Higher Education: Multiple Higher Education Tax Incentives Create
Opportunities for Taxpayers to Make Costly Mistakes (01-MAY-08,  
GAO-08-717T).							 
                                                                 
Federal assistance helps students and families pay for		 
postsecondary education through several policy tools--grant and  
loan programs authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 and more recently enacted tax preferences. This testimony
summarizes our 2005 report and provides updates on (1) how Title 
IV assistance compares to that provided through the tax code (2) 
the extent to which tax filers effectively use education tax	 
preferences, (3) potential benefits and costs of simplifying	 
federal student aid, and (4) what is known about the		 
effectiveness of federal assistance. This hearing is an 	 
opportunity to consider whether changes should be made in the	 
government's overall strategy for providing such assistance or to
the individual programs and tax provisions that provide the	 
assistance. This statement is based on updates to previously	 
published GAO work and reviews of relevant literature.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-717T					        
    ACCNO:   A81940						        
  TITLE:     Higher Education: Multiple Higher Education Tax	      
Incentives Create Opportunities for Taxpayers to Make Costly	 
Mistakes							 
     DATE:   05/01/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Aid for education					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost control					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Direct loans					 
	     Education or training costs			 
	     Education program evaluation			 
	     Educational grants 				 
	     Federal aid programs				 
	     Federal grants					 
	     Financial analysis 				 
	     Financial management				 
	     Higher education					 
	     Income taxes					 
	     Program management 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Student financial aid				 
	     Student loans					 
	     Tax administration 				 
	     Taxes						 
	     Taxpayers						 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 

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GAO-08-717T

   

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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Committee 
on Ways and Means, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2008: 

Higher Education: 

Multiple Higher Education Tax Incentives Create Opportunities for 
Taxpayers to Make Costly Mistakes: 

GAO-08-717T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-717T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Select Revenue Measures, Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Federal assistance helps students and families pay for postsecondary 
education through several policy toolsï¿½grant and loan programs 
authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and more 
recently enacted tax preferences. This testimony summarizes our 2005 
report and provides updates on (1) how Title IV assistance compares to 
that provided through the tax code (2) the extent to which tax filers 
effectively use education tax preferences, (3) potential benefits and 
costs of simplifying federal student aid, and (4) what is known about 
the effectiveness of federal assistance. 

This hearing is an opportunity to consider whether changes should be 
made in the governmentï¿½s overall strategy for providing such assistance 
or to the individual programs and tax provisions that provide the 
assistance. This statement is based on updates to previously published 
GAO work and reviews of relevant literature. 

What GAO Found: 

Title IV student aid and tax preferences provide assistance to a wide 
range of students and families in different ways. While both help 
students meet current expenses, tax preferences also assist students 
and families with saving for and repaying postsecondary costs. Both 
serve students and families with a range of incomes, but some forms of 
Title IV aidï¿½grant aid, in particularï¿½provide assistance to those whose 
incomes are lower, on average, than is the case with tax preferences. 
Tax preferences require more responsibility on the part of students and 
families than Title IV aid because taxpayers must identify applicable 
tax preferences, understand complex rules concerning their use, and 
correctly calculate and claim credits or deductions. While the tax 
preferences are a newer policy tool, the number of tax filers using 
them has grown quickly, surpassing the number of students aided under 
Title IV in 2002. 

Some tax filers do not appear to make optimal education-related tax 
decisions. For example, our analysis of a limited number of 2005 tax 
returns indicated that 19 percent of eligible tax filers did not claim 
either the tuition deduction or a tax credit. In so doing, these tax 
filers failed to reduce their tax liability by $219, on average, and 10 
percent of these filers could have reduced their tax liability by over 
$500. One explanation for these taxpayersï¿½ choices may be the 
complexity of postsecondary tax provisions, which experts have commonly 
identified as difficult for tax filers to use. 

Simplifying the grants, loans, and tax preferences may reduce 
complexities in higher education financing, including reducing the 
number of eligible tax filers that do not claim tax preferences, but 
more research would be necessary to understand the full benefits and 
costs of any such changes. 

Little is known about the effectiveness of Title IV aid or tax 
preferences in promoting, for example, postsecondary attendance or 
school choice, in part because of research data and methodological 
challenges. As a result, policymakers do not have information that 
would allow them to make the most efficient use of limited federal 
resources to help students and families. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO does not make new recommendations in this testimony. In 2002, GAO 
recommended, among other things, that the Department of Education 
sponsor research into key aspects of effectiveness of Title IV 
programs. Education began funding grants in July 2007 to conduct 
research on topics addressed in this statement; however, no project to 
date appears to directly evaluate the role and effectiveness of federal 
assistance in improving access to postsecondary education. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-717T]. For more 
information, contact Michael Brostek at (202) 512-9110 or George Scott 
at (202) 512-7215. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here this morning to discuss the complexity of 
multiple tax incentives targeted to postsecondary education. American 
higher education has long been crucial to the development of our 
nation's cultural, social, and economic capital. At the dawn of the 
21st century, changing workforce demographics, a more integrated global 
economy, and numerous technological advances are placing new demands on 
our colleges and universities. For the United States to remain 
competitive in the rising global knowledge economy, its citizens will 
need both the ways and means to endow themselves with the tools 
necessary for the task. Nevertheless, the affordability of American 
higher education remains a topic of considerable attention as evidenced 
by the work of the current Congress in both passing the College Cost 
Reduction and Access Act[Footnote 1] and its ongoing efforts to 
reauthorize the Higher Education Act of 1965. 

This hearing is an opportunity to consider whether any changes should 
be made in the government's overall strategy and the individual 
programs and tax provisions that provide financial assistance to 
students and families saving or paying for postsecondary education or 
repaying student loans. This opportunity to review the programs and tax 
provisions is important for several reasons. The fact that we face 
large and growing structural deficits in the future--primarily driven 
by demographics and rising health care costs--emphasizes the need to 
consider how the government allocates resources. In addition, we have 
noted that fundamental reexamination of government programs, policies, 
and priorities is necessary to assure that they match the needs of the 
21st century. We have identified the coordination of student aid 
programs[Footnote 2]and the effectiveness of those programs[Footnote 3] 
both as key topics needing congressional oversight. 

Our statement today will focus on four issues that emerged in our 2005 
report and subsequent 2006 testimony on student grant and loan 
assistance made available under Title IV of the Higher Education Act 
and postsecondary education tax preferences.[Footnote 4] 

* Postsecondary student financial assistance provided through programs 
authorized under Title IV and the tax code differ in three key ways. 
First, Title IV grant and loan programs traditionally provide aid to 
students and families while students are in college, whereas tax 
preferences help both during the college years as well as before and 
after college by assisting with saving for or repaying college costs. 
Additionally, while student aid programs and tax preferences serve 
students and families across a wide range of income groups, some Title 
IV programs--particularly the Pell Grant program--provide much of their 
financial assistance to students and families whose incomes are lower, 
on average, than students and families who receive student loans, tax 
credits, and deductions, or who make use of tax-exempt saving vehicles. 
Last, students and families have more responsibility for appropriately 
using and thereby obtaining the benefits of tax preferences than they 
do with Title IV aid. 

* Second, postsecondary tax preferences are difficult for families to 
understand and use correctly. Perhaps due to the complexity of the tax 
provisions, hundreds of thousands of taxpayers fail to claim tax 
preferences to which they are entitled or do not claim the tax 
preference that would be most advantageous to them. 

* Third, proposals to simplify the federal financial assistance 
programs for postsecondary education may help to address the 
complexities in the current system and improve tax filers' use of 
education tax preferences. However, more research is needed to 
understand the range of potential benefits and costs associated with 
any such changes. 

* Finally, we found that Congress has received little evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of assistance provided under Title IV or 
through tax preferences, including whether such assistance increases 
attendance or choice. 

Our statement today is drawn from reviews of relevant literature and 
updates to previous GAO reports and testimonies covering postsecondary 
Title IV programs and tax preferences. We conducted our work in April 
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Financial assistance to help students and families pay for 
postsecondary education has been provided for many years through 
student grant and loan programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965, as amended. Examples of these programs include 
Pell Grants for low-income students, PLUS loans to parents and graduate 
students, and Stafford loans.[Footnote 5] Much of this aid has been 
provided on the basis of the difference between a student's cost of 
attendance and an estimate of the ability of the student and the 
student's family to pay these costs, called the expected family 
contribution (EFC). The EFC is calculated based on information provided 
by students and parents on the Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA). Federal law establishes the criteria that students must meet 
to be considered independent of their parents for the purpose of 
financial aid and the share of family and student income and assets 
that are expected to be available for the student's education.[Footnote 
6] In fiscal year 2007, the Department of Education made available 
approximately $15 billion in grants and another $65 billion in Title IV 
loan assistance. Title IV also authorizes programs funded by the 
federal government and administered by participating higher education 
institutions, including the Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant 
(SEOG), Perkins loans, and federal work-study aid, collectively known 
as campus-based aid. Table 1 provides brief descriptions of the Title 
IV programs that we reviewed in our 2005 report and includes two 
programs--Academic Competitiveness Grants and National Science and 
Mathematics Access to Retain Talent Grants--that were created since 
that report was issued.[Footnote 7] 

Table 1: Description of Federal Student Aid Programs Authorized under 
Title IV of the Higher Education Act: 

Title IV student aid program: Pell Grant; 
Program description: Grants are made on the basis of the difference 
between the EFC and the maximum Pell award or the student's cost of 
attendance, whichever is less. Grants are not available for 
postgraduate study. 

Title IV student aid program: Supplemental Educational Opportunity 
Grant (SEOG); 
Program description: Schools administer grant funds, which are awarded 
to undergraduates with exceptional financial need; 
priority is given to Pell Grant recipients. Institutions must match a 
portion (at least 25 percent) of the federal funds allocated. 

Title IV student aid program: Academic Competitiveness Grant; 
Program description: Available to first-and second-year students who 
have completed a rigorous course of study in high school. To be 
eligible, students must also be eligible to receive a Pell Grant. 
Second-year students must also maintain at least a 3.0 grade-point 
average. 

Title IV student aid program: National Science and Mathematics Access 
to Retain Talent (SMART) Grant; 
Program description: Available to third-and fourth-year students 
pursuing a major in mathematics, science, or a foreign language deemed 
critical to national security. To be eligible, students must also be 
eligible to receive a Pell Grant and maintain at least a 3.0 grade-
point average. 

Title IV student aid program: Federal Work-Study; 
Program description: Schools administer funds, which are used to 
provide part-time jobs for undergraduate and graduate students with 
financial need. Participating schools or nonprofit employers generally 
contribute at least 25 percent of student's earnings (50 percent in the 
case of for-profit employers). 

Title IV student aid program: Federal Perkins Loan; 
Program description: Schools administer funds, comprised of federal 
capital contributions and school matching funds (at least one-third of 
federal contributions), to make low-interest (5 percent) loans for both 
undergraduate and graduate students with exceptional financial need. 
Borrower repayments are owed to the school. 

Title IV student aid program: Subsidized Federal Family Education Loan 
(FFEL) or Direct Stafford Loan; 
Program description: Loans made on the basis of financial need to 
undergraduate and graduate students who are enrolled at least half-
time. The federal government pays the interest costs on subsidized 
loans while the student is in school, for the first 6 months after the 
student leaves school, and during a period of deferment. 

Title IV student aid program: Unsubsidized FFEL or Direct Stafford 
Loan; 
Program description: Loans made to undergraduate and graduate students 
who are enrolled at least half-time. Unlike subsidized loans, the 
federal government does not pay the interest costs on unsubsidized 
loans while the student is in school, for the first 6 months after the 
student leaves school, and during a period of deferment. Otherwise, the 
terms and conditions of unsubsidized loans are the same as those for 
subsidized loans. 

Title IV student aid program: FFEL or Direct PLUS Loan; 
Program description: Loans made to parents on behalf of dependent 
undergraduate students enrolled at least half-time, or to graduate and 
professional students. Borrowers are subject to a credit check for 
adverse credit history and may be denied a loan. 

Source: GAO analysis of applicable federal laws and regulations. 

[End of table] 

Postsecondary assistance also has been provided through a range of tax 
preferences,[Footnote 8]including postsecondary tax credits, tax 
deductions, and tax-exempt savings programs. For example, the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997 allows eligible tax filers to reduce their tax 
liability by receiving, for tax year 2007, up to a $1,650 Hope tax 
credit or up to a $2,000 Lifetime Learning tax credit for tuition and 
qualified related expenses paid for a single student.[Footnote 9] 
According to the Office of Management and Budget, the fiscal year 2007 
federal revenue loss estimate of the postsecondary tax preferences that 
we reviewed was $8.7 billion. Tax preferences discussed as part of our 
2005 report and December 2006 testimony include the following:[Footnote 
10] 

* Lifetime Learning Credit--income-based tax credit claimed by tax 
filers on behalf of students enrolled in one or more postsecondary 
education courses. 

* Hope Credit--income-based tax credit claimed by tax filers on behalf 
of students enrolled at least half-time in an eligible program of study 
and who are in their first 2 years of postsecondary education. 

* Student Loan Interest Deduction--income-based tax deduction claimed 
by tax filers on behalf of students who took out qualified student 
loans while enrolled at least half-time. 

* Tuition and Fees Deduction--income-based tax deduction claimed by tax 
filers on behalf of students who are enrolled in one or more 
postsecondary education courses and have either a high school diploma 
or a General Educational Development (GED) credential.[Footnote 11] 

* Section 529 Qualified Tuition Programs--College Savings Programs and 
Prepaid Tuition Programs--non-income-based programs that provide 
favorable tax treatment to investments and distributions used to pay 
the expenses of future or current postsecondary students. 

* Coverdell Education Savings Accounts--income-based savings program 
providing favorable tax treatment to investments and distributions used 
to pay the expenses of future or current elementary, secondary, or 
postsecondary students. 

As figure 1 demonstrates, the use of tax preferences has increased 
since 1997, both in absolute terms and relative to the use of Title IV 
aid. 

Figure 1: Recipients of Title IV Assistance and Tax Filers Claiming an 
Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction, 1997--2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Tax Preferences Differ from Title IV Assistance in Timing, 
Distribution, and Students' and Families' Responsibility for Obtaining 
Benefits: 

Postsecondary student financial assistance provided through programs 
authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act and the tax code 
differ in timing of assistance, the populations that receive 
assistance, and the responsibility of students and families to obtain 
and use the assistance. 

Title IV and Tax Programs Differ in Benefit Timing: 

Title IV programs and education-related tax preferences differ 
significantly in when eligibility is established and in the timing of 
the assistance they provide. Title IV programs generally provide 
benefits to students while they are in school. Education-related tax 
preferences, on the other hand, (1) encourage saving for college 
through tax-exempt saving, (2) assist enrolled students and their 
families in meeting the current costs of postsecondary education 
through credits and tuition deductions, and (3) assist students and 
families repaying the costs of past postsecondary education through a 
tax deduction for student loan interest paid.[Footnote 12] 

Beneficiaries of Title IV Programs and Tax Preferences Differ: 

While Title IV programs and tax preferences assist many students and 
families, program and tax rules affect eligibility for such assistance. 
These rules also affect the distribution of Title IV aid and the 
assistance provided through tax preferences. As a result, the 
beneficiaries of Title IV programs and tax preferences differ. 

Title IV programs generally have rules for calculating grant and loan 
assistance that give consideration to family and student income, 
assets, and college costs in the awarding of financial aid.[Footnote 
13]For example, Pell Grant awards are calculated by subtracting the 
student's EFC from the maximum Pell Grant award ($4,310 in academic 
year 2007--2008) or the student's cost of attendance, whichever is 
less. Because the EFC is closely linked to family income and 
circumstances (such as the size of the family and the number of 
dependents in school), and modest EFCs are required for Pell Grant 
eligibility, Pell awards are made primarily to families with modest 
incomes. In contrast, the maximum unsubsidized Stafford loan amount is 
calculated without direct consideration of financial need: students may 
borrow up to their cost of attendance, minus the estimated financial 
assistance they will receive.[Footnote 14] As table 2 shows, 92 percent 
of Pell financial support in 2003--2004 was provided to dependent 
students whose family incomes were $40,000 or below, and the 38 percent 
of Pell recipients in the lowest income category ($20,000 or below) 

received a higher share (48 percent) of Pell financial support. 

Table 2: Percentage of Aid Recipients and Dollars of Aid by Income 
Category for Dependent Students Served by Selected Title IV Programs, 
Academic Year 2003--2004: 

Program: Pell Grant; 
Dependent students: Recipients; 
$0-20,000: 38; 
$20,001-40,000: 47; 
$40,001- 60,000: 14; 
$60,001-80,000: 2; 
$80,001-100,000: 0; 
More than $100,000: 0. 

Program: Pell Grant; 
Dependent students: Dollars; 
$0-20,000: 48; 
$20,001-40,000: 44; 
$40,001- 60,000: 8; 
$60,001-80,000: 1; 
$80,001-100,000: 0; 
More than $100,000: 0. 

Program: Stafford Subsidized Loan; 
Dependent students: Recipients; 
$0-20,000: 16; 
$20,001-40,000: 28; 
$40,001- 60,000: 23; 
$60,001-80,000: 17; 
$80,001-100,000: 9; 
More than $100,000: 7. 

Program: Stafford Subsidized Loan; 
Dependent students: Dollars; 
$0-20,000: 16; 
$20,001-40,000: 28; 
$40,001- 60,000: 24; 
$60,001-80,000: 17; 
$80,001-100,000: 9; 
More than $100,000: 6. 

Program: Stafford Unsubsidized Loan; 
Dependent students: Recipients; 
$0-20,000: 7; 
$20,001-40,000: 14; 
$40,001- 60,000: 14; 
$60,001-80,000: 19; 
$80,001-100,000: 18; 
More than $100,000: 28. 

Program: Stafford Unsubsidized Loan; 
Dependent students: Dollars; 
$0-20,000: 7; 
$20,001-40,000: 12; 
$40,001- 60,000: 12; 
$60,001-80,000: 18; 
$80,001-100,000: 19; 
More than $100,000: 32. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2003-2004 NPSAS data. 

Notes: See app. IV for confidence intervals associated with these 
estimates. 

[End of table] 

Numbers in rows may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

Because independent students generally have lower incomes and 
accumulated savings than dependent students and their families, 
patterns of program participation and dollar distribution differ. 
Participation of independent students in Pell, subsidized Stafford, and 
unsubsidized Stafford loan programs is heavily concentrated among those 
with incomes of $40,000 or less: from 74 percent (unsubsidized 
Stafford) to 95 percent (Pell) of program participants have incomes 
below this level. As shown in table 3, the distribution of award 
dollars follows a nearly identical pattern. 

Table 3: Percentage of Aid Recipients and Dollars of Aid by Income 
Category for Independent Students Served by Selected Title IV Programs, 
Academic Year 2003--2004: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2003-2004 NPSAS data. 

Notes: See app. IV for confidence intervals associated with these 
estimates. 

Numbers in rows may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

Many education-related tax preferences have both de facto lower limits 
created by the need to have a positive tax liability to obtain their 
benefit and income ceilings on who may use them. For example, the Hope 
and Lifetime Learning tax credits require that tax filers have a 
positive tax liability to use them, and income-related phase-out 
provisions in 2007 began at $47,000 and $94,000 for single and joint 
filers, respectively. Furthermore, tax-exempt savings are more 
advantageous to families with higher incomes and tax liabilities 
because, among other reasons, these families hold greater assets to 
invest in these tax preferences and have a higher marginal tax rate, 
and thus benefit the most from the use of these tax preferences. Table 
4 shows the income categories of tax filers claiming the three tax 
preferences available to current students or their families, along with 
the reduced tax liabilities from those preferences in 2005. 

Table 4: Percentage of Tax Filers Claiming Hope and Lifetime Learning 
Credits and Tuition Deduction and Tax Preference Dollars by Income 
Category, Tax Year 2005: 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income (SOI) data. 

Notes: See app. IV for confidence intervals associated with these 
estimates. 

[End of table] 

Numbers in rows may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 

Students and Families Have More Responsibility for Obtaining Benefits 
of Tax Preferences in Comparison to Title IV Aid: 

The federal government and postsecondary institutions have significant 
responsibilities in assisting students and families in obtaining 
assistance provided under Title IV programs but only minor roles with 
respect to tax filers' use of education-related tax preferences. To 
obtain federal student aid, applicants must first complete the FAFSA, a 
form that requires students to complete up to 99 fields for the 2007-- 
2008 academic year. Submitting a completed FAFSA to the Department of 
Education largely concludes students' and families' responsibility in 
obtaining aid. The Department of Education is responsible for 
calculating students' and families' EFC on the basis of the FAFSA, and 
students' educational institutions are responsible for determining aid 
eligibility and the amounts and packaging of awards. 

In contrast, higher education tax preferences require students and 
families to take more responsibility. Although postsecondary 
institutions provide students and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
with information about higher education attendance, they have no other 
responsibilities for higher education tax credits, deductions, or tax- 
preferred savings. The federal government's primary role with respect 
to higher education tax preferences is the promulgation of rules; the 
provision of guidance to tax filers; and the processing of tax returns, 
including some checks on the accuracy of items reported on those tax 
returns. The responsibility for selecting among and properly using tax 
preferences rests with tax filers. Unlike Title IV programs, users must 
understand the rules, identify applicable tax preferences, understand 
how these tax preferences interact with one another and with federal 
student aid, keep records sufficient to support their tax filing, and 
correctly claim the credit or deduction on their return. 

Some Tax Filers May Not Effectively Use Postsecondary Tax Preferences, 
Possibly Due to Complexity: 

According to our analysis of 2005 IRS data on the use of Hope and 
Lifetime Learning Credits and the tuition deduction, some tax filers 
appear to make less-than-optimal choices among them. The apparent 
suboptimal use of postsecondary tax preferences may arise, in part, 
from the complexity of these provisions. 

Some Tax Filers Appear to Make Suboptimal Choices: 

Making poor choices among tax preferences for postsecondary education 
may be costly to tax filers. For example, families may strand assets in 
a tax-exempt savings vehicle and incur tax penalties on their 
distribution if their child chooses not to go to college. They may also 
fail to minimize their federal income tax liability by claiming a tax 
credit or deduction that yields less of a reduction in taxes than a 
different tax preference or by failing to claim any of their available 
tax preferences. For example, if a married couple filing jointly with 
one dependent in his/her first 2 years of college had an adjusted gross 
income of $50,000, qualified expenses of $10,000 in 2007, and tax 
liability greater than $2,000, their tax liability would be reduced by 
$2,000 if they claimed the Lifetime Learning Credit but only $1,650 if 
they claimed the Hope Credit. 

In our analysis of 2005 IRS data for returns with information on 
education expenses incurred, we found that some people who appear to be 
eligible for tax credits or the tuition deduction did not claim them. 
We estimate that 2.1 million filers could have claimed a tax credit or 
tuition deduction and thereby reduced their taxes. However, about 19 
percent of those filers, representing about 412,000 returns, failed to 
claim any of them. The amount by which these tax filers failed to 
reduce their tax averaged $219; 10 percent of this group could have 
reduced their tax liability by over $500.[Footnote 15] 

In total, including both those who failed to claim a tax credit or 
tuition deduction and those who chose a credit or a deduction that did 
not maximize their benefit, we found that in 2005, 28 percent, or 
nearly 601,000 tax filers did not maximize their potential tax benefit. 
Regarding those making a poor choice among the provisions, for example, 
27 percent of tax filers that claimed the tuition deduction could have 
further reduced their tax liability by an average of $220 by instead 
claiming the Lifetime Learning Credit; 10 percent of this group could 
have reduced their tax liabilities by over $630. Tax filers that 
claimed the Hope Credit when the Lifetime Learning Credit was a more 
optimal choice failed to reduce their tax liabilities by an average of 
$356. 

Suboptimal choices were not limited to tax filers who prepared their 
own tax returns. A possible indicator of the difficulty people face in 
understanding education-related tax preferences is how often the 
suboptimal choices we identified were found on tax returns prepared by 
paid tax preparers. We estimate that 50 percent of the returns we found 
that appear to have failed to optimally reduce the tax filer's tax 
liability were prepared by paid tax preparers. Generalized to the 
population of tax returns we were able to review, returns prepared by 
paid tax preparers represent about 301,000 of the approximately 601,000 
suboptimal choices we found. Our April 2006 study of paid tax preparers 
corroborates the problem of confusion over which of the tax preferences 
to claim.[Footnote 16] Of the nine undercover investigation visits we 
made to paid preparers with a taxpayer with a dependent college 
student, three preparers did not claim the credit most advantageous to 
the taxpayer and thereby cost these taxpayers hundreds of dollars in 
refunds. In our investigative scenario, the expenses and the year in 
school made the Hope education credit far more advantageous to the 
taxpayer than either the tuition and fees deduction or the Lifetime 
Learning credit. 

The Suboptimal Use of Postsecondary Tax Preferences May Result from 
Their Complexity: 

The apparently suboptimal use of postsecondary tax preferences may 
arise, in part, because of the complexity of using these provisions. 
Tax policy analysts have frequently identified postsecondary tax 
preferences as a set of tax provisions that demand a particularly large 
investment of knowledge and skill on the part of students and families 
or expert assistance purchased by those with the means to do so. They 
suggest that this complexity arises from multiple postsecondary tax 
preferences with similar purposes, from key definitions that vary 
across these provisions, and from rules that coordinate the use of 
multiple tax provisions. Twelve tax preferences are outlined in IRS 
Publication 970, Tax Benefits for Education: For Use in Preparing 2007 
Returns. The publication includes four different tax preferences for 
educational saving. Three of these preferences--Coverdell Education 
Savings Accounts, Qualified Tuition Programs, and U.S. education 
savings bonds--differ across more than a dozen dimensions, including 
the tax penalty that occurs when account balances are not used for 
qualified higher education expenses, who may be an eligible 
beneficiary, annual contribution limits, and other features. 

In addition to learning about, comparing, and selecting tax 
preferences, filers who wish to make optimal use of multiple tax 
preferences must understand how the use of one tax preference affects 
the use of others. The use of multiple education-related tax 
preferences is coordinated through rules that prohibit the application 
of the same qualified higher education expenses for the same student to 
more than one education-related tax preference, sometimes referred to 
as "anti-double-dipping rules." These rules are important because they 
prevent tax filers from underreporting their tax liability. 
Nonetheless, anti-double-dipping rules are potentially difficult for 
tax filers to understand and apply, and misunderstanding them may have 
consequences for a filer's tax liability.[Footnote 17] 

Benefits to Simplifying Federal Student Aid Have Associated 
Implementation Challenges and Costs: 

Many researchers and policy analysts support simplifying the existing 
federal grant, loans and tax preferences in the belief that doing so 
would have a net benefit on encouraging access. Indeed, suggestions put 
forth in recent years to combine the federal grants and tax credits, 
for example, may help address some of the challenges we identified in 
recent years regarding tax filers' suboptimal use of postsecondary tax 
preferences or the confusion created by the interactions between direct 
student aid programs, such as the Pell Grant, and existing tax 
preferences. In this case, reducing the number of choices students and 
their families have to make would likely reduce tax filers' confusion 
and mistakes. 

To date, we have not undertaken any studies of how current Title IV 
student aid programs or tax preferences could be simplified and, as a 
result, have not developed any such models or proposals. However, while 
different aspects of simplification may provide students and their 
families with various benefits, Congress would likely want to weigh 
those benefits against a number of potentially related costs. 

Simplifying the federal application for student aid--A better 
understanding is needed about whether or to what extent simplifying the 
application for federal aid would: (1) alter the administration of 
other federal, state and institutional student aid programs, (2) be 
capable of accommodating future federal policies designed to target 
aid, and (3) affect current programs that are specifically tied to Pell 
Grant eligibility.[Footnote 18] The current FAFSA is used to determine 
students' eligibility for various federal aid programs, including Pell 
Grants, Academic Competitiveness Grants, SMART Grants, Stafford and 
PLUS loans, Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (SEOG), Perkins 
Loans, and Federal Work-Study. In addition, many states and schools 
rely on the FAFSA when awarding state and institutional student 
aid.[Footnote 19] To the extent that other programs require FAFSA-like 
information from applicants to award financial aid, additional research 
is needed to determine whether simplifying the FAFSA may actually 
increase the number of applications students and families would be 
required to submit. 

Simplifying eligibility verification requirements--Both grants and tax 
credits are awarded based, in part, on students' and their families' 
incomes, which means students and families are required to document 
their income to receive the benefit. Under the current system, some 
students and families are eligible to apply for Title IV student aid 
even though they are not required to file a tax return; in such cases, 
eligibility is computed based upon information reported on the FAFSA. 
Any plan to consolidate some or all of the current federal grants and 
tax preferences would need to consider how to minimize burden on 
students and families while also controlling federal administrative 
costs, for example, by minimizing the use of multiple verification 
procedures that use multiple forms of documentation and that are 
administered by multiple agencies. 

Simplifying program administration while maintaining federal cost 
controls --Federal grant and loan programs are administered by the 
Department of Education while federal tax preferences are administered 
by IRS. Under a system where existing grant aid and tax credits are 
consolidated, it is unclear without additional research, whether cost 
efficiency is better achieved through having the Department of 
Education or IRS assume federal budgeting and accounting 
responsibilities. In addition, the grant programs generally are subject 
to an annual appropriation which enables Congress to control overall 
federal expenditures by taking into account other federal priorities. 
In contrast, most tax preferences are like entitlement programs and 
their revenue losses can only be controlled by changing the statutory 
qualifications for the tax preference. 

Simplifying aid distribution--Policymakers will need to consider costs 
associated with the federal government recovering funds if students 
fail to maintain eligibility requirements over the course of an 
academic year. Families currently claim tax preferences after 
qualifying higher education expenses have been incurred but receive 
federal grant benefits to pay current expenses. Program simplifications 
that consolidate grants and tax preferences into a benefit paid before 
expenses are incurred likely will require the implementation of new 
cost recovery mechanisms or other means to allocate payments based on 
costs actually incurred. 

Simplifying eligible expenses--Room and board expenses are considered 
in the administration of the federal student aid programs authorized 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act but not in all tax 
preferences, particular the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits. Careful 
analysis will be needed of how such expenses could be accounted for in 
a simplified scheme if it is changed to being structured as a tax 
preference rather than a grant. Room and board expenses vary based on 
where a school is located or whether a student lives on or off campus, 
and they can be a significant component of a student's cost of 
attendance, particularly at community colleges. While certain 
strategies might be employed to lessen tax filers' recordkeeping 
requirements and result in fewer tax filer compliance issues, further 
research is needed on how such an allowance would be optimally set. 
Establishing too high an allowance, for example, could result in some 
students receiving a benefit in excess of the costs they incur for room 
and board, especially for those students who choose to live with their 
parents. Alternatively, if tax assistance is provided in advance of 
incurring costs, but the assistance is to be limited to costs actually 
incurred, a cost recovery or other administrative mechanism would be 
needed as discussed above. 

Research on Effectiveness of Federal Postsecondary Assistance Is 
Incomplete: 

Little is known about the effectiveness of federal grant and loan 
programs and education-related tax preferences in promoting attendance, 
choice, and the likelihood that students either earn a degree or 
continue their education (referred to as persistence). Many federal aid 
programs and tax preferences have not been studied, and for those that 
have been studied, important aspects of their effectiveness remain 
unexamined. In our 2005 report, we found no research on any aspect of 
effectiveness for several major Title IV federal postsecondary programs 
and tax preferences. For example, no research had examined the effects 
of federal postsecondary education tax credits on students' persistence 
in their studies or on the type of postsecondary institution they 
choose to attend, and there is limited research on the effectiveness of 
the Pell Grant program on students' persistence.[Footnote 20] One 
recently published study suggests that complexity in the federal grant 
and loan application processes may undermine its efficacy in promoting 
postsecondary attendance.[Footnote 21] The relative newness of most of 
the tax preferences also presents challenges because relevant data are 
just now becoming available. These factors may contribute to a lack of 
information concerning the effectiveness of the aid programs and tax 
preferences. 

In 2002, we recommended that the Department of Education sponsor 
research into key aspects of effectiveness of Title IV programs, that 
the Department of Education and the Department of the Treasury 
collaborate on such research into the relative effectiveness of Title 
IV programs and tax preferences, and that the Secretaries of Education 
and the Treasury collaborate in studying the combined effects of tax 
preferences and Title IV aid.[Footnote 22] In April 2006, the 
Department of Education's Institute for Education Sciences (IES) issued 
a Request for Applications to conduct research on, among other things, 
"evaluating the efficacy of programs, practices, or policies that are 
intended to improve access to, persistence in, or completion of 
postsecondary education." Multiyear projects funded under this subtopic 
began in July 2007. However, none of the grants awarded to date appear 
to directly evaluate the role and effectiveness of Title IV programs 
and tax preferences in improving access to, persistence in, or 
completion of postsecondary education. 

As we noted in our 2002 report, more research into the effectiveness of 
different forms of postsecondary education assistance is 
important.[Footnote 23] Without such information federal policymakers 
cannot make fact-based decisions about how to build on successful 
programs and make necessary changes to improve less-effective programs. 
The budget deficit and other major fiscal challenges facing the nation 
necessitate rethinking the base of existing federal spending and tax 
programs, policies, and activities by reviewing their results and 
testing their continued relevance and relative priority for a changing 
society.[Footnote 24] 

Concluding Observations: 

In light of the long-term fiscal challenge this nation faces and the 
need to make hard decisions about how the federal government allocates 
resources, this hearing provides an opportunity to continue a 
discussion about how the federal government can best help students and 
their families pay for postsecondary education. Some questions that 
Congress should consider during this dialog include the following: 

* Should the federal government consolidate postsecondary education tax 
provisions to make them easier for the public to use and understand? 

* Given its limited resources, should the government further target 
Title IV programs and tax provisions based on need or other factors? 

* How can Congress best evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
postsecondary education aid provided through the tax code? 

* Can tax preferences and Title IV programs be better coordinated to 
maximize their effectiveness? 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our 
statement. We welcome any questions you have at this time. 

Staff Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact 
Michael Brostek at (202) 512-9110 or [email protected] or George Scott 
at (202) 512-7215 or [email protected]. Individuals making contributions 
to this testimony include David Lewis, Assistant Director; Sarah 
Farkas, Sheila R. McCoy, John Mingus, Danielle Novak, Daniel Novillo, 
Carlo Salerno, Andrew J. Stephens, and Jessica Thomsen. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Postsecondary Aid Programs: 

The federal government helps students and families save, pay for, and 
repay the costs of postsecondary education through grant and loan 
programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 
as amended, and through tax preferences--reductions in federal tax 
liabilities that result from preferential provisions in the tax code, 
such as exemptions and exclusions from taxation, deductions, credits, 
deferrals, and preferential tax rates. 

Federal Grant and Loan Assistance to Postsecondary Students: 

Assistance provided under Title IV programs include Pell Grants for low-
income students, the Academic Competitiveness and National Science and 
Mathematics Access to Retain Talent Grants, PLUS loans, which parents 
as well as graduate and professional students may apply for, and 
Stafford loans.[Footnote 25] While each of the three grants reduces the 
price paid by the student, student loans help to finance the remaining 
costs and are to be repaid according to varying terms. Stafford loans 
may be either subsidized or unsubsidized. The federal government pays 
the interest cost on subsidized loans while the student is in school, 
and during a 6-month period known as the grace period, after the 
student leaves school. For unsubsidized loans, students are responsible 
for all interest costs.[Footnote 26] Stafford and PLUS loans are 
provided to students through both the Federal Family Education Loan 
program (FFEL) and the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program (FDLP). The 
federal government's role in financing and administering these two loan 
programs differs significantly. Under the FFEL program, private 
lenders, such as banks, provide loan capital and make loans, and the 
federal government guarantees FFEL lenders a minimum yield on the loans 
they make and repayment if borrowers default. Under FDLP, the federal 
government makes loans to students using federal funds. 

The Department of Education and its private-sector contractors jointly 
administer the program. Title IV also authorizes programs funded by the 
federal government and administered by participating higher education 
institutions, including the Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant 
(SEOG), Perkins loans, and federal work-study aid, collectively known 
as campus-based aid. 

To receive Title IV aid, students (along with parents, in the case of 
dependent students) must complete a Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid form. Information from the FAFSA, particularly income and 
asset information, is used to determine the amount of money--called the 
expected family contribution--that the student and/or family is 
expected to contribute to the student's education. Federal law 
establishes the criteria that students must meet to be considered 
independent of their parents for the purpose of financial aid and the 
share of family and student income and assets that are expected to be 
available for the student's education. Once the EFC is established, it 
is compared with the cost of attendance at the institution chosen by 
the student. The cost of attendance comprises tuition and fees; room 
and board; books and supplies; transportation; certain miscellaneous 
personal expenses; and, for some students, additional 
expenses.[Footnote 27] If the EFC is greater than the cost of 
attendance, the student is not considered to have financial need, 
according to the federal aid methodology. If the cost of attendance is 
greater than the EFC, then the student is considered to have financial 
need. Title IV assistance that is made on the basis of the calculated 
need of aid applicants is called need-based aid. Key characteristics of 
Title IV programs are summarized in table 5 below. 

Table 5: Description of Federal Student Aid Programs Authorized under 
Title IV of the Higher Education Act: 

Title IV student aid program: Pell Grant; 
Program details: Grants are awarded on the basis of difference between 
the EFC and the maximum Pell award or the student's cost of attendance, 
whichever is less. Grants are not available for postgraduate study; 
Annual award amounts: $400 to $4,310 for school year 2007--2008; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Dependent students: About 
2.1 million grants were awarded in school year 2003--2004, totaling 
$5.3 billion. The average grant award was $2,573; the median income of 
recipients was $24,576; Independent students: About 3 million grants 
were awarded in school year 2003--2004, totaling $7.4 billion. The 
average grant award was $2,436; the median income of recipients was 
$12,925. 

Title IV student aid program: Supplemental Educational Opportunity 
Grant; 
Program details: Schools administer grant funds, which are awarded to 
undergraduates with exceptional financial need; priority is given to 
Pell Grant recipients. Institutions must match a portion (at least 25 
percent) of the federal funds allocated; 
Annual award amounts: $100 to $4,000; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Dependent students: About 
554,000 grants were awarded in school year 2003--2004, totaling $494.2 
million. The average grant award was $892; the median income of 
recipients was $22,827; Independent students: About 715,000 grants were 
awarded in school year 2003--2004, totaling $391.9 million. The average 
grant award was $548; the median income of recipients was $11,040. 

Title IV student aid program: Academic Competitiveness Grant; 
Program details: Applicable to first-and second-year students who have 
completed a rigorous course of study in high school. To be eligible, 
students must also be eligible to receive a Pell Grant. Second-year 
students must also maintain at least a 3.0 grade-point average; 
Annual award amounts: $750 for first-year students and $1,300 for 
second-year students; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Students: About 310,000 
first-year grants and 110,000 second-year grants were expected to be 
awarded in school year 2006--2007, totaling an estimated $340.0 
million. The average grant award is estimated to be $657 and $1,245 
respectively. 

Title IV student aid program: National Science and Mathematics Access 
to Retain Talent (SMART) Grant; 
Program details: Applicable to third- and fourth-year students pursuing 
a major in mathematics, science, or a foreign language deemed critical 
to national security. To be eligible, students must also be eligible to 
receive a Pell Grant and maintain at least a 3.0 grade-point average; 
Annual award amounts: $4,000; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Students: About 40,000 
third-year grants and 40,000 fourth-year grants were expected to be 
awarded in school year 2006--2007, totaling an estimated $310.0 
million. The average grant award is estimated to be $3,718 and $3,875 
respectively. 

Title IV student aid program: Federal Work-Study; 
Program details: Schools administer funds, which are used to provide 
part-time jobs for undergraduate and graduate students with financial 
need. Participating schools or nonprofit employers generally contribute 
at least 25 percent of student's earnings (50percent in the case of for-
profit employers); 
Annual award amounts: Up to $300 more than the student's determined 
financial need; if employment continues past this point, federal funds 
may not be used to subsidize the employment; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Dependent students: About 
1.1 million awards were awarded in school year 2003--2004, totaling 
$2.0 billion. The average award was $1,901; the median income of 
recipients was $46,441; Independent students: About 438,000 awards were 
awarded in school year 2003--2004, totaling $1.0 billion. The average 
award was $2,303; the median income of recipients was $10,561. 

Title IV student aid program: Federal Perkins Loan; 
Program details: Schools administer funds, comprised of federal capital 
contributions and school matching funds (at least 1/3 of federal 
contributions), to make low-interest (5 percent) loans for both 
undergraduate and graduate students with exceptional financial need. 
Borrower repayments are owed to the school; 
Annual award amounts: $4,000 maximum for undergraduate students and 
$6,000 for graduate students; no minimum award amount. (Aggregate 
limits: $8,000 for undergraduates who have not completed 2 academic 
years; $20,000 for undergraduates who have completed 2 years; and, 
$40,000 for graduate students, including loans borrowed as an 
undergraduate.); 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Dependent students: About 
495,000 loans were made in school year 2003-
-2004, totaling $956.0 million. The average loan amount was $1,932; the 
median income of recipients was $39,175; Independent students: About 
329,000 loans were made in school year 2003--2004, totaling $905.3 
million. The average loan amount was $2,752; the median income of 
recipients was $10,277. 

Title IV student aid program: Subsidized FFEL or Direct Stafford Loan; 
Program details: Loans made on the basis of financial need to 
undergraduate and graduate students who are enrolled at least half- 
time. The federal government pays the interest costs on subsidized 
loans while the student is in school, for the first 6 months after the 
student leaves school, and during a period of deferment; 
Annual award amounts: $3,500 to $8,500 depending upon year of schooling 
and dependency status. Aggregate limits are $23,000 for undergraduates 
and $65,500 for graduate students; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Dependent students: About 
2.6 million loans were made in school year 2003--2004, totaling $8.1 
billion. The average loan amount was $3,188; the median income of 
recipients was $44,678; Independent students: About 3.8 million loans 
were made in school year 2003--2004, totaling $16.3 billion. The 
average loan amount was $4,340; the median income of recipients was 
$19,430. 

Title IV student aid program: Unsubsidized FFEL or Direct Stafford 
Loan; 
Program details: Loans made to undergraduate and graduate students who 
are enrolled at least half-time. Unlike subsidized loans, the federal 
government does not pay the interest costs on unsubsidized loans while 
the student is in school, for the first 6 months after the student 
leaves school, and during a period of deferment. Otherwise, the terms 
and conditions of unsubsidized loans are the same as those for 
subsidized loans; 
Annual award amounts: $3,500 to $20,500 depending on year of schooling 
(including any subsidized loan amounts received for the same period). 
Aggregate limits are $23,000 for dependent undergraduates, $46,000 for 
independent undergraduates, and $138,500 for graduate students; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: Dependent students: About 
1.6 million loans were made in school year 2003--2004, totaling $5.3 
billion. The average loan amount was $3,293; the median income of 
recipients was $75,835; Independent students: About 3.3 million loans 
were made in school year 2003--2004, totaling $18.5 billion. The 
average loan amount was $5,671; the median income of recipients was 
$22,108. 

Title IV student aid program: FFEL or Direct PLUS Loan; 
Program details: Loans made to parents on behalf of dependent 
undergraduate students enrolled at least half-time, or to graduate and 
professional students. Borrowers are subject to a credit check for 
adverse credit history and may be denied a loan; 
Annual award amounts: Maximum loan amounts are limited to cost of 
attendance less other estimated financial assistance for the period of 
enrollment; 
Number and characteristics of beneficiaries: About 634,000 loans were 
made in school year 2003--2004, totaling $5.7 billion. The average loan 
amount was $9,019; the median income of recipients was $71,397. 

Source: GAO analysis of applicable federal laws and regulations and 
academic year 2003-2004 NPSAS data. 

[End of table] 

Tax Preferences: 

Prior to the 1990s, virtually all major federal initiatives to assist 
students with the costs of postsecondary education were provided 
through grant and loan programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher 
Education Act. Since the 1990s, however, new federal initiatives to 
assist families and students in paying for postsecondary education have 
largely been implemented through the federal tax code. The federal tax 
code now contains a range of tax preferences that may be used to assist 
students and families in saving for, paying, or repaying the costs of 
postsecondary education. These tax preferences include credits and 
deductions, both of which allow tax filers to use qualified higher 
education expenses to reduce their federal income tax liability. The 
tax credits reduce the tax filers' income tax liability on a dollar- 
for-dollar basis but are not refundable. Tax deductions permit 
qualified higher education expenses to be subtracted from income that 
would otherwise be taxable. To benefit from a higher education tax 
credit or tuition deduction, a tax filer must use tax form 1040 or 
1040A, have an adjusted gross income below the provisions' statutorily 
specified income limits, and have a positive tax liability after other 
deductions and credits are calculated, among other requirements. 

Tax preferences also include tax-exempt savings vehicles. Section 529 
of the tax code makes tax free the investment income from qualified 
tuition programs. There are two types of qualified tuition programs: 
savings programs established by states and prepaid tuition programs 
established either by states or by one or more eligible educational 
institutions. Another tax-exempt savings vehicle is the Coverdell 
Education Savings Account. Tax penalties apply to both 529 programs and 
Coverdell savings accounts if the funds are not used for allowable 
education expenses. Key features of these and other education-related 
tax preferences are described below, in table 6. 

Table 6: Selected Postsecondary Education Tax Preferences: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: IRS and College Savings Plan Network; GAO analysis of 2005 IRS 
Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Modified adjusted gross income amounts are provided. 

[B] Under section 25A(h) of title 26, United States Code, the income 
phase-out amounts are indexed to inflation according to a formula 
specified in law for this purpose, which may or may not result in a 
yearly increase. 

[C] Under section 221(f) of title 26, United States Code, the income 
phase-out amounts are indexed to inflation according to a formula 
specified in law for this purpose, which may or may not result in a 
yearly increase. 

[D] or students who attended otherwise eligible educational 
institutions located within the Gulf Opportunity Zone in tax years 2005 
and 2006, the maximum Hope tax credit and maximum Lifetime Learning tax 
credit were doubled. This increase does not apply to tax years after 
2006. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 109-135, ï¿½ 102, 119 Stat. 
2577, 2594 (Jan. 7, 2005). 

[E] Although the tuition deduction has expired, legislation has been 
introduced that would reinstate the deduction. 

[End of table] 

Our review of tax preferences did not include exclusions from income, 
which permit certain types of education-related income to be excluded 
from the calculation of adjusted gross income on which taxes are based. 
For example, qualified scholarships covering tuition and fees and 
qualified tuition reductions from eligible educational institutions are 
not included in gross income for income tax purposes. Similarly, 
student loans forgiven when a graduate goes into certain professions 
for a certain period of time are also not subject to federal income 
taxes. We did not include special provisions in the tax code that also 
extend existing tax preferences when tax filers support a postsecondary 
education student. For example, tax filers may claim postsecondary 
education students as dependents after age 18, even if the student has 
his or her own income over the limit that would otherwise apply. Also, 
gift taxes do not apply to funds used for certain postsecondary 
educational expenses, even for amounts in excess of the usual $12,000 
limit on non-taxable gifts. In addition, funds withdrawn early from an 
Individual Retirement Account are not subject to the usual 10 percent 
penalty when used for either a tax filer's or his or her dependent's 
postsecondary educational expenses. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comparison of Assistance by Timing of Benefits for 
Selected Programs and Tax Preferences: 

Table 7: Comparison of Assistance by Timing of Benefit for Selected 
Programs and Tax Preferences: 

Type of assistance: Grant programs; 
Save for future expenses: [Empty]; 
Pay current expenses: Pell Grants; 
Supplemental Educational; 
Opportunity Grants; 
Academic Competitiveness; 
Grants; 
SMART Grants; 
Repay expenses: [Empty]. 

Type of assistance: Loan programs; 
Save for future expenses: [Empty]; 
Pay current expenses: Subsidized and Unsubsidized; 
Stafford Loans; 
Federal Perkins Loans; 
Federal PLUS Loans; 
Repay expenses: [Empty]. 

Type of assistance: Tax preferences; 
Save for future expenses: Coverdell Educational; 
Savings Accounts; 
Section 529 Qualified; 
Tuition Programs; 
Pay current expenses: Hope Credit; 
Lifetime Learning Credit; 
Tuition Deduction; 
Repay expenses: Student Loan Interest; 
Deduction. 

Type of assistance: Work-Study program; 
Save for future expenses: [Empty]; 
Pay current expenses: Federal Work-Study; 
Repay expenses: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Effects of Tax Rules on Tax Preference Use: 

For an example of how the use of college savings programs and the 
tuition deduction is affected by "anti-double-dipping" rules, consider 
the following: To calculate whether a distribution from a college 
savings program is taxable, tax filers must determine if the total 
distributions for the tax year are more or less than the total 
qualified educational expenses reduced by any tax-free educational 
assistance, i.e., their adjusted qualified education expenses (AQEE). 
After subtracting tax-free assistance from qualified educational 
expenses to arrive at the AQEE, tax filers multiply total distributed 
earnings by the fraction (AQEE / total amount distributed during the 
year). If parents of a dependent student paid $6,500 in qualified 
education expenses from a $3,000 tax-free scholarship and a $3,600 
distribution from a tuition savings program, they would have $3,500 in 
AQEE. If $1,200 of the distribution consisted of earnings, then $1,200 
x ($3,500 AQEE / $3,600 distribution) would result in $1,167 of the 
earnings being tax free, while $33 would be taxable. However, if the 
same tax filer had also claimed a tuition deduction, anti-double- 
dipping rules would require the tax filer to subtract the expenses 
taken into account in figuring the tuition deduction from AQEE. If 
$2,000 in expenses had been used toward the tuition deduction, then the 
taxable distribution from the section 529 savings program would rise to 
$700.[Footnote 28] For families such as these, anti-double-dipping 
rules increase the computational complexity they face and may result in 
unanticipated tax liabilities associated with the use of section 529 
savings programs. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals: 

We used two data sets for this testimony: Education's 2003-2004 
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study and the Internal Revenue 
Service's 2005 Statistics of Income. Estimates from both data sets are 
subject to sampling errors and the estimates we report are surrounded 
by a 95 percent confidence interval. The following tables provide the 
lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval for all 
estimate figures in the tables in this testimony. For figures and text 
drawn from these data, we provide both point estimates and confidence 
intervals. 

Table 8: Federal Student Aid Programs Authorized under Title IV of the 
Higher Education Act, Academic Year 2003-2004: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2003-2004 National Postsecondary Student Aid 
Study (NPSAS) data. 

[End of table] 

Table 9: Selected Postsecondary Education Tax Preferences, Tax Year 
2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 10: Selected Postsecondary Education Tax Preferences, Tax Year 
2005: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 11: Number of Tax Filers Claiming an Education Tax Credit or 
Tuition Deduction, Tax Years 1998-2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 12: Number of Tax Filers Claiming an Education Tax Credit or 
Tuition Deduction, Tax Years 1998-2005: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 13: Percentage of Aid Recipients and Dollars of Aid by Income 
Category for Dependent Students Served by Selected Title IV Programs, 
Academic Year 2003-2004: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2003-2004 NPSAS data. 

[End of table] 

Table 14: Percentage of Aid Recipients and Dollars of Aid by Income 
Category for Independent Students Served by Selected Title IV Programs, 
Academic Year 2003-2004: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2003-2004 NPSAS data. 

Table 15: Percentage of Tax Filers Claiming Hope and Lifetime Learning 
Credits and Tuition Deduction and Tax Preference Dollars by Income 
Category, Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 16: Number and Percentage of Form 1098-Ts with and without 
Postsecondary Education Expense Information, Tax Year 2005: 

1098-Ts with expense information; 
Number of returns: 4,292,132; 
Percent of returns: 24. 

1098-Ts without expense information; 
Number of returns: 13,399,837; 
Percent of returns: 76. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 17: Number and Percentage of Form 1098-Ts with and without 
Postsecondary Education Expense Information, Tax Year 2005: Confidence 
Intervals: 

1098-Ts with expense information; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 4,173,915; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 4,410,349; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 24; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 25. 

1098-Ts without expense information; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 13,200,126; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 13,599,548; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 75; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 76[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Lower and upper bounds were estimated independently and therefore 
may not add up to 100 percent. 

[End of table] 

Table 18: Number and Percentage of Taxpayers Apparently Eligible to 
Claim an Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction in Tax Year 2005: 

Total; 
Number of returns: 4,292,132; 
Percent of returns: 100. 

Apparently eligible; 
Number of returns: 2,770,570; 
Percent of returns: 65. 

All other; 
Number of returns: 1,521,562; 
Percent of returns: 35. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 19: Number and Percentage of Taxpayers Apparently Eligible to 
Claim an Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction in Tax Year 2005: 
Confidence Intervals: 

Total; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 4,290,711; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 4,292,132; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 100; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 100. 

Apparently eligible; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 2,673,200; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 2,867,940; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 63; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 66. 

All other; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 1,453,105; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 1,590,019; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 34; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 37[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Lower and upper bounds were estimated independently and therefore 
may not add up to 100 percent. 

[End of table] 

Table 20: Number and Percentage of Taxpayers Apparently Eligible to 
Claim an Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction That Failed to Do So 
in Tax Year 2005: 

Failed to claim; 
Number of returns: 412,058; 
Percent of returns: 19. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 21: Number and Percentage of Taxpayers Apparently Eligible to 
Claim an Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction That Failed to Do So 
in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Failed to claim; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 374,089; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 450,027; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 18; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 21. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 22: Amounts by Which Taxpayers Apparently Eligible for an 
Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction Failed to Reduce Their Tax 
Liability in Tax Year 2005: 

Median; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 79.16. 

Mean; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 219.12. 

10[TH] percentile; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 7.64. 

25[TH] percentile; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 24.07. 

75[TH] percentile; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 268.99. 

90[TH] percentile; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 577.38. 

Maximum value; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 2,000.00. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 23: Amounts by Which Taxpayers Apparently Eligible for an 
Education Tax Credit or Tuition Deduction Failed to Reduce Their Tax 
Liability in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Median: Lower bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 66.5. 

Median: Upper bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 99.58. 

Mean: Lower bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 189.46. 

Mean: Upper bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 248.97. 

10th percentile: Lower bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 5.8. 

10th percentile: Upper bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 11.71. 

25th percentile: Lower bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 19.69. 

25th percentile: Upper bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 31.9. 

75th percentile: Lower bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 217.46. 

75th percentile: Upper bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 324.17. 

90th percentile: Lower bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 492.24. 

90th percentile: Upper bound; 
Inaction led to increased tax liability: 721.48. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 24: Number and Percentage of Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That 
Claimed the Tuition Deduction but Would Have Been Better off Claiming 
the Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: 

Would have been better off claiming Lifetime Learning Credit; 
Number of returns: 131,912; 
Percent of returns: 27. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 25: Number and Percentage of Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That 
Claimed the Tuition Deduction but Would Have Been Better off Claiming 
the Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Would have been better off claiming Lifetime Learning Credit; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 110,152; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 153,672; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 23; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 30. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 26: Amounts by Which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That Claimed 
the Tuition Deduction Could Have Reduced Their Tax Liability by 
Claiming the Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: 

Median; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 73.04. 

Mean; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 220.24. 

10[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: a. 

25[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 25.16. 

75[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 233.91. 

90[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 631.37. 

Maximum value; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 1,697.00. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 27: Amounts by Which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That Claimed 
the Tuition Deduction Could Have Reduced Their Tax Liability by 
Claiming the Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: Confidence 
Intervals: 

Median: Lower bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 53.82. 

Median: Upper bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 110.64. 

Mean: Lower bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 161.41. 

Mean: Upper bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 279.06. 

10th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: a. 

10th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: a. 

25th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 18.92. 

25th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 42.66. 

75th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 157.16. 

75th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 312.42. 

90th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 345.18. 

90th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime Learning Credit produced larger reduction: 1,025.46. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 28: Number and Percentage of Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That 
Claimed the Lifetime Learning Credit but Would Have Been Better off 
Claiming the Tuition Deduction in Tax Year 2005: 

Would have been better off claiming the Tuition Deduction; 
Number of returns: 37,580; 
Percent of returns: 7. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 29: Number and Percentage of Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That 
Claimed the Lifetime Learning Credit but Would Have Been Better off 
Claiming the Tuition Deduction in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Would have been better off claiming the Tuition Deduction; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 26,897; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 50,845; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 5; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 9. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 30: Amounts by Which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That Claimed 
the Lifetime Learning Credit Could Have Reduced Their Tax Liability by 
Claiming the Tuition Deduction in Tax Year 2005: 

Median; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 145.17. 

Mean; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 204.61. 

10[TH] percentile; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

25[TH] percentile; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

75[TH] percentile; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 274.32. 

90[TH] percentile; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 397.45. 

Maximum value; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 934. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 31: Amounts by Which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That Claimed 
the Lifetime Learning Credit Could Have Reduced Their Tax Liability by 
Claiming the Tuition Deduction in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Median: Lower bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 83.73. 

Median: Upper bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 194.37. 

Mean: Lower bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 141.96. 

Mean: Upper bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 267.26. 

10th percentile: Lower bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

10th percentile: Upper bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

25th percentile: Lower bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

25th percentile: Upper bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

75th percentile: Lower bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 177.32. 

75th percentile: Upper bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: 374.41. 

90th percentile: Lower bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

90th percentile: Upper bound; 
Tuition deduction produced larger reduction: a. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 32: Number and Percentage of Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That 
Claimed a Hope Credit but Would Have Been Better off Claiming a 
Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: 

Total; 
Number of returns: 368,605; 
Percent of returns: 100. 

Would have been better off claiming Lifetime Learning Credit; 
Number of returns: 20,727; 
Percent of returns: 6. 

All other; 
Number of returns: 347,878; 
Percent of returns: 94. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 33: Number and Percentage of Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That 
Claimed a Hope Credit but Would Have Been Better off Claiming a 
Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Total; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 332,477; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 404,733; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 99; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 100. 

Would have been better off claiming Lifetime Learning Credit; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 12,950; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 31,217; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 4; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 8. 

All other; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 337,388; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 355,655; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 92; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 96[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Lower and upper bounds were estimated independently and therefore 
may not add up to 100 percent. 

[End of table] 

Table 34: Amounts by Which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That Claimed 
the Hope Credit Could Have Reduced Their Tax Liability by Claiming the 
Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: 

Median; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 296.15. 

Mean; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 356.37. 

10[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 86.43. 

25[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): a. 

75[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 494.62. 

90[TH] percentile; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): a. 

Maximum value; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 863. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 35: Amounts by Which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers That Claimed 
the Hope Credit Could Have Reduced Their Tax Liability by Claiming the 
Lifetime Learning Credit in Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Median: Lower bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 166.16. 

Median: Upper bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 491.75. 

Mean: Lower bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 257.82. 

Mean: Upper bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 454.93. 

10th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 64.32. 

10th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 156.97. 

25th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): a. 

25th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): a. 

75th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 303.59. 

75th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): 654.08. 

90th percentile: Lower bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): a. 

90th percentile: Upper bound; 
Lifetime credit produced larger reduction ($): a. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 36: Number and Percentage of Returns where Apparently Eligible 
Taxpayers Made Suboptimal Choice, Tax Year 2005: 

Total; 
Number of returns: 2,141,870; 
Percent of returns: 100. 

Taxpayers making suboptimal choice; 
Number of returns: 601,267; 
Percent of returns: 28. 

All other; 
Number of returns: 1,540,603; 
Percent of returns: 72. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 37: Number and Percentage of Returns where Apparently Eligible 
Taxpayers Made Suboptimal Choice, Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Total; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 2,056,824; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 2,229,485; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 100; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 100. 

Taxpayers making suboptimal choice; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 555,166; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 647,638; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 26; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 30. 

All other; 
Number of returns: Lower bound: 1,467,713; 
Number of returns: Upper bound: 1,613,493; 
Percent of returns: Lower bound: 70; 
Percent of returns: Upper bound: 74. 

[End of table] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

Table 38: Amounts by which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers that Made 
Suboptimal Choice Could Have Further Reduced Their Tax Liability in Tax 
Year 2005: 

Median; 
Amount ($): 85.74. 

Mean; 
Amount ($): 222.04. 

10[TH] percentile; 
Amount ($): 8.32. 

25[TH] percentile; 
Amount ($): 25.88. 

75[TH] percentile; 
Amount ($): 284.13. 

90[TH] percentile; 
Amount ($): 576.86. 

Maximum value; 
Amount ($): 2,000.00. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 39: Amounts by which Apparently Eligible Taxpayers that Made 
Suboptimal Choice Could Have Further Reduced Their Tax Liability in Tax 
Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

Median: Lower bound; 
Amount ($): 75.5. 

Median: Upper bound; 
Amount ($): 105.94. 

Mean: Lower bound; 
Amount ($): 197.46. 

Mean: Upper bound; 
Amount ($): 246.62. 

10th percentile: Lower bound; 
Amount ($): 6.41. 

10th percentile: Upper bound; 
Amount ($): 11.79. 

25th percentile: Lower bound; 
Amount ($): 22.28. 

25th percentile: Upper bound; 
Amount ($): 34.6. 

75th percentile: Lower bound; 
Amount ($): 236.65. 

75th percentile: Upper bound; 
Amount ($): 317.04. 

90th percentile: Lower bound; 
Amount ($): 499.46. 

90th percentile: Upper bound; 
Amount ($): 697.14. 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[End of table] 

Table 40: Number and Percentage of Suboptimal Choices Made by Paid Tax 
Preparers, Tax Year 2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

Table 41: Number and Percentage of Suboptimal Choices Made by Paid Tax 
Preparers, Tax Year 2005: Confidence Intervals: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of 2005 Statistics of Income data. 

[A] Estimate cannot be calculated due to small sample size. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (Sept. 27, 2007). 

[2] GAO, 21ST Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

[3] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, 
GAO-07-235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

[4] See GAO, Student Aid and Postsecondary Tax Preferences: Limited 
Research Exists on Effectiveness of Tools to Assist Students and 
Families through Title IV Student Aid and Tax Preferences, GAO-05-684 
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005), and GAO, Postsecondary Education: 
Multiple Tax Preferences and Title IV Student Aid Programs Create a 
Complex Education Financing Environment, GAO-07-262T (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec. 5, 2006). 

[5] Consolidation loans are also authorized under Title IV. These loans 
allow borrowers to combine multiple student loans, possibly from 
different lenders and from different loan programs, into a single new 
loan with extended repayment periods. Because consolidation loans do 
not generally result in an increase in loan principal, they are not 
addressed in this testimony. 

[6] To be classified as an independent student for the purpose of 
receiving Title IV financial aid, students must meet one of the 
following criteria: (1) be a veteran of the armed services, (2) be age 
24 years or older by December 31st of the award year, (3) be married, 
(4) be enrolled in a graduate or professional education program, (5) 
have legal dependents other than a spouse, or (6) be an orphan or ward 
of the court. Financial aid administrators may also classify students 
as independent through the exercise of their professional judgment for 
other unusual circumstances. 

[7] For greater detail on federal spending through Title IV 
postsecondary education assistance programs reviewed in our 2005 report 
and December 2006 testimony, see app. I. 

[8] Tax preferences--also known as tax expenditures--are reductions in 
tax liabilities that result from preferential provisions in the tax 
code, such as exemptions and exclusions from taxation, deductions, 
credits, deferrals, and preferential tax rates. 

[9] Pub. L. No. 105-34, ï¿½ 201, 111 Stat. 788, 799 (Aug. 5, 1997). 

[10] For expanded descriptions of postsecondary education-related tax 
preferences, see app. I. 

[11] The Tuition and Fees Deduction expired on December 31, 2007. 
Legislation has been introduced to reinstate the deduction. 

[12] Additional details on the differences in timing are available in 
app. II. 

[13] Campus-based aid programs authorized under Title IV differ from 
these programs in funding and eligibility: institutions provide 
matching funding for federal spending, and participating institutions 
distribute aid using institution-specific criteria consistent with 
federal program requirements. Because they have institution-specific 
criteria, the relationship between program rules and the distribution 
of benefits is more complex and was excluded from the analysis of our 
2005 report. 

[14] Additionally, loan amounts for both subsidized and unsubsidized 
Stafford loans are subject to statutory limits on annual and cumulative 
borrowing. 

[15] Confidence intervals for all estimates in this section are 
included in app. IV. 

[16] GAO, Paid Tax Return Preparers: In a Limited Study, Chain 
Preparers Made Serious Errors, GAO-06-563T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 
2006). 

[17] For an example of this phenomenon, please see app. III. 

[18] Examples include the recently established Academic Competitiveness 
and National Science and Mathematics Access to Retain Talent (SMART) 
Grants. 

[19] The first page of the FAFSA lists states' filing deadlines of the 
form for the purpose of state aid programs, which, for the 2007-2008 
award year range from March 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008. 

[20] Eric Bettinger. "How Financial Aid Affects Persistence," in 
College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How To 
Pay for It, edited by Caroline Hoxby, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004) 207-238. This study cites numerous data availability and 
reliability challenges confronting research examining Pell Grant 
effects on student collegiate outcomes. 

[21] Susan M. Dynarski, and Judith E. Scott-Clayton. "The Cost of 
Complexity in Federal Student Aid: Lessons from Optimal Tax Theory and 
Behavioral Economics." National Tax Journal, June 2006. 

[22] GAO, Student Aid and Tax Benefits: Better Research and Guidance 
Will Facilitate Comparison of Effectiveness and Student Use, GAO-02-751 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2002). 

[23] GAO-02-751. 

[24] GAO-05-325SP. 

[25] Consolidation loans are also authorized under Title IV. These 
loans allow borrowers to combine multiple student loans, possibly from 
different lenders and from different loan programs, into a single new 
loan with extended repayment periods. Because consolidation loans do 
not generally result in an increase in loan principal, consolidation 
loans are not addressed in this review. However, the federal government 
can incur significant costs in providing borrowers with these loans. 
See GAO, Student Loan Programs: As Federal Costs of Loan Consolidation 
Rise, Other Options Should Be Examined, GAO-04-101 (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 31, 2003) and Student Loan Programs: Lower Interest Rates and 
Higher Loan Volume Have Increased Federal Consolidation Loan Costs, GAO-
04-568T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004). 

[26] While called "unsubsidized," the federal government can still 
incur costs on such loans, including the costs associated with 
borrowers who default on their loans and, under the Federal Family 
Education Loan Program, the costs of making payments to lenders to 
ensure them a minimum federally guaranteed yield. 

[27] For example, these may include child care expenses for parents of 
young dependent children or supportive services for disabled students. 

[28] 1 The new nontaxable distribution figure is calculated $1,200 x 
($1,500/$3,600) = $500. The taxable portion then becomes 
$1,200 - $500 = $700. 

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