    Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments
    for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007 (16-MAY-08,
    GAO-08-757).

    From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the
    Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities
    that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first
    two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the
    air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can
    legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO
    focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and
    unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was
    asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment
    work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the
    results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however,
    the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry.
    The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were
    defined as locations where the government does not maintain a
    manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent
    monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative
    selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all
    potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's
    work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent
    systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a
    written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken
    to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to
    verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the
    response in this report.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-757
        ACCNO:   A82144
      TITLE:     Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security
    Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007
         DATE:   05/16/2008
      SUBJECT:   Border control
    	     Border patrols
    	     Border security
    	     Contraband
    	     Homeland security
    	     Identification cards
    	     Investigations by federal agencies
    	     Law enforcement
    	     Port security
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Risk assessment
    	     Risk management
    	     Security assessments
    	     Security investigations
    	     Security regulations
    	     Security threats
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism
    	     program goals or objectives

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    GAO-08-757

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    Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate:

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    GAO:

    May 2008:

    Border Security:

    Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for the Senate
    Committee on Finance, 2003-2007:

    GAO-08-757:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-757, a report to the Committee on Finance, U.S.
    Senate.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee
    on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists
    could exploit to enter the country. GAO�s first two testimonies focused
    on covert testing at ports of entry�the air, sea, and land locations
    where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In
    its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of
    unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry.

    GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment
    work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of
    testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of
    GAO�s work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and
    unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where
    the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or
    where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed
    a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to
    evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further,
    GAO�s work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent
    systemic weaknesses.

    In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous
    border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since
    2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS,
    but has included the response in this report.

    What GAO Found:

    GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities,
    both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border
    locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry,
    undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers� licenses, birth
    certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents,
    presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the
    United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by
    boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the
    northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three
    states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two
    other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia).
    In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions
    and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof
    of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total,
    undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success
    rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by
    boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show
    identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006,
    an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver�s license, but the
    officer said, �That�s fine, you can go� without looking at it. As a
    result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use
    counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of
    entry with little chance of being detected.

    In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and
    primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and
    unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO
    visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the
    request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.�Canada border, GAO found
    state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear
    to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border
    allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the
    cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into
    the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned,
    unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was
    alerted to GAO�s activities through the tip of an alert citizen.
    However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to
    locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the
    northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in
    one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were
    unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment
    was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an
    individual from crossing the border into the United States was a
    barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also
    identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed
    lands adjacent to the U.S.�Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces
    significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined
    cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive
    materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by
    crossing the U.S.�Canada border at any of the assessed locations.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-757]. For more
    information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or
    kutzg@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry:

    Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border
    Locations:

    Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions:

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

    Tables:

    Table 1: Entering the United States through Land Ports of Entry:

    Table 2: Entering the United States through Sea and Air Ports of Entry:

    Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned, Unmonitored Locations:

    Figure:

    Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States
    in a Northern Border Location:

    [End of section]

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    May 16, 2008:

    The Honorable Max Baucus:
    Chairman:
    The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
    Ranking Member:
    Committee on Finance:
    United States Senate:

    Intelligence officials believe that the United States will face a
    persistent and evolving terrorist threat and that the terrorist group
    al Qaeda will intensify its efforts to put operatives here. From
    January 2003 to September 2007, we testified on three occasions before
    your Committee to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists
    could exploit to enter the country.[Footnote 1] The vulnerabilities are
    related to traveler screening and border-protection efforts that were
    consolidated under Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in March 2003. Our first two
    testimonies were focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air,
    sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter
    the United States. For our third testimony, we focused on limited
    security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between
    ports of entry.[Footnote 2]

    This report summarizes the findings of the covert tests and security
    assessment work performed for your Committee and reported at hearings
    on January 30, 2003; August 2, 2006; and September 27, 2007. It is
    important to note that fugitives, smugglers, illegal immigrants, or
    other criminals could also take advantage of the vulnerabilities we
    identified. To summarize our work, we reviewed our prior testimonies
    and the work papers associated with them. We also requested information
    in writing from DHS related to recent efforts to secure U.S. borders
    and address the vulnerabilities highlighted by our work.

    For our testing at ports of entry, we entered the states of Washington,
    Idaho, Michigan, and New York from Canada; the states of California,
    Arizona, and Texas from Mexico; the state of Florida from Jamaica; and
    the state of Virginia from the Bahamas. To create counterfeit documents
    we used software, hardware, and materials that are available to the
    public. The tested ports of entry were a nonrepresentative selection we
    identified using publicly available information. Because we tested a
    nonrepresentative selection, it is not possible to project the results
    of our work to any other ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored
    border areas we visited were defined as locations where CBP does not
    maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no
    apparent monitoring equipment in place. We performed limited security
    assessments at a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did
    not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security
    vulnerabilities. Where possible, and at your request, investigators
    attempted to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive
    materials or other contraband to highlight the severity of the
    vulnerability at these border areas. DHS considered some of our results
    to be law-enforcement sensitive and requested that we not include
    certain information in our report, such as the names of states we
    visited for our September 2007 work on unmanned and unmonitored
    locations.

    We prepared this report from January to May 2008. However, all covert
    tests and security assessment work were performed prior to DHS's
    January 31, 2008, revised document procedures for U.S. citizens at
    ports of entry and it is therefore not possible to project our results
    to these new procedures. We are reporting on the results of testing at
    land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of our work
    was focused on land ports of entry. Further, the results of our covert
    testing and security assessments are applicable only to U.S. border
    security efforts and do not relate to efforts made by other
    governments. Our work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to
    represent systemic weaknesses in DHS border-protection efforts.
    Further, it does not address the entry of terrorists into the Bahamas,
    Canada, Jamaica, or Mexico. As noted in our prior testimonies, we
    performed all covert testing and security assessment work in accordance
    with standards prescribed by the President's Council on Integrity and
    Efficiency.

    Results in Brief:

    Our investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities,
    both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border
    locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry,
    undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth
    certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents,
    presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the
    United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by
    boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the
    northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three
    states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two
    other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia).
    In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions
    and counterfeit identification provided by our investigators as proof
    of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total,
    undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success
    rate.[Footnote 3] On several occasions, while entering by foot from
    Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to
    show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in
    2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a CBP officer his
    counterfeit Virginia driver's license, but the officer said, "That's
    fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these covert
    tests, we concluded that terrorists or other criminals could use
    counterfeit identification to pass freely through most of the tested
    ports of entry with little chance of being detected.

    In our most recent work, we shifted our focus from ports of entry and
    primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and
    unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states we
    visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the
    request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, we found
    state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear
    to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border
    allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the
    cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into
    the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned,
    unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was
    alerted to our activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However,
    the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the
    investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern
    border, investigators located several ports of entry in one state on
    the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned
    overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in
    operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual
    from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across
    the road that could be driven around. We also identified potential
    security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the
    U.S.-Mexico border. We concluded that CBP faces significant challenges
    on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator
    would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband
    undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at
    any of the assessed locations. A brief video highlighting the
    vulnerabilities we found during this investigation is available on the
    Internet at: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-07-884t/].

    We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to
    discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our
    August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to
    identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land
    border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP
    officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel
    Initiative[Footnote 4] and were working to implement it. This
    initiative has several parts, the most recent of which went into effect
    on January 31, 2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP
    indicated that resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents
    from investigating all instances of suspicious activity. For example,
    in the September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee,
    a CBP official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were
    patrolling the U.S.-Canada border at any given time. This represents a
    quarter of all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border
    during that period because the agents work in shifts, and may not be on
    duty due to sick leave or vacation time. CBP stated that the northern
    border presents more of a challenge than the southern border for
    several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the
    existence of many antiquated ports of entry.

    In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous
    border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since
    2003. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but
    have included the response in appendix I.

    Background:

    CBP is the lead federal agency in charge of securing the nation's
    borders. When CBP was created, it represented a merger of components
    from three agencies--the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal and Plant Health
    Inspection Service. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, its
    implementing regulations, and CBP policies and procedures, CBP officers
    are required to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals
    and whether they are eligible to enter the country at ports of entry.
    All international travelers attempting to enter the country through
    ports of entry undergo primary inspection, which is a preliminary
    screening procedure to identify those legitimate international
    travelers who can readily be identified as admissible.

    Regarding land ports of entry, the United States shares over 5,000
    miles of border with Canada to the north (including the state of
    Alaska), and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south.
    Individuals attempting to legally enter the United States by land
    present themselves to a CBP officer at one of the 170 ports of entry
    located along these borders. During the period of our investigations,
    U.S. citizens could gain entry to the United States by establishing
    their citizenship to the satisfaction of U.S. officials at a land port
    of entry. While this frequently involved a citizen presenting their
    birth certificate, photo identification (e.g., a driver's license), or
    baptismal records, the law did not require U.S. citizens to present any
    of these documents as proof of citizenship. Until recently, U.S.
    citizens could enter the country at land ports of entry based only on
    oral statements. However, as of January 31, 2008, U.S. citizens age 19
    and older are required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
    to present both proof of identity and citizenship when attempting to
    enter the United States by land. Documents that would fulfill this
    requirement could include a passport, a military ID with travel orders,
    or an enhanced driver's license. In the absence of a single document
    that establishes both proof of identity and citizenship, U.S. citizens
    require multiple documents, such as a driver's license and a birth
    certificate, to enter the United States. Requirements for entering the
    United States by sea are similar to those for entering by land.
    Regarding air ports of entry, starting on January 23, 2007, U.S.
    citizens were required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
    to present a passport or secure travel document when entering the
    United States. Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S.
    citizens entering the country by air from such locations as the
    Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica could establish their citizenship by oral
    assertions and documents such as drivers' licenses and birth
    certificates.

    It is illegal to enter the United States at any location other than a
    port of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and
    monitors areas between ports of entry. However, given limited resources
    and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is limited
    in its ability to monitor the border either through use of technology
    or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with its perception
    of the threat, CBP has distributed human resources differently on the
    northern border than it has on the southern border. According to CBP,
    as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the
    northern border and 11,986 agents assigned to the southern border. The
    number of agents actually providing border protection at any given time
    is far smaller than these figures suggest. As mentioned above, in the
    September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee, a CBP
    official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were
    patrolling the U.S.-Canada border at any given time--about a quarter of
    all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border during
    that period.

    Security Vulnerabilities at U.S. Ports of Entry:

    We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at
    ports of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the
    government inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators'
    counterfeit documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed
    them to enter the country. Second, we found that government officials
    did not always ask for identification. Although it was not a
    requirement for government officials to ask for identification at the
    time we performed our tests, we concluded that this was a major
    vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other criminals to easily
    enter the country.

    In table 1 below, each individual instance of an investigator crossing
    the border is noted separately, although, in some cases, investigators
    crossed the border in groups of two or more.

    Table 1: Entering the United States through Land Ports of Entry:

    No.:
    1;
    Date: November 2002;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: No documents provided;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 2;
    Date: November 2002;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 3;
    Date: November 2002;
    Country of departure: Mexico; Documents provided:
    Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 4;
    Date: December 2002;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 5;
    Date: December 2002;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 6;
    Date: August 2003;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 7;
    Date: August 2003;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 8;
    Date: October 2003;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and employee ID;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 9;
    Date: October 2003; Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport and driver's license;
    Result: Denied entry.

    No.: 10;
    Date: November 2003;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 11;
    Date: November 2003;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 12;
    Date: December 2003;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 13;
    Date: December 2003;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 14; Date:
    February 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 15; Date:
    February 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 16; Date:
    February 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: No documents provided;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 17;
    Date: February 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 18;
    Date: March 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 19;
    Date: March 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 20;
    Date: March 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: No documents provided;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 21;
    Date: March 2006;
    Country of departure: Mexico;
    Documents provided: No documents provided;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 22;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 23;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 24;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 25;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 26;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 27;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 28;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 29;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 30;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 31;
    Date: May 2006;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license;
    Result: Passed.

    Source: GAO.

    Note: DHS considered the consolidated listing of destination states to
    be law enforcement sensitive information. Therefore, this table does
    not include the names of the states investigators entered.

    [End of table]

    We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports
    of entry as different from our land crossings. For one thing, we did
    not perform the same amount of testing that we performed at land ports
    of entry. For another, the standard for admittance via air ports of
    entry continues to be stricter than via land and sea routes. In table 2
    below, each individual instance of an investigator entering the United
    States via air or sea is noted separately.

    Table 2: Entering the United States through Sea and Air Ports of Entry:

    No.: 1;
    Date: September 2002;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Port type: Sea;
    Documents provided: No documents provided;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 2;
    Date: September 2002;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Port type: Sea;
    Documents provided: No documents provided;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 3;
    Date: January 2003;
    Country of departure: Jamaica;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 4;
    Date: January 2003;
    Country of departure: Jamaica;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 5;
    Date: August 2003;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Port type: Sea;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 6;
    Date: August 2003;
    Country of departure: Canada;
    Port type: Sea;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 7;
    Date: January 2004;
    Country of departure: Jamaica;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit U.S. passport and driver's license;
    Result: Denied entry.

    No.: 8;
    Date: January 2004;
    Country of departure: Jamaica;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Denied entry.

    No.: 9;
    Date: March 2004;
    Country of departure: Bahamas;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 10;
    Date: March 2004;
    Country of departure: Bahamas;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    No.: 11;
    Date: March 2004;
    Country of departure: Bahamas;
    Port type: Air;
    Documents provided: Counterfeit driver's license and birth certificate;
    Result: Passed.

    Source: GAO.

    Note: DHS considered the consolidated listing of destination states to
    be law enforcement sensitive information. Therefore, this table does
    not include the names of the states investigators entered.

    [End of table]

    Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below.

    Counterfeit Identification Accepted as Proof of Citizenship in Most
    Cases:

    For our 2003 testimony, investigators successfully entered the United
    States using counterfeit drivers' licenses and other bogus
    documentation through a land port of entry in Washington. They also
    entered Florida via air from Jamaica using the same counterfeit
    documentation. Similar follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and
    2004, resulting in successful entry at locations in Washington, New
    York, California, Texas, and Virginia using counterfeit identification.
    In 2006, investigators successfully entered the United States using
    counterfeit drivers' licenses and other bogus documentation through
    seven land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, adding
    the states of Michigan, Idaho, and Arizona to the list of states they
    had entered.

    In the majority of cases, investigators entered the country by land
    using rental cars. When requested, they displayed counterfeit Virginia
    and West Virginia drivers' licenses and birth certificates to the
    government officials at ports of entry. They also used bogus U.S.
    passports and, in one case, a fake employee identification card in the
    name of a major U.S. airline. Government officials typically inspected
    the documentation while inquiring whether our undercover investigators
    were U.S. citizens. On some occasions, the officials asked whether our
    investigators had purchased anything in Canada or Mexico. In several
    instances, CBP officials asked our investigators to leave their
    vehicles and inspected the vehicles; they appeared to be searching for
    evidence of smuggling. In only one case on the northern border, one of
    our undercover investigators was denied entry because a CBP officer
    became suspicious of the expired U.S. passport with substituted photo
    offered as proof of citizenship.[Footnote 5]

    Undercover Investigators Did Not Show Identification in All Cases:

    For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request
    identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of
    entry in California. Our investigators' oral assertions that they were
    U.S. citizens satisfied the INS inspectors and they were allowed to
    enter the country. Later, while conducting our 2006 covert tests, we
    found that CBP officers did not request identification during several
    foot crossings from Mexico. For example, on February 23, 2006, two
    investigators crossed the border from Mexico into Texas on foot. When
    the first investigator arrived at the port of entry, he was waved
    through without being asked to show identification. At this point, the
    investigator asked the CBP officer whether he wished to see any
    identification. The officer replied, "OK, that would be good." The
    investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver's license
    from his wallet when the officer said "That's fine, you can go." The
    CBP officer never looked at the license. However, the CBP officer did
    request identification from the investigator who was walking behind the
    first investigator.

    In another test on March 15, 2006, two investigators entered Arizona
    from Mexico by foot. They had received a phone call in advance from
    another investigator who had crossed the border earlier using genuine
    identification. He said that the CBP officers on duty had swiped his
    driver's license through a scanning machine. Because the counterfeit
    drivers' licenses the other two investigators were carrying had fake
    magnetic strips, the investigators realized they could be questioned by
    CBP officers if their identification cards did not scan properly. When
    the two investigators arrived at the port of entry, they engaged one of
    the officers in conversation to distract him from scanning their
    drivers' licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer asked the
    investigators if they were both U.S. citizens. They said, "yes." He
    then asked the investigators if they had purchased anything in Mexico,
    and they responded, "no." The CBP officer then said, "Have a nice day"
    and allowed them to enter the United States. He did not ask for any
    identification.

    Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border
    Locations:

    We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and
    unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting
    testing at U.S.-Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our
    investigators was able to walk into the United States from Canada at a
    park straddling the border. The investigator was not stopped or
    questioned by law enforcement personnel from either Canada or the
    United States. In our September 2007 testimony, we reported on similar
    vulnerabilities at unmanned and unmonitored locations on the northern
    and southern borders. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we
    visited were defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned
    presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring
    equipment in place. Safety considerations prevented our investigators
    from performing the same assessment work on the U.S.-Mexico border as
    performed on the northern border.

    We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security
    assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that
    appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the
    cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from
    Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of
    entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were
    unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment
    was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to
    stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a
    barrier across the road that could be driven around. Finally,
    investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on
    federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
    did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement
    presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. See table
    3 for a summary of the vulnerabilities we found and the activity of
    investigators at each location.

    Table 3: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned, Unmonitored Locations:

    Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
    Location: 1;
    Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of
    radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
    Canada;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * No visible law enforcement response;
    * No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
    * Suspicious activity was reported to the U.S. Border Patrol, but
    responding agents were unable to locate investigators and their
    simulated contraband.

    Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
    Location: 2;
    Investigator activity: Took photographs of over half a dozen locations
    where state roads ended at the U.S.-Canada border;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * No visible law enforcement response despite suspicious activity;
    * No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
    * CBP stated that our activities would not be grounds for a formal
    investigation.

    Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
    Location: 3;
    Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of
    radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
    Canada;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * No visible law enforcement response;
    * No observable electronic monitoring equipment.

    Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
    Location: 4;
    Investigator activity: Simulated the cross-border movement of
    radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from
    Canada;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * Some surveillance cameras and law enforcement presence noted along
    the road;
    * Investigators crossed the border into the United States in a spot
    that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, then returned to Canada.

    Security vulnerability: State roads close to the border;
    Location: 5;
    Investigator activity: Approached the U.S.-Mexico border;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * Large law enforcement effort at this location, including U.S. Army
    National Guard units and unmanned aerial vehicles;
    * Investigator approached the border in a spot that appeared to be
    unmanned and unmonitored;
    * According to CBP, because our investigators did not approach from the
    direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement
    units to question these activities.

    Security vulnerability: Ports of entry with posted hours;
    Location: 6;
    Investigator activity: Attempted to trigger a law enforcement response
    by taking photographs of a port of entry that had closed for the night;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * A gate was placed across the road, but investigators observed it
    would be possible to drive around the gate;
    * U.S. Border Patrol responded 20 minutes after investigators were
    caught on camera at the port of entry;
    * Responding U.S. Border Patrol agent did not attempt to verify
    identity of investigators or search their vehicle.

    Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
    Location: 7;
    Investigator activity: Approached the U.S.-Mexico border;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * No visible law enforcement response;
    * No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
    * Investigators observed evidence of frequent border crossings into the
    United States at this location.

    Security vulnerability: Federally managed lands adjacent to border;
    Location: 8;
    Investigator activity: Stepped over a 4-foot-high border fence, entered
    Mexico, and returned again to the United States;
    Law enforcement response and additional observations:
    * No visible law enforcement response;
    * No observable electronic monitoring equipment;
    * No observed law enforcement presence despite proximity to border.

    Source: GAO.

    [End of table]

    Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below.

    State Roads Close to the Border:

    According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator
    can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of
    the crossing are critical factors in determining whether an area of the
    border is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border
    that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate
    the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband
    from Canada into the United States. For example, on October 31, 2006,
    our investigators positioned themselves on opposite sides of the U.S.-
    Canada border in an unmanned location. Our investigators selected this
    location because roads on either side of the border would allow them to
    quickly and easily exchange simulated contraband. After receiving a
    signal by cell phone, the investigator in Canada left his vehicle and
    walked approximately 25 feet to the border carrying a red duffel bag.
    While investigators on the U.S. side took photographs and made a
    digital video recording, the individual with the duffel bag proceeded
    the remaining 50 feet, transferred the duffel bag to the investigators
    on the U.S. side, and returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side. The
    set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time
    the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian and
    U.S. sides of the border. According to CBP records of this incident, an
    alert citizen notified the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious
    activities of our investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently
    attempted to search for a vehicle matching the description of the
    rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol
    was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even
    though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the
    port of entry.

    See figure 1 for a photograph of our investigator crossing the northern
    border at another unmanned, unmonitored location on the northern border
    with simulated contraband.

    Figure 1: GAO Investigator Crossing from Canada into the United States
    in a Northern Border Location:

    [See PDF for image]

    Photograph of GAO investigator crossing from Canada into the United
    States in a Northern Border Location.

    Note: Investigator's face has been blurred to protect his identity.

    [End of figure]

    In contrast to our observations on the northern border, our
    investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard
    presence near a state road on the southern border, including unmanned
    aerial vehicles. On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a
    main U.S. route about a quarter mile from a U.S.-Mexico port of entry.
    Traveling on a dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators
    used a GPS system to get as close to the border as possible. Our
    investigators passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National
    Guard units. In addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial
    vehicles and a helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point
    where the dirt road ran closest to the U.S.-Mexico border, our
    investigators spotted additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in
    a covered position. About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles,
    our investigators pulled off the road. One investigator exited the
    vehicle and proceeded on foot through several gulches and gullies
    toward the Mexican border. His intent was to find out whether he would
    be questioned by law enforcement agents about his activities. He
    returned to the vehicle after 15 minutes, at which time our
    investigators returned to the main road. Our investigators did not
    observe any public traffic on this road for the 1 hour that they were
    in the area, but none of the law enforcement units attempted to stop
    our investigators and find out what they were doing. According to CBP,
    because our investigators did not approach from the direction of
    Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement units to
    question these activities.

    Ports of Entry with Posted Hours:

    We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in
    one state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of
    entry are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that
    it relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt
    to interdict illegal border crossing activity. For example, on November
    14, 2006, at about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S.
    side of one port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators
    observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only
    visible preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the
    United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven
    around. CBP provided us with records that confirmed our observations
    about the barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one
    occasion a cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to
    illegally enter the United States. Although the violator was later
    caught by state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S.
    Border Patrol, we were concerned that these ports of entry were
    unmanned overnight.

    Federally Managed Lands:

    Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on
    federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas
    did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the
    time our investigators visited the sites. For example, on January 9,
    2007, our investigators entered federally managed land adjacent to the
    U.S.-Mexico border. The investigators had identified a road running
    parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators were informed by
    an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S. government was
    building a fence, the road was closed to the public. However, our
    investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was not
    physically closed. While driving west along this road, our
    investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law
    enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the
    movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of
    the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at
    one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion
    alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico,
    and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the
    location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law
    enforcement response to their activities.

    In another example, on January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on
    federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. In this
    area, the Rio Grande River forms the southern border between the United
    States and Mexico. After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks
    of the Rio Grande, our investigators observed, in two locations,
    evidence that frequent border crossings took place. In one location,
    the investigators observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the
    Mexican side of the river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S.
    side of the Rio Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side.
    Access to the boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn
    footpaths and vehicle tracks. An individual who worked in this area
    told our investigators that at several times during the year, the water
    is so low that the river can easily be crossed on foot. Our
    investigators were in this area for 1 hour and 30 minutes and observed
    no surveillance equipment, intrusion alarm systems, or law enforcement
    presence. Our investigators were not challenged regarding their
    activities.

    After performing our limited security assessment of these locations,
    investigators learned that a memorandum of understanding exists between
    DHS (of which CBP is a component), the Department of the Interior, and
    the Department of Agriculture regarding the protection of federal lands
    adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for
    protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal,
    environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for
    enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal
    sovereignty rights.

    Corrective Action Briefings and DHS Actions:

    We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to
    discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our
    August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to
    identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land
    border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP
    officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel
    Initiative and were working to implement it. This initiative has
    several parts, the most recent of which went into effect on January 31,
    2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP indicated that
    resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from
    investigating all instances of suspicious activity. CBP stated that the
    northern border presents more of a challenge than the southern border
    for several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the
    existence of many antiquated ports of entry.

    In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous
    border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since
    2003. To directly address vulnerabilities related to bogus
    documentation, DHS stated that measures have been implemented to
    enhance CBP officers' ability to detect fraudulent documents, such as:

    * providing updated fraudulent document training modules to the CBP
    Academy for inclusion in its curriculum,

    * implementing mandatory refresher training in detecting fraudulent
    documents, and:

    * providing the 11 ports of entry that have the highest rate of
    fraudulent document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist
    with the examination and detection of fraudulent documents.

    DHS also pointed out that, effective January 31, 2008, it has ended
    verbal declarations of citizenship at border crossings and now requires
    documents for U.S. citizens. If implemented effectively, this would
    address some of the vulnerabilities we identified in our 2003 and 2006
    testimonies. According to DHS, although the full implementation of its
    Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has been delayed, the
    implementation will also address vulnerabilities cited in our
    testimonies.

    In addition, DHS indicated that it has taken a number of actions
    related to the security of the northern border. In particular, DHS
    states that, as of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the
    Northern Border--a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified
    in our 2007 report. Furthermore, DHS plans to double personnel staffing
    levels over the next 2 years to over 2,000 agents by the end of fiscal
    year 2010. DHS also indicates that CBP has established a field testing
    division to perform covert tests that appear similar to our own tests,
    with a particular focus on detecting and preventing illicit radioactive
    material from entering the United States. We addressed DHS technical
    and sensitivity comments as appropriate. We did not attempt to verify
    the information provided by DHS, but have included its full response in
    appendix I.

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
    of this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30
    days from the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this
    report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested
    congressional committees and members. We will also make copies
    available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
    available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
    http://gao.gov].

    Please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov if you or your
    staffs have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
    on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
    to this report included John Cooney, Assistant Director; Andy
    O'Connell, Assistant Director; Barbara Lewis, Andrew McIntosh, Sandra
    Moore, and Barry Shillito.

    Signed by:

    Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
    Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

    Homeland Security:
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
    Washington, DC 20528:
    [hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]

    May 1, 2008:

    Mr. Gregory D. Kutz:
    Managing Director, Forensic Audits & Special Investigations:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, NW:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    Dear Mr. Kutz:

    Re: Draft Report GAO-08-757, Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests
    and Security Assessments for the Senate Committee on Finance for 2003-
    2007 (Job Code 192271).

    Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
    report. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials
    provided the following updates.

    The report summarizes findings of the GAO's covert tests and security
    assessment work performed and reported at hearings from 2003 through
    2007. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Internal Affairs
    conducts covert and overt testing of CBP operations through its
    Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD). The division was established
    to test and evaluate CBP's capabilities to detect and prevent illicit
    radioactive material from entering the United States. The test
    protocols focused on identifying potential technological
    vulnerabilities and/or systemic procedural and policy weaknesses
    related to the screening and detection of passengers and containers
    entering the United States with illicit radioactive material.

    As of April 23, 2008, OFTD reported that they successfully tested and
    evaluated two CBP land border crossings on their capabilities to detect
    and prevent terrorists and illicit radioactive material from entering
    the United States. In addition, consistent with the Security and
    Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, OFTD covertly and
    overtly tested and evaluated 21 of the Nation's top 22 busiest seaports
    for radiation detection and the effectiveness of the non-intrusive
    imaging radiation equipment deployed at the seaports.

    Overall, it was noted that the test results underscored the
    effectiveness of the radiation detection technology and the CBP
    officers' compliance with national and local radiation detection
    response protocols while calling attention to areas for improvement.

    The OFTD also developed a testing protocol that will assess and
    evaluate the CBP officers' capabilities to detect and prevent
    terrorists and travelers using fraudulent travel documents from
    entering the United States. The OFTD anticipates these tests will
    commence before the end of the fiscal year.

    The GAO report also focused on reported vulnerabilities on the northern
    and southern borders. CBP believes that the right combination of
    personnel, technology, tactical infrastructure and
    intelligence/partnerships are being deployed to address southern and
    northern border vulnerabilities.

    On the northern border, CBP has deployed additional Border Patrol
    agents from the southwest border to the northern border with 1,800
    expected by September 2009. In addition, CBP conducts joint operations
    with the Department of Defense's Joint Task Force - North, continues to
    pilot maritime technology projects incorporating ground based radar and
    proof of concept multi-sensor systems, and seeks increased liaisons
    with our Canadian partners through Project North Star and the
    Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. CBP also is expanding Air and
    Marine operations on the northern border, including the deployment of
    Predator B Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

    On the southern border, CBP is developing SBInet, a Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) program that will provide Border Patrol the
    appropriate mixture of personnel, technology, and infrastructure,
    combined into a common operational picture for the purpose of securing
    both the northern and southern borders. SBInet personnel are charged
    with designing, developing, and implementing a solution that
    incorporates surveillance and detection, command and control,
    intelligence, tactical infrastructure, communications and information
    technology. SBInet will use the latest innovative technology - cameras,
    biometrics, sensors, air assets, improved communications systems - to
    provide Border Patrol agents what they need to execute the agency's
    mission in the safest and most effective manner. Moving forward, CBP
    intends to complete construction on the 370 miles of pedestrian fencing
    and 300 miles of vehicle fencing along the southern border to enhance
    border security. Currently CBP has almost 170 miles of primary
    pedestrian fencing and 135 miles of vehicle fence in place. [Footnote
    6] Plans are to complete construction of the full 670 miles of fencing
    by the end of the calendar year.

    CBP completed technology requirements assessments of the Yuma, Tucson,
    and El Paso sectors and will look to fill those needs first as they
    present the highest threat areas. CBP currently has 4 mobile
    surveillance systems in operation and plans to deploy additional
    systems this year to the southwest border to serve as primary detection
    platforms. CBP also deployed over 7,500 unattended ground sensors (UGS)
    that provide continuous, low-cost, and covert awareness of cross-border
    activity. CBP is acquiring 2,500 additional UGS this fiscal year with
    1,250 of those planned for deployment on the northern border and 1,250
    on the southwest border.

    Dovetailing with the efforts on the southern border, Congress directed
    CBP to redirect $20 million of the Border Security, Fencing,
    Infrastructure, and Technology appropriation "to begin addressing needs
    and vulnerabilities along the northern border." Accordingly, CBP is
    developing a SBInet prototype that will inform and demonstrate the
    technology issues associated with the integration of air, land and
    maritime assets into a common operating picture on the northern border.

    Referring to both borders, the GAO report indicated that the GAO found
    two types of security vulnerabilities in their covert testing at ports
    of entry. The first vulnerability cited by the GAO is that some of the
    counterfeit documents presented by their undercover investigators went
    undetected by CBP officers. hi an effort to enhance fraudulent document
    training, CBP inserted updated training into the CBP Academy curriculum
    as well as implemented mandatory refresher training on detecting
    fraudulent documents. In addition, CBP provided the ports of entry that
    have the highest rate of fraudulent document interceptions with
    advanced equipment to assist with the examination and detection of
    fraudulent documents.

    The second vulnerability cited by GAO in this report is that
    investigators were not asked to provide identification. [Footnote 7]
    The GAO acknowledged that asking for identification was not a
    requirement at the time of the covert test however they concluded that
    "this was a major vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other
    criminals to easily enter the country." The full implementation of the
    Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) will address this and other
    vulnerabilities; however, the Congress has delayed its completion. In
    the interim, DHS is exercising its preexisting authority to require
    appropriate government documents at the border and end verbal
    declarations of citizenship. It is important to clarify that the
    implementation of WHTI is separate from the ending of verbal
    declarations. While they both work to enhance border security they are
    not interchangeable initiatives as the GAO report reflects.

    Effective January 31, 2008, under the aforementioned authority, United
    States, Canadian and Bermudian citizens are required to present one or
    more government-issued documents to prove identity and citizenship.
    Children ages 18 and under need only present a birth certificate. This
    transition inhibits entry of individuals who cannot confirm their
    identity and citizenship. Since the transition, changes in travel
    document requirement have not caused discernable increases in wait
    times at the border. Compliance rates are high and continue to
    increase. United States and Canadian citizens are presenting the
    requested documents when crossing the border.

    High compliance rates have also been reported during the initial phase
    of the WHTI. As of January 23, 2007, the WHTI Air Final Rule requires
    all arriving air travelers, regardless of age, to present a passport or
    other acceptable secure document for entry into the United States. In
    the last seven months, CBP has reported a compliance rate of 99 percent
    for citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda, and there has
    been no interruption to air transportation. This is the result of close
    coordination with federal government partners, private sector travel,
    tourism industry and the air carriers. The high level of compliance
    shows that Americans and foreign nationals alike are willing and able
    to obtain the necessary documents to enter or re-enter the United
    States once the requirements are known and enforced. On March 27, 2008,
    DHS announced that full implementation of the land and sea provisions
    of WHTI would begin July 1, 2009.

    As reflected in the report, CBP officials are tasked with a very
    complex, dangerous, and challenging job. They face those challenges
    every day with vigilance, dedication to service, and integrity as they
    work to strengthen national homeland security and protect America and
    its citizens.

    Attachment I "Recent and Planned Border Security Initiatives" provides
    additional, detailed information on Department activities.

    Technical and sensitivity comments have been provided under separate
    cover. We request that the GAO make appropriate changes in the draft
    report prior to releasing information that has been determined to be
    sensitive. We expect GAO to accord this material the same level of
    sensitivity as DHS. Any further disclosure only should occur with the
    express permission of the Department.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by:
    Penelope G. McCormack:
    Acting Director:
    Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:

    Attachment I: Recent and Planned Border Security Activities

    Northern Border Overview:

    Personnel:

    Border Patrol agent staffing on the Northern Border has increased
    significantly since September 11, 2001. Prior to 9-11, there were only
    340 Border Patrol agents assigned to the Northern Border responsible
    for securing nearly 4,000 miles of international border with Canada. As
    of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the Northern Border,
    a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified in the 2007 GAO
    report. Furthermore, personnel staffing levels will be doubled over the
    next two years to over 2,000 agents by the end of Fiscal Year 2010.
    These additional agents will be deployed to traditional assignments
    such as line watch but will also be assigned to liaison duties in the
    following offices:

    * Integrated Border Enforcement Teams;
    - Border Enforcement and Security Teams (BEST) pilot locations.

    * Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers.

    * US Attorney's Offices.

    * Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

    * State Fusion Centers.

    * Local Task Forces.

    Technology:

    The apparent lack of visibility of Border Patrol resources does not
    mean that the border is "unmanned and unmonitored." The Border Patrol
    currently employs a myriad of tactics to enforce border security along
    the Northern Border. These include but are not limited to ground
    surveillance sensors and cameras. Future technology includes:

    * Three-Ground Surveillance Radars will be deployed along the Northern
    Border.

    * The total number of unattended ground sensors deployed will increase
    and existing unattended ground sensors will be replaced with upgraded
    sensors and strategically deployed along the Northern Border in FY 2008.
    - The RCMP has deployed ground sensors in strategic locations in
    coordination with the US Border Patrol.

    * Improved mobile Infra-Red detection capability is being deployed to
    every Northern Border Sector.

    * The existing Remote Video Surveillance System in the Blaine
    Washington Sector will be upgraded to provide enhanced coverage of the
    border.

    * The deployment of interim technology will continue in the form of
    thermal night vision devices and G-2 Sentinel Systems which are
    advanced game cameras with video/unattended ground sensor capabilities.

    * SBInet Northern Demonstration Project: The demonstration will take
    place along the Lower St. Clair River in the Detroit Sector Area of
    Responsibility (AOR). The prototype will demonstrate how an integrated
    air, land and maritime border security solution will improve operations
    in an area of the Northern Border; improve situational awareness by
    integrating national and tactical intelligence sources into a common
    operating picture; and provide members of the border enforcement
    community with the information necessary to support homeland security
    strategies and plans for unity of effort.

    * Additional DHS Science and Technology and CBP Office of Information
    Technology pilot projects will be tested throughout the northern
    border. These pilot projects will involve four sectors and include the:
    - Use of bollards in the Blaine sector;
    - Placement of acoustic sensors in the Spokane sector to detect low
    flying aircraft incursions;
    - Testing of gel-celled unattended ground sensors in the Grand Forks
    sector; and;
    - BorderNet proof-of-concept pilot program in the Swanton sector which
    is designed to enhance current and future detection capabilities in a
    Northern Border operational environment.

    Partnerships:

    Liaison and intelligence sharing have been improved and increased with
    Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as with
    counterparts within the Canadian government.

    * Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS);
    - The IBETs are bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement teams that
    enhance border integrity and security by identifying, investigating,
    and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a threat to
    national security or are engaged in other organized criminal activity.

    * Border Enforcement and Security Teams;
    - Two Immigration and Customs Enforcement BEST pilots will begin in the
    Buffalo and Blaine Sectors. These teams will provide investigative
    support to IBETS.

    * Royal Canadian Mounted Police;
    - An RCMP Inspector has been detailed to the Border Patrol Headquarters
    to serve as a liaison between the two agencies;
    - Border Patrol is seeking to embed agents into the RCMP Divisions to
    enhance the dissemination of actionable intelligence and to ensure
    optimum information sharing with our Canadian partners.

    * Project North Star;
    - A bi-national forum that provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement
    managers a mechanism to enhance existing communications, cooperation,
    and partnership between agencies and personnel that operate within the
    border area.

    * Northern Border Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers
    (IOCC);
    - Multi-Component Intelligence Fusion Centers that facilitate the
    communication, intelligence and flow of information throughout a
    specific region to multiple law enforcement agencies.

    * Airfields Initiative;
    - The development of strong partnerships and liaison with the community
    and law enforcement organizations to gather and develop intelligence
    information on aircraft incursions.

    * Radio Interoperability Pilot Project;
    - Havre Border Patrol Sector and RCMP are participating in a pilot
    program that uses techniques to measure interoperability of radio
    systems.

    Southern Border Updates:

    Personnel:

    Based on the operational needs of the Border Patrol, for Fiscal Year
    2008, staffing will increase between 18 to 20 percent along the
    Southern border. As of April 2008, there were 14,138 agents assigned to
    the Southern border. That represents an increase of 18 percent from the
    11,986 agents identified in the 2007 GAO report.

    Technology:

    The Border Patrol is working towards the deployment of technology
    across the Southwest Border in an effort to gain operational control of
    our nation's border.

    * Ongoing delivery of 40 Mobile Surveillance Systems units to the
    southern border is occurring.

    * TUSCON-1 deployment: Will consist of the construction and placement
    of sensor and communication towers in the Tucson Station area of
    responsibility. The deployment will also add additional Unattended
    Ground Sensors.

    * AJO-1 deployment: Will consist of the construction and placement of
    sensor and communication towers in the Ajo Station AOR. The deployment
    will also add additional Unattended Ground Sensors.

    * Deployment of the Common Operating Picture into the TUSCON-1 and AJO-
    1 projects.

    * Purchase and deployment of 1250 unattended ground sensors.

    Tactical Infrastructure:

    Tactical infrastructure deployments along the Southwest Border have
    increased significantly during Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008.

    * Over 70 miles of pedestrian fencing was deployed during Fiscal Year
    2007.

    * Over 55 miles of vehicle barriers were deployed during Fiscal Year
    2007.

    * End of Calendar Year 2008 goals include the deployment of
    approximately 185 miles of additional vehicle fencing and 225 miles of
    pedestrian fencing along the Southwest Border.

    Partnerships:

    On the Southern border, CBP's Border Patrol partners with other DHS
    components, federal, state, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, and
    the Government of Mexico, to bring together resources and fused
    intelligence into a geographical area that has been heavily impacted by
    illicit smuggling activity. By partnering, DHS continues to have a
    significant positive effect combating the threat of domestic terrorism,
    illegal cross-border migration, and all related crime in the border
    environment.

    * Operation Stonegarden;
    - Operation Stonegarden is a DHS funded, Border Patrol led, operation
    designed to incorporate the services of State, Local, and Tribal (SLT)
    law enforcement agencies for the purpose of enhancing border security
    and preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons of mass
    effect while at the same time mitigating the conspicuous effects of
    human trafficking organizations.

    * Operation Jump Start;
    - On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced his plan to deploy up to
    6,000 National Guard personnel for the first year along the United
    States border with Mexico in support of CBP's comprehensive strategy
    for gaining control of our borders. The second year deployment is
    currently 3000 troops. The intent of the operation is to provide CBP's
    Border Patrol an immediate means to enhance border enforcement
    operations while Border Patrol increased its own internal enforcement
    resources through hiring additional Border Patrol agents, mission
    support personnel, and procuring and applying new technology and
    infrastructure. The result was Operation Jump Start, a sustained (2-
    year) DHS and Department of Defense (DOD) collaborative effort to
    increase border security while enhancing the Border Patrol's ability
    and capacity to achieve its mission.

    * Border Enforcement and Security Teams;
    - The Border Patrol is an active partner with Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement and other Federal, state, and local agencies in the BEST
    taskforces located throughout the southwestern border that were formed
    specifically to combat cross-border criminal activity and violence.
    Participation in the taskforces leverage Border Patrol knowledge of the
    border area with other agencies' investigative expertise.

    * Border Security Operations Center (BSOC);
    - The BSOC is located in Austin, Texas. It acts as a fusion center for
    the State of Texas Department of Public Safety regarding border
    security issues. As a participating agency, the Border Patrol shares
    and maintains intelligence and coordinates operational planning with
    law enforcement agencies within the State of Texas. The BSOC identifies
    trends and patterns to establish multi agency enforcement methodologies
    aimed at disrupting alien smuggling organizations and drug trafficking
    organizations operating in the region.

    * Border Violence Protocols (BVP);
    - BVP is a bi-national action plan to combat border violence and
    improve public safety and was signed by Secretary Michael Chertoff and
    Mexico's Secretary of the Interior, Carlos Maria Abascal Carranza. This
    action plan sets forth goals and objectives to ensure that the
    appropriate law enforcement agencies of the respective governments work
    together to provide an effective, comprehensive joint response to
    incidents of cross-border violence and crime.

    * Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security
    (OASISS);
    - OASISS is a bilateral prosecutions program between the United States
    Government and the Government of Mexico. The program targets and
    prosecutes alien smugglers and human traffickers that smuggle aliens
    into the United States.

    * Operation Streamline;
    - Operation Streamline is a collaborative effort of multiple agencies
    (U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Marshal's Service, ICE) that utilizes
    criminal prosecution to deter illegal entries and gain, maintain and
    expand control of problematic areas;
    - The Chief Patrol Agent identifies and designates a `zero tolerance
    zone' for all illegal entries and directs that all prosecutable aliens,
    regardless of nationality, apprehended within the geographic boundaries
    be processed for criminal prosecution and removal proceedings.

    Fraudulent Document Detection Updates:

    CBP has implemented the following measures to enhance the CBP Officers
    ability to detect fraudulent documents. With the exception of the
    specialized equipment deployed in 2006 to the 11 Ports of Entry (POEs)
    (bullet 5 below), all other actions noted below were intended for CBP
    Officers at all POEs:

    * 2004- Implemented mandatory 8 hours in fraudulent document detection
    for all CBP Officers.

    * 2004- Distributed packets with sample training documents and Driver's
    License Identification Guides to all POEs.

    * 2005- Printed and distributed the Pocket Guide Reference to Document
    Security Features and Printing Techniques.

    * 2005-2006 - Inserted Fraudulent Document Training into all relevant
    cross training modules.

    * 2006-Provided 11 POEs that have the highest rate of fraudulent
    document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist with the
    examination and detection of fraudulent documents.
    1. San Ysidro POE;
    2. Calexico POE;
    3. John F. Kennedy International Airport;
    4. Newark International Airport;
    5. Laredo POE;
    6. El Paso POE;
    7. Miami International Airport;
    8. Los Angeles International Airport;
    9. Dulles International Airport;
    10. Nogales POE;
    11. Atlanta International Airport.

    * 2006 - Inserted 12 hours of fraudulent document detection into the
    Advanced Admissibility Secondary Processing Training program.

    * 2007 - Provided updated fraudulent document training modules to the
    CBP Academy for inclusion in their curriculum.

    * 2007 - Provided Virtual Learning Center training on Machine Readable
    Visas.

    * 2007 - Implemented mandatory refresher fraudulent document training.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] See GAO, Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States,
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-438T] (Washington,
    D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003); GAO, Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in
    Screening Entrants into the United States, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-976T] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
    2, 2006); and GAO, Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at
    Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-884T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
    27, 2007).

    [2] Because of safety concerns, we could not perform covert tests at
    all unmanned and unmonitored border locations. For more information on
    covert testing, see GAO, Investigative Operations: Use of Covert
    Testing to Identify Security Vulnerabilities and Fraud, Waste, and
    Abuse, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-286T]
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2007).

    [3] In three cases, our undercover investigators were denied entry into
    the United States by CBP officers. In the first case, a CBP officer at
    the Canadian border noticed that our undercover investigator's U.S.
    passport contained a substituted photo and would not allow him to
    enter. We believe that the other two cases are linked to this single
    incident because CBP became aware of our covert testing.

    [4] DHS and the Department of State's effort to specify acceptable
    documents and implement document requirements at 326 air, land, and sea
    ports of entry is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

    [5] As a result of this incident, we believe CBP became aware of our
    covert testing and denied entry to two undercover investigators when
    they attempted to enter the country from Jamaica. Investigators were
    admitted to the United States after revealing they were GAO employees
    and providing real identification.

    [6] Figures for miles of pedestrian fencing and vehicle fencing in
    place include those miles that have been constructed since October
    2007, toward the achievement of the calendar year 2008 goal of
    deploying an additional 225 miles of pedestrian fencing and 185 miles
    of vehicle fencing along the southwest border. When these goals are
    achieved, CBP will have a total of 370 miles of pedestrian fencing and
    300 miles of vehicle fencing.

    [7] The GAO report implies that the failure of CBP officers and agents
    to approach GAO investigators while inside the United States represents
    a security vulnerability. However, GAO acknowledges that Border Patrol
    agents and unmanned aerial vehicles were observed monitoring the border
    during the October 2006 GAO investigation on the southern border. GAO
    presents no evidence that investigators were not being monitored
    appropriately by CBP during the entire time that investigators were
    along the U.S./Mexico border. The report does not address the likely
    possibility that Border Patrol agents would have approached the
    investigators while on foot or in their vehicle as appropriate if there
    was a suspicion of unlawful activity.

    [End of section]

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