
TRANSCOM's decision will necessitate reevaluating the approximately 300 
installations on its existing critical asset list--an undertaking that 
could potentially delay ASD(HD&ASA)'s issuance of the department's 
approved Defense Critical Asset List. Consequently, it is important for 
TRANSCOM to establish a timeline and key dates associated with the 
reevaluation process so that ASD(HD&ASA) can account for transportation 
assets in future iterations of the Defense Critical Asset List. Once 
this process is completed, ASD(HD&ASA) should have greater visibility 
over the full complement of mission-critical infrastructure and be 
better positioned to effectively remediate vulnerabilities to its most 
critical assets. While TRANSCOM officials have stated that they will 
discontinue the practice of using Transportation Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessments to identify specific critical transportation 
assets on the installations, they were not able to provide ASD(HD&ASA) 
or us with any documentation to confirm this decision officially. 
Lastly, until TRANSCOM finalizes its memorandum of understanding with 
the Joint Staff, it will not be able to define the roles and 
responsibilities of transportation subject matter experts to 
participate in the Joint Staff vulnerability assessments with a DCIP 
module. 

Although OSD issued department-wide guidance on critical infrastructure 
in 2005, knowledge of the program at the installation level--where 
critical transportation assets are located--is minimal because the 
military services have not yet developed their own implementation 
guidance. This lack of awareness has led installation officials to rely 
on other, more established programs to protect critical assets. While 
programs, such as DCIP and the Antiterrorism Program, do share some 
precepts, there are significant differences in the types of threats and 
hazards each program focuses on and in their emphasis on protection, 
resilience, and restoration of operations and assets. Until the 
military services issue guidance that installation personnel can use to 
implement local critical infrastructure programs, mission-critical 
assets may incur unintended risk. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making the following four recommendations to help assure the 
availability of critical assets in the Transportation Defense Sector. 

To enable decision makers within DOD to more effectively prioritize and 
target limited resources to reduce critical asset vulnerabilities and 
allow ASD(HD&ASA) to formulate a complete and accurate list of Defense 
Critical Assets, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through 
ASD(HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the 
Commander of TRANSCOM to take the following three actions: 

* Fully implement the criteria, methodology, and process in the draft 
DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual to reevaluate and 
update the identification of all critical transportation assets, and 
develop a timeline for doing so. 

* Discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its critical assets. 

* Finalize its memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to 
enable TRANSCOM transportation subject matter experts to participate in 
the DCIP module of a Joint Staff vulnerability assessment. 

To facilitate DCIP implementation at the installation level, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the secretaries of the 
military departments to develop and implement service-specific guidance 
based on published DOD DCIP guidance. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, which included three 
draft recommendations, DOD partially concurred with our 
recommendations. Also, TRANSCOM and U.S. Central Command provided us 
with technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where 
appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

In its written comments, DOD stated that it partially concurred with 
our recommendation that TRANSCOM fully implement the criteria, 
methodology, and processes outlined in the draft DOD Critical Asset 
Identification Process manual to reevaluate and update the 
identification of all critical transportation assets, and develop a 
timeline for doing so. DOD agreed with the recommendation and noted 
that TRANSCOM already has initiated implementation of the current draft 
manual as a means to reevaluate identification of critical 
transportation assets. DOD stated that, consequently, TRANSCOM does not 
require additional ASD(HD&ASA) direction to do so. However, while 
TRANSCOM officials agreed during our review to begin reevaluating their 
critical assets using established criteria in the draft manual, our 
recommendation also calls for TRANSCOM to develop a timeline for 
completing this action. DOD acknowledged in its written comments that 
while the draft manual provides a process for critical asset 
identification, it has not yet provided timelines for the various 
milestones. DOD's comments stated that ASD(HD&ASA) will work with the 
various components to establish timelines, but estimated that the 
manual will require approximately 1 year to complete, and will require 
timely cooperation and participation by numerous stakeholders. We 
believe that establishing these timelines is essential so that TRANSCOM 
can reevaluate and update the identification of all critical 
transportation assets in a timely manner. 

DOD partially concurred with our draft recommendation that TRANSCOM 
finalize the memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to 
discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its critical assets. In 
its written comments, DOD noted that this recommendation contained two 
separate issues: (1) the discontinuation of the Transportation 
Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments as means to identify critical 
assets and (2) the finalization of a memorandum of understanding 
between TRANSCOM and the Joint Staff. DOD noted in its written comments 
that the purpose of the memorandum of understanding is to define the 
roles and responsibilities of transportation subject matter experts to 
augment the enhanced DCIP module rather than to discontinue the use of 
the Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments. In 
response to DOD's comments and to reflect this distinction, we made 
this two recommendations rather than one. DOD also stated that no 
additional direction on ASD(HD&ASA)'s part is required because TRANSCOM 
has already taken steps to address both of these issues. As noted in 
our report, however, TRANSCOM officials were unable to provide 
ASD(HD&ASA) or us with any documentation to confirm that they have 
discontinued the use of the Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Assessments. TRANSCOM's discontinuation of the Transportation 
Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments as a means of identifying 
critical transportation assets and its adoption of the manual's 
methodology are both key to TRANSCOM's ability to provide DOD with an 
accurate list of critical transportation assets. Further, while we 
recognize that TRANSCOM has taken steps to coordinate with the Joint 
Staff to define its roles and responsibilities for the DCIP module to 
the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment, the memorandum of 
understanding remains in draft. Timely completion of the draft 
memorandum of understanding is important so that TRANSCOM's expertise 
can be adequately leveraged on future vulnerability assessments of 
critical transportation infrastructure. Therefore, we believe this 
recommendation remains valid. 

Finally, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop and 
implement service-specific guidance based on published DOD DCIP 
guidance. In its written response, DOD stated that the Army has already 
developed and is implementing service-specific guidance, and it noted 
that the military departments prefer to wait for the official 
publication of the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process 
manual before implementing service-specific guidance. We acknowledge 
the Army's efforts and recognize that other military services may 
prefer to wait until the manual is published before they implement 
service-specific guidance. However, our recommendation is based on the 
entire body of DOD's DCIP guidance--not just the draft DOD Critical 
Asset Identification Process manual, which is focused primarily on 
identification of critical assets and will take at least another year 
to complete. In our view, service-specific DCIP guidance should be 
issued promptly based on DOD Directive 3020.40 and DOD Instruction 
3020.45, which have been finalized at the OSD level. In the absence of 
timely service-specific DCIP guidance, installation personnel will 
continue to rely primarily on antiterrorism plans instead of on an all- 
hazards approach to remediate, mitigate, or otherwise reduce the 
vulnerabilities to critical transportation infrastructure. 

As agreed with your offices, we are sending copies of this report to 
the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate and House Committees on 
Appropriations, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services, and 
other interested congressional parties. We also are sending copies of 
this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Homeland 
Security; the Secretary of State; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Combatant Commanders of the 
functional and geographic combatant commands; the Commander, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
We will also make copies available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or . Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct our review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to 
assure the availability of critical assets in the Transportation 
Defense Sector, we obtained relevant documentation and interviewed 
officials from the following DOD organizations:[Footnote 26] 

Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

* Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer: 

* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]): 

Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and Homeland 
Defense: 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Combat Support Assessments Division: 

Military Services: 

* Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office, Critical 
Infrastructure Risk Management Branch: 

* Department of the Navy: 

- Office of the Chief Information Officer: 

- Mission Assurance Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 
Division, Dahlgren, Virginia: 

* Department of the Air Force, Air, Space and Information Operations, 
Plans, and Requirements, Homeland Defense Division: 

* Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Security Division, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Office: 

Combatant Commands: 

* Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, Critical Infrastructure Program 
Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: 

* Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Program Office, Patch Barracks, Germany: 

* Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Antiterrorism and Critical 
Infrastructure Division, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: 

- U.S. Forces Japan: 

Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Critical 
Infrastructure Program, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois: 

* Headquarters, Air Mobility Command, Homeland Defense Branch, Scott 
Air Force Base, Illinois: 

* Headquarters, Military Sealift Command, Force Protection Office: 

* Headquarters, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air 
Force Base, Illinois: 

* Headquarters, Transportation Engineering Agency, Scott Air Force 
Base, Illinois: 

Defense Infrastructure Sector Lead Agents: 

* Headquarters, U.S. Transportation Command, Critical Infrastructure 
Program, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois: 

* Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Directorate of Military 
Programs: 

Selected critical assets in the continental United States, Hawaii, the 
U.S. Territory of Guam, Germany, Greece, Kuwait and another country in 
U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, and Japan: 

We also met with officials from the Department of Homeland Security, 
Infrastructure Information Collection Division, to discuss the extent 
to which DOD was coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security 
on the protection of non-DOD-owned defense critical assets in the 
Transportation and Public Works Defense Sectors. Further, to become 
more familiar with additional work being conducted on defense critical 
infrastructure, we met in Arlington, Virginia, with officials from the 
George Mason University School of Law's Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Program and in Washington, D.C., with the Congressional 
Research Service (Resources, Science, and Industry Division). 

We drew a nonprobability sample of critical transportation assets 
located in the United States and abroad, using several critical asset 
lists developed by the Joint Staff, each of the four military services, 
and TRANSCOM. The assets we selected for review were initially drawn 
from the Joint Staff's list of Tier 1[Footnote 27] critical 
transportation assets; however, the list includes only 4 Tier 1 
critical transportation assets worldwide.[Footnote 28] To increase the 
size of our sample, we used TRANSCOM's Tier 1[Footnote 29] and Tier 2 
critical asset lists, which together total 300 critical assets. 
Further, we analyzed critical asset lists from each of the four 
military services for overlap with TRANSCOM's critical asset list. From 
this, we selected 22 assets for review that included geographic 
dispersion among two countries in each geographic region (Europe, the 
Middle East, and the Pacific). We also selected assets from each 
military service and that were representative of the three principal 
types of assets identified by TRANSCOM--air base, seaport, commercial 
airport. Our cases for review included two of the four Tier 1 critical 
transportation assets. The specific assets we reviewed, their 
locations, and the missions that they support are omitted from this 
appendix, since that information is classified. Figure 6 shows the 
methodology we used to select the critical transportation assets for 
review. 

Figure 6: GAO Critical Transportation Asset Selection Methodology: 

This figure is a flowchart detailing GAO Critical Transportation Asset 
Selection methodology. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Table 1 shows a breakout of critical transportation assets selected by 
geographic combatant command. 

Table 1: Number of Critical Transportation Assets Selected by Asset 
Category and Geographic Combatant Command Area of Responsibility: 

Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. Northern Command; 
Air base: 2; 
Seaport: 1; 
Commercial airport: 1[A]. 

Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. European Command; 
Air base: 2[B]; 
Seaport: 0[B]; 
Commercial airport: 0. 

Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. Central Command; 
Air base: 2; 
Seaport: 3; 
Commercial airport: 1. 

Geographic Combatant Command: U.S. Pacific Command[C]; 
Air base: 4; 
Seaport: 4; 
Commercial airport: 2. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] Selected but not visited. 

[B] One of the installations we visited in Europe identified by 
TRANSCOM is both an air base and a seaport. 

[C] U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility includes Hawaii and 
the U.S. Territory of Guam. 

[End of table] 

Because the Joint Staff list of Tier 1 critical assets does not include 
critical assets from the Public Works Defense Sector, for the purposes 
of this report, we are treating public works assets as supporting 
infrastructure. For the critical transportation assets that we 
selected, we also spoke with the asset owners and operators about their 
reliance on public works assets that support the critical assets. 

To evaluate TRANSCOM's identification and assessment efforts of its 
critical transportation assets, we reviewed documentation and guidance 
and met with officials from ASD(HD&ASA), the Joint Staff, the military 
services, and TRANSCOM. We analyzed critical asset identification 
criteria and guidance and compared the guidance with current asset 
identification efforts. In addition, we spoke with DOD installation and 
U.S. embassy personnel to discuss their involvement with various DOD 
critical asset data calls and other efforts they participated in to 
identify critical assets. We reviewed TRANSCOM's Transportation 
Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments for assets we selected for 
review to determine if specific critical transportation assets below 
the installation level were identified. We also attempted to match 
these critical assets identified through the TRANSCOM's vulnerability 
assessments with assets listed on TRANSCOM's critical asset list. 

To determine the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken 
actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation 
assets, both within and independent of DCIP, we reviewed DOD guidance 
on risk management and other complementary programs. In addition, we 
reviewed and analyzed installation emergency management plans and 
continuity of operations plans to determine how, if at all, critical 
assets were incorporated. We also interviewed combatant command, 
subcomponent, and installation personnel responsible for assuring the 
availability of critical transportation assets to ascertain the 
adequacy of guidance, assessments, inspections, funding, and other 
processes to enhance asset availability. Finally, we assessed the 
supporting public works infrastructure for the 22 assets we selected 
for review to determine their impact on the availability of the 
critical asset. 

To determine how DOD is funding critical transportation asset 
assurance, we reviewed and analyzed DCIP funding data and we 
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer. Additionally, we interviewed 
officials from ASD(HD&ASA) and TRANSCOM to verify that the funding data 
were comprehensive and reflected DCIP funding from all sources. 
Further, we interviewed installation officials; personnel from U.S. 
Forces Japan, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. 
Pacific Command; and U.S. embassy officials in Kuwait and another 
country in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, and Japan 
regarding other sources of funding. These sources include funding from 
other complementary programs or host nation contributions that provide 
an indirect contribution to the assurance of critical transportation 
assets. We found the data provided by DOD to be sufficiently reliable 
for representing the nature and extent of the DCIP funding. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 through July 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
2600 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600: 

Homeland Defense & Americas Security Affairs: 

August 11, 2008: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-08-851, "Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to 
Guidance Would Improve DoD's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the 
Availability of Critical Transportation Assets," (GAO Code 351124). DoD 
partially concurs with the three recommendations in the report. Our 
response to your recommendations is enclosed. 

Our point of contact for this action is Mr. Antwane Johnson, Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs, (703) 602-5730, extension 143 or 
[email protected]. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Paul McHale 

[End of section] 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report ï¿½ Dated July 18, 2008 GAO Code 351124/GAO-08-851
"Defense Critical Infrastructure: Adherence to Guidance Would Improve 
Doll's Approach to Identifying and Assuring the Availability of 
Critical Transportation Assets": 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, direct the Commander of the U.S. Transportation 
Command to fully implement the criteria, methodology, and process in 
the DoD Critical Asset Identification Process Manual to reevaluate and 
update the identification of all critical transportation assets, and 
develop a timeline for doing so. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. ASD (HD&ASA) agrees with the 
recommendation to fully implement the criteria, methodology, and 
process in Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP) Manual and to 
reevaluate and update the identification of all critical transportation 
assets. However, as noted in the report, the U.S. Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) already has initiated implementation of the 
current draft CAIP Manual as a means to reevaluate identification of 
transportation-related Task Critical Assets (TCAs); consequently 
USTRANSCOM does not require additional ASD (HD&ASA) direction to do so. 
While the draft CAIP Manual provides a process for critical asset 
identification, it has not yet provided timelines for the various 
milestones. ASD (HD&ASA) will work with Components to establish 
timelines. The CAIP requires close coordination between mission and 
asset owners, and given the complexity of interaction among the many 
participants in the process, we anticipate it will require 
approximately 1 year to complete the CAIP, and will require timely 
cooperation and participation by numerous stakeholders. Since the 
Defense Critical Asset (DCA) List is dynamic, as TCAs are identified in 
accordance with the Manual, they will be submitted into Strategic 
Mission Assurance Data System (SMADS) and may then be considered by the 
Joint Staff and the ASD (HD&ASA) as DCA candidates. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, direct the Commander of the U.S. Transportation 
Command to finalize the memorandum of understanding with the Joint 
Staff to discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessments as its primary tool for identifying its 
critical assets. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. ASD (HD&ASA) agrees with the 
recommendation to finalize the memorandum of understanding with the 
Joint Staff and to discontinue the use of Transportation Infrastructure 
Vulnerability Assessments (TIVAs) as the primary tool to identify 
critical assets. However, those are two separate issues. 

To accurately reflect the issues in the recommendation, request the 
recommendation be re- worded to read as follows: "The GAO recommends 
that the Secretary of Defense through the ASD (HD&ASA) and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the Commander, U.S. Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) to discontinue the use of TIVAs as its primary 
tool for identifying its critical assets and continue discussions with 
the Joint Staff to finalize the memorandum of understanding for 
USTRANSCOM CIP transportation subject matter experts to augment the 
enhanced DCIP module to the Joint Staff's Integrated Vulnerability 
Assessment when transportation assets are assessed." As currently 
written, this GAO recommendation implies the purpose of the memorandum 
of understanding is to discontinue the execution of TIVAs. In fact, the 
memorandum is being developed to define the roles and responsibilities 
of transportation subject matter experts to augment the enhanced DCIP 
module. A memorandum of understanding for the discontinuance of TIVAs 
is not required. This discontinuance, a USTRANSCOM initiative started 
on June 27, 2008, has already been taken in coordination with the Joint 
Staff; consequently USTRANSCOM does not require additional ASD (HD&ASA) 
direction to do so. 

As discussed in the July 1, 2008 Exit Teleconference, USTRANSCOM has 
already discontinued the planning and execution of its TIVAs. Assets 
will be identified in accordance with the Critical Asset Identification 
Process Manual methodology and in coordination with other Mission 
Owners and Resource Providers. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop and 
implement Service-specific guidance based on published DoD Defense 
Critical Infrastructure Program guidance. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. Although the Army has developed Service-
specific guidance (AR 525-26) and HQDA Implementation Letter (in final 
staffing) and is executing that guidance along with DoD Directive 
3020.40 and DoD Instruction 3020.45, the Military Departments prefer to 
await official publication of the Critical Asset Identification Process 
prior to implementing Service-specific guidance. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Mark A. Pross, Assistant 
Director; Jon K. Bateman; Gina M. Flacco; James P. Krustapentus; Kate 
S. Lenane; Danielle Pakdaman; Terry L. Richardson; Marc J. Schwartz; 
John S. Townes; Cheryl A. Weissman; and Alex M. Winograd made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Critical Infrastructure: Additional Air Force Actions Needed at 
Creech Air Force Base to Ensure Protection and Continuity of UAS 
Operations. GAO-08-469RNI. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2008 (For 
Official Use Only). 

Defense Critical Infrastructure: DOD's Risk Analysis of Its Critical 
Infrastructure Omits Highly Sensitive Assets. GAO-08-373R. Washington, 
D.C.: April 2, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure 
Effectiveness of DOD's Risk Management Approach for the Defense 
Industrial Base. GAO-07-1077. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2007. 

Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts to 
Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Its Critical Infrastructure. GAO-07- 
461. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America: A Strategy for Today: A Vision for Tomorrow 
(Washington, D.C.: 2004). The National Military Strategy is the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff's document on the strategic direction of the armed 
forces, which establishes three military objectives: (1) protect the 
United States against external attacks and aggression, (2) prevent 
conflict and surprise attack, and (3) prevail against adversaries. 

[2] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6, 2006). The Quadrennial Defense Review is a 
comprehensive internal review of DOD's forces, resources, and programs. 

[3] The purpose of public works infrastructure, according to the draft 
DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual, is to provide and 
maintain utilities and real property and provide emergency services. 

[4] DOD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 
(DCIP) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2005). 

[5] The 10 defense sectors are the Defense Industrial Base; Financial 
Services; Global Information Grid; Health Affairs; Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Logistics; Personnel; Public Works; 
Space; and Transportation. 

[6] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Guide DOD's Efforts 
to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Its Critical Infrastructure, GAO-07-
461 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007). 

[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure 
Effectiveness of DOD's Risk Management Approach for the Defense 
Industrial Base, GAO-07-1077 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2007). 

[8] GAO, Defense Critical Infrastructure: DOD's Risk Analysis of Its 
Critical Infrastructure Omits Highly Sensitive Assets, GAO-08-373R 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2008). 

[9] GAO, Defense Critical Infrastructure: Additional Air Force Actions 
Needed at Creech Air Force Base to Ensure Protection and Continuity of 
UAS Operations, GAO-08-469RNI (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2008) (For 
Official Use Only). 

[10] GAO, Defense Critical Infrastructure: DOD's Evolving Assurance 
Program Has Made Progress but Leaves Critical Space, Intelligence, and 
Global Communications Assets at Risk, GAO-08-828NI (For Official Use 
Only), forthcoming. 

[11] GAO-07-461. 

[12] While public works is one of the 10 defense sectors identified by 
ASD(HD&ASA) in DOD Directive 3020.40, assets in this defense sector did 
not rise to the same level of criticality as assets in other sectors. 
Because the Joint Staff list of Tier 1 critical assets does not include 
critical assets from the Public Works Defense Sector, for the purposes 
of this report, we are treating public works assets as supporting 
infrastructure. 

[13] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some 
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown 
chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

[14] At the time of our sample selection, only four transportation 
assets had been identified as Tier 1 critical assets; however, TRANSCOM 
subsequently identified four more, raising the total to eight Tier 1 
critical transportation assets. Of these eight assets, two were 
included in our sample. 

[15] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
17, 2003). 

[16] DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 13, 2007). 

[17] DOD Directive 3020.26, Defense Continuity Program (DCP) 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2007). 

[18] DOD Directive 3020.40 defines an asset as a distinguishable 
network entity that provides a service or capability. Assets are 
people, physical entities, or information located either within or 
outside the United States and owned or operated by domestic, foreign, 
public, or private sector organizations. 

[19] DOD Instruction 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 
(DCIP) Management, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2008). 

[20] DOD, ASD(HD&ASA), Strategy for Defense Critical Infrastructure 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2008). 

[21] DOD Instruction 3020.45. 

[22] According to DOD Instruction 3020.45, ASD(HD&ASA) is responsible 
for issuing a list of Defense Critical Assets based on nominations from 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

[23] An all-hazards approach looks not only at intentional threats, 
such as hostile or terrorist attack, but also non-intentional hazards, 
such as accidents, weather events, and natural disasters. 

[24] According to TRANSCOM officials, ASD(HD&ASA) will continue to fund 
the Transportation Defense Sector at an average of $720,000 per year 
until fiscal year 2013 at which time TRANSCOM will be required to seek 
funding for its defense sector responsibilities from the Air Force, 
TRANSCOM's executive agent. 

[25] A February 2006 memorandum from the Principal Deputy for 
ASD(HD&ASA) stated that beginning in fiscal year 2008, each service 
should allocate $2.4 million per year and each combatant command, 
through its executive agent, should allocate $1.8 million per year to 
carry out their assigned DCIP responsibilities. 

[26] DOD organizations are located in the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area unless otherwise indicated. 

[27] Critical assets are categorized into three tiers based on their 
relative criticality. The loss, incapacitation, or disruption of a Tier 
1 asset could result in mission (or function) failure at the DOD, 
military department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense 
agency, or defense infrastructure sector level. The loss, 
incapacitation, or disruption of a Tier 2 asset could result in mission 
(or function) degradation at the DOD, military department, combatant 
command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or defense infrastructure 
sector level. The loss, incapacitation, or disruption of a Tier 3 asset 
could result in mission (or function) failure below the military 
department, combatant command, sub-unified command, defense agency, or 
defense infrastructure sector level. 

[28] At the time of our sample selection, only four transportation 
assets had been identified as Tier 1 critical assets; however, TRANSCOM 
subsequently identified four more, raising the total to eight Tier 1 
critical transportation assets. Of these assets, two were included in 
our sample. 

[29] TRANSCOM's Tier 1 critical asset list is synonymous with the Joint 
Staff's Tier 1 critical transportation asset list. 

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