Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments
for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007 (16-MAY-08,	 
GAO-08-757).							 
                                                                 
From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the	 
Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities
that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first  
two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the 
air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can	 
legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO	 
focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and 	 
unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was	 
asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment  
work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the	 
results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however,
the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry.	 
The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were	 
defined as locations where the government does not maintain a	 
manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent  
monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative  
selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all 
potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's	 
work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent	 
systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a  
written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken
to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to	 
verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the	 
response in this report.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-757 					        
    ACCNO:   A82144						        
  TITLE:     Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security    
Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007	 
     DATE:   05/16/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Border control					 
	     Border patrols					 
	     Border security					 
	     Contraband 					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Identification cards				 
	     Investigations by federal agencies 		 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Port security					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Security assessments				 
	     Security investigations				 
	     Security regulations				 
	     Security threats					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     program goals or objectives			 

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GAO-08-757

   

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Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2008: 

Border Security: 

Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 2003-2007: 

GAO-08-757: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-757, a report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. 
Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee 
on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists 
could exploit to enter the country. GAOï¿½s first two testimonies focused 
on covert testing at ports of entryï¿½the air, sea, and land locations 
where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In 
its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of 
unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. 

GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment 
work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of 
testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of 
GAOï¿½s work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and 
unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where 
the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or 
where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed 
a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to 
evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, 
GAOï¿½s work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent 
systemic weaknesses. 

In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous 
border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 
2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, 
but has included the response in this report. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, 
both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border 
locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, 
undercover investigators carried counterfeit driversï¿½ licenses, birth 
certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, 
presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the 
United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by 
boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the 
northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three 
states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two 
other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). 
In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions 
and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof 
of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, 
undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success 
rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by 
boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show 
identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, 
an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driverï¿½s license, but the 
officer said, ï¿½Thatï¿½s fine, you can goï¿½ without looking at it. As a 
result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use 
counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of 
entry with little chance of being detected. 

In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and 
primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and 
unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO 
visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the 
request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.ï¿½Canada border, GAO found 
state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear 
to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border 
allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the 
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into 
the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, 
unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was 
alerted to GAOï¿½s activities through the tip of an alert citizen. 
However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to 
locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the 
northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in 
one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were 
unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment 
was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an 
individual from crossing the border into the United States was a 
barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also 
identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed 
lands adjacent to the U.S.ï¿½Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces 
significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined 
cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive 
materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by 
crossing the U.S.ï¿½Canada border at any of the assessed locations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-757]. For more 
information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry: 

Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border 
Locations: 

Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Entering the United States through Land Ports of Entry: 

Table 2: Entering the United States through Sea and Air Ports of Entry: 

Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned, Unmonitored Locations: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States 
in a Northern Border Location: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 16, 2008: 

The Honorable Max Baucus: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Finance: 
United States Senate: 

Intelligence officials believe that the United States will face a 
persistent and evolving terrorist threat and that the terrorist group 
al Qaeda will intensify its efforts to put operatives here. From 
January 2003 to September 2007, we testified on three occasions before 
your Committee to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists 
could exploit to enter the country.[Footnote 1] The vulnerabilities are 
related to traveler screening and border-protection efforts that were 
consolidated under Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in March 2003. Our first two 
testimonies were focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, 
sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter 
the United States. For our third testimony, we focused on limited 
security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between 
ports of entry.[Footnote 2] 

This report summarizes the findings of the covert tests and security 
assessment work performed for your Committee and reported at hearings 
on January 30, 2003; August 2, 2006; and September 27, 2007. It is 
important to note that fugitives, smugglers, illegal immigrants, or 
other criminals could also take advantage of the vulnerabilities we 
identified. To summarize our work, we reviewed our prior testimonies 
and the work papers associated with them. We also requested information 
in writing from DHS related to recent efforts to secure U.S. borders 
and address the vulnerabilities highlighted by our work. 

For our testing at ports of entry, we entered the states of Washington, 
Idaho, Michigan, and New York from Canada; the states of California, 
Arizona, and Texas from Mexico; the state of Florida from Jamaica; and 
the state of Virginia from the Bahamas. To create counterfeit documents 
we used software, hardware, and materials that are available to the 
public. The tested ports of entry were a nonrepresentative selection we 
identified using publicly available information. Because we tested a 
nonrepresentative selection, it is not possible to project the results 
of our work to any other ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored 
border areas we visited were defined as locations where CBP does not 
maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no 
apparent monitoring equipment in place. We performed limited security 
assessments at a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did 
not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security 
vulnerabilities. Where possible, and at your request, investigators 
attempted to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive 
materials or other contraband to highlight the severity of the 
vulnerability at these border areas. DHS considered some of our results 
to be law-enforcement sensitive and requested that we not include 
certain information in our report, such as the names of states we 
visited for our September 2007 work on unmanned and unmonitored 
locations. 

We prepared this report from January to May 2008. However, all covert 
tests and security assessment work were performed prior to DHS's 
January 31, 2008, revised document procedures for U.S. citizens at 
ports of entry and it is therefore not possible to project our results 
to these new procedures. We are reporting on the results of testing at 
land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of our work 
was focused on land ports of entry. Further, the results of our covert 
testing and security assessments are applicable only to U.S. border 
security efforts and do not relate to efforts made by other 
governments. Our work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to 
represent systemic weaknesses in DHS border-protection efforts. 
Further, it does not address the entry of terrorists into the Bahamas, 
Canada, Jamaica, or Mexico. As noted in our prior testimonies, we 
performed all covert testing and security assessment work in accordance 
with standards prescribed by the President's Council on Integrity and 
Efficiency. 

Results in Brief: 

Our investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, 
both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border 
locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, 
undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth 
certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, 
presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the 
United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by 
boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the 
northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three 
states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two 
other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). 
In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions 
and counterfeit identification provided by our investigators as proof 
of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, 
undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success 
rate.[Footnote 3] On several occasions, while entering by foot from 
Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to 
show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 
2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a CBP officer his 
counterfeit Virginia driver's license, but the officer said, "That's 
fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these covert 
tests, we concluded that terrorists or other criminals could use 
counterfeit identification to pass freely through most of the tested 
ports of entry with little chance of being detected. 

In our most recent work, we shifted our focus from ports of entry and 
primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and 
unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states we 
visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the 
request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, we found 
state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear 
to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border 
allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the 
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into 
the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, 
unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was 
alerted to our activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, 
the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the 
investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern 
border, investigators located several ports of entry in one state on 
the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned 
overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in 
operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual 
from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across 
the road that could be driven around. We also identified potential 
security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the 
U.S.-Mexico border. We concluded that CBP faces significant challenges 
on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator 
would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband 
undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at 
any of the assessed locations. A brief video highlighting the 
vulnerabilities we found during this investigation is available on the 
Internet at: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-07-884t/]. 

We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to 
discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our 
August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to 
identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land 
border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP 
officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative[Footnote 4] and were working to implement it. This 
initiative has several parts, the most recent of which went into effect 
on January 31, 2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP 
indicated that resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents 
from investigating all instances of suspicious activity. For example, 
in the September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee, 
a CBP official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were 
patrolling the U.S.-Canada border at any given time. This represents a 
quarter of all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border 
during that period because the agents work in shifts, and may not be on 
duty due to sick leave or vacation time. CBP stated that the northern 
border presents more of a challenge than the southern border for 
several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the 
existence of many antiquated ports of entry. 

In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous 
border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 
2003. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but 
have included the response in appendix I. 

Background: 

CBP is the lead federal agency in charge of securing the nation's 
borders. When CBP was created, it represented a merger of components 
from three agencies--the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, its 
implementing regulations, and CBP policies and procedures, CBP officers 
are required to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals 
and whether they are eligible to enter the country at ports of entry. 
All international travelers attempting to enter the country through 
ports of entry undergo primary inspection, which is a preliminary 
screening procedure to identify those legitimate international 
travelers who can readily be identified as admissible. 

Regarding land ports of entry, the United States shares over 5,000 
miles of border with Canada to the north (including the state of 
Alaska), and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south. 
Individuals attempting to legally enter the United States by land 
present themselves to a CBP officer at one of the 170 ports of entry 
located along these borders. During the period of our investigations, 
U.S. citizens could gain entry to the United States by establishing 
their citizenship to the satisfaction of U.S. officials at a land port 
of entry. While this frequently involved a citizen presenting their 
birth certificate, photo identification (e.g., a driver's license), or 
baptismal records, the law did not require U.S. citizens to present any 
of these documents as proof of citizenship. Until recently, U.S. 
citizens could enter the country at land ports of entry based only on 
oral statements. However, as of January 31, 2008, U.S. citizens age 19 
and older are required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 
to present both proof of identity and citizenship when attempting to 
enter the United States by land. Documents that would fulfill this 
requirement could include a passport, a military ID with travel orders, 
or an enhanced driver's license. In the absence of a single document 
that establishes both proof of identity and citizenship, U.S. citizens 
require multiple documents, such as a driver's license and a birth 
certificate, to enter the United States. Requirements for entering the 
United States by sea are similar to those for entering by land. 
Regarding air ports of entry, starting on January 23, 2007, U.S. 
citizens were required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 
to present a passport or secure travel document when entering the 
United States. Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S. 
citizens entering the country by air from such locations as the 
Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica could establish their citizenship by oral 
assertions and documents such as drivers' licenses and birth 
certificates. 

It is illegal to enter the United States at any location other than a 
port of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and 
monitors areas between ports of entry. However, given limited resources 
and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is limited 
in its ability to monitor the border either through use of technology 
or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with its perception 
of the threat, CBP has distributed human resources differently on the 
northern border than it has on the southern border. According to CBP, 
as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the 
northern border and 11,986 agents assigned to the southern border. The 
number of agents actually providing border protection at any given time 
is far smaller than these figures suggest. As mentioned above, in the 
September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee, a CBP 
official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were 
patrolling the U.S.-Canada border at any given time--about a quarter of 
all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border during 
that period. 

Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry: 

We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at 
ports of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the 
government inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators' 
counterfeit documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed 
them to enter the country. Second, we found that government officials 
did not always ask for identification. Although it was not a 
requirement for government officials to ask for identification at the 
time we performed our tests, we concluded that this was a major 
vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other criminals to easily 
enter the country. 

In table 1 below, each individual instance of an investigator crossing 
the border is noted separately, although, in some cases, investigators 
crossed the border in groups of two or more. 

Table 1: Entering the United States through Land Ports of Entry: 

No.: 
1; 
Date: November 2002; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: No documents provided; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 2; 
Date: November 2002; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 3; 
Date: November 2002; 
Country of departure: Mexico; Documents provided: 
Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 4; 
Date: December 2002; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 5; 
Date: December 2002; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 6; 
Date: August 2003; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 7; 
Date: August 2003; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 8; 
Date: October 2003; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and employee ID; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 9; 
Date: October 2003; Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport and driver's license; 
Result: Denied entry. 

No.: 10; 
Date: November 2003; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 11; 
Date: November 2003; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 12; 
Date: December 2003; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 13; 
Date: December 2003; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 14; Date: 
February 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 15; Date: 
February 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 16; Date: 
February 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: No documents provided; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 17; 
Date: February 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 18; 
Date: March 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 19; 
Date: March 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 20; 
Date: March 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: No documents provided; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 21; 
Date: March 2006; 
Country of departure: Mexico; 
Documents provided: No documents provided; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 22; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 23; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 24; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 25; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 26; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 27; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 28; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 29; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 30; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 31; 
Date: May 2006; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license; 
Result: Passed. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: DHS considered the consolidated listing of destination states to 
be law enforcement sensitive information. Therefore, this table does 
not include the names of the states investigators entered. 

[End of table] 

We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports 
of entry as different from our land crossings. For one thing, we did 
not perform the same amount of testing that we performed at land ports 
of entry. For another, the standard for admittance via air ports of 
entry continues to be stricter than via land and sea routes. In table 2 
below, each individual instance of an investigator entering the United 
States via air or sea is noted separately. 

Table 2: Entering the United States through Sea and Air Ports of Entry: 

No.: 1; 
Date: September 2002; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Port type: Sea; 
Documents provided: No documents provided; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 2; 
Date: September 2002; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Port type: Sea; 
Documents provided: No documents provided; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 3; 
Date: January 2003; 
Country of departure: Jamaica; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 4; 
Date: January 2003; 
Country of departure: Jamaica; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 5; 
Date: August 2003; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Port type: Sea; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 6; 
Date: August 2003; 
Country of departure: Canada; 
Port type: Sea; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 7; 
Date: January 2004; 
Country of departure: Jamaica; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport and driver's license; 
Result: Denied entry. 

No.: 8; 
Date: January 2004; 
Country of departure: Jamaica; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Denied entry. 

No.: 9; 
Date: March 2004; 
Country of departure: Bahamas; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 10; 
Date: March 2004; 
Country of departure: Bahamas; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

No.: 11; 
Date: March 2004; 
Country of departure: Bahamas; 
Port type: Air; 
Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate; 
Result: Passed. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: DHS considered the consolidated listing of destination states to 
be law enforcement sensitive information. Therefore, this table does 
not include the names of the states investigators entered. 

[End of table] 

Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below. 

Counterfeit Identification Accepted as Proof of Citizenship in Most 
Cases: 

For our 2003 testimony, investigators successfully entered the United 
States using counterfeit drivers' licenses and other bogus 
documentation through a land port of entry in Washington. They also 
entered Florida via air from Jamaica using the same counterfeit 
documentation. Similar follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and 
2004, resulting in successful entry at locations in Washington, New 
York, California, Texas, and Virginia using counterfeit identification. 
In 2006, investigators successfully entered the United States using 
counterfeit drivers' licenses and other bogus documentation through 
seven land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, adding 
the states of Michigan, Idaho, and Arizona to the list of states they 
had entered. 

In the majority of cases, investigators entered the country by land 
using rental cars. When requested, they displayed counterfeit Virginia 
and West Virginia drivers' licenses and birth certificates to the 
government officials at ports of entry. They also used bogus U.S. 
passports and, in one case, a fake employee identification card in the 
name of a major U.S. airline. Government officials typically inspected 
the documentation while inquiring whether our undercover investigators 
were U.S. citizens. On some occasions, the officials asked whether our 
investigators had purchased anything in Canada or Mexico. In several 
instances, CBP officials asked our investigators to leave their 
vehicles and inspected the vehicles; they appeared to be searching for 
evidence of smuggling. In only one case on the northern border, one of 
our undercover investigators was denied entry because a CBP officer 
became suspicious of the expired U.S. passport with substituted photo 
offered as proof of citizenship.[Footnote 5] 

Undercover Investigators Did Not Show Identification in All Cases: 

For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request 
identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of 
entry in California. Our investigators' oral assertions that they were 
U.S. citizens satisfied the INS inspectors and they were allowed to 
enter the country. Later, while conducting our 2006 covert tests, we 
found that CBP officers did not request identification during several 
foot crossings from Mexico. For example, on February 23, 2006, two 
investigators crossed the border from Mexico into Texas on foot. When 
the first investigator arrived at the port of entry, he was waved 
through without being asked to show identification. At this point, the 
investigator asked the CBP officer whether he wished to see any 
identification. The officer replied, "OK, that would be good." The 
investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver's license 
from his wallet when the officer said "That's fine, you can go." The 
CBP officer never looked at the license. However, the CBP officer did 
request identification from the investigator who was walking behind the 
first investigator. 

In another test on March 15, 2006, two investigators entered Arizona 
from Mexico by foot. They had received a phone call in advance from 
another investigator who had crossed the border earlier using genuine 
identification. He said that the CBP officers on duty had swiped his 
driver's license through a scanning machine. Because the counterfeit 
drivers' licenses the other two investigators were carrying had fake 
magnetic strips, the investigators realized they could be questioned by 
CBP officers if their identification cards did not scan properly. When 
the two investigators arrived at the port of entry, they engaged one of 
the officers in conversation to distract him from scanning their 
drivers' licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer asked the 
investigators if they were both U.S. citizens. They said, "yes." He 
then asked the investigators if they had purchased anything in Mexico, 
and they responded, "no." The CBP officer then said, "Have a nice day" 
and allowed them to enter the United States. He did not ask for any 
identification. 

Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border 
Locations: 

We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and 
unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting 
testing at U.S.-Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our 
investigators was able to walk into the United States from Canada at a 
park straddling the border. The investigator was not stopped or 
questioned by law enforcement personnel from either Canada or the 
United States. In our September 2007 testimony, we reported on similar 
vulnerabilities at unmanned and unmonitored locations on the northern 
and southern borders. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we 
visited were defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned 
presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring 
equipment in place. Safety considerations prevented our investigators 
from performing the same assessment work on the U.S.-Mexico border as 
performed on the northern border. 

We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security 
assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that 
appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the 
cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from 
Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of 
entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were 
unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment 
was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to 
stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a 
barrier across the road that could be driven around. Finally, 
investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on 
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas 
did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement 
presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. See table 
3 for a summary of the vulnerabilities we found and the activity of 
investigators at each location. 

Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned, Unmonitored Locations: 

Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; 
Location: 1; 
Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of 
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from 
Canada; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment; 
* Suspicious activity was reported to the U.S. Border Patrol, but 
responding agents were unable to locate investigators and their 
simulated contraband. 

Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; 
Location: 2; 
Investigator activity: Took photographs of over half a dozen locations 
where state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response despite suspicious activity; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment; 
* CBP stated that our activities would not be grounds for a formal 
investigation. 

Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; 
Location: 3; 
Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of 
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from 
Canada; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment. 

Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; 
Location: 4; 
Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of 
radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from 
Canada; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* Some surveillance cameras and law enforcement presence noted along 
the road; 
* Investigators crossed the border into the United States in a spot 
that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, then returned to Canada. 

Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border; 
Location: 5; 
Investigator activity: Approached the U.S.-Mexico border; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* Large law enforcement effort at this location, including U.S. Army 
National Guard units and unmanned aerial vehicles; 
* Investigator approached the border in a spot that appeared to be 
unmanned and unmonitored; 
* According to CBP, because our investigators did not approach from the 
direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement 
units to question these activities. 

Security vulnerability: Ports of entry with posted hours; 
Location: 6; 
Investigator activity: Attempted to trigger a law enforcement response 
by taking photographs of a port of entry that had closed for the night; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* A gate was placed across the road, but investigators observed it 
would be possible to drive around the gate; 
* U.S. Border Patrol responded 20 minutes after investigators were 
caught on camera at the port of entry; 
* Responding U.S. Border Patrol agent did not attempt to verify 
identity of investigators or search their vehicle. 

Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border; 
Location: 7; 
Investigator activity: Approached the U.S.-Mexico border; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment; 
* Investigators observed evidence of frequent border crossings into the 
United States at this location. 

Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border; 
Location: 8; 
Investigator activity: Stepped over a 4-foot-high border fence, entered 
Mexico, and returned again to the United States; 
Law enforcement response and additional observations: 
* No visible law enforcement response; 
* No observable electronic monitoring equipment; 
* No observed law enforcement presence despite proximity to border. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below. 

State Roads Close to the Border: 

According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator 
can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of 
the crossing are critical factors in determining whether an area of the 
border is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border 
that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate 
the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband 
from Canada into the United States. For example, on October 31, 2006, 
our investigators positioned themselves on opposite sides of the U.S.- 
Canada border in an unmanned location. Our investigators selected this 
location because roads on either side of the border would allow them to 
quickly and easily exchange simulated contraband. After receiving a 
signal by cell phone, the investigator in Canada left his vehicle and 
walked approximately 25 feet to the border carrying a red duffel bag. 
While investigators on the U.S. side took photographs and made a 
digital video recording, the individual with the duffel bag proceeded 
the remaining 50 feet, transferred the duffel bag to the investigators 
on the U.S. side, and returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side. The 
set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time 
the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian and 
U.S. sides of the border. According to CBP records of this incident, an 
alert citizen notified the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious 
activities of our investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently 
attempted to search for a vehicle matching the description of the 
rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol 
was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even 
though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the 
port of entry. 

See figure 1 for a photograph of our investigator crossing the northern 
border at another unmanned, unmonitored location on the northern border 
with simulated contraband. 

Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States 
in a Northern Border Location: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of GAO investigator crossing from Canada into the United 
States in a Northern Border Location. 

Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity. 

[End of figure] 

In contrast to our observations on the northern border, our 
investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard 
presence near a state road on the southern border, including unmanned 
aerial vehicles. On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a 
main U.S. route about a quarter mile from a U.S.-Mexico port of entry. 
Traveling on a dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators 
used a GPS system to get as close to the border as possible. Our 
investigators passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National 
Guard units. In addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial 
vehicles and a helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point 
where the dirt road ran closest to the U.S.-Mexico border, our 
investigators spotted additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in 
a covered position. About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, 
our investigators pulled off the road. One investigator exited the 
vehicle and proceeded on foot through several gulches and gullies 
toward the Mexican border. His intent was to find out whether he would 
be questioned by law enforcement agents about his activities. He 
returned to the vehicle after 15 minutes, at which time our 
investigators returned to the main road. Our investigators did not 
observe any public traffic on this road for the 1 hour that they were 
in the area, but none of the law enforcement units attempted to stop 
our investigators and find out what they were doing. According to CBP, 
because our investigators did not approach from the direction of 
Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement units to 
question these activities. 

Ports of Entry with Posted Hours: 

We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in 
one state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of 
entry are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that 
it relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt 
to interdict illegal border crossing activity. For example, on November 
14, 2006, at about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S. 
side of one port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators 
observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only 
visible preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the 
United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven 
around. CBP provided us with records that confirmed our observations 
about the barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one 
occasion a cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to 
illegally enter the United States. Although the violator was later 
caught by state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. 
Border Patrol, we were concerned that these ports of entry were 
unmanned overnight. 

Federally Managed Lands: 

Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on 
federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas 
did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the 
time our investigators visited the sites. For example, on January 9, 
2007, our investigators entered federally managed land adjacent to the 
U.S.-Mexico border. The investigators had identified a road running 
parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators were informed by 
an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S. government was 
building a fence, the road was closed to the public. However, our 
investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was not 
physically closed. While driving west along this road, our 
investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law 
enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the 
movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of 
the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at 
one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion 
alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico, 
and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the 
location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law 
enforcement response to their activities. 

In another example, on January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on 
federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. In this 
area, the Rio Grande River forms the southern border between the United 
States and Mexico. After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks 
of the Rio Grande, our investigators observed, in two locations, 
evidence that frequent border crossings took place. In one location, 
the investigators observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the 
Mexican side of the river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S. 
side of the Rio Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side. 
Access to the boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn 
footpaths and vehicle tracks. An individual who worked in this area 
told our investigators that at several times during the year, the water 
is so low that the river can easily be crossed on foot. Our 
investigators were in this area for 1 hour and 30 minutes and observed 
no surveillance equipment, intrusion alarm systems, or law enforcement 
presence. Our investigators were not challenged regarding their 
activities. 

After performing our limited security assessment of these locations, 
investigators learned that a memorandum of understanding exists between 
DHS (of which CBP is a component), the Department of the Interior, and 
the Department of Agriculture regarding the protection of federal lands 
adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for 
protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, 
environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for 
enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal 
sovereignty rights. 

Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions: 

We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to 
discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our 
August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to 
identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land 
border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP 
officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative and were working to implement it. This initiative has 
several parts, the most recent of which went into effect on January 31, 
2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP indicated that 
resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from 
investigating all instances of suspicious activity. CBP stated that the 
northern border presents more of a challenge than the southern border 
for several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the 
existence of many antiquated ports of entry. 

In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous 
border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 
2003. To directly address vulnerabilities related to bogus 
documentation, DHS stated that measures have been implemented to 
enhance CBP officers' ability to detect fraudulent documents, such as: 

* providing updated fraudulent document training modules to the CBP 
Academy for inclusion in its curriculum, 

* implementing mandatory refresher training in detecting fraudulent 
documents, and: 

* providing the 11 ports of entry that have the highest rate of 
fraudulent document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist 
with the examination and detection of fraudulent documents. 

DHS also pointed out that, effective January 31, 2008, it has ended 
verbal declarations of citizenship at border crossings and now requires 
documents for U.S. citizens. If implemented effectively, this would 
address some of the vulnerabilities we identified in our 2003 and 2006 
testimonies. According to DHS, although the full implementation of its 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has been delayed, the 
implementation will also address vulnerabilities cited in our 
testimonies. 

In addition, DHS indicated that it has taken a number of actions 
related to the security of the northern border. In particular, DHS 
states that, as of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the 
Northern Border--a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified 
in our 2007 report. Furthermore, DHS plans to double personnel staffing 
levels over the next 2 years to over 2,000 agents by the end of fiscal 
year 2010. DHS also indicates that CBP has established a field testing 
division to perform covert tests that appear similar to our own tests, 
with a particular focus on detecting and preventing illicit radioactive 
material from entering the United States. We addressed DHS technical 
and sensitivity comments as appropriate. We did not attempt to verify 
the information provided by DHS, but have included its full response in 
appendix I. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30 
days from the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this 
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested 
congressional committees and members. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://gao.gov]. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or [email protected] if you or your 
staffs have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report included John Cooney, Assistant Director; Andy 
O'Connell, Assistant Director; Barbara Lewis, Andrew McIntosh, Sandra 
Moore, and Barry Shillito. 

Signed by: 

Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director: 
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Homeland Security: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov] 

May 1, 2008: 

Mr. Gregory D. Kutz: 
Managing Director, Forensic Audits & Special Investigations: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Kutz: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-08-757, Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests 
and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance for 2003-
2007 (Job Code 192271). 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft 
report. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials 
provided the following updates. 

The report summarizes findings of the GAO's covert tests and security 
assessment work performed and reported at hearings from 2003 through 
2007. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Internal Affairs 
conducts covert and overt testing of CBP operations through its 
Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD). The division was established 
to test and evaluate CBP's capabilities to detect and prevent illicit 
radioactive material from entering the United States. The test 
protocols focused on identifying potential technological 
vulnerabilities and/or systemic procedural and policy weaknesses 
related to the screening and detection of passengers and containers 
entering the United States with illicit radioactive material. 

As of April 23, 2008, OFTD reported that they successfully tested and 
evaluated two CBP land border crossings on their capabilities to detect 
and prevent terrorists and illicit radioactive material from entering 
the United States. In addition, consistent with the Security and 
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, OFTD covertly and 
overtly tested and evaluated 21 of the Nation's top 22 busiest seaports 
for radiation detection and the effectiveness of the non-intrusive 
imaging radiation equipment deployed at the seaports. 

Overall, it was noted that the test results underscored the 
effectiveness of the radiation detection technology and the CBP 
officers' compliance with national and local radiation detection 
response protocols while calling attention to areas for improvement. 

The OFTD also developed a testing protocol that will assess and 
evaluate the CBP officers' capabilities to detect and prevent 
terrorists and travelers using fraudulent travel documents from 
entering the United States. The OFTD anticipates these tests will 
commence before the end of the fiscal year. 

The GAO report also focused on reported vulnerabilities on the northern 
and southern borders. CBP believes that the right combination of 
personnel, technology, tactical infrastructure and 
intelligence/partnerships are being deployed to address southern and 
northern border vulnerabilities. 

On the northern border, CBP has deployed additional Border Patrol 
agents from the southwest border to the northern border with 1,800 
expected by September 2009. In addition, CBP conducts joint operations 
with the Department of Defense's Joint Task Force - North, continues to 
pilot maritime technology projects incorporating ground based radar and 
proof of concept multi-sensor systems, and seeks increased liaisons 
with our Canadian partners through Project North Star and the 
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. CBP also is expanding Air and 
Marine operations on the northern border, including the deployment of 
Predator B Unmanned Aircraft Systems. 

On the southern border, CBP is developing SBInet, a Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) program that will provide Border Patrol the 
appropriate mixture of personnel, technology, and infrastructure, 
combined into a common operational picture for the purpose of securing 
both the northern and southern borders. SBInet personnel are charged 
with designing, developing, and implementing a solution that 
incorporates surveillance and detection, command and control, 
intelligence, tactical infrastructure, communications and information 
technology. SBInet will use the latest innovative technology - cameras, 
biometrics, sensors, air assets, improved communications systems - to 
provide Border Patrol agents what they need to execute the agency's 
mission in the safest and most effective manner. Moving forward, CBP 
intends to complete construction on the 370 miles of pedestrian fencing 
and 300 miles of vehicle fencing along the southern border to enhance 
border security. Currently CBP has almost 170 miles of primary 
pedestrian fencing and 135 miles of vehicle fence in place. [Footnote 
6] Plans are to complete construction of the full 670 miles of fencing 
by the end of the calendar year. 

CBP completed technology requirements assessments of the Yuma, Tucson, 
and El Paso sectors and will look to fill those needs first as they 
present the highest threat areas. CBP currently has 4 mobile 
surveillance systems in operation and plans to deploy additional 
systems this year to the southwest border to serve as primary detection 
platforms. CBP also deployed over 7,500 unattended ground sensors (UGS) 
that provide continuous, low-cost, and covert awareness of cross-border 
activity. CBP is acquiring 2,500 additional UGS this fiscal year with 
1,250 of those planned for deployment on the northern border and 1,250 
on the southwest border. 

Dovetailing with the efforts on the southern border, Congress directed 
CBP to redirect $20 million of the Border Security, Fencing, 
Infrastructure, and Technology appropriation "to begin addressing needs 
and vulnerabilities along the northern border." Accordingly, CBP is 
developing a SBInet prototype that will inform and demonstrate the 
technology issues associated with the integration of air, land and 
maritime assets into a common operating picture on the northern border. 

Referring to both borders, the GAO report indicated that the GAO found 
two types of security vulnerabilities in their covert testing at ports 
of entry. The first vulnerability cited by the GAO is that some of the 
counterfeit documents presented by their undercover investigators went 
undetected by CBP officers. hi an effort to enhance fraudulent document 
training, CBP inserted updated training into the CBP Academy curriculum 
as well as implemented mandatory refresher training on detecting 
fraudulent documents. In addition, CBP provided the ports of entry that 
have the highest rate of fraudulent document interceptions with 
advanced equipment to assist with the examination and detection of 
fraudulent documents. 

The second vulnerability cited by GAO in this report is that 
investigators were not asked to provide identification. [Footnote 7] 
The GAO acknowledged that asking for identification was not a 
requirement at the time of the covert test however they concluded that 
"this was a major vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other 
criminals to easily enter the country." The full implementation of the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) will address this and other 
vulnerabilities; however, the Congress has delayed its completion. In 
the interim, DHS is exercising its preexisting authority to require 
appropriate government documents at the border and end verbal 
declarations of citizenship. It is important to clarify that the 
implementation of WHTI is separate from the ending of verbal 
declarations. While they both work to enhance border security they are 
not interchangeable initiatives as the GAO report reflects. 

Effective January 31, 2008, under the aforementioned authority, United 
States, Canadian and Bermudian citizens are required to present one or 
more government-issued documents to prove identity and citizenship. 
Children ages 18 and under need only present a birth certificate. This 
transition inhibits entry of individuals who cannot confirm their 
identity and citizenship. Since the transition, changes in travel 
document requirement have not caused discernable increases in wait 
times at the border. Compliance rates are high and continue to 
increase. United States and Canadian citizens are presenting the 
requested documents when crossing the border. 

High compliance rates have also been reported during the initial phase 
of the WHTI. As of January 23, 2007, the WHTI Air Final Rule requires 
all arriving air travelers, regardless of age, to present a passport or 
other acceptable secure document for entry into the United States. In 
the last seven months, CBP has reported a compliance rate of 99 percent 
for citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda, and there has 
been no interruption to air transportation. This is the result of close 
coordination with federal government partners, private sector travel, 
tourism industry and the air carriers. The high level of compliance 
shows that Americans and foreign nationals alike are willing and able 
to obtain the necessary documents to enter or re-enter the United 
States once the requirements are known and enforced. On March 27, 2008, 
DHS announced that full implementation of the land and sea provisions 
of WHTI would begin July 1, 2009. 

As reflected in the report, CBP officials are tasked with a very 
complex, dangerous, and challenging job. They face those challenges 
every day with vigilance, dedication to service, and integrity as they 
work to strengthen national homeland security and protect America and 
its citizens. 

Attachment I "Recent and Planned Border Security Initiatives" provides 
additional, detailed information on Department activities. 

Technical and sensitivity comments have been provided under separate 
cover. We request that the GAO make appropriate changes in the draft 
report prior to releasing information that has been determined to be 
sensitive. We expect GAO to accord this material the same level of 
sensitivity as DHS. Any further disclosure only should occur with the 
express permission of the Department. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 
Penelope G. McCormack: 
Acting Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

Attachment I: Recent and Planned Border Security Activities 

Northern Border Overview: 

Personnel: 

Border Patrol agent staffing on the Northern Border has increased 
significantly since September 11, 2001. Prior to 9-11, there were only 
340 Border Patrol agents assigned to the Northern Border responsible 
for securing nearly 4,000 miles of international border with Canada. As 
of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the Northern Border, 
a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified in the 2007 GAO 
report. Furthermore, personnel staffing levels will be doubled over the 
next two years to over 2,000 agents by the end of Fiscal Year 2010. 
These additional agents will be deployed to traditional assignments 
such as line watch but will also be assigned to liaison duties in the 
following offices: 

* Integrated Border Enforcement Teams; 
- Border Enforcement and Security Teams (BEST) pilot locations. 

* Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers. 

* US Attorney's Offices. 

* Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). 

* State Fusion Centers. 

* Local Task Forces. 

Technology: 

The apparent lack of visibility of Border Patrol resources does not 
mean that the border is "unmanned and unmonitored." The Border Patrol 
currently employs a myriad of tactics to enforce border security along 
the Northern Border. These include but are not limited to ground 
surveillance sensors and cameras. Future technology includes: 

* Three-Ground Surveillance Radars will be deployed along the Northern 
Border. 

* The total number of unattended ground sensors deployed will increase 
and existing unattended ground sensors will be replaced with upgraded 
sensors and strategically deployed along the Northern Border in FY 2008.
- The RCMP has deployed ground sensors in strategic locations in 
coordination with the US Border Patrol. 

* Improved mobile Infra-Red detection capability is being deployed to 
every Northern Border Sector. 

* The existing Remote Video Surveillance System in the Blaine 
Washington Sector will be upgraded to provide enhanced coverage of the 
border. 

* The deployment of interim technology will continue in the form of 
thermal night vision devices and G-2 Sentinel Systems which are 
advanced game cameras with video/unattended ground sensor capabilities. 

* SBInet Northern Demonstration Project: The demonstration will take 
place along the Lower St. Clair River in the Detroit Sector Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). The prototype will demonstrate how an integrated 
air, land and maritime border security solution will improve operations 
in an area of the Northern Border; improve situational awareness by 
integrating national and tactical intelligence sources into a common 
operating picture; and provide members of the border enforcement 
community with the information necessary to support homeland security 
strategies and plans for unity of effort. 

* Additional DHS Science and Technology and CBP Office of Information 
Technology pilot projects will be tested throughout the northern 
border. These pilot projects will involve four sectors and include the:
- Use of bollards in the Blaine sector; 
- Placement of acoustic sensors in the Spokane sector to detect low 
flying aircraft incursions; 
- Testing of gel-celled unattended ground sensors in the Grand Forks 
sector; and; 
- BorderNet proof-of-concept pilot program in the Swanton sector which 
is designed to enhance current and future detection capabilities in a 
Northern Border operational environment. 

Partnerships: 

Liaison and intelligence sharing have been improved and increased with 
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as with 
counterparts within the Canadian government. 

* Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS); 
- The IBETs are bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement teams that 
enhance border integrity and security by identifying, investigating, 
and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to 
national security or are engaged in other organized criminal activity. 

* Border Enforcement and Security Teams; 
- Two Immigration and Customs Enforcement BEST pilots will begin in the 
Buffalo and Blaine Sectors. These teams will provide investigative 
support to IBETS. 

* Royal Canadian Mounted Police; 
- An RCMP Inspector has been detailed to the Border Patrol Headquarters 
to serve as a liaison between the two agencies; 
- Border Patrol is seeking to embed agents into the RCMP Divisions to 
enhance the dissemination of actionable intelligence and to ensure 
optimum information sharing with our Canadian partners. 

* Project North Star; 
- A bi-national forum that provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement 
managers a mechanism to enhance existing communications, cooperation, 
and partnership between agencies and personnel that operate within the 
border area. 

* Northern Border Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers 
(IOCC); 
- Multi-Component Intelligence Fusion Centers that facilitate the 
communication, intelligence and flow of information throughout a 
specific region to multiple law enforcement agencies. 

* Airfields Initiative; 
- The development of strong partnerships and liaison with the community 
and law enforcement organizations to gather and develop intelligence 
information on aircraft incursions. 

* Radio Interoperability Pilot Project; 
- Havre Border Patrol Sector and RCMP are participating in a pilot 
program that uses techniques to measure interoperability of radio 
systems. 

Southern Border Updates: 

Personnel: 

Based on the operational needs of the Border Patrol, for Fiscal Year 
2008, staffing will increase between 18 to 20 percent along the 
Southern border. As of April 2008, there were 14,138 agents assigned to 
the Southern border. That represents an increase of 18 percent from the 
11,986 agents identified in the 2007 GAO report. 

Technology: 

The Border Patrol is working towards the deployment of technology 
across the Southwest Border in an effort to gain operational control of 
our nation's border. 

* Ongoing delivery of 40 Mobile Surveillance Systems units to the 
southern border is occurring. 

* TUSCON-1 deployment: Will consist of the construction and placement 
of sensor and communication towers in the Tucson Station area of 
responsibility. The deployment will also add additional Unattended 
Ground Sensors. 

* AJO-1 deployment: Will consist of the construction and placement of 
sensor and communication towers in the Ajo Station AOR. The deployment 
will also add additional Unattended Ground Sensors. 

* Deployment of the Common Operating Picture into the TUSCON-1 and AJO-
1 projects. 

* Purchase and deployment of 1250 unattended ground sensors. 

Tactical Infrastructure: 

Tactical infrastructure deployments along the Southwest Border have 
increased significantly during Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008. 

* Over 70 miles of pedestrian fencing was deployed during Fiscal Year 
2007. 

* Over 55 miles of vehicle barriers were deployed during Fiscal Year 
2007. 

* End of Calendar Year 2008 goals include the deployment of 
approximately 185 miles of additional vehicle fencing and 225 miles of 
pedestrian fencing along the Southwest Border. 

Partnerships: 

On the Southern border, CBP's Border Patrol partners with other DHS 
components, federal, state, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, and 
the Government of Mexico, to bring together resources and fused 
intelligence into a geographical area that has been heavily impacted by 
illicit smuggling activity. By partnering, DHS continues to have a 
significant positive effect combating the threat of domestic terrorism, 
illegal cross-border migration, and all related crime in the border 
environment. 

* Operation Stonegarden; 
- Operation Stonegarden is a DHS funded, Border Patrol led, operation 
designed to incorporate the services of State, Local, and Tribal (SLT) 
law enforcement agencies for the purpose of enhancing border security 
and preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons of mass 
effect while at the same time mitigating the conspicuous effects of 
human trafficking organizations. 

* Operation Jump Start; 
- On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced his plan to deploy up to 
6,000 National Guard personnel for the first year along the United 
States border with Mexico in support of CBP's comprehensive strategy 
for gaining control of our borders. The second year deployment is 
currently 3000 troops. The intent of the operation is to provide CBP's 
Border Patrol an immediate means to enhance border enforcement 
operations while Border Patrol increased its own internal enforcement 
resources through hiring additional Border Patrol agents, mission 
support personnel, and procuring and applying new technology and 
infrastructure. The result was Operation Jump Start, a sustained (2-
year) DHS and Department of Defense (DOD) collaborative effort to 
increase border security while enhancing the Border Patrol's ability 
and capacity to achieve its mission. 

* Border Enforcement and Security Teams; 
- The Border Patrol is an active partner with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and other Federal, state, and local agencies in the BEST 
taskforces located throughout the southwestern border that were formed 
specifically to combat cross-border criminal activity and violence. 
Participation in the taskforces leverage Border Patrol knowledge of the 
border area with other agencies' investigative expertise. 

* Border Security Operations Center (BSOC); 
- The BSOC is located in Austin, Texas. It acts as a fusion center for 
the State of Texas Department of Public Safety regarding border 
security issues. As a participating agency, the Border Patrol shares 
and maintains intelligence and coordinates operational planning with 
law enforcement agencies within the State of Texas. The BSOC identifies 
trends and patterns to establish multi agency enforcement methodologies 
aimed at disrupting alien smuggling organizations and drug trafficking 
organizations operating in the region. 

* Border Violence Protocols (BVP); 
- BVP is a bi-national action plan to combat border violence and 
improve public safety and was signed by Secretary Michael Chertoff and 
Mexico's Secretary of the Interior, Carlos Maria Abascal Carranza. This 
action plan sets forth goals and objectives to ensure that the 
appropriate law enforcement agencies of the respective governments work 
together to provide an effective, comprehensive joint response to 
incidents of cross-border violence and crime. 

* Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security 
(OASISS); 
- OASISS is a bilateral prosecutions program between the United States 
Government and the Government of Mexico. The program targets and 
prosecutes alien smugglers and human traffickers that smuggle aliens 
into the United States. 

* Operation Streamline; 
- Operation Streamline is a collaborative effort of multiple agencies 
(U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Marshal's Service, ICE) that utilizes 
criminal prosecution to deter illegal entries and gain, maintain and 
expand control of problematic areas; 
- The Chief Patrol Agent identifies and designates a `zero tolerance 
zone' for all illegal entries and directs that all prosecutable aliens, 
regardless of nationality, apprehended within the geographic boundaries 
be processed for criminal prosecution and removal proceedings. 

Fraudulent Document Detection Updates: 

CBP has implemented the following measures to enhance the CBP Officers 
ability to detect fraudulent documents. With the exception of the 
specialized equipment deployed in 2006 to the 11 Ports of Entry (POEs) 
(bullet 5 below), all other actions noted below were intended for CBP 
Officers at all POEs: 

* 2004- Implemented mandatory 8 hours in fraudulent document detection 
for all CBP Officers. 

* 2004- Distributed packets with sample training documents and Driver's 
License Identification Guides to all POEs. 

* 2005- Printed and distributed the Pocket Guide Reference to Document 
Security Features and Printing Techniques. 

* 2005-2006 - Inserted Fraudulent Document Training into all relevant 
cross training modules. 

* 2006-Provided 11 POEs that have the highest rate of fraudulent 
document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist with the 
examination and detection of fraudulent documents. 
1. San Ysidro POE; 
2. Calexico POE; 
3. John F. Kennedy International Airport; 
4. Newark International Airport; 
5. Laredo POE; 
6. El Paso POE; 
7. Miami International Airport; 
8. Los Angeles International Airport; 
9. Dulles International Airport; 
10. Nogales POE; 
11. Atlanta International Airport. 

* 2006 - Inserted 12 hours of fraudulent document detection into the 
Advanced Admissibility Secondary Processing Training program. 

* 2007 - Provided updated fraudulent document training modules to the 
CBP Academy for inclusion in their curriculum. 

* 2007 - Provided Virtual Learning Center training on Machine Readable 
Visas. 

* 2007 - Implemented mandatory refresher fraudulent document training. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See GAO, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-438T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003); GAO, Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in 
Screening Entrants into the United States, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-976T] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
2, 2006); and GAO, Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at 
Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-884T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
27, 2007). 

[2] Because of safety concerns, we could not perform covert tests at 
all unmanned and unmonitored border locations. For more information on 
covert testing, see GAO, Investigative Operations: Use of Covert 
Testing to Identify Security Vulnerabilities and Fraud, Waste, and 
Abuse, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-286T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2007). 

[3] In three cases, our undercover investigators were denied entry into 
the United States by CBP officers. In the first case, a CBP officer at 
the Canadian border noticed that our undercover investigator's U.S. 
passport contained a substituted photo and would not allow him to 
enter. We believe that the other two cases are linked to this single 
incident because CBP became aware of our covert testing. 

[4] DHS and the Department of State's effort to specify acceptable 
documents and implement document requirements at 326 air, land, and sea 
ports of entry is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. 

[5] As a result of this incident, we believe CBP became aware of our 
covert testing and denied entry to two undercover investigators when 
they attempted to enter the country from Jamaica. Investigators were 
admitted to the United States after revealing they were GAO employees 
and providing real identification. 

[6] Figures for miles of pedestrian fencing and vehicle fencing in 
place include those miles that have been constructed since October 
2007, toward the achievement of the calendar year 2008 goal of 
deploying an additional 225 miles of pedestrian fencing and 185 miles 
of vehicle fencing along the southwest border. When these goals are 
achieved, CBP will have a total of 370 miles of pedestrian fencing and 
300 miles of vehicle fencing. 

[7] The GAO report implies that the failure of CBP officers and agents 
to approach GAO investigators while inside the United States represents 
a security vulnerability. However, GAO acknowledges that Border Patrol 
agents and unmanned aerial vehicles were observed monitoring the border 
during the October 2006 GAO investigation on the southern border. GAO 
presents no evidence that investigators were not being monitored 
appropriately by CBP during the entire time that investigators were 
along the U.S./Mexico border. The report does not address the likely 
possibility that Border Patrol agents would have approached the 
investigators while on foot or in their vehicle as appropriate if there 
was a suspicion of unlawful activity. 

[End of section] 

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