Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to 
Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed 
(26-JUN-08, GAO-08-754).					 
                                                                 
In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island	 
Summit, the United States established the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping	 
capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the  
Department of State (State) has allocated $374 million and	 
selected 52 countries to participate in the program. Congress	 
mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This	 
report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2)	 
whether State is consistently assessing the quality and 	 
effectiveness of the training, and (3) the extent to which	 
countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are	 
adequately screened for human rights abuses. GAO assessed State  
and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program documents,	 
interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted field 
work in eight countries.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-754 					        
    ACCNO:   A82561						        
  TITLE:     Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is     
Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements
Are Needed							 
     DATE:   06/26/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Civic action					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Equipment management				 
	     Federal aid programs				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military assistance			 
	     Human rights violations				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military materiel					 
	     Military training					 
	     Peacekeeping					 
	     Peacekeeping forces				 
	     Police training					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Protective equipment				 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Standards evaluation				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Foreign countries					 
	     Program coordination				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Africa						 
	     Global Peace Operations Initiative 		 
	     Italy						 

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GAO-08-754

   

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

June 2008: 

Peacekeeping: 

Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All 
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed: 

GAO-08-754: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-754, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the 
United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, 
with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has 
allocated $374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the 
program. 

Congress mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This 
report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether 
State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the 
training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria 
and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. 
GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program 
documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted 
field work in eight countries. 

What GAO Found: 

State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in 
three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing 
equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in 
meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have 
been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However, 
State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military 
peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the 
delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an 
equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in 
Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing 
some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DOD have 
trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several 
multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training 
centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to 
build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and 
equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in 
part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on 
training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the $98 million 
State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and 
infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared 
to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions. 

While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepersâprimarily from 
Africaâhave deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges 
in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard 
skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained 
instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military 
doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-
wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in 
skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the 
training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these 
program limitations result in Stateâs inability to assess the overall 
outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training. 

State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that 
generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen 
trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, Stateâs human 
rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by 
security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not 
always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses. 
For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received 
military training but were not screened for human rights violations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State improve oversight of 
equipment delivery, develop methods to assess the overall outcomes of 
the training program, and ensure that trainees are properly screened 
for human rights violations, among other things. State and DOD 
concurred or partially concurred with most of the recommendations, 
except for developing a method for evaluating the GPOI training program 
which State said already exists. GAO clarified the recommendation. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-754]. For more 
information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain: 

More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to 
Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its 
Training Program: 

GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria, but in Some 
Cases State Did Not Screen Trainees for Potential Violations of Human 
Rights: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: GPOI Partner Countries: 

Appendix III: International Contributions to 2004 G8 Summit Goal and 
GPOI: 

Appendix IV: Training and Peacekeeping Deployments of GPOI Partners: 

Appendix V: Equipment Provided to GPOI Partner Countries: 

Appendix VI: GPOI Activities to Support Long-term Skills and 
Infrastructure for Peacekeeping: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State: 

GAO Comments: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Activities for GPOI Goals and Objectives: 

Table 2: Peacekeeping Tasks Included in GPOI Military Skill Training: 

Table 3: GPOI Partner Countries 2004 to 2008, as of April 2008: 

Table 4: Military Peacekeepers Trained by GPOI and Deployed, by Country 
and Region (as of April 2008): 

Table 5: Types of Military Peacekeeping Equipment Provided to GPOI 
Partners: 

Table 6: Types of Training Equipment Provided for COESPU Training: 

Table 7: Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for 
Peacekeeping, by Region (as of April 2008): 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of GPOI Partner Countries: 

Figure 2: GPOI Expenditures by Region, as of April 2008: 

Figure 3: Projected and Actual Number of Trained Military Peacekeepers 
by Fiscal Year, as of April 2008: 

Figure 4: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military 
Peacekeepers, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 
2008): 

Figure 5: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region 
(fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008): 

Figure 6: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by 
Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008): 

Figure 7: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills 
and Infrastructure, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of 
April 2008): 

Abbreviations: 

ACOTA: Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance: 

AU: African Union: 

COESPU: Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

ECOWAS: Economic Community for West African States: 

EIPC: Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities: 

GCCGPOI: Coordination Committee: 

GPOI: Global Peace Operations Initiative: 

G8: Group of Eight: 

State: Department of State: 

UN: United Nations: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 26, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

Peace support operations throughout the world have grown from 4 United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 1988 to 17 in 2008; more than 
half of these missions began in the last 10 years.[Footnote 1] At the 
2004 Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States and other 
G8 nations responded to the growing need for well-trained and equipped 
peacekeepers by committing to expand the global capability for peace 
support operations--particularly African peacekeeping skills and 
capabilities.[Footnote 2] In 2004, the United States established the 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year, $660 million 
program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on 
enhancing peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Key goals of the program 
are to train military peacekeepers and stability police[Footnote 3] for 
peacekeeping missions, including a target of 75,000 military 
peacekeepers; provide long-term skills and infrastructure to GPOI 
partner countries and regional organizations; and provide nonlethal 
equipment and transportation to support countries' deployment of 
peacekeepers. Since 2005, the Department of State (State), in 
consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD), has allocated $374 
million to support GPOI objectives.[Footnote 4] 

In the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 5] Congress 
mandated that GAO assess the initiative and report on a number of 
issues, including the extent to which GPOI has met its goals, the 
metrics used to measure progress, the quality of training, GPOI's 
impact on countries' contributions to peacekeeping, and G8 and other 
countries' financial and technical assistance to expand global capacity 
for peace support operations. To address the mandate, this report 
assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is 
consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training 
program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria 
and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. 
Appendix III contains data on G8 and other countries' contributions to 
expanding the global capability for peacekeeping. 

To complete this review, we assessed State Department data on the 
number of troops trained, equipment provided, and other indicators. We 
interviewed officials from State and DOD in Washington, D.C.; officials 
from U.S. Combatant Commands for the Pacific, Southern Hemisphere, and 
Africa during visits to Germany and Miami; and U.S. and host country 
officials during site visits to Guatemala, Italy, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Mongolia. We determined that the data 
provided by State and DOD were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of our review. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to 
June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained in this review provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three 
principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing 
equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in 
meeting these goals.[Footnote 6] First, State and DOD have trained 
nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in Africa; supported 
the training of over 1,300 stability police; and provided nonlethal 
training equipment to some military peacekeepers. However, State is 
unlikely to meet its goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 
2010 and has encountered problems with accounting for and timely 
delivery of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries. Second, 
State supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone; has supplied 
equipment for missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; and has 
initiated a process for peacekeeping countries to request donor 
assistance for transportation and logistics needs.[Footnote 7] However, 
State has encountered some delays in providing timely delivery of 
nonlethal equipment to deployed peacekeepers. Third, to build 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure,[Footnote 8] State and DOD have 
trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted 
multinational peacekeeping exercises, refurbished training centers, and 
taken steps to establish a communications system in West Africa. 
However, State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure 
activities in Africa by 2010, in part due to African peacekeeping 
countries' limited resources and capabilities for supporting their own 
peacekeeping programs. Moreover, State has targeted a smaller share of 
resources for the development of long-term skills and infrastructure 
for peacekeeping than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa 
in other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region 
and a focus on training peacekeepers in this region for current 
missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent has 
been spent--compared to 20 percent to 50 percent in other regions--on 
activities to build the long-term skills and infrastructure that 
countries need to sustain peacekeeping operations on their own. 

While 56 percent of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers from 13 
countries, primarily in Africa, have deployed to peacekeeping missions, 
State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of peacekeepers it 
has trained and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. 
Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and UN 
requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the 
proficiency of military peacekeepers in the skills taught. For example, 
trainers we met with in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that they 
review participants' performance--of which Ghana and Senegal account 
for 44 percent of the total deployed GPOI-trained troops--in training 
exercises and exercise professional judgment to determine participants' 
ability to perform specific tasks, but they are not required to test 
the skills of military peacekeepers against a common standard. As a 
result, State cannot ascertain the proficiency of the military 
peacekeepers it has trained. State has mechanisms for monitoring and 
documenting the performance of contractors in Africa, including a 
program management team to monitor contractor performance in Africa. 
However, the responsibility for retaining evaluations of contractors' 
performance is unclear among State officials. Further, although State 
and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, 
State cannot fully account for the training activities of these 
instructors in their home countries. As of April 2008, State had only 
been able to identify that training had occurred by GPOI-trained 
instructors in two countries. In addition, State has supported the 
training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at Italy's Center 
of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), but cannot identify 
whether these instructors subsequently conduct training. Collectively, 
these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the 
overall outcomes of providing high-quality, effective peacekeeping 
training. 

State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that 
generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen 
trainees from partner countries for potential violations of human 
rights. Countries and their peacekeeping troops must generally meet a 
list of criteria identified in the program's strategy before they can 
receive GPOI-funded training and other assistance. Most partner 
countries generally met the participation criteria, including having an 
elected government, an acceptable human rights record, a willingness to 
participate in peace support operations, and an agreement on the use 
and security of U.S.-provided goods and services, but we found 24 
countries in which State's human rights reporting identified documented 
human rights violations by security forces in 2007. We found that 
peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for 
human rights abuses, in accordance with State guidance. Specifically, 
we found that State trained 81 individuals in 2007 from one country but 
did not screen them before they participated in GPOI-funded training. 
In addition, 17 military peacekeepers and stability police from 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted 
out of 382 trained from those countries in 2007. We also found that the 
commanders of seven composite units in three countries were screened 
for human rights violations, but the individual members of these units 
were not screened, as required by State guidance. As a result, it is 
possible that State and DOD have provided training to security 
personnel who have committed human rights abuses. 

We recommend that the Secretary of State improve oversight of nonlethal 
equipment delivery to partner countries, develop methods to assess the 
overall outcomes of the training program, and ensure that trainees are 
properly screened for human rights violations. We also recommend that 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, assess the estimated 
resources and time frames needed to complete activities to help achieve 
the G8 goals for developing African countries' capabilities to maintain 
peacekeeping operations on their own. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense. We received written comments from State and DOD, which we have 
reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. State concurred or 
partially concurred with seven of the eight recommendations and 
provided additional information to highlight the program's 
achievements. State did not concur with the recommendation to develop a 
method for evaluating GPOI training. State noted that methods already 
exist to evaluate the quality of the training program and measure 
proficiency of trainees. We disagree that State's current evaluation 
methods address our recommendation. State has not developed military 
task lists and associated training that can be applied at all GPOI 
training sites; sites currently use varying standards to assess the 
proficiency of trainees. DOD agreed with the need for greater 
standardization and more analysis of trainee performance. We modified 
the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide standard military 
tasks and related training that State, in consultation with DOD, should 
develop in accordance with the commitments made in the GPOI strategy. 
State also commented that it now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 
peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training rates. We were unable 
to validate State's new data since as recently as May 2008, program 
officials indicated that slow expenditure rates would delay State's 
efforts to reach the 2010 training goal. DOD also concurred or 
partially concurred with the findings and recommendations of the 
report. DOD agreed that State should work with DOD and Italy to 
validate personnel shortfalls at COESPU and fill the identified 
positions. DOD also stated that an assessment of resources and time 
frames should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI program. We did 
not revise this recommendation because it is intended to address our 
finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure 
activities in Africa by 2010. State and DOD also provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

Background: 

On April 1, 2004, the President approved GPOI, a 5-year program to help 
address significant gaps in international peace operations, including a 
shortage of capable peacekeepers, limited national capabilities to 
train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies, and a lack of mechanisms 
to help countries deploy peacekeepers and provide logistics support for 
them in the field. To support the development of peacekeeping 
capabilities of GPOI countries, the program incorporates and expands on 
the pre-existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA) program and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping 
Capabilities (EIPC) program.[Footnote 9] 

GPOI Has Seven Objectives to Improve Peacekeeping Operations Worldwide: 

In 2004, the United States established GPOI as a $660 million, 5-year 
program with seven objectives to increase and maintain the capacity, 
capability, and effectiveness of peace operations worldwide. These 
objectives are to: 

* train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military peacekeepers by 
2010; 

* support efforts at the International Center of Excellence for 
Stability Police (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and 
interoperability of stability police to participate in peace 
operations; 

* develop a program to procure and store peace operations equipment to 
facilitate the equipment's quick mobilization for peace operations; 

* develop a transportation and logistics support system to deploy and 
sustain peacekeeping in the field; 

* enhance the capacity of regional and subregional organizations for 
peace operations; 

* provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-related 
activities in Africa and globally; and: 

* conduct activities that support and assist partners in achieving self-
sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained from GPOI. 

U.S. Agencies and Partner Countries Participate in GPOI: 

State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in coordination with 
DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, is 
responsible for providing policy guidance; allocating resources; and 
coordinating GPOI programs, events, and activities. All GPOI 
allocations and program activities must be approved by the GPOI 
Coordination Committee (GCC), the formal decision-making body co- 
chaired by State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense. Participants of the GCC include the Joint 
Staff and, as required, other program implementers. GPOI implementers 
include the U.S. Combatant Commands, State's regional bureaus, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense's regional offices, and U.S. 
diplomatic posts. The regional combatant commands are the lead 
implementers of GPOI activities throughout the world, with the 
exception of Africa, where State's Bureau of African Affairs leads 
implementation of GPOI activities. Within the African Affairs Bureau, 
ACOTA is the lead implementer for the training and equipment portion of 
GPOI activities in Africa. 

State has designated 52 countries as partner countries eligible to 
receive funding for GPOI activities--38 for military peacekeepers, 3 
for stability police, and 11 for both military peacekeepers and 
stability police, as of April 2008. As figure 1 shows, the majority are 
located in Africa (22 countries) and the remaining are in Asia, South 
and Central America, Europe, and the Near East and Central Asia. (See 
app. II for a list of all GPOI partners.) 

Figure 1: Map of GPOI Partner Countries: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the world with the following depiction 
indicated for GPOI partner countries: 
* Military partner; 
* Stability police partner; 
* Both military partner and stability police partner. 

Source: Map Resources (map); GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

[End of figure] 

Majority of GPOI Funds Provided for Activities in Africa: 

State has allocated $374 million, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal 
year 2008, for GPOI activities worldwide, of which it has expended 
about $152 million for activities in four major categories: training, 
training equipment, deployment assistance, and skills and 
infrastructure. As displayed in figure 2, the majority--about $98 
million--has been spent[Footnote 10] in Africa, followed by about $30 
million in Asia and $12 million in South and Central America. In 
Africa, the majority has been spent on training and training equipment 
together followed by deployment assistance of equipment and 
transportation for deployed peacekeeping missions. In Asia, the 
majority has been spent on skills and infrastructure followed by 
training. In South and Central America, the majority has been spent on 
training equipment followed by activities for building skills and 
infrastructure. (App. II identifies the GPOI partner countries in these 
geographic regions.) 

Figure 2: GPOI Expenditures by Region, as of April 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Region: Africa; 
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $12.2155 million; 
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $28.2742 million; 
Training equipment funding: $19.0079 million; 
Training funding: $38.8121 million; 
Total: $98.3097 million. 

Region: Asia; 
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $15.3522 million; 
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $2 million; 
Training equipment funding: $3.76712 million; 
Training funding: $ 9.22004 million; 
Total: $30.33344 million. 

Region: South and Central America; 
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $2.0211 million; 
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $0.862212 million; 
Training equipment funding: $8.39237 million; 
Training funding: $0.263018 million; 
Total: $ 11.5387 million. 

Region: Europe; 
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: $2.02871 million; 
Deployment assistance[B] funding: $2.5 million; 
Training equipment funding: $0 million; 
Training funding: $4.5 million; 
Total: $9.02871 million; 

Region: Near East and Central Asia; 
Skills and infrastructure[A] funding: 0; 
Deployment assistance[B] funding: 0; 
Training equipment funding: 0; 
Training funding: $2.97781 million; 
Total: $2.97781 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

Note: Data for training and equipping in Africa are as of Mar. 15, 
2008. 

[A] Peacekeeping skills and infrastructure include activities to 
enhance the ability of countries to conduct training for their own 
peacekeeping mission and improve the capabilities of regional 
organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. 
See app. VI for information on the status of these activities in each 
region. 

[B] Deployment assistance includes expenditures on equipment and 
transportation provided for deployed peacekeeping missions. 

[End of figure] 

State and DOD Provide Training Using a Variety of Means: 

Training of military peacekeepers under GPOI can be provided by 
contractors, U.S. military active duty personnel, or by trainers from 
neighboring countries in the region, and is focused on providing 
battalion-level training for peacekeeping missions. U.S. contractors 
provide the majority of training in Africa and, when available, U.S. 
military active duty personnel serve as mentors to African trainees. In 
Asia, U.S. military personnel provide the majority of training but use 
contractors to provide some of the training for military officers. In 
Central America, training is provided by other countries and by U.S. 
military personnel.[Footnote 11] The United States has funded the 
training of a few individuals in the Near East and Europe. U.S. 
military personnel may serve as mentors to trainees in these regions. 
Training has not yet occurred in Central Asia. GPOI training of 
stability police is provided at COESPU--Italy's international training 
center for peace operations located in Vicenza, Italy, where the 
Italian Carabinieri[Footnote 12] train instructors of stability police 
units.[Footnote 13] 

GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain: 

State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three 
principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing 
equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in 
meeting these goals. Table 1 summarizes the status of GPOI activities 
for the three principal goals and seven objectives. First, State and 
DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in 
Africa, and supported the training of over 1,300 stability police, but 
it is unlikely that GPOI will meet its goal of training 75,000 military 
peacekeepers by 2010 due to the time it takes to expend program funds, 
and State and DOD have encountered delays in delivering nonlethal 
training equipment.[Footnote 14] Second, State has provided equipment 
to deployed missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; supports an 
equipment depot in Sierra Leone; and initiated a process for 
peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for their 
transportation and logistics needs, but some efforts have been delayed. 
Third, State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping 
instructors and conducted other activities. However, State faces delays 
in completing activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa 
by 2010. In addition, State has targeted a smaller share of resources 
to build African peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than to train 
and equip African peacekeepers, compared to other regions. This is due 
in part to the needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on 
training peacekeepers in this region for current missions. The 
following sections provide more information about the progress made in 
these areas. 

Table 1: Status of Activities for GPOI Goals and Objectives: 

GPOI Goal: Train and equip peacekeepers: Train and equip 75,000 
peacekeepers by 2010; 
Status of Activities: Trained about 40,000, not on track to train 
75,000 by 2010. Expect to meet training goal when all training funds 
are fully expended. Problems with procuring and accounting for training 
equipment. 

GPOI Goal: Train and equip peacekeepers: Provide support to Italy's 
International Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU); 
Status of Activities: On track to train 3,000 by 2010. Provided 
personnel for one staff position at COESPU. Additional positions Italy 
requested the United States to fill remain unfilled. 

GPOI Goal: Provide equipment and transportation to deployed missions: 
Develop a deployment equipment program for quick mobilization of 
equipment to support peacekeeping missions; 
Status of Activities: Equipment provided to six countries deployed in 
four peacekeeping missions. Maintain and provide equipment to depot in 
Sierra Leone. Delivery of some equipment has been slow. 

GPOI Goal: Provide equipment and transportation to deployed missions: 
Work with other G8 members to develop a program for peacekeeping 
countries to request donor assistance for transportation and logistics 
needs; 
Status of Activities: In October 2007, established e-mail communication 
system in cooperation with G8 to facilitate requests for assistance. 
First request communicated through system in April 2008. 

GPOI Goal: Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure: Enhance the 
capacity of regional and subregional organizations; 
Status of Activities: In Africa, trained some staff of one regional 
organization, provided computer equipment to three regional 
peacekeeping centers, and provided equipment for communication systems. 

GPOI Goal: Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure: Conduct 
activities that support peacekeeping countries' ability to develop and 
maintain their peacekeeping programs; 
Status of Activities: Trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, 
predominantly in Africa, and refurbished some training facilities in 
Central America and Asia. Limited ability in African countries to build 
and maintain their own training program. 

GPOI Goal: Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure: Create a 
clearinghouse function; 
Status of Activities: Supported the establishment of annual conferences 
held with G8 and other nations to share information and discuss efforts 
to support peacekeeping in Africa. In 2007, held first conference to 
discuss worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

[End of table] 

Thousands of Military Peacekeepers Trained in Africa, but Challenges 
Remain in Supporting Stability Police Training and Providing Training 
Equipment: 

The majority--92 percent--of military peacekeepers trained under GPOI 
are from African partner countries, while the remainder have been 
trained in Asia, Central America, and Europe. In addition, State has 
supported the training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at 
COESPU, providing about one-quarter of the school's budget. However, 
State is not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and 
has not provided support for all requested staff positions at COESPU. 
Further, State has provided about $31 million of training equipment to 
military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. 
However, State has faced challenges in delivering training equipment to 
GPOI partner countries in a timely manner and accounting for equipment 
delivery. 

GPOI Has Supported Training and Equipping of Military Peacekeepers, but 
Is Unlikely to Meet Its Goals by 2010: 

State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers as of 
April 2008--36,968 in Africa; 1,805 in Asia; 455 in Central and South 
America; and 289 in Europe (see app. IV for details on the number 
trained by region and country). State is not likely to complete the 
training of 75,000 military peacekeepers by the target date of 2010. As 
figure 3 shows, the actual number of troops trained is lower than 
State's projections. State expects to reach its goal once it has spent 
all GPOI training funds, but this will likely not occur until after 
2010 due to the time it takes to expend training funds. In commenting 
on a draft of this report, State asserts that it now expects that GPOI 
will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training 
rates. We were unable to validate State's new projections since as 
recently as May 2008, program officials from the GPOI office in the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI evaluation team 
indicated that slow expenditure rates related to training rates would 
delay their efforts to reach the 2010 training goal. 

Figure 3: Projected and Actual Number of Trained Military Peacekeepers 
by Fiscal Year, as of April 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Projected number to be trained: 12,042
Actual number trained: 12,847. 

Fiscal year: 2005-2006; 
Projected number to be trained: 31,271; 
Actual number trained: 25,743. 

Fiscal year: 2005-2007; 
Projected number to be trained: 48,449; 
Actual number trained: 38,314. 

Fiscal year: 2005-2008; 
Projected number to be trained: 62,649; 
Actual number trained: 39,518. 

Fiscal year: 2005-2009; 
Projected number to be trained: 75,099; 
Actual number trained: [Empty]. 

Source: State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

State has spent approximately $56 million to train military 
peacekeepers, as of April 2008. Figure 4 shows the expenditures of GPOI 
funds for training military peacekeepers by region. The majority of the 
funds, about $39 million, have been spent in Africa. 

Figure 4: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military 
Peacekeepers, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 
2008): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military Peacekeepers, by 
Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008): 

Africa: $38,812,079 (69.6%); 
Asia: $9,220,040 (16.5%); 
Europe: $4,500,000 (8.1%); 
Near East and Central Asia: $2,977,807 (5.3%); 
South and Central America: $263,018 (0.5%). 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to these funds, some of the combatant commands have spent 
additional DOD funds to support the State-funded GPOI training. For 
example, U.S. Pacific Command officials identified that they spent an 
estimated $8 million of additional DOD funds to develop courses for 
peacekeeping training and support multinational training exercises held 
in Mongolia and Bangladesh. 

COESPU Is Likely to Meet Training Goal for Stability Police by 2010 
Despite Shortfalls in State's Assistance: 

Based on current projections, COESPU has indicated that it is likely to 
meet its goal of training 3,000 stability police instructors by 2010. 
As of April 2008, State had expended $9 million of $15 million 
obligated for COESPU's operations, directly supporting about one- 
quarter of COESPU's budget.[Footnote 15] In 2005, the Italians 
requested assistance from the United States in filling six staff 
positions at COESPU in the areas of management, training, research, and 
publications. Since 2005, the United States has provided a military 
officer to serve in the deputy director position, but support has not 
been provided for the other requested staff positions at COESPU. 

According to a February 2008 State document and COESPU and U.S. 
officials we met with in Italy, the United States planned to provide 
support to fill a total of five staff positions at COESPU: deputy 
director, head of the training department for high-level courses, 
manager of research for stability police training doctrine, evaluator 
of course outcomes, and Web site and magazine manager. In January 2008, 
COESPU and U.S. officials we met with in Italy stated that these 
positions would help COESPU track the activities of its graduates, 
dispatch mobile training teams, and expand the number of students in 
each class. In May 2008, State officials in Washington, D.C., indicated 
that they plan to fund the position for an evaluator of course outcomes 
in the near future. In addition, we found that State does not always 
use staff at U.S. missions in partner countries to facilitate U.S. 
support to COESPU. For example, an embassy official in Senegal stated 
that when COESPU sent a questionnaire to Senegalese officials inquiring 
about deployments and training activities of COESPU graduates, State 
did not instruct the embassy to follow up and help obtain a response. 

State and DOD Have Encountered Problems in Providing and Accounting for 
Training Equipment: 

State has provided about $31 million in nonlethal training equipment to 
military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. The 
equipment provided includes individual and unit equipment for military 
units training for peacekeeping missions, as well as equipment for 
COESPU to train stability police instructors. State has encountered 
delays in the purchase and delivery of this equipment, often resulting 
in State's inability to provide equipment concurrently with training 
sessions. Further, State officials have been unable to fully account 
for training equipment delivered in Africa. 

The equipment provided includes individual equipment such as boots, 
first aid kits, and uniforms; and unit equipment such as radios, tents, 
and toolkits. (See app. V for more information on the types of training 
equipment provided in each region.) As figure 5 shows, the majority of 
the equipment was provided to partner countries in Africa. State also 
has provided individual training equipment directly to COESPU for 
students attending the school. This equipment included nonlethal items 
such as riot batons and shields. 

Figure 5: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region 
(fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region (fiscal 
years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008): 

Africa: $19,007,914 (61%); 
South and Central America: $8,392,374 (27%); 
Asia: $3,767,115 (12%). 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Note: Near East and Central Asia and Europe expended zero funds for 
training in this time period. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, officials from some of the combatant commands stated that 
they use other sources of funds to provide additional equipment to 
military peacekeepers. For example, U.S. Central Command officials 
identified an estimated $14 million in funds from DOD accounts to 
provide items such as body armor, water purification units, vehicles, 
and uniform equipment for a peacekeeping brigade in Kazakhstan in 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007. 

State and DOD have encountered problems in providing training equipment 
to partner countries in a timely manner. The procurement of equipment 
through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is responsible 
for a large amount of equipment for GPOI, has encountered delays due to 
the procurement priorities for U.S. military forces, the time needed to 
identify the specific equipment needs for each country, and 
manufacturing backlogs. For example, a 2007 State program evaluation 
found that only two of several hundred training equipment items 
procured through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for Central 
America with fiscal year 2005 funds had arrived in country by the end 
of 2007, and the delivery dates for the remaining equipment were 
unknown. Contractors and agency and host country officials in the 
countries we visited in Africa stated that training equipment often is 
not concurrently provided with GPOI training, due to the delays in 
procurement and delivery. In addition, U.S. officials in Guatemala 
stated they had to delay training when equipment was not delivered in 
time. 

State also has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery and 
transfer of equipment to partner countries. Specifically, State 
officials in Washington, D.C., have been unable to fully account for 
training equipment delivered to Africa. State has used a contractor to 
purchase in total approximately $19 million of equipment for African 
partner countries but, as of December 2007, could not account for the 
equipment's delivery. State officials responsible for implementing the 
program in Africa said that they instituted a new system in mid-2007 to 
account for the equipment delivered to partner countries. These 
officials said that the difficulties with accounting for equipment 
deliveries have been due to the fact that the previous system was 
poorly organized. In June 2008, these officials stated they had 
completed an inventory identifying the equipment items ordered and 
delivered using GPOI funds and were now able to fully account for the 
entire inventory of equipment purchase. 

State Has Provided Equipment and Transportation Support to Deployed 
Missions, but Some Efforts Have Been Delayed: 

State has provided equipment to deployed missions and recently 
established a system to facilitate donor assistance for transport and 
logistic support to peacekeeping countries deploying to missions. 
However, State has encountered delays in delivering equipment to 
missions, similar to the delays in delivering equipment for training. 

State has provided equipment to deployed missions in a number of ways. 
As figure 6 shows, the majority of this support has been provided to 
Africa. In Sierra Leone, since 2005, State has spent over $9 million in 
equipment and operational support, for an equipment depot used for 
peacekeeping missions and election support by the Economic Community 
for West African States (ECOWAS).[Footnote 16] As of April 2008, State 
also had provided $18 million of nonlethal equipment for six countries 
deploying to missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan. For 
example, State provided field kitchens, field medical clinics, water 
purification units, and generators to peacekeepers deploying to 
Somalia. This equipment helped support the deployment of at least 4,600 
peacekeepers, according to State. 

Figure 6: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by 
Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by Region: 

Africa: $28,274,176 (84%); 
Europe: $2,500,000 (7%); 
Asia: $2,000,000 (6%); 
South and Central America: $862,212 (3%). 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Note: Near East and Central Asia expended zero funding in this time 
period. 

[End of figure] 

Although State's goal is to provide equipment to countries deployed to 
peacekeeping missions in a timely manner, as of April 2008, $9 million 
of equipment obligated since 2005 for countries deployed to missions in 
Somalia and Sudan had not been provided by State. For example, State 
obligated $9 million in fiscal year 2005 to support Nigeria, Kenya, and 
the African Union in the peacekeeping mission to Sudan, but this 
equipment was not provided until 2007, according to State reporting, 
and $3.6 million remains to be expended. In another example, State 
documents indicate that $5.6 million in fiscal year 2006 funds 
obligated for the purchase of equipment to support peacekeepers 
deployed from Rwanda, Ghana, Burundi, and Nigeria have not yet been 
expended. 

To facilitate donor support for transportation and logistical needs of 
countries deploying peacekeepers, State established an electronic 
communication system in the fall of 2007. Requests made by countries 
seeking assistance with transportation and equipment for peacekeeping 
missions can be sent by e-mail to G8 and other countries that could 
provide such assistance. As of April 2008, five potential donor G8 
countries have designated a contact person to receive such requests, 
according to State. Although the GPOI strategy committed to initiating 
the process and establishing an electronic system by 2006, State did 
not establish the system until 2007. In April 2008, the first request 
for assistance for one country's deployment to the African Union 
mission in Somalia was communicated by State to donors through the 
system, according to State. 

State Has Targeted a Smaller Share of Resources to Build Peacekeeping 
Skills and Infrastructure in Africa Compared with Other Regions and 
Faces Delays in Completing Activities: 

State and DOD have conducted a number of activities to enhance 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure to develop the ability of 
countries to conduct training for their own peacekeeping missions and 
to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train 
for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Although African partners 
receive the majority of GPOI funds, State has targeted a smaller share 
of resources, comparatively, for activities to build peacekeeping 
skills and infrastructure among Africa peacekeepers, in part due to the 
needs and capabilities of the region and its focus on training and 
equipping peacekeepers to serve in current missions. 

State and DOD Have Conducted Activities to Build Skills and 
Infrastructure for Peacekeeping: 

State and DOD have conducted a range of activities to build 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure among partner countries. (See 
app. VI for information on the status of these activities in each 
region.) These activities include the following: 

* Enhancing the ability of countries to conduct their own peacekeeping 
training:
- trained 2,384 military peacekeeping instructors in African countries, 
266 in Asian countries, 43 in Central American countries, and 26 in 
European countries;
- refurbished training centers in Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Mongolia, and Ukraine; and:
- supported three annual multinational training exercises in Asia 
beginning in 2006, enabling peacekeeping units from different countries 
to train together. 

* Improving the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train 
for, and execute peacekeeping missions. These activities include the 
following:
- trained ECOWAS staff on mission planning and management;
- provided equipment and supported operations for the ECOWAS equipment 
depot;
- provided computer equipment to regional peacekeeping training centers 
in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali; and:
- funded training of units from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua, which will serve as a multinational brigade under the 
Conference of Central American Armed Forces. 

Smaller Proportion of GPOI Resources Have Been Targeted for Skills and 
Infrastructure Activities in Africa than in Asia: 

State has spent approximately $32 million in building skills and 
infrastructure in different regions of the world. As displayed in 
figure 7, State has spent more in Asia than Africa on activities that 
build skills and infrastructure--about $15 million in Asia and $12 
million in Africa--although Africa receives the majority of GPOI funds 
overall. 

Figure 7: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills 
and Infrastructure, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of 
April 2008): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills and 
Infrastructure, by Region: 

Asia: $15,352,196 (49%); 
Africa: $12,215,476 (39%); 
South and Central America: $$2,021,096 (6%); 
Europe: $2,028,709 (6%); 

Source: GAO analysis of State Department data. 

Note: Near East and Central Asia expended zero funding in this time 
period. 

[End of figure] 

Further, State has targeted a higher proportion of funds in South and 
Central America, Asia, and Europe on building skills and infrastructure 
than on training and equipping peacekeepers within those regions. In 
support of its goal to build skills and infrastructure, State has spent 
51 percent of all funds for Asia in this area, and about 20 percent of 
all funds for both South and Central America and Europe. In comparison, 
of the $98 million spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on assisting 
with peacekeeping skills and infrastructure.[Footnote 17] In response 
to our findings, State officials attributed the limited focus of 
resources for building skills and infrastructure in Africa to a drop in 
funding of more than 20 percent from the funding initially anticipated 
in 2005. These officials told us that the program objectives were 
developed with the expectation of receiving $660 million and the 
decrease in funding to approximately $500 million over 5 years has 
influenced program decisions and priorities. In May 2008, State and DOD 
officials said that discussions are underway to develop proposals for 
future GPOI activities after 2010. 

In addition to the funds expended by State, some of the combatant 
commands have used DOD funds to support GPOI activities in Asia, 
Africa, and Europe. For instance, U.S. Pacific Command officials 
identified that they spent about $500,000 in fiscal year 2007 to 
supplement the refurbishment of buildings at Mongolia's peacekeeping 
training center. In addition, some of the commands assign officers to 
serve as liaisons at peacekeeping training centers in other countries. 
For instance, U.S. African Command has a liaison officer at a 
peacekeeping training center in Ghana, and U.S. European Command has an 
officer at a peacekeeping training center in Bosnia.[Footnote 18] 

State Faces Delays in Completing Skills and Infrastructure Activities 
in Africa: 

Activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa have faced 
delays and will likely not be completed by 2010. Specifically, State 
faces delays in building African countries' ability to maintain their 
training programs, establishing a regional communication system for 
ECOWAS and the African Union, and transferring the equipment depot to 
ECOWAS. According to State officials, these delays are affected, in 
part, by African peacekeeping countries' limited resources and 
capabilities for supporting their own peacekeeping programs. State 
officials also have noted that the ability these countries have to 
support their peacekeeping program is directly affected by the rates of 
peacekeeper deployments these countries provide to peacekeeping 
missions. 

* In two of the African countries we visited, high rates of deployments 
of trained instructors limit their ability to build and maintain a 
training program. For example, in Senegal, officials stated that 
building a cadre of Senegalese instructors was difficult because once 
these instructors complete GPOI training, they are frequently deployed 
on missions due to their high skill levels. 

* The strategic communications system that State established for ECOWAS 
member countries is not fully operational. State documents identified 
that, while some countries were using the equipment, others had yet to 
either receive or use it. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
State told us that 11 countries have equipment and 2 are waiting on 
equipment delivery. State also obligated $4.5 million to set up a 
strategic communications system for the African Union but has been 
unable to install the system due to a licensing issue, according to 
State. 

* The ECOWAS equipment depot in Sierra Leone is likely to continue to 
function under joint control of the United States and ECOWAS. State 
maintains the depot, including the delivery and maintenance of 
nonlethal equipment used by ECOWAS members for peacekeeping and 
election support. State intends to transfer full responsibility to 
ECOWAS for the maintenance of the depot, according to State officials, 
but this is unlikely to happen in the near term. State officials said 
that ECOWAS is not fully capable of financing the depot in the near 
future and will require U.S. support in the near term for its 
operations and maintenance. 

More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to 
Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its 
Training Program: 

State and DOD provide training on a number of military peacekeeping 
skills, and 56 percent of these trained military peacekeepers from 13 
countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, as of April 2008. 
[Footnote 19] However, State faces challenges in assessing the quality 
and effectiveness of its training program. First, State cannot 
ascertain the proficiency of the peacekeepers it has trained against a 
standard level of skills taught during their training to determine if 
it is providing effective training. Second, State officials are unclear 
about their responsibilities for maintaining and recording evaluations 
of performance evaluations in the contractor performance system of 
contractors who provide training in Africa. Third, State is unable to 
fully account for the activities of trained instructors to measure the 
program's impact in building countries' capability to continue this 
training. Specifically, as of April 2008, State had trained more than 
2,700 military instructors and supported the training of over 1,300 
stability police instructors at COESPU, but could not identify whether 
these instructors subsequently conduct training. 

State and DOD Train Military Peacekeeping Units and Support Training of 
Stability Police but Cannot Ascertain the Proficiency of Trainees: 

State and DOD train military units in peacekeeping skills, primarily to 
aid participating countries in their deployment to peacekeeping 
operations.[Footnote 20] According to GPOI strategy and agency 
officials, the instruction is based on standard tasks identified in 
U.S. military training doctrine and UN training materials and is 
modified by the partner country's or region's needs, the skill levels 
of the soldiers in the unit, and the specific requirements of the 
peacekeeping mission. However, State does not have program-wide 
standards in place to measure the proficiency of trainees, the quality 
of instruction they receive, the performance of deployed trainees, or 
the activities of the trained military peacekeeping instructors. 
Further, State supports the Italian government, specifically the 
Italian Carabinieri, in providing training to stability police 
instructors for unit-level police operations on peacekeeping missions. 
However, State has no measures in place to identify the training 
provided by or the deployments of trained stability police instructors. 

Military Peacekeeper Training Consists of U.S. Military and UN Training 
Materials: 

State and DOD have provided training to military peacekeeping units in 
43 of the 52 countries, according to State documents.[Footnote 21] 
According to State data, 56 percent of about 40,000 trained military 
peacekeepers from 13 countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, 
the majority--97 percent--from African countries. Training is focused 
on providing peacekeeping skills to military units to assist 
preparation for deployment to a specific peacekeeping mission and is 
intended to supplement training already provided by the partner 
country.[Footnote 22] According to GPOI strategy and agency officials, 
GPOI implementers use relevant U.S. military doctrine to develop 
training instruction for military tasks. As displayed in table 2, 
training for these military units includes categories such as tactical 
skills for peacekeeping, medical care issues, and interaction with 
civilian groups and organizations, which contain a variety of 
peacekeeping tasks. For example, DOD and State provide instruction on 
tactical peacekeeping tasks such as how to escort a convoy, conduct 
checkpoint operations, or guard fixed sites. In addition, training of 
military peacekeepers in Africa may include instruction on firearms 
safety and marksmanship when training in such skills is identified as a 
need of that unit or country's military peacekeepers.[Footnote 23] 
Military peacekeeper training also includes standardized training 
identified by the United Nations, such as basic information about the 
United Nations, UN structure and capabilities, issues regulating the 
behavior of the individual peacekeeper, standard operations procedures, 
logistics, medical support, and human rights. 

Table 2: Peacekeeping Tasks Included in GPOI Military Skill Training: 

Category: Tactical peacekeeping; 
Types of Tasks: 
* Escorting convoys; 
* Patrolling; 
* Checkpoint operations; 
* Guarding fixed sites; 
* Operating a disarmament operation; 
* Reacting to insurgents and improvised explosive devices; 
* Marking unexploded ordinance. 

Category: Civil-military relations; 
Types of Tasks: 
* Securing noncombatants; 
* Evacuating noncombatants; 
* Reacting to civil disturbances. 

Category: Medical care; 
Types of Tasks: 
* Treating casualties; 
* Evacuating casualties. 

Category: Press and information operations; 
Types of Tasks: 
* Interacting with the media. 

Category: UN organization and standards; 
Types of Tasks: 
* Understanding gender and sexual exploitation issues. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State training documents. 

Note: This table is not intended to serve as an exhaustive list of 
available peacekeeping tasks. 

[End of table] 

Military officers also are provided training in planning and managing 
battalion functions during peacekeeping operations. For example, 
officers are introduced to skills needed to plan and execute the 
protection of a fixed site, such as a food distribution site or 
protecting a convoy. In Africa, State provides more detailed training 
in military staff skills than in Asia, in response to the level of 
capabilities and needs of the peacekeeping units. For example, training 
of peacekeeping military officers in Africa includes instruction on the 
basic roles and responsibilities of officers staffed to a battalion. 

While there are some consistencies across the regions in the curriculum 
available, military peacekeepers do not receive the same training in 
all regions. Regional implementers have developed a training curriculum 
that is generally based on tasks identified in U.S. military doctrine 
and UN training materials, which are modified to address the specific 
needs or desires of the region or country. Identified training 
instruction is further modified or adapted for each training session to 
meet the identified needs of the partner country, skill levels of the 
individuals in the unit to be trained, and the requirements of the 
specific peacekeeping mission, according to training officials and 
State and DOD program implementers. 

COESPU Training Tailored to General Topics of Instruction for Stability 
Police Units: 

COESPU has trained stability police instructors from 13 countries, 
providing training at two levels--senior-and junior-level officers or 
their civilian equivalents. Training for junior-level instructors is 
focused on the leaders of a stability police unit, while senior-level 
training is focused on the overall leadership of stability police 
operations. Courses in both levels include instruction on peace support 
operations, tactics, stability police operations, humanitarian law, 
international law, territorial awareness, and first aid. The Italian 
government developed the COESPU curriculum to provide general 
instruction for unit-level police operations on peacekeeping missions 
rather than tailoring the curriculum to specific missions. The 5-week 
senior-level course instructs course participants on the management of 
stability police operations as well as tactical instruction on shooting 
and driving. The 7-week junior-level course includes tactical courses 
on crowd control, urban area patrolling, high-risk arrests, VIP 
security, fire fighting, shooting, driving, and personal defense. The 
junior-level course also contains a simulation where course 
participants practice their skills in the training area. 

State Cannot Assess the Proficiency of Trainees to Determine if 
Capabilities Are Comparable to Other GPOI-Trained Peacekeepers: 

State does not have an established process for measuring the 
proficiency of trainees who receive similar types of training. GPOI 
trainers conduct training exercises and use after-action reviews and 
their professional judgment to determine students' ability to perform 
tasks as a unit during a training course. However, State and DOD do not 
evaluate the military peacekeeper trainees against a program-wide 
standard level of proficiency in the skills taught during their 
training. For example, the evaluation process to assess a unit's 
proficiency in operating a checkpoint depends on the instructor's 
judgment, and the information is not collected in a way that can be 
compared against other trained units. Rather, a participant is 
considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if he or she attends 80 percent 
of the training GPOI provides. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State noted that an individual 
participant is considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if his or her unit 
masters 80 percent of the training GPOI provides. However, according to 
the GPOI strategy and reporting provided by the GPOI evaluation team, 
implementers and trainers collect information that identifies 
individuals that participated in at least 80 percent of the training 
curriculum. Furthermore, the GPOI strategy states that the number of 
individuals who participate in unit training may be counted toward the 
goal of 75,000 if individuals are present for 80 percent or more of the 
unit training. In addition, implementers we met with told us that 
participants are counted as trained if they participate in at least 80 
percent of the training curriculum. State provided one example in which 
50 students from one country participating in two training courses were 
not counted as GPOI-trained because it was determined that the 
personnel were not sufficiently trained due to poor English language 
ability. 

Training and program officials in the countries we visited stated that, 
although they are not required to test students, they use their 
professional judgment as former or current U.S. military personnel to 
monitor students' performance and determine if more time should be 
spent in developing certain skills, when possible. According to 
training documents, after receiving instruction in tactical 
peacekeeping tasks, trainees perform the task as a unit, and the 
instructors are to observe their performance and determine how the unit 
is performing against a standard checklist of items. For example, 
during an exercise for securing a distribution site, instructors will 
observe the training to judge if the unit follows proper procedures to 
control a crowd, set up checkpoints and observation points for the 
distribution area, and report incident information. Trainers in 
Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that the intent of the training is 
to expose students to the tasks they need for peacekeeping, although 
they are not expected to achieve a specific level of proficiency in the 
skills taught. Military troops from Ghana and Senegal account for 44 
percent of the deployed GPOI-trained troops. In addition, State 
officials told us that although instructors follow training standards, 
the evaluation process of training is subjective and a unit's 
performance is affected by the skills and capabilities the soldiers 
bring to the training. 

The 2006 GPOI strategy states that GPOI program management personnel 
were in the process of developing military task lists and related 
trainings standards to contribute to standardization, interoperability, 
and sustainability, and ensure the proper use of resources. The 
strategy also states that developing such standards would help efforts 
to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the GPOI training program, 
events, and activities. However, during the course of our review State 
officials were unable to provide program-wide standards against which 
they could collect assessments to identify and evaluate the overall 
proficiency in comparable peacekeeping skills provided by GPOI to 
trainees worldwide. In commenting on a draft of this report, State 
stated that the program currently does not have standard military task 
lists and associated training standards to specify tasks, conditions, 
and standards for different types of military units participating in 
peacekeeping operations but that steps are being taken to develop 
training standards and military task lists that would be used as a 
basis to develop training plans and assess trainees. Such an evaluation 
would provide a measure with which to evaluate data that may be 
collected to identify the quality of the military peacekeepers GPOI has 
trained. 

Another measure of trainees' performance is how a unit performs during 
a peacekeeping mission. However, State and DOD are unable to collect 
assessments of peacekeepers' performance during a mission. GPOI 
trainers in Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia said they occasionally receive 
UN after-action reports that provide feedback on the performance of 
military peacekeepers trained by GPOI. However, State and DOD do not 
routinely collect or analyze these reports or independently assess how 
GPOI-trained troops performed. Without consistent reporting on the 
performance of the deployed units, State is unable to compare the 
performance of units trained within a country or region or between 
regions to identify similarities in the proficiency of military 
peacekeepers trained by GPOI. 

State Has Procedures for Monitoring Contractors Providing Training in 
Africa but Officials Are Unclear about Their Responsibility for 
Recording and Maintaining Performance Evaluations: 

State has some procedures in place to monitor whether contractors are 
meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements in training 
peacekeepers and providing advisor support. Specifically, State has 
assigned personnel in its Bureau of African Affairs to monitor the 
performance of contractors providing advisor support in Africa, 
established a program management team to oversee the activities of 
contractors providing training in Africa,[Footnote 24] and developed a 
plan to regularly monitor contractor performance. In addition, State 
receives regular status reports from the contractors. 

Quality assurance, especially regular surveillance and documentation of 
results, is essential to determine whether goods or services provided 
by the contractor satisfy the contract requirements. Surveillance 
includes oversight of a contractor's work to provide assurance that the 
contractor is providing timely and quality goods or services and to 
help mitigate any contractor performance problems. An agency's 
monitoring of a contractor's performance may serve as a basis for past 
performance evaluations that are considered during future source 
selections. State has a plan for monitoring and evaluating the 
performance of its contractors providing training in Africa. The 
quality assurance plan specifies the desired outcomes of the training 
provided, performance standards that the contractors are to meet, and 
State's process for evaluating contractors' performance. 

Although State's quality assurance plan identifies the process for 
evaluating contractors' performance, State officials implementing the 
program are unclear which office at State is responsible for recording 
the evaluation in the contractor performance system, as required by 
State regulations.[Footnote 25] State's contracting officials were 
uncertain whether evaluations of past contractor performance for 
training in Africa had been entered in the system by the program 
management team. An official from the ACOTA program management team 
told us they are not responsible for entering performance evaluations 
in the contractor performance system, in part because they are unable 
to access the system. However, evaluations of contractor past 
performance are prepared and maintained by this team, according to this 
official. State provided some evidence that indicated that evaluations 
of contractors' past performance had been prepared by the ACOTA program 
management team and considered when new task orders were placed on the 
existing contract for training in Africa. However, we did not fully 
assess the extent to which the evaluations of contractors' performance 
had been completed and considered in awarding training task orders. We 
did not examine State's compliance with its performance plan and the 
extent to which past performance evaluations were used to award 
training task orders. 

State Cannot Identify the Outcomes of the Training Program: 

State cannot fully account for the training activities of more than 
2,700 military peacekeeping instructors trained by the GPOI program. 
Further, State has supported the training of more than 1,300 stability 
police instructors at COESPU but cannot account for either the training 
or the deployment activities of these instructors. 

State Is Unable to Identify whether Military Peacekeeping Instructors 
Are Conducting Training as Intended: 

The activities of trained instructors provide a measure for the 
progress made in building a partner country's capacity to sustain its 
peacekeeper deployments in the future. Although State and DOD have 
trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeper instructors to continue 
training in their respective countries, State cannot fully determine 
whether this training has taken place. For example, as of April 2008, 
State had only been able to identify training that had occurred by GPOI-
trained instructors for two countries.[Footnote 26] The deployment of 
peacekeepers trained by these instructors is another measure of the 
program's ability to increase peacekeeping contributions. In March 
2008, 47 GPOI partner countries had military peacekeepers and observers 
deployed to UN peacekeeping missions. State cannot fully identify how 
many troops from these 47 countries, if any, were trained by the 2,700 
GPOI-trained military peacekeeping instructors. 

State Is Unable to Identify the Extent to Which Stability Police 
Instructors Are Conducting Training and Deploying to Peacekeeping 
Missions: 

COESPU has estimated that instructors trained at its training program 
will train an additional 4,500 stability police, according to COESPU 
documents and officials. The training activities of COESPU graduates 
are one measure of the efforts by Italy and the United States to 
increase worldwide capacity for stability police. Although State has 
supported the training of more than 1,300 stability police instructors 
at COESPU, State and COESPU have been unable to fully account for 
training conducted by these instructors in their home countries. 
Specifically, State has only been able to account for the indigenous 
training of one stability police unit conducted by COESPU graduates 
from one country, according to a State document. 

State and COESPU also are unable to identify if stability police units 
deploying to peacekeeping missions were trained by graduates from 
COESPU or if these graduates have deployed to missions themselves. 
First, State has been able to account only for the deployment of a 
stability police unit from the one country in which the unit was 
trained by graduates of COESPU, as of April 2008. Second, although 
COESPU has trained some instructors that are likely to lead stability 
police units in peacekeeping operations, State and COESPU cannot fully 
account for the deployments of these instructors. Specifically, State 
can account for the deployments of 13 of 236 students from India who 
were trained at COESPU, as of April 2008. 

GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria, but in Some 
Cases State Did Not Screen Trainees for Potential Violations of Human 
Rights: 

According to the GPOI strategy and State officials, before countries 
and their peacekeepers can receive GPOI training and other assistance, 
they must generally meet certain criteria including having an elected 
government, an acceptable human rights record, and the willingness to 
participate in peace support operations. GPOI partner countries 
generally met the criteria for inclusion in the program. However, for 
24 of the 52 countries, State's human rights reports for 2007 
identified human rights violations by security personnel. To comply 
with U.S. laws, State must verify that it does not have credible 
evidence that the foreign security forces identified to receive 
assistance have committed gross violations of human rights prior to the 
provision of training.[Footnote 27] We found that military peacekeepers 
and stability police were not always screened or were not properly 
screened for human rights abuses, as required by State guidance for the 
legislative requirements. 

GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria: 

State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries to 
participate in GPOI based on a list of criteria identified in the 
program's strategy.[Footnote 28] Partner countries should have an 
elected government and acceptable human rights record, willingness to 
participate in peace support operations, and agreements to ensure that 
U.S. training and equipment are used for the purposes intended, 
according to agency documents. 

State and DOD periodically review whether partner countries continue to 
meet these criteria and may suspend GPOI funding in cases where 
criteria are not met, according to agency officials. For example, 
funding of GPOI activities for Thailand was suspended after a military 
coup overthrew the democratically elected government in 2006.[Footnote 
29] However, some DOD officials expressed concern about the selection 
of certain countries and the criteria used to select countries. For 
example, officials in the African and Pacific commands and the Joint 
Staff said they did not agree with the selection of two countries in 
Africa and Asia and they felt it would limit available resources for 
ongoing activities in other countries. In another example, a DOD 
official said that additional criteria, such as the military HIV 
infection rates or attrition rates, should be taken into account in 
selecting partner countries because these factors affect the country's 
ability to deploy. For the training of stability police at COESPU, 
Italy and the United States jointly decided which countries would 
participate. 

We found that most of the 52 partner countries met the participation 
criteria, but 24 countries had identified human rights violations by 
security personnel in State's human rights reporting for 2007.[Footnote 
30] State officials cited a number of reasons to justify the inclusion 
of these countries in GPOI: State did not consider the human rights 
violations for some countries to be a systemic problem in the military 
or stated that these violations were associated with private security 
companies, not with the countries' military personnel;[Footnote 31] 
some countries were selected to support other strategic goals; and 
participation would allow some countries to receive human rights 
training not otherwise available. In addition, State officials said 
that the selection criteria are recommended but not required by the 
program and the United States engaged in diplomatic discussions with 
these countries to improve their human rights records. These officials 
indicated that the vetting of trainees for human rights abuses guards 
against the training of any human rights violators. Finally, State also 
formally submits a list of GPOI partner countries each year to Congress 
to ensure that Congress has oversight over the list of partner 
countries. 

State Did Not Properly Screen and Did Not Always Follow Its Guidance 
for Human Rights Vetting: 

Before providing any training or equipment support under GPOI, State 
must verify that it does not have credible evidence that the foreign 
security forces identified to receive assistance have committed gross 
violations of human rights. In our review of vetting documentation of 
2007 GPOI trainees from 14 countries[Footnote 32] identified in State 
reporting to have documented human rights violations by security 
personnel, we found cases where individuals and units that received 
training were not properly vetted. 

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts from 1998 to 
2006 included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, 
that restricted the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts 
to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible 
evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. 
In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Foreign 
Assistance Act was permanently amended to restrict the provision of 
assistance to foreign security units when credible evidence exists of 
gross violations of human rights by that unit. While the legal 
provisions restrict funding to "any unit of the security forces of a 
foreign country," State guidance is to screen or vet individuals who 
are identified for individual training or who are members of newly 
formed or composite units.[Footnote 33] Should an entire existing unit 
receive the training together, State guidance requires vetting of the 
unit name and commander only. To implement these legislative 
restrictions, State's guidance calls for U.S. embassies and State 
bureaus to screen individuals or units proposed for training to 
determine whether these foreign security forces have committed gross 
human rights violations. 

We found that State did not vet some individuals and units for human 
rights violations before training. Specifically, all 81 military 
peacekeepers who received training in 2007 from Honduras were not 
vetted before participating in GPOI-funded training courses. In 
addition, 16 military peacekeepers and stability police from 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted 
out of 382 trained in those countries in 2007, and a 665-person 
Nigerian battalion trained by GPOI was not vetted. In response to our 
findings, State officials have begun the vetting process for the 
individuals from Honduras who received GPOI training. We also found 
that some individuals who received training in 2007 were not screened 
in accordance with State's guidance for vetting newly formed or 
composite units. Specifically, the commanders of seven composite units 
in Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda and the commander of the ECOWAS standby 
force were screened for human rights violations, but the individual 
members of these units were not vetted, as required by State guidance. 
As a result of these lapses in vetting, it is possible that State and 
DOD have provided training to security personnel who committed human 
rights violations. 

State and DOD officials in the countries we visited said they face 
challenges in conducting vetting prior to training due to the 
difficulties both in getting the names of individuals in units prior to 
training and in having sufficient time to properly conduct vetting in 
the country and in Washington, D.C. State officials in the ACOTA office 
told us they have taken corrective action to prevent further vetting 
oversights by creating a new position in their office that would be 
responsible, in part, for monitoring the vetting data for all training 
provided in Africa. 

Conclusions: 

The growth of peace support operations has increased the importance and 
need for more comprehensive measures to ensure worldwide capability and 
capacity for responding to peacekeeping demands. The United States has 
taken the lead in the G8 goal to build this peacekeeping capability 
worldwide through GPOI. Since 2005, State and DOD, focusing the 
majority of GPOI resources on efforts in Africa, have undertaken 
numerous activities to increase countries' ability to serve in 
peacekeeping missions, including the training of nearly 40,000 military 
peacekeepers. However, it appears that GPOI will fall short of reaching 
certain established goals, such as training 75,000 military 
peacekeepers by 2010. State also has faced some challenges in 
supporting COESPU's need for additional staff, accounting for the 
delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner 
countries, evaluating the quality and effectiveness of its training 
program, and screening trainees for human rights abuses. Addressing 
these challenges will enhance GPOI's effectiveness as the program nears 
the end of its 5-year authorization and will help ensure that U.S. 
resources are focused on building partner countries' capabilities to 
provide quality peacekeepers worldwide. To meet the G8 commitment to 
expand global capabilities for peace support operations, GPOI 
activities that extend beyond 2010 will require more emphasis on 
developing the capabilities of African partners to maintain 
peacekeeping operations on their own. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance GPOI's effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and 
ensure proper screening for human rights violations, we recommend that 
the Secretary of State take the following six actions: 

1. Work in consultation with DOD to assist Italy in staffing the key 
unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate progress made and 
monitor results. 

2. Monitor implementation of new procedures to account for delivery and 
transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries on an 
ongoing basis. 

3. Provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United 
States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities 
of COESPU graduates in their home countries. 

4. Develop and implement, in consultation with DOD and in accordance 
with the GPOI strategy, the use of standard military task lists and 
related training standards to enable program managers to evaluate the 
quality of training and measure the proficiency of trainees program- 
wide. 

5. Ensure that the evaluations of contractor performance of training in 
Africa are properly recorded into the contractor performance system as 
required by agency regulations. 

6. Develop a system for monitoring the vetting activities for all GPOI 
training and ensure that all individuals in composite units are vetted 
for human rights violations, as required by State policy. 

To ensure that GPOI activities enhance the capabilities of countries to 
maintain peacekeeping operations on their own, we also recommend that 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, take the following 
two actions: 

1. Assess estimated resources and time frames needed to complete 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010. 

2. Ensure that any plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 
identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping 
skills and infrastructure in Africa. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State and 
Defense. We received written comments from State and DOD, which we have 
reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. State and DOD 
provided technical comments which we have incorporated in the report, 
as appropriate. 

State concurred or partially concurred with seven of the eight GAO 
recommendations and provided additional information to highlight the 
program's achievements. State did not concur with GAO's recommendation 
to develop a method for evaluating GPOI training. State notes that 
methods already exist to evaluate the quality of the training program 
and measure the proficiency of trainees. We disagree that State's 
current evaluation methods address our recommendation. State has not 
developed military task lists and associated training that can be 
applied at all GPOI training sites; sites currently use varying 
standards to assess the proficiency of trainees. DOD agrees with the 
need for greater standardization and more analysis of trainee 
performance. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for 
GPOI-wide standard military tasks and related training that State, in 
consultation with DOD, should develop in accordance with the 
commitments made in the GPOI strategy. State also commented that it now 
projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on 
new training rates. We were unable to validate State's new data since 
as recently as May 2008, program officials indicated that slow 
expenditure rates would delay State's efforts to reach the 2010 
training goal. 

DOD agreed with the findings and concurred or partially concurred with 
our recommendations. DOD agreed with the need for greater 
standardization and more analysis of trainee performance and agreed 
that State should work with DOD and Italy to validate personnel 
shortfalls at COESPU and fill the identified positions. DOD also stated 
that an assessment of resources and time frames required to achieve 
GPOI objectives should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI 
program. We did not revise this recommendation because it is intended 
to address our finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and 
infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and 
Defense. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IX. 

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

In response to a congressional mandate in the fiscal year 2008 Defense 
Authorization Act to review the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI), we assessed (1) the progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) 
whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness 
of the training program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet 
program criteria and whether program participants are adequately 
screened for human rights abuses. We attended a planning conference in 
October 2007 in Washington, D.C., for GPOI implementers and an October 
2007 conference with Group of Eight (G8) members and other partners to 
discuss worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping. 

Our scope of work included the Departments of State (State) and Defense 
(DOD) in Washington, D.C.; U.S. Combatant Commands for Africa, Europe, 
Pacific, and Southern Hemisphere; and site visits to Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We observed 
training and visited facilities refurbished with GPOI funds during site 
visits to Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, and Senegal. In selecting 
field work countries, we considered the following criteria: funding 
allocations, number of military peacekeepers trained, number of trained 
peacekeepers that have deployed to missions, training schedules, and 
unique characteristics, such as the location of Italy's training school 
for stability police and the equipment depot in Sierra Leone. We 
selected these countries in Africa, Asia, and Central America because 
they had received more funding allocations and had trained and deployed 
more troops than other GPOI partner countries in those regions and also 
were scheduled to conduct training during our visits. We selected Italy 
to assess U.S. support to stability police training at the Center of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), Germany to interview 
officials from the U.S. European and African commands, Sierra Leone to 
assess the GPOI equipment depot, and Ethiopia to assess GPOI activities 
with the African Union. 

To assess the progress GPOI made in meeting its goals, we reviewed data 
gathered by State on the number of troops trained and the equipment 
provided, reports from agencies and COESPU of activities at COESPU, and 
monthly and annual progress reports. We compared the information in 
these sources with benchmarks established in the GPOI strategy for the 
goals and objectives of the program. In addition, we collected and 
reviewed information on obligations and expenditures of GPOI funds and 
surveyed the combatant commands responsible for implementing GPOI to 
estimate any additional funds they used to support GPOI activities. To 
assess the reliability of State's data on troops trained and equipment 
provided, as well as obligations and expenditures, we reviewed relevant 
documentation and spoke with agency officials, including the GPOI 
program assessment team, about data quality control procedures. We 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report. 

To determine whether State is consistently assessing the quality and 
effectiveness of the GPOI training program, we identified the training 
provided and determined what training assessments were conducted. We 
reviewed training programs of instruction, training contracts and task 
orders, and related training documents. We also interviewed State and 
DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the 
countries listed, as well as trainers in Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Mongolia, and Senegal. To identify the training provided at COESPU, we 
reviewed training documents and conducted interviews with Italian 
officials at COESPU. To identify the measures that State has in place 
to oversee contractor activities for training and advisor support in 
Africa, we reviewed contracts and related documents and interviewed 
State officials, including officials from the Office of Acquisitions 
Management and the Bureau of African Affairs. 

To identify the activities of trained instructors and stability police, 
we reviewed data gathered by State on the deployments of trained 
military peacekeepers, including instructors and stability police 
instructors, and data gathered by State and COESPU on the training 
activities of these instructors. We also interviewed Italian officials 
at COESPU, State officials, and training officials and contractors. We 
reviewed relevant documentation and spoke with agency officials, 
including the GPOI program assessment team, about data quality control 
procedures. We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of 
trained peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names 
of those who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under 
GPOI. However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the 
units trained under GPOI has deployed, and that any individual who 
joins the peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may 
receive additional training from their unit officers, we determined 
that the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained 
peacekeeping. For the data on the activities of instructors trained 
under GPOI, we found that State and COESPU did not have complete or 
reliable data for the purposes of identifying comprehensive information 
about the training activities of these individuals in their home 
country. We also found that COESPU and State did not have sufficient 
information to identify the deployment or training activities of 
stability police instructors trained at COESPU. 

To determine the extent to which countries meet program criteria and 
whether participants are adequately screened for human rights abuses, 
we examined the GPOI strategy and interviewed State and DOD officials 
in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the countries listed 
previously. To determine how human rights violations were taken into 
account, we compared State's 2007 human rights reports, which 
identified countries with documented human rights violations by 
security personnel, with the list of GPOI partner countries. We also 
reviewed State's human rights reports to identify whether partner 
countries had an elected government. To determine whether GPOI 
countries showed a willingness to deploy, we examined which countries 
had deployed troops on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. To 
ensure that end-use and re-transfer provisions for equipment and 
training were agreed to, we reviewed whether Section 505 agreements 
were signed with each of the countries.[Footnote 34] We interviewed 
State officials and collected additional information for countries that 
did not clearly meet some of these criteria. In addition, we reviewed 
State documents identifying human rights vetting procedures. We 
selected 14 countries with documented human rights violations by 
security forces that received training in 2007 and assessed whether 
individuals and units trained in these countries were vetted for human 
rights violations. To do this, we compared vetting records from State 
for the training provided to individuals and units from these countries 
with the training rosters provided by State. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to June 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GPOI Partner Countries: 

There are 52 countries that received GPOI training, equipment, or other 
support to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities and contributions. 
Table 3 provides a list of partner countries that received support for 
their military peacekeeping, stability police, or both, from 2004 to 
2008, as of April 2008. 

Table 3: GPOI Partner Countries 2004 to 2008, as of April 2008: 

Country/Organization: Africa: Angola; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Benin; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Botswana; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner:[Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Burkina Faso; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Burundi; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Cameroon; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Ethiopia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Gabon; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Ghana; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Kenya; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Malawi; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Mali; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Mozambique; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Namibia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Niger; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Nigeria; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Rwanda; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Senegal; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: South Africa; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Tanzania; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Uganda; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Africa: Zambia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Europe: Albania; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Europe: Macedonia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Europe: Romania; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Europe: Serbia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Check]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Europe: Ukraine; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Jordan; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Morocco[A]; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Check]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Kazakhstan; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Near East and Central Asia: Tajikistan; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Bangladesh; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Cambodia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Fiji[A]; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: India; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Check]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Indonesia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Malaysia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Mongolia; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Nepal; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Pakistan; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Empty]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Check]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Philippines; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Sri Lanka; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Asia: Thailand; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Belize; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Chile; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: El Salvador; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Guatemala; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Honduras; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Nicaragua; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Paraguay; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: South and Central America: Peru; 
Military peacekeeping partner: [Check]; 
Stability police partner: [Empty]; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: [Empty]. 

Country/Organization: Total: 52 countries; 
Military peacekeeping partner: 38 countries; 
Stability police partner: 3 countries; 
Military peacekeeping and stability police partner: 11 countries. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[A] Morocco and Fiji are not currently GPOI partner countries. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: International Contributions to 2004 G8 Summit Goal and 
GPOI: 

The members of the G8 and other nations have supported the commitments 
of the 2004 G8 Summit and GPOI.[Footnote 35] The information below 
provides additional information on the nature of contributions made by 
the international community but does not provide a comprehensive list 
of all contributions made by the G8 and other nations. 

G8 nations have contributed to peace support operations in a number of 
ways, including the training and equipping of military peacekeepers, 
individual police, and stability police; supporting the development of 
peacekeeping doctrine; providing funding to support national and 
regional peacekeeping training centers; providing funding and 
logistical support to regional organizations; and establishing a 
stability police training school. For example, three G8 nations have 
provided instructors to the COESPU, according to State and COESPU 
officials. In another example, countries have provided equipment to 
support the troops deployed to peacekeeping missions. Contributions of 
G8 nations are largely for activities in Africa or in support of 
peacekeeping missions in this region, according to State documents. 
According to State, in 2007, the G8 and other nations identified 760 
peacekeeping-related programs, events, and activities that member 
states were conducting in Africa alone. 

The G8 and other nations also have directly contributed to the U.S. 
GPOI program. According to State, 19 countries have contributed to the 
U.S. program, primarily by providing training instructors to support 
GPOI-funded training.[Footnote 36] For example, 4 countries provided 
instructors to the Central American peacekeeper training school in 
Guatemala and 14 countries provided instructors to the multilateral 
peacekeeper training exercises held in Mongolia in 2006 and 2007. State 
paid travel costs for all the training instructors for the Central 
American training. For the Mongolia exercises, seven countries paid 
their own way, and State and DOD paid for the remaining countries. 

Two countries also have provided funding and personnel support directly 
to State for GPOI. Specifically, the Netherlands has committed to 
provide State with $7 million per year for 3 years, to be used for 
peacekeeping training and equipment activities in Africa. According to 
State officials, about $5.3 million was received at the end of 2007, 
and they expect to receive the remaining $1.7 million for 2007 in the 
near term. State officials in the Bureau of African Affairs told us 
that two additional countries have indicated plans to provide a total 
of about $37 million directly to State to support peacekeeping missions 
in Darfur and Somalia. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Training and Peacekeeping Deployments of GPOI Partners: 

State and DOD have trained nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers from a 
total of 43 countries and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). As of April 2008, about 56 percent of GPOI-trained military 
peacekeepers have deployed to peacekeeping missions, and the majority 
have deployed from African partner countries.[Footnote 37] As table 4 
shows, of the 39,518 military peacekeepers trained by GPOI, almost 
22,000 have deployed to peacekeeping missions.[Footnote 38] According 
to State, these peacekeepers have deployed to 12 United Nations or 
African Union missions, as well as other missions not supported by the 
UN or the African Union. African partner countries have deployed the 
majority of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers--97 percent or 21,435-- 
and the remaining 3 percent have deployed from partner countries in 
Asia. An additional 6,277 military peacekeepers from African partner 
countries were trained in anticipation of deployments to UN missions in 
the near future, according to State reporting. 

Table 4: Military Peacekeepers Trained by GPOI and Deployed, by Country 
and Region (as of April 2008): 

GPOI partner: Africa: Benin; 
Peacekeepers trained: 2,519; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 2,053. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Botswana; 
Peacekeepers trained: 165; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Burkina Faso; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,890; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Cameroon; 
Peacekeepers trained: 12; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)[A]; 
Peacekeepers trained: 288; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Gabon; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,393; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 202. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Ghana; 
Peacekeepers trained: 3,853; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 2,920. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Kenya; 
Peacekeepers trained: 86; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 39. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Malawi; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,073; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Mali; 
Peacekeepers trained: 997; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Mozambique; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,029; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Namibia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 882; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Niger; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,157; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 666. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Nigeria; 
Peacekeepers trained: 4,988; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 3,758. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Rwanda; 
Peacekeepers trained: 4,903; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 4,811. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Senegal; 
Peacekeepers trained: 7,888; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 6,833. 

GPOI partner: Africa: South Africa; 
Peacekeepers trained: 243; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 98. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Tanzania; 
Peacekeepers trained: 971; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 55. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Uganda; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,955; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Africa: Zambia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 676; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Subtotal Africa;
Peacekeepers trained: 36,968; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 21,435. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Bangladesh; 
Peacekeepers trained: 128; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Brunei[B]; 
Peacekeepers trained: 6; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Cambodia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 173; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Fiji; 
Peacekeepers trained: 47; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: India[B]; 
Peacekeepers trained: 47; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 45. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Indonesia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 208; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Laos[B]; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Malaysia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 116; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Mongolia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 629; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 497. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Nepal; 
Peacekeepers trained: 11; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Philippines; 
Peacekeepers trained: 8; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Singapore[B]; 
Peacekeepers trained: 10; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Sri Lanka; 
Peacekeepers trained: 58; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Thailand; 
Peacekeepers trained: 278; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Asia: Tonga[B]; 
Peacekeepers trained: 85; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 19. 

GPOI partner: Subtotal Asia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1,805; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 561. 

GPOI partner: South and Central America: 
Belize; Peacekeepers trained: 2; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: South and Central America: El Salvador; 
Peacekeepers trained: 24; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: South and Central America: Guatemala; 
Peacekeepers trained: 306; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: South and Central America: Honduras; 
Peacekeepers trained: 87; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: South and Central America: Nicaragua; 
Peacekeepers trained: 36; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Subtotal South and Central America; 
Peacekeepers trained: 455; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Europe: Albania; 
Peacekeepers trained: 254; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Europe: Ukraine; 
Peacekeepers trained: 34; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Subtotal for Europe; 
Peacekeepers trained: 289; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Near East and Central Asia: Jordan; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Subtotal Near East and Central Asia; 
Peacekeepers trained: 1; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 0. 

GPOI partner: Total; 
Peacekeepers trained: 39,518; 
Peacekeepers deployed: 21,996[C]. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[A] Training for ECOWAS was for the commander and staff of the Standby 
Force Headquarters. Multiple countries participated in these exercises. 

[B] Brunei, India, Laos, Singapore, and Tonga did not receive GPOI 
funds, but sent peacekeepers to be trained during GPOI-funded events. 

[C] GPOI also has provided deployment equipment and transportation to 
support the deployment of 4,680 military peacekeepers from Indonesia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, and an unspecified number of military 
peacekeepers from Chile and Guatemala. In addition, 229 military 
peacekeepers from Mongolia deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and 343 
military peacekeepers deployed to Afghanistan from the South-Eastern 
Europe Brigade of the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Equipment Provided to GPOI Partner Countries: 

Table 5 provides information on the type of equipment that has been or 
may be provided to partner countries to support training and 
deployments for peacekeeping. Table 6 provides information on the type 
of equipment that has been provided to COESPU to support stability 
police training. State officials indicated that military peacekeepers 
keep some of the individual training equipment for use during 
deployments. 

Table 5: Types of Military Peacekeeping Equipment Provided to GPOI 
Partners: 

Category of equipment: Individual equipment; 
Types of equipment: 
* Uniforms[A]; 
* Boots; 
* Helmets; 
* First aid kits; 
* Sleeping bags; 
* Flashlights; 
* Knee and elbow pads; 
* Goggles; 
* Hammocks; 
* Wet weather ponchos; 
* Load-bearing suspenders; 
* Small arms cases; 
* Shovels; 
* Duffel bags; 
* Field packs. 

Category of equipment: Unit equipment; 
Types of equipment: 
* Computers, software, office supplies; 
* Weapons cleaning kits; 
* Kevlar helmets; 
* Canteens; 
* Compasses; 
* Global positioning systems (GPS); 
* Radios; 
* Tents; 
* Mine detection kits; 
* Riot batons or policeman clubs; 
* Riot shields; 
* Pickup trucks, buses, military HUMVEEs, ambulances; 
* Topography equipment; 
* Tool kits for carpenters, electricians, and plumbers; 
* Folding cots; 
* Insect nets; 
* Portable bath units. 

Category of equipment: Deployment equipment; 
Types of equipment: 
* Level 1 medical clinic (100 beds, large tents, lab, surgery area)[B]; 
* Field kitchens[B]; 
* Night vision goggles; 
* Radios; 
* Refrigeration truck[B]; 
* Water purification units; 
* Generators; 
* Tents; 
* Fork lifts, pick-up trucks; 
* Fuel tankers (10,000 liters)[C]; 
* Fuel trucks (5000 liters)[C]; 
* Water tankers (5000 liters)[C]; 
* Concertina wire[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[A] Uniform includes undershirt, shirt, pants, hats and belts. Gloves 
include light duty gloves and barbed wire handling. 

[B] Equipment provided to the African Union, directly to support the 
African Union Mission to Somalia. 

[C] Equipment provided to African Union Mission in Sudan. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Types of Training Equipment Provided for COESPU Training: 

Category of equipment: Individual equipment; 
Types of equipment: 
* Under garments; 
* Uniforms; 
* Gym suits; 
* Winter jackets and hats; 
* Basic hygiene products; 
* Boots; 
* Study materials (notebooks); 
* SWAT gloves. 

Category of equipment: Training equipment; 
Types of equipment: 
* Library and media materials; 
* Computer equipment; 
* Bedding; 
* Plexiglas riot shields; 
* Riot batons; 
* Body armor; 
* Shin and arm protectors; 
* Mannequins for self-defense training; 
* Helmets with face shields; 
* NBCR[A] suits, decontamination kits, signals; 
* Plastic weapons; 
* Nonlethal teargas canister thrower; 
* Nonlethal tear gas and flash bang canisters; 
* Inert improvised explosive devices (for demonstrations); 
* Firefighting equipment. 

Source: GAO analysis of State data. 

[A] NBCR is Nuclear Biological Chemical Radiological. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GPOI Activities to Support Long-term Skills and 
Infrastructure for Peacekeeping: 

Table 7 provides information on the type and status of activities that 
State and DOD have conducted to build skills and infrastructure to meet 
partner countries' long-term needs to sustain peacekeeping. 

Table 7: Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for 
Peacekeeping, by Region (as of April 2008): 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Advisors to support 
African Union (AU) and ECOWAS; 
Status: Currently providing two advisors to support AU and ECOWAS: one 
assisting ECOWAS Strategic Management Planning Cell, and one assisting 
the AU in planning peacekeeping operations. In 2005 to 2006, two 
additional positions for advisor support to AU and ECOWAS were 
supported. State officials are considering phasing out advisor support 
and providing direct financial assistance to AU and ECOWAS. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Training instructors to 
continue peacekeeping training; 
Status: Trained 2,384 instructors. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Strategic communications 
systems for ECOWAS and AU; 
Status: ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange System partially active, 
but some countries do not have equipment installed. AU Regional 
Information Exchange System has not been installed due to a licensing 
issue. Also provided travel support for a command control and 
communication information systems conference. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Training to ECOWAS to 
support stand up of regional peacekeeping battalion; 
Status: Three training sessions conducted for ECOWAS Standby Taskforce 
Headquarters staff. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Multinational peacekeeping 
exercises; 
Status: In 2006, implemented a multinational peacekeeping exercise for 
ECOWAS countries. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Support to peace 
operations training centers; 
Status: Provide computer and software equipment to peace operations 
training centers in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali. Support also is planned for 
Nigeria in fiscal year 2008. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Support equipment depots; 
Status: Supporting an ECOWAS motor pool depot with equipment 
refurbishment capability located in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Provided 
equipment to support AU deployments to Sudan. 

Type of support provided, by region: Africa: Support of AU facility; 
Status: Provided mechanical and electrical supplies for renovation of 
the AU situation room and computer equipment and furniture to the AU 
strategic planning cell. 

Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Support for a communications 
system among training centers in the region; 
Status: Funds have been expended to purchase equipment for centers in 
Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to support a 
regional communication system for collaboration among peace support 
operations training centers. Plans are in place to add Malaysia. The 
network is not yet operational. 

Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Multinational peacekeeping 
exercises; 
Status: Supported three multinational peacekeeping capstone exercises: 
two in Mongolia and one in Bangladesh. 

Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Peace operations training 
centers; 
Status: Provided funds to refurbish centers in Mongolia and Indonesia. 
Additional support is planned for Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, and Thailand. 

Type of support provided, by region: Asia: Training instructors to 
continue peacekeeping training; 
Status: Trained 266 instructors. 

Type of support provided, by region: Europe: Peace operations training 
centers; 
Status: Supported U.S. uniformed instructor position at center in 
Bosnia and provided funds to refurbish and provide equipment to center 
in Ukraine. 

Type of support provided, by region: Europe: Support for regional 
organizations; 
Status: Provided communications equipment and contractor support to the 
South Eastern European Brigade for deployment to Afghanistan. 

Type of support provided, by region: Europe: Training instructors to 
continue peacekeeping training; 
Status: Trained 26 instructors. 

Type of support provided, by region: South and Central America: Peace 
operations training Centers; 
Status: Provided funds to refurbish center in Guatemala. 

Type of support provided, by region: South and Central America: 
Training instructors to continue peacekeeping training; 
Status: Trained 43 instructors. 

Type of support provided, by region: Near East: Support to peace 
operations training centers; 
Status: Plans to provide funds to peacekeeping training center in 
Jordan to refurbish and supply computer equipment. 

Type of support provided, by region: Central Asia: No activities to 
build skills and infrastructure as of April 2008; 
Status: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State funding data and reporting 
documents. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

June 18, 2008: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, 
"Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All 
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed," GAO Job Code 
320519. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
David Potter, Wing Commander, Bureau of Political and Military Affairs 
at (202) 647-1355. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Brafrod R. Higgins: 

cc: GAO - Monica Brym: 
PM - Stephen Mull: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

U.S. Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed (GAO-08-754, GAO 
Code 320519): 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and 
comment on the Government Accountability Office draft Report entitled, 
"Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 
2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed." The Department believes, 
contrary to the findings of the report, that it is, in fact, on track 
to meet the objectives of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
by 2010; and that with over 35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 
peacekeeping operations around the world, GPOI has already demonstrated 
significant success, forestalled the loss of life, prevented suffering, 
and safeguarded property. [See comment1] 

In outlining the rationale for this perspective, this response will 
address each of GPOI's seven objectives, provide our position on the 
draft Report's recommendations, which for the most part we are already 
fulfilling, and provide additional comments where warranted. We will 
highlight areas where our analysis differs from that of the GAO and 
acknowledge areas in the report that highlight the need for improvement 
in certain aspects of GPOI implementation. 

Achievement of GPOI Objectives: 

Contrary to the title of the GAO report, we assess that the GPOI 
objectives will be achieved under current conditions and within 
projected resource levels. The basis for this assessment is presented 
below. Our analysis first presents the objectives as stated on page 6 
of the draft GAO report, contrasts that wording with the actual 
objectives of the GPOI Strategy, and then describes actual and/or 
projected achievements by objective. [See comment 2] 

Objective 1: 

Draft GAO Report - "train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military 
peacekeepers by 2010;" 

GPOI Strategy - "Train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000 
peacekeepers worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, from FY 2005-2010, 
to increase global capacity to participate in peace operations." 

Analysis - We have modeled the projected training under three sets of 
assumptions. Our most conservative projection is based on the Africa 
Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) Program's minimum 
contracted throughput of 1,000 trainees per month with other programs 
operating at a throughput of 75 percent of the current training rate. 
This set of conditions will result in achievement of the 75,000 
peacekeeper objective in the final quarter of 2010. More realistic 
projections using ACOTA's current throughput and more representative 
training rates for other programs suggest the objective will be 
achieved in the third quarter of 2010. The GAO report provides no data 
to the contrary. [See comment 3] 

Objective 2: 

Draft GAO Report - "support the Italian government's efforts to 
establish an international center to train stability police forces that 
would then participate in peacekeeping operations;" 

GPOI Strategy - "Provide support to the international Center of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the 
capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in 
peace operations." 

Analysis - The GPOI program has contributed $10.5M to COESPU in
Vicenza, Italy, and will soon provide an additional $4.5M. As of May 
31, 2008, this institution has trained 1,399 stability police members 
from 26 countries at the High Level/Senior Officers Course and the 
Middle Managers Course. Each course provides their respective training 
audiences with the skills to lead, command, and manage formed police 
units participating in peace support operations. [See comment 4] 

Objective 3: 

Draft GAO Report - "develop a program to procure and store peace 
operations equipment to facilitate the equipment's quick mobilization 
for peace operations;" 

GPOI Strategy - "Develop a cached equipment program to procure and 
warehouse equipment for use in peace operations anywhere around the 
globe." 

Analysis -With a total $42.8M investment, the GPOI program has 
established a system for storing and distributing equipment that has 
been used successfully by seven GPOI partners in peace operations in 
Darfur, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Afghanistan, and Haiti. Over $9M has 
been expended to refurbish; re-stock with vehicles, communications 
equipment, generators, and water purification units; and manage an 
equipment depot in Sierra Leone. A further $33.8M has been obligated to 
procure other equipment such as personal protective gear, vehicles and 
vehicle parts, tactical radios, medical trauma kits, field rations, and 
other supplies. 

Objective 4: 

Draft GAO Report -"develop a transportation and logistics support 
system to deploy and sustain peacekeeping in the field;" 

GPOI Strategy - "Work with other G8 members to develop a globally-
oriented transportation and logistics support arrangement (TLSA) to 
help provide transportation for deploying peacekeepers and logistics 
support to sustain units in the field." 

Analysis -The United States is leading the G8 activity with regard to 
this initiative, which came out of the G8's Sea Island Action Plan of 
2004. The United States established a virtual donors' coordination 
mechanism to enable deploying nations' requests for Transportation and 
Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA) assistance to be shared among TLSA 
participants, which includes the United States and four other G8 member 
nations. In response to requests for transportation and logistics 
support, the USG has provided $13M to nations deploying to the African 
Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS), the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM), and the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL). [See comment 5] 

Objective 5: 

Draft GAO Report - "enhance the capacity of regional and sub-regional 
organizations for peace operations;" 

GPOI Strategy - "Enhance the capacity of regional and sub-regional 
organizations to train for, plan, prepare for, manage, conduct, obtain, 
and sustain lessons-learned from peace operations by providing 
technical assistance, training, and material support; and, support 
institutions and activities which offer these capabilities to a 
regional audience." 

Analysis - The draft GAO Report notes that GPOI has conducted 
activities to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to 
plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Specifically, they 
cite training activities for ECOWAS and units from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua that will comprise the multinational 
CFAC brigade. Globally, GPOI is supporting or has supported 18 peace 
operations training centers, 7 peace support operations collaboration 
centers, 7 multinational peacekeeping exercises, 3 technical advisors, 
and provided training for the peacekeeping mission planning and 
management staffs of two regional organizations. As a result of these 
and other programs, events, and activities, the peacekeeping-related 
capabilities of the affected regional organizations and institutions 
have been improved. [See comment 6] 

Objective 6: 

Draft GAO Report -"provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-
related activities in Africa and globally." 

GPOI Strategy - "Create a `clearinghouse' function to exchange 
information and coordinate G8 efforts to enhance peace operations 
training and exercises in Africa; and continue to provide support to 
subsequent clearinghouse initiatives, including globally-oriented 
activities, throughout the life of the G8's Action Plan for Expanding 
Global Capability for Peace Support Operations." 

Analysis - Africa Clearinghouse meetings were conducted in 2004, 2006, 
2007, and 2008, with GPOI hosting the 2004 inaugural meeting in 
Washington. Clearinghouse meetings are now firmly established as an 
event within the annual cycle of G8 meetings. The United States 
initiated and hosted a G8++ Global Clearinghouse in 2007 and 
representatives from 32 countries concluded that the event was of value 
and should be continued. The Clearinghouse meetings have raised the 
awareness of all participants regarding the breadth and depth of 
peacekeeping capacity building programs and are helping to reduce 
potential redundancies and make individual country programs more 
complementary. 

Objective 7: 

Draft GAO Report - "conduct activities that support and assist partners 
in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained 
from GPOI." 

GPOI Strategy - "Conduct sustainment/self-sufficiency activities in 
support of the objectives above with a focus on assisting Partners to 
sustain proficiencies gained in training programs." 

Analysis - The GPOI strategy contains a model showing the requirements 
to achieve and maintain operational effectiveness in peace operations. 
The model recognizes that a number of elements are solely within the 
purview of national governments and other organizations. Every activity 
funded through GPOI can be linked directly or indirectly to one of the 
elements within that model, therein demonstrating that GPOI activities 
do support and assist in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining 
proficiencies. 

Department Response to Draft Report Recommendations: 

The GAO Report recommends the Secretary of State take the following six 
actions and then, in consultation with DoD, take two additional actions:
Recommendation 1: "Work in consultation with DoD to assist Italy in 
staffing the key unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate 
progress made and monitor results." 

State Response: Concur. We were, prior to the GAO investigation, 
already working with COESPU and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) to staff a position at the training facility to address 
evaluation and monitoring. 

Recommendation 2: "Monitor implementation of new procedures to account 
for delivery and transfer of non-lethal training equipment to partner 
countries on an ongoing basis." 

State Response: Concur. Three primary supply chains are used for the 
delivery of non-lethal training equipment to partner countries: Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) - implemented through the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA); commercial acquisition - implemented through 
the State Department's Office of Acquisition Management's regional 
procurement support offices (RPSO); and commercial acquisition - 
implemented through ACOTA. Procedural changes, including the use of 
joint inventories, improved electronic record keeping, and the 
requirement for national representatives to sign U.S. Government 
acquisition documentation, are being implemented in each of these 
supply chains to assure more robust accountability. Additional staff 
personnel are also being contracted to ACOTA, U.S. Southern Command, 
and State to apply greater scrutiny in this area. 

It should be noted that State's GPOI Evaluation Team identified the 
equipment accountability shortfall prior to the GAO's investigation of 
the GPOI Program. This same team, through its existing procedures for 
monitoring program achievement, will monitor the effectiveness of the 
reforms being implemented. 

Recommendation 3: "Provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help 
the United States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment 
activities of COESPU graduates in their home countries." 

State Response: Concur. GPOI has been examining mechanisms to improve 
data collection on the activities of COESPU graduates and is developing 
a systematic approach for the gathering of post-training data. 

To that end, and following consultations with the Italian MFA and 
COESPU, State has agreed to use GPOI funds to staff one contractor at 
the training facility to develop an alumni database, outreach materials 
for COESPU graduates, and tracking mechanisms. In addition, State is 
examining ways to strengthen diplomatic outreach to COESPU partner 
countries to request ongoing feedback from partners regarding the 
performance and activities of their COESPU graduates. Guidance for 
identifying responsibilities will be provided to the Posts in our 
COESPU partner countries once the contractor is in place at COESPU and 
the tracking mechanisms have been established. 

Recommendation 4: "Develop, in consultation with DoD, a method for 
evaluating the quality of training and measuring the proficiency of 
trainees in critical skills." 

State Response: These methods already exist. Evaluation of trainee 
proficiency and the quality of training are conducted at all training 
events. These evaluations occur at multiple levels. Lead trainers and 
mentors, both active duty military and/or U.S. military veterans with 
20 to 30 years experience constitute the core of GPOI training and 
evaluation programs. The lead trainers conduct performance-oriented 
training and remedial training; evaluate individual soldier 
proficiencies and unit collective performance. The mentors, in turn, 
serve to coach the trainers and render assessments on the overall 
quality of the training. Supporting these individuals in conducting the 
evaluation, particularly at the GPOI-funded United Nations-certified 
specialist courses, are subject matter experts drawn from the broader 
international community. GPOI managers from State and Defense evaluate 
the overall effectiveness of the broader GPOI program. 

One of GPOI's strengths has been its ability to tailor the program of 
instruction to the desires and capabilities of the recipient nation. 
This allows the GPOI partner to receive training at an appropriate 
level, but does not mean that all nations are assessed to be equally 
competent at the completion of training events. Units from various 
countries participating in a multilateral peacekeeping operation will 
begin the exercise with varying levels of proficiency and, while all 
will benefit from the experience, it is not expected that all will have 
exactly the same level of proficiency at the end. The evaluation data 
maintained by State and the implementing agent will accurately indicate 
the level of proficiency. 

To provide greater standardization, we will be developing Military Task 
Lists (MTLs) and associated training standards to specify tasks, 
conditions, and standards for different types of military units 
participating in peacekeeping operations. The MTLs will form the basis 
from which training plans are developed and trainees assessed. A 
Statement of Work to develop the MTLs and training standards has been 
written, and requires a joint State and Defense steering board to 
oversee the development. 

Another area where we seek to improve is in reviewing post-training 
proficiency. Currently, we collect formal and anecdotal reports from a 
variety of sources. Our process also includes after-action reports on 
UN peacekeeping operations and from the regional entities that field 
peacekeeping operations such as the African Union (AU) or ECOWAS. 
However, we recognize the need to do more and to do it in a systematic 
manner. We are considering greater use of technology, such as the ACOTA 
website and the Peace Support Operations Collaboration Center (PSOCC) 
network, to capture informal field and host nation anecdotes, field 
trips to mission areas, and post-training surveys. While we desire 
rigor in the information collected on the performance of GPOI-trained 
personnel when they deploy on operations or after they return to their 
home country, we recognize that any collection process is dependent, in 
part, on the cooperation of the host country, regional organization, or 
the UN. 

Recommendation 5: "Ensure that the evaluations of contractor 
performance in Africa are properly recorded into the contractor 
performance system as required by agency regulations." 

State Response: Concur. Although evaluation data has been collected, 
the data has yet to be entered into State's contracting databases. With 
the imminent arrival of additional staff for State's Office of 
Acquisition Management (AQM), we expect that evaluation data to be 
loaded shortly. 

Recommendation 6: "Develop a system for monitoring the vetting 
activities for all GPOI training and ensure that all individuals in 
composite units are vetted for human rights violations, as required by 
State policy." 

State Response: Partially Concur. State's policy on vetting composite 
units has been published and distributed. While there were shortcomings 
when the process was first implemented, we believe that they have been 
remedied and that the process is effective in identifying and 
preventing any potential recipients from receiving training where there 
is credible evidence that they have committed gross violations of human 
rights. [See comment 8] 

In examining the section of the draft GAO Report that underpins this
recommendation, we note that State's policy on vetting composite units 
changed in April 2007. At that time, the seven composite units referred 
to on pages 5 and 35 of the draft Report were already in the 
administrative pipeline for training (some of which was conducted in 
April 2007). The failure to vet in accordance with the updated policy 
should be considered as a consequence of the change in policy, a policy 
change which in itself should be taken as an indicator of State's 
commitment to ensure full compliance with this requirement. 

Notwithstanding the above, the State is fully committed to compliance 
with the Leahy Law and will undertake regularly to remind those U.S. 
Government elements responsible for implementing GPOI of their 
obligations and responsibilities. 

Recommendation 7: "In consultation with DoD, assess estimated resources 
and timeframes needed to complete peacekeeping and infrastructure 
activities in Africa by 2010." 

State Response: Partially Concur. The GPOI Strategy objectives are a 
mixture of quantifiable targets and qualitative objectives that seek to 
improve the status quo. The quantifiable targets will be met and the 
status quo will be improved upon in the qualitative areas referred to 
in GPOI's objectives. ACOTA, GPOI's primary activity in Africa, 
regularly updates its Vision, Mission, and Strategy Plan to assess the 
resources and timelines needed to continue peacekeeper training 
programs for as long as they will be required by the AU, Africa's 
regional economic communities, and the continent's troop contributing 
countries. 

Because African militaries are conscript armies, personnel at the 
enlisted levels often serve for limited periods of time, thus requiring 
that new and refresher training be conducted over the long term. In 
keeping with this requirement, ACOTA maintains a highly detailed 
program plan that lists all the requirements and resources pertaining 
to the annual and long-term commitments that it has entered into on a 
bilateral and multilateral basis, or in support of U.S. policy goals 
and objectives. This document identifies the annual requirements needed 
to conduct the ACOTA program in Africa at its optimum levels, and also 
allows for prioritization and management of activities when budgetary 
constraints restrict the full implementation of the program plan. 

Recommendation 8: "In consultation with DoD, ensure that any plans for 
extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient resources for 
developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa." 

State Response: Concur. While the goals of GPOI will be met with the 
resources allocated for FY 2005-2009, the demand for international 
peacekeeping continues to grow. Accordingly, the Administration is 
exploring a proposal which would see GPOI-like activities continue 
across the globe, to include developing additional long-term 
peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa. 

Additional Comments: 

PART Score and Data Reliability: 

GPOI achieved a score of 91.5 percent and a rating of "effective" (the 
highest of five possible ratings) by the Office of Management and 
Budget's 2007 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). We consider this 
external rating a significant endorsement of GPOI's success and that 
which deserves mention in the GAO Report. As the PART considered, inter 
alia, the verifiability and auditability of data collected in support 
of Program outcomes, we consider it an endorsement of the data 
presented in this response. Additionally, the draft GAO Report states 
on page 4 that "We determined that the data provided by State and DoD 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review." 

Budget Projections: 

GPOI's actual and projected achievements have occurred with increased 
efficiencies, allowing us to achieve the goals with an overall funding 
level projected at $480M over the life of the program. (This is a 
projection because the final year's allocation has not been 
established.) This amount will be well below the original announced 
commitment to GPOI of $660M over five years. 

Attribution of Activities against GPOI Objectives: 

The template for activity proposals submitted as part of the budgetary 
allocation development process requires GPOI implementing agencies to 
identify which GPOI objectives the proposed activity would support. 
Many proposals contribute towards two or three objectives, a fact 
further reflected in the matrix of annual allocations approved by the 
GPOI Coordinating Committee. 

In reviewing achievements against the seven GPOI objectives, the draft 
GAO Report rates performance by region. This methodology attributes 
each GPOI activity to a single GPOI objective instead of acknowledging 
the full spectrum of benefits that any single activity may generate. 

One example of the problems that arise when a GPOI activity is linked 
to only one objective is the issue of nations deploying trainers on 
peace support operations. It is inaccurate to suggest that a nation is 
not capitalizing on the GPOI investment by deploying trainers on 
operations. Operational experience provides trainers with the 
opportunity to reinforce the knowledge and skills that enable them to 
act as a force multiplier for their nation in a practical setting that 
no training activity can fully simulate. 

Other Forms of Security Assistance/Foreign Aid in Africa: 

In addition to allocating each GPOI activity to only one GPOI 
objective, the draft GAO Report's assessment also does not take into 
account other forms of U.S. and non-U.S. assistance in Africa. GPOI is 
not the only USG program providing foreign assistance for peacekeeping, 
nor is the United States the only country that provides foreign 
assistance for peacekeeping in Africa. GPOI resource allocations are 
based on regional program plans where implementers take into account 
partner/regional needs, U.S. security objectives, and other 
U.S./international programs. GPOI implementers are cognizant of 
concurrent efforts, and design their programs accordingly. For example, 
the regional peace operations training centers in Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, 
and Kenya receive a greater portion of their operating funds from non-
U.S. sources, requiring GPOI to contribute only a partial amount of the 
total costs of those efforts. The European Union, through the 
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (RECAMP), 
and the U.S. Combatant Commands provide regional exercise opportunities 
that reduce the need to spend GPOI funds on capstone exercises (ACOTA 
has only conducted one regional exercise). 

Human Rights: 

The USG invites countries to participate in GPOI following an 
assessment against six criteria listed in the GPOI Strategy. One 
criterion is the country's human rights record. The assessment is 
conducted in an interagency forum and involves thoughtful consideration 
of all available information. Separately, individuals or units 
nominated to participate in GPOI-funded training activities undergo 
vetting for credible allegations of gross human rights abuses. This 
vetting demands that there be an absence of credible evidence against 
the individual or unit prior to the commencement of training. The draft 
GAO Report seeks to draw parallels between these two processes. 
However, there is a significant difference between systemic human 
rights abuses by the security forces of a nation and allegations of 
abuse by an individual or single unit. The alleged actions of a small 
group should not, in and of themselves, result in the cessation of GPOI 
activities with the non-implicated security forces of that country. It 
is also important to note that all GPOI-funded training contains 
instruction on human rights. 

The following are GAO's responses to the Department of State's letter 
dated June 18, 2008. 

GAO Comments: 

1. State asserts that GPOI is on track to meet its objectives with over 
35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations. We disagree 
that 35,000 peacekeepers have deployed to 18 missions with the training 
or support of GPOI. State's assertion conflicts with GPOI evaluation 
team data that identified 22,000 peacekeepers trained by GPOI that 
deployed to 12 UN or AU missions, as well as other missions not 
supported by the UN or AU, as of April 2008. State's statistics include 
peacekeepers GPOI trained that have not deployed, supported but not 
trained by GPOI, or troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (non-UN 
missions). Appendix IV provides additional information on the 
peacekeeper deployments of GPOI partners. 

2. State asserts that GPOI objectives will be achieved under the 
current conditions and within projected resource levels. We disagree 
with this assessment because according to State's own training 
projections it is not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 
2010, faces delays in providing support of nonlethal equipment to 
deployed peacekeepers, and is unlikely to complete planned skills and 
infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010. In addition, State has not 
provided additional support for requested staff positions at COESPU 
that would facilitate the evaluation of progress made at COESPU. 

3. State now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by the 
third quarter of 2010 based on new training rates and asserts that we 
do not provide a realistic projection. We were unable to validate this 
information. As of April 2008, the number of military peacekeepers 
trained is lower than the target number needed to meet the goal of 
75,000 by the end of 2010. As recently as May 2008, officials from the 
GPOI office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI 
evaluation team indicated that slow expenditure rates related to 
training rates would delay their efforts to reach the goal by 2010. 
Accordingly, we are unable to validate State's new projections provided 
in its comments to this report. 

4. State asserts that it has contributed $10.5 million to COESPU and 
plans to provide an additional $4.5 million. We disagree that this is a 
contribution already provided to COESPU. State has obligated $15 
million for COESPU, which includes the $10.5 million and $4.5 million, 
but has only provided $9 million of that amount to COESPU, according to 
State funding data identifying expenditures as of April 2008. 

5. State has stated that the United States established a virtual 
donors' coordination mechanism to enable deploying nations to 
facilitate donor assistance in transportation and logistics support. We 
agree that a communication system has been established, however, we 
note that the mechanism for facilitating this support is an e-mail 
system. We also note that the system was established in the fall of 
2007 and that, as of April 2008, only one request had been communicated 
by State to donors through this system, according to the State 
officials responsible for this system. 

6. State presents information on a number of activities that it asserts 
were conducted under GPOI to improve the capabilities of regional 
organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. We 
disagree that GPOI has conducted all of these activities and believe 
that the activities listed in State's comment include a combination of 
planned and completed activities. In appendix VI we have presented the 
GPOI activities that have been completed to build skills and 
infrastructure for peacekeeping in support of the GPOI objective to 
assist partners in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining GPOI 
proficiencies. The information we have presented was obtained from 
expenditure information and data provided by the GPOI assessment team 
and GPOI program office. To confirm activities that were completed as 
of April 2008, we crosschecked reported information by the GPOI program 
with GPOI program implementers responsible for implementing these 
activities, including the Africa Bureau and its ACOTA program, and U.S. 
African, Pacific, and Southern Commands. 

7. State asserts that methods already exist for evaluating the quality 
of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical 
skills. We disagree that these methods address our recommendation. 
State has not developed military task lists and associated training 
that can be applied at all GPOI training sites, although the GPOI 
strategy in 2006 identified the need for the development of military 
task lists and related military training standards to contribute to 
standardization, interoperability, and sustainability, and to ensure 
the proper use of resources. The strategy also indicated that 
developing such standards would help efforts to evaluate the overall 
effectiveness of GPOI training programs, events, and activities. We 
assert that there is value in evaluating the performance of trainees, 
in the areas where there are consistencies in the training, against a 
standard level of proficiency in the skills taught during their 
training, in order to identify the quality of training provided across 
the program and to identify the proficiency of trained troops program- 
wide. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide 
standards to provide program managers with the ability to measure 
proficiency of GPOI-trained troops program-wide and in accordance with 
the commitments made in the GPOI strategy. 

8. State asserts that its process for vetting composite units to 
prevent potential recipients from receiving training where there is 
credible evidence of committed gross violations of human rights is 
effective and that our findings on the vetting of composite units 
trained under GPOI are unfairly applied against an updated agency 
policy on vetting composite units. We disagree. The seven composite 
units we identify in this report were vetted and received training 
after the policy change in April 2007. We identified these units in our 
review of vetting records provided by State's ACOTA office and training 
rosters of individuals trained provided by State's GPOI evaluation 
team. According to the data provided by State, three composite units 
from Niger received training in August 2007 and November-December 2007, 
one composite unit from Nigeria received training in September-October 
2007, and three composite units from Uganda received training in July 
2007. Records for these units indicate that vetting was completed 
between June 2007 and November 2007. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Global Security Affairs: 
2900 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-2900: 

Mr. Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Christoff: 

The Department of Defense (DoD) supports the intent of the Global 
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), recognizes the increasing 
demand for trained peacekeepers, and supports the efforts of the 
Department of State in executing the program. DoD appreciates the 
opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability 
Office draft report, entitled "Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but U.S. 
is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements 
Are Needed," dated May 22, 2008. DoD believes that improvements in GPOI 
are needed. 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work 
in consultation with DoD to assist Italy in staffing the key unfilled 
positions at Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) 
to better evaluate progress made and monitor results. (p. 37/GAO Draft 
Report) 

DOD Response: 

Partially concur - The Department of State and DoD should encourage 
COESPU to better evaluate progress and monitor results. DoD has placed 
a U.S. military liaison at COSEPU, and the Department of State should 
work with DoD and Italy to validate any personnel shortfalls and fill 
positions that result from this process. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State 
develop in consultation with DoD, a method for evaluating the quality 
of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical 
skills. (p. 37/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response:
Partially concur - Some GPOI training events are evaluated, however 
there is room for greater standardization and more comprehensive 
analysis of post-training performance. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State in 
consultation with DoD assess estimated resources and timeframes needed 
to complete peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa 
by 2010. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response:
Partially concur - DoD agrees with the recommendation to assess 
resources and timeframes required to achieve GPOI objectives in Africa. 
However, DoD would like to see this effort applied to all regions 
engaged by the GPOI program. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State in 
consultation with DoD ensure that any plans for extending Global Peace 
Operations Initiative (GPOI) activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient 
resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and 
infrastructure in Africa. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report) 

DOD Response:
Concur - State should closely consult with DoD to ensure that resources 
provided are sufficient to meet the requirements of the extended 
program. 

My points of contact for this memorandum are COL Steve Whitmarsh, 703-
602-5287, and Ms. Kelly Waud, 703-602-5298. 

Signed by: 

Greg Gross: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Partnership Strategy: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgements: 

Key contributors to this report include Audrey Solis, Assistant 
Director; Monica Brym; Justin Monroe; and Diahanna Post. Technical 
assistance was provided by Ashley Alley, Johana Ayers, Joseph Brown, 
Lynn Cothern, Barry Deweese, Nisha Hazra, Chris Kunitz, Isidro Gomez, 
Matthew Reilly, Elizabeth Repko, Ronald Schwenn, Jay Smale, Adrienne 
Spahr, Barbara Steel-Lowney, Laverne Tharpes, and Heather Whitehead. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In addition, according to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, regional organizations led 33 peacekeeping 
operations in 2007. 

[2] G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 

[3] In this report, we refer to two types of peacekeepers: military 
peacekeepers and stability police. We have defined stability police as 
police whose duties bridge the gap between military troops and civilian 
police in peace operations. The United States does not directly train 
stability police for peacekeeping missions. The Departments of State 
and Defense provide financial and personnel resources to support the 
Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, which trains 
instructors of stability police units for peacekeeping missions. 

[4] State's and DOD's plans include funding activities for GPOI through 
fiscal year 2009. 

[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.L. 110-
181 Â§ 1211, 122 Stat. 369 (Jan. 28, 2008). 

[6] We have categorized the seven objectives of the program under three 
key program goals. 

[7] The program provides only nonlethal equipment for training or to 
support deployments to peacekeeping mission. 

[8] For the goal of building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, we 
have included activities to enhance the ability of countries to conduct 
training for their own peacekeeping missions and improve the 
capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute 
peacekeeping missions. 

[9] The ACOTA program was established in 1997 under African Crisis 
Response Initiative and focuses on field and staff training and 
exercises for African battalions and multinational force staffs. ACOTA 
continues to operate within the scope of GPOI. From 1997 to 2004, the 
EIPC program provided support to 31 countries to develop their 
institutional capacity to provide military units for peacekeeping and 
similar multinational operations and to promote interoperability. 

[10] In this report, we use "spent" to refer to expended funds. 

[11] For example, Argentine peacekeeping instructors provide trainers 
to Central America's peacekeeping training school in Coban, Guatemala. 

[12] The Carabinieri are the Italian National Force that has both 
military and police authority. 

[13] Stability police units bridge the gap between military troops and 
civilian police in peace operations. 

[14] The program provides only nonlethal equipment for training or to 
support deployments to peacekeeping mission. 

[15] State obligated $10.5 million in fiscal year 2005 funds for COESPU 
activities. State officials expect to obligate an additional $4.5 
million of fiscal year 2005 GPOI funds by spring 2008. GPOI funds cover 
about half of training and program expenses at COESPU, according to 
U.S. officials in Italy. 

[16] This equipment depot is currently run jointly by the United States 
and ECOWAS. The 15 members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo 
Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinee, Guinee Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togolese Republic. 

[17] Of the funds expended in Africa, 59 percent was spent on training 
and training equipment and 29 percent on deployment assistance. 

[18] GPOI provides funding for the nonsalary costs of the U.S. European 
Command liaison officer position in Bosnia. 

[19] We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained 
peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those 
who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI. 
However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units 
trained under GPOI have deployed, and that any individual who joins the 
peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive 
additional training from his or her unit officers, we determined that 
the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained 
peacekeeping. 

[20] The intent of the training is to provide units with the skills to 
function at the level of a military battalion unit in a peacekeeping 
mission. 

[21] Five additional countries participated in GPOI training, but GPOI 
funds were not used to pay for their training. 

[22] Basic training in military skills is the responsibility of the 
partner nation. 

[23] GPOI does not provide bullets or lethal weapons used by troops 
during training. 

[24] The ACOTA office is comprised of nine contractor employees and one 
federal employee, according to a State official. 

[25] State regulations require that past performance must be evaluated, 
recorded, and entered electronically into the contractor performance 
system, which is a computer database maintained by the National 
Institutes of Health (48 C.F.R. 42.1502, 42.1503; 48 C.F.R. 642.1503- 
70). 

[26] One of these countries participated in military peacekeeper 
training funded by GPOI in Mongolia, but is not a GPOI partner and paid 
for the costs associated with attending the training exercise, 
according to agency documents. 

[27] The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 made permanent the 
following requirement: "No assistance shall be furnished under this Act 
or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a 
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that 
such unit has committed gross violations of human rights." The 
prohibitions do not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on 
Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective 
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit 
to justice (22 U.S.C. 2378d). A similar provision has appeared in prior 
foreign operations appropriations acts. 

[28] In May 2008, State officials informed us that Mauritania had been 
added as a new GPOI country. We did not assess if this country meets 
the criteria for partnership with GPOI. 

[29] With the recent election of a new government in Thailand, State 
expects to resume activities once U.S. prohibitions on security 
assistance are lifted. 

[30] These countries were Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay. 

[31] This was the case for Honduras, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Zambia. 

[32] These 14 countries are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia. 

[33] Composite units are defined as units in which individuals are 
temporarily drawn together from already-established units to form a new 
unit. 

[34] Section 505 agreements prohibit the furnishing of defense articles 
or related services or training on a grant basis unless the country 
agrees that it will not use the defense articles or training for 
purposes other than those for which furnished. 

[35] G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 

[36] These countries include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, 
Chile, France, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, 
United Kingdom, and Uruguay. 

[37] We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained 
peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those 
who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI. 
However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units 
trained under GPOI have deployed, and that any individual who joins the 
peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive 
additional training from his or her unit officers, we determined that 
the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained 
peacekeepers. 

[38] An additional 572 troops were trained or received equipment for 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

[End of section] 

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