Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project	 
Selection for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve 
Oversight in Iraq (23-JUN-08, GAO-08-736R).			 
                                                                 
Since fiscal year 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $46  
billion dollars for relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.	 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is one of several U.S. agencies  
that administer U.S.-funded relief and reconstruction programs in
Iraq. In particular, DOD manages the Commander's Emergency	 
Response Program (CERP), which is designed to enable local	 
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent 	 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their 
areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will	 
immediately assist the indigenous population. Thus far, Congress 
has appropriated more than $3 billion for CERP in Iraq and	 
Afghanistan. Since the program's inception, DOD has steadily	 
increased its funding requests in response to theater conditions,
and reported obligations have also grown substantially. DOD's	 
funding requests have increased by more than a billion dollars	 
from fiscal years 2004 through 2008. For fiscal year 2008, DOD	 
requested $1.2 billion to fund CERP projects in Iraq and	 
Afghanistan and plans to request an additional $507 million,	 
primarily for CERP in Iraq. Furthermore, DOD's reported 	 
obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan have grown from about $179  
million in fiscal year 2004 to more than $1.1 billion in fiscal  
year 2007. In addition, over the same period of time, the number 
of projects in both countries has grown from about 6,450 to about
8,700. According to DOD regulations, CERP is intended for	 
small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction	 
projects for the benefit of Iraqi people. The guidance issued by 
the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) establishes 19	 
authorized uses for CERP funds, including transportation,	 
electricity, and condolence payments. CERP funds can be used for 
both construction and non-construction projects. In Iraq,	 
commanders follow Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) standard	 
operating procedures for CERP, which expand upon DOD regulations.
MNC-I guidance states that the keys to project selection are to  
(1) execute quickly, (2) employ many Iraqis, (3) benefit the	 
Iraqi people, and (4) be highly visible. DOD regulations identify
the roles and responsibilities that different offices play in	 
managing CERP. The Secretary of the Army serves as the executive 
agent and is responsible for ensuring that commanders carry out  
CERP in a manner that is consistent with applicable laws,	 
regulations and guidance. The Commander of U.S. Central Command  
(CENTCOM) is responsible for allocating CERP resources. Public	 
Law No. 108-106 and subsequent laws require DOD to provide	 
Congress with quarterly reports on the source, allocation, and	 
use of CERP funds. The reports are compiled based on information 
about the projects that was entered by unit officials into the	 
Iraq Reconstruction Management System, a database that tracks	 
projects' status and maintains a historical record of all	 
reconstruction activity in Iraq, including those projects funded 
by CERP. Because of significant congressional interest, we	 
conducted this work under the authority of the Comptroller	 
General to undertake work at his own initiative and examined the 
following questions regarding the CERP program in Iraq: (1) To	 
what extent does DOD guidance establish selection criteria for	 
CERP projects? (2) To what extent do commanders in Iraq 	 
coordinate CERP with other U. S. government agencies and with the
government of Iraq? and (3) To what extent do DOD and MNC-I	 
exercise oversight of CERP projects in Iraq?			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-736R					        
    ACCNO:   A82482						        
  TITLE:     Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide      
Project Selection for Commander's Emergency Response Program and 
Improve Oversight in Iraq					 
     DATE:   06/23/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Budget obligations 				 
	     Budgeting						 
	     Construction costs 				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Eligibility determinations 			 
	     Emergency management				 
	     Emergency response 				 
	     Emergency response funds				 
	     Evaluation criteria				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Funds management					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International relations				 
	     Iraq War and reconstruction			 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military officers					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Regulation 					 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Program costs					 
	     Afghanistan					 
	     DOD Commanders' Emergency Response 		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-08-736R

   

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June 23, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

Subject: Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project 
Selection for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve 
Oversight in Iraq: 

Since fiscal year 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $46 billion 
dollars for relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The Department 
of Defense (DOD) is one of several U.S. agencies that administer U.S.- 
funded relief and reconstruction programs in Iraq. In particular, DOD 
manages the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is 
designed to enable local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond 
to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within 
their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will 
immediately assist the indigenous population[Footnote 1]. Thus far, 
Congress has appropriated more than $3 billion for CERP in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Since the program's inception, DOD has steadily increased 
its funding requests in response to theater conditions, and reported 
obligations have also grown substantially. DOD's funding requests have 
increased by more than a billion dollars from fiscal years 2004 through 
2008. For fiscal year 2008, DOD requested $1.2 billion to fund CERP 
projects in Iraq and Afghanistan and plans to request an additional 
$507 million, primarily for CERP in Iraq. Furthermore, DOD's reported 
obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan have grown from about $179 million 
in fiscal year 2004 to more than $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2007. In 
addition, over the same period of time, the number of projects in both 
countries has grown from about 6,450 to about 8,700. In particular, the 
number of projects costing more than $500,000 has increased from 13 in 
fiscal year 2004 to 276 in fiscal year 2007 and in fiscal year 2007 
accounted for about 46 percent of the reported obligations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 

According to DOD regulations, CERP is intended for small-scale, urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects for the benefit of 
Iraqi people. The guidance issued by the Undersecretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) establishes 19 authorized uses for CERP funds, including 
transportation, electricity, and condolence payments. In addition, the 
regulation identifies 10 unauthorized uses of CERP funds, such as a use 
that directly or indirectly benefits U.S., coalition, or other 
supporting military personnel.[Footnote 2] CERP funds can be used for 
both construction and non-construction projects. In Iraq, commanders 
follow Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) standard operating procedures 
for CERP, which expand upon DOD regulations. MNC-I guidance states that 
the keys to project selection are to (1) execute quickly, (2) employ 
many Iraqis, (3) benefit the Iraqi people, and (4) be highly visible. 
In addition, according to MNC-I guidance, projects estimated to cost 
more than $500,000 must be approved by the MNC-I commander. Major 
subordinate commanders have approval authority for less costly projects 
and may further delegate this authority to the brigade level. MNC-I is 
the tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations 
throughout Iraq. MNC-I officials, including engineers, civil affairs 
officers, and finance officers, administer CERP in Iraq. CERP projects 
are generally identified and executed at the brigade and battalion 
levels in Iraq. 

DOD regulations identify the roles and responsibilities that different 
offices play in managing CERP. For example, the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) establishes and supervises the execution of 
principles, policies, and procedures to be followed in connection with 
CERP. The Secretary of the Army serves as the executive agent and is 
responsible for ensuring that commanders carry out CERP in a manner 
that is consistent with applicable laws, regulations and guidance. The 
Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for 
allocating CERP resources.[Footnote 3] 

Public Law No. 108-106 and subsequent laws require DOD to provide 
Congress with quarterly reports on the source, allocation, and use of 
CERP funds. The reports are compiled based on information about the 
projects that was entered by unit officials into the Iraq 
Reconstruction Management System, a database that tracks projects' 
status and maintains a historical record of all reconstruction activity 
in Iraq, including those projects funded by CERP. 

Because of significant congressional interest, we conducted this work 
under the authority of the Comptroller General to undertake work at his 
own initiative and examined the following questions regarding the CERP 
program in Iraq: (1) To what extent does DOD guidance establish 
selection criteria for CERP projects? (2) To what extent do commanders 
in Iraq coordinate CERP with other U. S. government agencies and with 
the government of Iraq? and (3) To what extent do DOD and MNC-I 
exercise oversight of CERP projects in Iraq? 

To address the objectives, we identified and reviewed guidance for 
CERP. We interviewed officials from the Offices of the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Financial Management and Comptroller). We traveled to Iraq to speak 
with officials at MNC-I and its parent command Multinational Force-Iraq 
(MNF-I) and at the brigade and battalion levels. We also interviewed 
officials from selected units that returned recently from Iraq about 
their experiences implementing, executing, and assessing CERP. In order 
to evaluate the extent of coordination activities, we interviewed 
officials at the Department of State, the United States Agency for 
International Development, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, both 
in Washington, D.C. and in Iraq. In addition, we performed a trend 
analysis of reported obligations for CERP projects in Iraq and 
interviewed officials about information contained in the reports to 
Congress. Based on interviews with officials about data contained in 
the reports to Congress, we believe that the data is sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. The focus of this report is 
the use of CERP in Iraq. We plan to issue a report looking at the 
implementation of CERP in Afghanistan at a later date. A more detailed 
discussion of our scope and methodology is located in enclosure I. We 
conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to April 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

On May 2, 2008, we briefed congressional staff on our observations. 
This report summarizes the information discussed at that briefing. We 
are attaching slides from the briefing in enclosure II. 

Summary: 

DOD has established broad selection criteria for CERP projects, which 
gives significant discretion to commanders in determining the types of 
projects to undertake. CERP is intended to provide commanders a source 
of funds that allow them to respond to urgent, small-scale humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction needs that will immediately assist the local 
Iraqi population. However, DOD guidance provides no definition for 
small-scale or urgent, which leaves commanders with the responsibility 
of developing their own definitions. Commanders we interviewed had 
varying definitions for small-scale. For example, one commander told us 
that he would not execute projects that cost more than $200,000, 
whereas another commander told us that he executed projects that cost 
more than $1 million. Another commander focused on projects that cost 
from $20,000 to $100,000 that would immediately provide drinking water 
to the local population, while other CERP-financed water projects have 
cost more than $5 million. Yet another commander chose to execute 
projects that would be completed while his unit was deployed. 
Furthermore, our review of the quarterly reports to Congress 
demonstrated the wide spectrum in size and costs of projects. For 
instance, projects ranged from a waterline repair costing slightly more 
than $100 to an electrical distribution system costing more than $11 
million. In addition, during our visit to Iraq, we observed three 
projects: a multimillion-dollar sewage lift station, a several hundred 
thousand dollar sports center and community complex, and a fruit and 
vegetable stand that had been renovated with a $2,500 grant. Commanders 
typically defined urgent as restoring a basic human need, such as water 
and electricity, or projects identified by the local Iraqi government 
as its most pressing requirement for the area. As a result, the scale, 
complexity, and duration of projects selected vary across commands. 
While the majority of CERP projects have cost less than $500,000, the 
number of projects costing more than $500,000 has increased 
significantly. Some of these projects cost millions of dollars and are 
estimated to take more than 1 year to complete (see table 1). According 
to DOD officials, factors contributing to the increasing number of CERP 
projects costing more than $500,000 include the lack of other available 
reconstruction money, improved security in the region and the fact that 
many of the immediate needs of the Iraq people were addressed during 
the initial phases of CERP. 

Table 1: Trends in CERP Projects in Iraq: 

Number of projects [A]; 
4,101; 
FY 2005: 7,266; 
FY 2006: 3,811; 
FY 2007: 6,915. 

Number of projects costing $500,000 or more; 
FY 2004: 10; 
FY 2005: 181; 
FY 2006: 151; 
FY 2007: 228. 

Reported funds obligated (in millions); 
FY 2004: $139.3; 
FY 2005: $716.4; 
FY 2006: $509.7[B]; 
FY 2007: $897.9[B]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This number includes projects that are not reconstruction but 
involve cash payouts, such as condolence, battle damage, detainee, and 
grant payments. 

[B] According To DOD Officials, Additional Projects Valued At $400,000 
In Fiscal Year 2006 And $16.7 Million in fiscal year 2007 were reported 
in the Army's financial management system but were not captured in the 
Iraq Reconstruction Management System due to units being in remote 
locations and not having access to the database. As a result, these 
projects and their costs were not included in the detailed quarterly 
reports but were included in the summary report to Congress. 

[End of table] 

DOD officials told us that they are satisfied with the broad CERP 
guidance and that any modification, specifically defining small-scale 
and urgent, might affect the program's flexibility, which is a large 
part of what makes it such an attractive tool for commanders to use. 
However, without a clearer definition of small-scale and urgent, 
commanders are developing a wide range of interpretations such that it 
is difficult to determine whether the projects being selected by the 
commanders in fact are consistent with DOD's intent for the program. 

Commanders reported that they generally coordinated projects with the 
appropriate U.S. and Iraqi officials, as required by guidance. MNC-I 
guidance requires commanders to coordinate CERP projects with various 
elements, including the local Iraqi government agencies, civil affairs 
elements, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).[Footnote 4] The 
officials include Iraqi government personnel as well as military and 
nonmilitary U.S. officials. MNC-I guidance further states that 
coordination with local officials is critical to ensure that a project 
meets a need and will be maintained and that numerous projects have 
been built that did not meet their intended purpose because of lack of 
coordination. Unit officials we interviewed said that they coordinated 
projects through the appropriate PRT or embedded PRT element, and also 
coordinated with the appropriate Iraqi government officials before 
beginning the construction of a project. For instance, commanders told 
us that they met with the local leader, such as the local sheik or 
mayor, to learn of the types of projects needed in the area and to gain 
buy-in for the sustainment of projects. Many commanders told us that 
they had a good working relationship with the PRT or the embedded PRT 
and believed that personality played a role in the effectiveness of the 
relationship between commanders and the PRT or embedded PRT. 
Furthermore, Army officials told us that they coordinated with 
representatives from the national ministries on projects costing more 
than $500,000. For example, a CERP-funded hospital would be coordinated 
with the Ministry of Health. MNC-I guidance does not require commanders 
to coordinate with Department of State or United States Agency for 
International Development officials who are not part of the PRT or 
embedded PRT. However, MNC-I guidance notes that coordination efforts 
may include synchronizing CERP projects with complementary programs 
funded by United States Agency for International Development or other 
nongovernmental organizations within the commander's area of 
responsibility. Military, Department of State, and United States Agency 
for International Development officials we interviewed in Iraq said 
that the presence of the PRTs and embedded PRTs had improved 
coordination between programs funded by these agencies and they were 
generally satisfied with the coordination that was taking place. 
Commanders also stated that they only coordinated with the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers on CERP projects that were very costly or very 
complex. 

While the MNC-I project approval process provides some oversight, the 
Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , the Army and 
MNC-I have limited oversight of CERP in Iraq because they (1) do not 
require units executing projects to monitor them, (2) have not 
established performance metrics, and (3) have limited knowledge of 
projects under $500,000. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) limits its oversight to developing CERP guidance, 
reviewing the CERP quarterly reports, and submitting the CERP budget 
request to Congress. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Financial Management and Comptroller) reviews both the quarterly 
report submitted to Congress and the CERP budget request before it is 
submitted to Congress. According to officials from the Offices of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Assistant Secretary of the 
Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), CERP is a commanders' 
program that should retain maximum flexibility and therefore limit 
their oversight of CERP although they noted that both offices have 
access to the Iraq Reconstruction Management System database. MNC-I 
develops implementing guidance for CERP in Iraq and approves all 
projects costing $500,000 or more, but has no role in the approval 
process for projects costing less than $500,000 and only limited 
visibility of projects under $500,000. The MNC-I approval process 
requires extensive documentation prior to approval, such as a detailed 
scope of work that clearly identifies the work that the contractors 
need to perform as well as the estimated costs for the projects, 
documentation that those handling the funds are authorized to do so, 
and a purchase request and commitment document authorizing the release 
of funds. Additionally, although not required, many commanders we spoke 
with reported having proposed projects reviewed by their legal staff. 

* Project monitoring: Neither DOD nor MNC-I guidance establishes a 
requirement for units executing projects to monitor them. MNC-I 
guidance has a broad requirement for the MNC-I engineer to monitor 
reconstruction projects, but does not include a requirement for units 
executing projects to monitor them. Project monitoring is included in 
the CERP guidance for Afghanistan and, as we recently reported, is a 
generally accepted quality assurance principle[Footnote 5]. Although 
DOD's and MNC-I's guidance does not require project monitoring by units 
that execute the projects, unit-level officials we interviewed stated 
that they, or their representatives, generally conducted site visits of 
ongoing construction projects, but often lacked the knowledge to ensure 
that contractors built projects to the correct specifications. Some 
said that they were not subject matter experts, and unless something 
was blatantly erroneous with the construction, they may not be able to 
determine whether the projects were built to contractual 
specifications. In a recent testimony, we noted that the capacity to 
properly manage and oversee contractor performance was one of the 
essential elements for achieving good acquisition outcomes, and if any 
of the elements were missing, it could lead to unmet expectations. 
Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor 
performance is crucial to ensuring that DOD receives the best value for 
the money spent on CERP projects[Footnote 6]. In conducting site 
visits, commanders told us that they found projects that were executed 
by previous units in various states, for example, completed but not 
sustained by the Iraqi government, vandalized, or nonexistent. The lack 
of formal project monitoring guidance to units that are executing 
projects leaves it to the discretion of commanders to conduct site 
visits. In the absence of such a requirement for regular monitoring, 
commanders and ultimately MNC-I officials miss the opportunity to 
gather information that could be useful in assessing future uses of 
CERP funds, including helping them to decide the success rates of 
projects and whether certain types of projects should be undertaken in 
the future and whether CERP funds are being used in a fiscally 
responsible manner. Also, the lack of subject matter experts puts DOD 
at risk of being unable to identify and correct poor contractor 
performance, which could affect the cost, completion, and 
sustainability of CERP projects. 

* Performance metrics: No performance metrics exist for CERP. As we 
have previously reported, federal agencies should develop plans that 
establish objective, quantifiable, and measurable performance goals 
that should be achieved by a program. We have also noted that as 
agencies align their activities to support mission-related goals, they 
should also make better linkages between levels of funding and their 
anticipated results.[Footnote 7] Performance metrics might include 
quantitative data, such as the number of projects sustained by the 
government of Iraq or the number of people employed as a result of a 
CERP project, or qualitative data obtained from the surveys 
periodically conducted of the Iraqi people. In the absence of such 
metrics, commanders, as they move through their areas of 
responsibility, sometimes develop their own indicators or use anecdotal 
information to assess the impact of CERP funds. For example, in 
addition to forming their own views, commanders may talk to Iraqis who 
have benefited from the projects, talk to Iraqis who operate the 
projects, or speak with members of the local Iraqi government about the 
impact of the CERP projects. The Secretary of the Army serves as the 
executive agent and is responsible for developing procedures to ensure 
that commanders carry out CERP in a manner that is consistent with 
applicable laws, regulations and guidance. The CENTCOM Commander is 
responsible for allocating CERP resources. We believe that parameters 
for information gathering could be established, which then could be 
incorporated into commanders' current interactions with the local Iraqi 
leaders. This would provide a more consistent basis for assessing the 
impact of CERP projects. Without performance measures or indicators, 
MNC-I and DOD do not have the necessary data to assess the results or 
outcomes of the CERP projects, and therefore lack information that 
would be useful in evaluating and validating commanders' requests for 
CERP funding needs. 

* Limited knowledge of projects under $500,000: Although MNC-I 
officials have some visibility over projects costing more than $500,000 
because they approve these projects, they have limited visibility and 
oversight for projects costing less than $500,000. Our analysis 
indicates that about 97 percent of CERP projects in Iraq cost less than 
$500,000 in fiscal year 2007. This equates to more than $507 million, 
or 56 percent, of reported obligated funds for CERP projects in Iraq. 
Currently, MNC-I officials receive the same information that is 
included in the quarterly reports to Congress on all CERP projects in 
Iraq, including those costing less than $500,000. The information in 
these reports is limited--project number, project location, a brief 
description of the project, and the reported obligation amount. MNC-I 
officials said that they do not review the projects listed in the 
reports for appropriateness and only become involved with projects 
costing less than $500,000 if a problem is brought to their attention. 
The quarterly reports do not provide information about the number of 
projects completed during a quarter, the number of projects that have 
been started but not completed, or the number of projects that have not 
been sustained or maintained by the Iraqi government or the local 
population. Program managers need operational and financial data to 
determine whether they are meeting their agencies' goals and utilizing 
resources effectively and efficiently.[Footnote 8] Without greater 
visibility, MNC-I does not have a basis for assessing the outcomes of 
projects costing less than $500,000, evaluating commanders' funding 
requests, or assessing the effective and efficient usage of CERP 
resources in meeting the program's intent. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

As DOD continues to request funding for CERP projects in Iraq, it is 
important that DOD and commanders at all levels have the information 
needed to determine whether projects are meeting the intent of the 
program, assess program outcomes, and be better informed about their 
funding requests. Therefore, to improve the program and management, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) to revise DOD's CERP guidance to include: 

* definitions of small-scale and urgent and: 

* a requirement that units that execute CERP projects provide project 
monitoring to ensure that contractors have met the contract 
specifications. 

Furthermore we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) in conjunction with others to 
develop performance measures or indicators for CERP and use these 
indicators as well as other information to evaluate project 
effectiveness and sustainability as well as the program's budget 
requests. 

In addition, we recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff direct the Commander of CENTCOM to direct the Commander of MNF-I 
to take steps to gain greater visibility of projects costing less than 
$500,000, such as obtaining and reviewing summary information on the 
status of projects, completion rates, and impact of projects on the 
community. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments to a draft report DOD generally agreed with our 
recommendations. DOD also stated that CERP is an important tool that 
military commanders are using effectively in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
noted that they welcomed our findings as another opportunity to improve 
operations in Iraq. DOD's comments are reprinted in enclosure III. In 
addition, DOD provided technical comments which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

In commenting on the draft report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendations to revise DOD's CERP guidance to include definitions of 
small-scale and urgent and require that units that execute CERP 
projects provide project monitoring to ensure that contractors have met 
the contract specifications. According to DOD officials, the Department 
has revised its CERP guidance to reflect these changes. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop performance 
measures or indicators for CERP and use these indicators as well as 
other information to evaluate project effectiveness and sustainability 
as well as the program's budget requests. DOD noted that the department 
has revised its CERP guidance to require the development of performance 
indicators for projects and agreed that processes must be established 
that will help guarantee the successful completion of projects. 
However, DOD did not agree that past projects are a primary factor in 
determining future projects. In our report, we did not indicate that 
past projects should be a primary factor in determining future projects 
and understand that CERP is intended to meet the immediate needs of the 
local population. As we noted in the report, we believe that agencies 
should make linkages between levels of funding and their anticipated 
results. Performance metrics would provide data that would allow DOD to 
evaluate overall program effectiveness and use this information as one 
factor in evaluating and validating commander's project proposals and 
related budget requests for CERP. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to direct the Commander 
of MNF-I to take steps to gain greater visibility of projects costing 
less than $500,000, such as obtaining and reviewing summary information 
on the status of projects, completion rates, and impact of projects on 
the community. However, DOD noted that MNC-I would be the appropriate 
organization to receive this recommendation. As we noted in our report, 
MNF-I relies on MNC-I to administer CERP in Iraq. Hence, our 
recommendation is directed to MNF-I because it is CENTCOM's overarching 
authority for military operations in Iraq and MNC-I reports to it. 
Furthermore, DOD noted that MNC-I tracks all projects and monitors 
their progress using the Iraq Reconstruction Management System and 
participates in division coordination meetings. MNC-I officials were 
not able to provide us with basic program information such as how many 
projects had been started but not completed and what the status of 
projects were after completion. Although this information may exist in 
the Iraq Reconstruction Management System database, it appears that it 
is not being evaluated. Moreover, while MNC-I regularly participates in 
division-level coordination meetings, at which subordinate units 
present significant projects, our recommendation is geared toward 
having greater visibility over projects costing less than $500,000. As 
we noted in our report, MNC-I officials stated that they do not become 
involved in these projects unless a problem is brought to their 
attention. 

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. Copies of this report will 
also be made available to others upon request. In addition, this report 
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 519-9619 or at [email protected]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in enclosure IV. 

Signed by: 

Sharon L. Pickup, Director: 

Defense Capabilities and Management: 

Enclosures - 4: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

Enclosure I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the project selection criteria for the Commander's 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq, we obtained and reviewed 
guidance from the Department of Defense (DOD), Multinational Corps-Iraq 
(MNC-I), and the Combined Joint Task Force and assessed changes in 
guidance over time. We also traveled to Iraq to interview officials at 
higher commands, including those responsible for the overall management 
of CERP at MNC-I as well as commanders, staff judge advocates, 
comptrollers, civil affairs officers, and project purchasing officers 
from Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND-B) about how program 
objectives are developed and what criteria exist for project selection. 
Additionally, we interviewed officials at the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) as well as 
military officials at the division, brigade, and battalion levels, 
including commanders, staff and brigade judge advocates, civil affairs 
officers, paying agents, project purchasing officers, executive 
officers, finance officers, effects officers, and targeting officers at 
selected units that redeployed from Iraq from January 2007 through 
December 2007, regarding what guidance and criteria were used to select 
projects. We selected these units (1) based on their redeployment dates 
from Iraq; (2) to ensure that we obtained information from officials at 
the division, brigade, and battalion levels who had direct experience 
with CERP; and (3) because unit officials had not yet been transferred 
to other locations within the United States or abroad. 

To assess the extent to which commanders coordinate CERP projects with 
other U.S. reconstruction programs, such as those funded by the 
Department of State, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and with the 
Iraqi provincial government, we reviewed and analyzed current 
applicable guidance to determine what coordination, if any, was 
required. We also interviewed officials at selected returned units that 
had redeployed from Iraq from January through December 2007, and 
officials at the Department of State, USAID, and the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers in Washington, D.C., to determine the extent of their 
coordination activities. Additionally, we traveled to Iraq and 
interviewed officials at higher commands, including officials at MNC-I 
and MND-B such as commanders, judge advocates, comptrollers, civil 
affairs officers, and project purchasing officers from MND-B and 
officials based in Iraq from the Department of State, USAID, and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Gulf Region Division about what 
coordination takes place and what, if any, mechanisms were in place to 
ensure coordination between agencies and with the Iraqi government. 

In order to determine the extent to which DOD provides oversight, 
including reviews of annual funding requests, we obtained and reviewed 
applicable guidance to ascertain what type of oversight is required and 
what oversight and monitoring procedures are in place. We also 
interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Financial Management and Comptroller) as well as officials at selected 
returned units, and we traveled to Iraq to interview officials at 
higher commands, including officials at MNC-I and MND-B, as well as 
commanders, judge advocates, comptrollers, and civil affairs officers 
from MND-B about the type of oversight that exists, including the 
project approval and project monitoring processes. In addition, while 
in Iraq, we spoke with officials at Multinational Force-Iraq and MNC-I 
involved in the budgeting process about how annual funding requests are 
developed and subsequently reviewed. To determine how DOD assesses the 
impact of program activities, including the use of performance 
measures, we reviewed and analyzed applicable guidance to see if any 
measures of effectiveness were required or specified. We also 
interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial 
Management and Comptroller) as well as military officials at selected 
units who had redeployed from Iraq. Additionally, we traveled to Iraq 
to interview officials at higher commands, including officials at MNC- 
I and MND-B, such as commanders, judge advocates, comptrollers, and 
civil affairs officers about what measures or indicators they used to 
determine the effectiveness of the program. To gain a further 
understanding of the impact of projects, we visited selected CERP 
projects in MND-B. 

In addition, we performed a trend analysis of the reported obligations 
in the quarterly CERP reports to Congress and interviewed officials 
about information contained in the reports. Based on interviews with 
officials and our review of a limited number of CERP projects, we 
believe that these data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report. In addition, we reviewed a small number of fiscal year 
2008 CERP project files to become familiar with the documents 
maintained in the files. We requested a sample of fiscal year 2006 and 
fiscal year 2007 CERP project files for our audit work, but military 
officials could not locate the files during the time of our review: 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), Pentagon, Virginia: 

Department of the Army: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial 
Management and Comptroller): 

United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia: 

United States Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia: 

National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia: 

United States Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.: 

United States Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, Baghdad, 
Iraq: 

Multinational Force-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq: 

Multinational Corps-Iraq, Camp Victory, Iraq: 

Multinational Division-Baghdad, Camp Liberty, Iraq: 

4TH Infantry Division, Camp Liberty, Iraq: 

1ST/34TH Brigade Combat Team, Minnesota Army National Guard, Rosemont, 
Minnesota: 

3RD Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2ND Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, 
Washington: 

3RD/ 82ND Brigade Combat Team, Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina: 

25TH Infantry Division, Honolulu, Hawaii: 

Other government agencies: United States Agency for International 
Development, Washington, D.C.: 

United States Agency for International Development, Baghdad, Iraq: 

Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Department of State, Baghdad, Iraq: 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to April 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure II: Briefing to Congressional Committee: 

Commanderï¿½s Emergency Response Program (CERP) In Iraq: 

Briefing to Congressional Committees:

Objectives: 

To what extent does DOD guidance establish selection criteria for CERP 
projects? 

To what extent do commanders in Iraq coordinate CERP projects with 
other U. S. government agencies and with the Government of Iraq? and: 

To what extent do DOD and MNC-I exercise oversight of CERP projects in 
Iraq? 

Scope and Methodology: 

To meet our objectives, we: 

* Reviewed legislation and guidance for CERP projects in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; 

* Interviewed DOD officials, Army units in Iraq, Army units returning 
from Iraq, Department of State, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and Army Corps of Engineers officials both in Iraq 
and Washington, D.C.; 

* Reviewed and analyzed quarterly CERP reports to Congress; 

* Reviewed audit reports from other agencies; 

GAGAS standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The Commanderï¿½s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is intended to 
provide commanders a source of funds to respond to urgent, small-scale 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs that will immediately 
assist the local Iraqi population.

In FY 04, Congress appropriated CERP funds as part of the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Public Law 108-106, section 1110. 

In fiscal year 2008, DOD requested $1.2 billion for CERP and Congress 
appropriated about $500 million to fund the CERP program. DOD is 
requesting an additional $480 million for Iraq.

Figure: Trends in Reported CERP Obligations in Iraq for FY 2004-FY 
2007: 

This figure is a vertical bar graph showing trends in reported CERP 
obligations in Iraq for FY 2004-FY 2007. The X axis represents the 
fiscal year, and the Y axis represents the dollars obligated (in 
millions). 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $139.3. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $716.4. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $509.7. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $897.9. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure: FY 2007 CERP Reported Obligations Breakout by Category in Iraq: 

This figure is a vertical bar graph showing FY 2007 CERP reported 
obligations breakout by category in Iraq. The X axis represents the 
category, and the Y axis represents the dollars obligated (in 
millions). 

Category: Agriculture; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $22.1. 

Category: Civic cleanup; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $64.7. 

Category: Civic support vehicles; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $13.2. 

Category: Condolence payments; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $11.3. 

Category: Economic, financial, and management improvements; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $36.5. 

Category: Education; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $115.2. 

Category: Electricity; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $124.3. 

Category: Food protection; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $5.6. 

Category: Healthcare; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $28.6. 

Category: Irrigation; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $19.5. 

Category: Other; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $35.3. 

Category: Detainee payments; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $0.6. 

Category: Protective measures; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $49.6. 

Category: Repair to civic and cultural facilities; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $67.5. 

Category: Battle damage; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $7.0. 

Category: Rule of law; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $28.4. 

Category: Telecommunications; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $4.1. 

Category: Transportation; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $98.6. 

Category: Water and sanitation; 
Dollars obligated (in millions): $163.1. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Objective 1: 

1. To what extent does DOD guidance establish selection criteria for 
CERP? 

Authorized uses for CERP funds Identified by DOD Guidance: 

1. water and sanitation:  

2. food production and distribution: 

3. agriculture: 

4. electricity: 

5. healthcare: 

6. education: 

7. telecommunications: 

8. economic, financial and management improvements: 

9. transportation: 

10. rule of law and governance: 

11. irrigation: 

12. civic cleanup activities: 

13. civic support vehicles: 

14. repair of civic and cultural facilities: 

15. condolence payments to individual civilians for death or physical 
injury resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military 
operations: 

16. repair, or payment for repair of property damage that results from 
U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations: 

17. payments to individuals upon release from detention: 

18. protective measures, such as fencing, lights, barrier materials, 
berming over pipelines, guard towers, temporary civilian guards, etc.: 

19. other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects: 

Figure: Examples of CERP projects: 

This figure is a combination of photographs showing CERP projects. 

Photo #1: 

This sewage lift station in the Ghazaliya neighborhood in Baghdad, Iraq 
is a multimillion dollar CERP project that is being managed by the Army 
Corps of Engineers-Gulf Regional Division. The lift station will help 
the sewer system operate correctly and alleviate standing sewage and 
storm runoff. 

Photo #2: 

The sports complex and community center is a CERP project that cost 
several hundred thousand dollars and is located along a Sunni-Shi'a 
fault line in the Mansour district in Baghdad, Iraq. Military officials 
hope that the project will help bring the divided community together. 

Photo #3: 

The owner of this market stall was the recipient of a $2,500 CERP 
grant, which was used to renovate his produce stand in Baghdad, Iraq. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Unauthorized uses for CERP funds Identified by DOD Guidance: 

1. Direct or indirect benefit to U.S., coalition or supporting military 
personnel: 

2. Providing goods, services, or funds to national guard forces, border 
security forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection 
forces, highway patrol units, police, special police, or intelligence 
or other security forces: 

3. Except as authorized by law and separate implementing guidance, 
weapons buy-back programs, or other purchases of firearms or 
ammunition: 

4. Entertainment: 

5. Reward Programs: 

6. Removal of unexploded ordinance: 

7. Duplication of services available through municipal governments: 

8. Salaries, bonus or pensions of Iraqi or Afghan military or civilian 
government personnel: 

9. Training, equipping or operating costs of Iraqi or Afghan military 
or security forces: 


10. Conducting psychological operations, information operations, or 
other US, coalition, or Iraqi/Afghanistan Security Force Operations 
Unauthorized uses of CERP funds Identified by DOD guidance: 

Selection Criteria is Subject to Interpretation: 

CERP guidance gives commanders considerable leeway in the approval of 
projects as long as they meet the intent of the CERP program. 

DOD guidance states that CERP is to be used for small scale, urgent 
humanitarian and reconstruction needs. However, DOD guidance does not 
define ï¿½small-scaleï¿½ or ï¿½urgentï¿½. 

* DOD officials (Comptroller and Army Budget Office) explained that a 
finite definition for the terms might impact the programï¿½s flexibility. 

Units we visited had varying definitions for ï¿½small scaleï¿½ and 
ï¿½urgentï¿½. 

* ï¿½Small scaleï¿½ was defined by commanders as one of the following: 

- A dollar amount, or: 

- Project type, or: 

- Time to complete a project: 

* ï¿½Urgentï¿½ was defined by commanders as one of the following: 

- As restoring basic human needs, or: 

- By what the local Iraqi population said they needed most (e.g. 
school, clinic, etc.) 

CERP Guidance and Criteria: 

Projects may be both construction and non-construction. The type of 
projects that commanders approve varies and depends upon strategy of 
the commander, needs of the area, and security in the area. 

MNC-I guidance states the keys to project selection are 1) execute 
quickly; 2) employ many Iraqis; 3) benefit the Iraqi people; and 4) be 
highly visible. 

Over time, as conditions change, the type of projects that commanders 
executed evolved. Some projects cost millions of dollars and are 
estimated to take more than one year to complete. The number of 
projects costing over $500,000 has generally increased and Sons of Iraq 
(temporary civilian guards who protect critical infrastructure in Iraq) 
has become a high priority for CERP funds. For instance, a Baghdad 
military division estimates it will spend about 40 percent of its CERP 
budget on Sons of Iraq. 

Objective 2: 

To what extent do commanders in Iraq coordinate CERP projects with 
other U.S. government agencies and with the Government of Iraq? 

Guidance requires coordination with various elements in Iraq
Coordination occurs at the local level in Iraq: 

Guidance for Iraq requires commanders to coordinate with the following: 

1. Local Iraqi government agencies, 

2. Civil affairs elements, 

3. Engineers,

4. Provincial reconstruction and development councils, 

5. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs consist of civil-
military officials, including Department of State and United States 
Agency for International Development officials, and primarily focus on: 

1. Improving governance,

2. Increasing security,

3. Developing the economy, and: 

4. Reconstruction: 

Coordination with the Department of State and United States Agency for 
International Development is not required by guidance, except at the 
PRT level, but MNC-I guidance notes that coordination may include 
complementary programs provided by USAID and other non-governmental 
agencies. 

Coordination occurs at the local level in Iraq: 

Commanders reported coordinating CERP projects with the appropriate PRT 
and with the local Iraqi governance; however the extent of coordination 
with PRTs was a function of the rapport between the entities.

Some PRTs in Iraq are embedded (ePRT) with the brigades; while others 
are larger individual organizations. Army officials in Iraq stated that 
they had an excellent relationship with ePRTs and believe the presence 
of PRTs and ePRTs have led to improved coordination between military, 
Department of State, and United States Agency for International 
Development efforts. 

Army officials told us that projects costing over $500,000 were 
coordinated with appropriate officials within the Iraqi government, 
including ministry representatives. 

Units that we visited generally stated that coordination with Army 
Corps of Engineers was limited to larger or more complex projects. 

Objective 3: 

To what extend do DOD and MNC-1 exercise oversight of CERP projects in 
Iraq? 

Approval levels for CERP: 

Guidance establishes the approval levels for projects thereby providing 
some level of oversight in theater. 

Although MNC-I has some visibility over projects costing more than 
$500,000 because they approve these, they have limited visibility and 
oversight for projects costing less than $500,000. MNC-I is not 
involved in the approval process for projects that cost less than 
$500,000. Our analysis indicates that about 97 percent of CERP projects 
in Iraq cost less than $500,000 in FY 07. This equates to more than 
$507 million, or 56 percent, of reported obligated funds for CERP 
projects. 

Iraq; 
CERP Project Amount: Over $500,000; 
Approval Authority: Multinational Corps-Iraq Commander; 
Can be Delegated?: No. 

Iraq; 
CERP Project Amount: Less than $500,000; 
Approval Authority: Major Subordinate Command Commander; 
Can be Delegated?: Yes. 

Oversight in Iraq varied: 

Oversight is an element of the project approval and project monitoring 
processes. These two phases of the CERP process receive varying levels 
of oversight. 

Project Approval: 

* Commanders we spoke with reported vetting projects through the 
appropriate approval authorities including Brigade commanders and Staff 
Judge Advocates who checked to ensure that the projects fell within 
CERP guidelines. 

* Many commanders that we visited told us that the approval process was 
too bureaucratic and cumbersome which impacted their ability to respond 
quickly to the needs of the local population. For example, one 
commander told us that it took 30-45 days between identifying a project 
and getting the project started. 

* One division has established an automated approval system for CERP 
projects. Subordinate units scan in the CERP documentation required for 
project approval and can then track where the projects stands in the 
approval process through a web portal. 

Project Monitoring: 

DOD and MNC-I guidance directs strict control over the fiscal tracking 
for CERP projects, but does not require units who execute the projects 
to conduct project monitoring, such as site visits, to ensure that 
projects meet specifications. 

Commanders or their representatives we visited stated that they 
conducted site visits to determine the status of project completion. 
However, they told us that often they did not possess the proper skill 
sets to determine if a project was built to specifications. 

Afghanistan guidance could serve as a model for Iraq guidance in terms 
of oversight: 

Afghanistan guidance requires oversight of CERP projects. Specifically, 
units must provide a quality assurance and quality control mechanism 
for all CERP projects. 

Afghanistan guidance also requires that technical engineering support 
be used for construction project design and development as well as 
quality assurance during execution. 

No CERP performance indicators exist: 

GAO has previously reported that federal agencies develop performance 
measures for a program.

Multiple commanders said they believe CERP is an effective program. 
However, no formal performance indicators have been established to 
assess the impact of CERP projects in Iraq. Commanders collected some 
anecdotal information about the impact that CERP had on the local 
populace.

* Some commanders reported that they tracked direct and indirect fire 
attacks as well as improvised explosive device attacks to determine 
whether attacks increase or decrease after a CERP project is executed 
in an area. Commanders stated that attacks usually decreased in areas 
where CERP projects were executed but cannot definitively tie the 
decrease to the CERP project. 

* Some commanders also cited increased information sharing and greater 
cooperation from the local Iraqi populace as a positive result of CERP 
projects. 

Performance metrics might include quantitative data such as the number 
of projects the Government of Iraq sustained or the number of people 
employed as a result of a CERP project or qualitative data gathered by 
surveys of Iraqi people. 

DODï¿½s oversight is limited in scope: 

DOD officials, specifically OSD Comptroller and Army Budget Office, 
view CERP as a commanderï¿½s program which should retain maximum 
flexibility and therefore limit their oversight to reviewing the CERP 
quarterly reports to Congress. 

* Army Budget Office reviews the quarterly CERP reports to Congress for 
completeness and to ensure that project descriptions match the project 
category. OSD Comptroller then reviews the quarterly CERP reports to 
Congress for completeness, accuracy of calculations, and whether the 
projectï¿½s description is assigned to the appropriate CERP category. 
Additionally, the OSD Comptrollerï¿½s General Counsel reviews the reports 
to Congress.

* OSD Comptroller and Army Budget Office officials informed us that 
they rely on commanders and those administering CERP in theater to 
determine what CERP projects are appropriate.

Multinational Force-Iraq said that they do not have responsibility for 
CERP because it is a Title 10 function, and rely on MNC-I to administer 
CERP. 

MNC-I receives the quarterly CERP reports to Congress that contains all 
CERP projects, including those costing less than $500,000 and reviews 
the reports to ensure that projects are correctly categorized, but does 
not review them for the appropriate use of CERP funds. MNC-I typically 
only becomes involved with projects that cost less than $500,000 when 
they are notified that there is a problem with the project or there 
could be a problem with it. 

DODï¿½s review of CERP budget request is limited: 

MNC-I develops the budget request for CERP based on such things as 
information received from Multinational Divisions on planned projects 
and historical execution. However, they do not review and prioritize 
planned projects from the Multinational Divisions prior to sending the 
request to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). 

CENTCOM sends the annual budget request to the Army Budget Office. It 
is a line item request for the entire program and no supporting 
justification is required. 

The Army Budget Office reviews the request and the funding level for 
the previous year, then adds a percentage increase for inflation prior 
to the request being sent to Congress. Their review of the CERP funding 
request includes coordinating with the Army officials in charge of 
operations to ascertain anticipated deployed strengths and force 
rotations, and with CENTCOM finance officials to obtain CERP 
requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan. If the operational command does 
not provide a specific requirement for increased CERP funding, the Army 
Budget Office holds CERP funding constant and adds an inflation factor, 
and then forwards the request to OSD Comptroller and the Office of 
Management and Budget for review and subsequent release to Congress. 

CENTCOM determines the funding level between Iraq and Afghanistan. 

[End of section] 

Enclosure III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Under Secretary Of Defense: 
1100 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington. DC 20301-1 100: 

Comptroller: 

June 6, 2008: 

Sharon L. Pickup: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548:  

Dear Ms. Pickup:

This is the Department of Defense response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, GAO-08-736R, "Military 
Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for 
Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, " 
dated May 2, 2008 (GAO Code 351054). By providing authority for the 
Commanders' Emergency Response Program, Congress has made available an 
important tool that our military commanders are using effectively in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. We welcome the GAO findings as another 
opportunity to improve operations in Iraq. The Department's responses 
to the recommendations included in draft report are enclosed. Technical 
comments have been provided to your staff separately. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Tina W. Jonas: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated MAY 2, 2008: 

GAO Code 351054 /GAO-08-736R: 

"Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection 
for Commander's Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in 
Iraq" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to revise its 
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) guidance to include: 

* a definition of small-scale and urgent, and: 

* a requirement that units that execute CERP projects provide project 
monitoring to ensure that contractors have met the contract 
specifications. 

DOD Response: Concur. DoD has issued revised guidance to incorporate 
these recommendations. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in conjunction 
with others, to develop performance measures or indicators for the 
Commander's Emergency Response Program and use these indicators as well 
as other information to evaluate project effectiveness and 
sustainability as well as the program's budget requests. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. DoD has amended the Commander's 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) guidance to require performance 
indicators for CERP-funded projects. The revised guidance will require 
that performance indicators be developed and submitted as part of a 
project proposal package in theater and used to evaluate it through 
project close-out. 

We agree with the GAO that CERP projects must be established with 
processes that will help guarantee successful completion. However, 
given the fact that CERP is directly linked to the immediate warfight 
and is, by design, focused on projects that will meet the needs of the 
immediate situation, we do not concur that past projects are a primary 
factor in determining future projects. CERP funding is driven by the 
security situation in theater and that is the environment that the 
local commanders use in prioritizing projects. It is this influence of 
CERP in the irregular warfare of counter-insurgency that the military 
commanders identify as its intrinsic value. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff direct the Commander, U.S. Central Command to direct 
the commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq to take steps to gain greater 
visibility of projects costing less than $500,000, such as obtaining 
and reviewing summary information on the status of projects, completion 
rates, and impact of projects on the community. 

DOD Response: Partially Concur. DoD has revised the guidance 
accordingly. However, we note that the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-
I) would be the appropriate organization for this recommendation. In 
addition, MNC-I currently tracks all projects and monitors their 
progress. The MNC-I regularly participates (in person or via video- 
teleconference) in division-level coordination meetings at which 
subordinate units present significant projects and status information. 

Enclosure IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: Sharon Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments:In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, 
Assistant Director; James Ashley; Grace Coleman; Joel Grossman; Nicole 
Harms; Melissa Hermes; Larry Junek; Ron La Due Lake; Gregory Marchand; 
Leo Sullivan; Sonja Ware; and Karen Werner made key contributions to 
this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] CERP was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003 
and was originally funded by seized Iraqi assets and monies from the 
Development Fund for Iraq. However, in November 2003, Congress 
appropriated $180 million for CERP as part of the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, Pub. L. No.108-106 (2003). 

[2] DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 12, ch. 27, 
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (Nov. 2007). 

[3] CENTCOM is one of DOD's six regional combatant commands. Its area 
of responsibility includes Iraq and Afghanistan. Combatant commanders 
are responsible for overseeing U.S. military operations that take place 
in their geographic area. CENTCOM determines the allocation of funds 
between Iraq and Afghanistan. 

[4] PRTs are a joint civilian-military interagency effort that serve as 
the primary interface for U.S. and coalition partners and provincial 
and local governments throughout Iraq. Embedded PRTs are civilian-led 
teams that work in concert with the brigade combat teams. 

[5] GAO, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective 
Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract in 
Iraq, GAO 08-316R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008). 

[6] GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address 
Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investment, GAO-08-568T 
(Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008). 

[7] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[8] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).

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