Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess		 
Organization's Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross	 
Role in Catastrophic Events (18-SEP-08, GAO-08-823).		 
                                                                 
Voluntary organizations have traditionally played a major role in
the nation's response to disasters, but the response to Hurricane
Katrina raised concerns about their ability to handle large-scale
disasters. This report examines (1) the roles of five voluntary  
organizations in providing mass care and other services, (2) the 
steps they have taken to improve service delivery, (3) their	 
current capabilities for responding to mass care needs, and (4)  
the challenges they face in preparing for large-scale disasters. 
To address these questions, GAO reviewed the American Red Cross, 
The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic	 
Charities USA, and United Way of America; interviewed officials  
from these organizations and the Federal Emergency Management	 
Agency (FEMA); reviewed data and laws; and visited four high-risk
metro areas--Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Washington, D.C.  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-823 					        
    ACCNO:   A84281						        
  TITLE:     Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess   
Organization's Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross	 
Role in Catastrophic Events					 
     DATE:   09/18/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Charitable organizations				 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Disaster recovery					 
	     Disaster recovery plans				 
	     Disaster relief aid				 
	     Emergency management				 
	     Emergency medical services 			 
	     Emergency preparedness				 
	     Emergency response 				 
	     Emergency response personnel			 
	     Emergency response procedures			 
	     Federal agencies					 
	     Federal aid to states				 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Funds management					 
	     Grant monitoring					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Hurricane Katrina					 
	     Hurricanes 					 
	     Local governments					 
	     Natural disasters					 
	     Relief agencies					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Volunteer forces					 
	     Volunteer services 				 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Assessments					 
	     Catastrophic Incident Supplement			 
	     Emergency Support Function 6--Mass Care,		 
	     Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human		 
	     Services Annex					 
                                                                 
	     FEMA Gap Analysis Program				 
	     Homeland Security Grant Program			 
	     National Response Framework			 
	     National Response Plan				 

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GAO-08-823

   

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2008: 

Voluntary Organizations: 

FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizationsï¿½ Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic Events: 

GAO-08-823: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-823, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Voluntary organizations have traditionally played a major role in the nationï¿½s response to disasters, but the response to Hurricane Katrina raised concerns about their ability to handle large-scale disasters.  This report examines (1) the roles of five voluntary organizations in providing mass care and other services, (2) the steps they have taken to improve service delivery, (3) their current capabilities for responding to mass care needs, and (4) the challenges they face in preparing for large-scale disasters.  To address these questions, GAO reviewed the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and United Way of America; interviewed officials from these organizations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); reviewed data and laws; and visited four high-risk metro areasï¿½Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and Washington, D.C. 

What GAO Found: 

The five voluntary organizations we reviewed are highly diverse in their focus and response structures. They also constitute a major source of the nationï¿½s mass care and related disaster services and are integrated into the 2008 National Response Framework. The Red Cross in particularï¿½the only one whose core mission is disaster responseï¿½has a federally designated support role to government under the mass care provision of this Framework. While the Red Cross no longer serves as the primary agency for coordinating government mass care servicesï¿½as under the earlier 2004 National Planï¿½it is expected to support FEMA by providing staff and expertise, among other things. FEMA and the Red Cross agree on the Red Crossï¿½s role in a catastrophic disaster, but it is not clearly documented.  While FEMA recognized the need to update the 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement to conform with the Framework, it does not yet have a time frame for doing so.

Since Katrina, the organizations we studied have taken steps to strengthen their service delivery by expanding coverage and upgrading their logistical and communications systems. The Red Cross, in particular, is realigning its regional chapters to better support its local chapters and improve efficiency and establishing new partnerships with local community-based organizations. Most recently, however, a budget shortfall has prompted the organization to reduce staff and alter its approach to supporting FEMA and state emergency management agencies. While Red Cross officials maintain that these changes will not affect improvements to its mass care service infrastructure, it has also recently requested federal funding for its governmental responsibilities.  

Capabilities assessments are preliminary, but current evidence suggests that in a worst-case large-scale disaster, the projected need for mass care services would far exceed the capabilities of these voluntary organizations without government and other assistanceï¿½despite voluntary organizationsï¿½ substantial resources locally and nationally. Voluntary organizations also faced shortages in trained volunteers, as well as other limitations that affected their mass care capabilities. Meanwhile, FEMAï¿½s initial assessment does not necessarily include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations and does not yet address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. In addition, the ability to assess mass care capabilities and coordinate in disasters is currently hindered by a lack of standard terminology and measures for mass care resources, and efforts are under way to develop such standards. 

Finding and training more personnel, dedicating more resources to preparedness, and working more closely with local governments are ongoing challenges for voluntary organizations. A shortage of staff and volunteers was most commonly cited, but we also found they had difficulty seeking and dedicating funds for preparedness, in part because of competing priorities.  However, the guidance for FEMA preparedness grants to states and localities was also not sufficiently explicit with regard to using such funds to support the efforts of voluntary organizations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that FEMA update and document the Red Crossï¿½s role in a catastrophic event, take steps to incorporate voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities in its assessments, and clarify funding guidance for certain disaster preparedness grants. In commenting on the draft report, FEMA agreed with two recommendations, but disagreed with the recommendation to better incorporate voluntary organizations in assessments. We continue to believe such efforts are important for preparedness. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-823]. For more information, contact Cynthia Fagnoni at (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 18, 2008: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Voluntary organizations have long played a critical role in providing care to people affected by emergencies or natural disastersï¿½no more so than in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Recently, the catastrophic loss of life from a major cyclone in Burma was also a sober reminder of the need for such organizations. In the United States, hundreds of voluntary organizations, most often locally or regionally based, routinely assist disaster victims with mass sheltering and feeding and other services. Among those able to provide resources nationally are the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities, and the United Way. In terms of funding, alone, following the 2005 hurricanes, the Red Cross raised more than $2.1 billion; The Salvation Army, $325 million; Catholic Charities USA, $150 million; the United Way, $28 million; and the Southern Baptist Convention, about $20 million. 

While our nationï¿½s voluntary organizations have been critical complements to local, state, and federal government agencies during disasters, the magnitude of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack and Hurricane Katrina, in particular, revealed the need to further build a national system of emergency management that better integrates voluntary agenciesï¿½ efforts and capabilities. A national blueprint for such a system that coordinates voluntary, government, and private sector responders is outlined by the Department of Homeland Securityï¿½s (DHS) 2008 National Response Framework (the Framework). National planning has been a complex process on many frontsï¿½local, state, and federal government, and privateï¿½and many questions arise in the process. In particular Congress and others have raised concerns regarding the capabilities of voluntary organizations, in support of governments, to provide mass care and other assistance when there is a large-scale disaster. To provide insight into the readiness of these organizations to respond to large-scale disasters requiring a federal response, we examined the following questions: 

1. What are the roles of major national voluntary organizations in providing mass care and other human services in response to large-scale disasters requiring federal assistance? 

2. What steps have these organizations taken since Katrina to strengthen their capacity for service delivery? 

3. What is known about their current capabilities for responding to mass care needs in such a large-scale disaster? 

4. What are the remaining challenges that confront voluntary organizations in preparing for such large-scale disasters? 

Overall, to address these objectives, we reviewed federal and voluntary organization documents; conducted site visits; interviewed local, state, and national governmental and voluntary agency officials; and reviewed relevant laws. More specifically, we reviewed governmental and other reports on the lessons learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina as well as key federal disaster management documents, including the 2008 National Response Framework; the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the Framework, which describes the federal governmentï¿½s detailed strategy for coordinating a national response to a catastrophic disaster; and Emergency Support Function 6ï¿½Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services Annex (ESF-6), which together describe the federal coordination of the delivery of federal mass care and other human services. We also interviewed officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)ï¿½a federal agency within DHS that is the lead agency for responding to disasters. For five major voluntary organizationsï¿½the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and United Way of Americaï¿½we reviewed documents including their disaster response plans, memorandums of agreement, and various data, such as data on shelters and other mass care resources. We also interviewed voluntary organization officials at their national headquarters as well as the Director of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), an umbrella group of nationwide nonprofit organizations. To examine voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilitiesï¿½especially in mass careï¿½we conducted site visits to four metropolitan areas considered at high risk for different types of disasters, such as major earthquakes, hurricanes, or terrorist attacks: (1) Los Angeles, California; (2) Miami, Florida; (3) New York City, New York; and (4) Washington D.C. For each of these areas, we reviewed documents and obtained available data from the voluntary organizations on their sheltering and feeding capabilities. We also interviewed officials from the selected voluntary organizations; local and state government emergency management agencies; NVOADï¿½s local affiliates, known as Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD); and FEMAï¿½s regionally based liaisons to the voluntary sector, known as voluntary agency liaisons. In discussing voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities in this report, we do not attempt to assess the total disaster response capabilities in any single location that we visited or the efficacy of any responses to particular scenarios, such as major earthquakes versus hurricanes. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

The voluntary organizations in our review are a major source of mass care and other services in large-scale disasters and play key roles in national response, in coordination with local, state, and federal governments, under the National Response Framework. Four of these organizations provide a variety of services such as mass care feeding, case management, and cleanup, while the fifthï¿½the United Wayï¿½mostly conducts fund-raising for other organizations. The organizationsï¿½ response structures also vary, from more centralized, with a high level of authority at the national level, to more decentralized, in which local units are autonomous. Most of the organizations coordinate their services with each other and governments at various levels through formal written agreements and equally important informal working relationships. The newly issued National Response Framework recognizes the importance of voluntary organizations in disaster response and specifically designates the American Red Cross as one of the support agencies for the mass care functions of ESF-6. This support role represents a change from the Red Crossï¿½s role in the earlier national plan as the primary agency for mass care, because FEMA and the Red Cross agreed that the Red Crossï¿½as a nongovernmental entityï¿½cannot legally direct federal resources. Recently, in response to a major budget deficit, the Red Cross made staffing cuts and other changes in its operations and also sought federal funding to assist it with the cost of its support agency responsibilities under the Framework. The Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the Framework, which describes the federal vision of the national response to a catastrophic disaster, still characterizes the Red Cross as the primary agency for mass care, although both FEMA and Red Cross officials agreed that the Red Cross would serve as a support agency in accordance with the more recent ESF-6 role change. FEMA and Red Cross officials also agreed that the Red Cross would continue to provide mass care services in a catastrophic disaster, acting as a private service provider, regardless of any future revisions to this Supplement. While FEMA is revising an annex to the Framework on catastrophic incidents, according to agency officials, it does not currently have a time frame for revising the more detailed, operationally specific Supplement, although agency officials said they are in the process of establishing a review timeline. Although the Red Cross and FEMA told us that they understand the Red Crossï¿½s role as a support agency in a catastrophic event, there is no interim agreement documenting these expectations. 

In response to weaknesses evident during Katrina, the four direct service providers in our reviewï¿½Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charitiesï¿½have taken steps to strengthen their service delivery by expanding service coverage and improving collaboration with each other on services, logistics, and communications. To address its gaps in service coverage, the Red Cross is in the process of implementing two main strategies: reorganizing its chapters and developing stronger partnerships with local community and faith-based organizations, particularly in rural areas with hard-to-reach populations. According to Red Cross officials, these initiatives are expected to improve service delivery while expanding services to communities that do not have established Red Cross chapters. While the Red Cross has made staffing cuts and other changes in response to its budget deficit, Red Cross officials reported that these service delivery initiatives would continue; nevertheless, the effect of these changes remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the national and four local offices of the direct service providers to varying degrees also strengthened their ability to coordinate services by collaborating more on feeding and case management and improving their logistical and communications systems. For example, to prevent future breakdowns in resource deployment and management, the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention are working together to improve management of their supply chains. 

Initial assessments have not fully captured the collective capabilities of major voluntary organizations; however, evidence suggests that without government and other assistance, a worst-case large-scale disaster would overwhelm voluntary organizationsï¿½ current sheltering and feeding capabilities, according to voluntary organization officials and data we reviewed. The federal government and voluntary organizations in our review have started to identify mass care capabilities, but most existing assessments are locally or regionally based and do not provide a picture of nationwide capabilities. For example, FEMAï¿½s 2007 survey of disaster capabilities in selected states assesses sheltering but has not yet begun to address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. Moreover, it does not include all voluntary organization capabilities, since participating states only include information from organizations with which they have formal 
agreements, according to FEMA officials. In the metro areas we visited, these agreements were generally limited to the Red Cross. Except for the Red Cross, the other voluntary organizations we reviewed have not yet assessed their own nationwide capabilities, and some do not use standard terms or measures for characterizing mobile kitchens and other disaster resources. In the four metro areas we visited, the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention were able to provide data on their local sheltering and feeding resources, and they also report having substantial nationwide resources that can be brought to bear in an affected area for a large-scale disaster. Nevertheless, the need for mass care services in a worst-case large-scale disaster, as projected by government and the Red Cross, would likely overwhelm their current capabilities, according to voluntary organization officials as well as our analysis. For example, a major earthquake in a metropolitan area could necessitate shelter for as many as 300,000 people, according to DHS, but Red Cross officials in Los Angelesï¿½a city prone to earthquakesï¿½ told us their local sheltering capacity is 84,000 people under optimal conditions. Voluntary organization officials also said developing additional capability is constrained by the limited availability of personnel and other logistical challenges. In recognition of these challenges, local governments we visited and FEMA officials told us they are planning to use government employees and private sector resources to help address sheltering and feeding needs. Red Cross and FEMA officials also told us that in a catastrophic situation, assistance will likely be provided from many sources, including the general public, as well as the private and nonprofit sectors, that are not part of any prepared or planned response. 

National and local voluntary organizations, including local VOADs, in our study continue to face challenges in increasing the number of trained personnel, identifying and dedicating financial resources for preparedness, and strengthening governmental links. Officials from these organizations told us that they found it difficult to dedicate staff to planning and coordination activities for future disasters. In addition, shortages of trained mass care volunteers continue to be an ongoing concern despite the efforts of voluntary organizations and government agencies to build a cadre of trained personnel. Identifying and dedicating financial resources for disaster planning and preparedness becomes increasingly difficult for organizations in light of competing priorities. For example, while the Red Cross raised more than $2 billion following Katrina, currently the Red Cross commented that it has been difficult to raise public donations to support its capacity-building initiatives. Additionally, while DHS emergency preparedness grants are another potential source of such funding, voluntary organization officials told us they typically do not receive funding from these grants. According to a senior official from FEMAï¿½s grant office, FEMA considered voluntary organizations as among the eligible subgrantees for several emergency preparedness grants, but federal guidance to states who distribute these grants did not clearly indicate this. Finally, although the service providers in our review took steps to increase coordination with each other, coordination and interaction with government agencies at all levels remain a challenge for organizations we visited. While local VOADs in the areas we visited helped voluntary organizations coordinate with each other and local government agencies, the ability of these VOADs to effectively work with government agencies varied. For the Red Cross, it is too soon to tell how its recent staffing cuts and other changes will affect its ability to coordinate with FEMA and state governments during disasters. 

In this report we are making recommendations to FEMA to update and document FEMAï¿½s expectations for the Red Cross in a catastrophic disaster, take steps to better incorporate voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities into its assessments of mass care capabilities, and clarify statesï¿½ ability to consider voluntary organizations and local VOADs as among the potential recipients of federal preparedness funds. In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA agreed with our recommendations on establishing a time frame for updating the role of the American Red Cross in the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and clarifying federal guidance to states on potential recipients of preparedness grants. However, FEMA criticized certain aspects of our methodology, asserting that the draft did not address the role of states in coordinating mass care. As stated in our objectives, the focus of our report, by design, is on voluntary organizationsï¿½ roles and capabilities in disaster response. While focusing on voluntary organizations, our draft report also acknowledges the disaster response role and responsibilities of governmentsï¿½local, state, and federalï¿½under the National Response Framework. Accordingly, we interviewed local, state, and federal government emergency management officials, as described in the more detailed description of our reportï¿½s methodology. FEMA also raised concerns about whether the voluntary organizations discussed in our report provided a comprehensive picture of mass care capabilities. However, our report does not attempt to address all the services and capabilities of the voluntary sector but acknowledges that other voluntary organizations also provide mass care and other services. It also includes the caveat that we do not attempt to assess the total disaster response capabilities in any single location we visited. FEMA also disagreed with our recommendation to better incorporate voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities in assessments because the government cannot command and control private sector resources. However, FEMA is required under the Post-Katrina Act to establish a comprehensive assessment system to assess the nationï¿½s prevention capabilities and overall preparedness. A comprehensive assessment of the nationï¿½s capabilities should account as fully as possible for voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities in mass care. Assessing capabilities more fully does not require controlling these resources but rather cooperatively obtaining and sharing information. Without such an assessment, the government will have an incomplete picture of the mass care resources it can draw upon in large-scale disasters. In its comments, FEMA also asserted that our report incorrectly assumes that if funding was made available, it would enable voluntary organizations to shelter and care for people in catastrophic events. However, we discuss potential federal funding in relation to voluntary organizationsï¿½ preparedness and planning activities, not direct services. As noted in the report, such funding could be used to strengthen voluntary organizationsï¿½ disaster preparedness, such as coordination with FEMA, training of personnel, and developing continuity of operations plans. FEMA also provided some technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We also provided a draft of this report to the American Red Cross as well as excerpts from the draft report, as appropriate, to The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and NVOAD. In its comments, the Red Cross further explained its role in providing post-evacuation sheltering under New York Cityï¿½s coastal storm plan and provided technical clarifications. We added information as appropriate to further clarify the American Red Crossï¿½s role in providing sheltering in New York City. In addition, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and NVOAD provided us with technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

State and local governments generally have the principal responsibility 
for meeting mass care and other needs in responding to a disaster; 
however, governments largely carry out this responsibility by relying 
on the services provided by voluntary organizations. Voluntary 
organizations provide sheltering, feeding, and other services, such as 
case management, to disaster victims and have long supported local, 
state, and federal government responses to disasters. 

Voluntary Organizations in Disasters: 

Voluntary organizations have historically played a critical role in 
providing services to disaster victims, both on a routine basis--in 
response to house fires and local flooding, for example--and in 
response to far rarer disasters such as devastating hurricanes or 
earthquakes.[Footnote 1] Their assistance can vary from providing 
immediate services to being involved in long-term recovery efforts, 
including fund-raising. Some are equipped to arrive at a disaster scene 
and provide immediate mass care, such as food, shelter, and clothing. 
Other charities address short-term needs, such as providing case 
management services to help disaster victims obtain unemployment or 
medical benefits. Other voluntary organizations provide long-term 
disaster assistance such as job training or temporary housing 
assistance for low-income families. In addition, local organizations 
that do not typically provide disaster services may step in to address 
specific needs, as occurred when churches and other community 
organizations began providing sheltering after the Gulf Coast 
hurricanes. 

The American Red Cross, a nongovernmental organization founded in 1881, 
is the largest of the nation's mass care service providers. Operating 
under a congressional charter since 1900, the Red Cross provides 
volunteer humanitarian assistance to the armed forces, serves as a 
medium of communication between the people of the United States and the 
armed forces, and provides direct services to disaster victims, 
including feeding, sheltering, financial assistance, and emergency 
first aid.[Footnote 2] 

An additional key player in the voluntary sector is NVOAD, an umbrella 
organization of nonprofits that are considered national in their scope. 
Established in 1970, NVOAD is not itself a service delivery 
organization but rather coordinates planning efforts by many voluntary 
organizations responding to disaster, including the five organizations 
in this review. In addition to its 49 member organizations, NVOAD also 
coordinates with chartered state Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster (VOAD) and their local affiliates. 

The occurrence in 2005 of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita revealed many 
weaknesses in the federal disaster response that were subsequently 
enumerated by numerous public and private agencies--including the GAO, 
the White House, and the American Red Cross. These weaknesses included 
a lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities among and between 
voluntary organizations and FEMA and a need for the government to 
include voluntary organizations in national and local disaster 
planning. According to several post-Katrina reports, the contributions 
of voluntary organizations, especially faith-based groups, had not been 
effectively integrated into the earlier federal plan for disaster 
response--the 2004 National Response Plan. These reports called for 
better coordination among government agencies and voluntary 
organizations through cooperative relationships and joint planning and 
exercises. 

National Approach to Disaster Response: 

Under the Homeland Security Act, which President Bush signed in 2002, 
as amended by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 
(Post-Katrina Act),[Footnote 3] FEMA has been charged with 
responsibility for leading and supporting a national, risk-based, 
comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation. In support of this mission, FEMA is 
required to partner with the private sector and nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as state, local, tribal governments, emergency 
responders, and other federal agencies. Under the act, FEMA is 
specifically directed, among other things, to: 

* build a comprehensive national incident management system; 

* consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into 
a single, coordinated national response plan; 

* administer and ensure the implementation of that plan, including 
coordinating and ensuring the readiness of each emergency support 
function under the plan; and: 

* update a national preparedness goal and develop a national 
preparedness system to enable the nation to meet that goal. 

As part of its preparedness responsibilities, FEMA is required to 
develop guidelines to define risk-based target capabilities for 
federal, state, local, and tribal preparedness and establish a 
comprehensive assessment system to assess, on an ongoing basis, the 
nation's prevention capabilities and overall preparedness. FEMA is also 
required to submit annual reports which describe, among other things, 
the results of the comprehensive assessment and state and local 
catastrophic incident preparedness. FEMA may also use planning 
scenarios to reflect the relative risk requirements presented by all 
kinds of hazards. As we noted in previous reports and testimony, the 
preparation for a large-scale disaster requires an overall national 
preparedness effort designed to integrate what needs to be done (roles 
and responsibilities), how it should be done, and how well it should be 
done.[Footnote 4] The principal national documents designed to address 
each of these questions are the National Response Framework, the 
National Incident Management System, and the National Preparedness 
Guidelines. A core tenet of these documents is that governments at all 
levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, such as 
the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations, coordinate during 
disasters that require federal intervention. (See fig. 1.) 

Figure 1: Federal Framework for National Response to Large-Scale 
Disasters: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure illustrates the following information: 

National Response Framework: 
What needs to be done and who needs to do it? 

National Incident Management System: 
How should it be done? 

National Preparedness Guidelines: 
How well should it be done? 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

National Response Framework: 

DHS's National Response Framework, which became effective in March 
2008, delineates roles for federal, state, local, and tribal 
governments; the private sector; and voluntary organizations in 
responding to disasters. The new framework revises the National 
Response Plan, which was originally signed by major federal government 
agencies, the Red Cross, and NVOAD in 2004. Under the National Response 
Framework, voluntary organizations are expected to contribute to these 
response efforts through partnerships at each level of government. In 
addition, FEMA, in conjunction with its voluntary agency liaisons, acts 
as the interface between these organizations and the federal 
government. (See fig. 2.) 

Figure 2: Voluntary Organizations, Governments, and Private Sector 
Roles under the National Response Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure illustrates the following information: 

National Response Framework (NRF): 

* Voluntary organizations and private sector: 
Voluntary organizations perform vital service missions such as: 
- providing shelters; 
- coordinating volunteers; 
- interfacing with government response officials at all levels. 
Private sector: 
- supports community response; 
- organizes business to ensure resiliency; 
- protects and restores critical infrastructure and commercial 
activity. 

* Federal government: 
Directs the response of all necessary federal department and agency 
capabilities and coordinates with other responders when an incident 
occurs that exceeds or is anticipated to exceed local and state 
resources. 

* State and tribal governments: 
- Supplements and facilitates local efforts before, during, and after 
incidents; 
- Coordinates resources and capabilities; 
- Obtains support from other states and federal government. 

* Local governments: 
Has primary responsibility for community preparedness and response. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

The Framework also creates a flexible and scalable[Footnote 5] 
coordinating structure for mobilizing national resources in a large- 
scale disaster. Under the Framework, local jurisdictions and states 
have lead responsibility for responding to a disaster and can request 
additional support from the federal government as needed.[Footnote 6] 

In addition, for catastrophic incidents that almost immediately 
overwhelm local and state resources and result in extraordinary levels 
of mass casualties or damage, the Framework--through its Catastrophic 
Incident Supplement--specifies the conditions under which the federal 
government can proactively accelerate the national response to such 
disasters without waiting for formal requests from state governments. 
[Footnote 7] The Supplement was published in 2006 after Hurricane 
Katrina.[Footnote 8] 

Sheltering, Feeding, and Other Human Services under the ESF-6 in the 
National Framework: 

The National Framework organizes the specific needs that arise in 
disaster response into 15 emergency support functions, or ESFs. Each 
ESF comprises a coordinator, a primary agency, and support agencies-- 
usually governmental agencies--that plan and support response 
activities. Typically, support agencies have expertise in the 
respective function, such as in mass care, transportation, 
communication, or firefighting.[Footnote 9] In a disaster, FEMA is 
responsible for activating the ESF working groups of key federal 
agencies and other designated organizations that are needed. 

For the voluntary organizations in our review, Emergency Support 
Function 6 (ESF-6) is important because it outlines the organizational 
structure used to provide mass care and related services in a disaster. 
These services are: 

* mass care (e.g., sheltering, feeding, and bulk distribution of 
emergency relief items), 

* emergency assistance (e.g. evacuation, safety, and well-being of 
pets), 

* disaster housing (e.g., roof repair, rental assistance), and: 

* human services (e.g., crisis counseling, individual case management). 

Under ESF-6, FEMA is designated as the primary federal agency 
responsible for coordinating and leading the federal response for mass 
care and related human services, in close coordination with states and 
others such as voluntary organizations--a role change made in 2008 in 
response to issues that arose during Katrina. FEMA carries out this 
responsibility by convening federal ESF-6 support agencies during 
disasters and coordinating with states to augment their mass care 
capabilities as needed. Under ESF-6, the Red Cross and NVOAD are each 
named as support agencies to FEMA, along with numerous federal 
departments, such as the Department of Health and Human Services. 
FEMA's voluntary agency liaisons, located in FEMA regions, are largely 
responsible for carrying out these coordinating duties with voluntary 
organizations. 

Voluntary Organizations Are a Major Source of Mass Care and Other 
Services in Disasters and Have Significant Support Roles under the 
National Response Framework: 

As private service providers fulfilling their humanitarian missions, 
the voluntary organizations in our review have historically served as 
significant sources of mass care and other services in large-scale 
disasters and play key roles in national response--in coordination with 
local, state, and federal governments--under the National Response 
Framework. While their response structures differ in key ways--with 
some having more centralized operations than others, for example--these 
voluntary organizations coordinate their services through formal 
written agreements and through informal working relationships with 
other organizations. In recognition of their long-standing leadership 
in providing services to disaster victims, these organizations, 
especially the American Red Cross and NVOAD, have considerable roles in 
supporting FEMA under the nation's National Response Framework. While 
this new Framework shifted the Red Cross from a primary agency for mass 
care to a support agency, largely because the Red Cross cannot direct 
federal resources, the 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement has not 
been updated to reflect this change. FEMA does not currently have a 
timetable for revising the Supplement, as required under the Post- 
Katrina Act, and while FEMA and Red Cross officials told us that they 
have a mutual understanding of the Red Cross's role as a support agency 
in a catastrophic disaster, this understanding is not currently 
documented. 

While the Voluntary Organizations Differ in Key Ways, They Have 
Traditionally Been Major Providers of Mass Care and Other Services: 

While the major national voluntary organizations in our review differ 
in their types of services and response structures, they have all 
played important roles in providing mass care and other services, some 
for over a century. According to government officials and reports on 
the response to Katrina, the Red Cross and the other voluntary 
organizations we reviewed are a major source of mass care and other 
disaster services, as was evident in the response to Hurricane Katrina. 
[Footnote 10] 

Types and Focus of Disaster Services Vary Among the Voluntary 
Organizations: 

The five voluntary organizations we reviewed differ in the extent to 
which they focus on providing disaster services and in the types of 
services they provide. Four of the five organizations directly provide 
a variety of mass care and other services, such as feeding and case 
management, while the fifth--the United Way--focuses on fund-raising 
for other organizations. As the nation's largest disaster response 
organization, the Red Cross is the only one of the five in our review 
the core mission of which is to provide disaster response 
services.[Footnote 11] In providing its services, the Red Cross 
typically coordinates with state and local governments to support their 
response and has formal agreements with state or local emergency 
management agencies to provide mass care and other disaster services. 
For example, the Red Cross serves as a support agency in the 
Washington, D.C., disaster response plan for mass care, feeding, and 
donations and volunteer management. In contrast to the Red Cross, The 
Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities 
are faith-based organizations that provide varying types and degrees of 
disaster services - some for decades--as an extension of their social 
and community service missions.[Footnote 12] The United Way raises 
funds for other charities and provides resources to local United Way 
operations, but does not directly provide services to survivors in 
response to disasters. (See table 1.) 

Table 1: Disaster-Related Services Provided by the Five Voluntary 
Organizations In Our Review: 

Organization: American Red Cross; 
Mass care services provided: 
* sheltering; 
* feeding; 
* emergency first aid; 
* bulk distribution of emergency items; 
* collection and provision of information on disaster victims to family 
members; 
Human services provided: 
* health and mental services; 
* emergency financial assistance; 
Other disaster-related services provided: 
* blood services. 

Organization: The Salvation Army; 
Mass care services provided: 
* feeding; 
* sheltering; 
* bulk distribution of emergency items; 
Human services provided: 
* disaster social services; 
Other disaster-related services provided: 
* spiritual and emotional care; 
* cleanup and restoration services; 
* donations management; 
* missing persons services; 
* medical assistance. 

Organization: Southern Baptist Convention; 
Mass care services provided: 
* feeding; 
Human services provided: Not applicable; 
Other disaster-related services provided: 
* chainsaw crews who clear trees and other obstructions following a 
disaster; 
* child care; 
* showering units for volunteers and victims; 
* chaplaincy and counseling; 
* "mud out" operations in which volunteers assist in removal of debris 
from buildings following a flood; 
* temporary repairs; 
* bilingual services. 

Organization: Catholic Charities USA; 
Mass care services provided: Not applicable; 
Human services provided: 
* individual and family case management, which may include mortgage or 
rent assistance, home repair assistance, and transportation; 
* referrals to other organizations for benefits; 
* medical and cash assistance; 
* disaster crisis counseling; 
Other disaster-related services provided: 
* temporary housing. 

Organization: United Way of America; 
Mass care services provided: Not applicable; 
Human services provided: Not applicable; 
Other disaster-related services provided: 
* fund-raising for other disaster service providers; 
* participates in local committees to address unmet needs; 
* sponsors information and referral system (2-1-1 Hotline)[A]; 
* helps coordinate unaffiliated or spontaneous volunteers. 

Source: Data provided by charities. 

Note: In this table, the terms "mass care" and "human services" 
characterize types of services in line with these terms as used in the 
federal Emergency Support Function-6 under the National Response 
Framework. 

The number 2-1-1 is a telephone number that, where available, connects 
people with community and human services and volunteer opportunities 
(e.g., food banks, shelters, counseling, child-care). Its 
implementation is being spearheaded by the United Way and information 
and referral agencies in states and local communities. As of June 2007, 
2-1-1 coverage serves approximately 198 million Americans, or about 65 
percent of the United States population, according to the United Way. 

[End of table] 

While voluntary organizations have traditionally played an important 
role in large-scale disasters, their role in response to Hurricane 
Katrina, the largest natural disaster in U.S. history, was even more 
significant,[Footnote 13] especially for the three mass care service 
providers in our study--the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the 
Southern Baptist Convention. For example, after Katrina, the Red Cross 
provided more than 52.6 million meals and snacks and opened more than 
1,300 shelters across 27 states, while the Southern Baptist Convention 
provided more than 14.6 million meals and The Salvation Army provided 
3.8 million articles of clothing. While Catholic Charities USA and its 
affiliates do not generally provide mass care services, during Katrina 
it assisted with feeding by donating food. (See table 2.) 

Table 2: Disaster Services Provided during and after the Gulf Coast 
Hurricanes: 

Organization: American Red Cross; 
Sheltered: 3.4 million overnight stays[A]; 
Meals provided: 52.6 million meals and snacks; 
Money raised: $2.1 billion; 
Volunteers: Volunteers: 245,000. 

Organization: The Salvation Army; 
Sheltered: 91,400 lodging spaces provided; 
Meals provided: 7.7 million meals and snacks; 
Money raised: $365 million[B]; 
Volunteers: Volunteer hours served: 506,443. 

Organization: Southern Baptist Convention; 
Sheltered: Not applicable; 
Meals provided: 14.6 million meals; 
Money raised: $20 million[C]; 
Volunteers: Volunteer days: 165,748. 

Organization: Catholic Charities USA; 
Sheltered: Not applicable; 
Meals provided: 51 million pounds of food provided; 
Money raised: $150 million; 
Volunteers: More than 110 Catholic Charities dioceses responded during 
Katrina. 

Organization: United Way of America; 
Sheltered: Not applicable; 
Meals provided: Not applicable; 
Money raised: $28 million; 
Volunteers: Not applicable. 

Source: Data provided by charities. 

Note: Since voluntary organizations report these data differently, the 
data are not necessarily comparable. 

[A] Overnight stays provided by the Red Cross from August to December 
2006. 

[B] Money raised by the Red Cross as of May 2006. 

[C] Money raised by The Salvation Army as of February 2006. 

[End of table] 

Voluntary Organizations' Response Structures Differ: 

The four direct service providers in our study--the Red Cross, The 
Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities 
[Footnote 14]--each have distinct disaster response structures, with 
their national offices having different levels of authority over the 
organization's affiliates and resources, reflecting a continuum from 
more centralized operations, such as the Red Cross, to more 
decentralized operations, such as Catholic Charities USA. For example, 
in a large-scale disaster, the national office of the Red Cross 
directly sends headquarters-based trained staff, volunteers, and 
equipment to the affected disaster site, while Catholic Charities USA's 
disaster response office provides technical assistance to the affected 
member dioceses but does not direct resources. (See table 3.) 
Similarly, to facilitate its ability to direct a nationwide response 
from headquarters, the Red Cross has a national headquarters and 
service area staff of about 1,600 as of May 2008, maintains a 24/7 
disaster operations center at its headquarters, and has a specially 
trained cadre of over 71,000 volunteers who are nationally deployable, 
according to the Red Cross. In contrast, the Southern Baptist 
Convention and Catholic Charities each have 1 or 2 staff at their 
national offices who are responsible for disaster response coordination 
for their organizations. These differences in the national offices' 
roles within the voluntary organizations means that when voluntary 
organizations respond to disasters of increasing magnitude by "ramping 
up"--a process similar to the scalable response described in the 
National Response Framework--they do so in different ways and to 
different extents. 

Table 3: Voluntary Organizations' National Office Disaster Response 
Functions in Large-Scale Disasters: 

American Red Cross: 
Directs response: [Check]; 
Provides personnel and equipment: [Check]; 
Coordinates personnel and equipment: [Check]; 
Provides technical assistance: [Check]. 

The Salvation Army: 
Directs response: [Empty]; 
Provides personnel and equipment: [Empty]; 
Coordinates personnel and equipment: [Check]; 
Provides technical assistance: [Check]. 

Southern Baptist Convention: 
Directs response: [Empty]; 
Provides personnel and equipment: [Empty]; 
Coordinates personnel and equipment: [Check]; 
Provides technical assistance: [Empty]. 

Catholic Charities USA: 
Directs response: [Empty]; 
Provides personnel and equipment: [Empty]; 
Coordinates personnel and equipment: [Empty]; 
Provides technical assistance: [Check]. 

Source: GAO analysis of voluntary organization data. 

[End of table] 

While the voluntary organizations in our review coordinate with one 
another and with the government, their disaster response structures are 
not necessarily congruent with the response structures of other 
voluntary organizations or aligned geographically or jurisdictionally 
with those of government. In essence, the voluntary organizations' 
response structures do not necessarily correspond to the local, state, 
and federal structures of response--as described in the National 
Framework. For example, The Salvation Army and Catholic Charities are 
not aligned geographically with states, while the Southern Baptist 
Convention is aligned roughly along state lines, called state 
conventions, and the Red Cross's organizational structure supports 
regional chapter groupings, which are also aligned generally by state. 
Furthermore, while the Red Cross and The Salvation Army have regional 
or larger territorial units, these are not necessarily congruent with 
FEMA's 10 regions. (See table 4). 

Table 4: Voluntary Organizations' Regional and Local Response 
Structures: 

Regional level: 

* American Red Cross--has four regions, each comprising between four 
and eight disaster offices; 

* The Salvation Army--has four territorial offices that coordinate 
regional disaster response through 40 divisions. Each division can 
encompass one or more states depending on density and population; 

* Southern Baptist Convention-- does not have a regional level. 
Neighboring state conventions coordinate as needed, but each is 
independent; 

* Catholic Charities USA--does not have a regional level; 

Local level: 

* American Red Cross--has 733 local chapters; 

* The Salvation Army--has local command centers located in communities 
that report to the divisions; 

* Southern Baptist Convention--has 42 autonomous state conventions 
organized loosely according to state boundaries; 

* Catholic Charities USA--has 180 member dioceses, each owned and 
operated independently. 

Source: Data provided by charities. 

[End of table] 

In a similar vein, these service providers do not necessarily follow 
the command and control structure typical of the federal incident 
command system set forth in the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) for unifying disaster response.[Footnote 15] These organizations 
vary in the extent to which they have adopted this command system, 
according to officials we spoke with. For example, organization 
officials told us that the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the 
Southern Baptist Convention use this command system, while Catholic 
Charities does not. 

Mutual Aid Agreements and Informal Working Relationships Link the 
Organizations to One Another: 

The voluntary organizations in our review coordinate and enhance their 
service delivery through formal written agreements at the national 
level. While not all of the voluntary organizations have such 
agreements with each other, the Red Cross maintains mutual aid 
agreements with the national offices of The Salvation Army, the 
Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities USA, as well as 39 
other organizations with responsibilities under ESF-6. For example, 
under a 2000 agreement between the Red Cross and the Southern Baptist 
Convention, a feeding unit addendum describes operations and financial 
responsibilities when the two organizations provide mass feeding 
services cooperatively. According to Southern Baptist Convention 
officials, the general premise of this agreement is that the Convention 
will prepare meals in its mobile feeding units, while the Red Cross 
will distribute these meals using its emergency response vehicles. 

According to many of the voluntary organization officials we 
interviewed, another essential ingredient for response is to have 
active, informal working relationships with leaders of other 
organizations that are well established before disasters strike. These 
relationships are especially important when organizations do not have 
formal written agreements[Footnote 16] or when the agreements do not 
necessarily represent the current relationship between two 
organizations.[Footnote 17] Regular local VOAD meetings and joint 
training exercises with local and state governments facilitate these 
working relationships by providing an opportunity for relationship 
building and informal communication. For example, a Florida 
catastrophic planning exercise in 2006-2007 brought together 300 
emergency management professionals and members of the Florida VOAD to 
develop plans for two types of catastrophic scenarios. According to 
disaster officials, relationships built through this type of 
interaction allow participants to establish connections that can be 
drawn upon during a disaster. 

The ESF-6 under the National Framework Recognizes the Important Role of 
the Red Cross and NVOAD Members in Disasters: 

The National Response Plan that was instituted after September 11, and 
the 2008 National Response Framework, which superseded it, both 
recognized the key role of the Red Cross and NVOAD member organizations 
in providing mass care and other services by giving the Red Cross and 
NVOAD responsibilities under the ESF-6 section of the Framework. 

The Red Cross Role: 

The 2008 National Response Framework, which revised the National 
Response Plan, clarified some aspects of the Red Cross's role that had 
been problematic during the Katrina response. Under the 2008 ESF-6 
section of the Framework, the Red Cross has a unique federally 
designated role as a support agency to FEMA for mass care. As noted in 
our recent report, the Red Cross was previously designated as the 
primary agency for mass care under ESF-6 in the 2004 National Response 
Plan, but the Red Cross's role was changed under the 2008 Framework to 
that of a support agency.[Footnote 18] This role change was made in 
large part because FEMA and the Red Cross agreed--in response to issues 
that arose during Katrina--that the primary agency responsible for 
coordinating mass care nationwide needs to be able to direct federal 
resources. 

As a support agency under ESF-6, the Red Cross helps FEMA and the 
states coordinate mass care activities in disasters. In particular the 
Red Cross is charged with providing staff and specially trained 
liaisons to work at FEMA's regional offices and other locations, and 
providing subject matter expertise on mass care planning, preparedness, 
and response. In addition, the Red Cross is expected to take the lead 
in promoting cooperation and coordination among government and national 
voluntary organizations that provide mass care during a disaster, 
although it does not direct other voluntary organizations in this role. 
(See fig. 3.) ESF-6 also acknowledges the Red Cross's separate role as 
the nation's largest mass care service provider, which is distinct from 
its role under the Framework. When providing mass care services, the 
Red Cross acts on its own behalf and not on behalf of the federal 
government, according to the ESF-6. 

Figure 3: Red Cross Role under the National Response Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure illustrates the Red Cross role under the National Response 
Framework, as follows: 

American Red Cross: 

* Provides Red Cross staff to work daily at DHS/FEMA regional offices 
in support of ESF #6 Mass Care activities; 

* Provides specially trained liaisons to work at designated DHS/FEMA 
locations to support ESF #6 Mass Care activities as requested; 

* Provides subject-matter expertise on general mass care planning, 
preparedness, and response activities, as well as Red Cross-specific 
activities in these areas; 

* Provides information on current Red Cross mass care activities as 
requested prior to and during response operations; 

* Supports DHS/FEMA in working with designated state lead agencies for 
mass care in planning preparedness and response activities, to include 
exercise participation. 

Source: GAO analysis; images: Art Explosion. 

[End of figure] 

In recent months, the Red Cross has reported a significant budget 
deficit that has led it to substantially reduce its staff, including 
those assigned to FEMA and its regional offices, and to seek federal 
funding for its ESF-6 responsibilities--a major policy shift for the 
organization. According to Red Cross officials, the Red Cross has 
experienced major declines in revenues in recent years, and the 
organization reported a projected operating budget deficit, for fiscal 
year 2008, of about $150 million. To address this shortfall, in early 
2008 the Red Cross reduced the number of its staff by about 1,000, with 
most of these staffing cuts made at its national headquarters and in 
service areas, in departments that support all Red Cross functions, 
such as information technology, human resources, and communications. 
These cuts included eliminating its full-time staff at FEMA's 10 
regional offices and reducing staff that supported state emergency 
management agencies from 14 to 5. While it is too soon to tell the 
impact of these changes, Red Cross officials we spoke with told us 
these staffing cutbacks will not affect its ability to provide mass 
care services. For example, several positions were also added to its 
Disaster Services unit to support local chapters' service delivery, 
according to Red Cross data, including area directors and state 
disaster officers--a new position at the Red Cross. However, with 
regard to its ESF-6 responsibilities, Red Cross officials also said 
that while the organization will continue to fulfill its ESF-6 
responsibilities, it is changing the way it staffs FEMA's regional 
offices during disasters by assigning these responsibilities, among 
others, to state disaster officers and using trained volunteers to 
assist in this role. According to the Red Cross, its costs for 
employing a full-time staff person in each FEMA regional office and for 
staffing its headquarters to support federal agencies during disasters 
is $7 million annually, for an operation that the Red Cross says is no 
longer sustainable. Consequently, in May 2008 testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Red 
Cross requested that Congress authorize and appropriate funding to 
cover these positions and responsibilities under the ESF-6.[Footnote 
19] In addition, the Red Cross requested $3 million to assist it in 
funding its role of integrating the mass care services provided by the 
nongovernmental sector, for a total of $10 million requested. 

Role of NVOAD and Its Members: 

In addition to the Red Cross, NVOAD is also designated as a support 
agency under the 2008 ESF-6 section of the Framework, as it was in the 
previous national plan. In its role as a support agency for mass care, 
NVOAD is expected to serve as a forum enabling its member organizations 
to share information, knowledge, and resources throughout a disaster; 
it is also expected to send representatives to FEMA's national response 
center to represent the voluntary organizations and assist in disaster 
coordination. A new element in the 2008 ESF-6 is that voluntary 
organizations that are members of NVOAD are also specifically cited in 
ESF-6 under NVOAD, along with descriptions of their services or 
functions in disaster response. According to NVOAD and FEMA officials, 
listing the individual NVOAD members and their services in the ESF-6 
does not change organizations' expected roles or create any 
governmental obligations for these organizations to respond in 
disasters, but rather recognizes that NVOAD represents significant 
resources available through the membership of the voluntary 
organizations. 

Under the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, the Red Cross Is Still 
Described as the Lead Agency for Mass Care, Which Is Inconsistent with 
Changes Made to ESF-6: 

While the Red Cross's role for ESF-6 has been changed from that of a 
primary agency under the National Response Plan to that of a support 
agency under the new Framework, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 
still reflects its earlier role, requiring the Red Cross to direct 
federal mass care resources. The Supplement provides the specific 
operational framework for responding to a catastrophic incident, in 
accordance with federal strategy. When the Supplement was issued, in 
2006, the Red Cross was the primary agency for coordinating federal 
mass care assistance and support for the mass care section of ESF-6 
under the National Response Plan.[Footnote 20] As previously mentioned, 
in January 2008 the Red Cross's role under ESF-6 changed from that of a 
primary agency to that of a support agency, partly because the Red 
Cross lacks the authority to direct federal resources. The Supplement 
has not yet been updated to reflect this recent change in the Red 
Cross's role. However, FEMA and Red Cross officials agreed that in a 
catastrophic incident, the Red Cross would serve as a support agency 
for mass care--not as the lead agency--and therefore would not be 
responsible for directing federal resources. According to FEMA, in a 
catastrophic incident, the management, control, dispensation, and 
coordination of federal resources will change, shifting this 
responsibility from the Red Cross to FEMA, so as to be consistent with 
the National Response Framework and the ESF-6. 

In addition to describing its ESF-6 support agency responsibilities in 
a catastrophic disaster, the Supplement lays out the mass care services 
the Red Cross would provide in a catastrophic disaster--acting as a 
private organization--and FEMA and Red Cross officials agreed that the 
Red Cross would continue to provide these services as part of its 
private mission, regardless of the change to its role in the ESF-6 or 
any future revisions to the Supplement. The Red Cross's services and 
actions as a private service provider are integrated into the 
Supplement for responding to catastrophic disasters. In an event of 
catastrophic magnitude, the Red Cross is expected to directly provide 
mass care services to disaster victims, such as meals and immediate 
sheltering services to people who are denied access to their homes. The 
Supplement also includes the Red Cross in a schedule of actions that 
agencies are expected to automatically take in response to a no-notice 
disaster, such as a terrorist attack or devastating earthquake. For 
example, within 2 hours after the Supplement is implemented, the Red 
Cross is expected to inventory shelter space in a 250-mile radius of 
the disaster using the National Shelter System, dispatch specially 
trained staff to assess needs and initiate the Red Cross's national 
response, coordinate with its national voluntary organization partners 
to provide personnel and equipment, and deploy Red Cross kitchens and 
other mobile feeding units. However, according to the ESF-6, in 
providing these mass care services, the Red Cross is acting on its own 
behalf and not on the behalf of the federal government or other 
governmental entity, and the Supplement similarly states that the Red 
Cross independently provides mass care services as part of its broad 
program of disaster relief. According to Red Cross officials, if the 
Supplement were implemented, the Red Cross would continue providing the 
same mass care services that it has always provided as a private 
organization. FEMA officials agreed that its expectations of the 
services the Red Cross would provide in a catastrophic event have not 
changed, and that its role as a service provider has not been affected 
by the changes to the ESF-6. According to FEMA, FEMA will augment the 
Red Cross's resources in a catastrophic disaster, and the two 
organizations are working together to develop a memorandum of agreement 
to ensure that the Red Cross is provided with adequate federal support 
for logistics, human resources, and travel in a catastrophic event. 

Although FEMA is charged with revising the Supplement under the Post- 
Katrina Reform Act,[Footnote 21] agency officials told us that the 
agency does not currently have a time frame for updating the Supplement 
and does not have an interim agreement documenting FEMA's and the Red 
Cross's understanding of the Red Cross's role as a support agency under 
the Supplement. FEMA officials told us that the agency was revising the 
2004 Catastrophic Incident Annex--a brief document that establishes the 
overarching strategy for a national response to this type of incident-
-but that it does not yet have a time frame for updating the more 
detailed Supplement, which provides the framework for implementing this 
strategy, although the agency told us that it is in the process of 
establishing a review timeline. According to FEMA, future revisions to 
the Supplement will shift responsibility for directing federal mass 
care resources from the Red Cross to FEMA, in order to remain 
consistent with the National Response Framework and ESF-6. Furthermore, 
FEMA and the Red Cross told us that they have a mutual understanding of 
the Red Cross's role as a support agency in a catastrophic disaster. 
However, this understanding is not currently documented. As the 
experience in responding to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, it is 
important to have a clear agreement on roles and responsibilities. 
Crafting such agreements in writing ahead of time--before the need to 
respond to a catastrophic event--would help clarify potentially unknown 
sources of misunderstanding and communicate this understanding not just 
to FEMA and the Red Cross, but also to FEMA's many support agencies for 
ESF-6 and the Red Cross's partner organizations in the voluntary 
sector. There is also precedent for having an interim agreement on 
changed roles: In 2007, while the National Response Plan was being 
revised, FEMA and the Red Cross developed an interim agreement on roles 
and responsibilities that set forth the Red Cross's shift from primary 
to support agency. 

Voluntary Organizations Have Taken Steps to Expand Coverage and 
Strengthen Their Service Delivery Structures: 

In response to weaknesses in service delivery that became evident 
during Hurricane Katrina, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, 
the Southern Baptist Convention, and Catholic Charities have acted to 
expand their service coverage and strengthen key aspects of their 
structures. The Red Cross has reorganized its chapters and established 
new partnerships with local community and faith-based organizations, 
particularly in rural areas with hard-to-reach populations. While Red 
Cross officials did not expect these improvements to be undermined by 
the organization's budget deficit, the effect of recent staff 
reductions at headquarters and elsewhere remains to be seen. Meanwhile, 
all four organizations, to varying degrees, have made changes to 
strengthen their ability to coordinate services by collaborating more 
on feeding and case management and improving their logistical and 
communications systems. 

The Red Cross Is Taking Steps to Expand Service Coverage by 
Reorganizing Its Response Structure: 

In recognition of the fact that its service coverage had been 
inadequate during the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes,[Footnote 22] the Red 
Cross subsequently reorganized its service delivery structure and 
initiated or strengthened partnerships with local community 
organizations--a process that is still ongoing. During Katrina, when 
approximately 770,000 people were displaced, the Red Cross was widely 
viewed as not being prepared to meet the disaster's unprecedented 
sheltering needs, in part because some areas--particularly rural areas-
-lacked local chapters or were not offering services; furthermore, the 
Red Cross had weak relationships with faith-based and other community 
groups that stepped in during this crisis to assist disaster victims. [Footnote 23] To address these problems, the Red Cross is implementing two main initiatives: 

First, to expand and strengthen its service delivery, including its 
capacity to respond to catastrophic disasters, the Red Cross is 
reorganizing its field structure by: 

* Establishing a more flexible approach to service delivery to 
accommodate varying needs of diverse communities within the same 
jurisdiction. According to the Red Cross, the jurisdiction of many 
chapters consisted of urban, suburban, and rural counties. Previously, 
chapter services were based on an urban model, but this one-size-fits- 
all approach, according to the Red Cross, did not well suit the needs 
and capacities of suburban and rural areas. The Red Cross now 
differentiates among three service levels, and each chapter can match 
service levels to the communities within its jurisdiction according to 
the community's population density and vulnerability to disasters. 
[Footnote 24] As part of this differentiated approach, the chapters 
also use a mix of methods for providing services--from teams of 
disaster-trained volunteers to toll-free numbers and the Internet to 
formal partnerships--depending on the service level needed. 

* Realigning its regional chapter groupings--each consisting of three 
to eight local chapters--to cover larger geographic areas, additional 
populations, and better support their local chapters. Regional chapters 
were established based on factors such as population density, total 
geographic area, and community economic indicators. According to the 
Red Cross, streamlining administrative back-office functions, such as 
human resources and financial reporting, through an organization-wide 
initiative to reduce duplication will free up chapter resources for 
service delivery. With this realignment, regional chapters now are 
expected to provide their local chapters with technical assistance, 
evaluate local chapters' overall service delivery capacity, and 
identify strategies to maximize service delivery, according to the Red 
Cross. 

Second, the Red Cross is working to strengthen its local chapters' 
relationships with local faith-and community-based organizations so as 
to help better serve diverse and hard-to-reach populations. During 
Katrina, the Red Cross lacked such relationships in certain parts of 
the country, including hurricane-prone areas, and did not consistently 
serve the needs of many elderly, African-American, Latino, and Asian- 
American disaster victims and people with disabilities. To remedy this, 
the Red Cross initiated a new community partnership strategy under 
which local chapters identify key community organizations as possible 
disaster response partners and enter into agreements with them on 
resources to be provided, including reimbursements for costs associated 
with sheltering disaster victims. The partnership strategy's goals 
include improving service to specific communities by overcoming 
linguistic and cultural barriers; increasing the number of possible 
facilities for use as shelters, service centers, and warehouses; and 
enlisting the support of organizations that have relationships with the 
disabled community. According to Red Cross officials, local chapters 
around the country have initiated thousands of new partnerships with 
faith-based and local community organizations. However, because these 
partnerships are formed at the local chapter level, the national office 
does not track the exact number of new agreements signed, according to 
the Red Cross. 

In addition, the Red Cross has also taken some actions to better 
address the mass care needs of disaster victims with disabilities--a 
particular concern during Katrina--although concerns still remain about 
the nation's overall preparations for mass care for people with 
disabilities. For example, the Red Cross developed a shelter intake 
form to help volunteers determine if a particular shelter can meet an 
individual's needs as well as new training programs for staff and 
volunteers that specifically focus on serving the disabled, as we 
previously reported.[Footnote 25] It has also prepositioned items such 
as cots that can be used in conjunction with wheelchairs in warehouses 
to improve accessibility to shelters. However, as we reported in 
February 2008, Red Cross headquarters officials told us that some local 
chapters were not fully prepared to serve people with disabilities and 
that it was difficult to encourage local chapters to implement 
accessibility policies. In the report we also noted that FEMA had hired 
a disability coordinator to improve mass care services for the 
disabled, but it had not yet coordinated with the National Council on 
Disability, as required under the Post-Katrina Act. More specifically, 
we recommended that FEMA develop a set of measurable action steps, in 
consultation with the disability council, for coordinating with the 
council. According to the National Disability Council, while FEMA and 
the council have met on several occasions to discuss their joint 
responsibilities under the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA has not yet developed 
action steps for coordination in consultation with the council. FEMA 
officials told us they are preparing an update for us on their response 
to the recommendation. 

Although the Red Cross recently significantly reduced its staffing 
levels, the staffing cutbacks were designed to uphold the 
organization's delivery of disaster services, according to the Red 
Cross. Red Cross national officials told us that overall, these and 
other staffing cuts were designed to leave service delivery intact and 
that the Red Cross plans to maintain the reorganization of its chapter 
and service level structure as well as its community partnership 
initiative. However, since these changes are so recent, it remains to 
be seen how or whether the cuts and realignment of responsibilities 
will affect the organization's post-Katrina efforts to expand and 
strengthen its service delivery. 

To Improve Their Service Delivery Structures, the Red Cross and Other 
Organizations Increased Coordination and Strengthened Their Logistics 
and Communications Systems: 

On the basis of their experiences with large-scale disasters, including 
Katrina, the national offices, and to some extent the local offices, of 
the direct service providers in our study reported to varying degrees 
increasing coordination with each other. [Footnote 26] In particular, 
they collaborated more on feeding operations and information sharing 
and made logistical and communications improvements to prevent future 
problems, according to organization officials. 

Coordination on Provision of Services: 

With regard to mass care services, officials from the national offices 
of the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist 
Convention--the three mass care providers in our review--reported 
increasing their collaboration on delivering mass feeding services. 
During Katrina, mass care services were duplicated in some locations 
and lacking in others, partly because voluntary organizations were 
unable to communicate and coordinate effectively. One reason for this 
confusion, according to the Southern Baptist Convention, was that many 
locally based volunteers were unaware that the national offices of the 
Red Cross and the Southern Baptist Convention had a mutual aid 
agreement to work with each other on feeding operations and as a result 
did not coordinate effectively. Since Katrina, the Southern Baptist 
Convention and the Red Cross have developed a plan to cross-train their 
kitchen volunteers and combine their core curricula for kitchen 
training. Similarly, The Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist 
Convention--who also collaborate on mass feeding services--created a 
joint training module that cross-trains Southern Baptist Convention 
volunteers to work in Salvation Army canteens and large Salvation Army 
mobile kitchens. The two organizations also agreed to continue liaison 
development. 

In addition, the voluntary organizations in our study told us that they 
shared case management information on the services they provide to 
disaster survivors through the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN)-- 
which is a partnership among several national disaster relief nonprofit 
organizations.[Footnote 27] After September 11, CAN developed a Web- 
based case management database system that allows participating 
organizations to reduce duplication of benefits by sharing data about 
clients and resources with each other following disasters. This system 
was used in Katrina and subsequent disasters. The Red Cross, The 
Salvation Army, and the United Way were among the seven original 
partners that developed and implemented CAN. According to officials 
from the Red Cross's national headquarters office, CAN has served as a 
tool for improving coordination and maintaining consistency across 
organizations and has also fostered collaboration at the national level 
among organization executives. An official from Catholic Charities USA 
told us it has seen a reduction in the duplication of services to 
clients since it began participating in CAN. Two of the local areas we 
visited participated in CAN--New York City and Washington, D.C.--and 
officials from some local voluntary organizations and VOADs in these 
two cities said they participate in CAN.[Footnote 28] In New York City, 
Red Cross officials said CAN was used to support the Katrina victims 
who were evacuated to the area. Catholic Charities officials told us 
that following September 11, CAN helped ease the transition between the 
Red Cross's initial case management services and longer-term services 
provided by other organizations. In addition, an official from the 
local VOAD said using CAN is a best practice for the sector. 

Coordination on the Logistics of Mass Care Supplies and Services: 

The three voluntary organizations that provide mass care services have 
taken steps to improve their supply chains by coordinating more with 
each other and FEMA to prevent the breakdown in logistics that had 
occurred during Hurricane Katrina, according to officials we spoke 
with. In responding to Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross, FEMA, and 
others experienced difficulties determining what resources were needed, 
what was available, and where resources were at any point in time, as 
we and others reported. Since then, the Red Cross and FEMA's logistics 
department have communicated and coordinated more on mass care 
capacity, such as the inventory and deployment of cots, blankets, and 
volunteers, according to national office Red Cross officials. The Red 
Cross also said the logistics departments of the Red Cross and FEMA 
meet regularly and that the two organizations are working on a formal 
agreement and systematically reviewing certain areas, such as sharing 
information on supplies and warehousing. In addition to the Red Cross, 
the Southern Baptist Convention and The Salvation Army made changes to 
improve their supply chain management systems. In Katrina, the Southern 
Baptist Convention experienced a breakdown in the system that prevented 
it from replenishing its depleted mobile kitchen stock, according to 
officials from the organization. While FEMA ultimately helped with 
supplies, the Southern Baptist Convention has since collaborated with 
the Red Cross and The Salvation Army to develop a supply chain 
management system to minimize logistical problems that could interfere 
with its ability to provide feeding services, according to national 
office officials from the Southern Baptist Convention. 

Changes to Strengthen Communications Systems: 

To ensure that disaster staff and volunteers can receive and share 
information during a disaster, the voluntary organizations in our 
review told us they had to varying degrees strengthened their 
communications systems since Katrina. Hurricane Katrina destroyed core 
communications systems throughout the Gulf Coast, leaving emergency 
responders and citizens without a reliable network needed for 
coordination.[Footnote 29] Since then, to prevent potential loss of 
communication during disasters, the Red Cross increased the number of 
its disaster response communications equipment and prepositioned 
emergency communications response vehicles that had Global Positioning 
Systems. According to organization officials, the Red Cross 
prepositioned communications equipment in 51 cities across the country, 
with special attention to hurricane-prone areas. The Red Cross also 
provided some communications equipment to the Southern Baptist 
Convention for its mobile kitchens and trucks. According to Red Cross 
national office officials, the organization's long-term goal for 
communications is to achieve interoperability among different systems 
such as landline, cellular, and radio networks. Furthermore, the Red 
Cross reported that it can communicate with FEMA and other federal 
agencies during a disaster through its participation in the national 
warning system and its use of a high-frequency radio program also used 
by federal agencies; in contrast, communication with nonfederal 
organizations is through liaisons in a facility or by e-mail or 
telephone. In addition to these Red Cross efforts, the Southern Baptist 
Convention enabled its ham radio operators throughout the country to 
directly access its national disaster operations center through a 
licensed radio address, began including a communications officer in 
each of its incident command teams, and established a standard 
communications skill set for all of its local affiliates, among other 
improvements. Local Salvation Army units also reported upgrading their 
communications system since Katrina. In Washington, D.C., The Salvation 
Army began developing an in-house communications system in the event 
that cellular and satellite communications networks are down, and in 
Miami, The Salvation Army equipped its canteens with Global Positioning 
Systems to help disaster relief teams pinpoint locations if street 
signs are missing due to a disaster. In addition, Catholic Charities in 
Miami purchased new communications trailers with portable laptop 
computer stations, Internet access, a generator, and satellite access, 
according to a Catholic Charities official. 

Although Early Assessments Are Limited, a Worst-Case Large-Scale 
Disaster Would Likely Overwhelm the Current Ability of Major Voluntary 
Organizations to Provide Mass Care in Four Metro Locations without 
Government and Other Assistance: 

Although initial assessments do not yet fully capture the collective 
capabilities of major voluntary organizations, the evidence suggests 
that without government and other assistance, a worst-case large-scale 
disaster would overwhelm voluntary organizations' current mass care 
capabilities in the metropolitan areas we visited. The federal 
government and voluntary organizations have started to identify 
sheltering and feeding capabilities. However, at this point most 
existing assessments are locally or regionally based and do not provide 
a full picture of the nationwide capabilities of these organizations 
that could augment local capabilities. Furthermore, attempts to develop 
comprehensive assessments are hindered by the lack of standard terms 
and measures in the field of mass care. In the four metro areas we 
visited, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern 
Baptist Convention were able to provide information on their local 
sheltering and feeding resources, and in large-scale disasters their 
substantial nationwide resources could be brought to bear in an 
affected area. Nevertheless, the estimated need for sheltering and 
feeding in a worst-case large-scale disaster---such as a Katrina-level 
event--would overwhelm these voluntary organizations. We also found, 
however, that many local and state governments in the areas we visited, 
as well as the federal government, are planning to use government 
employees and private sector resources to help address such extensive 
needs. Red Cross and FEMA officials also told us that in a catastrophic 
situation, assistance will likely be provided from many sources, 
including the general public, as well as the private and nonprofit 
sectors, that is not part of any prepared or planned response. 

Capabilities Assessment for Mass Care Is an Emerging Effort That Has 
Yet to Fully Include Voluntary Organizations: 

Because the assessment of capabilities among multiple organizations 
nationwide is an emerging effort--largely post-Katrina--it does not yet 
allow for a systematic understanding of the mass care capabilities that 
voluntary organizations can bring to bear to address large-scale 
disasters in the four metropolitan areas in our review. Assessments 
help organizations identify the resources and capabilities they have as 
well as potential gaps. To assess capabilities in such disasters in any 
metro area, it is necessary to have information not only on an 
organization's local capabilities but also its regional and nationwide 
capabilities.[Footnote 30] Under this scalable approach--which is a 
cornerstone of the Framework and the Catastrophic Supplement as well-- 
local voluntary organizations generally ramp up their capabilities to 
respond to large-scale disasters, a process that is shown in figure 4. 
Voluntary organizations are generally able to handle smaller disasters 
using locally or regionally based capabilities, but in a large-scale 
disaster their nationwide capabilities can be brought to bear in an 
affected area. While our focus in this review is on voluntary 
organizations' resources and capabilities, governments at all levels 
also play a role in addressing mass care needs in large-scale 
disasters. 

Figure 4: Voluntary Organizations' Scaling Up Process in Large-Scale 
Disasters: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains images indicating the magnitude of response to 
disasters on a scale depicting both an increasing scale of disaster and 
an increasing scale of response. 

Example given include: 

Local response: 
House fire. 

Regional response: 
Significant tornadoes, initiating a request for assistance from the 
local level. 

National response: 
Category 3 hurricane, initiating a request for assistance from the 
regional level. 

Source: GAO analysis; images: Art Explosion. 

[End of figure] 

In anticipation of potential disasters, the federal government and the 
Red Cross have separately started to assess sheltering and feeding 
capabilities, but these assessments involve data with different 
purposes, geographic scope, and disaster scenarios. Consequently they 
do not yet generate detailed information for a comprehensive picture of 
the capabilities of the voluntary organizations in our review. (See 
table 5.) 

Table 5: Current and Ongoing Assessments of Disaster Response 
Capabilities by FEMA and the Red Cross: 

Source: FEMA/DHS; 
Title: Gap Analysis Program (GAP); 
Goal or purpose: To identify states' existing disaster capability and 
potential gaps in seven critical areas: sheltering, debris removal, 
evacuation, temporary housing, medical needs, commodity distribution, 
and fuel availability. Once gaps are identified, FEMA works with the 
states to address any deficiencies; 
Geographic scope: Phase I: 21 hurricane-prone states and territories 
along the Eastern and Gulf Coasts; Phase II: Expanding to all states; 
Type(s) of disasters: Phase I: Category III Hurricane; Phase II: States 
can choose the types of disasters they want to use for the assessment; 
Date completed: Phase I: 2007; Phase II: 2009; (tentative); 
Limitations: Does not assess feeding capabilities outside of shelters; 
Does not incorporate data from voluntary organizations if they do not 
have formal agreements with state or local governments. 

Source: FEMA/DHS; American Red Cross; 
Title: National Shelter System[A]; 
Goal or purpose: To provide information using a Web-based system on 
shelter facilities, capacity, and population counts; 
Geographic scope: Nationwide; 
Type(s) of disasters: Not applicable; 
Date completed: Red Cross version was released in 2006. New FEMA 
version scheduled for release in 2008; 
Limitations: Primarily includes data on shelters operated by the Red 
Cross, and states have recently entered new data on non-Red Cross 
shelters. 

Source: American Red Cross; 
Title: Risk-Based Capacity Building Initiative; 
Goal or purpose: To address catastrophic risks by identifying existing 
capabilities and creating a response strategy to address the unique 
requirements of selected catastrophic events; 
Geographic scope: Six high-risk areas of the country[B]; 
Type(s) of disasters: The most likely, worst-case catastrophic disaster 
scenario for each area; 
Date completed: 2007; Limitations: 
Limited to six high-risk areas of the country. 

Source: American Red Cross; 
Title: Chapter Disaster Readiness Assessments; 
Goal or purpose: To gain a clear understanding of each chapter's 
ability to respond and deliver services should a disaster occur within 
its jurisdiction; 
Geographic scope: All Red Cross chapters; 
Type(s) of disasters: The assessment determines the chapter's readiness 
to respond to disasters of different magnitudes ranging from a 10 
family event to a major disaster[C]; 
Date completed: Conducted annually starting in 2003. Most recent 
assessment was in spring 2007; 
Limitations: Looks at each chapter individually rather than assessing 
the organization as a whole. 

Source: GAO analysis: 

[A] An initial shelter system that is owned and was paid for by the Red 
Cross, with FEMA as a partner agency, is currently operational. The 
federal National Shelter System--operated by FEMA in partnership with 
the Red Cross--is owned and housed at FEMA and scheduled for release in 
August 2008. When completed, the plan is for the Red Cross to enter and 
verify data for Red Cross shelters, and for states to enter and verify 
data for all other shelters. 

[B] The six areas were Southern California, National Capital Region, 
New York City Metropolitan Area, Gulf Coast, California Bay Area, and 
Southeast Coast. 

[C] In its Chapter Readiness Assessments, the Red Cross defines a major 
disaster as the largest, most likely event that could have an impact on 
the chapter. Each chapter is expected to meet with local emergency 
managers to discuss the largest most likely event. The minimum service 
delivery requirements for this scenario is for a chapter to be able to 
operate two shelters with a total of 200 residents, prepare and serve 
1,000 meals per day, and staff one government liaison office. 

[End of table] 

FEMA is currently spearheading two initiatives that to some extent 
address the mass care capabilities of voluntary organizations in our 
review. FEMA's Gap Analysis Program, which has so far looked at state 
capabilities in 21 hurricane-prone states and territories, has begun to 
take stock of some voluntary organizations' capabilities. According to 
FEMA officials, states incorporated sheltering data from organizations 
with which they have formal agreements. In the four metro areas we 
visited, however, we found that--unlike the Red Cross--The Salvation 
Army and the Southern Baptist Convention did not generally have formal 
agreements with the state or local government.[Footnote 31] For this 
reason, it is unlikely that their resources have been included in this 
first phase, according to FEMA officials.[Footnote 32] Also, this 
initial phase of analysis did not assess feeding capabilities outside 
of those available in shelters, a key facet of mass care for which 
voluntary organizations have significant resources.[Footnote 33] 
Another form of assessment under way through FEMA and the Red Cross-- 
the National Shelter System database--which collects information on 
shelter facilities and capacities nationwide--largely consists of 
shelters operated by the Red Cross, and states have recently entered 
new data on non-Red Cross shelters as well.[Footnote 34] While The 
Salvation Army and other voluntary spokesmen told us they have shelters 
at recreation centers and other sites that are not listed in this 
database, FEMA officials told us the accuracy of the shelter data is 
contingent upon states reporting information into the system and 
updating it frequently. FEMA has offered to have its staff help states 
include non-Red Cross shelter data in the database and has also 
provided or facilitated National Shelter System training in 26 states 
and 3 territories. As of July 2008, shelters operated by the Red Cross 
account for about 90 percent of the shelters listed, and according to 
FEMA officials, 47 states and 3 territories have entered non-Red Cross 
shelter data into the database. In commenting on the draft report, FEMA 
noted that in addition to these assessments, the agency is conducting 
catastrophic planning efforts to help some states develop sheltering 
plans for responding to certain disaster scenarios. For example, the 
states involved in planning efforts for the New Madrid earthquake are 
developing plans to protect and assist their impacted populations and 
identifying ways to augment the resources provided by voluntary 
organizations and the federal government. 

Of the voluntary organizations in our review, the Red Cross is the only 
one that has, to date, undertaken self-assessments of its capabilities. 
First, its annual readiness assessments of individual local chapters 
provide an overview of locally based capabilities for disasters of 
various scales and identify shortfalls in equipment and personnel for 
each chapter. Second, the Red Cross has also conducted comprehensive 
assessments of its sheltering and feeding capabilities in six high-risk 
areas of the country as part of its capacity-building initiative for 
those areas. Focusing on the most likely worst-case catastrophic 
disaster scenario for each area, this initiative reflects the Red 
Cross's primary means of addressing its responsibilities under the 
federal Catastrophic Supplement. Red Cross officials said that while 
they incorporated data from The Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist 
Convention into this assessment, many of their other partner 
organizations were unable to provide the Red Cross with such 
information. The Salvation Army and Southern Baptist Convention 
officials with whom we spoke said they have not yet assessed their 
organizations' nationwide feeding capabilities, although they were able 
to provide us with data on the total number of mobile kitchens and 
other types of equipment they have across the country. 

Also underlying the problem of limited data on voluntary organizations 
is the lack of standard terminology and measures for characterizing 
mass care resources. For example, voluntary organizations do not 
uniformly use standard classifications for their mobile kitchens. This 
makes it difficult to quickly assess total capacity when dozens of 
mobile kitchens from different organizations arrive at a disaster site 
or when trying to assess capabilities. While DHS requires all federal 
departments and agencies to adopt standard descriptions and measures-- 
a process defined in NIMS as resource typing--voluntary organizations 
are not generally required to inventory their assets according to these 
standards. Red Cross officials report that their organization does 
follow these standards, but The Salvation Army and Southern Baptist 
Convention officials said their organizations currently do not, 
although the latter has taken steps to do so. Specifically, national 
Southern Baptist officials said they are working with the Red Cross and 
The Salvation Army to standardize their mobile kitchen classifications 
using NIMS resource definitions. We also found indications of change at 
the local level in California with regard to The Salvation Army. 
Officials there told us they used NIMS resource typing to categorize 
the organization's mobile kitchens in the state and that they have 
provided these data to California state officials. 

Meanwhile, FEMA is also working with NVOAD to standardize more ESF-6 
service terms, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Post- 
Katrina Reform Act.[Footnote 35] This initiative currently includes 
terms and definitions for some mass care services such as shelter 
management and mobile kitchens.[Footnote 36] However, FEMA officials 
said it may be several years before additional standard terms and 
measures are fully integrated into disaster operations. 

While Voluntary Organizations' Resources Are Substantial, Their 
Sheltering and Feeding Capabilities Would Likely Fall Short of 
Estimated Needs in a Worst-Case Large-Scale Disaster without Government 
and Other Assistance: 

Although systematic assessments of mass care capabilities are limited, 
it is evident that in large-scale, especially worst-case, catastrophic 
disasters, the three mass care voluntary organizations would not likely 
be able to fulfill the need for sheltering and feeding in the four 
metropolitan areas in our review without government and other 
assistance, according to voluntary organization officials we 
interviewed as well as our review of federal and other data. Red Cross 
officials, as well as some officials from other organizations we 
visited, generally agreed that they do not have sufficient capabilities 
to single-handedly meet all of the potential sheltering and feeding 
needs in some catastrophic disasters. While the mass care resources of 
these voluntary organizations are substantial, both locally and 
nationally, our analysis indicates a likely shortage of both personnel 
and assets. Anticipating such shortages, the voluntary organizations we 
spoke with are making efforts to train additional personnel. According 
to local, state, and federal government officials we spoke with, 
government agencies--which play key roles in disaster response--told us 
that they were planning to use government employees and private sector 
resources in such disasters in addition to the resources of voluntary 
organizations. Red Cross and FEMA officials also told us that in a 
catastrophic situation, assistance will likely be provided from many 
sources, including the general public, as well as the private and 
nonprofit sectors, that are not part of any prepared or planned 
response. 

Federal and Other Estimates of Needs in Worst-Case Large-Scale 
Disasters: 

Within the past few years, DHS, the Red Cross, and others have 
developed estimates of the magnitude of mass care services that might 
be needed to respond to worst-case catastrophic disasters, such as 
various kinds of terrorist attacks or a hurricane on the scale of 
Katrina or greater. The estimates vary according to the type, 
magnitude, and location of such disasters and are necessarily 
characterized by uncertainties.[Footnote 37] (See table 6.) 

Table 6: Examples of Federal and Other Estimates of the Magnitude of 
Mass Care Needs in Worst-Case Large-Scale Disasters: 

Source: Department of Homeland Security; -Target Capabilities List 
(September 2007); 
Methodology: The estimates were developed by DHS after an in-depth 
analysis of the Major Earthquake scenario in the National Planning 
Scenarios[A]; 
Geographic scope: A major metropolitan area with a population of 
approximately 10 million people; 
Type(s) of disasters: 7.2-magnitude earthquake with a subsequent 8.0 
earthquake (Richter scale); 
Estimated needs: Sheltering (people): 313,000; 
Estimated needs: Feeding: 1.5 million meals per day. 

Source: American Red Cross; -Risk-Based Capacity Building Initiative 
(July 2007); 
Methodology: Red Cross worked with state and local officials and other 
disaster experts to develop worst-case disaster scenarios in six high-
risk areas of the country; 
Geographic scope: Six high-risk areas of the county, encompassing the 
four metropolitan areas in our study: Southern California; National 
Capital Region; New York City metro area; Gulf Coast; California Bay 
area; Southeast Coast; 
Type(s) of disasters: Southern California: 7.2 to 7.5 magnitude 
earthquake; Washington, D.C., region: chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or major explosion terrorist attack; New York 
metropolitan area: category III/IV hurricane; Gulf Coast: Category V 
hurricane; 
Estimated needs: Sheltering (people): 564,113 (Southern California); 
300,000 (Washington, DC); 605,000[C] (New York City metro area); 
328,646[D] (Gulf Coast); 
Estimated needs: Feeding: 2.5 million people will need feeding 
(Southern California); [Empty][B] (Washington, DC); 4 million people 
will need feeding[C] (New York City metro area); 657,292 meals per 
day[D] (Gulf Coast). 

Source: Florida Division of Emergency Management[E]; -Hurricane Ono 
planning project (November 2007); 
Methodology: The estimates were developed by a team of state and 
federal subject matter experts for use at a catastrophic planning 
workshop; Geographic scope: South Florida; 
Type(s) of disasters: Category V hurricane; 
Estimated needs: Sheltering (people): 885,000; 
Estimated needs: Feeding: 3 million meals per day. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] The National Planning Scenarios were developed by the Homeland 
Security Council--in partnership with DHS; other federal departments 
and agencies; and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments--to 
illustrate the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of a range of 
major events. The 15 scenarios include terrorist attacks and major 
disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 

[B] The Red Cross's assessment for a chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or major explosion terrorist attack in the 
Washington, D.C., region does not include an estimate for the number of 
people needing feeding services. 

[C] Estimates are specifically for New York, New York. 

[D] Estimates are specifically for Florida. 

[E] The Hurricane Ono planning project is a joint initiative by FEMA 
and the state of Florida. It is part of the Florida catastrophic 
planning project that started in the fall of 2006.These estimates 
provide the basis for analyzing the ability of voluntary organizations--
particularly the Red Cross--to provide sheltering and feeding in 
response to large-scale, especially catastrophic disasters. In a 
catastrophic disaster, government agencies are expected to work 
together with voluntary organizations and the private sector to 
collectively meet the substantial need for mass sheltering and feeding, 
according to the National Framework and Catastrophic Supplement. 

[End of table] 

Sheltering Resources and Capabilities: 

Although sheltering resources are substantial, in a worst-case large- 
scale disaster, the need for sheltering would likely exceed voluntary 
organizations' current sheltering capabilities in most metro areas in 
our study, according to government and Red Cross estimates of needs. 
The preponderance of shelters for which data are available are operated 
by the Red Cross in schools, churches, community centers, and other 
facilities that meet structural standards, but The Salvation Army and 
other organizations also operate a small number of sheltering 
facilities as well. The Red Cross does not own these shelter 
facilities, but it either manages the shelters with its own personnel 
and supplies under agreement with the owners or works with its partner 
organizations and others to help them manage shelters. At the national 
level, the Red Cross has identified 50,000 potential shelter facilities 
across the country, as noted in the National Shelter System database. 
In addition, the Red Cross has enough sheltering supplies, such as cots 
and blankets, to support up to 500,000 people in shelters nationwide. 
[Footnote 38] However, while disaster victims can be evacuated to 
shelters across the country if necessary, as happened after Katrina, 
Red Cross officials told us they prefer to shelter people locally. In 
the four metro areas we visited, the Red Cross has identified shelter 
facilities and their maximum or potential capacities, as shown in table 
7. 

Table 7: Shelters Operated by the American Red Cross and Potential 
Capacity in Four Metropolitan Areas: 

Number of shelter facilities: 
Washington, D.C.: 386; 
New York, N.Y.: 623; 
Los Angeles, Calif.: 341; 
Miami, Fla.: 65. 

Total bed space capacity: 
Washington, D.C.: 13,000; 
New York, N.Y.: 311,500[A]; 
Los Angeles, Calif.: 84,000; 
Miami, Fla.: 38,000. 

Source: Data provided by the Red Cross. 

Note: The actual number of people the Red Cross can shelter in these 
facilities after a large-scale disaster would be affected by such 
things as the location and scope of the disaster-impacted area, the 
availability of trained personnel, the condition of utilities and other 
infrastructure, and the availability of transportation. 

[A] During the initial evacuation phase of the response, these same 
shelters would be operated by the New York City government and would 
have the capacity to shelter more than 600,000 people. The evacuation 
shelters have higher capacities because they provide fewer services and 
need less space per person than the shelters that are operated by the 
Red Cross that provide more comprehensive services. 

[End of table] 

Despite local and nationally available resources, the kinds of large- 
scale disasters for which estimates of need exist would greatly tax and 
exceed the Red Cross's ability to provide sheltering. For example, for 
a major earthquake in a metropolitan area, DHS estimates that 313,000 
people would need shelter,[Footnote 39] but in Los Angeles--a city 
prone to earthquakes--Red Cross officials told us they are capable of 
sheltering 84,000 people locally under optimal conditions. The Red 
Cross's own analyses of other types of worst-case disaster scenarios 
also identified shortages in sheltering capacity in New York and 
Washington, D.C., as well.[Footnote 40] For example, for a nuclear 
terrorist attack in Washington, D.C., the Red Cross estimates that 
150,000 people would need sheltering in the National Capital Region and 
identified a gap of over 100,000 shelter spaces after accounting for 
existing capabilities. 

The ability to build or strengthen sheltering capabilities depends on 
several elements, including the availability of trained personnel and 
supplies, the condition of shelter facilities, and the particular 
disaster scenario and location, among other things. Chief among these 
constraints, according to national and local Red Cross officials, is 
the shortage of trained volunteers. Red Cross officials said there are 
17,000 volunteers and staff in the Red Cross's national disaster 
services human resources program that have received extensive training 
in sheltering as of May 2008 and an additional 16,000 Red Cross workers 
trained in mass care that can be deployed across the country.[Footnote 
41] However, local chapters are still expected to be self-sufficient 
for up to 5 days after a large-scale disaster occurs, while staff and 
volunteers are being mobilized nationwide. According to the Red Cross's 
annual chapter assessments, personnel shortages limit the ability of 
all four chapters we visited to manage the local response beyond 
certain levels. In New York City, Red Cross officials noted that it has 
identified enough shelters to optimally accommodate more than 300,000 
people, but that it has only enough personnel locally to simultaneously 
operate 25 shelters, for a total sheltering capability of 12,500 
people. The Red Cross is working with its local chapters to develop 
action plans to address personnel shortages. For example, in New York, 
the Red Cross has set a goal of recruiting 10,000 additional 
volunteers--in addition to the 2,000 it had as of December 2007 to 
operate shelters--and plans to attract 850 new volunteers each quarter. 
In addition, supply chain and warehousing challenges affect the ability 
to maximize sheltering capabilities. According to Red Cross officials, 
it is not necessary to maintain large inventories of some supplies, 
such as blankets, if they can be quickly and easily purchased. However, 
obtaining other supplies such as cots requires a long lead time since 
they may need to be shipped from as far away as China, a fact that can 
be particularly problematic in no-notice events such as major 
earthquakes. While purchasing supplies as needed can reduce warehousing 
costs, this approach can also be affected by potential disruptions in 
the global supply chain, according to officials we spoke with. 

In DHS's Catastrophic Incident Supplement, an underlying assumption is 
that substantial numbers of trained mass care specialists and managers 
will be required for an extended period of time to sustain mass care 
sheltering and feeding activities after a catastrophic disaster. In 
recognition of the need to increase the number of trained personnel to 
staff existing shelters, state and local governments in the four 
metropolitan areas we visited told us they are planning to train and 
use government employees to staff shelters in such large-scale 
disasters. For example, in New York City, the Office of Emergency 
Management is preparing to use trained city government employees and 
supplies to provide basic sheltering care for up to 600,000 residents 
in evacuation shelters. The city-run evacuation shelters would be 
located at schools for the first few days before and after a 
catastrophic hurricane. After this initial emergency plan is 
implemented, the city expects the Red Cross to step in and provide more 
comprehensive sheltering services to people who cannot return to their 
homes.[Footnote 42] As Red Cross officials told us, the New York City 
government is the only local organization with the potential manpower 
to staff all the available shelters, but the Red Cross will also 
provide additional personnel to help operate some of the city's 
evacuation shelters and special medical needs shelters. As of November 
2007, 22,000 New York City employees had received shelter training 
through a local university, with some additional training from the Red 
Cross. Similarly, in Los Angeles, as of January 2008, approximately 
1,400 county employees had been trained in shelter management so far, 
and the Red Cross has set a goal to train 60,000 of the county's 90,000 
employees. In addition, state governments have resources, equipment, 
and trained personnel that can be mobilized to provide mass care, 
according to state and FEMA officials. States can also request 
additional resources from neighboring states through their mutual aid 
agreements. According to Red Cross and FEMA officials, in a 
catastrophic disaster, sheltering assistance would likely be provided 
from many sources, such as churches and other community organizations, 
as occurred in the aftermath of the Katrina hurricanes, and they also 
noted that such assistance was not part of any prepared or planned 
response. 

Feeding Resources and Capabilities: 

Although voluntary organizations' feeding resources are also 
substantial, the feeding needs in a worst-case large-scale disaster 
would likely exceed the voluntary organizations' current feeding 
capabilities for most metro areas in our review, according to 
government and Red Cross estimates of needs. In their feeding 
operations, voluntary organizations make use of mobile kitchens or 
canteens to offer hot meals and sandwiches, prepackaged meals known as 
meals-ready-to-eat (MRE), and hot and cold meals prepared by contracted 
private vendors.[Footnote 43] The Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and 
the Southern Baptist Convention have locally based resources for 
feeding disaster victims in the four metro areas we visited. For 
example, The Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention have 
mobile kitchens stationed in close proximity to each of the four metro 
areas we visited. Some of these mobile kitchens are capable of 
producing up to 25,000 meals per day. The Red Cross also has feeding 
resources in these metro areas including prepackaged meals, vehicles 
equipped to deliver food, and contracts with local vendors to prepare 
meals. In addition, by mobilizing nationwide resources, such as mobile 
kitchens and prepackaged meals, the Red Cross reports that it currently 
has the capability, together with the Southern Baptist Convention, to 
provide about 1 million meals per day--about the maximum number of 
meals served per day during Katrina. Across the country, The Salvation 
Army has 697 mobile kitchens and other specialized vehicles and the 
Southern Baptist Convention has 117 mobile kitchens that can be 
dispatched to disaster sites, according to organization officials. 
[Footnote 44] Furthermore, Red Cross officials also said they have 6 
million prepackaged meals stockpiled in warehouses across the country 
that can be quickly distributed in the first few days after a disaster, 
before mobile kitchens are fully deployed to the affected area. Red 
Cross officials also said that they can tap into additional food 
sources, such as catering contracts with food service providers, during 
prolonged response efforts. 

Despite these substantial resources nationwide, in a worst-case large- 
scale disaster, feeding needs would still greatly exceed the current 
capabilities of these voluntary organizations, according to government 
and Red Cross estimates of needs under different scenarios. For 
example, DHS estimates that feeding victims of a major earthquake would 
require approximately 1.5 million meals per day, but this need is 
considerably greater than the 1 million meals per day currently 
possible, leaving a shortfall of about 500,000 meals per day.[Footnote 
45] According to state government estimates, the gap is even larger for 
other types of disaster scenarios. For example, according to Florida 
state estimates, a category IV hurricane could produce the need for 3 
million meals per day, which is considerably greater than the 1 million 
meals per day that the Red Cross can provide. In addition, a nuclear 
terrorist attack in Washington, D.C., would require 300,000 meals per 
day more than the Red Cross's current capabilities allow, according to 
the Red Cross's internal assessments. 

The ability to build or strengthen feeding capabilities depends on the 
availability of trained personnel, equipment, and supplies. As with 
sheltering, some voluntary organization officials told us that the key 
constraint is the limited availability of trained personnel. Feeding 
services are a labor-intensive process. For example, Southern Baptist 
Convention officials said it takes a team of 50 trained people to 
operate a large mobile kitchen, and an additional 50 people are needed 
every 4 days because teams are rotated in and out of disaster sites. 
Southern Baptist Convention officials said that although they have 
75,000 trained volunteers in their organization, there are still not 
enough trained volunteers, especially experienced team leaders. They 
said the shortage of experienced team leaders is particularly 
challenging because mobile kitchens cannot be deployed without a team 
leader. The voluntary organizations are addressing these personnel 
shortages by promoting training programs for new staff and volunteers 
and also utilizing additional unaffiliated, untrained volunteers who 
join during response efforts. For example, according to The Salvation 
Army, its national disaster training program has trained more than 
16,000 personnel throughout the United States since 2005. In addition, 
supply disruptions are also a major concern in large-scale disasters 
because mobile kitchens and other feeding units need to be restocked 
with food and supplies in order to continue providing meals. Red Cross 
officials told us they are in the process of expanding their food 
supply by contracting with national vendors to provide additional meals 
during disasters. In addition, as previously mentioned, the Southern 
Baptist Convention faced problems resupplying its mobile kitchens 
during the response to Hurricane Katrina and has since taken steps to 
develop a supply chain management system with the Red Cross and The 
Salvation Army to minimize future logistical problems. 

In the four metro areas we visited, some state and local government 
officials we met with told us they are planning to fill these gaps in 
feeding services by contracting with private sector providers. In 
Florida, the state is planning to use private sector contractors to 
fill gaps in feeding services in preparation for a catastrophic 
hurricane. A Florida state official said obtaining and distributing the 
estimated 3 million meals per day that would be needed is a huge 
logistical challenge that would require the state to use 20 to 40 
private vendors. In Washington, D.C., the emergency management 
officials said they are also establishing open contracts with private 
sector providers for additional prepackaged meals and other food 
supplies. 

Federal Government's Supplementary Efforts: 

As a result of FEMA's new responsibilities under the Post-Katrina Act 
and its new role as the primary agency for mass care under the National 
Framework, FEMA officials have told us that the agency was working to 
identify additional resources for situations in which the mass care 
capabilities of government and voluntary organizations are exceeded. 
[Footnote 46] FEMA officials said that FEMA has developed contracts 
with private companies for mass care resources for situations in which 
the needs exceed federal capabilities. After Katrina, FEMA made four 
noncompetitive awards to companies for housing services. Since then, 
contracts for housing services have been let through a competitive 
process and broadened in scope so that if a disaster struck now they 
could also include facility assessment for shelters, facility 
rehabilitation--including making facilities accessible--feeding, 
security, and staffing shelters. According to the FEMA official in 
charge of these contracts, the contracts gave the federal government 
the option of purchasing the resources it needs in response to 
disasters. FEMA officials said, however, that they prefer using federal 
resources whenever possible because private sector contract services 
are more expensive than federal resources. FEMA also has a mass care 
unit that is responsible for coordinating ESF-6 partner agency 
activities and assessing state and local government shelter shortfalls. 
According to FEMA, the members of the mass care unit based in 
Washington, D.C., are composed of subject matter experts trained in 
various mass care operations, including sheltering. Mass care teams 
have been deployed to assist with sheltering operations, such as the 
California wildfires of 2007 and the Iowa floods of 2008. FEMA regional 
offices have also begun to hire staff dedicated to mass care. 

Shortages in Personnel, Preparedness Funding, and Connections to 
Government Remain a Challenge: 

Shortages in trained personnel, identifying and dedicating financial 
resources for preparedness activities, and strengthening connections 
with government agencies continue to challenge the voluntary 
organizations in our study. Voluntary organizations in our review 
continue to face shortages in trained staff to work on preparing for 
future disasters, among other things, and volunteers to help provide 
mass care services, even though voluntary organizations and government 
agencies we met with made efforts to train additional personnel. 
Identifying and dedicating financial resources for disaster planning 
and preparedness become increasingly difficult as voluntary 
organizations also strive to meet competing demands. In addition, the 
level of involvement and interaction of voluntary organizations in 
disaster planning and coordination with government agencies is an 
ongoing challenge, even for the American Red Cross, which has recently 
changed the way it works with FEMA and state governments. 

Personnel Shortages Continue to Be a Common Concern: 

The most commonly cited concern that voluntary organizations have about 
their capabilities is the shortage of trained staff or volunteers, 
particularly for disaster planning and preparedness, according to 
voluntary organization officials. State and local governments are 
primarily responsible for preparing their communities to manage 
disasters locally--through planning and coordination with other 
government agencies, voluntary organizations, and the private sector. 
However, voluntary organization officials we met with told us it was 
difficult for them to devote staff to disaster planning, preparedness 
activities, and coordination. At the national level, the Southern 
Baptist Convention and Catholic Charities USA maintained small staffs 
of one or two people that work on disaster preparedness and 
coordination, which they said made preparedness and coordination for 
large-scale disasters challenging. At the local level, we also heard 
that staff who were responsible for disaster planning for their 
organization had multiple roles and responsibilities, including 
coordinating with others involved in disaster response as well as daily 
responsibilities in other areas. This was particularly an issue for the 
faith-based organizations, such as The Salvation Army and the Southern 
Baptist Convention, for whom disaster response, while important, is 
generally ancillary to their primary mission. For example, in Florida 
the state Southern Baptist Convention has a designated staff member 
solely focused on disaster relief and recovery, but other state 
Southern Baptist Conventions expect disaster staff to split their time 
among other responsibilities, such as managing the men's ministry, and 
generally do not have the time or ability to interact with the state 
emergency management agency, according to an official from the Florida 
Southern Baptist Convention. Similarly, a Salvation Army official in 
Miami commented that The Salvation Army could do more if they had a 
dedicated liaison employee to help with their local government 
responsibilities, including coordinating the provision of mass care 
services, which the organization provides in agreement with the local 
government. According to a national official from Catholic Charities 
USA, local Catholic Charities that provide disaster services usually 
have one employee to handle the disaster training and response 
operation, in addition to other responsibilities. While it would be 
ideal for all local Catholic Charities to have at least two or three 
employees trained in disaster response, she said, the organization 
currently does not have resources for this training. In New York and 
Los Angeles, officials from Catholic Charities confirmed that the lack 
of personnel capable of responding to disasters is an ongoing challenge 
for their organization. 

These shortages in trained staff affected the ability of some local 
voluntary organizations and VOADs we met with to develop and update 
business continuity and disaster response plans, according to officials 
from these organizations.[Footnote 47] In Los Angeles, an official from 
Catholic Charities told us that it does not have a disaster or 
continuity-of-operations plan tailored to the organization's needs, 
because it does not have dedicated disaster staff to develop such 
plans. Voluntary organization officials in Miami emphasized the 
importance of having such continuity plans, because after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Wilma struck Florida in 2005, most of the local voluntary 
organizations in the area were unable to provide services due to damage 
from the storm. In addition, organizations and VOADs we visited said 
that they struggle to update their disaster response plans. For 
instance, in Los Angeles, an official from the local VOAD told us that 
the organization's disaster response plan needed to be updated, but 
that the VOAD has not addressed this need because of staffing 
limitations. This official also told us the VOAD was planning to hire 
two full-time staff sometime in 2008 using federal pandemic influenza 
funds received through the county public health department.[Footnote 
48] 

In addition, as mentioned earlier, voluntary organization officials 
both nationally and locally told us that they face a shortage of 
trained volunteers, which limits their ability to provide sheltering 
and feeding in large-scale, and especially catastrophic disasters. This 
continues to be an ongoing concern despite the efforts of voluntary 
organizations and government agencies to build a cadre of trained 
personnel. 

Voluntary Organizations Face Difficulties in Identifying and Dedicating 
Funding for Disaster Preparedness and Capacity Building: 

Identifying and dedicating funding for disaster preparedness is a 
challenge for voluntary organizations in light of competing priorities, 
such as meeting the immediate needs of disaster survivors. Officials 
from voluntary organizations in our review told us that they typically 
raised funds immediately following a disaster to directly provide 
services, rather than for disaster preparedness--or, for that matter, 
longer-term recovery efforts. Although the Red Cross raised more than 
$2 billion to shelter, feed, and provide aid to disaster survivors 
following Katrina, the Red Cross recently acknowledged that it is less 
realistic to expect public donations to fund its nationwide disaster 
capacity-building initiatives. Similarly, the biggest challenge for 
Catholic Charities USA is identifying funds for essential disaster 
training--a key aspect of preparedness, according to an official. At 
the local level, an official from Catholic Charities in New York noted 
also that incoming donations tend to focus on funding the initial 
disaster response. As we previously reported, vague language and 
narrowly focused definitions used by some voluntary organizations in 
their appeal for public donations following the September 11 attacks 
contributed to debates over how funds should be distributed, 
particularly between providing immediate cash assistance to survivors 
or services to meet short-and long-term needs.[Footnote 49] An 
indication of this continuing challenge is that officials from Catholic 
Charities in Washington, D.C., and New York reported that they are 
still working with September 11 disaster victims and communities, and 
that they struggle to raise funds for long-term recovery work in 
general. 

Besides public donations, while federal grant programs could provide 
another potential source of preparedness funding for voluntary 
organizations, local voluntary organization officials told us it was 
difficult to secure funding through these programs without support from 
the local government.[Footnote 50] Local voluntary organizations 
officials we met with said that federal funding for disaster 
preparedness, such as the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program, 
could be useful in helping their organization strengthen their 
capabilities. For example, such grants could be used to coordinate 
preparedness activities with FEMA and other disaster responders, better 
enable voluntary organizations to develop continuity of operations 
plans, and train staff and volunteers. However, although voluntary 
organizations are among those that play a role in the National Response 
Framework--especially in relation to ESF-6--these organizations 
received little to no federal funding through programs such as the 
Homeland Security Grant Programs, according to some local voluntary 
organization and VOAD officials we visited. Under most of these grants, 
states or local governments are the grant recipients, and other 
organizations such as police and fire departments can receive funds 
through the state or local governments. Of the local voluntary 
organizations and VOADs in our study, two Red Cross chapters received 
DHS funding in recent years, according to the Red Cross. In Los 
Angeles, Red Cross officials told us that the chapter had to be 
sponsored and supported by the local government in order to receive DHS 
funding for shelter equipment and supplies. 

While the director of FEMA's grant office told us that FEMA considered 
voluntary organizations as among the eligible subgrantees for several 
preparedness grants under the Homeland Security Grant Program, the 
grant guidance does not state this explicitly. According to fiscal year 
2008 grant guidance, a state-designated administrating agency is the 
only entity eligible to formally apply for these DHS funds. The state 
agency is required to obligate funds to local units of government and 
other designated recipients, but the grant guidance does not define 
what it means by "other designated recipient." In addition, FEMA 
strongly encourages the timely obligation of funds from local units of 
government to other subgrantees, as appropriate, but possible 
subgrantees are not identified. State agencies have considerable 
latitude in determining how to spend funds received through the grant 
program and which organizations to provide funds to, according to the 
FEMA grant director. However, for fiscal year 2005, approximately two- 
thirds of Homeland Security Grant Program funds were dedicated to 
equipment--such as personal protective gear, chemical and biological 
detection kits, and satellite phones--according to DHS, while 18 
percent were dedicated to planning activities.[Footnote 51] An official 
from FEMA's grants office told us that following the September 11 
attacks, the grant program focused on prevention and protection from 
terrorism incidents, but it has evolved since Katrina. According to 
this official, the fiscal year 2008 grant guidance encourages states to 
work with voluntary organizations, particularly for evacuations and 
catastrophic preparedness. Furthermore, this official said it is 
possible that DHS grant funding has not yet trickled down to local 
voluntary organizations. It is possible that the tendency of DHS 
funding programs to focus on equipment for prevention and protection 
rather than on preparedness and planning activities could also shift as 
states and localities put equipment and systems into place and turn to 
other aspects of preparedness. 

Voluntary Organizations' Connections with Local Governments and FEMA 
Remain a Challenge: 

Local VOADs can play a key role in disaster preparation and response 
through interactions with local emergency management agencies of local 
governments, although the local VOADS in the areas we visited varied in 
their ability and approach to working with local governments on 
disasters. Like NVOAD, local VOADs are not service providers. Instead, 
like NVOAD nationally, local VOADs play an important role in 
coordinating response and facilitating relationship building in the 
voluntary sector at the local level, according to government officials. 
Generally, most of the voluntary organizations in the locations we 
visited were members of their local VOADs. Several local government 
emergency managers told us they relied on the local VOADs as a focal 
point to help them coordinate with many voluntary organizations during 
disasters. Some local VOADs in our review met regularly and were 
closely connected to the local governmental emergency management 
agency--including having seats at the local emergency operations 
centers. More specifically, the Red Cross was a member of the local 
VOADs in the areas we visited. It also directly coordinated with 
government agencies during a disaster and had a seat at the local 
emergency operations center in all four locations. In New York and 
Miami, The Salvation Army units were VOAD members and had seats as 
well. Other VOADs were less active and experienced and were not as 
closely linked to governmental response. In Washington, D.C., the local 
VOAD has struggled to maintain a network and continually convene since 
its inception, according to the current VOAD Chair. In Miami, a local 
VOAD member told us that the VOAD had little experience with large- 
scale disasters, because it re-formed after Hurricane Katrina and the 
area has not experienced major hurricanes since then. In addition, one 
of the local VOADs was tied to a local ESF-6 mass care operating unit, 
while others were more closely connected to an emergency function that 
managed unaffiliated volunteers and donations. The local VOAD in Los 
Angeles worked with the local government on ESF-6, issues while the 
VOADs in Miami and Washington, D.C., coordinated with government 
agencies through managing volunteers and donations during disasters. 

Currently, NVOAD has few resources to support state and local VOADs. 
NVOAD's executive director told us that NVOAD plans to provide state 
and local VOADS with more support using Web-based tools and guidance, 
but these plans are hindered by a lack of funding to implement them. As 
we recently reported, NVOAD is limited in its ability to support its 
national voluntary organization members, and also lacks the staff or 
resources to support its affiliated state and local VOADs.[Footnote 52] 
Because of these limitations, we recommended that NVOAD assess members' 
information needs, improve its communication strategies after 
disasters, and consider strategies for increasing staff support after 
disasters. NVOAD agreed with this recommendation and reported that the 
organization is looking to develop communications systems that take 
better advantage of current technologies. Since our previous report was 
issued, NVOAD has expanded its staff from two to four members, some of 
whom are working to build the collective capacity of state and local 
VOADs and providing training and technical assistance to state VOADs. 

At the federal level, although FEMA plays a central role in 
coordinating with voluntary organizations on mass care and other human 
services, its difficulties in coordinating activities with the 
voluntary sector due to staffing limitations were also noted in this 
earlier report. At the time of our report, FEMA only had one full-time 
employee in each FEMA region[Footnote 53]--a voluntary agency liaison-
-to coordinate activities between voluntary organizations and FEMA, and 
FEMA liaisons did not have training to assist them in fully preparing 
for their duties. In light of FEMA's responsibilities for coordinating 
the activities of voluntary organizations in disasters under the 
National Framework, we recommended that FEMA take additional actions to 
enhance the capabilities of FEMA liaisons in order to fulfill this 
role. FEMA agreed with our recommendation; however, it is too early to 
assess the impact of any changes to enhance liaisons' capabilities. 

Last, because of its current budget deficit, the Red Cross faces new 
challenges in fulfilling its ESF-6 role as a support agency. The Red 
Cross noted that it is working closely with its government partners in 
leadership positions to manage the transition, following its staffing 
reductions at FEMA's regional offices and elsewhere and the subsequent 
realignment of staff responsibilities. The Red Cross reported that it 
will monitor the impact of these changes and make adjustments as 
needed. At the same time, as was previously mentioned, the Red Cross 
has also requested $10 million in federal funding to cover its staffing 
and other responsibilities under the ESF-6. According to FEMA 
officials, FEMA funded 10 regional positions to replace the Red Cross 
mass care planner positions that were terminated. FEMA also said that 
while it is too early to assess the long-term impact of these Red Cross 
staffing changes, FEMA was experiencing some hindrance to effective 
communications and limits on the Red Cross's participation in planning 
at FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and field offices. Regarding 
the Red Cross strategy of relying on shared resources and volunteers 
instead of full-time dedicated staff in FEMA regional offices, FEMA 
officials noted that dedicated staff has proven to be a more reliable 
source for an ongoing relationship and interaction between agencies. 
They expressed concern that the lack of dedicated staff, frequent 
rotations, and inconsistent skill level of volunteers--used instead of 
full-time Red Cross staff--will hamper communications and may impede 
coordination efforts. These concerns are similar to the difficulties 
Red Cross ESF-6 staff faced during Katrina, as we noted in a previous 
review.[Footnote 54] 

Conclusions: 

Because the American Red Cross and other major voluntary organizations 
play such a vital role in providing mass care services during large- 
scale disasters, the importance of having a realistic understanding of 
their capabilities cannot be underestimated. FEMA has taken initial 
steps by having states assess their own capabilities and gaps in 
several critical areas and has completed an initial phase of this 
analysis. However, this broad assessment effort has yet to fully 
include the sheltering capabilities of many voluntary organizations and 
has not yet begun to address feeding capabilities outside of shelters. 
We understand that when a large-scale disaster strikes, some portion of 
mass care services will be provided by local voluntary organizations 
that did not specifically plan or prepare to do so, and that their 
capabilities cannot be assessed in advance. However, without more 
comprehensive data from voluntary sector organizations that expect to 
play a role, the federal government will have an incomplete picture of 
the mass care resources it could draw upon as well as of the gaps that 
it must be prepared to fill in large-scale and catastrophic disasters. 
Unless national assessments more fully capture the mass care 
capabilities of key providers, questions would remain about the 
nation's ability to shelter and feed survivors, especially in another 
disaster on the scale of Katrina. 

To the extent that local, state, and federal governments rely on 
voluntary organizations to step in and care for massive numbers of 
affected people, the challenges these organizations face in preparing 
for and responding to rare--but potentially catastrophic--disasters are 
of national concern. Reliant on volunteers and donations, many of the 
organizations we visited said that federal grant funding could help 
them better prepare for and build capacity for large-scale disasters, 
because they struggle to raise private donations for this purpose. 
Federal grants, while finite, are available to assist in capacity 
building, and voluntary organizations can be among those who receive 
federal grant funds from states and localities, according to FEMA 
officials. However, most of the voluntary organizations in our review 
have not received such funding, although they told us it would be 
beneficial. While there are many competing demands and priorities for 
such funds, clearer grant guidance could at least ensure that those 
making grant decisions consider voluntary organizations and VOADs as 
among those able to be subgrantees under these grants. Unless voluntary 
organizations are able to strengthen their capabilities and address 
planning and coordination challenges, the nation as a whole will likely 
be less prepared for providing mass care services during a large-scale 
disaster. 

An additional area of concern is the expected role of the Red Cross in 
a catastrophic disaster of a scale that invokes the federal 
government's Catastrophic Incident Supplement. As the experience with 
responding to Katrina showed, it is important to agree on roles and 
responsibilities, as well as have a clear understanding of operating 
procedures in the event of a catastrophic disaster. However, FEMA 
officials said they have not yet revised or updated the Supplement, as 
required under the Post-Katrina Reform Act, with the result that the 
mass care section of the Supplement still reflects Red Cross's previous 
role as primary agency for mass care, and not its current role as a 
support agency under ESF-6. While both FEMA and the Red Cross told us 
they expected the Red Cross to play a support agency role in a 
catastrophic event--consistent with the ESF-6--unless this 
understanding is confirmed in writing and incorporated into federal 
planning documents for responding to a catastrophic event, the nature 
of that understanding cannot be transparent to the many parties 
involved in supporting mass care. 

Finally, while it is too early to assess the impact of the changes in 
how the American Red Cross expects to coordinate with FEMA in 
fulfilling its responsibilities under ESF-6, its capacity to coordinate 
with FEMA is critical to the nation's mass care response in large-scale 
disasters. As a result, the continued implementation, evolution, and 
effect of these changes bear watching. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement reflects the American Red Crossï¿½s current role under ESF-6 as a support agency for mass care, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a time frame for updating the mass care section of the Supplement so that it is consistent with the changes in the ESF-6 under the new Framework, and no longer requires the Red Cross to direct federal government resources. In the meantime, FEMA should develop an interim agreement with the Red Cross to document the understanding they have on the Red Crossï¿½s role and responsibilities in a catastrophic event. 

To more fully capture the disaster capabilities of major voluntary organizations that provide mass care services, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take steps to better incorporate these organizationsï¿½ capabilities into assessments of mass care capabilities, such as FEMAï¿½s GAP Analysis, and to broaden its assessment to include feeding capabilities outside of shelters. Such steps might include: 

* soliciting the input of voluntary organizations, such as through NVOAD; 

* integrating voluntary organization data on capabilities into FEMAï¿½s analyses; and

* encouraging state governments to include voluntary mass care 
organization data in studies. 

To help these voluntary organizations better prepare for providing mass care in major and catastrophic disasters, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to clarify the Homeland Security Grant Program funding guidance for states so it is clear that voluntary organizations and local VOADs are among those eligible to be subgrantees under the program. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. Overall, in its response, FEMA acknowledged the importance of mass care planning among governmental and nongovernmental partners and stated that the report provides a broader understanding of the mass care support capabilities of several national voluntary organizations. FEMA also agreed with our recommendation on establishing a time frame for updating the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and with our recommendation on clarifying Homeland Security Grant Funding guidance. However, FEMA criticized certain aspects of the draft report, asserting, for example, that our methodology did not address the role of states in coordinating mass care. FEMA also disagreed with our recommendation to better incorporate voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities in assessments. FEMA provided technical clarifications and additional examples of its planning activities, which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. FEMAï¿½s written comments are provided in appendix III of this report. 

In its comments, FEMA stated that our understanding of mass care service delivery and the reportï¿½s scope and methodology was flawed partly because, in the agencyï¿½s view, the draft report did not adequately reflect the role of state governments in disaster response. As stated in our objectives, the primary focus of our report, by intention and design, is on voluntary organizationsï¿½ roles and capabilities in disaster response. Our report accordingly discusses selected voluntary organizationsï¿½ services and roles, actions in response to past disasters such as Katrina, their mass care capabilities, and the main challenges they face. As noted in our report, the National Response Framework and the Catastrophic Incident Supplement recognize the importance of voluntary organizationsï¿½ role in disaster response, particularly with regard to mass care. While focusing on voluntary organizations, our draft report also acknowledges and discusses the disaster response role and responsibilities of governmentsï¿½local, state, and federalï¿½under the Framework. In line with this, we therefore interviewed local, state, and federal government emergency management officials, as stated in the more detailed description of our reportï¿½s methodology. We have added clarifying language as appropriate to our report to make clear our consideration of state governmentsï¿½ role. 

In its comments, FEMA also raised concerns about whether the voluntary organizations discussed in our report provided a comprehensive picture of mass care capabilities. However, our report does not attempt to address all the services and capabilities of the voluntary sector. The report acknowledges that other voluntary organizations also provide mass care and other services and includes the caveat that we do not attempt to assess the total disaster response capabilities in any single location we visited. As described in our section on scope and methodology, we selected the five voluntary organizations in our report because of their contributions to the Hurricane Katrina response and congressional interest in these particular organizations. While mass care represents a significant focusï¿½and is the only focus in discussing capabilitiesï¿½other findings are not limited in this way. For example, we discuss all five organizationsï¿½ services and contributions during Katrina. However, for the purpose of discussing mass care capabilities, we specifically focused on the three voluntary organizations in our review that provide mass careï¿½the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention. We did not include the United Way or Catholic Charities in our finding on capabilities because we agree that they do not provide mass care services. The draft report explicitly states this narrower scope and our reasons for it in key places. 

FEMA also commented that two tables in the draft report were incomplete. FEMA stated that table 5, on assessments of capabilities, did not include FEMAï¿½s catastrophic planning efforts. Since the table focuses on assessments rather than broader planning initiatives, we have incorporated this information into our report as an example of FEMAï¿½s planning efforts. FEMA also stated that table 6, on estimated mass care needs in worst-case disasters, represents a limited view of mass care capabilities and coordination. However, the tableï¿½s purpose is to provide estimates of the magnitude of mass care services that would be needed to respond to worst-case disasters, and not to identify gaps in capabilities or coordination issues, which we address in later sections of our report. We have modified the tableï¿½s title to clarify the information it contains. 

Regarding FEMAï¿½s response to our recommendations, FEMA agreed with our recommendation that it should establish a time frame for updating the mass care section of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement so that it is consistent with the changes in ESF-6 under the new Framework. In its comments, FEMA noted it is in the process of establishing a timeline for updating the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and will change the role of the Red Cross from that of a primary to support agency when the document is updated. We have noted this in the report accordingly. FEMA also agreed with our recommendation to clarify the Homeland Security Grant Program Funding guidance so that it is clear voluntary organizations and VOADs are considered eligible subgrantees. 

FEMA disagreed with our recommendation that it should take steps to better incorporate the capabilities of voluntary organizationsï¿½ into assessments of mass care capabilities. Specifically, FEMA said that federal, state, and local governments cannot command and control private sector resources. We understand the limitations of governmental authority over voluntary organizationï¿½s resources; however, as we mention in the draft report, under the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is required to establish a comprehensive assessment system to assess the nationï¿½s prevention capabilities and overall preparedness, including its operational readiness. While the act does not specifically include voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities, a comprehensive assessment of the nationï¿½s capabilities should account as fully as possible for voluntary organizationsï¿½ capabilities in mass care. Taking steps to assess capabilities more fully does not require controlling these resources but rather cooperatively obtaining and sharing information. This could be done as an extension of FEMAï¿½s ongoing partnerships with voluntary organizations to help strengthen coordination and collaboration in preparation for future disasters. We continue to think that it is important for FEMA to assess the significant capabilities that voluntary organizations can bring to bear in support of governmental efforts to prepare for and respond to disasters. As we noted in our report, without such an assessment, the government will have an incomplete picture of the mass care resources it can draw upon in large-scale disasters. 

In its comments, FEMA also asserted that our report incorrectly assumes that if funding were made available, it would enable voluntary organizations to shelter and care for people in catastrophic events. However, our report discusses potential federal funding in relation to voluntary organizationsï¿½ preparedness and planning activities, not direct services. As noted in the report, such funding could be used to strengthen voluntary organizationsï¿½ disaster preparedness, such as coordination with FEMA, training of personnel, and developing continuity-of-operations plans. If FEMA provided clearer guidance to states on voluntary organizationsï¿½ potential eligibility for these grants as subgrantees, voluntary organizations might be able to strengthen planning and coordination for future disasters and better utilize their substantial capabilities. A key premise of the National Response Framework is that voluntary organizations play a vital role in times of need, and recent experience has demonstrated that voluntary organizations already play significant roles in providing shelter and care in large-scale disasters. 

We also provided a copy of our draft report to the American Red Cross and excerpts from the draft report as appropriate to The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. In its comments, the American Red Cross further explained its role in New York Cityï¿½s coastal storm plan. We have added this information as appropriate to further clarify the Red Crossï¿½s role under this scenario. In addition, the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and NVOAD provided us with technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The American Red Crossï¿½s written comments are provided in appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities, the United Way, and NVOAD. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAOï¿½s Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Cynthia M. Fagnoni: 
Managing Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues: 

List of Congressional Requesters: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Finance: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Herb Kohl: 
Chairman: 
Special Committee on Aging: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable David E. Price: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives:

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

We designed our study to provide information on (1) what the roles of 
major national voluntary organizations are in providing mass care and 
other human services in response to large-scale disasters requiring 
federal assistance, (2) what steps these organizations have taken since 
Katrina to strengthen their capacity for service delivery, (3) what is 
known about these organizations' current capabilities for responding to 
mass care needs in such a large-scale disaster, and (4) what the 
remaining challenges are that confront voluntary organizations in 
preparing for such large-scale disasters. We focused our review on the 
following five major voluntary organizations based on their 
contributions during Hurricane Katrina and congressional interest: the 
American Red Cross, The Salvation Army, the Southern Baptist 
Convention, Catholic Charities USA, and the United Way of America. 
Since the United Way of America does not provide direct services in 
disasters, we did not include it in our analysis of recent improvements 
to service delivery, response capabilities, and remaining challenges. 
For our review of voluntary organizations' response capabilities, we 
limited our focus to the three organizations in our study that provide 
mass care services: the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the Southern 
Baptist Convention. To obtain information for all of the objectives, we 
used several methodologies: we reviewed federal and voluntary 
organization documents; reviewed relevant laws; interviewed local, 
state, and federal government and voluntary agency officials; conducted 
site visits to four selected metropolitan areas; and collected data on 
the voluntary organizations' capabilities. 

Reviews of Governmental and Voluntary Agency Documents: 

We reviewed governmental and voluntary organization documents to obtain 
information on the role of voluntary organizations, recent improvements 
to service delivery, response capabilities, and remaining challenges. 
To obtain an understanding of the federal disaster management 
framework, we reviewed key documents, such as the 2008 National 
Response Framework, the Emergency Support Function 6--Mass Care, 
Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services Annex (ESF-6), the 
2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement, and the 2007 National 
Preparedness Guidelines, which collectively describe the federal 
coordination of mass care and other human services. We also reviewed 
pertinent laws, including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act of October 2006. In addition, we reviewed documents for each of the 
five voluntary organizations in our review, which describe their roles 
in disasters and explained their organizational response structures. 
These documents included mission statements, disaster response plans, 
and statements of understanding with government agencies and other 
voluntary organizations. We also reviewed key reports written by 
federal agencies, Congress, voluntary organizations, policy institutes, 
and GAO to identify lessons learned from the response to Hurricane 
Katrina and steps voluntary organizations have taken since then to 
improve service delivery. [Footnote 55] 

Interviews of Federal Government and National Voluntary Organization 
Officials: 

We interviewed federal government and national voluntary organization 
officials to obtain information on the role of voluntary organizations, 
recent improvements to service delivery, response capabilities, and 
remaining challenges. At the federal level, we interviewed officials 
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the ESF-6 Mass 
Care Unit, the FEMA Grants Office, and the Disaster Operations 
Directorate. We also interviewed the executive director of the National 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD). We interviewed 
these officials regarding the role of the voluntary organizations in 
disaster response, grants and funding offered to voluntary 
organizations, voluntary organization and government logistics in 
disasters, assessments of capabilities, and the types of interactions 
each of them has with the organizations from our review. We also 
interviewed national voluntary organization officials from the five 
organizations in our review about the roles of their organizations in 
disaster response, improvements the organizations had made to 
coordination and service delivery since Hurricane Katrina, their 
organizations' capabilities to respond to disasters, and what remaining 
challenges exist for the organizations in disaster response. 

Visits to Four Major Metropolitan Areas: 

We visited four metropolitan areas--Washington, D.C.; New York, New 
York; Miami, Florida; and Los Angeles, California--to review the roles, 
response structures, improvements to service delivery, response 
capabilities, and challenges that remain for the selected voluntary 
organizations' in these local areas. We selected these metropolitan 
areas based on their recent experiences with disaster, such as 
September 11; their potential risk for large-scale disasters; and the 
size of their allotments through the federal Urban Areas Security 
Initiative grant program. The metropolitan areas that we selected also 
represent four of the six urban areas of the country considered most at 
risk for terrorism under the 2007 Urban Areas Security Initiative. 

During our visits to the four metropolitan areas, we interviewed 
officials from the five voluntary organizations, local and state 
government emergency management agency officials, the heads of the 
local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), and FEMA's 
regionally based liaisons to the voluntary sector, known as voluntary 
agency liaisons (VAL). During our interviews, we asked about the roles 
and response structures of voluntary organizations in disaster 
response, improvements the organizations had made to coordination and 
service delivery since Hurricane Katrina, the organizations' 
capabilities to respond to disasters, and what challenges exist for the 
organizations in disaster response. 

Capabilities Data and Catastrophic Estimates: 

To review voluntary organizations' sheltering and feeding capabilities, 
we collected data through interviews and written responses from the 
three organizations in our study that provide mass care: the Red Cross, 
The Salvation Army, and the Southern Baptist Convention. By 
capabilities we mean the means to accomplish a mission or function 
under specified conditions to target levels of performance, as defined 
in the federal government's National Preparedness Guidelines. We 
collected data on both their nationwide capabilities and their locally 
based capabilities in each of the four metropolitan areas we visited. 
To obtain capabilities data in a uniform manner, we requested written 
responses to questions about sheltering and feeding capabilities from 
these organizations in the localities we visited, and in many of these 
responses, voluntary organizations described how they derived their 
data. For example, to collect data on feeding capabilities, we asked 
voluntary organization officials how many mobile kitchens they have and 
how many meals per day they are capable of providing. To assess the 
reliability of the capability data provided by the voluntary 
organizations, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials 
knowledgeable about the data. However, we did not directly test the 
reliability of these data because the gaps between capabilities and 
estimated needs were so large that greater precision would not change 
this underlying finding. It was also not within the scope of our work 
to review the voluntary organizations' systems of internal controls for 
data on their resources and capabilities. 

To identify potential needs for mass care services, we used available 
estimates for catastrophic disaster scenarios in each of the selected 
metropolitan areas: Washington, D.C.--terrorism; New York, New York-- 
hurricane; Miami, Florida--hurricane; and Los Angeles, California-- 
earthquake. We reviewed federal, state, and Red Cross estimates of 
sheltering and feeding needs resulting from these potential 
catastrophic disasters: 

* Federal catastrophic estimates--We reviewed the earthquake estimates 
from the Target Capabilities List that were developed by the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) after an in-depth analysis of the Major 
Earthquake scenario in the National Planning Scenarios. The National 
Planning Scenarios were developed by the Homeland Security Council--in 
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, other federal 
departments and agencies, and state and local homeland security 
agencies. The scenario assumes a 7.2 magnitude earthquake with a 
subsequent 8.0 earthquake occurs along a fault zone in a major 
metropolitan area with a population of approximately 10 million people, 
which is approximately the population of Los Angeles County. 

* State catastrophic estimates--We reviewed catastrophic hurricane 
estimates from the Florida Division of Emergency Management's Hurricane 
Ono planning project. The project assumes a Category V hurricane making 
landfall in South Florida, which has a population of nearly 7 million 
people. 

* Red Cross catastrophic estimates--We reviewed catastrophic estimates 
from the Red Cross's risk-based capacity building initiative. To 
develop these estimates, the Red Cross worked with state and local 
officials and other disaster experts to develop "worst case" disaster 
scenarios in six high-risk areas of the country, including the four 
metropolitan areas in our study. The scenarios for these four 
metropolitan areas were: a 7.2 to 7.5 magnitude earthquake in Southern 
California; a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or major 
explosion terrorist attack in the Washington, D.C. region; a Category 
III/IV hurricane in the New York metropolitan area; and a Category V 
hurricane in the Gulf Coast. 

To identify general findings about nationwide preparedness, we compared 
the capabilities data provided by the voluntary organizations to these 
catastrophic disaster estimates. We did not attempt to assess the total 
disaster response capabilities in any single location that we visited 
or the efficacy of any responses to particular scenarios, such as major 
earthquakes versus hurricanes. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to September 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: NVOAD Members: 

Adventist Community Services: 
Americaï¿½s Second Harvest: 
American Baptist Men/USA: 
American Radio Relay League, Inc. (ARRL): 
American Red Cross: 
Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team (AMURT): 
Catholic Charities USA: 
Christian Disaster Response: 
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC): 
Church of the Brethrenï¿½Brethren Disaster Ministries: 
Church of Scientology Disaster Response: 
Church World Service: 
City Team Ministries: 
Convoy of Hope: 
Disaster Psychiatry Outreach: 
Episcopal Relief and Development: 
Feed the Children: 
Friends Disaster Service, Inc. 
Habitat for Humanity: 
HOPE Coalition America: 
Humane Society of the United States:
International Aid:
International Critical Incident Stress Foundation:
International Relief and Development (IRD):
International Relief Friendship Foundation (IRFF):
Latter Day Saints Charities: 
Lutheran Disaster Response:
Mennonite Disaster Service:
Mercy Medical Airlift (Angel Flight):
National Association of Jewish Chaplains:
National Emergency Response Team:
National Organization for Victim Assistance:
Nazarene Disaster Response:
Operation Blessing:
Points of Light Foundation and Volunteer Center National Network:
Presbyterian Church (USA):
REACT International, Inc.
Samaritanï¿½s Purse:
Save the Children:
Society of St. Vincent de Paul:
Southern Baptist Convention:
The Salvation Army:
Tzu Chi Foundation:
United Church of Christï¿½Wider Church Ministries: 
United Jewish Communities: 
United Methodist Committee on Relief: 
United Way of America: 
Volunteers of America: 
World Vision: 

Source: NVOAD as of July 2008. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov] 

September 5, 2008: 

Cynthia M. Fagnoni: 
Managing Director, Education, Workforce And Income Security Issues: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Fagnoni: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) Draft Report GAO-08-823 entitled FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizations' Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic Events. Input provided by: IA/Mass Care Unit, Voluntary Agency (VOLAG) Unit. 

FEMA acknowledges that enhanced mass care planning is needed across Federal, State, local, and non-governmental partners and is actively working to ensure that the capabilities and contributions of non-governmental and voluntary agencies are reflected in planning and operational documents. 

The Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) and the American Red Cross (p.25): 

FEMA acknowledges that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) needs to be updated to reflect changes in the National Response Framework (NRF) and is in the process of establishing a review timeline. 

In addition, FEMA would like to take this opportunity to clarify the distinction between the roles and responsibilities of the American Red Cross as (1) a humanitarian organization that provides mass care services based on the seven principles of the International Red Cross Movement, with its roles and responsibilities as a (2) nongovernmental/ voluntary organization signatory to the NRF and the CIS. 

In its role as a signatory to the NRF and CIS, the American Red Cross provides disaster and emergency preparedness, response and recovery services through a network of local chapters for most incidents in CONUS and OCONUS in support of Federal disaster operations. The American Red Cross is the only non-profit organization chartered by Congress (36 U.S.C. 300101-300111) to develop and implement a system of disaster and emergency relief nationwide. The American Red Cross has the capability to mobilize over 54,000 trained volunteers nationwide to respond to and assist in most disasters. 

Also, the American Red Cross has over 740 chapters strategically located nationwide. This incredible response capacity is achieved through the donations of the American public and, to a more limited degree, through contracts with private and public sector organizations.

As established in their charter, the American Red Cross acts under its own authority to provide services independent of government funding or intervention. The services the organization provides are based on the American Red Cross's internal resources, vision, mission, commitment to the local communities where its chapters are located and its understanding of the Congressional Charter. Even if it was not a signatory organization to the NRF and CIS, the Red Cross would provide the same level of service to disaster survivors as it does today.

As a primary agency for mass care under the Federal Response Plan (FRP), and later, the National Response Plan (NRP), the American Red Cross struggled with maintaining separate roles and responsibilities. The role of primary agency for mass care under the NRF requires the designated agency to have the authority to manage and dispose of Federal assets; provide direction and command to Federal and State agencies; to coordinate other non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and receive direct requests and assignments from Federal authorities. At times, these roles and responsibilities clash with three principles of the Red Cross movement: impartiality, neutrality and independence. For example, Federal programs limit assistance to illegal immigrants; the American Red Cross provides full assistance and services to individuals regardless of their citizenship status.

By contrast, under the CIS, the activities required are not in conflict with the American Red Cross role as an independent and non-governmental organization.

Table 5: Current and Ongoing Assessments of Disaster Response Capabilities by FEMA and the Red Cross (p.38): 

This section of the report does not include on-going catastrophic planning efforts underway in California, Florida and the States that may be impacted by a New Madrid earthquake (AR, TN, MS, MO, IN, IL and AL). In the planning phase, all potentially affected State governments are developing plans to protect and assist their impacted populations. Planning for sheltering in a post-impact environment is being conducted at the State level. This planning includes the augmentation of resources provided by Federal agencies and non-profit organizations.

The American Red Cross is not a government agency and does not encourage their local chapters to assume this lead role as the State Mass Care agency. States assign government agencies as the lead to work with counties and local government shelter and feeding services providers to ensure that local resources are available and to establish processes to augment local efforts. States with assigned agencies to lead Emergency Support Functions (ESF) # 6 Mass Care and sheltering functions include but are not limited to Louisiana, Texas, New York and Alabama. 

Table 6: Examples of Federal and Other Estimates of Mass Care Needs in Worst-Case Large-Scale Disasters (p.43): 

Consistent with the information provided throughout the report, this table represents a limited view of mass care capabilities and the current coordination that exists between State, local, and non-governmental partners.

To highlight the role of State and local partners, we offer the following information related to mass care and sheltering capabilities in the City of New York:

The table cites the American Red Cross' ability to shelter 600,000+ people in the event that a Category 3 Hurricane were to hit the New York City area. The Department of Homeless Services of the City of New York is the designated lead agency for the sheltering of citizens evacuated pre-landfall and for a catastrophic disaster, as well as the development and implementation of citywide sheltering plans. The Greater New York Chapter of the American Red Cross supports the activities of the Department of Homeless Services by staffing, feeding and providing support to the affected population. The Department of Homeless Services still is the lead sheltering agency for the City and will coordinate activities with the American Red Cross throughout the post-landfall response.

Most importantly, the American Red Cross shelter data for New York City omitted schools and other city-owned facilities in their post-impact scenarios. City government policy is to return public facilities to their normal functions as soon as possible after an event and thus the City has requested that American Red Cross identify alternate shelter facilities; however, if no other viable sheltering alternatives were to be available, the City government would extend the use of their facilities for sheltering operations and request additional assistance from the State for the purpose of housing those in need of shelter.

Appendix 1: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology (p.64)

While the information cited in the report provides the reader with a broader understanding of the mass care support capabilities of several national voluntary organizations, the GAO's basic understanding of the delivery of mass care services, and by extension the scope and methodology of the report are fundamentally flawed.

"To obtain information for all of the objectives, we used several methodologies: we reviewed federal and voluntary organization documents, reviewed relevant laws, interviewed government and voluntary agency officials, conducted site visits to four metropolitan areas, and collected date on the voluntary organizations' capabilities." (p.64)

This methodology overlooks a critical partner in the coordination and delivery of mass care recovery services and capabilities - the State. 

As declared in their own legislation, States are responsible for the safety and well being of their constituents. While non-governmental agencies such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Southern Baptist Convention support States in the execution of their responsibilities, at no time is the State's responsibility relinquished.

On 2008 Florida Statues Title XVIII Chapter 252.35 Emergency management powers; Division of Emergency Management (2):

Include a shelter component that includes specific regional and interregional planning provisions and promotes coordination of shelter activities between the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. This component must, at a minimum: contain strategies to ensure the availability of adequate public shelter space in each region of the state; establish strategies for refuge-of-last-resort programs; provide strategies to assist local emergency management efforts to ensure that adequate staffing plans exist for all shelters, including medical and security personnel; provide for a post-disaster communications system for public shelters; establish model shelter guidelines for operations, registration, inventory, power generation capability, information management, and staffing; and set forth policy guidance for sheltering people with special needs.

It is important to note that the American Red Cross is an auxiliary resource (as the Nation's primary mass care service provider). Traditionally, the Red Cross negotiates with local jurisdictions for the use of public facilities and other resources, including but not limited to security, medical support (a large percentage of nurses assigned to shelters are from local or State Public Health agencies) and food (from school lunch programs), transportation and maintenance of the facilities.

The States of Florida and New York, both cited within the GAO report discussed herein, have delegated their immediate emergency services responsibilities to local government, while still retaining a support role when necessary. In drafting its report, the GAO did not interview State emergency management personnel of these two States to better understand the delegation and authorities, State resources, available services, equipment and trained personnel. For example, the State of Florida uses an assistance model similar to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which is used for interstate emergency assistance to share resources between potentially affected and non-affected counties.

FEMA also has concerns about whether the NGOs that GAO interviewed for this report provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of mass care capabilities. Our specific concerns are as follows:

* Catholic Charities of USA and the United Way are not mass care providers and should have not been interviewed for the report. Catholic Charities provides Case Management, an issue that was discussed in this report has no relation with mass care and any reference should be taken out as it may confuse the readers. 

* Several key National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) which are providers of mass care were not interviewed. Those include: Second Harvest, Save the Children, Feed the Children, and Convoy of Hope. 

* There are additional NVOAD members that provide volunteers and manage spontaneous volunteers. Representatives from these organizations were not interviewed. Their perspective would have been valuable to the report in that their capabilities would help to address the concerns raised by the American Red Cross and other NGOs related to staffing requirements in a catastrophic event. 

* Citizen Corps and the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) were not interviewed. CNCS AmeriCorps and Citizen Corps Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) volunteers provide personnel for the management of shelters to local and State agencies.

Government Responsibilities:

State Roles and Responsibilities: The responsibilities of sheltering fall under the auspices of State government, which through legislation delegates those responsibilities to local governments. Typically, local American Red Cross chapters are enlisted by local governments to support the management, feeding and delivery of emergency assistance to individuals and households in need. However, local government may request assistance from other agencies or local non-profits, such as The Salvation Army or volunteer fire departments.

In New York State (Note: the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) was not interviewed for the GAO report), northern and rural county volunteer fire auxiliaries serve as shelter managers for emergency events such as floods, residential fires, snow storms and blizzards. This illustrates that sheltering is a local responsibility in New York and the State is the ultimate agent responsible for the implementation and support of shelters.

FEMA encourages States to develop strategies that include the use of non-governmental agencies to provide sheltering services; however, when specialized sheltering is needed, or there is a gap in general population sheltering resources, State and local jurisdictions can contract these sheltering services from non-profit organizations or for-profit private companies.

If requirements are beyond the State's capability to contract local resources exist, the State may deploy resources from neighboring States, through EMAC; FEMA will reimburse the affected State for costs associated with the deployment of EMAC resources.

Federal Roles and Responsibilities: The Federal government's role is to support and augment State needs for all phases of disaster preparedness, response and recovery; therefore, when requested, this can include augmentation of State sheltering capabilities. 

FEMA, through the Public Assistance program, has established reimbursement policies for States when providing sheltering services. The NRF allows the U.S. Department of Agriculture-Forest Services, as well as the Corporation for National and Community Services, to be mission assigned to support sheltering services if needed. As it is not a Federal agency, the American Red Cross cannot be mission assigned. In the event that resource needs exceed the capacity of NGOs and State and Federal agencies, FEMA' s Individual Assistance-Technical Assistance Contracts (IA-TAC) Branch can activated. IA-TAC contracts with the private sector can augment American Red Cross staff shortages as well as provide full staffing and equipment to cover any shelter shortfalls.

To support the new authorities granted by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, FEMA created the Mass Care Unit within the Disaster Assistance Directorate. The twelve members of the Mass Care Unit based in Washington DC are composed of Subject Matter Experts (SME) who are trained in various mass care operations including sheltering. Current responsibilities of the unit include, but are not limited to, coordinating ESF # 6 partner agency activities and assessing State, Tribal and local governments shelter shortfalls. To support declared disasters FEMA Mass Care teams have deployed to assist sheltering operations - such as the California Wildfires of 2007 and the Iowa Floods of 2008. FEMA regional offices have also begun to hire staff dedicated to mass care.

Response to Recommendations: 

The agency's response to specific recommendations laid out in the report are as follows:

Recommendation: Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to establish a timeframe for updating the mass care section of the (Catastrophic Incident) Supplement so that it is consistent with the changes in ESF #6 under the new (National Response) Framework, and no longer requires the Red Cross to direct federal government resources. In the meantime, FEMA should develop an interim agreement with the Red Cross to document the understanding they have on the Red Cross's roles and responsibilities in a catastrophic event.

FEMA concurs with the recommendation. FEMA will change the role of the American Red Cross from a primary to a support agency in the CIS when the document is updated.

Recommendation: Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to take steps to better incorporate these organizations' capabilities into assessments of mass care capabilities, such as FEMA's Gap Analysis and to broaden its assessment to include feeding capabilities outside of shelters.

FEMA non-concurs with this recommendation and would like to correct several inaccuracies in the underlying operational assumptions found within this report. These assumptions are identified as follows: 

a) That FEMA or the Federal government should be able to account for and control the assets and resources of applicable non-profit and private organizations;

b) That, if funding is made available, non-profit organizations will be able to shelter and care for people in catastrophic events.

FEMA, State and local governments cannot command and control private sector resources unless the Federal government is funding them. Private organizations, both non-profit and for-profit, are responsible for their assets and the disposition of their assets. We can collaborate, cooperate and coordinate, but we cannot command or dispose of their resources. FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons and Mass Care staff work closely with the NVOAD to ensure coordination of National assets and full participation of voluntary agencies, as well as to avoid the duplication of benefits to disaster assistance recipients

Recommendation: Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA to clarify the Homeland Security Grant Program funding guidance for states so it is clear that voluntary organizations and local VOADs are among those eligible to be subgrantees under the program.

FEMA concurs with the recommendation. We will provide additional information in our 60 day letter after the GAO final report is published. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: American Red Cross: 

American Red Cross: 
Office of the General Counsel: 
2025 E Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20006: 

(202) 303-5433: 
(202) 303-0143 (fax): 

Writers Direct Dial: 
(202) 303-5466: 
[email protected]: 

Legal Assistant: 
(202) 303-5519: 
[email protected]: 

Direct Fax: 
(202) 303-0143: 

August 27, 2008: 

By E-Mail: 

Gale Harris, Assistant Director: 
Deborah Signer, Senior Analyst: 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO): 
441 G Street N.W. 
Washington DC 20548: 

Re: GAO Draft Report: 

Dean Gale and Deborah: 

Attached please find Comments of the American Red Cross on the U.S.. Government Accountability Office Draft Report, "Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should Move Fully Assess Organizations' Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role In Catastrophic Events" (GAO-08-823). 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Lori Polacheck: 
Senior Counsel: 

Comments of the American Red Cross on the U.S. Government Accountability
Office Draft Report, "Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizations' Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic Events" 

The American Red Cross appreciates the opportunity to comment on the GAO Draft Report, "Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizations' Mass Cate Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic Events" ("Draft Report"). Our comments are as follows: 

Page 6: The Draft Report states that the Red Cross commented that it "may" be difficult to raise public donations to support capacity building initiatives,. Instead of "may," the words "has been" would more accurately reflect the fundraising challenges. 

Page 8: The description of the Red Cross omits the Red Cross's blood, emergency preparedness, and health and safety programs, and these are important components of the organization's humanitarian mission. 

Page 16: the report makes reference to the Red Cross doing Public Health Services, which are not within our scope. 

Page 16: In addition to the services listed, the Red Cross also provides emergency financial assistance. 

Page 16: "Safe & Well" is a Red Cross Disaster Welfare Information service, so the reference to both is redundant. 

Pages 23, 24 and 58: the Draft Report states that the Red Cross is seeking federal funding to carry out our assigned responsibilities under the National Response Framework. We believe we are carrying out ow assigned responsibilities now; we are requesting funding because it would help us do more. 

Page 30: At this point we are unable to confirm that the number of new Red Cross partnerships is more than 10,000, but we are confident that we have entered into many thousands of new partnerships. 

Page 34: The reference to the Red Cross increasing "the number of its disaster response communication networks" is a bit misleading and suggests we've added complexity. We increased our available communications equipment, but we did not add networks. 

Page 39: The reference to "Red Cross shelters" still sounds as if we own these buildings (although this point is clarified later in the document on p. 44). 

Page 44, footnote: This footnote references the highest single night occupancy during Katrina (141K); it is not a cumulative number of persons sheltered and this should be clarified. 

Page 45: The GAO's main contention regarding sheltering capacity in the New York metropolitan area, that "the need for sheltering would likely exceed voluntary organizations' current sheltering capabilities," is correct. However, the Draft Report seems to miss the distinction that the Red Cross will not have to shelter 600,000 people in New York City during the evacuation phase of a catastrophic hurricane Under New York City's Coastal Storm Plan's worst case scenario, the City will be doing that, using city employees The Draft Report cites 623 "American Red Cross shelters" accommodating 311,500 people (i.e., 623 shelters at the Red Cross's preferred shelter capacity of 500 each), but those are actually New York City shelters with a capacity of 1,000 each. So, under the planning assumptions for the evacuation phase of a catastrophic hurricane in the New York metro area, there would be no gap in shelter capacity. 

Regarding the staffing of shelters in New York City, current plans call for the Red Cross to supply up to 1,690 workers to 65 city evacuation centers and an additional 384 workers to eight special medical needs shelters. These targets are achievable. 

Nevertheless, the Red Cross faces a challenge when the City's evacuation centers close and the Red Cross becomes responsible for people who cannot return home, but that would be a smaller number than the 600,000 who may need shelter during the evacuation phase.. At this later stage of the response, the Greater New York chapter would be reinforced by national Red Cross resources. 

Page 58: The report makes it sound as if FEMA funding for liaison positions is already in hand, which is not the case. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Gale C. Harris, Assistant Director; Deborah A. Signer, Analyst-in-Charge; William W. Colvin; Amanda M. Leissoo; and Lacy Vong made significant contributions to this report. In addition, Susan Bernstein provided writing assistance, Jessica Botsford and Doreen Feldman provided legal assistance, Walter Vance provided technical assistance, and Mimi Nguyen assisted with the graphics. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organizations' 
Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic 
Events. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-823]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2008. 

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS's Preparedness for 
Catastrophic Disasters. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-868T]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' 
Allocation and Management Methods, but Measuring Programs' Impact on 
National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-488T]. Washington, D.C.: March 
11, 2008. 

National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity 
and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-369]. Washington, D.C: 
February 27, 2008. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have Developed Emergency 
Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-609]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 12, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 
Catastrophic Disasters. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-88]. February 2007. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Systems. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red 
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712]. June 8, 2006. 

Homeland Security Assistance for Nonprofits: Department of Homeland 
Security Delegated Selection of Nonprofits to Selected States and 
States Used a Variety of Approaches to Determine Awards. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-663R]. Washington, D.C.: May 
23, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-442T]. Washington, D.C.: March 
8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 23, 2006. 

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary 
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-365R]. 
Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-297T]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable 
Organizations' Contributions in Disasters. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-259]. Washington, D.C.: 
December 19, 2002. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Voluntary organizations--also called charities--are organizations 
established to address the needs of the poor or distressed and other 
social welfare issues and represent a substantial presence in American 
society. Federal, state, and private agencies monitor how well 
voluntary organizations are meeting these needs. At the federal level, 
the Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c) establishes categories of tax- 
exempt organizations and recognizes charitable organizations, among 
others, for this purpose. See also GAO, September 11: More Effective 
Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in 
Disasters, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-259] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2002). 

[2] Congress repealed the Red Cross's 1900 charter and adopted a new 
charter in 1905, which has been amended several times. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 107-296, as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-295. 

[4] See for example GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and 
FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic 
Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T] 
(Washington, D.C. : July 31, 2007). 

[5] A scalable response refers to one that is adaptable to change in 
size, scope, and complexity, with resources from all levels of 
government, appropriately scaled to need, according to the Framework. 

[6] The primary authority under which the federal government provides 
assistance to states after a disaster is the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 5121-5201. 
Under the act, the President may issue a major disaster or emergency 
declaration when a governor, whose state resources are overwhelmed, 
requests federal assistance. The Post-Katrina Act amended the Stafford 
Act so that the President could provide accelerated federal assistance 
and support without a governor's request where necessary to save lives, 
prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage. Pub. L. No. 109- 
295, ï¿½ 681. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA provides assistance for mass 
care, debris removal, restoration of facilities, and financial aid to 
families and individuals, among other activities. The Stafford Act also 
specifies that in providing relief and assistance, FEMA may use--with 
consent--the personnel and facilities of voluntary disaster relief 
organizations in distributing food, supplies, or other items, among 
other things. 

[7] Catastrophic incidents are defined differently from major 
disasters. Under the Stafford Act, a major disaster is defined as "any 
natural catastropheï¿½.or regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or 
explosion in any part of the United States." 5 U.S.C. ï¿½ 5122(2). The 
Post-Katrina Act added a definition of catastrophic incident as "any 
natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that 
results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption, 
severely affecting the population (including mass evacuations), 
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government 
functions in an area." Pub. L. No. 109-295, ï¿½ 602(4). The 2008 National 
Response Framework contains the same definition of a catastrophic 
incident. In this report, we also use the term "catastrophic disaster" 
or "catastrophic event" to refer more generally to large-scale 
disasters of great magnitude that may or may not meet the definition of 
a catastrophic incident. 

[8] The 2005 draft version of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement had 
not yet been fully adopted when Hurricane Katrina occurred and was not 
invoked at the time to guide the federal response to the disaster. 

[9] Support agencies are assigned based on their authorities, 
resources, and capabilities in a given functional area, according to 
the National Framework. State governments often operate response 
structures with similar emergency support functions. 

[10] Other sources of these services include the private sector, 
through contracts with various levels of government, and government 
agencies and employees at local, state, and federal levels. In 
addition, other voluntary organizations that are outside the scope of 
this report, such as America's Second Harvest, also provide services. 
America's Second Harvest is a charitable hunger relief organization, 
comprising a network of more than 200 member food banks and food rescue 
organizations across the nation. 

[11] According to the Red Cross's mission statement, the Red Cross will 
provide relief to victims of disaster and help people prevent, prepare 
for, and respond to emergencies. 

[12] For example, Catholic Charities' mission--exercising leadership in 
assisting its membership in their mission of service, advocacy, and 
convening--does not refer to disaster response or relief, and the 
organization has become more active in disaster response since 1990. In 
contrast, The Salvation Army has provided emergency services to 
individuals and communities since its first charter was enacted in the 
United States in 1899, and the first major U.S. disaster that The 
Salvation Army responded to was in 1900 in response to the Galveston, 
Texas, hurricane, while the Southern Baptist Convention began its 
disaster work in 1967. 

[13] The role of voluntary organizations was particularly important in 
Katrina because state and local resources were overwhelmed and the 
Interagency Incident Management Group, within the Department of 
Homeland Security, was not activated until roughly 36 hours after 
Katrina made landfall. 

[14] For the purposes of this report, we are focusing on the four 
organizations in our review that provide direct services in disasters, 
especially mass care; consequently, unless otherwise noted, the United 
Way will not be included in general statements about the voluntary 
organizations. 

[15] NIMS provides a standardized structure for command during 
disasters. The incident command system is able to be applied in a 
variety of settings as a management system that is intended to assist 
in making incident management more effective. The system accomplishes 
this through an integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, 
procedures, and communications that operate within one organizational 
structure. While voluntary organizations are not required to adopt this 
incident command structure, FEMA encourages voluntary organizations to 
adhere to NIMS procedures and terminology to help facilitate their 
integration into government preparedness and response efforts. 

[16] As we previously reported, voluntary organizations can better 
assist those in need of disaster assistance through coordination and 
collaboration, as well as understanding each other's roles and 
responsibilities. This requires effective working relationships with 
frequent contacts. Collaborative working relationships are essential 
building blocks of strategies that ease access to disaster assistance. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-259]. 

[17] Some of the organizations in our review maintain formal written 
agreements that predate September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and the 
development of the NRF. For example, the written agreement between the 
Red Cross and Catholic Charities was created in 1991 and the agreement 
between the Red Cross and The Salvation Army was established in 1994. 
These agreements confirm long-term relationships between the 
organizations, but do not necessarily reflect their current working 
relationships, according to officials we spoke with. 

[18] GAO, National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to 
Improve Capacity and Coordination between Government and Voluntary 
Sectors, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-369] 
(Washington, D.C: Feb. 27, 2008). 

[19] Testimony of Joseph Becker, Senior Vice President, Disaster 
Services, American National Red Cross, May 15, 2008, before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 

[20] The 2006 Catastrophic Incident Supplement was a supplement to the 
2004 National Response Plan for catastrophic incidents. The Supplement 
remains in effect under the 2008 National Response Framework. 

[21] Pub.L. No. 109-295, ï¿½611(13). 

[22] See the American Red Cross's self-assessment: From Challenge to 
Action: American Red Cross Actions To Improve and Enhance its Disaster 
Response And Related Capabilities For the 2006 Hurricane Season and 
Beyond: (Washington, D.C.: June 2006). 

[23] See the bibliography for a list of studies and reports on the response to Hurricane Katrina.

[24] The different service levels are for (a) large metropolitan 
centers with substantial disaster vulnerability, (b) areas with medium 
population densities with moderate vulnerability, and (c) rural areas 
and isolated communities with limited vulnerability. According to the 
Red Cross, chapters will identify a service delivery plan for rural and 
isolated areas. In some isolated, remote areas, for example, Red Cross 
services may be offered by means of a partnership with a local 
volunteer fire district and access to Internet and telephone support 
while in other areas, services may be offered through a trained 
disaster action team, health and safety providers, and occasional 
visits by Red Cross staff. 

[25] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-369]. 

[26] While the national offices of the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, 
the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic Charities, and United Way 
made direct contributions to the Hurricane Katrina response and relief 
effort, in the four metropolitan areas we visited, the Katrina 
experiences of the voluntary organizations' local offices varied, such 
as sending their staff and volunteers to affected areas or providing 
evacuees with housing assistance and case management services in their 
own area. In addition, the local voluntary organizations we met with 
discussed their service delivery improvements based on their 
experiences during other large-scale disasters in their regions, such 
as the September 11 attacks in the New York and Washington, D.C., metro 
region or the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake. 

[27] After September 11, GAO recommended that FEMA convene a working 
group to encourage voluntary organizations involved in disaster 
response to integrate several lessons learned from the attacks, 
including easing access to aid for those eligible and enhancing 
coordination among charities and with FEMA. See GAO-03-259. Following 
our report, seven of the largest disaster response organizations-- 
including the Red Cross, The Salvation Army, and the United Way--in 
partnership with FEMA, formed CAN to ease collaboration and facilitate 
data sharing. 

[28] Currently, six communities nationwide participate as pilot 
communities that will lead to the development of new models of 
community readiness and response. The six pilot communities are the 
District of Columbia; San Francisco, California; New York City, New 
York; New Orleans, Louisiana; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Seattle, 
Washington. In addition to pilot cities, CAN has the capacity to deploy 
throughout the United States for large-scale disasters and is available 
through a request process. According to an official from the Red 
Cross's national headquarters office, CAN is available all across the 
country and CAN partner organizations are encouraging their local 
affiliates to use it. 

[29] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

[30] This is particularly important for catastrophic disasters that 
would trigger a proactive national federal response under the 
Catastrophic Incident Supplement. 

[31] The Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention primarily 
provide feeding services, but The Salvation Army also has some shelter 
facilities it can operate during large-scale disasters, according to 
officials we met. 

[32] Red Cross officials said they have provided states with 
capabilities data that included some information from other voluntary 
organizations, but it is not known the extent to which states 
incorporated these data into their GAP assessments. 

[33] The GAP analysis began by having states and territories identify 
existing disaster capabilities and potential gaps in seven critical 
areas: sheltering, debris removal, evacuation, temporary housing, 
medical needs, commodity distribution, and fuel availability. Since the 
first phase focused on hurricane-prone areas of the country, it did not 
include one of the four locations in our review --the Los Angeles metro 
area--in the analysis. 

[34] An initial shelter system that is owned and was paid for by the 
Red Cross, with FEMA as a partner agency, is currently operational. 
However, FEMA has developed a federal National Shelter System that will 
be owned and housed at FEMA and is scheduled for release in August 
2008. When the federal shelter system is completed, the plan is for Red 
Cross to enter and verify data for Red Cross shelters, and for states 
to enter and verify data for all other shelters. See GAO-08-369. 

[35] The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to collaborate with state, 
local, and tribal governments, and organizations that represent 
emergency response providers on developing standards for deployment 
capabilities, including typing of resources likely needed in disasters. 
Pub. L. No. 109-295, ï¿½611(13). 

[36] FEMA has so far developed definitions for 120 kinds of resources 
used in disaster response, but only a few of these are related to mass 
care. 

[37] Red Cross officials emphasized to us that estimating needs for 
scenarios is very speculative because of the unknowns and varying 
aspects of mass care needs. For example, one official noted that pre- 
event evacuation shelter needs are different from regular shelter needs 
for people whose homes are destroyed. He also noted that shelter needs 
can follow different trajectories after some types of disaster such as 
an earthquake, not reaching maximum levels until several days after an 
initial impact. 

[38] The Red Cross estimated that 500,000 people would need shelters in 
a worst-case scenario, or approximately three times the highest number 
of people sheltered during a single night during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. 

[39] The catastrophic estimate is not for a specific geographic 
location but is based on an earthquake along a fault zone in a major 
metropolitan area with a population of approximately 10 million people, 
which is about the population of Los Angeles County. This estimate is 
from DHS's Target Capabilities List (September 2007). A key element of 
the DHS National Preparedness Guidelines, the Target Capabilities List 
defines specific capabilities that communities, the private sector, and 
all levels of government should collectively possess in order to 
respond effectively to disasters. 

[40] The Red Cross's risk-based capacity-building initiative assessment 
of a category V hurricane in the Gulf Coast identified a surplus of 
sheltering capacity in all of Florida of approximately 113,000 bed 
spaces over estimated needs. However, a Red Cross official said that 
since this initiative was state focused, it did not specifically assess 
sheltering capacity in the Miami metropolitan area. 

[41] Red Cross officials also said that more volunteers could be 
trained and deployed after a disaster. 

[42] The Red Cross does not currently have the capability to shelter 
all the people that would be unable to return to their homes, according 
to the Red Cross's own analysis. The New York City government plans to 
return the evacuation shelters, which include schools and other city- 
owned facilities, to their normal functions as soon as possible after a 
disaster, but would extend the use of these facilities for sheltering 
if needed. The number of people needing comprehensive sheltering 
services is expected to be smaller than the 600,000 who may need 
sheltering during the evacuation phase of a catastrophic hurricane. 

[43] Mobile kitchens, also known as canteens, are essentially kitchens 
on wheels that can prepare and serve two to three hot meals per day. 
For example, a typical Salvation Army mobile kitchen has a griddle, 
four burner stove top, oven, microwave, refrigerator/freezer, and 
generator. 

[44] The Salvation Army also has buildings located across the country 
that can be used during disasters as feeding sites and distribution 
centers. 

[45] This DHS estimate of feeding needs is from the Target Capabilities 
List (September 2007). 

[46] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-369]. 

[47] Business and continuity-of-operations plans are important for 
maintaining essential services, since a large-scale disaster could 
disrupt operations by damaging shelter facilities, making equipment 
inaccessible, and displacing volunteers and staff. 

[48] The Pandemic Influenza Funding program is administered by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services. Funding under this program is intended to improve 
state and local capacity to prepare for and respond to an influenza 
pandemic through projects such as engaging the public as part of the 
public health decision-making process and initiating collaborative 
planning among health care providers to ensure the delivery of 
essential services during a pandemic influenza outbreak. 

[49] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-259]. 

[50] DHS provides states and local governments with technical 
assistance and funding to enhance emergency management and homeland 
security. Specifically, DHS provides a range of grant programs 
administered by FEMA to states and local governments for emergency 
management under the Homeland Security Grant Program, which funds 
planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise activities in 
support of national preparedness and response. The programs under 
Homeland Security Grant Program include the State Homeland Security 
Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative. In particular, the 
Urban Areas Security Initiative grant is awarded to some states with 
high-threat and high density urban areas that need planning, exercises, 
equipment, and training to respond to acts of terrorism. 

[51] Since 2005, DHS has produced an Annual Report on Preparedness 
Funding, which includes data on the obligation, expenditure status, and 
use of funds for all major federal preparedness grants--including non- 
DHS grants--awarded to states, localities, and other nonfederal 
entities. 

[52] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-369]. 

[53] There are 10 FEMA regional offices and each can include up to 
eight states. 

[54] During Katrina, the Red Cross's ESF-6 staffing strategies made it 
difficult for ESF-6 staff to develop and maintain effective working 
relationships with staff from other organizations. See GAO, Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be 
Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712] (Washington, D.C.: June 
8, 2006). 

[55] See the bibliography for a complete list of the ï¿½lessons learnedï¿½ reports we reviewed. 

[End of section] 

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