Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed
Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many
Challenges Yet to Be Addressed (01-MAY-08, GAO-08-722T).
To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese
communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S.
forces in the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense
Policy Review Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American
military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. The
Department of Defense (DOD) plans to move 8,000 Marines and an
estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the
2014 goal. GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the
buildup of U.S. forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this
testimony addresses (1) DOD's planning process for the military
buildup on Guam, (2) potential challenges for DOD and the
government of Guam associated with the buildup, and (3) the
status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to meet
infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup. This testimony
is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO report on
DOD's overseas master plans and prior work on issues related to
the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part,
on preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DOD's
planning effort to address the challenges associated with the
military buildup on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of
DOD-related growth on surrounding communities in the continental
United States. GAO is not making recommendations at this time.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-722T
ACCNO: A81943
TITLE: Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed
Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many
Challenges Yet to Be Addressed
DATE: 05/01/2008
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Defense economic analysis
Environmental impact statements
Environmental monitoring
Environmental protection
Federal funds
Foreign governments
Funds management
International cooperation
International relations
Military dependents
Military facilities
Military facility construction
Military forces
Military training
Program evaluation
Public key infrastructure
Regional planning
Reporting requirements
Strategic planning
Foreign countries
program goals or objectives
Guam
Japan
U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review
Initiative
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GAO-08-722T
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:15 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, May 1, 2008:
Defense Infrastructure:
Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their
Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet to Be Addressed:
Statement of Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-08-722T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-722T, a testimony before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese
communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in
the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review
Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American military units in
Japan to other areas, including Guam. The Department of Defense (DOD)
plans to move 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 dependents from
Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal.
GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the buildup of U.S.
forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this testimony addresses
(1) DOD�s planning process for the military buildup on Guam, (2)
potential challenges for DOD and the government of Guam associated with
the buildup, and (3) the status of planning efforts by the government
of Guam to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup.
This testimony is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO
report on DOD�s overseas master plans and prior work on issues related
to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part, on
preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DOD�s planning
effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup
on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of DOD-related growth on
surrounding communities in the continental United States.
What GAO Found:
DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam;
however, many key decisions remain, such as the final size of the
military population, which units will be stationed there, and what
military facilities will be constructed. This part of the planning
process is ongoing, along with the development of a required
environmental impact statement, currently expected to be issued in
2010. However, DOD will submit budget requests for fiscal year 2010
prior to that date, and thus may not know the full extent of its
facility requirements before asking Congress to provide the associated
funding. Officials of the Navy�s Joint Guam Program Office told us that
immediately after the environmental impact statement is completed, DOD
will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014
goal discussed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. However, other
DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this is an optimistic
schedule considering the possibility that the environmental impact
statement could be delayed, the complexities of moving thousands of
Marines and their dependents to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient
funding from the governments of United States and Japan to support the
move.
DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges
associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD�s challenges
include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such
as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also
challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on
Guam�s community and civilian infrastructure. For example, according to
DOD and government of Guam officials, Guam�s highways may be unable to
bear the increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its
electrical system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy
needed, its water and wastewater treatment systems are already near
capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity and
environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated
with the projected increase in U.S. forces and their dependents.
The government of Guam�s efforts to plan to meet infrastructure
challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities are
in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated with the
military buildup contribute to the difficulties Guam officials face in
developing precise plans. These challenges are somewhat analogous to
challenges communities around continental U.S. growth bases face.
Government of Guam officials recognize that the island�s infrastructure
is inadequate to meet the projected demand; however, funding sources
are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as to whether and to
what extent the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial
assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to the military
buildup. In September 2007, GAO reported that most communities
experiencing civilian and military population growth at Army
installations in the continental United States will likely incur costs
to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure
improvements, and many of these communities are also seeking federal
and state assistance.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making recommendations at this time.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-08-722T. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or [email protected].
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the planning
effort for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities in Guam and to
describe the associated challenges for the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the local community in accommodating the expansion of DOD's
military presence on Guam. To reduce the burden of the U.S. military
presence on Japanese communities while maintaining a continuing
presence of U.S. forces in the region, the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy
Review Initiative[Footnote 1] established a framework for the future of
U.S. force structure in Japan, including the relocation of American
military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. As a part of
this initiative, DOD plans to move 8,000 Marines and their estimated
9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. At the
same time, the other military services are also planning to expand
their operations and military presence on Guam. For example, the Navy
plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic capabilities, and
waterfront facilities; the Air Force plans to develop a global
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen
Air Force Base; and the Army plans to place a ballistic missile defense
task force on Guam. As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps
realignment, the total military buildup on Guam is estimated to cost
over $13 billion and increase Guam's current population of 171,000 by
an estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and dependents (or
14.6 percent) to 196,000. The government of Japan is expected to
contribute about $6.1 billion toward the costs of the Marine Corps
move, although a portion of these funds could be repaid over time by
the U.S. government.
We have issued several reports on DOD's integrated global presence and
basing strategy[Footnote 2] and its overseas master plans for changing
U.S. military infrastructure overseas as required by the fiscal year
2004 Senate military construction appropriation bill report.[Footnote
3] Most recently, in September 2007, we reported on DOD's overseas
master plans for changing its infrastructure overseas and on the status
of DOD's planning effort and the challenges associated with the buildup
of military forces and facilities on Guam.[Footnote 4] In that report,
we found that DOD's planning effort for the military buildup on Guam
was in its initial stages, with many key decisions and challenges yet
to be addressed. Additionally, we found that the potential effects of
the increase in military forces on Guam's infrastructure--in terms of
population and military facilities--had not been fully addressed. Also,
in September 2007, we reported how communities in the continental
United States are planning and funding for infrastructure to support
significant personnel growth in response to implementing base
realignment and closure, overseas force rebasing, and force modularity
actions.[Footnote 5]
As requested, my testimony today will focus on three principal
objectives. First, I will address DOD's planning process for the
military buildup on Guam. Second, I will point out potential challenges
for DOD and the government of Guam associated with the military
buildup. Third, I will describe the status of planning efforts by the
government of Guam to address infrastructure challenges to the local
community caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities.
My testimony is based largely on findings of our September 2007 report
on DOD's overseas master plans and information from a prior report on
issues related to reducing the effects of the U.S. military presence in
Okinawa.[Footnote 6] My testimony is also based, in part, on
preliminary observations from our ongoing review of DOD's overseas
master plans and its planning effort to address the challenges
associated with the military buildup on Guam and on two separate
reports of the effects of DOD-related growth on surrounding communities
in the continental United States.[Footnote 7] As part of our ongoing
work, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, U.S. Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine
Expeditionary Force, and the Navy's Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO)--
the office established to plan and execute the military buildup on
Guam--to discuss the planning process for DOD's military realignments
on Guam and to identify challenges associated with the buildup of
military forces and infrastructure on Guam. We also met with the
Governor of Guam and his staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff
from the office of the Guam Delegate to the House of Representatives,
and various Guam community groups to discuss their planning efforts and
any challenges they may face related to the military buildup. We expect
to report the results of our ongoing review to congressional defense
committees later this year. We conducted this performance audit and our
prior reports in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; yet,
many key decisions must still be made, such as the final size of the
military population, which units will be stationed there, and what
military facilities will be required. The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy
Review Initiative established a framework for the future of U.S. force
structure in Japan and the Marine Corps realignment to Guam. The U.S.
Pacific Command then developed the Guam Integrated Military Development
Plan[Footnote 8] to provide an overview of the projected military
population and infrastructure requirements. However, the exact size and
makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the housing, operational,
quality of life, and service support infrastructure required are not
yet fully known. This part of the planning process is ongoing, along
with the development of a required environmental impact statement.
Before JGPO can finalize its master plan for the military buildup on
Guam, it needs to complete the required environmental impact statement,
currently expected to be issued in 2010. Prior to that date, DOD will
submit its fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first
phase of military construction projects on Guam. Thus, DOD may be
asking Congress to fund the military construction projects without the
benefit of a completed environmental impact statement or a final
decision on the full extent of its facility and funding requirements.
DOD officials said that the department often requests funding during
the same period environmental impact statements are being developed for
large projects, including major base realignments and closures. JGPO
officials told us that immediately after the environmental impact
statement is completed, DOD will commence construction of facilities in
efforts to meet the 2014 goal identified in the Defense Policy Review
Initiative. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe
that this is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the
possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed,
the complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents
from Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient funding from
the governments of United States and Japan to support the Marine Corps
move.
DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges
associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD's challenges
include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such
as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also
challenges in addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on
Guam's community and infrastructure. For example, according to DOD and
government of Guam officials, Guam's highways may be unable to bear the
increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its
electrical system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy
needed, its water and wastewater treatment systems are already near
capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity and
environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated
with relocation of U.S. forces and their dependents.
The government of Guam's efforts to plan to meet infrastructure
challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities on
Guam are in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated
with the military buildup further contribute to the difficulties Guam
officials face in developing precise plans. These challenges are
somewhat analogous to the challenges communities around continental
United States growth bases face. Furthermore, government of Guam
officials stated that Guam will likely require significant funding to
address the island's inadequate infrastructure capacity; however,
funding sources are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as to
whether and to what extent the government of Guam will be able to
obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to
the military buildup. In September 2007, we reported that most U.S.
communities surrounding growing Army bases have unique infrastructure
improvement needs, such as schools, transportation, and other
infrastructure improvements, and many of these communities are also
seeking state and federal assistance.[Footnote 9]
Background:
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in
Okinawa and other locations in Japan. The U.S. military occupation of
Japan ended in 1952, but the United States administered the Ryukyu
Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972. Efforts to address the Japanese
population's concerns regarding U.S. military presence in Okinawa began
more than a decade ago. One chief complaint is that the Okinawa
prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. forces in Japan and that more
than 70 percent of the land U.S. forces utilize in Japan is on Okinawa.
Many citizens of Okinawa believe the U.S. presence has hampered
economic development. The public outcry in Okinawa following the
September 1995 abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three
U.S. servicemembers brought to the forefront long-standing concerns
among the Okinawan people about the effects of the U.S. military
presence on the island. According to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, at that time, the continued ability of the United States to
remain in Japan was at risk, and it was important to reduce the effects
of the U.S. military presence on the Okinawan people. To address these
concerns, bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan
began, and the Security Consultative Committee established the Special
Action Committee on Okinawa in November 1995. The committee developed
recommendations on ways to limit the effects of the U.S. military
presence on Okinawa by closing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and
relocating forces from that base to another base on Okinawa, and
recommended numerous other operational changes. On December 2, 1996,
the U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Japan
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and State, and the Director General of the
Japan Defense Agency issued the committee's final report.
In 1998, we reviewed the Special Action Committee's Final Report.
[Footnote 10] At that time, among other things, we reported that the
forward deployment on Okinawa significantly shortens transit times,
thereby promoting early arrival in potential regional trouble spots
such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits. For example, it
takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from Okinawa, as compared
with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from
the continental United States. Similarly, it takes about 1-1/2 days to
make the trip from Okinawa by ship to South Korea, as compared with
about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days from the
continental United States. Also, the cost of this presence is shared by
the government of Japan, which provides land and other infrastructure
on Okinawa rent free and pays part of the annual cost of Okinawa-based
Marine Corps forces, such as a portion of the costs for utilities and
local Japanese labor. Most initiatives of the Special Action Committee
on Okinawa involving training operations, changes to the status of
forces agreement procedures, and noise reduction were successfully
implemented. In contrast, initiatives involving land returns have not
been as successful, with the majority still ongoing. For example, the
closure of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was never completed and the
air station remains open and operational. According to U.S. Forces
Japan officials, these initiatives may involve multiple construction
projects to satisfy the requirements of the initiatives as well as
detailed coordination between the government of Japan and the local
communities to gain consensus for these projects.
In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained
security consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security
alliance to better address today's rapidly changing global security
environment. DOD's Defense Policy Review Initiative established a
framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to
create the conditions to reduce the burden on Japanese communities and
create a continuing presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater by
relocating units to other areas, including Guam (app. I shows the
location of Guam). This initiative also includes a significant
reduction and reorganization of the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa to
include relocating 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents
to Guam. More than 10,000 Marines and their dependents will remain
stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. Another initiative includes
the closure and replacement of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma at a
less densely populated location on Okinawa by the 2014 goal as a result
of local concerns involving safety and noise. DOD officials view the
success of the Futenma replacement facility as a key objective of the
initiative that will need to be completed in order for other
realignment actions to take place. Previously, the United States and
Japan were unsuccessful in closing and replacing the Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma as a part of the Special Action Committee effort on
Okinawa.
Other Global Realignments:
In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been
described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military
forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. The initiative is
intended to close bases no longer needed to meet Cold War threats as
well as bring home U.S. forces while stationing more flexible,
deployable capabilities in strategic locations around the world. As
part of its transformation, DOD has been reexamining overseas basing
requirements to allow for greater U.S. military flexibility to combat
conventional and asymmetric threats worldwide.
The Marine Corps realignment from Okinawa to Guam is just one of
several initiatives to move military forces and equipment and construct
supporting military facilities on Guam. In addition to the Marine
Corps' move to Guam, the Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure,
logistic capabilities, and waterfront facilities to support transient
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing, combat logistics force ships,
submarines, surface combatants, and high-speed transport ships at Naval
Base Guam. The Air Force plans to develop a global intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base
by hosting various types of aircraft, such as fighters, bombers, and
tankers, and the Global Hawk system, which is a high-altitude, long-
endurance unmanned aerial reconnaissance system, on both permanent and
rotational bases. The Army also plans to place a ballistic missile
defense task force on Guam with approximately 630 soldiers and 950
dependents. As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps
realignment, the active duty military personnel and dependent
population of more than 14,000 on Guam is expected to increase
approximately 176 percent to more than 39,000 (app. II shows current
U.S. military bases on Guam).
Master Planning Requirements for the Military Buildup on Guam:
As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began
to emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness
of the military construction program and the need for a well-developed
master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure.
In July 2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military
construction projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in
the President's budget request until such time as they can be
incorporated into a master plan for Guam and viewed in that context.
Further, the committee directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to
the appropriation committees a master plan for Guam by December 29,
2006, and a report accounting for the United States' share of this
construction program to project-level detail and the year in which each
project is expected to be funded.[Footnote 11] The Senate report also
directed GAO to review DOD's master planning effort for Guam as part of
its annual review of DOD's overseas master plans.[Footnote 12] As
discussed in our 2007 report, DOD has not issued a Guam master plan for
several reasons. First, the required environmental impact statement,
which will take at least 3 years to complete according to DOD documents
and officials, was initiated on March 7, 2007.[Footnote 13] According
to DOD officials, the results of that environmental impact statement
will influence many of the key decisions on the exact location, size,
and makeup of the military infrastructure development on Guam. Second,
exact size and makeup of the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet
identified. Third, DOD officials said that additional time is needed to
fully address the challenges related to funding uncertainties,
operational requirements, and Guam's economic and infrastructure
requirements.
Organizations and Responsibilities:
The U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for
the movement of Marine Corps forces to Guam. In August 2006, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to establish JGPO to
facilitate, manage, and execute requirements associated with the
rebasing of Marine Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including the
planning for all the other remaining military realignments on Guam.
Specifically, JGPO was tasked to lead the coordinated planning efforts
among all the DOD components and other stakeholders to consolidate,
optimize, and integrate the existing DOD infrastructure on Guam. The
office's responsibilities include integration of operational support
requirements, development, and program and budget synchronization;
oversight of the construction; and coordination of government and
business activities. JGPO is expected to work closely with the local
Guam government, the government of Japan, other federal agencies, and
Congress in order to manage this comprehensive effort and to develop a
master plan.
The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility over
the insular areas for all matters that do not fall within the program
responsibility of other federal departments or agencies. Also, the
Interior Secretary presides over the Interagency Group on Insular Areas
and may make recommendations to the President or heads of agencies
regarding policy or policy implementation actions of the federal
government affecting insular areas. The Secretary, as the presiding
officer of this interagency group, established a Working Group on Guam
Military Expansion to address issues related to the military buildup.
The working group includes representatives of the Departments of State,
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Labor, Justice, Transportation,
Housing and Urban Development, Education, and Veterans Affairs as well
as the Navy, the Small Business Administration, the Office of
Management and Budget, and others. Five ongoing subgroups were
established to discuss policy and resource requirements relating to (1)
labor and workforce issues, (2) Guam civilian infrastructure needs, (3)
health and human services requirements, (4) the environment, and (5)
socioeconomic issues.
DOD Has Established a Framework for Military Buildup on Guam, but the
Planning Process Is Ongoing:
The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has established the
framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan,
including the realignments on Okinawa and Guam. However, no final
decision on the exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam,
including their operational, housing, and installation support
facilities, has been made. The environmental impact statement expected
in 2010 may affect many key planning decisions.
Framework for the Military Realignment and Buildup:
DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that
serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on
Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the
U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the
framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to
create the conditions to reduce the burden of American military
presence on local Japanese communities and to create a continuing
presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including
Guam. In its Defense of Japan 2006 publication, the Japan Ministry of
Defense reported that more than 70 percent of U.S. facilities and areas
are concentrated in Okinawa and regional development has been greatly
affected by the concentration.[Footnote 14] That publication
recommended that the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps forces from
Okinawa to Guam should occur as soon as possible. It further noted that
based on bilateral meetings in 2005 and 2006, the government of Japan
had decided to support the United States in its development of
necessary facilities and infrastructure, including headquarters
buildings, barracks, and family housing, to hasten the process of
moving Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam.
Subsequently, in July 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam
Integrated Military Development Plan[Footnote 15] to provide an
overview of the projected military population and infrastructure
requirements; however, it provides limited information on the expected
effects of the military buildup on the local community and off base
infrastructure. The plan is based upon a notional force structure that
was used to generate land and facility requirements for basing,
operations, logistics, training, and quality of life involving the
Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces in
Guam. Also, JGPO has completed its first phase of the Guam master
planning process and developed basic facility requirements with general
cost estimates and mapping concepts. The second phase of the master
planning is in progress and will include more detailed infrastructure
requirements, facility layouts, and cost estimates for fiscal years
2010 and 2011. JGPO is developing a planning-level Guam joint military
master plan that will be submitted to congressional staff by September
15, 2008. However, that plan is not considered a final master plan
since DOD is awaiting the results of the environmental impact statement
and record of decision, which are due in 2010.
Size and Makeup of Forces and Other Variables Are Not Yet Known:
The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the
operational, housing, and installation support facilities required are
not yet fully known. While the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review
Initiative identified Marine Corps units for relocation from Okinawa,
assessments are still under way within DOD to determine the optimal mix
of units to move to Guam, which may also include Marines from other
locations, such as Hawaii and the continental United States.
Approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents of the
Third Marine Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine
Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st
Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters are
expected to be included in the move to Guam. The Marine Corps forces
remaining on Okinawa will consist of approximately 10,000 Marines plus
their dependents of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. While these broad
estimates provide a baseline, according to DOD officials we spoke with,
the Marine Corps is still determining the specific mix of units and
capabilities needed to meet mission requirements on Guam. In addition,
Marine Corps officials said that the department was reviewing the mix
of units moving to Guam in light of the department's plan to increase
the number of Marines to 202,000 from 180,000.[Footnote 16]
The number and mix of units is significant because, according to Marine
Corps officials, the operational, housing, and installation support
facilities on Guam will depend on the type, size, and number of units
that will make the move. That determination will define the training
and facility requirements, such as the number and size of family
housing units, barracks, and schools and the capacity of the
installation support facilities needed to support the military
population and operations. In response to the ongoing assessment by the
Marine Corps, JGPO officials said that they were initiating a master
plan that will reflect the building of �flexible:
Results of the Required Environmental Impact Statement May Affect
Several Key Decisions:
Before JGPO can finalize its Guam master plan, it will need to complete
the required environmental impact statement. According to DOD
officials, the results of the environmental statement, currently
expected to be issued in 2010, can affect many of the key decisions on
the exact location, size, and makeup of the military infrastructure
development.
On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare
an environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),[Footnote 17] as
implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality
Regulations,[Footnote 18] and Executive Order 12114. The notice of
intent in the Federal Register[Footnote 19] states that the
environmental impact statement will:
* Examine the potential environmental effects associated with
relocating Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units
(which comprise approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000
dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact statement
will examine potential effects from activities associated with Marine
Corps units' relocation to include operations, training, and
infrastructure changes.
* Examine the Navy's plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic
capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient
nuclear aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental
impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront
improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing.
* Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force
(approximately 630 solders and their estimated 950 dependents) in Guam.
The environmental impact statement will examine potential effects from
activities associated with the task force, including operations,
training, and infrastructure changes.
JGPO officials recognize that the results of this environmental
assessment process may affect the development and timing of JGPO's
master plan for Guam. Under NEPA and the regulations established by the
Council on Environmental Quality, an environmental impact statement
must include a purpose and need statement, a description of all
reasonable project alternatives and their environmental effects
(including a "no action" alternative), a description of the environment
of the area to be affected or created by the alternatives being
considered, and an analysis of the environmental impacts of the
proposed action and each alternative.[Footnote 20] Further, accurate
scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are
essential to implementing NEPA. For example, federal agencies such as
DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity, including
scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in the
environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft
environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are
required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has
jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the
comments of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American
tribes, and any agency that has requested that it receive such
statements. Until an agency issues a final environmental impact
statement and record of decision, it generally may not take any action
concerning the proposal that would either have adverse environmental
effects or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives.
DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses
and cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of Guam master
plan and thus affect the construction schedule of military facilities
needed to accommodate thousands of Marines and dependents by the 2014
goal identified in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. DOD will
submit its fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first
phase of military construction projects prior to the completion of the
environmental impact statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to
fund the military construction projects without the benefit of a
completed environmental impact statement or a final decision on the
full extent of its facility and funding requirements. DOD officials
said that this practice of requesting funding during the development of
environmental impact statements is common within the department for
large projects, such as major base realignments and closures. JGPO
officials told us that immediately after the environmental impact
statement and record of decision are completed, the department will
commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal.
However, other DOD and government of Guam officials believe that this
is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the possibility
that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the
complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents from Okinawa
to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United States and
Japan to support military construction projects.
Several DOD and Government of Guam Challenges Have Yet to Be Addressed:
DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges
associated with the military buildup, including addressing funding and
operational challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which
could affect the development and implementation of their planning
efforts. First, DOD has not identified all funding requirements and may
encounter difficulties in obtaining funding given competing priorities
within the department. Second, DOD officials need to address the
operational and training limitations on Guam, such as for sea and
airlift capabilities, and training requirements for thousands of
Marines. Third, the increase in military personnel and their dependents
on Guam and the large number of the construction workers needed to
build military facilities will create challenges for Guam's community
and civilian infrastructure.
DOD Faces Funding Challenges:
The military services' realignments on Guam are estimated to cost over
$13 billion. Included in this $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine
Corps buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion. However, these
estimates do not include the estimated costs of all other defense
organizations that will be needed to support the additional military
personnel and dependents on Guam. For example, the Defense Logistics
Agency, which will help support the services' influx of personnel,
missions, and equipment to Guam, will likely incur additional costs
that are not included in the current estimate. Also, the costs to move
and accommodate Marine Corps units from locations other than Okinawa to
Guam are not included in the estimate. In addition, the costs
associated with the development of training ranges[Footnote 21] and
facilities on nearby islands are not included in the current estimate
for the military buildup. According to JGPO officials, the total costs
for the military buildup will eventually be identified and integrated
into JGPO's master plan for Guam.
Of the $10.3 billion estimate for the Marine Corps buildup, the
government of Japan is expected to contribute up to $2.8 billion in
funds without reimbursement for the construction of facilities, such as
barracks and office buildings. The government of Japan is also expected
to provide another $3.3 billion in loans and equity investments for
installation support infrastructure, such as on base power and water
systems, and military family housing. Most of this $3.3 billion is
expected over time to be recouped by Japan in the form of service
charges paid by the U.S. government and in rents paid by American
servicemembers with their overseas housing allowance provided by DOD.
In addition, according to DOD officials, there are several conditions
that must be met before the government of Japan contributes to the cost
of the Marine Corps move. First, the government of Japan has stipulated
that its funds will not be made available until it has reviewed and
agreed to specific infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or
delay of any initiative outlined in the Defense Policy Review
Initiative may affect the other initiatives, because various planning
variables need to fall into place in order for the initiatives to move
forward. For example, DOD officials expect that if the Futenma
replacement facility in Okinawa (estimated to cost from $4 billion to
$5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation to Guam may be
canceled or delayed. Previously, the United States and Japan were
unsuccessful in closing and replacing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
as a part of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa process in 1996.
[Footnote 22] DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement
facility as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be
completed in order for other realignment actions to take place,
including the move to Guam. Finally, the government of Japan may
encounter challenges in funding its share of the Marine Corps move
considering Japan's other national priorities and its commitments
associated with funding several other major realignments of U.S. forces
in Japan under the Defense Policy Review Initiative.
DOD Faces Operational Challenges:
Operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility support
and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, have not
been fully addressed. According to Marine Forces Pacific officials, the
Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military sealift and
airlift to reach destinations in Asia that may be farther away than was
the case when the units were based in Okinawa. For example, in a
contingency operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to
deploy from Sasebo, Japan, or other locations to collect the Marines
and their equipment on Guam and then go to the area where the
contingency is taking place, potentially risking a delayed arrival at
certain potential trouble spots. According to Marine Corps officials,
amphibious shipping capability and airlift capacity are needed in Guam,
which may include expanding existing staging facilities and systems
support for both sealift and airlift. The Marine Corps estimated
additional costs for strategic lift operating from Guam to be nearly
$88 million annually.
Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to
meet the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A
DOD analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges
on Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force
because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific
Command is also in the process of conducting a training study that
covers both Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
to see what options are available for training in the region. Marine
Forces Pacific officials stated that live-fire artillery training,
amphibious landings, and tracked vehicle operations will be challenging
because of the combination of factors associated with the limited size
of training areas available and the environmental concerns on the
Northern Mariana Islands.
Increase in Military Presence Is Likely to Cause Local Community and
Infrastructure Challenges:
The increase in military presence is expected to have significant
effects on Guam's community and infrastructure, and these challenges
have not been fully addressed. This undertaking is estimated to
increase the current Guam population of approximately 171,000 by an
estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and dependents (or 14.6
percent) to 196,000. The Guam population could also swell further
because DOD's personnel estimates do not include defense civilians and
contractors who are also likely to move to Guam to support DOD
operations.
DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the military
buildup will have significant effects on the local community. For
example:
* As a result of the military buildup on Guam, construction demands
will exceed local capacity and the availability of workers, though the
extent to which the local workers can meet this increase has yet to be
determined. For example, on the basis of trend data, government of Guam
officials estimate the current construction capacity to be
approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated
construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed by DOD to
meet the planned 2014 completion date. In addition, Guam currently
faces a shortage of skilled construction workers. Preliminary analysis
indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 construction workers will be required
to support the projected development on Guam. One estimate is that Guam
may be able to meet only 10 to 15 percent of the labor requirement
locally, a concern to federal, military, and local officials. Nearby
countries may have workers willing to come to Guam to take jobs to
construct needed facilities, but these workers will have to temporarily
enter the United States on temporary nonagricultural workers visas,
currently capped at 66,000 per year. JGPO officials said that
legislation recently passed by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives that will increase the cap in the short term is a first
step toward addressing many of their concerns with temporary
nonagricultural workers visas.
* The government of Guam has expressed several concerns about the
potential effects of an influx of foreign workers on Guam's community.
The Civilian Military Task Force recommended that Guam needs to
establish a department that would focus on processing foreign workers.
Further, a government of Guam report stated that the influx of foreign
workers would put a strain on existing emergency care services, medical
facilities, and public utilities.
In addition, DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the
island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the increased demand due
to the military buildup. For example:
* Guam's commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing
space, crane operations, and container storage locations. The military
buildup requires a port with double the current capacity, and military
cargo is expected to increase sixfold during construction of facilities
required for the buildup.
* Guam's two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance
(ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air
Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance
must be transported on one of these major roads that run through highly
populated areas. The current highway system also experiences slippery
surfaces, potholes, and occasional flooding. Traffic between military
installations and commercial, business, and residential areas is
anticipated to increase significantly with the military buildup.
* Guam's electrical system--the sole power provider on the island--is
not reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and
voltage and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to
deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military
buildup.
* Guam's water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and
have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution
lines. The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent.
* Guam's solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental
challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life.
Currently, the solid waste landfills in Guam have a number of
unresolved issues related to discharge of pollutants and are near
capacity.
Government of Guam's Planning Efforts Are in Their Initial Stages:
The government of Guam's planning efforts to address infrastructure
challenges associated with the buildup of military forces are in the
initial stages, and several uncertainties further contribute to the
difficulties the government of Guam faces in developing precise plans
to address the effects of the military buildup on the local community
and infrastructure. In addition, funding sources to address
infrastructure challenges are uncertain. As we have found with some
communities experiencing civilian and military population growth
surrounding Army installations in the continental United States, the
government of Guam will likely ask for assistance to provide civilian
infrastructure improvements.
Two recent studies that examine the various effects of the military
buildup on the local infrastructure and community were developed by the
government of Guam and KPMG. First, the Governor of Guam commissioned
the Civilian Military Task Force to develop a plan that would both
accommodate the military personnel expansion and provide opportunities
for the Guam community. The task force issued its report in November
2007, which provided a synopsis of the various funding and resource
needs.[Footnote 23] Second, the government of Guam contracted KPMG to
examine the needs and challenges Guam faces in regard to the military
buildup. The October 2007 report made preliminary assessments on the
effects of the military buildup on Guam's infrastructure, economy, and
social services.[Footnote 24] One study estimated that more than $3
billion will be required for civilian infrastructure and government
services to address the military buildup.[Footnote 25]
The uncertainties associated with exact size, makeup, and timing of the
forces to be moved to Guam make it difficult for the government of Guam
to develop comprehensive plans to address the effects of the proposed
military buildup. Guam officials said that without accurate information
it is difficult to develop an infrastructure program that identifies
civilian construction projects and financing to support the military
buildup and to form an administrative structure to oversee and
coordinate project scheduling and implementation. In our September 2007
report on communities experiencing civilian and military population
growth at continental U.S. Army installations, we found that without
knowing whether Army headquarters-level offices or the local base plans
have accurate information about the expected growth, communities are
not well positioned to plan for and provide adequate schools, housing,
transportation, and other infrastructure.
As discussed previously, government of Guam officials recognize that
the island's infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand
and will likely require significant funding to address this challenge.
However, the extent to which the government of Guam will be able to
obtain financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands from
the federal government is unclear. Government of Guam officials we met
with were uncertain as to whether and to what extent federal grant
programs will be available to address Guam's public infrastructure to
support the military realignments. On the basis of its initial review,
KPMG reported that the data it collected from the government of Guam
suggested that it is likely there will be a significant funding gap
between the availability of funds and requirements for Guam's
infrastructure program.[Footnote 26] KPMG further reported that $282
million in federal funding was provided to Guam in 2006. Without
additional federal assistance, government of Guam officials believe
that local infrastructure improvements to accommodate the military
buildup would take decades to complete. In our September 2007 report on
U.S. communities experiencing civilian and military population growth
at Army installations, we found that communities will likely incur
costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other
infrastructure improvements.[Footnote 27] Because of limited local
funding, some of these communities are seeking federal and state
assistance.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions you or any members of the committee may have at this
time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this statement, please contact Brian
J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this testimony. GAO staff members making major
contributions to this testimony are listed in appendix III.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Location of Guam:
Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is located
in the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles southwest of Honolulu,
Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the Philippines; and 1,560 miles
southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Location of Guam:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the Pacific Ocean area with specific
indications of distances from Guam to the following cities:
From Guam:
Distance to Manila: 1,600 miles;
Distance to Taipei: 1,700 miles;
Distance to Tokyo: 1,560 miles;
Distance to Honolulu: 3,810 miles.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Military Installations on Guam:
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), about 29 percent of the
land on Guam is controlled by DOD (as indicated in white in fig. 2), 52
percent is privately owned, and 19 percent is under the supervision of
the government of Guam.
Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Guam, with the location of the following
military installations indicated:
Andersen AFB:
Northwest Field, Anderson AFB:
Andersen South:
NCTS Finegayan:
South Finegayan Housing:
Naval Hospital:
NCTS Barrigada:
Guam International Airport:
Apra Harbor Naval Complex:
Ordnance Annex:
Apra Heights:
Tenjo Vista Tank Farm:
Sasa Valley Tank Farm:
Nimitz Hill.
Source: DOD.
Note: NCTS is the abbreviation for naval computer and
telecommunications station and AFB is the abbreviation for air force
base.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant
Director; Nelsie Alcoser; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Jamilah Moon
made major contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Overseas Master Plans/Global Posturing:
Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD
Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military
Buildup on Guam. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015]. Washington, D.C.:
September 12, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-852].
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R]. Washington, D.C.:
August 22, 2006.
Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing
U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R]. Washington, D.C.:
June 27, 2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs
Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-609]. Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2004.
Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S.
Military Presence on Okinawa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-66]. Washington, D.C.:
March 2, 1998.
Community Growth Bases:
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.:
April 1, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007]. Washington, D.C.:
September 13, 2007.
U.S. Insular Areas:
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation Would
Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition Period.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-466]. Washington,
D.C.: March 28, 2008.
U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-119].
Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006.
U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care
Funding. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-75].
Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005.
Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing with
Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-423]. Washington, D.C.:
April 11, 2002.
Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid
Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants' Impact on U.S. Areas.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-270T]. Washington,
D.C.: December 6, 2001.
Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had
Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-40]. Washington, D.C.:
October 5, 2001.
U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/OGC-98-5]. Washington, D.C.:
November 7, 1997.
Insular Areas Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-184R]. Washington, D.C.:
September 13, 1996.
U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal
Government. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-GGD-95-71].
Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995.
U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination Among
U.S. Agencies Are Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-94-62]. Washington, D.C.:
February 7, 1994.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD officials refer to the process through which the United States
and Japan negotiated the initiatives that realign U.S. forces in Japan
as the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The realignment initiatives
were the result of Security Consultative Committee meetings in 2005 and
2006 between U.S. and Japan officials. The Security Consultative
Committee is made up of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and
Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense.
The committee sets overall bilateral policy regarding the security
relationship between the United States and Japan. The results of these
meetings established a framework for the future U.S. force structure in
Japan, including the Marine Corps move from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam.
[2] GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual
Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global
Posture Restructuring, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-852] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006).
[3] GAO, DOD's Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-913R] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive
Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-680R] (Washington,
D.C.: June 27, 2005); and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting
U.S. Infrastructure Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive
Master Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-609]
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004).
[4] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving,
but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the
Military Buildup on Guam, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2007).
[5] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for
Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations
Expecting Substantial Growth, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007).
[6] GAO, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of
the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-66] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 2, 1998).
[7] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and
Road Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-602R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
1, 2008), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
1007].
[8] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan
(Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: July 11, 2006).
[9] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007].
[10] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-
66].
[11] S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006).
[12] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1015].
[13] The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to
serve as an action-forcing device to ensure that the policies and goals
defined in the National Environmental Policy Act are infused into the
ongoing programs and actions of the federal government. Further,
regulations for implementing the act established by the Council on
Environmental Quality specify that to the fullest extent possible,
agencies shall prepare draft environmental impact statements
concurrently with and integrated with other environmental impact
analyses and related surveys and studies required by the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Historic Preservation Act of
1966, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and other environmental
review laws and executive orders. See 40 C.F.R. � 1502.25.
[14] Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2006 (Japan: October
2006).
[15] U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan.
[16] The planned increase in the Army's and Marine Corps' forces
collectively is commonly referred to as Grow the Force.
[17] National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. � 4321-4347.
[18] 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508.
[19] 72 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007).
[20] 40 C.F.R. � 1502.13-1502.16.
[21] Adequate training ranges are critical to maintaining military
readiness.
[22] The United States and Japan are continuing their effort to close
and replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as a part of the Defense
Policy Review Initiative.
[23] Guam Civilian Military Task Force, Planning for Military Growth:
November 2007 Needs Assessment (Hag�t�a, Guam: Nov. 2007).
[24] KPMG, Conduct Studies Associated with Military Growth and
Integration Initiatives for the Island of Guam (Oct. 31, 2007).
[25] According to KPMG, the cost estimates and figures presented in the
study are incomplete and were not verified or validated by government
of Guam or KPMG officials. Moreover, KPMG officials concluded that more
work in terms of testing and analysis needed to be conducted on
financial data presented in the report.
[26] See footnote 24.
[27] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1007].
[End of section]
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Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: [email protected]:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, [email protected]:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected]:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
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