Securing U.S. Nuclear Material: DOE Has Made Little Progress	 
Consolidating and Disposing of Special Nuclear Material 	 
(04-OCT-07, GAO-08-72). 					 
                                                                 
The Department of Energy (DOE) recognizes that a terrorist attack
on a DOE site containing material that can be used in a nuclear  
weapon could have devastating consequences. DOE currently stores 
special nuclear material at 10 sites in 8 states. To reduce	 
security costs, DOE plans to consolidate the material at fewer	 
sites and dispose of material that it no longer needs. In 2005,  
DOE chartered the Nuclear Material Disposition and Consolidation 
Coordination Committee (the committee) to plan for consolidation 
and disposition of DOE's special nuclear material. GAO was asked 
to (1) examine DOE's progress in consolidating and disposing of  
special nuclear material and (2) determine if DOE's plans to	 
consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material can be	 
implemented on schedule and within cost. To do this, GAO reviewed
the committee's plans and discussed consolidation and disposition
with DOE officials.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-72						        
    ACCNO:   A77047						        
  TITLE:     Securing U.S. Nuclear Material: DOE Has Made Little      
Progress Consolidating and Disposing of Special Nuclear Material 
     DATE:   10/04/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Nuclear facilities 				 
	     Nuclear facility security				 
	     Nuclear materials					 
	     Nuclear waste disposal				 
	     Nuclear waste management				 
	     Nuclear waste storage				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Physical security					 
	     Plutonium						 
	     Radioactive waste disposal 			 
	     Radioactive wastes 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Uranium						 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Nuclear Materials Disposition and			 
	     Consolidation Coordination Committee		 
                                                                 

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GAO-08-72

   

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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

October 2007: 

Securing U.S. Nuclear Material: 

DOE Has Made Little Progress Consolidating and Disposing of Special 
Nuclear Material: 

GAO-08-72: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-72, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) recognizes that a terrorist attack on a 
DOE site containing material that can be used in a nuclear weapon could 
have devastating consequences. DOE currently stores special nuclear 
material at 10 sites in 8 states. To reduce security costs, DOE plans 
to consolidate the material at fewer sites and dispose of material that 
it no longer needs. In 2005, DOE chartered the Nuclear Material 
Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee (the committee) to 
plan for consolidation and disposition of DOEï¿½s special nuclear 
material. GAO was asked to (1) examine DOEï¿½s progress in consolidating 
and disposing of special nuclear material and (2) determine if DOEï¿½s 
plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material can be 
implemented on schedule and within cost. To do this, GAO reviewed the 
committeeï¿½s plans and discussed consolidation and disposition with DOE 
officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Although the committee has spent nearly 2 years planning to consolidate 
and dispose of special nuclear material, it has drafted only two of the 
eight implementation plans it intends to develop; and complexwide 
consolidation and disposition activities have not yet begun. The 
committee has drafted plans for consolidating and disposing of 
plutonium-239 and for disposing of uranium-233: 

* Plutonium-239: Under the committeeï¿½s plutonium-239 plan, surplus 
plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory will be 
consolidated at the Savannah River Site. Much of the plutonium-239 
would then be prepared for permanent disposition through 
vitrificationï¿½a process that mixes nuclear material with molten glass, 
which is then poured into metal canisters where it hardens. The 
vitrified plutonium-239 would be stored on site inside large canisters 
filled with vitrified high-level radioactive waste and, if DOEï¿½s plans 
are realized, later be permanently disposed of at a geologic repository 
to be built at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

* Uranium-233: Under the committeeï¿½s draft uranium-233 plan, most of 
DOEï¿½s uranium-233 will be disposed of by mixing it with other uranium 
isotopes to convert it into a more stable form that requires less 
security and that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as 
radioactive waste. DOE has begun activities to modify an existing 
facility that can perform this process at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, where most of DOEï¿½s uranium-233 is currently stored. Other 
sites that store uranium-233 would either ship it to Oak Ridge for 
processing or send it to DOE radioactive waste disposal facilities in 
New Mexico or Nevada. 

The remaining six plans are still in early stages of development. 
Factors that have contributed to DOEï¿½s limited progress in finalizing 
plans include leadership changes on the committee and uncertainty over 
who in the department has final approval authority for the committeeï¿½s 
plans. Because of such factors, DOE is unlikely to meet its goal of 
completing all eight implementation plans by December 2008. DOE cannot 
ensure that its plans are carried out on schedule and within cost 
because the plans drafted to date have only limited descriptions of 
organizational roles and responsibilities and lack performance measures 
to monitor the departmentï¿½s progress toward meeting its consolidation 
and disposition goals. DOE officials stated that the plans do not need 
to include such information because a forthcoming revision of a DOE 
order on nuclear material management will define organizational roles 
and responsibilities and the department already uses performance 
measures. However, the revision to the DOE order is not scheduled to be 
completed until late 2007, and the performance measures that DOE uses 
are not specifically intended to monitor activities required to 
implement consolidation and disposition plans. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOE (1) specify who in the department is 
responsible for final approval of the committeeï¿½s plans and (2) require 
that the plans include descriptions of organizational roles and 
responsibilities and performance measures. In commenting on a draft of 
the report, DOE agreed with the recommendations but believed that the 
report did not sufficiently recognize DOEï¿½s progress. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-72]. For more information, contact Gene 
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOE's Plans to Consolidate and Dispose of Special Nuclear Material Are 
Not Yet Complete: 

DOE's Plans Lack Information Necessary to Help Ensure Their 
Implementation Is on Schedule and within Cost: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DOE Sites Currently Storing Category I Special Nuclear 
Material: 

Figure 2: Proposed Consolidation Sites for Category I Special Nuclear 
Material: 

Abbreviations: 

DBT: Design Basis Threat: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 4, 2007: 

The Honorable Joe Barton: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful 
terrorist attack on a site containing special nuclear material-- 
material that can be used in nuclear weapons such as plutonium-239, 
uranium-233, and highly enriched uranium (uranium that is enriched to 
over 20 percent concentration of uranium-235)--could have devastating 
consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. The National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency 
within DOE, and other DOE program offices, such as the Office of 
Environmental Management and the Office of Nuclear Energy, are 
responsible for the storage, transportation, and management of hundreds 
of tons of special nuclear material. These organizations currently 
store special nuclear material at 10 sites in 8 states, including the 
Hanford Site in Washington, the Pantex Plant in Texas, the Savannah 
River Site in South Carolina, Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, Y-12 National Security Complex 
in Tennessee, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Los 
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, Sandia National Laboratory in 
New Mexico, and the Nevada Test Site in Nevada. 

All of the sites listed above have facilities that contain Category I 
special nuclear material (see fig. 1). Category I material includes 
specified quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, and highly enriched 
uranium in the following forms: (1) assembled nuclear weapons and test 
devices; (2) pure products containing higher concentrations of 
plutonium, uranium-233, or highly enriched uranium, such as major 
nuclear components and recastable metal; and (3) high-grade materials, 
such as carbides, oxides, and nitrates. The risks associated with 
Category I special nuclear material vary but include (1) the nuclear 
detonation of a weapon or test device at or near design yield; (2) the 
creation of improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear 
yield; (3) theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon; and (4) the 
potential for sabotage in the form of radioactive dispersal, or "dirty 
bomb." Quantities of special nuclear material less than Category I 
quantities are referred to as Category II, III, and IV quantities. 
Although Category II, III, IV quantities are not, by themselves, 
capable of producing a nuclear yield, they must still be secured to 
prevent theft and use for radioactive dispersal or accumulation for use 
in a nuclear weapon. 

Figure 1: DOE Sites Currently Storing Category I Special Nuclear 
Material: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the United States, depicting the following DOE 
Sites Currently Storing Category I Special Nuclear Material: 

* Savannah River Site, South Carolina; 
* Oak Ridge, Tennessee; 
* Y-12, Tennessee; 
* Pantex, Texas; 
* Los Alamos, New Mexico; 
* Sandia, New Mexico; 
* Nevada Test Site, Nevada; 
* Idaho, Idaho; 
* Hanford, Washington; 
* Lawrence Livermore, California. 

Source: DOE Draft Strategic Plan. 

[End of figure] 

Because special nuclear material, especially Category I special nuclear 
material, poses such risks, the costs to secure it can be high. For 
example, DOE predicts that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory will 
spend $464 million to secure and store Category I and II special 
nuclear material from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2014. In 
addition, DOE estimates that continued storage of Category I quantities 
of plutonium-239 at the Hanford Site will cost over $800 million 
through 2018. Many of these costs could be reduced or avoided, if 
special nuclear material were consolidated at fewer sites. DOE could 
also reduce storage costs by permanently disposing of about 50 metric 
tons of plutonium-239 and about 375 metric tons of highly enriched 
uranium that the department has determined it no longer needs for 
nuclear weapons. Unless it disposes of this material, DOE must store it 
indefinitely--with the department incurring costs for continued storage 
and security. 

In 2005, DOE chartered the Nuclear Materials Disposition and 
Consolidation Coordination Committee (the committee) to study and plan 
for the consolidation of DOE's inventory of special nuclear material at 
fewer sites (see fig. 2.), and the permanent disposition of material it 
no longer needs. 

Figure 2: Proposed Consolidation Sites for Category I Special Nuclear 
Material: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the United States, depicting the following 
Proposed Consolidation Sites for Category I Special Nuclear Material: 

* Savannah River Site, South Carolina; 
* Y-12, Tennessee; 
* Pantex, Texas; 
* Nevada Test Site, Nevada; 
* Idaho, Idaho. 

Source: DOE Draft Strategic Plan. 

[End of figure] 

The committee consists of members from NNSA and the other DOE program 
offices that manage special nuclear material. Since its creation, the 
committee has adopted a two-pronged approach to its consolidation 
planning efforts. First, the committee has been developing a strategic 
plan that will assist the department in, among other things, 
identifying opportunities to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear 
material. When completed, the strategic plan will serve as a high level 
out-year planning document for the department's program offices to 
follow in their budgeting and project planning. Second, the committee 
is developing eight separate implementation plans, which are intended 
to analyze viable alternatives and cost estimates for each of the eight 
consolidation and disposition tasks DOE has identified. Specifically, 
the committee is developing implementation plans to: 

* Remove plutonium pits from Zone 4 at Pantex. DOE currently stores 
plutonium "pits"--the central core of a nuclear weapon, consisting 
largely of plutonium-239--in a secure area at the Pantex Plant known as 
Zone 4 West. DOE plans to eventually transport pits that are no longer 
required for nuclear weapons to the Savannah River Site, disassemble 
them, convert the plutonium-239 into oxide, and blend it with uranium 
oxide to produce mixed-oxide fuel for commercial nuclear power 
plants.[Footnote 1] 

* Consolidate and dispose of plutonium-239 in nonpit forms. In addition 
to plutonium pits at Pantex, DOE also stores plutonium-239 that is no 
longer needed for nuclear weapons in nonpit forms, such as contaminated 
metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear 
weapons production process. Because nonpit plutonium is in forms that 
can be easily dispersed and plutonium can be dangerous to human health, 
even in small quantities, it must be stabilized and packaged 
appropriately to minimize the risk of accidental release. DOE stores 
most of its nonpit plutonium-239 at Hanford, Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Savannah 
River Site.[Footnote 2] 

* Consolidate plutonium-238. In addition to plutonium-239, DOE also 
stores plutonium-238, a special nuclear material that is used to 
produce heat sources for space probes. Most of DOE's plutonium-238 is 
currently stored at Los Alamos and Idaho National Laboratories, with 
smaller amounts stored at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, Hanford, Pantex, and the Savannah River 
Site. DOE plans to consolidate storage of plutonium-238 and evaluate 
disposition options for some of its inventory that is not still being 
used. 

* Dispose of uranium-233. DOE has already consolidated the majority of 
its uranium-233 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory; however, smaller 
inventories are stored at other laboratories including Los Alamos 
National Laboratory and Idaho National Laboratory. 

* Remove Category I and II special nuclear material from Sandia 
National Laboratory. Sandia currently stores Category I quantities of 
highly enriched uranium that are used in the Sandia Pulse Reactor--a 
fast-burst reactor that is used to simulate nuclear weapons effects. 

* Remove Category I and II special nuclear material from Los Alamos 
National Laboratory. Los Alamos currently stores Category I quantities 
of plutonium-239, plutonium-238, and smaller amounts of highly enriched 
uranium that it uses for nuclear weapons certification and design 
activities and to fabricate new plutonium pits. 

* Remove Category I and II special nuclear material from Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. Lawrence Livermore currently stores 
Category I quantities of plutonium-239 and smaller amounts of highly 
enriched uranium that it uses for nuclear weapons certification and 
design activities. 

* Consolidate or remove special nuclear material at the Y-12 National 
Security Complex. Y-12 currently stores Category I quantities of highly 
enriched uranium that it uses to fabricate nuclear weapons components. 
DOE plans to consolidate highly enriched uranium into fewer locations 
at the site and to remove some material that is no longer needed for 
nuclear weapons from the site entirely, by blending it with other 
uranium isotopes to produce fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. 

In October 2005, DOE's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Environmental Management, who now chairs the committee, testified that 
the committee was 1 to 2 years away from completing a strategic plan to 
consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material. According to the 
committee's draft strategic plan, it intends to complete its 
implementation plans by December 31, 2008. In this context, you asked 
us to (1) examine the progress DOE has made consolidating and disposing 
of special nuclear material and (2) determine whether DOE can ensure 
that these plans will be implemented on schedule and within cost. 

To achieve these objectives, we reviewed DOE's draft strategic plan for 
nuclear materials management and the two implementation plans for the 
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear materials that the 
committee has developed to date. We reviewed relevant DOE orders and 
policies, and we examined environmental assessments and other DOE 
documents prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act. We also interviewed members of the committee and their staff, 
including officials from NNSA and DOE's Office of Environmental 
Management. Additional information on our objectives, scope, and 
methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our work between 
August 2006 and October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Although DOE has spent nearly 2 years planning for the consolidation 
and disposition of special nuclear material, its plans are incomplete; 
and complexwide consolidation and disposition activities for special 
nuclear material have not begun. DOE has completed only two of the 
eight implementation plans for consolidating and disposing of special 
nuclear material--one for plutonium-239 in nonpit forms and one for 
uranium-233: 

* The plutonium-239 implementation plan recommends relocating the 
surplus nonpit plutonium-239 currently stored at Hanford, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory and 
consolidating it at the Savannah River Site, pending disposition. Much 
of the plutonium-239 would then be prepared for permanent disposition 
through vitrification--a process that mixes nuclear material with 
molten glass, which is then poured into metal canisters, where it 
hardens. The vitrified plutonium-239 would be stored on site inside 
large canisters filled with vitrified high level radioactive waste and, 
if DOE's plans are realized, later be permanently disposed of at a 
geologic repository to be built at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Although 
this is essentially the same plutonium consolidation and disposition 
strategy the department has proposed since 2005, and despite the fact 
that the implementation plan states that consolidation could be 
completed by October 2009 if shipments began in the spring of 2007, 
shipments of plutonium to the Savannah River Site are not scheduled to 
begin until October 2007. 

* The draft uranium-233 implementation plan calls for disposing of the 
majority of DOE's uranium-233 by mixing it with other uranium isotopes 
to convert it into a more stable form that requires less security and 
that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as radioactive 
waste. DOE currently estimates that modification of an existing 
facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to process the uranium-233 
will be completed in 2011 at a cost of approximately $433.3 million, 
which includes the cost of securing the material. The facility is 
planned to operate through 2015. Other sites storing smaller quantities 
of uranium-233, such as Los Alamos and Idaho National Laboratories, 
among others, would dispose of uranium-233 either by shipping it to Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory for processing or transporting it to DOE 
radioactive waste disposal facilities in New Mexico or Nevada. 

The remaining six implementation plans are still in early stages of 
development and have not yet been reviewed by the committee. Several 
factors have contributed to DOE's limited progress in finalizing plans, 
including leadership changes on the committee, insufficient data 
initially on the quantities of special nuclear material stored by each 
DOE site, and uncertainty over who in the department has final approval 
authority for implementation plans developed by the committee. Because 
of such factors, DOE is unlikely to meet its goal of completing all 
eight implementation plans by December 2008. 

DOE cannot ensure that its implementation plans are carried out on 
schedule and within cost because the two plans completed to date have 
only limited descriptions of organizational roles and responsibilities 
and lack performance measures that could be used to monitor the 
department's progress toward meeting its consolidation and disposition 
goals. Neither DOE's plutonium-239 plan nor its uranium-233 plan 
specifies which DOE organization will ultimately be responsible for 
ensuring that consolidation and disposition occur. In addition, both 
plans lack any milestones or other performance measures to track 
whether plutonium-239 and uranium-233 shipments for consolidation and/ 
or disposition occur on schedule. According to DOE officials, the plans 
do not need to include such information because, among other things, a 
forthcoming revision of a DOE order on nuclear material management will 
define the program offices' and sites' roles and responsibilities, and 
the department already uses performance measures to monitor nuclear 
material management activities. However, the revision to the DOE order 
is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007 and, until the 
revision is complete, program offices and sites will lack updated 
guidance on their roles and responsibilities for consolidation and 
disposition. In addition, the performance measures that DOE uses--such 
as the number of containers of enriched uranium packaged for long-term 
storage and the volume of waste disposed--are not specifically intended 
to monitor the activities required to implement DOE's consolidation and 
disposition plans. 

We are recommending that DOE clarify who in the department is 
responsible for approving implementation plans developed by the 
committee. We are also recommending that DOE ensure that the 
implementation plans have clear definitions of organizational roles and 
responsibilities and performance measures so that the department and 
outside entities such as the Congress can ensure accountability for 
successfully implementing these plans and monitor the progress the 
department is making consolidating and disposing of special nuclear 
material. 

In its comments on a draft version of the report, DOE agreed with our 
recommendations, but the department stated that we did not give 
sufficient credit for the progress it has made consolidating and 
disposing of special nuclear material or for the improvements the 
committee has made to communication and cooperation within the 
department. DOE specifically noted that the completion of the plutonium-
239 implementation plan will allow the department to begin shipping 
plutonium from Hanford, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los 
Alamos National Laboratory to the Savannah River Site in early October 
2007. We recognized throughout our report the progress DOE has made and 
the important contributions the committee has made to the department's 
consolidation and disposition efforts by improving communication and 
cooperation among the various DOE program offices and sites that 
currently store special nuclear material. DOE also provided detailed 
technical comments that we have incorporated into this report when 
appropriate. 

Background: 

Since the beginning of the Manhattan Project in the 1940s, a primary 
mission of DOE and its predecessor organizations has been to design, 
build, and test the nation's nuclear weapons. To accomplish this 
mission, DOE constructed a vast nuclear weapons complex throughout the 
United States. Much of this complex was devoted to the production and 
fabrication of nuclear weapons components. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, DOE temporarily suspended some operations throughout the weapons 
complex because of safety and environmental concerns. Many of these 
shutdowns became permanent with the end of the Cold War. Because these 
shutdowns were initially considered to be temporary, the department did 
not make long-term plans for the storage or the permanent disposition 
of special nuclear material before suspending operations. As a result, 
large quantities of special nuclear material were left without a clear 
plan for their long-term storage or permanent disposition. 

While in storage, DOE must secure special nuclear material from 
potential terrorists interested in acquiring it for use in a nuclear 
weapon, improvised nuclear device, or "dirty bomb." To manage potential 
security risks, DOE has developed the Design Basis Threat (DBT), a 
classified document that identifies the potential size and capabilities 
of terrorist forces. DOE requires the contractors operating its sites 
to provide sufficient security personnel and equipment to defend 
against the threats identified in the DBT. Since September 11, 2001, 
the DBT has been revised several times. The increasing security threats 
outlined in the DBT have greatly increased the cost of protecting 
special nuclear material. Although specific measures vary from site to 
site, all protective systems at the department's most sensitive sites 
include the following: 

* integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting intruders; 

* physical barriers, such as fences; 

* hardened facilities and/or vaults; and: 

* a heavily armed paramilitary protective force equipped with items 
such as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and 
chemical protective gear. 

To help meet the requirements of the current DBT and reduce overall 
security costs, DOE plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear 
material that it no longer needs. In 2004, we recommended that DOE 
develop a departmentwide plan to meet the May 2003 DBT and that this 
plan should include activities related to consolidation, such as the 
transportation of special nuclear materials.[Footnote 3] Similarly, in 
2005, we recommended that the department develop a detailed plan for 
the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials as 
part of a departmentwide plan to meet the requirements of the October 
2004 DBT.[Footnote 4] We also recommended in 2005 that DOE develop a 
comprehensive strategy for consolidating, storing, and disposing of 
plutonium.[Footnote 5] 

DOE's Plans to Consolidate and Dispose of Special Nuclear Material Are 
Not Yet Complete: 

DOE has spent nearly 2 years developing plans for the consolidation and 
disposition of special nuclear material, but its plans are incomplete; 
and complexwide consolidation and disposition activities have not 
begun. Of the eight implementation plans the department has committed 
to complete by 2008, DOE has developed only two draft implementation 
plans: one for consolidating and disposing of plutonium-239, and one 
for disposing of uranium-233. However, the remaining six implementation 
plans are still in early stages of development and have not yet been 
considered by the committee. Several factors have contributed to DOE's 
limited progress in finalizing plans. These factors include several 
committee leadership changes and the need for accurate data on the 
department's nuclear material inventory. 

DOE Has Developed Consolidation and Disposition Plans for Plutonium-239 
and Uranium-233: 

DOE has developed implementation plans for plutonium-239 in nonpit 
forms and uranium-233. Both plans identify the location, form, and 
quantity of material to be consolidated and/or disposed of and the 
relevant factors that must be considered before the plans are 
implemented. 

Plutonium-239 Implementation Plan: 

The plutonium-239 implementation plan recommends relocating the 
surplus, nonpit plutonium-239 stored at Hanford, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory and 
consolidating it with plutonium-239 already stored at the Savannah 
River Site. Removing plutonium-239 from the Hanford site presents the 
greatest near-term potential cost savings to DOE. By removing plutonium-
239 from the site, Hanford would eliminate its only remaining Category 
I special nuclear material storage facility; and the department would 
avoid spending several hundred million dollars for security upgrades 
that would be required for this facility to meet DOE's security 
requirements. The department estimates the cost of security upgrades 
and continued storage of plutonium-239 at Hanford through 2018 at $831 
million. Once the plutonium-239 is relocated to the Savannah River 
Site, most of it would then be prepared for permanent disposition 
through vitrification--a process that would stabilize the plutonium-239 
by mixing it with molten glass and then pouring it into small metal 
canisters, where it hardens. The smaller canisters containing vitrified 
plutonium-239 would than be placed into larger canisters, which would 
then be filled with high-level radioactive waste. These large canisters 
would be stored on-site and, if DOE's plans are realized, eventually 
shipped to a geologic repository that DOE intends to construct at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada. Construction of a new facility at the Savannah River 
Site to vitrify the plutonium-239 is estimated to be completed in 2012 
and to operate through 2019 at a cost of between $300 million and $500 
million with estimated annual operating costs of $75 million. DOE is 
also planning on disposing of smaller quantities of plutonium-239 by 
processing the plutonium-239 with other high-level radioactive waste in 
the Savannah River Site's H Canyon facility. 

The plutonium-239 implementation plan is essentially the same plutonium 
consolidation and disposition strategy the department has proposed 
since 2005; however, shipments of plutonium-239 to the Savannah River 
Site are not scheduled to begin until October 2007. There are several 
reasons for DOE's failure to make progress consolidating plutonium-239. 
First, as discussed in our July 2005 report,[Footnote 6] DOE is 
prohibited from shipping plutonium to the Savannah River Site by 
law[Footnote 7] until a disposition plan is developed and submitted to 
the Congress. It was not until September 2007, while our draft report 
was at DOE for review and comment, that DOE submitted the disposition 
plan required by law. In addition, although the plutonium-239 
implementation plan has been approved by the committee and by the 
committee's Executive Steering Committee--which is comprised of the 
chairman of the full committee and the Under Secretaries for Energy, 
Science, and Nuclear Security--DOE officials told us that the plan 
could not be implemented until the Secretary of Energy approved actions 
contained in the plan that required secretarial approval. 

Uranium-233 Implementation Plan: 

Most of DOE's uranium-233 is stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
Tennessee, in a Category I special nuclear material storage facility 
known as the Building 3019A complex. DOE is planning to equip these 
buildings to dispose of uranium-233 by mixing it with other uranium 
isotopes to convert it into a more stable form that requires less 
security and that is suitable for long-term storage or disposition as 
radioactive waste--a process known as downblending. The downblended 
uranium-233 will then be placed in storage at another location at Oak 
Ridge, and the Building 3019A complex will be closed. Uranium-233, 
which is a special nuclear material, must be secured to prevent theft, 
among other things. However, after the material has been downblended, 
it will not be Category I material, and DOE will no longer have to 
provide it with a high level of security. According to DOE, 
construction of a facility at Building 3019A to downblend uranium-233 
will be completed in 2011. The department estimates that carrying out 
its plan for the Building 3019A complex will cost about $433.3 million, 
including security and construction expenses. DOE, which has already 
begun construction activities at Building 3019A, plans to operate the 
facility through 2015. 

In addition to Oak Ridge National Laboratory, DOE stores smaller 
quantities of uranium-233 at other sites, including the Los Alamos, 
Idaho, Argonne, and Brookhaven National Laboratories, among others. The 
draft uranium-233 implementation plan recommends shipping some of Los 
Alamos National Laboratory's uranium-233 to Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. In addition, the plan notes that some sites--such as Idaho, 
Argonne, and Brookhaven laboratories, among others--possess smaller 
amounts of uranium-233 that can be disposed of without processing. 
Although the plan's recommendations vary by site, in general, the plan 
calls for these sites to send material to DOE waste disposal 
facilities, such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico and 
the Nevada Test Site. According to DOE's estimates, shipping and 
disposing of uranium-233 at these facilities will cost more than $10 
million. 

Although DOE's uranium-233 plan calls for processing most of the 
material at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and directly disposing of the 
remainder, the plan also notes that some material may be retained for 
programmatic use. For instance, DOE's Brookhaven and New Brunswick 
laboratories have requested to receive small quantities of uranium-233 
currently stored at Building 3019A. In addition, NNSA plans to retain 
small quantities of material, which will be used to maintain the 
technologies and infrastructure that would be needed if the United 
States were to resume nuclear testing. Furthermore, the uranium-233 
plan states that NNSA has proposed retaining an additional 
approximately 45 kilograms of uranium-233 currently stored at Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory for future use. According to the plan, if this 
material is retained, it will not be stored at Oak Ridge; instead, it 
will be relocated to an unspecified NNSA facility. However, because 45 
kilograms constitutes a Category I quantity of uranium-233, any site 
that receives this material will be required to meet costly security 
requirements. 

Several Factors Have Contributed to the Limited Progress DOE Has Made 
In Finalizing Consolidation and Disposition Plans: 

Although DOE and NNSA officials have begun drafting the remaining six 
implementation plans, the plans have not yet been reviewed by the 
committee. The committee has not been able to meet its own established 
timelines for completing these plans. For example, the committee 
planned to complete implementation plans for removing special nuclear 
material from Sandia National Laboratory by January 2007 and for 
consolidating special nuclear material into fewer facilities and 
removing material no longer needed for nuclear weapons from the Y-12 
National Security Complex by March 2007. However, according to a DOE 
official, the Sandia plan was scheduled to be complete by August 2007, 
and work on the Y-12 plan did not begin until July 2007. In the 
interim, Sandia National Laboratory has been working to consolidate 
and/or remove its special nuclear material under a separate plan that 
was developed by Sandia in 2004. 

Several factors have limited the committee's progress in finalizing 
consolidation and disposition plans. First, the committee experienced 
several leadership changes between January 2005 and November 2005. For 
example, the first chairman of the committee, appointed on January 31, 
2005, only held the position until March 2005. The second chair held 
the position for about 6 months, and the Deputy Secretary of Energy 
appointed the third and current chair to the position in November 2005. 
According to DOE officials, these frequent leadership changes hindered 
the committee's initial planning efforts. In addition, DOE and NNSA 
program offices that manage special nuclear material had little 
involvement with early committee efforts. For example, the second 
chairperson began developing special nuclear material consolidation and 
disposition plans independent of program offices with nuclear materials 
management, disposition, and security responsibilities. 

Furthermore, prior to the committee's development of consolidation and 
disposition plans, the committee needed to first determine the exact 
amounts of special nuclear material stored at each site. DOE maintains 
a nuclear material inventory assessment database that is designed to 
identify fiscal year-end nuclear material inventories. However, 
according to DOE officials, the data in this database are typically 
between 6 and 18 months old, limiting their usefulness. In April 2006, 
the committee began requesting nuclear material inventory data directly 
from program managers at each site in an effort to identify all nuclear 
material intended for consolidation and/or permanent disposition. This 
request resulted in the identification of some special nuclear 
material, specifically, uranium-233 at one DOE site for which a method 
for permanent disposition had not yet been determined. This discovery 
delayed the development of the uranium-233 implementation plan while 
disposition alternatives were developed. 

Another factor that has contributed to the department's limited 
progress is uncertainty about who is responsible for approving the 
committee's implementation plans. According to the committee's charter, 
the committee's Executive Steering Committee is authorized to approve 
the committee's strategic plan and to direct departmental resources 
required to implement the approved strategic plan. Although the charter 
is silent on who approves individual implementation plans, the 
committee has been preparing implementation plans under the assumption 
that they would be approved by the Executive Steering Committee and 
subsequently carried out under its authority. As previously noted, the 
plutonium-239 implementation plan has been approved by the Executive 
Steering Committee; however, the uranium-233 implementation plan, to 
date, has not. Notwithstanding the Executive Steering Committee's 
approval of the plutonium-239 implementation plan in early 2007, this 
plan has only recently begun to be carried out. This is because DOE's 
Office of General Counsel has taken the position that, despite the 
authority provided in the committee's charter for the Executive 
Steering Committee to approve and implement the committee's strategic 
plan, the department must comply with all statutory and regulatory 
requirements associated with actions contained in the committee's 
implementation plans prior to the plans being carried out. DOE's Office 
of General Counsel considers the implementation plans to be only 
recommendations until the Secretary approves such actions. The 
plutonium-239 implementation plan listed among actions "proposed to be 
taken" the Secretary's submittal of a disposition plan to the Congress. 
The Secretary did not submit the disposition plan until September 2007. 

DOE's Plans Lack Information Necessary to Help Ensure Their 
Implementation Is on Schedule and within Cost: 

DOE cannot ensure that its implementation plans for consolidating and 
disposing of special nuclear material will be carried out on schedule 
and within cost because the two plans completed to date include only 
limited information on organizational roles and responsibilities--such 
as who is ultimately responsible for ensuring that consolidation and 
disposition occur--and they lack performance measures, such as 
milestones and outcome-related measures. DOE officials told us it is 
addressing organizational roles and responsibilities and performance 
measures through, among other things, a forthcoming revision to a DOE 
order on nuclear materials management and existing performance measures 
used to monitor nuclear material management. However, the revision to 
the DOE order is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007; and 
until it is complete, program offices and sites will lack updated 
guidance on their roles and responsibilities for consolidation and 
disposition. Furthermore, DOE's existing performance measures are not 
specifically intended to monitor the department's progress in 
implementing its consolidation and disposition plans. For instance, the 
Savannah River Site uses various performance measures, such as the 
number of containers of enriched uranium packaged for disposition. 
According to a DOE official, however, these measures--known 
collectively as the "gold chart"--are not detailed enough to be used to 
monitor the execution of individual implementation plans. 

DOE's Plans Have Limited Information on Organizational Roles and 
Responsibilities: 

DOE's two completed plans for consolidation and disposition include 
limited information on organizational roles and responsibilities. GAO's 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, notes the 
importance of clearly defining organizational roles and 
responsibilities to establish accountability to help achieve desired 
results. Federal law states that agencies must establish internal 
administrative controls in accordance with the standards prescribed by 
the Comptroller General.[Footnote 8] The Comptroller General published 
such standards in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, which sets out internal control standards for all aspects 
of an agency's operation. Internal control comprises the plans, 
methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives, 
and supports performance-based management. 

In particular, GAO's internal control standards note that the manner in 
which an agency delegates authority and responsibility throughout the 
organization affects accountability within the agency. Our previous 
work has found that national strategies--plans that may be national in 
scope, cut across levels of government, and involve a large number of 
organizations and entities both within and outside of government-- 
should include information on organizational roles and responsibilities 
to foster accountability and coordination.[Footnote 9] DOE's plans 
share the characteristics of a national strategy because the plans 
involve different levels of government and multiple organizations, such 
as program offices and sites. 

DOE's two completed implementation plans differ in how much detail they 
provide on organizational roles and responsibilities. As we have 
previously noted, defining organizational roles and responsibilities 
helps to answer the fundamental question about who is in 
charge.[Footnote 10] For example, the plutonium-239 plan states that 
the committee's Executive Steering Committee must approve the plan, but 
does not include any information on which program offices, sites, or 
other DOE organizations are responsible for carrying out the other 
actions that the plan identifies as necessary next steps, such as 
finalizing a schedule for plutonium-239 shipments from Hanford, Los 
Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore. In contrast, the uranium-233 
implementation plan includes program-and site-specific 
responsibilities. For instance, in its discussion of the recommended 
alternative for each site that has special nuclear material, the plan 
states that Los Alamos, should work with the Building 3019A project and 
DOE's Carlsbad field office, which manages the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant radioactive waste disposal facility, to determine the details of 
packaging, transporting, and receiving uranium-233. In addition, the 
plan states that DOE's Office of Science, which has expressed interest 
in obtaining uranium-233 from Building 3019A for use by its Brookhaven 
and New Brunswick laboratories, should obtain the necessary funding, 
collaborate with NNSA's Office of Stockpile Technology, and retrieve 
the requested material. 

However, both plans have only limited information about which entities 
are responsible for funding and coordinating consolidation and 
disposition activities, and neither plan states which program office, 
site, or other DOE organization is ultimately accountable for ensuring 
that consolidation and disposition occur. The plutonium-239 plan 
provides estimates for the overall cost of consolidation, but it does 
not specifically identify which program offices and sites are 
responsible for paying these costs. For example, the plan estimates 
that consolidation at the Savannah River Site will incur about $116 
million in secure transportation costs, but it does not state which 
office or site is responsible for paying these expenses. The uranium- 
233 plan also includes cost estimates by site for consolidation and 
disposition activities but notes that its estimates are not complete. 
For instance, the plan acknowledges that the estimate for removing 
material from Los Alamos National Laboratory does not include the cost 
of disposing the material. However, the uranium-233 plan includes some 
information on which program office or site will pay for consolidation 
and disposition activities. For instance, it notes that the Office of 
the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Secure Transportation is 
responsible for the cost of transporting uranium-233 from Los Alamos 
National Laboratory to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for processing. 
However, the plan does not assign responsibility for all of the costs 
associated with activities at a site. For example, in its discussion of 
alternatives for disposing of uranium-233 currently at Idaho National 
Laboratory, the plan estimates that it will cost $4.1 million to 
shuttle material from Idaho National Laboratory to the Nevada Test 
Site; but it does not state who will pay for these shipments. Finally, 
neither plan designates responsibility to a program office or site for 
providing overall coordination of the multiple entities involved in 
consolidation and disposition of special nuclear material. 

We have reported in the past about DOE's problems achieving the 
coordination necessary to accomplish its consolidation goals. For 
example, we found that DOE's reliance on individual sites to create 
consolidation plans resulted in inconsistent plans. Specifically, the 
Hanford site planned to ship plutonium to the Savannah River Site in a 
form that the Savannah River Site did not have plans for storing; and, 
as a result, the Savannah River Site was unable to receive some of 
Hanford's plutonium.[Footnote 11] In our April 2004 and two July 2005 
reports, we recommended that DOE develop and implement a departmentwide 
plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among program 
offices and sites to consolidate special nuclear material.[Footnote 12] 

DOE's Plans Lack Performance Measures to Monitor Progress Consolidating 
and Disposing of Special Nuclear Material: 

GAO's internal control standards also call for the establishment and 
review of performance measures to help ensure that agency management's 
orders are carried out. Our prior work has found that effective 
national strategies incorporate outcome-related performance measures to 
address steps needed to achieve desired results. Furthermore, we have 
previously reported that measuring performance allows organizations to 
track their progress toward their goals and gives managers crucial 
information on which to base their organizational and management 
decisions.[Footnote 13] We have also noted that milestones are an 
important means for an agency to evaluate its progress and for the 
Congress to hold an agency accountable.[Footnote 14] 

Both of DOE's completed implementation plans lack performance measures, 
such as outcome-related measures and milestones. First, neither plan 
includes outcome-related measures that indicate how the program offices 
and sites will track how much material has been consolidated or 
disposed. For example, the plans do not include targets for the amount 
of material being packaged or shipped for consolidation. Second, 
neither plan includes milestones to help ensure that implementation 
occurs on schedule. For example, the plutonium-239 plan states that 
consolidation of this material can be completed by fiscal year-end 
2009, if shipments begin in spring 2007; but it lacks any interim 
milestones to track whether shipments occur on schedule. As noted 
earlier, these shipments have not begun, to date. Similarly, the 
uranium-233 plan states that the current schedule for the shutdown of 
Building 3019A calls for all shipments to be completed by June 2012. 
However, the plan does not include milestones to help determine whether 
the site is on-schedule to meet this deadline. The plan includes only 
one milestone, a cleanup milestone for Idaho National Laboratory that 
was already in place when the plan was created. 

DOE Officials Contend that Other Guidance and Current Practices Address 
Organizational Roles and Responsibilities and Performance Measures: 

DOE officials stated that they believe departmental guidance and 
current practices address organizational roles and responsibilities and 
performance measures. Specifically: 

Organizational roles and responsibilities. Officials stated that 
forthcoming guidance and current practices address organizational roles 
and responsibilities for consolidation and disposition activities. 
These include the following: 

* Forthcoming revision to DOE Order 5660.1B (Management of Nuclear 
Materials). Officials noted that the department's order on nuclear 
materials management is currently being revised to include 
organizational responsibilities for consolidation and disposition 
activities. The order has not been updated since it was written in 
1994, and it does not mention new DOE organizations, such as NNSA, 
which was established in 2000. DOE officials told us that the revised 
order will outline specific responsibilities for NNSA's Office of 
Defense Programs, DOE's Office of Environmental Management, DOE's 
Office of Nuclear Energy, and DOE field organizations that oversee 
contractors' management of nuclear materials. However, the revised 
order is not scheduled to be completed until late 2007. Until it is 
complete, the program offices and sites will lack updated guidance on 
their roles and responsibilities for consolidation and disposition. 

* Additional guidance for specific sites and/or program offices. DOE 
officials asserted that the department's implementation plans to 
consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material do not include 
detailed information on how they will be implemented because they are 
intended to be high-level plans. Officials noted that other guidance 
will provide more detailed information. According to a DOE official, 
the action memorandum that will accompany each plan will clarify 
responsibilities if there is uncertainty among the program offices or 
sites on this issue. A department official also told us that the 
revised order, when completed, will require the development of site- 
specific disposition plans, in addition to maintaining the current 
order's requirement for nuclear material management plans by site. 
Although we acknowledge that the committee does not intend for the 
plans to provide detailed guidance, our prior work on national 
strategies indicates that the more information a plan includes, the 
easier it will be for the responsible parties to implement the plan and 
achieve its goals.[Footnote 15] 

* Current practices. DOE officials stated that it is not necessary for 
the implementation plans to include organizational roles and 
responsibilities because the relevant program offices already 
understand their roles and responsibilities. According to a DOE 
official, the committee includes representatives from all of the 
program offices that manage special nuclear material; and, as such, the 
program offices are aware of their duties for carrying out the plans. 
However, the committee is scheduled to dissolve after it has completed 
the last implementation plan for consolidation and disposition. 
Therefore, if clarification about organizational roles and 
responsibilities is necessary in the future, it may be difficult for 
the program offices to resolve such issues after the committee has 
disbanded. 

Performance measures. DOE officials also noted that the department 
currently uses performance measures to monitor its nuclear material 
management activities. A DOE official noted that each DOE program 
office uses its own performance measures. For instance, the 
department's Office of Environmental Management's current performance 
measures include the following: 

* Quarterly project reviews. An official noted that DOE sites submit 
quarterly project reviews that include performance measures for 
activities related to managing special nuclear material, such as 
monitoring containers used to store this material. The quarterly 
project review for the Savannah River Site, for example, includes 
numeric measures, such as the number of containers of enriched uranium 
packaged for disposition. However, a DOE official acknowledged that 
these measures, known collectively as the "gold chart," are not 
detailed enough to be used to monitor the execution of individual 
implementation plans. In addition, because the performance measures are 
not specifically intended to address activities needed to implement 
DOE's plans to consolidate and dispose of special nuclear material, it 
is unclear whether they will be helpful in monitoring the department's 
progress in carrying out these plans. 

* Milestone Report. DOE's 2006 Milestone Report[Footnote 16] includes 
performance measures such as the number of certified containers of 
plutonium metal or oxide packaged for long-term storage and the volume 
of low-level waste disposed. However, like the performance measures in 
the quarterly project reviews, these measures are not intended to 
monitor the progress of consolidation and disposition activities. The 
Milestone Report states that its performance measures are intended to 
track the Office of Environmental Management's progress toward site 
cleanup targets. 

Conclusions: 

The successful consolidation and disposition of special nuclear 
material has the potential to significantly reduce the risks posed by 
storing this material as well as the security costs that can reach 
hundreds of millions of dollars at each DOE site that stores it. Until 
DOE completes its plans and clarifies who has final approval authority, 
the department will have difficulty ensuring that consolidation and 
disposition activities begin in a timely manner. Further, without 
incorporating descriptions of organizational roles and responsibilities 
and performance measures in the plans, the department cannot ensure 
that its plans can be implemented on schedule and within cost. 
Moreover, until the plans include defined organizational roles and 
responsibilities, the Congress may have difficulty in holding DOE 
accountable for its responsibilities in consolidating and disposing of 
special nuclear material. Similarly, the Congress may face challenges 
in evaluating the progress of consolidation and disposition activities 
because DOE's plans lack performance measures to provide such 
information. Given the large cost savings that DOE could realize by 
consolidating and disposing of special nuclear material that is no 
longer needed for national security purposes, we believe that it is 
vital that DOE develop plans for consolidation and disposition that 
provide the department and the Congress with the necessary tools to 
ensure their successful implementation. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that DOE begins implementing its plans to consolidate 
and dispose of special nuclear material in a timely manner, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Energy specify who in the department-- 
the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination 
Committee, the committee's Executive Steering Committee, or the 
Secretary himself--is responsible for final approval of plans. 

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy require that 
DOE's implementation plans for consolidating and disposing of special 
nuclear material include the following: 

* A description of the organizational roles and responsibilities for 
consolidating and disposing of DOE's special nuclear material such as 
information about which program offices or sites are responsible (1) 
for ensuring that consolidation and disposition occurs, (2) for paying 
for consolidation and disposition activities, and (3) for coordinating 
the activities of the numerous DOE organizations involved in 
consolidation and disposition; and: 

* Performance measures that will allow DOE and the Congress to monitor 
the department's progress in consolidating and disposing of special 
nuclear material, including milestones for shipping special nuclear 
material for consolidation and outcome-based measures, such as 
quantities of special nuclear material that have been consolidated and 
disposed. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE with a draft version of this report for its review and 
comment. DOE agreed, in principle, with our recommendations to identify 
consolidation and disposition plan approval authority, clarify 
organizational roles and responsibilities, and establish performance 
measures. 

However, DOE believed that our report lacked balance and objectivity 
because the report did not give the department sufficient credit for 
the progress it has made consolidating and disposing of special nuclear 
material or for the improvements the Nuclear Materials Disposition and 
Consolidation Coordination Committee has made to communication and 
cooperation within the department. For example, DOE stated that the 
committee has made a substantial contribution by completing an 
implementation plan that recommended consolidation of weapons-usable 
plutonium at the Savannah River Site. As a result, DOE anticipates 
shipments of plutonium from Hanford, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Savannah River 
Site will begin in early October 2007. 

We recognize throughout our report the progress DOE has made and the 
important contributions the committee has made to the department's 
consolidation and disposition efforts by improving communication and 
cooperation among the various DOE program offices and sites that 
currently store special nuclear material. For example, our draft report 
discussed the committee's plutonium-239 implementation plan in detail. 
It is important to note, however, that the plutonium-239 implementation 
plan is only one of eight implementation plans the committee is 
developing and, to date, only one other--for disposition of uranium- 
233--has been completed. Furthermore, as our draft report noted, the 
plutonium-239 implementation plan is essentially the same plutonium 
consolidation and disposition strategy the department has proposed 
since 2005. It was not until September 2007, while our draft report was 
at DOE for its review and comment, that the department submitted to the 
Congress the disposition plan required by law that will allow DOE to 
begin shipping plutonium to the Savannah River Site. 

DOE also provided detailed technical comments that we have incorporated 
into this report when appropriate. DOE's comments on our draft report 
are included in appendix II. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 
days from the date of this report. We will then send copies to the 
Secretary of Energy, the Administrator, NNSA; the Director, Office of 
Management and Budget; and appropriate congressional committees. We 
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need 
additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or 
[email protected]. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
statement. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

At the request of the Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
House of Representatives, and the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House 
of Representatives, we examined (1) the progress the Department of 
Energy (DOE) has made in consolidating and disposing of special nuclear 
material and (2) whether DOE can ensure that these plans will be 
implemented on schedule and within cost. 

To obtain information on DOE's progress in consolidating and disposing 
of special nuclear material, we reviewed the activities of DOE's 
Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee 
(the committee). Specifically, we reviewed the committee's charter, 
minutes from the committee's meetings, and congressional testimonies 
prepared by the chairman of the committee to obtain information about 
the committee's progress in developing plans to consolidate and/or 
dispose of special nuclear material. We also reviewed a draft strategic 
plan and two draft implementation plans for the consolidation and 
disposition of special nuclear material that were prepared by the 
committee. Specifically, we reviewed the draft Department of Energy 
Strategic Plan for Nuclear Materials Management, the November 2006 
draft Implementation Plan for Consolidation and Disposition of Surplus 
Weapons-Usable Plutonium, and the June 2007 draft Implementation Plan 
for Disposition of Surplus Uranium-233. We also reviewed relevant DOE 
orders and policies, such as the DOE Order 5660.1B, Management of 
Nuclear Materials. In addition, we examined environmental assessments 
and other DOE documents prepared in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act such as DOE/EA-1574, Environmental Assessment 
for U-233 Stabilization, and Building 3019 Complex Shutdown at the Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, as well as its 
accompanying Finding of No Significant Impact published in the Federal 
Register. To obtain additional information on the status and content of 
DOE's plans, we interviewed members of the committee) including 
officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration and DOE's 
Office of Environmental Management and staff of committee members. 

To determine whether DOE will be able to ensure that its plans will be 
implemented on schedule and within cost, we reviewed the two draft 
implementation plans and the draft strategic plan prepared by the 
committee. We assessed the two implementation plans using our Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government and the characteristics 
of an effective national strategy developed in our prior work, which 
reviewed several sources of information, including legislative and 
executive branch guidance on national strategies, the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature on strategic 
planning and performance, and our past reports and 
testimonies.[Footnote 17] In addition, we also interviewed members of 
the committee to learn about DOE's efforts to ensure the effective 
implementation of its nuclear material consolidation and disposition 
plans. 

We conducted our work from August 2006 to October 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

September 11, 2007: 

Mr. James Noel: 
Assistant Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW, Room 2J28: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Noel: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report, "Securing 
Nuclear Material, DOE Has Made Little Progress Consolidating and 
Disposing of Special Nuclear Material" (GAO-07-1182). We agree, in 
principle, with the draft report's recommendations to identify 
consolidation and disposition plan approval authority(ies), clarify 
organizational roles and responsibilities, and establish performance 
measures. 

However, the draft report contains a number of factual inaccuracies and 
errors of omission resulting in a report lacking balance and 
objectivity. As indicated in our detailed comments (enclosed), the 
Department has made substantial progress over the past several years in 
both the areas of special nuclear material (SNM) consolidation and 
disposition. While much of this progress pre-dates the establishment of 
the Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination 
Committee (NMDCCC), the committee has improved the communication and 
cooperation within the Department. The committee has helped the 
Department to achieve its goals to enhance the security of excess and 
surplus SNM and its ultimate disposition. For example, the NMDCCC has 
already made a very substantial contribution to the Department's 
nuclear material consolidation and disposition progress by completing 
an implementation plan that recommended consolidation of weapons-usable 
plutonium at the Savannah River Site (SRS), and by playing a key role 
in completing all five actions identified in that plan for implementing 
that recommendation. Those five actions were all subsequently completed 
essentially on schedule, thus addressing the Department's most urgent 
nuclear material consolidation issue: the removal of plutonium from the 
Hanford Site. As a result of completing those actions, the Department 
anticipates shipments of plutonium from Hanford, Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory to SRS will 
begin in early October 2007, to further consolidate plutonium storage 
pending disposition. 

If you have any questions, please call me at (202) 586-7709 or Mr. Karl 
Goodwin, Acting Director of Safeguards and Security/Emergency 
Management, at (301) 903-5498. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Charles E. Anderson: 
Chairperson: 
Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination Committee: 

Enclosure 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

[End of section] 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Assistant 
Director; A. Don Cowan; James Noï¿½l; Omari Norman; Alison O'Neill; and 
Susan W. Tieh made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] For more information on the storage of plutonium pits at Pantex, 
see GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Storage of Plutonium Pits at the Pantex 
Plant, GAO-07-539RSU (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2007). 

[2] For more information on plutonium storage at the Savannah River 
Site, see GAO, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take 
Action to Safely Consolidate Plutonium, GAO-05-665 (Washington, D.C.: 
July 20, 2005) and GAO, Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning 
Has Complicated DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts, GAO-06-164T 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

[3] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues 
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004); GAO, Nuclear Security: Several 
Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science, and 
Environment to Meet the May 2003 Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-894T 
(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004). 

[4] GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated 
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 15, 2005). 

[5] GAO-05-665 and GAO-06-164T. 

[6] GAO-05-665. 

[7] 50 U.S.C. ï¿½ 2567 (Supp. IV 2004). 

[8] 31 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½ 3512(b), (c) (2000). 

[9] For more information on the characteristics of an effective 
national strategy, see GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-
408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More 
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-
06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006). 

[10] GAO-04-408T. 

[11] GAO-05-665. 

[12] GAO-04-623, GAO-05-611, and GAO-05-665. 

[13] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[14] GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear 
Weapons Complex, GAO-06-606T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2006). 

[15] GAO-04-408T. 

[16] The conference report for the Fiscal Year 2006 Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations Act requests the department to submit 
semiannual reports that include information on whether the department 
is meeting its cleanup milestones, as well as annual budget estimates 
and life-cycle costs for cleanup, for the years 2006, 2012, and 2035. 
Reports are due on March 1 and September 1 of each year. H.R. Rep. No. 
109-275, at 149 (2005). 

[17] GAO-04-408T and GAO-06-788. 

[End of section] 

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