Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the	 
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands	 
(30-MAY-08, GAO-08-670).					 
                                                                 
Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism,	 
particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the  
Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide needed ground	 
forces. Section 354 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense	 
Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number of military 
readiness issues. In this report, GAO addresses (1) the extent to
which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force	 
requirements has impacted the force and (2) the extent to which  
DOD has faced challenges in managing the training and use of	 
these forces, and taken steps to address any challenges. To	 
address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD policies, guidance,	 
and data and interviewed department, joint, combatant command,	 
and service officials as well as trainers and over 300 deploying,
deployed, and redeploying servicemembers.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-670 					        
    ACCNO:   A82224						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage 
the Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational	 
Demands 							 
     DATE:   05/30/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Force planning					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military officers					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Military personnel deployment			 
	     Military training					 
	     Mission essential operations			 
	     National defense operations			 
	     Standards						 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     program goals or objectives			 
	     Afghanistan					 
	     Global War on Terrorism				 
	     Iraq						 

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GAO-08-670

This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-670 
entitled 'Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the 
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands' which 
was released on May 30, 2008.

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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate and the 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2008: 

Military Readiness: 

Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training and Use of Certain 
Forces to Meet Operational Demands: 

GAO-08-670: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-670, a report to the Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services, House of 
Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, 
particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the 
Department of Defenseï¿½s (DOD) ability to provide needed ground forces. 
Section 354 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act 
directed GAO to report on a number of military readiness issues. In 
this report, GAO addresses (1) the extent to which DODï¿½s use of 
nonstandard forces to meet ground force requirements has impacted the 
force and (2) the extent to which DOD has faced challenges in managing 
the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to address any 
challenges. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed DOD policies, 
guidance, and data and interviewed department, joint, combatant 
command, and service officials as well as trainers and over 300 
deploying, deployed, and redeploying servicemembers. 

What GAO Found: 

The use of nonstandard forcesï¿½individuals in certain temporary 
positions, and units with missions that require the unit personnel to 
learn new skills or operate in different environmentsï¿½has helped DOD 
fulfill U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements that the Army 
otherwise would not have been able to fill, but these efforts have also 
caused challenges across the force. For certain Navy and Air Force 
occupational specialties, these nonstandard force deployments have 
challenged the servicesï¿½ abilities to (1) balance the amount of time 
their forces are deployed with the amount of time they spend at home, 
and (2) meet other standard mission requirements. Some of the 
communities that have been most affected by nonstandard force 
deployments include the engineering, security force, and explosive 
ordnance disposal communities. In addition, the services have been 
challenged by emerging requirements for capabilities which do not exist 
in any of the servicesï¿½ standard forces, such as the transition teams 
that train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. These requirements are 
particularly taxing because the teams are composed primarily of 
officers and senior noncommissioned officers. Because standard forces 
do not exist to meet these leadership requirements, the services are 
forced to take leaders from other commands, which must then perform 
their missions without a full complement of leaders. 

The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the 
services and CENTCOM have helped DOD manage challenges related to 
nonstandard forces, but additional steps are needed to ensure 
consistency in training and using these forces. Nonstandard forces face 
more complex relationships than standard forces, making coordination of 
their training and use more challenging. Specifically, their training 
requirements are established by both the services and theater 
commanders and training may be conducted by trainers from another 
service. In addition, while deployed, these forces often report to 
commanders from two different services. Furthermore, authorities 
concerning the training and use of forces do not specifically address 
the training and use of nonstandard forces. DOD has taken significant 
steps to coordinate the training of its nonstandard forces through 
regular conferences at which CENTCOM and service officials develop 
detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces. However, the 
training of individual augmentees has not been fully coordinated. As a 
result, individuals who perform the same types of tasks may receive 
different levels of training. Also, the services waive training 
requirements without consistently coordinating with CENTCOM, so CENTCOM 
lacks full visibility over the extent to which all of its forces have 
met requirements. To increase support and oversight of the use of 
nonstandard forces in theater, the services have taken steps to improve 
coordination, which have reduced instances where nonstandard forcesï¿½ 
missions, tasks, or organization are modified. However, the services do 
not have full visibility over their nonstandard forces and view the 
authority of ground force commanders differently, which has sometimes 
led to differences in their use of nonstandard forces. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To better manage the training and use of nonstandard forces, GAO 
recommends that DOD develop and issue a policy, which clarifies: 
responsibilities for the training of all nonstandard forces, including 
individual augmentees; training waiver responsibilities and procedures; 
and the nature and extent of ground force commandersï¿½ authorities to 
direct the use of nonstandard forces. DOD concurred with this 
recommendation and stated it has work underway to review existing 
policy and to ensure necessary guidance is in place. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-670]. For more 
information, contact Sharon L. Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Use of Nonstandard Forces Has Helped DOD to Meet CENTCOM 
Requirements but Has Also Created New Challenges: 

Increased Coordination Has Helped DOD Address Some Challenges Related 
to the Training and Use of Nonstandard Forces, but Other Challenges 
Still Remain: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: Military Command and Control Relationships: 

Appendix IV: Training Requirements for Nonstandard Forces Deploying to 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM): 

Appendix V: Servicemembers' Perceptions of Preparation for Nonstandard 
Force Deployments: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EOD: explosive ordnance disposal: 

HMMWV: High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

SEAL: Sea, Air, Land: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 30, 2008: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Since 2001, over a million U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers 
have been deployed abroad for military operations in support of the 
Global War on Terrorism, and the demands of current operations, 
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the ability of 
the Army and Marine Corps to provide needed ground forces. In response 
to the high demand for ground forces and the high operations tempos of 
Army and Marine Corps forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken 
steps to broaden the pool from which it can draw forces. Specifically, 
DOD has helped to mitigate the demands on the Army by deploying 
personnel from the Navy and the Air Force, and it has deployed 
personnel from all four services to meet emerging demands for leaders. 

In this report, we distinguish between "standard forces" and 
"nonstandard forces." Standard forces perform their core missions 
within service deployment constructs, such as Army brigades or Marine 
Corps regiments. Nonstandard forces refer to a broad range of forces 
that are currently being used to augment DOD's standard forces and meet 
ongoing demands, primarily in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area 
of operations. Specifically, we use the term nonstandard forces to 
include four different groups of forces that DOD has categorized as 
follows: 

* Joint sourced forces--units from one service that are deployed to 
perform their core missions in place of units from another service; for 
example, Navy or Air Force medical units deployed to fill requirements 
for Army medical units. 

* In-lieu-of forces--units trained and deployed to execute missions 
outside of their core competencies; for example, Army artillery units 
that are trained and then deployed to fill requirements for military 
police units. 

* Ad-hoc forces--temporary units formed by consolidating individuals 
and equipment from various commands or services and then training these 
personnel to meet mission requirements; for example, the transition 
teams that are currently training Iraqi and Afghan forces. 

* Individual augmentees--individuals deployed for temporary positions 
that augment staff operations during contingencies; for example, 
individuals deployed to fill temporary positions in the Multinational 
Force-Iraq joint headquarters. 

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 
[Footnote 1] modified the Comptroller General's requirements for 
reporting on the readiness of Army and Marine Corps ground forces 
outlined in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007.[Footnote 2] In response to these requirements, we are 
issuing a series of products on readiness issues; a list is included at 
the end of this report. This report addresses DOD's efforts to mitigate 
the impact of high operational tempos specifically, assessing (1) the 
extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet ground force 
requirements has impacted the force, and (2) the extent to which DOD 
has faced challenges in managing the training and use of these forces, 
and taken steps to address any challenges. 

To assess the extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces has 
impacted the force, we analyzed documents provided by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 
and the services, and we discussed the impacts of using nonstandard 
forces with officials from these organizations and with individual 
servicemembers. To assess the extent to which DOD has faced challenges 
in managing the training and use of these forces, and taken steps to 
address any challenges, we reviewed and analyzed portions of the United 
States Code that deal with service and combatant command 
responsibilities for preparing their forces, as well as OSD, Joint 
Staff, combatant command, and service policies and guidance. We also 
interviewed department, joint, combatant command, and service officials 
as well as trainers and individual servicemembers. Specifically, we 
traveled to the CENTCOM area of operations in November 2007 and 
conducted group discussions with over 300 servicemembers who had 
deployed to CENTCOM for nonstandard force missions. Each servicemember 
also completed a questionnaire at the end of the discussion group 
sessions. Most of these personnel were Air Force servicemembers who 
were completing their deployments and in the process of redeploying 
from Iraq to the United States through Kuwait, but we also interviewed 
redeploying Navy and Army personnel. Many of the servicemembers we met 
with had performed engineering, detainee operations, or convoy 
missions, which are among the largest nonstandard missions in Iraq. We 
also interviewed officials from the commands that oversee the 
deployment of nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM area of operations as 
well as officials responsible for the oversight of personnel from 
specific specialties, such as explosive ordnance disposal. Additional 
information about our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD has used Navy and Air Force personnel to fill some CENTCOM force 
requirements that would otherwise have exceeded the Army's capacity to 
supply personnel and it has also deployed individuals to meet new 
demands for leaders, but these efforts have created other challenges 
for the services. By deploying nonstandard forces in addition to its 
standard forces, DOD has spread the CENTCOM requirements for ongoing 
operations across a wider portion of the force, but available data 
indicate that nonstandard forces represent a small portion of the total 
deployed force. While deployments of Navy and Air Force nonstandard 
forces have helped to mitigate the high demands for Army forces, some 
requirements, such as those for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and 
medical personnel, can be met only by a small number of highly skilled 
individuals from among the services. Other requirements, such as those 
for military police, have been met with a larger group of nonstandard 
forces. Although the use of nonstandard forces has helped DOD fill 
CENTCOM requirements that the Army otherwise would not have been able 
to fill, it has also challenged the Navy's and the Air Force's 
abilities to balance the amount of time their forces are deployed with 
the amount of time they spend at home, as well as their abilities to 
meet other mission requirements. Despite these challenges, the Navy and 
the Air Force have stated that they can sustain the current level of 
nonstandard force contributions in support of ongoing operations, but 
not without causing strain on the force. In addition, over the course 
of ongoing operations, requirements have emerged for new capabilities 
that do not reside in any of the services' force structures. 
Requirements for individual augmentees and the transition teams that 
train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most common examples 
of these emerging requirements. Both sets of requirements are focused 
on leaders--primarily officers and middle-to senior-grade 
noncommissioned officers. This demand for leaders has created 
challenges for the services because the leaders are generally pulled 
from other units or commands, which are left to perform their missions 
without their full complement of leaders. The demand also increases 
deployment rates for the individual leaders who fill the positions. 

The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the 
services and CENTCOM--or its ground force commanders--have helped DOD 
manage challenges related to nonstandard forces, but additional steps 
are needed to ensure consistency in the training and use of these 
forces. Nonstandard forces face more complex relationships than 
standard forces, making coordination of their training and use more 
challenging. Specifically, their training requirements are established 
by both the services and commanders in theater and much of their 
training may be conducted by trainers from another service. In 
addition, while they are deployed, these forces often report to 
commanders from two different services. Furthermore, joint doctrine 
concerning the training and use of forces does not specifically address 
the training and use of nonstandard forces, with their complex training 
and command relationships. DOD has taken significant steps to 
coordinate the training of its nonstandard forces through regular 
conferences at which CENTCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and service 
officials develop detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces. 
However, the training of individual augmentees has not been fully 
coordinated; as a result, individuals who perform the same types of 
tasks in theater may receive different levels of training. Also, the 
services waive some training requirements without consistently 
coordinating with CENTCOM, so CENTCOM lacks full visibility over the 
extent to which all of its assigned forces have met its training 
requirements. To increase support and oversight of the use of 
nonstandard forces in theater, the services since 2004 have taken steps 
to improve coordination with the ground force commanders who provide 
the day-to-day taskings for these forces. Air Force commanders said 
that the increased coordination with ground force commanders has 
reduced the number of instances in which ground force commanders have 
modified the missions, tasks, or organization of Air Force nonstandard 
forces, and the Navy's similar coordination efforts have allowed it to 
more easily limit the extent to which its nonstandard forces perform 
tasks for which they have not been fully trained and equipped. Despite 
these coordination efforts, we noted that the Navy and the Air Force do 
not always have full visibility over commanders' use of nonstandard 
forces in theater, and have differing views on the authority of ground 
force commanders, which has sometimes led to differences in the use of 
nonstandard forces. 

To better manage the training and use of nonstandard forces, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in consultation with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop and issue a 
policy to guide the training and use of nonstandard forces. At a 
minimum, the policy should clarify: responsibilities for the training 
of all nonstandard forces, including individual augmentees; training 
waiver responsibilities and procedures; and the nature and extent of 
ground force commanders' authorities to direct the use of nonstandard 
forces. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with 
our recommendation and stated it has work underway to review existing 
policy and ensure that guidance is in place for effective training and 
equipping of nonstandard forces and individual augmentees. In addition, 
DOD provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the 
report as appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety 
in appendix II. 

Background: 

Military Roles and Responsibilities: 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the top military advisor 
to the Secretary of Defense and the President and has many 
responsibilities, which include the development of a number of 
overarching military plans and policies. The Chairman has set forth 
doctrine that addresses command relationships and authorities, 
principles for command and control, guidance for organizing joint 
forces and other selected joint activities in Joint Publication 1, 
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and provides 
further detail on such issues as they relate to joint land operations 
in Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land 
Operations.[Footnote 3] 

The U.S. military's global presence is organized into a series of 
geographic combatant commands. The commander of each combatant command 
has authority over assigned U.S. military forces operating within that 
command's area of operations and is directly responsible for planning 
and conducting the operations that achieve national, alliance, or 
coalition strategic objectives based on directives that flow from the 
President and the Secretary of Defense. Combatant commanders may 
exercise this authority through subordinate joint force commanders. The 
commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has authority to direct all 
aspects of military operations in the command's area of responsibility. 
Joint force commanders under CENTCOM are responsible for conducting 
region-specific operations, such as Operations Iraqi Freedom in Iraq 
and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For example, in Iraq, the 
commander of Multinational Force-Iraq--a CENTCOM joint force commander-
-provides direction to the commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq, who 
in turn directs the joint force commanders responsible for particular 
regions within Iraq. Regional commanders in Iraq control the brigade- 
sized units operating in their areas. Army brigade combat teams or 
Marine Corps regimental combat teams are led by experienced officers 
who generally have broad responsibilities for conducting missions with 
their assigned forces. When these ground force commanders are directing 
standard forces from their own services, they are responsible not only 
for directing the day-to-day movements of these forces, but also for 
organizing them and determining the scope of their missions within the 
parameters set by higher command authority. When ground force 
commanders control forces from more than one service, joint doctrine 
requires that they synchronize the unique capabilities and limitations 
of each force in order to achieve unity of effort.[Footnote 4] 

Combatant commanders and service secretaries have responsibilities 
related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that are assigned to the 
combatant commands. Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code,[Footnote 5] the 
commander of a combatant command is directly responsible for the 
preparedness of the command to carry out assigned missions and each 
service secretary is responsible for training and carrying out the 
functions of the service so as to fulfill the current and future 
operational requirements of the combatant commands. For example, when 
the Army provides standard forces to a combatant command such as 
CENTCOM, it takes steps to ensure that these forces meet Army training 
requirements and certifies that these requirements have been completed 
before deploying its servicemembers. In addition, these forces 
generally are commanded in theater by a subordinate commander from 
their own service. Because section 164 of Title 10 of the United States 
Code also gives combatant commanders wide-reaching authority over their 
assigned forces--including the authority to coordinate joint training-
-CENTCOM and its ground component command have issued lists of required 
training tasks that apply to forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of 
operations. Coordination of service and combatant commander 
responsibilities and training requirements is generally straightforward 
and simple when it involves standard forces because standard forces are 
normally trained by their parent service and then directed in theater 
by commanders from the same service, who organize them, determine the 
scope of their missions, and direct their the day- to-day movements. 

Meeting Requirements with Nonstandard Forces: 

Combatant commands like CENTCOM state their need for forces using 
various requirements documents, such as Requests for Forces and Joint 
Manning Documents. The joint and service force providers are 
responsible for identifying forces available to meet these combatant 
command requirements. The force providers have used two types of forces 
to meet CENTCOM requirements--standard forces and nonstandard forces. 
Standard forces perform their core missions within service deployment 
constructs.[Footnote 6] Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
required large numbers of ground forces, including requirements for 
certain combat support and combat service support skills. Engineering, 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and detainee operations personnel 
have been in particularly high demand. As the Army and Marine Corps 
standard forces that were filling these CENTCOM requirements began to 
approach or exceed DOD's deployment rotation goals, DOD looked to 
nonstandard forces as a way to help meet the large CENTCOM 
requirements. DOD has relied on the following nonstandard forces. 

* Joint sourced forces: These are forces from one service deployed to 
perform their core missions in place of units from another service. An 
example would be a Navy Mobile Construction Battalion filling an Army 
combat heavy engineer requirement. 

* In-lieu-of forces: These are forces trained and deployed to execute 
missions outside of their core competencies. An example would be taking 
an existing Army artillery battalion, providing it with training and 
equipment, and deploying it to fill a transportation or military police 
requirement. 

* Ad-hoc forces: These are temporary forces formed by consolidating 
individuals and equipment from various commands or services and then 
training the personnel to meet mission requirements. The most common ad-
hoc units are the transition teams that are training Iraqi and Afghan 
forces. 

* Individual augmentees: These are individuals deployed for temporary 
positions that augment staff operations during contingencies. An 
example would be individuals deployed to fill temporary positions in 
the Multinational Force-Iraq joint headquarters. 

We have previously testified that in order to meet the challenges of 
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has taken steps to 
increase the availability of personnel for deploying units.[Footnote 7] 
However, in the process, the services have been unable to meet DOD's 
deployed/at home ratio goals, for some personnel. DOD's goal is for 
active component personnel to be at home twice as long as they are 
deployed. However, many forces, especially those in high demand, are 
experiencing deployed/at home ratios of 1:2 or less. These goals have 
been especially challenging for the Army, which has successively 
increased the length of its Iraq deployments--from 6 to 12 and 
eventually to 15 months. For reserve component personnel, DOD has set a 
goal to limit involuntary mobilizations to 12 months, with 5 years 
between involuntary mobilizations. However, when he issued these goals 
in a January 2007 memorandum,[Footnote 8] the Secretary of Defense 
noted that in the short term, DOD will not be able to meet the goals. 

The Use of Nonstandard Forces Has Helped DOD to Meet CENTCOM 
Requirements but Has Also Created New Challenges: 

While DOD's limited use of nonstandard forces has spread large CENTCOM 
requirements across a wider portion of the force, the use of 
nonstandard forces has not alleviated the high pace of operations among 
Army forces and it has created several new challenges for the services. 
Specifically, it has exacerbated the high pace of operations for 
selected Navy and Air Force occupational specialties. In addition, 
nonstandard force requirements for individual leaders have created 
challenges for the services because the leaders are generally pulled 
from other units or commands, which are left to perform their missions 
without their full complement of leaders. The demands also increase 
deployment rates for the individual leaders who fill the positions. 

Use of Nonstandard Forces Spreads Requirements Across More of the 
Force, but Available Data Indicate That Nonstandard Forces Represent a 
Small Portion of the Deployed Force: 

By deploying nonstandard forces in addition to its standard forces, DOD 
has spread the CENTCOM requirements for ongoing operations across a 
wider portion of the force, but available data indicate that 
nonstandard forces represent a small portion of the deployed force. 
Navy and Air Force officials provided us with historical data which 
indicate that the use of their nonstandard forces has been increasing 
since 2004. The figures show that the two services together deployed at 
least 17,000 nonstandard forces between mid-2006 and early 2008--a 
relatively small number compared to an average deployed force of about 
180,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan during a similar time period.[Footnote 
9] According to Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Joint Forces Command 
officials, Army and Marine Corps nonstandard forces also constitute a 
relatively small portion of the deployed force. However, unclassified 
figures on the number of deployed Army and Marine Corps nonstandard 
forces are not available. 

DOD Has Used Nonstandard Forces to Meet CENTCOM's Large Requirements: 

DOD's use of nonstandard forces has helped to increase the supply of 
certain forces, but the Army has continued to deploy its forces at 
higher than desired rates due to imbalances that still exist between 
the available supply and current demand for forces. DOD's rotation goal 
calls for active component forces to spend at least twice as much time 
at home as deployed. Therefore, if the services are to meet this goal, 
the supply of deployable personnel must be at least three times the 
demand for those particular personnel--one person would be deployed and 
two would be at home. Because nonstandard forces make up a relatively 
small portion of the deployed force, the deployments of nonstandard 
forces have generally had a limited impact on the supply of forces 
relative to the demand for those forces. As a result, officials 
reported that the Army has continued to deploy its personnel at rates 
in excess of DOD's deployment goals. 

Two factors can affect the supply of personnel, including nonstandard 
forces, which are available to meet CENTCOM's large demands. The demand 
for some occupational specialties--such as medical or EOD personnel-- 
can only be met by a small, highly skilled group of personnel who 
generally have undergone extensive individual or unit training to 
prepare them for their missions. For example, CENTCOM has increasing 
demands for EOD personnel to locate, identify, and dispose of various 
forms of explosive ordnance, but the services have limited numbers of 
EOD personnel who have completed the training necessary to perform 
these tasks. The Navy has about 2,200 deployable EOD personnel. 
[Footnote 10] These individuals are required to complete 54 weeks of 
training, which includes parachuting and diving, in addition to basic 
EOD training. Similarly, the Air Force has only about 1,000 qualified 
EOD personnel. Deployments of personnel from these relatively small 
Navy and Air Force EOD communities have helped DOD fulfill CENTCOM 
requirements that the Army otherwise would have been unable to fill. 
However, due to the CENTCOM demands for EOD personnel, Army EOD 
personnel will continue to face deployments at a pace above DOD's 1:2 
deployed/at home goal, typically deploying for 15 months and returning 
home for only 12 months. 

The different service approaches for filling requirements can also 
affect the supply of personnel, including nonstandard forces, which are 
available to meet CENTCOM's large demands. For example, the Army and 
the Navy approaches for fulfilling CENTCOM's military police 
requirements have increased the supply of available personnel more than 
the Air Force approach for meeting these requirements.[Footnote 11] 
Since the early phases of operations in Iraq, the Army increased the 
supply of personnel it had available to meet military police 
requirements by retraining units which were not in high demand, such as 
artillery and quartermaster units, and then deploying them in addition 
to its military police units. The Navy has also increased the supply of 
personnel available to meet these requirements by drawing personnel 
both from its Master-at-Arms specialty, which most closely resembles 
the Army's military police occupation, and from a broad range of 
specialties that were not police-related. The Navy adopted this 
approach because all of its nonstandard forces undergo mission-specific 
training prior to deploying. The Air Force approach did less to 
increase the supply of available personnel because it fulfilled these 
requirements exclusively with personnel from its relatively small 
security force occupational specialty. Because the Air Force used only 
a small portion of its force to meet these requirements, it did little 
to address the imbalance between CENTCOM's large demand for military 
police forces and the available supply of forces. As a result, not only 
are Army forces continuing to deploy at higher than desired rates, but 
the Air Force's security personnel are also deploying at high rates. 

Nonstandard Force Deployments Increase Challenges for Some Portions of 
the Navy and the Air Force: 

Nonstandard force deployments have made it more difficult for the Air 
Force and the Navy to limit the high pace of operations in some 
occupational communities and they have created new challenges as the 
services have fewer personnel available to fulfill the standard 
missions of these communities. For example, the impact of nonstandard 
force deployments on the Air Force's security forces has been 
significant. These forces had a high tempo of operations before they 
began deploying for nonstandard force missions, and about half of the 
Air Force's 8,000 security forces who deployed in 2007 served as 
nonstandard forces. The length of these nonstandard force deployments 
varied between 6 and 12 months, but these forces generally had a 1:1 
deployed/at home ratio, far below the DOD 1:2 goal. In addition, 
predeployment training requirements and standard mission requirements 
add significantly to the pace of operations for these security forces 
during their time at home. During our interviews with security force 
personnel who were redeploying from Iraq, many noted that they had been 
deployed to Iraq more than once and several servicemembers expressed 
the opinion that, given the full range of their responsibilities, they 
would be lucky to be home for 8 months of the year between deployments. 
Because Navy and Air Force personnel in some specialties, such as 
engineering, were experiencing high tempos even before they began 
deploying for nonstandard force missions, the services are finding it 
more difficult to limit the high tempo of operations for personnel in 
these occupational specialties. To help address these challenges, the 
services are expanding some of these stressed career fields. For 
example, the Navy is adding a mobile construction battalion to its 
force and the Air Force is adding heavy engineering personnel.[Footnote 
12] Air Force officials have also reported that nonstandard EOD 
deployments were intensifying already high personnel tempos for these 
forces and Navy data show that EOD personnel are away from their home 
stations for more than half the time that they are between nonstandard 
CENTCOM deployments. 

The nonstandard force deployments of some occupational communities have 
also presented the services with additional challenges as fewer 
personnel are available to fulfill the standard missions of these 
communities. For example, the nonstandard force deployments of Navy and 
Air Force EOD personnel result in fewer personnel being available for 
standard EOD missions. As part of their standard mission, Navy EOD 
forces support U.S. Special Operations Command units, including Navy 
Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) units and Army Special Forces. They can also be 
called upon to counter weapons of mass destruction, clear harbors and 
waterways, and perform underwater repairs and salvage. Air Force 
officials have reported that nonstandard EOD deployments affect the 
service's ability to provide EOD teams in support of homeland missions 
such as deployments for major political events. The deployments of 
nonstandard Air Force security forces also result in fewer personnel 
being available for traditional mission requirements, such as ensuring 
the safety, security, reliability, and availability of nuclear weapons; 
providing flight line security; and providing home station security at 
Air Force bases. 

Despite the challenges that they face as a result of nonstandard force 
deployments, Navy and Air Force officials have stated that the services 
will be able to sustain their current levels of nonstandard force 
deployments to meet CENTCOM requirements. However, they report that 
these deployments will cause strain on the force because many of the 
CENTCOM requirements are concentrated in specific occupational 
specialties. 

CENTCOM's Demand for Leaders Has Created Challenges for Service 
Commands, Units, and Individuals: 

CENTCOM's extensive nonstandard force requirements for officers and 
middle-to senior-grade noncommissioned officers have challenged the 
commands or units responsible for fulfilling these requirements as well 
as the individual leaders who have deployed to fill the positions. Over 
the course of ongoing operations, requirements have emerged for new 
capabilities that do not reside in any of the services' force 
structures. Requirements for individual augmentees and the transition 
teams that train local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most 
common examples of these emerging requirements. CENTCOM has thousands 
of positions for these nonstandard force leaders. These positions are 
being filled with personnel from all four services, but because the 
services do not have permanent transition team units or pools of 
available individuals, they generally transfer leaders from other 
commands or units to fill these positions. Personnel from service 
headquarter organizations are deploying to fill many of these 
leadership positions, but operational units are also being tasked by 
the services to give up some of their leaders. Officials reported that 
because the units and commands that deploy their key leaders generally 
do not receive replacement personnel, they face challenges as they are 
left to perform their own missions without their full complement of 
leaders. Both service and CENTCOM officials reported that the 
organizations which are giving up personnel face a difficult choice in 
deciding which of their leaders to keep and which of their leaders to 
deploy. The Navy recently began taking steps to relieve its commanders 
of having to make these difficult decisions. Under a new policy, the 
Navy will fill most individual augmentee positions with servicemembers 
who are between assignments, rather than pulling servicemembers from 
positions within other commands.[Footnote 13] The stated purposes of 
this policy include providing stability for sailors and their families 
and improving manning stability at the unit level. As such, it 
mitigates the impact of individual augmentee deployments on Navy 
commands that were previously required to deploy some of their leaders. 

CENTCOM's large demand for leaders has also created challenges for some 
of the leaders who have deployed to fill these CENTCOM requirements. 
Because transition teams are generally comprised of officers and middle-
and senior-grade noncommissioned officers, and individual augmentees 
tend to come from similar leadership ranks, not from the large pool of 
junior enlisted personnel, leaders who are deploying to fill CENTCOM's 
nonstandard leadership positions may experience a high tempo of 
operations. Many of these leaders are being taken from commands when 
they are in the "at home" portion of their deployment cycles. As a 
result, they may be deployed in excess of DOD's 1:2 deployed/at home 
goal for active forces, or DOD's 1:5 goal for reserve component forces. 
Even the leaders who are deploying from defense agencies or 
headquarters organizations may have just left an operational unit, 
where they had recently deployed. 

Increased Coordination Has Helped DOD Address Some Challenges Related 
to the Training and Use of Nonstandard Forces, but Other Challenges 
Still Remain: 

The steps that DOD has taken to increase coordination between the 
services and CENTCOM--or its ground force commanders--have helped DOD 
manage several challenges related to the training and use of its 
nonstandard forces, but other challenges still remain. Nonstandard 
forces face more complex training and command relationships than 
standard forces. Their training requirements are established by both 
the services and commanders in theater and much of their training may 
be conducted by trainers from another service. In addition, while they 
are deployed, these forces often report to commanders from two 
different services. DOD has taken significant steps to coordinate the 
training of its nonstandard forces through regular conferences at which 
CENTCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and service officials develop 
detailed training plans for some nonstandard forces. However, the 
training of individual augmentees has not been fully coordinated; as a 
result, individuals who perform the same types of tasks in theater may 
receive different levels of training. Furthermore, the services waive 
some training requirements without consistently coordinating with 
CENTCOM, so CENTCOM lacks full visibility over the extent to which all 
of its assigned forces have met its training requirements. However, 
since 2004, the services have taken steps to increase oversight of 
nonstandard forces in theater, and enhanced coordination with the 
ground force commanders who provide the day-to-day taskings for these 
forces. Despite these coordination efforts, we noted that the Navy and 
the Air Force do not always have full visibility over commanders' use 
of nonstandard forces in theater, and have differing views on the 
authority of ground force commanders, which has sometimes led to 
differences in the use of nonstandard forces. 

DOD Faces Challenges in Managing Training and Use of Nonstandard Forces 
Due to Complex Command Relationships and Other Factors: 

DOD faces challenges in coordinating the training and use of 
nonstandard forces that it does not typically face with its standard 
forces because of differences in the provision of training and more 
complex command relationships. While standard forces may have one or 
more chains of command, standard forces are generally trained by their 
parent service to requirements set by that service and then directed in 
theater by commanders from the same service, who organize them, 
determine the scope of their missions, and direct their day-to-day 
movements. As a result, the coordination of the training and use of 
standard forces is generally straightforward. 

In contrast, many nonstandard forces undergo training provided by 
another service and face more complicated command relationships, making 
coordination of their training and use more challenging. For example, 
because the Navy and the Air Force are unable to provide most of the 
ground combat skills training that their nonstandard forces require, 
the Army has agreed to provide ground combat skills training at Army 
locations such as Camp Shelby, Fort Bliss, and Fort Dix. The Army also 
provides Navy and Air Force nonstandard forces specialized training at 
Army Training and Doctrine Command locations. For example, it provides 
a military police investigator course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. 

While some nonstandard forces are trained by their own services and 
report only to commanders from that same service, many nonstandard 
forces are trained by a different service and then report in theater to 
commanders from more than one service. For example, "in-lieu-of" Army 
artillery units may be trained by the Army to perform military police 
functions and then deployed to theater, where they would typically 
report to an Army commander who would determine their organization, the 
scope of their missions, and their day-to-day tasks. Other nonstandard 
forces, such as Navy forces performing detainee operations or Air Force 
units performing convoy missions, have more complicated relationships. 
While these Navy units typically receive Army training, these Air Force 
units receive Air Force training. However, both the Navy and the Air 
Force units typically face dual chains of command in theater. They 
typically receive their day-to-day taskings from an Army ground force 
commander but also report to commanders from their own services, who 
are responsible for determining their organization and the scope of 
their missions. For more information on command and control 
relationships in the CENTCOM area of operations, see appendix III. 

Given these complex training and command relationships, roles and 
responsibilities must be clearly understood in order for the in-theater 
use of nonstandard forces to align with the training of those forces. 
However, joint doctrine concerning the training and use of forces-- 
including command relationships, roles, and responsibilities--was 
established before DOD began expanding its use of nonstandard forces in 
2004. Moreover, the latest version of the joint doctrine does not 
specifically address the training and use of nonstandard forces, with 
their complex training and command relationships. Lacking policies that 
specifically define roles and responsibilities for nonstandard forces, 
the services have increased their coordination to address these complex 
training and command relationships. While individual augmentees 
typically report to a single commander in theater, these nonstandard 
forces may also face challenges because their in-theater commanders may 
not be from the individual augmentee's parent service and because the 
in-theater commanders may not be from the same service that trained the 
individual augmentee. 

Commands and Services Have Taken Significant Steps to Coordinate Plans 
for Training Some Nonstandard Forces: 

CENTCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command have taken steps to coordinate 
efforts to plan for the predeployment training that many nonstandard 
forces need, including participating in periodic conferences, referred 
to as Joint Sourced Training and Oversight conferences. At these 
meetings, officials from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
CENTCOM, and U.S. Joint Forces Command conduct line-by-line reviews of 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force nonstandard forces and determine 
which training the deploying service will provide and which training 
the Army will provide for the other services. To prepare for the Joint 
Sourced Training and Oversight conferences, the Air Force and the Navy 
take certain steps, including informally consulting with Army 
officials, as the following examples illustrate. 

* The Air Force holds its own periodic conferences to determine the 
specific training needs of its nonstandard forces. During these 
conferences, officials from various Air Force training, headquarters, 
and theater-level commands and organizations evaluate the list of 
CENTCOM-required training tasks and determine what, if any, additional 
training nonstandard forces may require. To avoid unwanted duplication 
of training, they also determine whether any existing Air Force 
training can be used to meet CENTCOM's requirements. Army officials 
attend these conferences to coordinate necessary training that the Air 
Force is not able to provide. However, CENTCOM headquarters officials 
responsible for developing the training requirements generally have not 
attended these conferences. 

* The Navy also reviews training requirements for its nonstandard 
forces and it conducts informal discussions with the Army prior to the 
Joint Sourced Training and Oversight conferences. During these 
discussions the Navy determines what additional training its 
nonstandard forces may require, but it does not attempt to substitute 
training that sailors already receive for CENTCOM's required training, 
and CENTCOM officials do not generally participate in these 
discussions. 

As a result of these coordination efforts, officials we interviewed 
believe they have been able to gain a good understanding of CENTCOM and 
service training requirements for certain nonstandard forces and the 
types of training that will be provided to ensure these requirements 
are met. See appendix IV for more information on training requirements 
and types of training. 

Individual Augmentee Training Has Not Been Fully Coordinated: 

While the Joint Sourced Training and Oversight conference participants 
coordinate training plans for most nonstandard forces, the participants 
do not address the training needs for one group of nonstandard forces-
-individual augmentees--during the conferences. Rather, each service 
conducts its own program of instruction, which vary in content and 
length, and which may involve training from other services. For 
example, the Army's specific program of instruction that deploying Army 
individual augmentees must attend is 7 days long. These augmentees must 
also complete additional Army-specific training, either before or after 
they attend the individual augmentee course. The Navy requires its 
individual augmentees to attend a 17-day combat training course, run by 
the Army at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Prior to December 2007, Air 
Force individual augmentees received no ground combat skills training. 
Since then, the Air Force has been sending its individual augmentees 
through one of three courses ranging in length from 5 to 10 days, which 
are based on internally developed Air Force requirements. In some 
cases, individual augmentees from one service have attended a different 
service's training course. For example, according to Army training 
officials, some Navy personnel--who were not subject to the additional 
Army training requirements--attended the Army's individual augmentee 
training, rather than the Navy course, because the Army course took 
less time to complete than the Navy course. Despite the differences in 
individual augmentee training, Army, Navy, and Air Force individual 
augmentees often serve side-by-side in theater and are expected to 
perform the same types of tasks. 

CENTCOM Lacks Full Visibility over Services' Granting of Training 
Waivers: 

Under Title 10 of the United States Code and joint doctrine, the 
combatant commands and the service secretaries have responsibilities 
related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that are assigned to the 
combatant commands. In exercising these authorities, the services 
determine required training for their forces and have also established 
procedures for waiving training under certain circumstances. In 
addition, CENTCOM has established a list of certain "theater entry 
requirements" characterized as training tasks on which it expects 
deploying forces to train prior to deployment. See appendix IV for 
additional information on training requirements and types of training. 
While the services and CENTCOM have coordinated some training plans, 
the services have implemented procedures for waiving CENTCOM-required 
training without fully coordinating with the CENTCOM headquarters 
office responsible for developing the training requirements on either 
the development of the waiver procedures or the actual issuing of 
waivers. Navy nonstandard forces that have completed Navy combat skills 
training more than 90 days prior to their deployment would normally 
have to update their training by repeating the course, but they can 
waive this requirement if they complete relevant combat skills training 
that significantly exceeds what they would receive in the Navy course. 
[Footnote 14] The Air Force grants waivers for combat skills training 
on a case-by-case basis. The Air Force headquarters operations office 
considers approval of combat skills training waivers for Air Force 
nonstandard forces if the commander who has day-to-day control over 
those forces accepts the risk of lost training and states in writing 
that the forces will not conduct missions outside of their operating 
bases. According to CENTCOM officials, the services have not 
consistently coordinated these waiver policies with CENTCOM. Therefore, 
CENTCOM does not have full visibility over the extent to which its 
assigned forces have met its established training requirements. 
Officials from both the Navy and the Air Force emphasized that they 
grant few training waivers, but they said that they do not track all 
nonstandard force training waivers. 

Services Have Taken Steps to Coordinate More Closely with Ground Force 
Commanders, but Have Differing Views about the Ground Force Commanders' 
Authority to Use Nonstandard Forces: 

Since 2004, the services have expanded their efforts to provide 
oversight and support to their nonstandard forces, including 
coordinating with ground force commanders to ensure the forces are 
being used for missions and tasks for which they were trained. 
Specifically, the Navy increased the number of staff and the amount of 
resources it dedicates to supporting nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM 
theater. The Air Force also expanded its in-theater support of its 
nonstandard forces, and in 2007 it redesignated its Expeditionary 
Mission Support Groups as Air Expeditionary Groups in order to increase 
their level of authority. While the two services have in-theater 
support commands at several locations, the commanders and their support 
personnel are regularly in the field interacting with ground force 
commanders and nonstandard forces. Air Force and Navy officials from 
the in-theater commands said that expanding their support has led to 
increased coordination with ground force commanders. According to Air 
Force commanders, this coordination has reduced the number of instances 
in which ground force commanders have modified the missions, tasks, or 
organization of their nonstandard forces after they arrive in theater. 
Similarly, the Navy has enhanced its ability to coordinate the 
successful resolution of cases in which ground force commanders may 
require Navy nonstandard forces to perform tasks for which they have 
not been fully trained and equipped. 

Despite these coordination efforts, we noted that the Navy and the Air 
Force do not always have full visibility over commanders' use of 
nonstandard forces in theater, and have differing views on the 
authority of ground force commanders, which has sometimes led to 
differences in the use of nonstandard forces. Because the services do 
not always have representatives from the supporting commands collocated 
with all of their nonstandard forces, they are not able to coordinate 
with ground force commanders concerning all changes to organization, 
mission, or tasks. For example, the service commands do not have 
visibility over their nonstandard force members who volunteer for 
additional tasks for which they may not be properly prepared. Navy 
officials estimate that there may be six cases per month in which 
volunteers from their nonstandard forces perform tasks for which they 
have not been fully trained. Because servicemembers do so without the 
knowledge of their Navy chain of command, the command officials were 
unable to precisely state the extent to which Navy nonstandard forces 
volunteered, and they had not directly observed the situations in which 
the servicemembers volunteered. Air Force commanders estimated that 95 
percent of Air Force nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM area of 
operations were performing precisely the tasks for which they were 
trained, equipped, and deployed. However, they said a relatively small 
number of personnel were performing tasks or missions which differed 
from those on CENTCOM's requirements document, and added that in most 
cases these new tasks underutilized the skills of the nonstandard 
forces. 

Divergent interpretations of assigned roles and responsibilities have 
also posed challenges as commanders have sought to use their 
nonstandard forces. For example, the services maintain that there are 
limitations on the ground force commanders' authority to modify the 
organization, missions, or tasks of deployed nonstandard forces. 
Specifically, the Air Force interprets CENTCOM's requirements documents 
strictly, and its Air Expeditionary Group commanders work with ground 
force commanders to try to prevent Air Force nonstandard forces from 
performing any missions or tasks that are not identified in CENTCOM's 
requirements documents. The Air Expeditionary Group commanders also 
seek to prevent CENTCOM or the ground force commanders from moving 
forces to locations that are not outlined in the original requirements. 
Air Force officials cite joint doctrine as justification for the Air 
Expeditionary Group commanders' ability to impose such limitations on 
ground force commanders. Conversely, CENTCOM officials told us they 
believe the ground force commanders' authority enables these commanders 
to move forces wherever they are needed. Many of the groups of 
redeploying airmen with whom we spoke felt that their Air Force chain 
of command was too involved in their daily activities; they stated that 
they could have performed their missions more effectively had they been 
allowed to work exclusively with their ground force commanders. Others 
were glad that their Air Force chain of command had intervened when the 
ground force commander had tried to adjust their missions. For more 
information on servicemembers' views on their nonstandard force 
deployments, see appendix V. 

The Navy's interpretation of CENTCOM's requirements documents and joint 
doctrine is less strict than the Air Force's interpretation. Like the 
Air Expeditionary Groups, Navy officials coordinate with ground force 
commanders whenever that is possible. However, Navy commanders allow 
their nonstandard forces to perform additional tasks if (1) the ground 
force commander deems these additional tasks necessary to accomplish 
the mission and (2) the additional tasks do not put sailors at risk by 
requiring them to do something for which they are not trained and 
equipped. Based on these criteria, Navy officials told us that it is 
not unusual for their nonstandard forces to receive a change of mission 
or mission location. When we spoke to naval officers who had served in 
individual augmentee billets in Iraq and Afghanistan, they noted that 
their tasks were commonly modified or expanded, but they also said that 
the training they had received at the Navy's individual augmentee 
course had made them capable of performing all of their assigned tasks. 
In general, most of the nonstandard force servicemembers who reported 
that their tasks had changed while deployed indicated that the 
adjustments, such as moving units to different locations or performing 
additional duties, were minor. Although most of these tasks were 
performed in Iraq or Afghanistan, they did not necessarily expose the 
nonstandard forces to any additional danger. For example, a reserve 
intelligence officer told us that she was performing comptroller 
functions. In addition, leaders from one of the U.S. Naval Forces 
Central Command task groups that support Navy nonstandard forces said 
that some petty officers were performing support functions, which were 
appropriate leadership duties for their rank, but which were not in 
line with the petty officers' occupational specialties or predeployment 
training. Running dining halls was one specific example. 

Conclusions: 

To meet CENTCOM's requirements for servicemembers in certain high- 
demand specialties, the Navy and the Air Force have deployed 
nonstandard forces in place of Army personnel. Although the number of 
deployed nonstandard forces is small when compared with the total 
number of forces deployed to the CENTCOM area of operations, many 
nonstandard forces, like standard ground forces, have made repeated 
deployments and have had limited time at home between deployments. 
However, complex training and command relationships have presented 
nonstandard forces with challenges that standard forces do not 
typically face. Because existing authorities do not specifically 
outline roles and responsibilities for the training and use of 
nonstandard forces, CENTCOM and the services have sought to coordinate 
their efforts to ensure that nonstandard forces are properly trained 
and used in theater. While this coordination has increased 
significantly since 2004, DOD cannot currently ensure that all of its 
nonstandard forces are being used consistent with the tasks, 
conditions, and standards for which they have been trained because (1) 
CENTCOM does not have full visibility over training waivers, (2) 
individual augmentee training has not been coordinated, (3) service in-
theater commands do not always have command personnel present with all 
their nonstandard forces, and (4) in some cases, even when coordination 
has occurred, divergent interpretations of existing authorities cause 
the services and CENTCOM or its ground force commanders to come to 
different conclusions concerning missions that should be assigned to 
nonstandard forces in theater. Until DOD issues policy guidance that 
clarifies (1) the roles and responsibilities for preparing and training 
nonstandard forces, including waiver responsibilities and procedures, 
and (2) the nature and extent of ground force commanders' authorities 
to direct the use of these forces, DOD will continue to face challenges 
regardless of its level of coordination. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To enhance the management of DOD's nonstandard forces, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (Personnel and Readiness) in conjunction with the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop and issue a policy to guide the 
training and use of nonstandard forces. At a minimum, the policy should 
clarify: 

* responsibilities for the predeployment training of all nonstandard 
forces, including individual augmentees; 

* training waiver responsibilities and procedures, and; 

* the nature and extent of ground force commanders' authorities to 
direct the use of nonstandard forces. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

The Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) provided 
written comments on a draft of this report. The department concurred 
with the recommendation, and stated it has work underway to review 
existing policy and ensure the necessary guidance is in place for 
effective training and equipping of nonstandard forces and individual 
augmentees. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we have 
incorporated in the report as appropriate. The department's comments 
are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at 
no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Sharon L. Pickup, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the extent to which DOD's use of nonstandard forces to meet 
ground force requirements has impacted the force, we interviewed 
officials from the entities involved in the oversight, management, and 
use of nonstandard forces, including the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorates for Manpower and 
Personnel and Operations, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Joint 
Forces Command, and the service headquarters and service force 
providers. We discussed our methodology for identifying and defining 
nonstandard forces with CENTCOM, the service headquarters, and the 
service force providers. We then obtained data from the services on the 
extent to which they have relied on nonstandard forces in support of 
ongoing operations as well as data on the use of nonstandard forces 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Joint Forces Command. Using 
these data, we determined as a baseline the extent to which the 
services rely on these forces to meet operational requirements and the 
resultant effect on operational tempo. Because nonstandard force 
definitions have differed over time and across the services, we were 
not able to assess the reliability of these data. We discussed the 
implications of the use of nonstandard forces on the overall force, 
obtaining testimonial evidence from officials (1) responsible for the 
management and oversight of these forces, and (2) using these forces, 
including, but not limited to, officials from CENTCOM; the service 
component commands--U.S. Air Forces Central, U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command, and Army Central Command; service headquarters, and service 
force providers. We obtained and reviewed documentation on the impact 
that the use of nonstandard forces has had on the services, in general, 
and on particular career fields within the services, such as security 
forces, engineering, and explosive ordnance disposal. In addition, we 
analyzed transcripts of congressional testimony presented by DOD 
officials on the reliance on nonstandard forces in support of ongoing 
operations. 

To assess the extent to which DOD has faced challenges in managing the 
training and use of nonstandard forces, and taken steps to address any 
challenges, we reviewed and analyzed relevant sections of Title 10 of 
the United States Code as well as DOD, Joint Staff, combatant command, 
and service policies and requirements. In particular, we reviewed the 
principles and concepts for joint operations as outlined in Joint 
Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, to 
include roles and responsibilities established under existing command 
and control relationships. We also collected and examined theater 
training requirements that have been established for deploying 
nonstandard forces, including the CENTCOM-issued, theater-specific 
training requirements and the tasks required by the Coalition Forces 
Land Component Command. We discussed the intent of these training 
requirements and the steps by which individuals and units can meet 
these requirements with officials from CENTCOM and the Coalition Forces 
Land Component Command and the Camp Buehring Udairi Range Complex in 
Kuwait. To determine the extent to which the services and joint 
community have processes in place to prepare and deploy nonstandard 
forces and how these processes address and allow the waiving of theater 
training requirements for nonstandard forces, we interviewed officials 
from the OSD, U.S. Joint Forces Command, CENTCOM, and service 
headquarters. In addition, we spoke with officials from the Navy's 
Fleet Forces Command, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, U.S. Army 
Forces Command, First U.S. Army, Third U.S. Army, Second Air Force, and 
Ninth Air Force. We met with officials at the Army Continental United 
States Replacement Center and conducted meetings and observed training 
at the Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Training, the Air Force Basic 
Combat Convoy Course, and the Common Battlefield Airman Training-Bridge 
course. We also observed several relevant conferences, including the 
Second Air Force-hosted Training and Equipment Review Boards in 
September 2007 and January 2008, and the Joint Sourced Training and 
Oversight conference hosted by U.S. Joint Forces Command in April 2008. 
At these conferences, we held discussions with officials to fully 
understand the issues and challenges associated with the reliance on 
nonstandard forces. To determine the procedures in place to oversee the 
use of nonstandard forces while deployed, we reviewed joint doctrine 
and service policies and spoke with U.S. Air Forces Central officials, 
Air Expeditionary Group commanders, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command 
officials, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Combined Task Force 
commanders, and CENTCOM officials. 

To gain insight on servicemember perspectives on deploying as part of a 
nonstandard force, we conducted semi-structured discussion group 
sessions with over 300 deploying, deployed, and redeploying enlisted 
servicemembers and officers from each service. Specifically, we 
traveled to the CENTCOM area of operations in November 2007 to conduct 
a majority of these discussion groups. In selecting individuals to 
speak with, we asked the service headquarters and CENTCOM service 
component commands to identify all servicemembers redeploying within 
the time frame of our visit. We then spoke with as many of the 
redeployers as were available while in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The 
basic criterion used in soliciting these individuals was that they were 
a servicemember deployed or redeploying as part of a nonstandard force. 
Most of the groups of servicemembers with whom we spoke were Air Force 
servicemembers in the process of redeploying from Iraq. However, we 
also interviewed Army and Navy servicemembers deployed and redeploying, 
as available, to gain their perspectives on their deployments. Many of 
the servicemembers with whom we spoke had performed engineering, 
detainee operations, or convoy missions, which are among the largest 
nonstandard missions in Iraq. Topics of discussion during the sessions 
included notification, preparation, and training for the nonstandard 
deployment, and in-theater performance. Following each discussion 
group, we administered a short survey to each participant which 
solicited further information on their experience deploying as a 
nonstandard force. We collected 303 surveys--254 from Air Force 
personnel, 33 from Navy personnel, 12 from Army personnel, and 4 
surveys that did not specify the member's service. The surveys covered 
39 individual augmentees and 264 nonstandard unit personnel. Upon 
return from CENTCOM, we met with an additional 21 Army personnel 
redeploying from individual augmentee deployments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan at the Army's Continental United States Replacement Center 
at Fort Benning. The same process was used for these discussion groups 
as those previously discussed. We then met with 43 Navy personnel at 
the Navy's Individual Augmentee Combat Training at Fort Jackson and 15 
Air Force personnel at the Air Force's Basic Combat Convoy Course at 
Camp Bullis deploying as part of a nonstandard force. For the 
discussion groups we held with deployers, we administered a discussion 
session, but did not follow these sessions with the survey instrument 
because the individuals had not yet deployed as part of a nonstandard 
force. Comments provided during the discussion groups cannot be 
projected across the entire military community because the participants 
were not selected using a generalizable sampling methodology. To 
validate information we heard in the discussion groups, we interviewed 
officials from the Navy and Air Force commands that oversee the 
deployment of nonstandard forces in the CENTCOM area of operations, 
service headquarters, and CENTCOM. Despite our requests, the Marine 
Corps did not make any servicemembers or officials available during our 
CENTCOM travel. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Personnel and Readiness: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

Ms. Sharon L. Pickup
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Pickup: 

This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the 
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands," dated 
May 5, 2008 (GAO Code 351060/ GAO-08-670). 

DOD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. 
Detailed comment on the GAO recommendation is enclosed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Joseph J. Angello, Jr. 
Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
Readiness: 

Enclosure: As Stated: 

GAO Draft Report -- Dated May 5, 2008: 
GAO Code 351060/GAO-08-670: 

"Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the Training 
and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands" 

Department Of Defense Response To The Recommendation: 

Recommendation I: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to develop and issue a policy to guide the training and use of non-
standard forces. At a minimum, the policy should clarify: 

* responsibilities for the pre-deployment training of all non-standard 
forces, including individual augmentees; 

* training waiver responsibilities and procedures; and; 

* the nature and extent of ground force commanders' authorities to 
direct the use of non-standard forces. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department of Defense currently has work 
underway to review existing policy and ensure the necessary guidance is 
in place for effective training and equipping of non-standard forces 
and individual augmentees. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Military Command and Control Relationships: 

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States, describes various authorities relevant to the command and 
control of deployed forces. These authorities include operational 
control, tactical control, and administrative control. This publication 
does not make distinctions between the control of standard forces and 
the control of nonstandard forces. 

* Operational control refers to the authority to perform those 
functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, 
and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. 
Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects 
of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish 
missions assigned to the command. The service operational commanders 
that we interviewed in theater interpreted operational control as their 
authority to organize their assigned forces and adjust the scope of the 
missions of these forces. The Navy and the Air Force exercise 
operational control over most of their own nonstandard forces in the 
CENTCOM area of operations. 

* Tactical control is defined as a commander's authority over assigned 
or attached forces or commands or military capability made available 
for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of 
movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to 
accomplish assigned missions or tasks. Tactical control, like 
operational control, can be exercised by commanders at or below the 
combatant command level and can be delegated within a command. 
Commanders that we interviewed for this engagement interpreted tactical 
control as commanders' abilities to provide the day-to-day taskings of 
their assigned troops, within established mission guidelines. In the 
CENTCOM area of operations, ground force commanders exercise tactical 
control over forces under their command, including nonstandard forces. 

* Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over 
subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and 
support including organization of service forces, control of resources 
and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and 
unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and 
other matters not included in the operational missions of the 
subordinate or other organizations. This is the authority necessary to 
fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for 
administration and support. Each of the services exercises 
administrative control over its own forces, including nonstandard 
forces, in the CENTCOM area of operations. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Training Requirements for Nonstandard Forces Deploying to 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM): 

Nonstandard forces that deploy to the CENTCOM area of operation are 
generally subject to at least three different sets of training 
requirements--the combatant commander's training tasks, the coalition 
forces land component commander's training tasks, and service training 
tasks. CENTCOM has issued requirements for forces deploying to its area 
of operations, which include minimum training tasks for both units and 
individuals. These requirements establish a baseline of combat skill 
proficiency for all forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of operations. 
As such, they contain both individual task requirements and groups of 
training tasks that are tailored to distinct mission areas. Required 
individual tasks include force protection, law of land warfare, rules 
of engagement, language training briefings, weapons qualification and 
basic marksmanship, High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 
egress assistance training, first aid, and counter-improvised explosive 
device training. The requirements also include unit tasks that are 
tailored to 24 distinct missions--including engineering units, military 
police companies, area support medical companies, and light-medium 
truck companies--and a final set of unit tasks that apply to all the 
units which are not included in the 24 distinct missions. The unit 
training requirements are organized into categories that include 
driver, convoy live-fire, communications, heavy weapons, troop leading 
procedures and military decision-making process, and combat lifesaver 
training tasks. The amount of training required in each category 
depends on the mission individual units will undertake. For example, a 
general aviation company requires no communications, heavy weapons, or 
combat lifesaver training, whereas the requirements for military police 
law and order detachments include tasks in each of these categories. 

In addition to the CENTCOM requirements, the Coalition Forces Land 
Component Command, the command that directs all land forces on behalf 
of CENTCOM, has also developed a list of required training tasks. These 
tasks include antifratricide; counter-improvised explosive device level 
I awareness; Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device 
Electronic Warfare System familiarity; escalation of force; test fire/ 
confirm zero; and HMMWV egress assistance training. Most servicemembers 
who deploy to Iraq conduct training at the Udairi Range complex at Camp 
Buehring in Kuwait before they deploy to Iraq. Camp Buehring offers 
training on tasks required by the Coalition Forces Land Component 
Command. However, personnel can complete at least one of these required 
tasks--the HMMWV egress assistance training, which is also included in 
the CENTCOM training requirements--in the United States before 
deploying to Kuwait. In addition to the training on the Coalition 
Forces Land Component Command minimum tasks, Camp Buehring offers units 
an opportunity to (1) gain additional practice on tasks they have 
already learned, (2) receive updated instruction on the latest tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, and (3) complete additional training tasks 
that unit or service leaders determine are necessary so that the unit 
will be able to accomplish its mission. 

In addition to the CENTCOM and Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
requirements, deploying nonstandard forces are required to complete 
service-specific training requirements. Some of these service-required 
tasks overlap with the CENTCOM or Coalition Forces Land Component 
Command minimum tasks, but the services also have some unique training 
requirements. For example, all Army forces entering the CENTCOM area of 
operations must complete biometrics training, a requirement that is not 
included in CENTCOM's minimum requirements. Another example of a 
service-unique training requirement would be the Air Force requirement 
for individual augmentees to receive 23 hours of training on tactical 
field operations, such as breaking contact with the enemy and crossing 
danger areas. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Servicemembers' Perceptions of Preparation for Nonstandard 
Force Deployments: 

The groups of redeploying nonstandard forces with whom we spoke 
generally felt prepared to perform their assigned tasks while deployed 
within the CENTCOM area of operations.[Footnote 15] Many groups of 
nonstandard forces with whom we spoke listed combat lifesaver training 
as some of the most valuable training conducted in the United States 
prior to deployment to theater. In addition, many groups of nonstandard 
forces emphasized the importance of training with the outgoing unit 
after arrival at their mission location. For example, deploying Air 
Force convoy truck drivers complete a series of tasks--preferably 
together with the personnel they are replacing--before they assume 
their mission. These tasks included riding with outgoing personnel on 
"local missions" to deliver supplies to bases in Kuwait. In addition, 
personnel with whom we spoke from the Army transportation company said 
that senior noncommissioned officers used the opportunity in theater 
before beginning the mission to train junior soldiers on specific 
tasks, such as heavy weapons firing and training on specific vehicles, 
which these junior soldiers may not have had opportunities to practice 
operating prior to deployment. 

The groups of servicemembers with whom we spoke generally noted that 
the training they received to prepare them for their nonstandard force 
deployment was not always relevant to their missions or was redundant. 
However, unit leaders, trainers, and service officials with whom we 
spoke usually had explanations for the redundant training or had taken 
steps to improve the training identified through feedback as less 
relevant. For example, several senior leaders in the units with whom we 
spoke noted that although they had not needed to use their weapons 
training during their deployments, they were glad to have completed it 
just in case they had needed it. The leader of one large unit also 
noted that while the time his personnel spent on their individual 
qualifications could have been shortened, the full training time was 
necessary to build his leadership team in a unit that was composed of 
personnel from numerous different commands. 

The largest group of nonstandard forces with whom we spoke--airmen 
responsible for trucking goods from Kuwait to Iraq--generally agreed 
that their U.S.-based training did not fully reflect the tasks they 
were expected to conduct while deployed. Servicemembers noted that they 
received a significant amount of training on the use of "gun trucks" 
(armored HMMWVs with heavy weapons attached), even though the Army had 
taken over the convoy security mission in theater. They also said that 
their training time in the U.S. could have been better used to practice 
driving tractor trailers, since that is what they actually did in 
theater. Officials responsible for training these airmen indicated that 
they had received similar feedback, and stated that they were adjusting 
the Air Force training course to better reflect actual tasks performed 
in theater. Specifically, the course officials had requisitioned the 
latest model of Army truck that the Air Force nonstandard forces were 
driving in theater and they had tripled the number of miles driven by 
the airmen in these vehicles during their predeployment training. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or [email protected]. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Ferren, Assistant 
Director; Burns Chamberlain; Nicole Harms; Joanne Landesman; Amanda 
Miller; Jason Pogacnik; and Kristy Williams made major contributions to 
this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to 
Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-497T]. Washington D.C.: 
February 14, 2008. 

Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That 
Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While 
Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-814]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 19, 2007. 

Military Personnel: DOD Lacks Reliable Personnel Tempo Data and Needs 
Quality Controls to Improve Data Accuracy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-780]. Washington D.C.: July 
17, 2007. 

Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination Needed 
to Ensure Viability of the Army's Prepositioning Strategy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-144]. Washington D.C.: 
February 15, 2007. 

Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army's 
Implementation of Its Equipment Reset Strategies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-439T]. Washington D.C.: 
January 31, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-308SP]. Washington, D.C.: January 9, 2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 110-181, ï¿½354 (2008). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½345 (2006). 

[3] Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United 
States (May 14, 2007) and Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control 
for Joint Land Operations (Mar. 23, 2004). 

[4] Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land 
Operations (Mar. 23, 2004). 

[5] See 10 U.S.C. ï¿½164 for responsibilities of commanders of combatant 
commands, and 10 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½3013, 5013, and 8013 for the responsibilities 
of the service secretaries. 

[6] The Army typically deploys brigades; the Navy, carrier or 
amphibious assault groups; the Air Force, air expeditionary force 
wings; and the Marine Corps, regiments or marine expeditionary units. 

[7] GAO, Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions 
Needed to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-497T] (Washington D.C.: Feb. 
14, 2008). 

[8] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force 
(Jan. 19, 2007). 

[9] Because the services did not collect data for similar time periods, 
we included Navy nonstandard force requirements for fiscal year 2007 
and Air Force nonstandard force requirements from March 2006 through 
March 2008. We also included individual augmentees deployed as of 
August 2007. In addition, the deployed force in Iraq and Afghanistan 
represents an average of forces deployed from July 2007 through October 
2007. 

[10] This number includes sailors from deployable EOD mobile units 
only. The Navy also has additional EOD personnel assigned to shore duty 
who are not deployable. 

[11] These requirements are for detainee operations, law and order, and 
base security missions. 

[12] These Air Force units are commonly referred to as RED HORSE units 
(Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron 
Engineers). 

[13] NAVADMIN 147/07, Global War on Terrorism Support Assignments (June 
2007). 

[14] NAVADMIN 355/07, Navy Individual Augmentee Combat Skills Training 
(Dec. 2007). 

[15] We met with nonrepresentative groups, which included more than 300 
servicemembers who were redeploying from the CENTCOM area of 
operations. Appendix I contains additional details about these 
individuals. 

[End of section] 

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