Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed 
to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain	 
Capable Afghan National Security Forces (18-JUN-08, GAO-08-661). 
                                                                 
Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan	 
National Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense	 
(Defense), through its Combined Security Transition		 
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs U.S. efforts to develop the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the 	 
Department of State (State), the Afghan National Police (ANP). To
follow up on recommendations from GAO's 2005 report on the ANSF, 
GAO analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain 
criteria we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and	 
challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. To address these 
objectives, GAO reviewed Defense, State, and contractor documents
and met with cognizant officials. GAO has prepared this report	 
under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations 
on his own initiative.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-661 					        
    ACCNO:   A82405						        
  TITLE:     Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and	 
Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces 		 
     DATE:   06/18/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Employee training					 
	     Force planning					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign military assistance			 
	     Foreign military training				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     International relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military personnel retention			 
	     Military training					 
	     Mission budgeting					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Police training					 
	     Risk factors					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic forces					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Afghan National Police				 
	     Afghan National Security Forces			 
	     Afghanistan					 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-661

   

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to [email protected]. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

June 2008: 

Afghanistan Security: 

Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a 
Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security 
Forces: 

GAO-08-661: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-661, a report to Congressional Committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense (Defense), through 
its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs 
U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in 
conjunction with the Department of State (State), the Afghan National 
Police (ANP). 

To follow up on recommendations from GAOï¿½s 2005 report on the ANSF, GAO 
analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria 
we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and challenges faced in 
developing the ANA and ANP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed 
Defense, State, and contractor documents and met with cognizant 
officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller Generalï¿½s 
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 

What GAO Found: 

In 2005, GAO recommended that Defense and State develop detailed plans 
for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided a 
document in response to this recommendation. This 5-page document lacks 
sufficient detail for effective interagency planning and oversight. For 
example, while the document includes some broad objectives and 
performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones and no 
intermediate milestones for assessing progress, and it lacks a 
sustainability strategy. Although Defense and State are partners in 
police training, the document does not include Stateï¿½s input or 
describe Stateï¿½s role. Further, State has not completed a plan of its 
own. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan to develop 
the ANSF that includes force goals, objectives, and performance 
measures. While this is an improvement over prior field-level planning, 
it is not a substitute for a coordinated, detailed Defense and State 
plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. In 2008, Congress 
mandated that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for 
strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining 
the ANSF. These have not been provided. Without a detailed plan, it is 
difficult to assess progress and conduct oversight of the cost of 
developing the ANSF. This is particularly important given the limited 
capacity of the Afghan government to fund the estimated $2 billion per 
year ANSF sustainment costs for years into the future. 

The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA 
since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being 
fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to 
develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has 
grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 
80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates 
for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while 
trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls 
exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units 
report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items 
Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. 
Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global 
priorities. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA 
to reach full capability may be delayed. 

Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an 
investment of over $6 billion, no police unit is fully capable and 
several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop the police. First, 
less than one-quarter of the police have mentors present to provide 
training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, 
police units continue to face shortages in equipment items that Defense 
considers critical, such as vehicles, radios, and body armor. In 
addition, Afghanistanï¿½s weak judicial system hinders effective policing 
and rule of law, and the ANP consistently experiences problems with 
pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Defense began a new 
effort in November 2007 to address these challenges, but the continuing 
shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To ensure action on GAOï¿½s 2005 recommendation and a 2008 Defense 
Authorization Act mandate, Congress should consider conditioning a 
portion of future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, 
detailed plan for the ANSF, including a sustainment strategy. State 
expressed concerns about conditioning future funding, and Defense 
disagreed, stating that current guidance is sufficient. GAO maintains 
that a coordinated, detailed plan is essential to accountability of 
U.S. efforts to develop the ANSF. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661]. For more 
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Departments of Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, 
Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF: 

Few Afghan Army Units Are Capable of Leading Operations and Efforts to 
Develop Their Capability Face Several Challenges: 

Several Challenges Impede Efforts to Improve Capability of Afghan 
National Police Forces: 

Conclusion: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Security Forces: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Defense and State Support to Train and Equip Afghan Army and 
Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008: 

Table 2: Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces: 

Table 3: Description of Key Phases in the Training and Equipping of the 
ANSF: 

Table 4: Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA Force Structure, as of 
April 2008: 

Table 5: Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of April 2008: 

Table 6: Re-Enlistment Rates for ANA Combat Personnel, March 2006 to 
February 2008: 

Table 7: Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than 
Half the Required Amount On Hand, as of February 2008: 

Table 8: Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008: 

Table 9: Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, as of April 2008: 

Table 10: Structure of the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National 
Army: 

Table 11: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National 
Police: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Mountainous Terrain in Afghanistan: 

Figure 2: ANA Commando Training Facility Outside of Kabul: 

Figure 3: Trainees Attending a Class at the Kabul Police Academy: 

Figure 4: Comparison of ANA Corps Personnel Assigned to a Unit to the 
Number On Hand, as of February 2008: 

Figure 5: Rifles of Variable Quality Donated to the ANSF: 

Figure 6: Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP: 

Figure 7: Afghan National Civil Order Police Trainees in Kabul: 

Figure 8: Structure of the ANA Combat Forces: 

Figure 9: ANP Chain of Command: 

Abbreviations: 

ANA: Afghan National Army: 

ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police: 

ANP: Afghan National Police: 

ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces: 

AWOL: absent without leave: 

CM: capability milestone: 

CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan: 

EU: European Union: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

NCO: non-commissioned officer: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 18, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and other coalition nations, has worked to 
develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP)--collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF)--to provide security for Afghanistan. The goal of these efforts 
is to transfer responsibilities for the security of Afghanistan from 
the international community to the Afghan government. From 2002 to 
2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip 
the Afghan army and police forces. In 2005[Footnote 1] and 2007, 
[Footnote 2] we found that the training and equipping of the army and 
police had made some progress, but that the Department of Defense 
(Defense) and the Department of State (State), the agencies responsible 
for implementing these efforts, lacked detailed plans and cost 
estimates for completing and sustaining the ANSF. We concluded that, 
without capable and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces, 
terrorists could again create a safe haven in Afghanistan and 
jeopardize efforts by the United States and the international community 
to develop the country. Since 2005, security in Afghanistan has 
deteriorated significantly. Attacks by armed opposition groups have 
grown across Afghanistan, with numerous attacks directly targeting the 
ANA and ANP. 

Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed our 
work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United 
States.[Footnote 3] In this review, we (1) analyzed U.S. plans for 
developing the ANSF and identified the extent to which these plans 
contained detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, 
and sustainability strategies; (2) examined the progress made and 
challenges faced in developing the capabilities of the ANA; and (3) 
examined the progress made and challenges faced in developing the 
capabilities of the ANP. 

To address the objectives of this engagement, we reviewed Defense and 
State planning, funding, and evaluation documents related to the U.S. 
efforts to establish, train, and equip Afghan army and police forces. 
We discussed these efforts with Defense and State officials in 
Washington, D.C.; Kabul, Afghanistan; and the U.S. Central Command in 
Tampa, Florida, and with private contractors implementing U.S. 
programs. In Afghanistan, we viewed Afghan army and police training 
facilities and equipment warehouses and met with officials from the 
United States, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, NATO, and 
the United Nations. We are currently performing separate reviews on the 
accountability of equipment provided to the ANSF and U.S. efforts to 
reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. 
Consequently, we do not assess these issues in depth in this report. 
See appendix I for a complete description of our scope and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

The Departments of Defense and State have not yet developed a 
coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. We 
recommended in 2005, and reaffirmed in 2007, that the plans should 
include clearly defined objectives and performance measures, milestones 
for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, and a 
strategy for sustaining the results achieved. Additionally, in 2008, 
Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for 
strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining 
the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided GAO a document that, according to 
Defense officials, met GAO's 2005 recommendation.[Footnote 4] However, 
this 5-page document does not provide sufficient detail for effective 
planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some 
broad objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term 
milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no 
sustainability strategy. Further, even though Defense and State are 
partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not describe 
the role of State or other key stakeholders. Moreover, State did not 
participate in the development of the Defense document and has not 
completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, the Combined Security 
Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) completed a field-level plan 
for ANSF development, which includes force goals, objectives, and 
performance measures. However, this field-level plan is not a 
substitute for a coordinated Defense and State plan with near-and long- 
term resource requirements. Without a coordinated, detailed plan, it is 
difficult for Congress to assess progress and conduct oversight on the 
extent and cost of the U.S. commitment needed to develop capable and 
sustainable ANSF. This is particularly important given the recent calls 
for further increasing the size of the ANSF and the potential costs, 
currently estimated at approximately $2 billion per year, of sustaining 
the ANSF for years into the future. 

The United States has provided over $10 billion to develop the ANA 
since 2002; however, less than 2 percent (2 of 105 units) of ANA units 
are assessed as fully capable of conducting their primary mission. 
Thirty-six percent (38 of 105) are assessed as capable of conducting 
their mission, but require routine[Footnote 5] international 
assistance, while the remaining ANA units (65 of 105 units) are either 
planned, in basic training, or assessed as partially able or unable to 
conduct their primary mission. Building an Afghan army that can lead 
security operations requires manning,[Footnote 6] training, and 
equipping of personnel; however, U.S. efforts to build the ANA have 
faced challenges in all of these areas. First, while the ANA has grown 
to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000-- 
nearly three times the 19,600[Footnote 7] Defense reported in 2005--the 
ANA has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for 
leadership positions and retaining its personnel. Second, while 
trainers or mentors[Footnote 8] are present in every ANA combat unit, 
less than half the required number are deployed in the field. Defense 
officials cited an insufficient number of U.S. trainers and coalition 
mentors in the field as the major impediment to providing the ANA with 
the training to establish capabilities, such as advanced combat skills 
and logistics, necessary to sustain the ANA force in the long term. 
Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in approximately 
40 percent of critical equipment items, including vehicles, weapons, 
and radios. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of U.S. 
trainers and equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, 
according to senior Defense officials. Without resolving these 
challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be 
delayed. 

Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an 
investment of nearly $6 billion, no Afghan police unit is assessed as 
fully capable of performing its mission. Similar to the effort to build 
the ANA, development of a national Afghan police force that is fully 
capable requires manning, training, and equipping of police personnel-
-all areas in which the U.S. continues to face challenges. First, less 
than one-quarter of the ANP has police mentors[Footnote 9] present to 
provide training in the field, evaluate police capability, and verify 
that police are on duty. According to Defense officials leading the 
effort in Kabul, the shortage of mentors is the primary obstacle to 
building a fully capable police force. Second, the ANP has not received 
about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers critical and 
continues to face shortages in several types of equipment, including 
vehicles, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan's weak 
judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and our 
analysis of status reports from the field indicates that the ANP 
consistently experiences problems with police pay, corruption, and 
attacks from insurgents. Recognizing these challenges, Defense began a 
new effort in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan police; 
however, the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort 
at risk. 

To help ensure that action is taken to address our recommendation from 
2005 and the recently enacted mandate under the 2008 Defense 
Authorization Act, Congress should consider conditioning a portion of 
future appropriations for development of the ANSF on the completion of 
a coordinated, detailed plan, including development of a strategy for 
sustaining the forces. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, State expressed concerns about 
conditioning future appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan 
and highlighted ongoing coordination efforts with Defense as well as 
certain operational changes, many of which occurred after the 
completion of our fieldwork in August 2007. Defense disagreed that 
Congress should consider conditioning a portion of future 
appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan and stated 
that current guidance provided is sufficient to implement a successful 
program to train and equip the ANSF. Defense also disagreed with our 
conclusion that progress is difficult to assess without a detailed 
plan. While we acknowledge that changes may have occurred since August 
2007, Defense and State have yet to develop a coordinated, detailed 
plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF. Furthermore, while Defense 
produces various documents that report on the current status of the 
ANSF, these documents do not contain intermediate milestones or 
consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track 
to achieve its desired results within a set time frame. Therefore, we 
maintain that without a coordinated, detailed plan for the development 
of the ANSF, ensuring oversight and assessing progress of the program 
is difficult. 

Background: 

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States, several 
allies, and Afghanistan's Northern Alliance forcibly removed the 
Taliban regime from Afghanistan for providing a safe haven to al Qaeda 
terrorists. After years of conflict and Taliban rule, the new Afghan 
government inherited a state with limited capacity to govern; an 
economy dominated by the narcotics trade; constraints on economic 
development due, in part, to resource limitations and mountainous 
terrain (see fig. 1); a poorly developed infrastructure with few roads 
and little household access to power and running water; and weak 
national security forces. 

Figure 1: Mountainous Terrain in Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of mountainous terrain in Afghanistan. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In April 2002, the United States and other donor nations met in Geneva, 
Switzerland, to help Afghanistan address threats to its security. At 
the Geneva conference, the donors established a security reform 
strategy for Afghanistan: the United States would lead the training of 
the Afghan army and Germany would lead the police reconstitution 
effort. However, due, in part, to Afghanistan's pressing security needs 
and concerns that the German training program was moving too slowly, 
the United States expanded its role in the police training effort. As 
we reported in 2005, according to cognizant German officials, Germany 
viewed its role in the police sector as one of advising and consulting 
with donors and the Afghan government rather than as the major 
implementer or funding source. 

The Role and Development of the Afghan National Army: 

In 2002, the international community endorsed the decision of the 
Afghan government to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA 
force of no more than 70,000.[Footnote 10] In 2006, this vision was 
reaffirmed by the Afghan government and the international community 
through its integration into the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy[Footnote 11] and Afghanistan Compact,[Footnote 12] documents 
that articulated economic, social, and security priorities for 
Afghanistan. These documents also set the end of 2010 as the timeline 
for the establishment of the ANA. In February 2008, citing increased 
security challenges, the Afghan government and its international 
partners endorsed a 10,000-person increase in the force structure of 
the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000.[Footnote 13] 

The strategic role of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the ANA is to 
defend and deter aggression against Afghanistan, support and defend the 
Afghan Constitution, defeat the insurgency and terrorism, and support 
Afghanistan's reconstruction and reintegration into the regional and 
international community, among other things. To accomplish this, the 
army's current force structure includes (1) Ministry of Defense and 
general staff personnel, (2) sustaining institutions, (3) intermediate 
command staff, (4) combat forces, and (5) Afghan air corps personnel. 
Combat forces form the basic operational arm of the ANA and are divided 
into five corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. A corps 
contains 1 or more brigades. A typical brigade consists of 
approximately 2,800 personnel: three light infantry battalions (with 
approximately 650 personnel each), one combat support battalion (with 
approximately 500 personnel), and one combat services support battalion 
(with approximately 350 personnel). (See app. II for additional details 
on the force structure and functions of the ANA.) 

U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, in partnership 
with the government of Afghanistan. The Defense-staffed CSTC-A oversees 
the Afghan army's training, facilities development, assessment, and 
equipment provision. Under CSTC-A is Task Force Phoenix, a joint 
coalition task force responsible for training, mentoring, and advising 
the Afghan army at the Kabul Military Training Center and elsewhere in 
the country (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: ANA Commando Training Facility Outside of Kabul: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of ANA Commando training facility outside of Kabul. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Reconstitution of the Afghan National Police Force: 

The reconstitution of the ANP began in February 2002 when donor nations 
agreed to establish a multiethnic, sustainable, 62,000-member 
professional police service committed to the rule of law. In May 2007, 
the Afghan government and its international partners approved an 
interim increase in the number of police forces from 62,000 to 82,000, 
to be reviewed every 6 months. The Afghan government and international 
community set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of 
the ANP force. 

In addition to enforcing the rule of law, the role of the ANP is to 
protect the rights of citizens, maintain civil order and public safety, 
support actions to defeat insurgency, control national borders, and 
reduce the level of domestic and international organized crime, among 
other activities. The force structure for the police includes Ministry 
of Interior headquarters and administrative staff, uniformed police 
personnel, and several specialized police units. This report primarily 
focuses on U.S. efforts to build the uniformed police, the largest 
component of the Afghan police force. (See app. II for further details 
on the force structure and functions of the ANP.) 

U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANP are directed by 
Defense, through CSTC-A, with support from State, which provides policy 
guidance to the effort and oversight of civilian contractors 
implementing police training courses. The primary U.S. contractor 
involved in the police training effort is DynCorp International, which 
provides police training courses in criminal investigation, physical 
fitness, and weapons and survival skills, and civilian mentors to 
assist in developing the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the police 
forces it administers. Germany leads efforts to train commissioned and 
noncommissioned Afghan police officers at the Kabul Police Academy (see 
fig. 3). 

Figure 3: Trainees Attending a Class at the Kabul Police Academy: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of trainees attending a class at the Kabul Police Academy. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

U.S. Support to Train and Equip Afghan National Security Forces: 

The United States provided $16.5 billion from fiscal years 2002 through 
2008 to support the training and equipping of the Afghan army and 
police (see table 1). Slightly over 45 percent (approximately $7.6 
billion) of the funding was provided in fiscal year 2007, in an effort 
to accelerate the training and equipping and enhance the capabilities 
of the ANSF. These figures do not include certain operational costs, 
such as the personnel costs for U.S. servicemembers assigned to the 
training and equipping mission. (See app. I for further details on our 
methodology.) 

Table 1: Defense and State Support to Train and Equip Afghan Army and 
Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008 (Dollars in millions): 

Assistance program: Afghan Army[C]; 
FY 2002: $76.9; 
FY 2003: $362.7; 
FY 2004: $723.7; 
FY 2005: $1,736.6; 
FY 2006: $767.1; 
FY 2007: $4,884.2; 
FY 2008 request[A]: $1,721.7; 
Total[B]: $10,273.0. 

Assistance program: Afghan Police; 
FY 2002: $25.5; 
FY 2003: $5.0; 
FY 2004: $223.9; 
FY 2005: $837.9; 
FY 2006: $1,299.8; 
FY 2007: $2,701.2; 
FY 2008 request[A]: $1,105.6; 
Total[B]: $6,198.8. 

Assistance program: Total; 
FY 2002: $102.4; 
FY 2003: $367.7; 
FY 2004: $947.6; 
FY 2005: $2,574.5; 
FY 2006: $2,066.9; 
FY 2007: $7,585.4; 
FY 2008 request[A]: $2,827.3; 
Total[B]: $16,471.8. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data. 

[Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.] 

[A] Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately $1,450 million that has 
been appropriated (approximately $1,108 million for the ANA and 
approximately $342 million for the ANP) and approximately $1,378 
million that has been requested (approximately $614 million for the ANA 
and approximately $764 million for the ANP). 

[B] Totals include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. 
Fiscal years 2007 and 2008 figures include Afghan Security Forces 
Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding, and International 
Military Education and Training funds. 

[C] Funding for the Afghan Army includes detainee operations. 

[End of table] 

Other Donor Support: 

More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided 
funds, equipment, or personnel to support U.S. efforts to train and 
equip the ANSF. As of March 2008, non-U.S. donors have provided about 
$820 million in support of efforts to develop the ANSF: approximately 
$426 million was provided to supplement efforts to train and equip the 
Afghan army and about $394 million in support of the Afghan police. 
Over 15 nations contribute mentors to the army, providing approximately 
one-third of the personnel who assist in training ANA units in the 
field. The EU has provided 80 mentors to assist the police at the 
ministerial, regional, and provincial levels out of approximately 215 
pledged. Additionally, the United Nations Development Programme 
administers the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which 
provides reimbursement to the Afghan government for police salaries. 
Approximately 80 percent of international donations for the ANP have 
supported programs through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan 
(about $311 million of about $394 million). 

Prior GAO Recommendations and Congressional Mandate: 

We previously identified the need for detailed plans to complete and 
sustain the ANSF. In June 2005, GAO reported that the Secretaries of 
Defense and State should develop detailed plans for completing and 
sustaining the ANSF that contain clearly defined objectives and 
performance measures, milestones for achieving stated objectives, 
future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results 
achieved. Our report recommended that the Secretaries provide this 
information to Congress when the executive branch requests funding for 
the Afghan army or police forces. Although Defense and State generally 
concurred with this recommendation, both suggested that existing 
reporting requirements addressed the need to report to Congress their 
plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces. 
Our analysis of Defense and State reporting to Congress determined that 
the departments did not have the detailed plans we recommended to guide 
the development of the ANSF and to facilitate congressional oversight. 
As a result, in our 2007 report, we reiterated the need for Defense and 
State to develop such plans. 

Following our reports, in 2008, Congress mandated that the President, 
acting through the Secretary of Defense, submit reports to Congress on 
progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, including a 
comprehensive and long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the 
ANSF. Reports must be submitted every 180 days after that date, through 
the end of fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 14] The first such report was due 
by the end of April 2008, but has yet to be provided to Congress. In 
addition, Congress also mandated that Defense submit reports on a long- 
term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Reports must be submitted 
every 180 days after that date, through the end of fiscal year 2010. 
[Footnote 15] The first such report was due by the end of April 2008, 
but has yet to be provided to Congress. 

The Departments of Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, 
Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF: 

Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan for 
completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, despite 
our recommendation in 2005 and a mandate from Congress in 2008 that 
such a plan be developed. Defense provided GAO a 5-page document in 
January 2007 that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet 
GAO's recommendation. However, it does not include several of the key 
elements identified in our recommendation and does not provide a 
sufficient level of detail for effective interagency planning and 
congressional oversight. Although CSTC-A has developed a field-level 
plan in Afghanistan that integrates the Afghan government's interest, 
this represents military planning and is not a coordinated Defense and 
State plan with near-and long-term resource requirements. Without a 
coordinated, detailed plan containing the elements identified in our 
2005 recommendation, as noted earlier, congressional oversight 
concerning the extent and cost of the U.S. commitment to train and 
equip the ANSF is difficult, and decision makers may not have 
sufficient information to assess progress and allocate defense 
resources among competing priorities.[Footnote 16] 

Defense Document Is Limited in Scope and Detail: 

As of March 2008, neither Defense nor State had developed a 
coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the ANSF that 
includes clearly defined objectives and performance measures, 
milestones for achieving stated objectives, and a strategy for 
sustaining the results achieved, including transitioning program 
responsibility to Afghanistan. In January 2007, Defense provided us a 5-
page document that, according to Defense officials, is intended to meet 
GAO's 2005 recommendation for detailed plans to complete and sustain 
the ANSF. Although Defense and State are partners in training the ANP, 
the Defense document does not describe the role of State or other key 
stakeholders. State also did not contribute to the development of this 
document and has not developed a plan of its own. In addition, U.S. 
military officials responsible for the effort to build the ANSF were 
not familiar with the document at the time of our visit to Kabul in 
August 2007--over 6 months after we received the document from Defense 
officials in Washington. 

The 5-page document that Defense developed in response to our 2005 
recommendation is limited in scope and detail. For example, although 
the document provides some broad objectives and performance measures 
for training and equipping the ANSF, it identifies few milestones. 
Further, these milestones are not consistent with long-term milestones 
identified in field documents generated by U.S. military forces 
operating in Afghanistan and do not include intermediate milestones for 
judging progress in the medium term. The document provides no mechanism 
for measuring progress over time against established baselines, other 
than monthly status reports from the field. These status reports, while 
useful in identifying month-to-month progress in unit capabilities, use 
baselines that generally go back no more than 18 months. As such, it is 
difficult to identify progress since the start of the program and the 
effect that various factors, such as additional resources, have had on 
training and equipment availability, as discussed in prior GAO work. 
[Footnote 17] 

High-Level Plan Lacks Focus on Sustainment Funding: 

Defense's 5-page document, in response to our 2005 recommendations, 
does not provide a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF. Defense 
currently estimates that no additional money, beyond the approximately 
$16.5 billion provided between fiscal years 2002 to 2008, is needed to 
complete the initial training and equipping of a 70,000-person army 
force and an 82,000-person police force. If the force structure grows, 
Defense officials acknowledged that budgetary requirements likely would 
also increase. In February 2008, the Afghan government and its 
international partners endorsed an increase in the force structure of 
the ANA by 10,000. A Defense official stated that increasing the force 
structure by 10,000 additional army personnel will cost approximately 
an additional $1 billion. 

In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $2 billion a year 
will be needed for the next 5 years to sustain the ANSF--$1 billion for 
the Afghan army and $1 billion for the police.[Footnote 18] This is 
based on a 152,000-person end-strength--70,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP. 
Defense officials estimate that increasing the ANA force structure by 
10,000 will cost about $100 million annually to sustain. By comparison, 
in 2005, Defense and State estimated the cost to sustain an ANA force 
of 70,000 and an ANP force of 62,000 would total $600 million per year. 
This sustainment estimate, however, did not include the cost of 
sustaining capabilities such as airlift, which is currently being 
developed for the Afghan army. 

Defense expects the sustainment transition to begin in fiscal year 
2009. According to U.S. military officials in Afghanistan and the 
recently approved CSTC-A Campaign Plan, U.S. involvement in training 
and equipping the ANSF may extend beyond a decade. However, neither 
Defense nor State has identified funding requirements or forecasts 
beyond 2013. 

As noted earlier, the United States has been a major contributor to 
this mission, providing approximately $16.5 billion between fiscal 
years 2002 and 2008 to train and equip the forces. At present, 
Afghanistan is unable to support the recurring costs of its security 
forces, such as salaries and equipment replacement, without substantial 
foreign assistance. An international task force studying the effects of 
increasing the size of the ANP noted that by 2012, if the Afghan 
Ministry of Finance assumed responsibility for police salaries, the 
salary costs for an 82,000 police force could total nearly 9 percent of 
the Afghan government's budget--a cost that could mean large cuts in 
other programs, such as education, health, and other social services, 
according to the task force. 

U.S. officials stated that until Afghan revenues increase 
substantially, the international community would likely need to assist 
in paying sustainability costs, including some salaries. However, 
despite what U.S. military officials in Afghanistan stated, Defense 
officials in Washington have not indicated how long and in what ways 
the U.S. government expects to continue assisting the ANSF. In a 
briefing on the U.S. approach to sustaining the ANSF, Defense and State 
officials stated that sustainment costs will be transitioned to the 
government of Afghanistan commensurate with the nation's economic 
capacity, and that the United States and the international community 
will need to assist Afghanistan in developing revenues and capacity to 
sustain the army and police. For example, Defense and State officials 
stated that greater revenues could be obtained by improving border 
management, noting that customs duties generate more than half of 
Afghanistan's revenues. These officials, however, did not identify any 
other ways to improve revenues for the security sector nor did they 
identify whether this information is being incorporated into a broader 
plan for developing and sustaining the ANSF when we inquired about such 
a plan. 

CSTC-A Plan Provides Guidance for Field-Level Operations, but Is Not a 
Substitute for a Coordinated State and Defense Plan: 

Since GAO reported in 2005, field-level planning for the training and 
equipping of the ANSF has improved. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a 
field-level plan for ANSF development, and an operations order with 
further detail on the development and execution of the fiscal year 2008 
ANSF force generation program. The Campaign Plan for the Development of 
Afghan National Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan) is a 
military plan.[Footnote 19] It provides field-level goals, objectives, 
and capability milestones for the development of the Ministries of 
Defense and Interior, including Afghan army and police forces. With a 
new emphasis on quality training, the plan extends the time frames for 
ANSF development beyond those reported in our 2005 report.[Footnote 20] 
However, while this military plan provides needed field guidance, it is 
not a coordinated Defense and State plan with near-and long-term 
resource requirements. 

When we last reported in 2005, Defense had not fully implemented or 
been able to reach agreement on criteria for assessing an Afghan army 
unit's readiness to operate without training assistance. Since that 
time, Defense has developed criteria--called capability milestones 
(CM)--to assess army and police progress in manning, training, and 
equipping the forces. Units are assessed against four capability 
milestones that range from CM1 to CM4. A unit, agency, staff function, 
or installation rated at CM1 is fully capable of conducting its primary 
operational mission but may require assistance from the international 
community in certain situations. For instance, a combat unit capable of 
operating at CM1 is fully capable of planning, executing, and 
sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level; 
however, coalition support may be required for certain capabilities, 
such as close air support, medical evacuation, or indirect fire 
support.[Footnote 21] By contrast, a unit, agency, or staff function 
rated at CM4 has been established but is not yet capable of conducting 
its primary operational mission and can only undertake portions of its 
mission with significant assistance, and reliance on, international 
support. The table below provides descriptions of the capability 
milestones, as identified in the CSTC-A Campaign Plan. 

Table 2: Capability Milestones for Afghan National Security Forces: 

Capability milestone: CM1; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
capable of conducting primary operational mission(s). Depending on the 
situation, units may require specified assistance from the Coalition or 
international community. 

Capability milestone: CM2; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
capable of conducting primary operational mission(s) with routine 
assistance from, or reliance on, international community support. 

Capability milestone: CM3; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
capable of partially conducting primary operational mission(s), but 
still requires assistance from, and is reliant on, international 
community support. 

Capability milestone: CM4; 
Description: The unit, agency, staff function, or installation is 
formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational 
mission(s). It may be capable, available, or directed to undertake 
portions of its operational mission but only with significant 
assistance from, and reliance on, international community support. 

Source: Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military 
and Police Forces--Interim, January 29, 2008. 

[End of table] 

The Campaign Plan identifies three key phases in the development of 
Afghan army and police forces: fielding/generating forces, developing 
forces, and transitioning to strategic partnership. Table 3 describes 
these phases and their corresponding milestones. It is not clear from 
the Campaign Plan whether the milestones are based on an ANA force 
structure of 70,000 or 80,000. If based on 70,000, the milestones would 
likely need to be revisited. 

Table 3: Description of Key Phases in the Training and Equipping of the 
ANSF: 

Campaign phase: Phase 1: Field/Generate Afghan National Security 
Capability; 
Description: Army and police forces are manned, have completed 
individual training, and are equipped to 85 percent or better; 
Milestone date: Complete by mid-2010. 

Campaign phase: Phase 2: Develop Afghan National Security Capability; 
Description: Afghan and Coalition forces will jointly plan, coordinate, 
and conduct operations. Coalition forces will partner with army and 
police units to assist in the development of capabilities necessary to 
achieve CM1; 
Milestone date: Complete by the end of 2011. 

Campaign phase: Phase 3: Transition to Strategic Partnership; 
Description: The Afghan government will assume the lead responsibility 
for its own security needs, with continued engagement by the 
international community. CSTC-A will have completed its current mission 
and should transition into a security assistance organization; 
Milestone date: Extends beyond 2019. 

Source: CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National 
Military and Police Forces--Interim, January 29, 2008. 

[End of table] 

Milestone dates for the accomplishment of certain objectives have been 
extended beyond those reported earlier. For example, our 2005 report 
states that Defense officials estimated that basic training for 43,000 
ground combat troops would be accomplished by the fall of 2007. 
However, the Campaign Plan extends this date to mid-2010. According to 
the CSTC-A Commander, given resource constraints and the new emphasis 
on fielding quality forces, certain deadlines for the fielding, 
generation, and development of Afghan forces have had to be extended. 

In addition to capability milestones, personnel and equipment 
requirements have also been established since our last report. In 2005, 
we noted that documents identifying personnel and equipment 
requirements for the Afghan National Security Forces were not complete. 
However, since that time, the Afghan Ministries of Defense and 
Interior, assisted by CSTC-A, have completed personnel and equipment 
requirements, known as Tashkils.[Footnote 22] The Tashkils list in 
detail the authorized staff positions and equipment items for the ANA 
and ANP. Moreover, ANA Tashkils have been converted into an electronic 
force management database by the U.S. Army Force Management Support 
Agency, which provides standardization and consistency given frequent 
CSTC-A personnel rotations. Agency officials expect that the ANP 
Tashkils will also be converted to a similar system. 

Few Afghan Army Units Are Capable of Leading Operations and Efforts to 
Develop Their Capability Face Several Challenges: 

The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA 
since 2002, but less than 2 percent (2 of 105 ANA units rated) are 
assessed at CM1--full operational capability. Building an Afghan army 
that can lead its own operations requires manning, training, and 
equipping army personnel; however, U.S. efforts to build the Afghan 
army have faced challenges in all of these areas. First, while the ANA 
has increased in size and basic recruiting is strong, the ANA has 
experienced difficulties manning the army, such as finding qualified 
candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, 
the insufficient number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors in the 
field is a major impediment to providing the ANA with the follow-up 
training, including in areas such as advanced combat skills and 
logistics, needed to sustain the force in the long term. Finally, ANA 
combat units report significant shortages in approximately 40 percent 
of items defined as critical by Defense, including machine guns and 
vehicles. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of mentors and 
equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to 
senior Defense officials. Without resolving these challenges, the 
ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. 

More Troops Trained, but Very Few ANA Units Rated as Having Capability 
to Lead Operations: 

Defense planning calls for the development of an 80,000-person ANA 
force structure that includes Ministry of Defense personnel, sustaining 
institutions, and infantry forces capable of accomplishing its mission 
with limited assistance from the international community. As of April 
2008, Defense reports that approximately 58,000 army personnel received 
training and were assigned to the ANA. The chart below details the 
number of ANA forces authorized compared with the number currently 
assigned (see table 4). 

Table 4: Afghan Ministry of Defense and ANA Force Structure, as of 
April 2008: 

Forces: Ministry of Defense/General Staff; 
Authorized: 3,185; 
Trained and assigned: 2,596; 
Percent assigned: 82. 

Forces: Sustaining institutions[A]; 
Authorized: 2,001; 
Trained and assigned: 1,679; 
Percent assigned: 84. 

Forces: Intermediate commands[B]; 
Authorized: 16,169; 
Trained and assigned: 13,511; 
Percent assigned: 84. 

Forces: Combat troops; 
Authorized: 56,127; 
Trained and assigned: 37,866; 
Percent assigned: 67. 

Forces: Afghan Air Corps; 
Authorized: 3,000; 
Trained and assigned: 2,141; 
Percent assigned: 71. 

Forces: Total; 
Authorized: 80,482[C]; 
Trained and assigned: 57,793; 
Percent assigned: 72. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of 
Defense data. 

Note: As discussed later in this report, the number of troops trained 
and assigned is greater than number on-duty due to attrition, 
absenteeism, leave, and battlefield casualties. 

[A] Sustaining institutions include Military Intelligence Regional 
Offices, Communications Support Element, Acquisition Agency, 
Installation Management Department, Military Police Company (Kabul 
Area), and Detainee Operations. 

[B] Intermediate commands include Headquarters Support Brigade and the 
logistics, training, recruiting, and medical commands. 

[C] The 482 positions above 80,000 account for the Afghan National 
Guard Force. 

[End of table] 

Since we reported in 2005, more personnel have been trained and 
assigned to the ANA. Specifically focusing on combat troops, Defense 
reports that 37,866 combat troops have been trained and assigned to the 
ANA as of April 2008, compared with 18,300 troops in March 2005. 
Although this represents more than a twofold increase in the amount of 
combat troops, it is approximately 5,000 forces less than Defense had 
predicted would be trained by fall 2007. Moreover, new positions have 
been added to the ANA's structure since our 2005 report, including an 
expanded Afghan air corps[Footnote 23] and the ANA force structure has 
increased to 80,000. 

While more troops have received training, as of April 2008, only two 
ANA units--out of 105 rated--are assessed as CM1--fully capable. Thirty-
six percent of ANA units (38 of 105 rated units) are assessed at CM2 
and are capable of conducting their primary mission with routine 
international support. The remaining ANA units are less capable. Thirty-
one percent (32 of 105 rated units) are CM3--capable of partially 
conducting their primary mission, but reliant on international support; 
11 percent (11 of 105 rated units) are CM4--formed but not yet capable; 
and 21 percent (22 of 105 rated units) are not yet formed or not 
reporting (see table 5).[Footnote 24] 

Table 5: Defense Assessment of ANA Capabilities, as of April 2008: 

Army units: Corps headquarters (5); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 1; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 3; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 1; 
CM4 Not Capable: 0; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 0. 

Army units: Brigade headquarters (14); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 6; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 5; 
CM4 Not Capable: 1; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 2. 

Army units: Combat battalions (49); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 1; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 18; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 15; 
CM4 Not Capable: 6; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 9. 

Army units: Combat support and combat services support battalions (33); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 11; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 8; 
CM4 Not Capable: 3; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 11. 

Army units: Air Corps headquarters (1); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 0; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 1; 
CM4 Not Capable: 0; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 0. 

Army units: Air Corps squadrons (3); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 0; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 2; 
CM4 Not Capable: 1; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 0. 

Army units: Number of ANA units (105); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 2 (2%); 
CM2 Capable with Support: 38 (36%); 
CM3 Partially Capable: 32 (31%); 
CM4 Not Capable: 11 (11%); 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 22 (21%). 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

Note: Percentages in the table may not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[A] An ANA unit that is categorized as "not formed or not reporting" is 
either a planned unit or a unit in basic training. 

[End of table] 

While few ANA units are rated as fully capable, Defense officials 
stated that ANA troops had performed well in combat situations. 
[Footnote 25] Personnel assigned to mentor the ANA that we interviewed 
in Afghanistan praised the efforts of Afghan troops, and U.S. and 
Afghan officials stated they were pleased with the development of the 
army to date. 

The expected date when the ANA will gain the capability to assume lead 
responsibility for its own security is unclear. As of April 2008, 
monthly reports provided by CSTC-A show the expected date of full ANA 
capability as March 2011.[Footnote 26] However, this date does not 
account for shortfalls in the required number of mentors and trainers. 
Thus, Defense officials cautioned that currently predicted dates for 
the achievement of a fully capable Afghan army are subject to change 
and may be delayed. 

Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in Manning, Training, 
and Equipping the Force: 

U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in manning the 
army, such as recruiting for leadership positions and retaining 
personnel; shortfalls in the number of U.S. trainers and coalition 
mentors deployed with ANA units in the field to assist in developing 
capable ANA forces; and shortages of critical equipment items. 

Afghan Army Faces Difficulties Reducing Absenteeism, Recruiting 
Qualified Candidates for Leadership and Specialist Positions, and 
Retaining Personnel: 

Although the ANA has grown in numbers, it faces manning challenges, 
including absenteeism, recruitment of leaders and specialists, and 
retention of personnel. 

First, although approximately 32,700[Footnote 27] combat personnel 
received training and were assigned to one of the five ANA corps, the 
number of combat troops on hand is less than those trained and assigned 
due to attrition, absenteeism, scheduled leave, and battlefield 
casualties.[Footnote 28] As of February 2008, Defense reported that 
about 20 percent of combat personnel assigned were not present for duty 
(see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: Comparison of ANA Corps Personnel Assigned to a Unit to the 
Number On Hand, as of February 2008: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains a horizontal bar graph as well as a map of 
Afghanistan depicting the location of territory assigned to ANA Corps. 

Corps: 201st; 
Units assigned: 8.4 thousand; 
Units on hand: 7.1 thousand. 

Corps: 203rd; 
Units assigned: 6.6 thousand; 
Units on hand: 5.3 thousand. 

Corps: 205th; 
Units assigned: 11.2 thousand; 
Units on hand: 8.5 thousand. 

Corps: 207th; 
Units assigned: 3.1 thousand; 
Units on hand: 2.6 thousand. 

Corps: 209th; 
Units assigned: 3.4 thousand; 
Units on hand: 2.8 thousand. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

Note: This figure includes approximately 32,700 ANA combat personnel 
assigned to the five ANA corps, as well as civilians serving in support 
roles for the ANA. 

[End of figure] 

Although some of those absent from the army may have scheduled their 
absence or been killed in duty, Defense assessment reports from 
November 2007 to February 2008 show between 8 and 12 percent of combat 
unit personnel were absent without leave (AWOL), with AWOL rates as 
high as 17 percent for soldiers in one ANA corps. For the ANA to 
achieve sustained growth, a senior Defense official stated that AWOL 
rates should be no higher than 8 percent. Officials attributed these 
absences to a variety of causes, such as soldiers leaving their units 
to take their pay home and the lack of significant penalties for such 
absences. To address these issues, the Afghan Ministry of Defense, 
assisted by CSTC-A, has initiated programs to allow soldiers to 
transfer their pay to family members and to facilitate the deposit of 
ANA salaries directly into soldiers' bank accounts. CSTC-A officials 
stated these programs should reduce AWOL rates.[Footnote 29] 

Second, although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing 
difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist 
positions. Defense reports that recruiting goals for ANA infantry 
positions have been met, despite adjustments to increase ANA training 
output by 6,000 soldiers annually. However, CSTC-A noted shortfalls in 
the number of candidates available for non-commissioned officer (NCO) 
and specialty skill positions, such as logistics and medical support. 
Between November 2007 and February 2008, ANA manning levels for NCOs 
ranged between 50 to 70 percent of the authorized number. NCOs provide 
a vital link between senior officers and soldiers and can provide 
leadership to ANA units in the field, according to a senior Defense 
official. Officials attributed the shortage to the low level of 
literacy among ANA recruits. CSTC-A is attempting to address this 
shortfall by promoting NCOs from within ANA ranks and implementing new 
programs to target literate recruits. CSTC-A expects to have greater 
than 90 percent of the ANA's authorized NCOs staffed by summer 2008. 
The ANA is also experiencing difficulties manning specialist positions 
such as logistics, medical support, and engineering. Although the ANA 
has developed courses to train military specialists, the current Afghan 
army is comprised primarily of infantry forces. This is, in part, 
because ANA recruits learn basic infantry skills first. However, this 
focus is also due to difficulties identifying candidates who are 
suitable for advanced training. According to Defense officials, without 
suitably trained support personnel, the ANA will need to rely on 
coalition forces to provide support services. 

Third, the ANA is facing challenges retaining personnel. A typical ANA 
contract lasts for 3 years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are 
given the opportunity to re-enlist with the Afghan army. Between March 
2006 and February 2008, just over half of those combat personnel 
eligible to re-enlist opted to do so, as shown in table 6.[Footnote 30] 

Table 6: Re-Enlistment Rates for ANA Combat Personnel, March 2006 to 
February 2008: 

ANA unit: Kabul Military Training Center; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 474; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 239; 
Number re-enlisted: 235; 
Percent re-enlisted: 50. 

ANA unit: 201st Corps; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 2,554; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 731; 
Number re-enlisted: 1,823; 
Percent re-enlisted: 71. 

ANA unit: 203rd Corps; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 1,319; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 554; 
Number re-enlisted: 765; 
Percent re-enlisted: 58. 

ANA unit: 205th Corps; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 963; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 523; 
Number re-enlisted: 440; 
Percent re-enlisted: 46. 

ANA unit: 207th Corps; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 1,037; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 864; 
Number re-enlisted: 173; 
Percent re-enlisted: 17. 

ANA unit: 209th Corps; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 730; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 401; 
Number re-enlisted: 329; 
Percent re-enlisted: 45. 

ANA unit: Total; 
Number eligible to re-enlist: 7,077; 
Number who did not re-enlist: 3,312; 
Number re-enlisted: 3,765; 
Percent re-enlisted: 53. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[End of table] 

U.S. and Afghan officials attributed these re-enlistment rates to a 
variety of factors, such as stationing soldiers away from their 
families, the rapid pace of ANA military operations, and the higher 
salaries offered by private companies and insurgent groups looking to 
recruit trained Afghan soldiers. To address these factors, a senior 
Defense official stated that the Ministry of Defense and CSTC-A are 
discussing the implementation of several programs such as allowing re- 
enlisting soldiers greater choice in determining where they will be 
stationed and increasing re-enlistment bonuses. Without the ability to 
retain trained personnel, ANA units will continue to lack experience 
and thus may be delayed in reaching their ability to lead security 
operations. For instance, in November 2007, the capability assessment 
of the ANA's 209th corps in northern Afghanistan lowered the rating of 
one of its battalions from CM2 to CM3 when the battalion failed to 
retain approximately half of its NCOs. Further, the assessment noted 
that progress developing the capability of this battalion could be 
delayed nearly a year. 

Shortage of U.S. Embedded Trainers and Coalition Mentors Delaying 
Advanced Skill Training for the ANA: 

Although some U.S. embedded trainers or coalition mentors are present 
in every ANA corps, the ANA is experiencing shortages in the number of 
these required[Footnote 31] personnel to assist in its development. 
According to CSTC-A's Campaign Plan, after an ANA unit is fielded, 
either an embedded training team (comprised of U.S. personnel) or a 
mentoring team (comprised of coalition personnel) should be assigned to 
the unit.[Footnote 32] These teams are responsible for developing the 
skills of ANA army units from initial fielding until the unit has 
developed the capability to assume lead responsibility for its security 
mission. As the ANA unit builds capability, embedded trainers and 
mentors guide and assess the units and provide them with access to air 
support and medical evacuation. 

Shortages exist in the number of embedded trainers and mentors fielded. 
For instance, as of April 2008, the United States has fielded 46 
percent (1,019 of 2,215) of Defense's required number of embedded 
trainers. Officials attributed these shortfalls to competing U.S. 
priorities for Defense personnel, including the war in Iraq. CSTC-A has 
submitted requests for additional forces to act as embedded trainers to 
assist the ANA; however, the request has been deferred. As of April 
2008, members of the international community assisting in this effort 
have fielded 32 out of 37 mentor teams promised, although the number of 
international mentors in the field is smaller than the number of U.S 
embedded trainers. Approximately one-third of personnel in the field 
assisting ANA unit development are coalition mentors, while two-thirds 
are U.S. personnel.[Footnote 33] 

Without adequate training or mentoring, the ANA's ability to take the 
lead in security operations may be delayed. First, Defense officials 
have cited an insufficient number of embedded trainers and coalition 
mentors deployed with units in the field as the major impediment to 
providing the ANA with the training it needs to establish the 
capabilities necessary to sustain the force in the long term, such as 
maneuver skills in battalion-level operations, intelligence collection, 
and logistics. Without these skills, smaller ANA units cannot operate 
collectively at the battalion level, must rely on the coalition for 
support tasks, and cannot assume the lead for their own security. 
Secondly, as ANA units achieve greater levels of capability, embedded 
trainers and mentors are responsible for assessing and validating their 
progress. CSTC-A's Campaign Plan states that the validation process is 
intended to improve collective training of ANA units; however, without 
adequate numbers of U.S. embedded trainers and coalition mentors, this 
validation will be slowed. CSTC-A officials stated that this delay in 
validation would lengthen the amount of time it will take the ANA to 
achieve full capability. Moreover, Defense officials noted that, as the 
number of ANA units fielded increases, the number of U.S. embedded 
training and coalition mentoring personnel needed also rises. For 
instance, when we visited Afghanistan in August 2007, Defense officials 
stated 73 U.S.-embedded training and coalition mentoring teams were 
needed to assist the development of the ANA; however, Defense officials 
projected that by December 2008 103 teams would be needed. Without 
additional training and mentoring personnel to meet this increased 
need, delays in ANA development will likely be exacerbated. 

Critical Equipment Shortfalls Remain Due to Changing Procurement Plans, 
Competing Global Priorities, and Production Limitations: 

Since we reported in 2005, new equipment plans for the ANA have been 
implemented and the ANA has received more equipment items. In 2005, 
Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged 
weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to 
be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In 2006, 
Defense began providing some ANA forces with U.S. equipment. Further, 
as security deteriorated, equipment needs changed and Defense planned 
to provide more protective equipment, such as armored Humvees, and more 
lethal weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades. 

In support of these efforts, approximately $3.7 billion was provided 
between fiscal years 2005 and 2008 to equip the ANA.[Footnote 34] As of 
February 2008, CSTC-A reports that the ANA combat forces are equipped 
with 60 percent of items defined as critical by Defense, a 7 percentage 
point increase since August 2007. 

Despite these advances, shortages exist in a number of equipment items 
defined as critical by Defense. For instance, of 55 critical equipment 
items for ANA combat forces, CSTC-A reports having less than half of 
the required amount on hand for 21 of these items. Types of critical 
equipment items with significant shortfalls include vehicles, weapons, 
and communication equipment (see table 7). 

Table 7: Critical Equipment Items for ANA Combat Forces with Less Than 
Half the Required Amount On Hand, as of February 2008: 

Item: Vehicles and generators: 15-Kilowatt Generator; 
Number required: 40; 
Number on hand: 19; 
Percent of required on hand: 48. 

Item: Vehicles and generators: Excavating Vehicle; 
Number required: 120; 
Number on hand: 56; 
Percent of required on hand: 47. 

Item: Vehicles and generators: M872A4 Semi-trailer; 
Number required: 316; 
Number on hand: 82; 
Percent of required on hand: 26. 

Item: Vehicles and generators: 30-Kilowatt Generator; 
Number required: 75; 
Number on hand: 16; 
Percent of required on hand: 21. 

Item: Vehicles and generators: Armored Humvee; 
Number required: 4,580; 
Number on hand: 469; 
Percent of required on hand: 10. 

Item: Vehicles and generators: Dump Truck; 
Number required: 60; 
Number on hand: 5; 
Percent of required on hand: 8. 

Item: Vehicles and generators: Humvee Ambulance; 
Number required: 710; 
Number on hand: 0; 
Percent of required on hand: 0. 

Item: Eastern bloc[A] weapons: DsHK 12.7 mm Heavy Machine Gun; 
Number required: 576; 
Number on hand: 175; 
Percent of required on hand: 30. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M500 Shotgun; 
Number required: 525; 
Number on hand: 116; 
Percent of required on hand: 22. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M224 60mm Mortar; 
Number required: 68; 
Number on hand: 15; 
Percent of required on hand: 22. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M203A2 40mm Grenade Launcher; 
Number required: 2,851; 
Number on hand: 527; 
Percent of required on hand: 19. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M16A2 Semi-automatic Rifle; 
Number required: 53,287; 
Number on hand: 6,018; 
Percent of required on hand: 11. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M249 Machine Gun; 
Number required: 3,584; 
Number on hand: 162; 
Percent of required on hand: 5. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M240B Machine Gun; 
Number required: 2,013; 
Number on hand: 81; 
Percent of required on hand: 4. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M24 Sniper Rifle; 
Number required: 1,544; 
Number on hand: 12; 
Percent of required on hand: 1. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M2 .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun; 
Number required: 576; 
Number on hand: 0; 
Percent of required on hand: 0. 

Item: NATO-standard[B] weapons: M252 81mm Mortar; 
Number required: 30; 
Number on hand: 0; 
Percent of required on hand: 0. 

Item: Communications technology: High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted Radio; 
Number required: 1,031; 
Number on hand: 501; 
Percent of required on hand: 49. 

Item: Communications technology: Omni-Directional Antenna Mast; 
Number required: 503; 
Number on hand: 180; 
Percent of required on hand: 36. 

Item: Communications technology: Very High-Frequency Vehicle Mounted 
Radio; 
Number required: 200; 
Number on hand: 71; 
Percent of required on hand: 36. 

Item: Communications technology: Field Switch Board; 
Number required: 752; 
Number on hand: 202; 
Percent of required on hand: 27. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

Note: Equipment requirements are defined in the ANA's Military Table of 
Equipment, known as a Tashkil. 

[A] Eastern bloc equipment generally refers to equipment developed by 
the Soviet Union and produced in Eastern bloc countries. 

[B] NATO-standard refers to NATO approved standardization processes 
applied to equipment, which can include production codes and equipment 
specifications. According to NATO's Logistics Handbook, the aim of 
standardization is to enhance the Alliance's operational effectiveness 
and to improve the efficient use of available resources. 

[End of table] 

Although shortfalls exist for certain items defined as critical by 
Defense, such as NATO-standard machine guns, this does not necessarily 
mean that the ANA is unequipped. Defense officials stated that while 
ANA forces wait to receive NATO-standard weapons, Eastern bloc 
substitutes will be used. However, several ANA combat corps reported 
shortages in these items as well. For instance, each month between 
November 2007 and February 2008 at least 2 of 5 ANA corps reported 
shortages in Eastern bloc anti-tank weapons and 1 of 5 ANA corps 
reported shortages in Eastern bloc light machine guns. Moreover, 
shortfalls in items for which no Eastern bloc substitute is being used, 
such as communication equipment and cargo trucks, were reported in 
every ANA combat corps in February 2008. 

Defense officials attribute these shortfalls to a variety of factors, 
such as competing global priorities for equipment, production delays, 
and delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 funding, among 
other reasons. As equipment orders are filled, ANA units may not be the 
top priority to receive certain equipment items. CSTC-A officials said 
that U.S. soldiers currently in combat have first priority to receive 
some of the equipment that is also requested for the ANA, while 
security forces in other nations, such as Iraq, may also be higher 
priority than the Afghan army. When U.S. forces or other nations have 
higher priority to receive equipment, CSTC-A officials noted that ANA 
orders are delayed. Officials at the U.S. Army Security Assistance 
Command also stated that Iraq may be a higher priority than 
Afghanistan, while a senior official from the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) stated that other nations, such as Georgia 
and Lebanon, may also receive higher priority. Furthermore, production 
delays for certain equipment items may contribute to equipment 
shortfalls. For instance, CSTC-A officials stated that due to 
production delays, certain equipment items, such as NATO-standard heavy 
machine guns and mortars, were not currently available and would not 
likely be delivered until 2009 or 2010. Similarly, Defense officials in 
Washington, D.C., stated that production limitations were responsible 
for some equipment shortages, particularly in the case of NATO-standard 
mortars. Additional factors cited as contributing to equipment 
shortages included delayed receipt and execution of fiscal year 2007 
funding, accelerated fielding of ANA units, and difficulties 
distributing equipment to the field. 

One method to help address shortages while western equipment is delayed 
is through increased equipment donations from the international 
community. CSTC-A is currently seeking additional contributions, 
particularly of Eastern bloc equipment, such as the basic soldier 
assault rifle. Between 2002 and March 2008, over 40 non-U.S. donors 
provided approximately $426 million to assist in the training and 
equipping of the ANA. Eighty-eight percent of this support has been in 
the area of equipment; however, the value of equipment donations is 
determined by the donor, according to CSTC-A officials. The quality of 
this donated equipment has been mixed (see fig. 5), and delivery of 
some donations has been delayed due to limited funds to pay for 
shipments into Afghanistan. 

Figure 5: Rifles of Variable Quality Donated to the ANSF: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of rifles of variable quality donated to the ANSF. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

To address quality issues, NATO and CSTC-A have established procedures 
to verify that international donations comply with current needs for 
the ANA and, if necessary, verify the condition and completeness of 
equipment. Furthermore, to defray the cost of shipments into 
Afghanistan, a NATO-administered trust fund has been established to 
support the transportation of equipment into Afghanistan. However, 
Defense officials stated that the amount of money in the trust fund, 
which they estimated to be approximately $1 million, is limited and may 
not support the transportation of a large number of donations. 
Additionally, CSTC-A has also set aside funding to transport donated 
goods when required. 

The development of capable ANA forces may be delayed by shortages in 
equipment, as units cannot be certified as fully capable in equipment 
unless they have 85 percent or more of their critical equipment items. 
CSTC-A anticipates that all ANA brigades will be equipped to at least 
85 percent of requirements for critical equipment items by December 
2008; however, according to Defense's March 2008 monthly status report, 
expected dates for achieving CM1 in equipment were pushed back for 12 
of 14 combat brigades by between 1 to 7 months due, in part, to delayed 
delivery and distribution of items such as vehicles and weapons. 
Moreover, shortages in equipment items may hinder training efforts, 
since having certain equipment items on hand, such as trucks, may be 
necessary to teach ANA personnel logistics and maintenance skills. 

Several Challenges Impede Efforts to Improve Capability of Afghan 
National Police Forces: 

Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an 
investment of nearly $6 billion, no police unit is assessed as fully 
capable of performing its mission. Development of an Afghan police 
force that is fully capable requires manning, training, and equipping 
of police personnel. However, the United States faces challenges in 
several areas related to these efforts to build a capable police force. 
First, less than one-quarter of the ANP has police mentors present to 
provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. 
Second, the Afghan police have not received about one-third of the 
equipment items Defense considers critical, and continue to face 
shortages in several categories of equipment, including trucks, radios, 
and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan's weak judicial system hinders 
effective policing, and our analysis of status reports from the field 
indicates that the ANP consistently experiences problems with police 
pay, corruption, and attacks, including by insurgents. Recognizing that 
these challenges hamper ANP development, Defense began a new long-term 
initiative in November 2007 to reconstitute the uniformed police--the 
largest component of the Afghan police. However, the continuing 
shortfall in police mentors may pose a risk to the initiative's 
success. 

No Police Units Are Rated as Fully Capable of Performing Their Mission: 

Defense defines a fully capable 82,000-person ANP force as one that is 
able to independently plan, execute, and sustain operations with 
limited coalition support.[Footnote 35] However, Defense reporting 
indicates that, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully 
capable of performing its mission (see table 8).[Footnote 36] 
Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of 
uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), 
which together comprise about three-fourths of the ANP's authorized end-
strength, were rated at CM4--the lowest capability rating.[Footnote 37] 
Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated at CM2, 
and the other 6 at CM3. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 
percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable 
and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading 
operations with coalition support. 

Table 8: Defense Assessment of ANP Capabilities, as of April 2008: 

Police units: Uniformed Police Districts (365); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 6; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 6; 
CM4 Not Capable: 296; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 57. 

Police units: Border Police Battalions (33); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 0; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 0; 
CM4 Not Capable: 33; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 0. 

Police units: Civil Order Police Battalions (20); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 6; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 2; 
CM4 Not Capable: 2; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 10. 

Police units: Counter Narcotics Police Units (15); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 0; 
CM3 Partially Capable: 10; 
CM4 Not Capable: 3; 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 2. 

Police units: Number of ANP units (433); 
CM1 Fully Capable: 0; 
CM2 Capable with Support: 12 (3%); 
CM3 Partially Capable: 18 (4%); 
CM4 Not Capable: 334 (77%); 
Unit Not Formed or Not Reporting[A]: 69 (16%). 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. 

[A] A uniformed police district that is categorized as "not formed or 
not reporting" has not been rated by Defense. A civil order police 
battalion or a counter narcotics police unit that is categorized as 
"not formed or not reporting" is a planned unit or in training. 

[End of table] 

According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for 
completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012--a 
date that conflicts with the Afghan government and international 
community benchmark of establishing police forces that can effectively 
meet Afghanistan's security needs by the end of 2010. 

Growth of Police Force Is Difficult to Quantify: 

Defense reporting indicates that, as of April 2008, nearly 80,000 
police had been assigned out of an end-strength of 82,000 (see table 
9).[Footnote 38] This is an increase of more than double the 
approximately 35,000 we previously reported as trained as of January 
2005. 

Table 9: Afghan Ministry of Interior Forces, as of April 2008: 

Ministry of Interior Headquarters: 
Number authorized: 6,015; 
Number assigned: 5,237; 
Percent assigned: 87. 

Uniformed Police: 
Number authorized: 44,319; 
Number assigned: 42,969; 
Percent assigned: 97. 

Border Police; 
Number authorized: 17,970: 
Number assigned: 12,213; 
Percent assigned: 68. 

Auxiliary Police: 
Number authorized: 0; 
Number assigned: 9,318; 
Percent assigned: N/A[A]. 

Civil Order Police: 
Number authorized: 5,365; 
Number assigned: 1,523; 
Percent assigned: 28. 

Criminal Investigative Division: 
Number authorized: 4,148; 
Number assigned: 2,815; 
Percent assigned: 68. 

Counter Narcotics Police: 
Number authorized: 3,777; 
Number assigned: 2,265; 
Percent assigned: 60. 

Customs Police: 
Number authorized: 0; 
Number assigned: 623; 
Percent assigned: N/A[A]. 

Counter Terrorism Police: 
Number authorized: 406; 
Number assigned: 411; 
Percent assigned: 101. 

Standby/Highway Police: 
Number authorized: 0; 
Number assigned: 2,536; 
Percent assigned: N/A[A]. 

Total: 
Number authorized: 82,000; 
Number assigned: 79,910; 
Percent assigned: 97. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Afghan Ministry of 
Interior data. 

[A] The auxiliary police, customs police, standby police, and highway 
police are no longer authorized. 

[End of table] 

Despite this reported increase in police manning, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which the police force has grown. As we noted 
in May 2007, the Afghan Ministry of Interior produces the number of 
police assigned and the reliability of these numbers has been 
questioned. A Defense census undertaken since our May 2007 report 
raises additional concerns about these manning numbers. Specifically, 
Defense conducted a census to check the reliability of ministry payroll 
records and reported in September 2007 that it was unable to verify the 
physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police and more 
than 10 percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll 
records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense's census did not 
cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot be applied to 
the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense's census 
raise questions about the extent to which the ANP has grown since our 
2005 report. 

Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and 
Verification of Police on Duty: 

According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police 
mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training 
and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Police mentor teams 
in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law 
enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide 
training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the 
civilian mentors. As we reported in 2005, international peacekeeping 
efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have shown that field-based 
training of local police by international police mentors is critical to 
the success of similar programs to establish professional police 
forces. Such training allows mentors to build on classroom instruction 
and provide a more systematic basis for evaluating police performance. 

Defense reporting indicates that, as of January 2008, less than one- 
quarter of the ANP had police mentor teams present. DynCorp, State's 
contractor for training and mentoring the police, was able to provide 
about 98 percent (540 of 551) of the authorized number of civilian 
mentors as of April 2008. However, as of the same date, only about 32 
percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in 
country. Due to this shortage of military mentors to provide force 
protection, movement of available civilian mentors is constrained--a 
serious limitation to providing mentor coverage to a police force that 
is based in more than 900 locations around the country and, unlike the 
army, generally operates as individuals, not as units.[Footnote 39] 
Moreover, a knowledgeable CSTC-A official stated that additional 
civilian mentors would not help to address the shortfall in military 
mentors because they could not be deployed to the field without 
military mentors to provide protection. According to Defense officials, 
the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher 
priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, 
particularly Iraq. 

While the United States and the EU have taken steps to provide 
additional police mentors, the extent to which these efforts will 
address current shortfalls is unclear. In January 2008, Defense 
announced that approximately 1,000 Marines would be sent to Afghanistan 
in the spring of 2008 on a one-time, 7-month deployment to assist in 
the training and development of the ANP.[Footnote 40] However, this 
temporary deployment will neither fully nor permanently alleviate the 
underlying shortage of military mentors for the ANP, which stood at 
over 1,600 as of April 2008. In June 2007, the EU established a police 
mission in Afghanistan with the objective of providing nearly 200 
personnel to mentor, advise, and train the Ministry of Interior and 
ANP. According to State, the number of EU personnel pledged has 
subsequently increased to about 215. However, State figures indicate 
that the EU had staffed about 80 personnel as of February 2008--less 
than 40 percent of its pledged total. Moreover, State officials said 
that restrictions in the EU mandate limit the extent to which its 
personnel are permitted to provide field-based training. 

Defense, State, and DynCorp officials all identified the continuing 
shortfall in police mentors as a challenge to U.S. efforts to develop 
the Afghan police. Specifically, the mentor shortage has impeded U.S. 
efforts in three areas: 

* Field-based training: Senior Defense officials, including the 
commanding general of CSTC-A, stated that the ongoing shortfall in 
police mentors has been the primary obstacle to providing the field- 
based training necessary to develop a fully capable police force. In 
addition, State has reported that a significant increase in mentoring 
coverage is essential to improving the quality of the police through 
field-based training. DynCorp officials also acknowledged the shortage 
of mentors to be a challenge to providing necessary training. 

* Evaluation: According to a knowledgeable CSTC-A official, the 
shortage of police mentors is a serious challenge to evaluating the 
capability of the police and identifying areas in need of further 
attention. Defense recently introduced a monthly assessment tool to be 
used by mentors to evaluate police capability and identify strengths 
and weaknesses. However, CSTC-A identified extremely limited mentor 
coverage of the police as a significant challenge to using this tool to 
generate reliable assessments. As of February 2008, police mentors were 
able to assess only about 11 percent of uniformed police districts 
using this new tool. 

* Verification of police on duty: The shortage of available police 
mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to verify the number of Afghan police 
on duty. For example, as of April 2008, Defense could not verify 
whether any police were reporting for duty in 5 of Afghanistan's 34 
provinces due to the lack of mentors. Furthermore, although Defense has 
planned to conduct monthly surveys to determine how many police are 
reporting for duty in selected districts, a knowledgeable CSTC-A 
official stated that mentors are not available to conduct surveys. 
However, a random sample of 15 police districts conducted by the United 
Nations found fewer than half of authorized police reporting for duty. 

Without sufficient police mentors present to conduct field-based 
training and evaluation and verify police manning, development of fully 
capable, fully staffed Afghan police forces may continue to be delayed. 

Efforts of Civilian Mentors Complicated by Dual Chain of Command: 

Although DynCorp has been able to provide nearly all of the authorized 
number of civilian mentors, DynCorp stated that the activities of these 
mentors have been complicated by a dual chain of command between State 
and Defense.[Footnote 41] According to a 2005 interagency decision, 
Defense is responsible for directing the overall U.S. effort to train 
and equip the Afghan police, while State is responsible for providing 
policy guidance and management of the DynCorp contract. According to 
DynCorp, this dual chain of command has affected its efforts in 
multiple ways, such as by producing conflicting guidance and 
complicating reporting, placement of personnel, the use of facilities, 
and training and mentoring activities. 

Police Continue to Face Difficulties with Equipment Shortages and 
Quality: 

Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, Congress made available $5.9 
billion to support the training and equipping of the ANP. At least $1.3 
billion of that amount, or 22 percent, has been directed toward 
equipment purchases.[Footnote 42] Although equipping of the police has 
improved in recent months, shortages remain in several types of 
equipment that Defense considers critical.[Footnote 43] Since our 
August 2007 visit to Afghanistan, the percentage of critical ANP 
equipment on hand has grown from 53 to 65 percent as of February 2008. 
This improvement includes increased totals of items on hand, such as 
rifles and grenade launchers. Further, Defense anticipates the ANP will 
be equipped with 85 percent of critical equipment items by December 
2008. However, as of February 2008, shortages remained in several types 
of critical equipment, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. Defense 
officials cited several factors that have contributed to these 
shortages. First, according to CSTC-A officials, equipment shortages 
are due to competing priorities, particularly the need to equip U.S. 
forces deployed to operational situations and security forces in Iraq. 
Second, CSTC-A attributed the specific shortage in body armor to the 
inability of two supplying contractors to deliver the requested items 
on schedule. Third, Defense officials cited additional causes of 
equipment shortages such as delayed receipt and execution of fiscal 
year 2007 funding and instances where CSTC-A did not provide equipment 
orders in a timely manner. Defense officials and documentation also 
indicated that distributing equipment to police in the field once it is 
procured is challenging due to the unstable security situation, 
difficult terrain, weather conditions, and the remoteness of some 
police districts. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns 
with the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the 
police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the 
nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of 
good quality. 

Our analysis of weekly progress reports produced in 2007 by DynCorp 
civilian police mentors provides additional evidence of equipment- 
related challenges and other logistical difficulties.[Footnote 44] 
Specifically, 88 percent (46 of 52) of weekly reports contained 
instances of police operating with equipment of insufficient quality or 
quantity or facing problems with facilities or supplies. For example, 
the reports include several cases where Afghan border police are 
inadequately equipped to defend their positions on the border or face 
insurgent forces. Recognizing this shortcoming, CSTC-A has planned to 
equip the border police with heavy machine guns, which it expects to 
arrive in the fall of 2008. In addition, 81 percent (42 of 52) of 
weekly reports contained examples of limited police ability to account 
for the equipment provided to them.[Footnote 45] In July 2007, CSTC-A 
initiated efforts to train the police in basic supply and property 
accountability procedures.[Footnote 46] According to CSTC-A, equipment 
is no longer being issued to police districts unless the districts' 
property officers are first trained. For example, more than 1,500 
trucks have been on hand and ready for issue since late 2007 (see fig. 
6), but the Afghan Minister of Interior has delayed distribution of 
these vehicles until adequate accountability procedures and driver 
training are established in the target districts. Similarly, as of 
February 2008, about half of the approximately 17,000 machine guns on 
hand had not been distributed to the police. 

Figure 6: Trucks Awaiting Distribution to ANP: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of trucks awaiting distribution to ANP. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and 
Attacks: 

Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of 
law is a prerequisite for effective policing. However, in 2005 and 
2007, we reported that few linkages existed in Afghanistan between the 
Afghan judiciary and police, and the police had little ability to 
enforce judicial rulings. According to State, much of Afghanistan 
continues to lack a functioning justice system. In addition, according 
to CSTC-A, the slow rate at which the rule of law is being implemented 
across Afghanistan inhibits effective community policing. 

Our analysis of DynCorp's weekly progress reports from 2007 indicates 
that police in the field also face persistent problems with pay, 
corruption, and attacks.[Footnote 47] 

* Pay problems: 94 percent (49 of 52) of weekly reports contained 
instances of police experiencing problems with pay. These include 
numerous examples of police who have not been paid in several months 
and multiple cases of police who quit their jobs as a result of pay- 
related problems, thereby potentially leaving their districts more 
vulnerable to insurgent forces. Our prior work found that one cause for 
the corrupt practices exhibited by many Afghan police is their low, 
inconsistently paid salaries. Furthermore, according to State, the 
Ministry of Interior's traditional salary distribution process afforded 
opportunities for police chiefs and other officials to claim a portion 
of their subordinates' salaries for themselves. To minimize skimming of 
salaries, CSTC-A is instituting a three-phase program to pay all 
salaries into bank accounts via electronic funds transfer by December 
2008. According to Defense, electronic funds transfer had been 
implemented in 12 of 34 provinces as of August 2007. The government of 
Afghanistan also has decided to increase police salaries to achieve pay 
parity with the Afghan army. 

* Corruption: 87 percent (45 of 52) of weekly reports contained 
instances of corruption within the police force or the Ministry of 
Interior. These include multiple examples of police personnel providing 
weapons or defecting to the Taliban and several cases of high-ranking 
officials engaging in bribery or misconduct. Moreover, State 
documentation notes that one branch of the ANP, the highway police, was 
disbanded in early 2007 because it was notorious for corruption. 
However, DynCorp weekly reporting indicates that several thousand 
highway police were still working and being paid by the Ministry of 
Interior as of September 2007. The ministry, in conjunction with CSTC- 
A and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, is 
currently engaged in an effort to reform and streamline the ANP rank 
structure according to several criteria, including evidence of previous 
corruption amongst ANP officers.[Footnote 48] 

* Attacks: 85 percent (44 of 52) of weekly reports contained instances 
of attacks against the police. These include numerous cases where 
police are targeted by suicide bombers or with improvised explosive 
devices. According to DynCorp, insurgent attacks against the ANP have 
increased due to greater involvement of the ANP in counterinsurgency 
operations and the perception that the police are a more vulnerable 
target than the Afghan army and coalition forces. DynCorp weekly 
reports do include several instances where police were able to 
successfully fend off attack; however, they also contain multiple cases 
of the dangerous working conditions that police face causing 
difficulties in retaining or recruiting personnel. 

New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor 
Coverage a Risk Factor: 

Recognizing several of the challenges faced by the ANP, Defense began a 
new initiative in November 2007 to train and equip the Afghan uniformed 
police. Defense documentation that outlines this initiative 
acknowledges that the Afghan police lack capability, have been 
inadequately trained and equipped, and are beset by corruption. To 
target these and other challenges, Defense introduced the Focused 
District Development plan in November 2007 to train and equip the 
uniformed police--those assigned to police districts throughout the 
country who comprise over 40 percent of the intended ANP end-strength 
of 82,000. According to Defense, reforming the uniformed police--the 
immediate face of the Afghan government to citizens at the local level-
-is the key to the overall reform of the ANP.[Footnote 49] Under the 
Focused District Development model, the entire police force of a 
district is withdrawn from the district and sent to a regional training 
center to train together for 8 weeks and receive all authorized 
equipment while their district is covered by the Afghan National Civil 
Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force trained and equipped 
to counter civil unrest and lawlessness (see fig. 7).[Footnote 50] The 
police force then returns to its district, where a dedicated police 
mentor team provides follow-on training and closely monitors the police 
for at least 60 days. Defense expects to be able to reconstitute about 
5 to 10 districts at a time for the first year of Focused District 
Development, with each training cycle lasting about 6 to 8 months. 
Overall, according to State, it will take a minimum of 4 to 5 years to 
complete the initiative. 

Figure 7: Afghan National Civil Order Police Trainees in Kabul: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of Afghan National Civil Order Police Trainees in Kabul. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

State documentation indicates that no districts had completed an entire 
Focused District Development cycle as of March 2008[Footnote 51]. Until 
an entire cycle is completed, it will be difficult to fully assess the 
initiative. However, limited police mentor coverage may complicate 
efforts to execute this new program. Defense documentation identifies 
sufficient police mentor teams as the most important requirement for 
successful reform. However, according to the commanding general of CSTC-
A, the ongoing shortfall in police mentors available to work with newly 
trained district police will slow implementation of the initiative. In 
addition, a senior Defense official stated that unless the mentor 
shortage is alleviated, the number of police mentor teams available to 
provide dedicated training and monitoring will eventually be exhausted. 
Moreover, according to DynCorp, civilian mentors have an important role 
in Focused District Development--particularly in providing district-
level mentoring--but are not accompanying military mentors into 
districts that are considered unsafe. Given that one selection 
criterion for districts is location in unstable areas of the country 
where better policing might improve the security situation, it is 
unclear how often civilian mentors will be able to participate in 
district-level mentoring. Defense documentation also identifies 
sufficient equipment availability as a requirement for successful 
reform. According to Defense, adequate equipment is currently on hand 
to support the Focused District Development initiative. However, given 
current shortfalls in various ANP equipment items, it is unclear if 
having sufficient equipment on hand for the initiative may lead to 
increased equipment shortages for elements of the ANP, such as the 
border police, that are not currently being targeted through the 
initiative. 

Conclusion: 

Establishing capable Afghan national security forces is critical to 
improving security in Afghanistan and the U.S. efforts to assist 
foreign allies and partners in combating terrorism. To date the U.S. 
has invested billions of dollars in this effort and estimates that 
billions more will be required to build and sustain the ANSF beyond the 
existing forces--few of which have been assessed as fully capable of 
conducting their primary mission. As such, measuring progress and 
estimating long-term costs are particularly important given that U.S. 
officials estimate that this mission could exceed a decade. The 
recommendations in our 2005 report called for detailed Defense and 
State plans that include clearly defined objectives and performance 
measures, milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding 
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, 
including plans for transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan. In 
2007, Defense provided a 5-page document in response to our 
recommendation. However, this document included few long-term 
milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no 
sustainability strategy. In 2008, Congress mandated that Defense, in 
coordination with State, submit reports on a comprehensive and long- 
term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a long-term 
detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. Defense has yet to provide these 
reports. As such it remains difficult to determine if U.S. efforts are 
on track and how much more they will cost to complete. Until a 
coordinated, detailed plan is completed, Congress will continue to lack 
visibility into the progress made to date and the cost of completing 
this mission--information that is essential to holding the performing 
agencies accountable. Consequently, we believe that future U.S. 
investments should be conditioned on the completion of a coordinated, 
detailed plan for developing a capable ANSF. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To help ensure that action is taken to facilitate accountability and 
oversight in the development and sustainment of the ANSF, and 
consistent with our previous 2005 recommendation and the 2008 
congressional mandate, Congress should consider conditioning a portion 
of future appropriations related to training and equipping the ANSF on 
completion of a coordinated, detailed plan that, among other things, 
includes clearly defined objectives and performance measures, 
milestones for achieving these objectives, future funding requirements, 
and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved, including plans for 
transitioning responsibilities to Afghanistan; and the timely receipt 
of the reports mandated by sections 1230 and 1231 of Pub. L. 110-181, 
the first of which are already late. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

State and Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report. 
State's comments are reproduced in appendix III. Defense's comments, 
along with GAO responses to selected issues raised by Defense, are 
reproduced in appendix IV. The agencies also provided us with technical 
comments, which we have incorporated throughout the draft as 
appropriate. 

State appreciated GAO's views on how to improve efforts to develop the 
ANSF, which it considers critical to long-term sustainable success in 
Afghanistan. State expressed concerns about conditioning future 
appropriations on the completion of a detailed plan. In addition, State 
highlighted ongoing coordination efforts with Defense as well as 
certain other operational changes, many of which occurred after the 
completion of our fieldwork in August 2007. For example, while we note 
that civilian mentors are not accompanying military mentors into 
districts that are considered unsafe, State notes in its comments that 
civilian police mentors are now deployed with their military 
counterparts to all ongoing Focused District Development districts and 
that all efforts are made to enable the deployment of civilian police 
in support of the program. 

We acknowledge State's concerns and appreciate its efforts to 
coordinate with Defense. However, we believe that a coordinated, 
detailed plan that clearly identifies the various agencies' roles would 
be beneficial, given the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff 
in Afghanistan. We believe a coordinated, detailed plan with 
intermediate milestones is also important particularly in light of the 
new Focused District Development initiative for ANP training, which 
will entail considerable resources and time to complete. Further, 
intermediate milestones would provide policymakers with more 
information regarding the transition to a normalized security 
assistance relationship, as discussed by State in its comments. 

Defense disagreed that Congress should consider conditioning a portion 
of future appropriations on completion of a coordinated, detailed plan 
to develop the ANSF, and stated that current guidance provided by State 
and Defense to the field is sufficient to implement a successful 
program to train and equip the ANSF. Defense noted that the 5-page 
document it provided to GAO in January 2007 articulated goals for the 
size, capabilities, and requirements for the ANSF, and reflected an 
approach approved by multiple agencies--including State. Defense also 
cited a number of other documents it considers to be part of the effort 
to develop the ANSF. Furthermore, Defense disagreed with our conclusion 
that, absent a detailed plan, progress in developing the ANSF is 
difficult to assess, and stated that monthly progress reports and 
communication with Congress provide legislators with the information 
needed to assess the program and allocate resources. 

We do not believe that the 5-page document provides a strategic-level 
plan for the development of the ANSF. The document does not represent a 
coordinated Defense and State plan for completing and sustaining the 
ANSF with sufficient detail and transparency for Congress and others to 
make informed decisions concerning future resources. This 5-page 
document, which Defense now refers to as a "Strategic Vision" and which 
CSTC-A officials were unaware of at the time of our review, does not 
identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of the Department of 
State, Defense's key partner in training the ANP. This is an element 
that one would expect in a strategic planning document for ANSF 
development. Furthermore, the document contains just one date--December 
2008, by which time the 152,000 person ANSF would be completed. 
Defense's document lacks any other intermediate or long-term milestones 
by which progress could be measured. While the U.S. role in training 
and equipping the ANSF could exceed a decade, according to CSTC-A 
representatives, neither the 5-page document nor the documents 
identified by Defense in its comments to GAO constitute a 
sustainability strategy. For example, while Defense states that the 
international community will need to sustain the ANSF for the "near- 
term" until government revenues increase in Afghanistan, the document 
lacks further detail regarding the expected time frames for increasing 
government revenues, as well as a definition of "near-term." As such, 
it remains unclear how long Defense and State expect to support the 
ANSF. 

Furthermore, we maintain that, without a coordinated, detailed plan, 
assessing progress in developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense 
produces various documents that report in detail on the current status 
of the ANSF, these documents do not contain intermediate milestones or 
consistent end dates necessary to determine if the program is on track 
to achieve its desired results within a set timeframe. For additional 
details, refer to GAO comments that follow appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 
addition, this report is available on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions concerning 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]. 
Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations: 

United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chairman:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To analyze U.S. plans for developing and sustaining the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) and identify the extent to which these plans 
contain detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, 
and sustainability strategies, we reviewed planning documents from 
Combined Security Transition Command--Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, including draft and CSTC-A-approved 
versions of the Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National 
Military and Police Forces (Campaign Plan); a planning document 
provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a Defense 
briefing on ANSF sustainment. We evaluated these documents to determine 
the extent to which they contain the four criteria previously 
recommended by GAO and discussed them with cognizant Defense officials 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. We also spoke with officials from the U.S. Central Command and 
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
to discuss their contribution to the Campaign Plan. In addition, while 
in Kabul, we discussed the Campaign Plan with officials from Embassy 
Kabul; the commanding general of CSTC-A and other CSTC-A officials; and 
the Afghan Minister of Defense. Finally, we examined the Afghanistan 
Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy to gain 
familiarity with documents developed by Afghanistan and the 
international community. The information on foreign law in this report 
does not reflect our independent legal analysis but is based on 
interviews and secondary sources. 

To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United 
States in building the Afghan National Army (ANA), we reviewed monthly 
assessment reports produced by Task Force Phoenix and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other Defense 
offices and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
CSTC-A, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. Army 
Force Management Support Agency. In addition, we met with the following 
officials to discuss the progress made and challenges faced by the 
United States in building the ANA: 

* In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Force Management Support 
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and State's Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs. 

* In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with personnel mentoring the army; 
officials from CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force 
Phoenix; Embassy Kabul; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; MPRI; 
and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, including the Minister of Defense. 
We also visited an equipment warehouse and army training facilities. 
Moreover, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by telephone, 
including several CSTC-A representatives. 

To determine the progress made and challenges faced by the United 
States in building the Afghan National Police (ANP), we reviewed 
monthly assessment reports produced by Task Force Phoenix and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as well as documents obtained from several other 
Defense offices and agencies, including the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, CSTC-A, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the U.S. 
Army Force Management Support Agency. In addition, we met with the 
following officials to discuss the progress made and challenges faced 
by the United States in building the ANP: 

* In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Force Management Support 
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, State's Bureaus of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Political- 
Military Affairs, and DynCorp International. 

* In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with U.S. police mentors; officials 
from CSTC-A, including its commanding general; Task Force Phoenix; 
Embassy Kabul; the United Nations; DynCorp International; MPRI; and the 
Afghan Ministry of Interior, including the Minister of Interior. We 
also visited an equipment warehouse and police training facilities. 
Further, we interviewed officials based in Afghanistan by telephone, 
including representatives of CSTC-A, DynCorp International, and the 
United Nations Development Programme's Law and Order Trust Fund for 
Afghanistan. 

Additionally, we asked State to provide weekly progress reports 
produced by DynCorp International for 2005, 2006, and 2007. To identify 
challenges faced by the police, we conducted a content analysis to 
categorize and summarize the observations contained in these reports. 
Specifically, we independently proposed categories, agreed on the 
relevant categories, reviewed reports, and categorized the observations 
contained therein. Instances discussed in more than one report were 
only categorized and counted the first time they appeared. To ensure 
the validity and reliability of this analysis, we reconciled any 
differences. Once all differences were reconciled, we analyzed the data 
to identify the challenges most often discussed. Because State did not 
provide us a complete set of reports for 2005 or 2006, we were only 
able to perform this analysis on 2007 reports. 

To determine the reliability of the data we collected on funding, 
mentors, equipment, and ANSF personnel numbers and capability, we 
compared and corroborated information from multiple sources and 
interviewed cognizant officials regarding the processes they used to 
compile the data. 

* To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and 
international funding data, we compiled and compared data from Defense, 
State, and other donor countries with information from cognizant U.S. 
agency officials in Washington, D.C. We also compared the funding data 
with appropriations and authorization legislation, congressional budget 
requests, and reports to Congress to corroborate their accuracy. 
Additionally, we compared the funding data with our May 2007 
Afghanistan report.[Footnote 52] Differences between table 1 in this 
report and the funding chart presented in our May 2007 report are due 
to the following factors: 

- Certain funds were removed, such as those provided to support a 
protective detail for Afghanistan's President, because agency officials 
later clarified that these dollars did not support efforts to train and 
equip the ANSF, while certain funds were added, such as those used to 
provide support for counter narcotics police, because agency officials 
later clarified that these dollars supported efforts to train and equip 
the ANSF. 

- For fiscal years 2007 and 2008, totals printed in May 2007 included 
budget requests. Subsequently, some of these requested totals changed, 
such as the allocation of money in Defense's 2008 Global War on Terror 
request and Defense's support of efforts to train and equip Afghan 
counter narcotics police. 

Although we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an 
opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents received and 
our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the 
funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this engagement. 

* To determine the reliability of data on the number of military 
mentors, we corroborated figures in unclassified progress reports 
against classified mentor requirements and discussed Defense progress 
reports with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We checked the reliability of 
data on the number of civilian mentors by comparing Defense and State 
figures for consistency and speaking to State officials. Finally, we 
assessed the reliability of data on European Union police mentors by 
comparing Defense, State, and European Union data and checking for 
inconsistencies. Based on these assessments and interviews, we 
determined that these data on mentors were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this engagement. 

* To assess the reliability of equipment data, we compared different 
lists of equipment on hand to corroborate their accuracy and 
interviewed cognizant officials by telephone to discuss shortages of 
equipment and procedures for keeping track of equipment provided to the 
ANA and ANP. Based on these comparisons and discussions, we concluded 
that the equipment data provided to us were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of this engagement. 

* To assess the reliability of ANSF capability figures, we spoke with 
officials from CSTC-A, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and State to discuss 
the processes by which these data are generated. Additionally, while in 
Kabul, we attended the monthly meeting during which Defense officials 
discuss and determine ANA capability figures. Moreover, we requested 
after-action reports to evaluate the capability of ANA troops in the 
field. However, Defense officials were not able to provide us with this 
documentation. To evaluate the reliability of ANSF personnel numbers, 
we spoke with officials from CSTC-A and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Overall, based on our discussions with cognizant officials, we 
concluded that ANSF capability and ANA personnel data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this engagement. However, based on 
concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and highlighted in our 
prior work, as well as the results of the census conducted by Defense, 
we note in this report that the number of ANP reported as assigned may 
not be reliable. Because Defense relies on the number of ANP reported 
as assigned as a measure of progress in building the ANP, we include 
this figure in our report as evidence that the ANP appear to have grown 
in number over the last 3 years. However, we also note that due to 
concerns about the reliability of the figure, it is difficult to 
quantify the exact extent to which the ANP has grown. 

We conducted this performance audit from March 2007 through June 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Security Forces: 

The Afghan National Security Forces are comprised of the Afghan 
National Army and Afghan National Police. The structure of these 
organizations is described below. (See table 10 for the Afghan army and 
table 11 for the Afghan police.) 

Table 10: Structure of the Ministry of Defense and Afghan National 
Army: 

Component: Ministry of Defense and General Staff; 
Description: Department of the Afghan government responsible for 
developing, fielding, and ensuring the operational readiness of the 
ANA. The Ministry of Defense develops strategic plans for the defense 
of Afghanistan. The General Staff implements Ministry of Defense 
policies and guidance for the ANA. 

Component: Sustaining Institutions and Intermediate Commands; 
Description: Sustaining institutions and intermediate commands support 
the Ministry of Defense at an institutional level and include 
facilities installation and management, acquisitions, logistics, 
communications support, regional military intelligence offices, 
detainee operations, medical command, ANA training and recruiting 
commands, military police, and the Headquarters Support and Security 
Brigade, an ANA unit that performs specialist tactical and ceremonial 
missions. 

Component: Combat Forces; 
Description: Operational arm of the ANA, comprising about 70 percent of 
the total personnel. Combat forces are divided into five corps, with 
responsibility for different regions of Afghanistan. 

Component: Afghan Air Corps; 
Description: The air corps provides support for Afghan army and police 
forces. Once trained, it will perform missions such as presidential 
airlift, medical evacuation, training, and light attack. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense documents. 

[End of table] 

Combat forces comprise 70 percent of the ANA's personnel and are 
divided into five corps, located in different regions of Afghanistan. 
Each corps contains a number of brigades, most of which consist of five 
battalions: three light infantry battalions, one combat support 
battalion, and one combat services support battalion. The exception is 
the quick reaction force in 201st corps, which is comprised of one 
infantry battalion, one mechanized infantry battalion, and one armored 
battalion, in place of the three light infantry battalions. Each corps 
also includes one battalion of the National Commando Brigade (see fig. 
8). 

Figure 8: Structure of the ANA Combat Forces: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an organizational chart depicting the structure of the 
ANA Combat Forces, as follows: 

201st Corps: 
* Brigade: 
- INF Kandak; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* Brigade: 
- INF Kandak; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* Brigade: 
- INF; 
- Mech INF; 
- Armour; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* CDO BN(dashed line). 

203rd Corps/205th Corps: 
* Brigade: 
- INF Kandak; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* Brigade: 
- INF Kandak; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* CDO BN(dashed line). 

207th Corps/209th Corps: 
* Brigade: 
- INF Kandak; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* Brigade: 
- INF Kandak; 
- CS; 
- CSS; 
* CDO BN (dashed line). 

CDO BN: Battalion from the National Commando Brigade; 
INF: Kandak Infantry Battalion; 
CS: Combat Support Battalion; 
CSS: Combat Services Support Battalion; 
INF: Infantry Battalion; 
Mech INF: Mechanized Infantry Battalion; 
Armor: Armored Battalion. 

Note: The dashed lines in figure 8 depict the organizational 
relationship between ANA Corps and battalions of the National Commando 
Brigade. Each ANA Corps contains a battalion of the National Commando 
Brigade. These battalions are controlled from the Commando Brigade 
Headquarters. However, each ANA Corps has the responsibility to provide 
housing and administration to the Commando battalions located within 
its Corps. 

[End of figure] 

Table 11: Structure of the Ministry of Interior and Afghan National 
Police: 

Component: Ministry of Interior; 
Description: Department of the government of Afghanistan responsible 
for the protection of the country's international borders and the 
enforcement of the rule of law. 

Component: Afghan Uniformed Police; 
Description: Police assigned to police districts and provincial and 
regional commands; duties include patrols, crime prevention, traffic 
duties, and general policing. 

Component: Afghan Border Police; 
Description: Provide broad law enforcement capability at international 
borders and entry points. 

Component: Afghan National Civil Order Police; 
Description: Specialized police force trained and equipped to counter 
civil unrest and lawlessness. 

Component: Criminal Investigative Division; 
Description: Lead investigative agency for investigations of national 
interest, those with international links, and those concerned with 
organized and white-collar crime. 

Component: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan; 
Description: Lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing 
narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan. 

Component: Counter Terrorism Police; 
Description: Lead police and law enforcement efforts to defeat 
terrorism and insurgency. 

Component: Standby Police/Highway Police/Auxiliary Police/Customs 
Police; 
Description: No longer authorized. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense documents. 

[End of table] 

The ANP currently consists of six authorized components under the 
Ministry of Interior. The uniformed police, the largest of these six 
components, report to the police commanders of each Afghan province. 
Provincial commanders report to one of five regional commanders, who 
report back to the Ministry of Interior. The other five authorized 
components of the ANP all report directly to the ministry (see fig. 9). 

Figure 9: ANP Chain of Command: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure depicts the ANP Chain of Command as follows: 

Ministry of Interior: 
* Regional Commanders; 
- Provincial Commanders; 
- Uniformed Police; 
* Border Police; 
* Civil Order Police; 
* Criminal Investigation Police; 
* Counter Narcotics Police; 
* Counter Terrorism Police. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

May 30, 2008: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Afghanistan 
Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure 
Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan 
National Security Forces," GAO Job Code 320488. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Nisha Singh, Desk Officer, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at 
(202) 647-5985. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: JP, for: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 

cc: GAO - Hynek Kalkus: 
SCA - Richard Boucher: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to 
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable
Afghan National Security Forces: 
(GAO-08-661, GAO Code 320488): 

The Department welcomes this report and appreciates the GAO's views on 
how to improve our efforts to develop the Afghan National Security 
Forces, which we consider critical to long-term sustainable success in 
Afghanistan. 

The Department is however deeply concerned with the GAO's 
recommendation that Congress consider conditioning a portion of future 
appropriations on completion of a detailed plan to develop the Afghan 
National Security Forces, including a strategy for sustaining the 
forces. Afghan National Security Forces are the backbone of our 
counterinsurgency efforts and are increasingly shouldering combat 
duties that would otherwise require U.S. or allied forces; a 
requirement that would withhold funding would be counterproductive to 
our fundamental interests and would send the wrong signal to the Afghan 
people about the American commitment. We do however recognize that 
there are significant challenges, and appreciate the GAO report 
highlighting them. 

As detailed in GAO's report (GAO-08-661), the Department of Defense 
executes the overall Afghan National Security Forces Development 
program. The Department of Defense has directive authority of 
Department of Defense funded efforts to organize, train and equip the 
Afghan National Security Forces and - through its executive agent the 
Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan - determines overall 
program requirements in accordance with policy direction from the U.S. 
Chief of Mission. The Department views the development of the Afghan 
National Security Forces as critical to the overall strategic mission, 
and our collaborations in the field and in Washington are serious and 
substantive. The Secretary of State is required to concur on the use of 
the Afghan Security Force Fund to ensure that this funding is 
consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan. 

With regard to the Afghan National Police, in late 2007 the Departments 
of Defense and State agreed to establish a joint police program 
planning board to ensure a coherent and consistent approach. Based in 
Kabul and staffed by key representatives of Combined Security 
Transition Command - Afghanistan and the Embassy, the Board provides a 
formal mechanism for short-, medium- and long-term program planning and 
offers the opportunity to include other relevant parties (e.g., 
Ministry of Interior, EUPOL). In addition to USG inter-agency 
coordination, international police strategy can be coordinated through 
the International Police Coordination Board. 

To further strategic planning, Embassy Kabul and Combined Security 
Transition Command - Afghanistan have significantly improved informal 
coordination in Kabul and in the field. Through daily and weekly 
consultation as well as joint field visits, Combined Security 
Transition Command - Afghanistan provides Embassy Kabul proposals for 
Afghan National Police development and Embassy Kabul provides expert 
guidance on whether and how the proposals can be implemented. 

To address concerns about the chain of command in the field where 
military and civilian police frequently work together on program 
implementation, issues and concerns are filtered up to Kabul through 
respective Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan and 
Embassy channels. As a result, minor concerns are more frequently 
resolved at the field level, and those that filter back to Kabul are 
addressed jointly by program experts at Combined Security Transition 
Command - Afghanistan and the Embassy for a coordinated response. Joint 
operations with police mentor teams (PMT) have been significantly 
improved with the implementation of the Focused District Development 
program and clear instruction on mission mandate. 

With regard to the deployment of civilian police at the district level 
in support of Focused District Development, at the time of this report, 
civilian police have been deployed with their military counterparts to 
all cycle I and cycle II Focused District Development districts and are 
actively mentoring Afghan National Police at the district level, as 
well as at the provincial and regional level. Security assessments are 
conducted for every Focused District Development site and all efforts 
are made to enable the deployment of civilian police in support of the 
program. 

With regard to the Afghan National Army, the Department's assistance 
consists of International Military Education and Training funding to 
the Afghan military. This funding supports the professional military 
education for about sixty Afghani military officers - the State 
Department does not currently provide significant amounts of funding to 
train and equip the Afghan National Army on a large scale level. As a 
long-term relationship with Afghanistan is vital to the security 
interests of the United States, the Department endeavors to transition 
to a normalized security assistance relationship with Afghanistan in 
the near future, whereby the Department would provide Foreign Military 
Financing in addition to International Military Education and Training 
to fund the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army. The 
Department of Defense and Department of State have always agreed that 
the pivotal point in this funding shift would be when we transition 
from building the Afghan National Army (providing large equipment and 
training) to sustaining the Afghan National Army. This report is 
helpful in identifying Congressional concerns as we move forward. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs: 
2700 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2700: 

May 27, 2008: 

Mr. Charles Johnson Jr. 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Mr. Johnson: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report (GAO-08-661), "Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional 
Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop 
and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces," dated May 9, 2008 
(GAO Code 320488). 

My point of contact is Ms. Madeline LePage, (703) 695-2859, or email: 
[email protected]. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James J. Shinn: 

Attachment: DoD response to draft GAO report. 

GAO Draft Report Dated May 9, 2008: 
GAO-08-661 GAO Code 320488: 

"Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed To 
Ensure Completion Of A Detailed Plan To Develop And Sustain Capable 
Afghan National Security Forces" 

The Department of Defense (DoD) disagrees with the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report conclusion that progress in 
developing the ANSF is difficult to assess. DoD also disagrees with the 
GAO's recommendation that Congress consider conditioning a portion of 
future appropriations on completion of a detailed plan to develop the 
ANSF, including a strategy for sustaining the forces. We believe DoD 
and Department of State (DoS) have provided sufficient guidance to 
Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and Embassy 
Kabul for implementing a successful train and equip program. 
Withholding funding will delay the development of the ANSF, which is 
critical to long-term stability and security in Afghanistan. The ANSF 
development program is a well-reasoned, successful program that, 
despite numerous challenges, is building the Afghan Government's 
capacity to respond to the insurgency, provide stability, and implement 
rule of law in Afghanistan. 

The Strategic Vision for the ANSF provided to GAO in January 2007 
provided strategic-level guidance for the development of the ANSF, 
articulated goals for the size, capabilities, and requirements in the 
development of the ANSF in response to the insurgency. This new 
approach to the ANSF was approved by the Principals Committee (National 
Security Advisor, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others) 
in November 2006 as part of a comprehensive review of U.S. Government 
efforts in Afghanistan that concluded we must do more to help build 
Afghan capacity. 

Moreover, DoD shared with GAO other elements of the U.S. Government's 
comprehensive effort to develop the ANSF, including financial guidance 
on the use of appropriated Afghan Security Forces Funds; interagency 
guidance, such as annual Memorandums of Agreement between DoD and DoS 
for implementing the police program; and field-level planning, such as 
the recent CSTC-A Campaign Plan. 

Responding to the GAO's specific criticisms: 

* Identifies few long-term and no intermediate milestones: The 
Strategic Vision establishes both quantitative and qualitative measures 
to assess the development of Army and Police units and Ministerial 
capacity. Progress along these measures is assessed in a monthly report 
that tracks manning, training, equipment, and capability of independent 
operations. These metrics are projected and tracked, allowing senior 
officials to monitor progress. [See comment 1] 
- Also, in accordance with the 2007 NDAA, DOD submits the Training and 
Readiness Assessment (TRA) every 90 days to the Defense Congressional 
Oversight Committees. The TRA specifically assesses both the training 
and readiness of the Afghan Army and Afghan Police by unit, to include 
narrative explanations. 

* Milestones are not consistent with CSTC-A's milestones. CSTC-A's 
milestones include campaign phases and capabilities milestones, and are 
consistent with DoD strategic guidance. Any differences that exist are 
a result of developments in the security situation over the past year. 
DoD's Strategic Vision document was produced in November 2006 and 
finalized in January 2007, and CSTC-A's campaign plan was finalized in 
2008. The overarching goals, objectives, and requirements are 
consistent. [See comment 2] 

* Lacks a sustainability strategy: In the near-term, the key to 
accomplishing our goal of a secure and stable Afghanistan is for the 
international community to sustain the ANSF until Government of 
Afghanistan revenues increase. DoD, where appropriate, has supported 
efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to increase revenues (e.g., 
border security contributes to customs revenues), and to encourage 
increased international contributions (e.g., establishing an 
International Security Cooperation directorate in CSTC-A to facilitate 
donations to the ANSF). [See comment 3] 
- DoD provides timely and transparent information about the ANSF 
requirements to those U.S. Government agencies (e.g., Departments of 
Treasury and State), and international organizations (e.g., World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund) with responsibility for developing 
the Afghan economy. The February 2008 World Bank assessment of the 
sustainability of the ANSF demonstrates this cooperation. 

* Does not include the DoS's input: The Strategic Vision shared with 
the GAO was a longer articulation of a plan approved by the Principals 
Committee for the Afghan National Security Forces, in which DoS was 
represented by the Secretary of State, as well as the U.S. Ambassador 
to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann. [See comment 4] 

* Does not describe the DoS's role: The DoS's role in the development 
of the ANSF is articulated clearly in other documents, including the 
Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriation ("with the concurrence of 
SecState..."), a 2005 classified cable from Secretary of State, and an 
annual Memorandum of Understanding between DoD and DoS on the 
implementation of the training of the Afghan National Police, each of 
which was provided to the GAO. [See comment 5] 

DoD also disagrees with the GAO's conclusion that progress in 
developing the ANSF cannot be assessed because of the lack of detailed 
plans. Progress towards quantitative and qualitative goals is 
consistently monitored and regularly reported to Congress through DoD 
monthly reports, briefings to Congressional staff, and testimony by 
senior Defense officials, all of which provide legislators with the 
information needed to assess progress and allocate resources. GAO's 
report notes that limited numbers of Afghan National Army (ANA) units 
are now capable of independent operations with coalition support, a 
significant development considering the ANA started from nothing six 
years ago. This progress is even more impressive considering DoD only 
began to support ANA development of independent operations capability 
in 2006. In March 2008, the first ANA unit became capable of operating 
independently and in April 2008, President Karzai announced that the 
ANSF would assume responsibility for security in Kabul in summer 2008. 
The ANA is expected to be manned, trained, equipped, and capable of 
independent operations with limited coalition support by March 2011. 
[See comment 6] 

Although the police continue to trail the Army in capability because of 
smaller resources initially invested, there is demonstrated evidence of 
their improvement beyond the number of forces cited by the GAO. As of 
April 2008, 12 Afghan National Police (ANP) units are assessed capable 
of independent operations with coalition support. This includes six 
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) battalions and six Afghan 
Uniformed Police district units. The ANP are expected to be manned, 
trained, equipped, and capable of independent operations with limited 
support by December 2012. Although this is two years after the 
Afghanistan Compact benchmark, it includes an 82,000-person force, 
compared to the 62,000 originally targeted in the Compact. 

Technical corrections have been provided separately to the GAO 
including comments on the availability of transportation funds. 

The following are GAO's comments on Defense's written response, dated 
May 27, 2008, to our draft report. 

GAO Comments: 

1. Defense states that its document establishes quantitative and 
qualitative measures to assess ANSF development. While the 5-page 
document contains some qualitative measures to assess ANSF development, 
it contains only one milestone date, December 2008, when, according to 
the document, the ANSF will have achieved initial independent operating 
capability. However, this one milestone is not consistent with dates 
contained in monthly reports that track manning, training, equipment, 
and capability, which have fluctuated. While the monthly updates are 
useful in providing the status of ANSF capability, each monthly report 
is a snapshot in time without consistent baselines that would 
facilitate an assessment of progress over time. For example, even 
though the United States began funding and training the ANA in 2002, 
the February 2007 report that was provided to GAO as an attachment to 
the 5-page document uses three different baselines for assessing the 
ANSF--July 2005 for the number of trained and equipped Afghan army and 
police, June 2006 for the status of the ANA battalion Training and 
Readiness Assessments, and the first quarter of 2007 for the status of 
ANA and ANP embedded training teams and mentors. However, the report 
does not refer back to 2002 in measuring progress. Similarly, the 
Training and Readiness Assessments that are provided on a quarterly 
basis to congressional oversight committees are also snapshots in time. 

2. Defense maintains that the CSTC-A milestones are consistent with 
those in the 5-page Defense document. We disagree. The three phases and 
associated time frames of ANSF development are articulated differently 
in the 5-page document and the CSTC-A Campaign Plan. For example, Phase 
III in CSTC-A's Campaign Plan--Transition to Strategic Partnership--is 
not identified as a phase in the 5-page document. 

Defense also contends that differences between the two documents are 
due to developments in the security environment. While this may be 
true, absent a detailed plan with specific time frames, it is difficult 
to assess the extent to which deteriorating security delayed ANSF 
development. 

3. Defense notes that until government revenues increase in 
Afghanistan, the international community will need to sustain the ANSF 
and that such international support is required for the "near-term." 
Moreover, Defense states that, where appropriate, it supports efforts 
to increase government revenues in Afghanistan. However, in the absence 
of further detail regarding the expected timeline for increasing 
government revenues--or the definition of "near-term"--it remains 
unclear how long the United States will need to support the ANSF. As we 
note in our report, the United States has been a major contributor to 
this mission--investing about $16.5 billion to develop the ANSF. 
Furthermore, current costs to sustain the force are estimated to be at 
over $2 billion annually. Given that the Afghan government is currently 
unable to support the recurring costs of its security forces and that 
U.S. officials estimate this mission could exceed a decade, additional 
clarity on the estimated length of time and amount of money needed to 
complete this mission, and the potential for Afghan financial 
contributions, could assist in conducting oversight of the program. 

4. Defense states that the 5-page document received by GAO was a longer 
articulation of a plan approved by State. However, although Defense and 
State are partners in training the ANP, the fact remains State did not 
participate in the development of the 5-page document Defense provided 
to GAO, nor has State developed a plan of its own. Defense's 5-page 
document does share basic end-strength and capability information with 
two slides on ANSF development approved by the Principals Committee for 
ANSF Development. However, these slides do not themselves constitute a 
coordinated plan and do not contain elements, such as intermediate 
milestones, identified by GAO in our 2005 recommendation and agreed to 
by Defense and State as needed. 

5. Defense contends that the role of State in ANSF development is 
articulated in documents other than the 5-page document provided to 
GAO. However, while State's role may be discussed elsewhere, the 5-page 
document provided to us by Defense does not describe the role of State 
or other key stakeholders. If, as stated, Defense intends this document 
to provide strategic-level guidance for the development of the ANSF, 
including in it an articulation of the roles and responsibilities of 
partners and key stakeholders could assist in implementing and 
coordinating the program's efforts. For instance, we note in our report 
that the dual chain of command between State and Defense has 
complicated the efforts of civilian mentors assisting with the program. 

6. We maintain that, without a detailed plan, assessing progress in 
developing the ANSF is difficult. While Defense produces various 
documents that report in detail on the current status of the ANSF, 
these documents do not contain consistent baseline data, intermediate 
milestones, or consistent end dates necessary to determine if the 
program is on track to achieve its desired results within a set time 
frame. For example, after 6 years and a U.S. investment of about $16.5 
billion in the program, Defense status reports show that, as of April 
2008, less than 2 percent (2 of 105) ANA units and no ANP units (0 of 
433) are rated as fully capable and the estimated completion date of 
these forces is March 2011 and December 2012, respectively. Defense 
asserts this is impressive, particularly for the ANA. However, without 
interim milestones against which to assess the ANSF, it is difficult to 
know if this status constitutes progress or will allow Defense to meet 
its currently projected completion dates. Moreover, the completion 
dates cited by Defense do not constitute firm goals and have shifted 
numerous times during the course of our review. For instance, in 
monthly Defense reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008, 
completion dates for the ANA fluctuated from December 2008 to September 
2010 to March 2011. Likewise, over the same period, completion dates 
for the ANP fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 
2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as 
"to be determined." Moreover, as we note in our report, Defense 
officials stated that completion dates contained in its monthly status 
reports did not account for shortfalls in the required number of 
mentors and trainers and, therefore, could be subject to further 
change. 

Defense also states that it only began to support independent 
operations capability for the ANA in 2006. While it is true that 
planned capability for the ANA was upgraded in 2006, absent a detailed 
plan, it is unclear the extent to which this planned capability upgrade 
should be expected to affect the timeline for the development of 
individual ANA units. Had Defense implemented GAO's 2005 recommendation 
to produce such a plan, it might be able to provide more clarity on the 
relationship between planned capability upgrades and program timelines. 
Moreover, even though planned ANA capability was upgraded in 2006, 
prior to that time, the U.S. invested nearly $3 billion to develop the 
ANA and reported approximately 20,000 troops trained as of May 2005. 
Absent a plan with performance measures, such as planned capability, 
linked to intermediate milestones and end dates, it is difficult to 
assess the results achieved by this financial investment. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Affairs and 
Trade, (202) 512-7331 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Key contributors to this report include Hynek Kalkus, Assistant 
Director; Lynn Cothern; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Mark Dowling; Cindy 
Gilbert; Elizabeth Guran; Al Huntington; and Elizabeth Repko. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy Terrorist 
Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-622]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs 
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-336]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 29, 2008. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units 
as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully 
Developed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-143R]. 
Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not 
Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1195]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 4, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has 
Reached Iraqi Security Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-711]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP]. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007. 

Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable Iraqi 
Security Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
612T]. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007. 

Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating 
Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78]. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
15, 2006. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating 
Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. 
Goals. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made 
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575]. Washington, D.C.: June 
30, 2005. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring 
Security Responsibility to Iraqi Military and Police. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T]. Washington, D.C.: March 
14, 2005. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited 
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-403]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 2, 2004. 

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607]. Washington, D.C.: June 
30, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police 
Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575] (Washington, 
D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

[2] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key 
Issues for Congressional Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP] (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2007). 

[3] 31 U.S.C. 712(3). 

[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575]. 

[5] International assistance may include logistics support, 
intelligence collection, or operations planning. 

[6] In this report, the term manning includes recruitment of personnel, 
assignment to duty, promotion, and retention. 

[7] As we reported in 2005, the number 19,600 consisted of 18,300 
combat troops and 1,300 personnel assigned to sustaining commands 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575]. 

[8] In this report, U.S. military personnel who train Afghan army units 
in the field are referred to as trainers and coalition personnel who 
train Afghan army units in the field are referred to as mentors. 

[9] In this report, personnel who train Afghan police in the field are 
collectively referred to as mentors. U.S. military personnel who train 
Afghan police in the field are referred to as military mentors, while 
contractors who train Afghan police in the field are referred to as 
civilian mentors. 

[10] The agreement occurred in December 2002 at the Bonn II donor 
conference near Bonn, Germany. 

[11] Afghanistan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for 
Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction, Volume One, 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006. 

[12] The Afghanistan Compact, The London Conference on Afghanistan, 
January 31-February 1, 2006. 

[13] Along with increasing the force structure to 80,000 in February 
2008, the Afghan government and its international partners also 
approved an additional 6,000 ANA personnel to account for personnel in 
training or otherwise not assigned to units. 

[14] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
110-181, sec. 1230. 

[15] Pub. L. 110-181, sec. 1231. 

[16] GAO has previously reported on the need for agencies to take a 
more strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency 
and ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with 
measurable, realistic goals and time frames, prioritized resource 
needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. See, for example, 
GAO, Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost 
Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-669T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008). GAO concluded in this report that until the Army 
provides a comprehensive plan for its modular restructuring and 
expansion initiatives, which identifies progress and total costs, 
decision makers may not have sufficient information to assess progress 
and allocate defense resources among competing priorities. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575]. 

[18] Sustainment of the ANSF covers items such as salaries, equipment 
replacement, operations and maintenance costs, logistics support costs, 
and training for replacement soldiers and police. 

[19] The elements of a campaign plan are laid out in Joint Publication 
5-0, Joint Operations Planning, December 26, 2006. 

[20] In 2005, we reported that Afghan combat troops would complete 
basic training by the fall of 2007. The Campaign Plan has identified 
mid-2010 as the date when basic training for all ANSF forces would be 
completed. 

[21] In previous planning documents, CM1 is known as "independent 
operating capability." A senior U.S. military official in Afghanistan 
stated, however, that "full operational capability" is a more accurate 
description since Afghan army and police forces may require coalition 
support under certain circumstances. 

[22] Afghan Tashkils are similar to the Military Table of Organization 
and Equipment (MTOE) found in the U.S. military. 

[23] When we reported in 2005, the air wing planned for the Afghan army 
was to provide secure transportation for the President of Afghanistan. 
The currently planned air corps will provide support such as medical 
evacuation and light attack, in addition to presidential airlift. 

[24] As shown in table 5, CSTC-A provided us with the capability rating 
for 105 army units. 

[25] ANA units have participated with coalition forces in 
counterinsurgency operations, assisted in the rescue of hostages, and 
provided security for peace talks and local events, among other 
activities. 

[26] While most of the ANA is projected to reach full capability before 
March 2011, the Afghan air corps, an important element to providing 
increased independence to Afghan forces, is not expected to achieve 
full capability before this date. 

[27] The 32,700 figure represents the number of ANA combat forces 
trained and assigned to one of the five ANA Corps as reported by CSTC- 
A on February 20, 2008. 

[28] Defense officials said that because the ANA lacks a death benefit 
system, soldiers who have died may remain on the payroll so that their 
families receive compensation. 

[29] Since its implementation, the electronic salary payment program 
has become more widely used among ANA personnel-increasing from 2 
transactions in February 2006 to 4,227 transactions in July 2007. 

[30] CSTC-A documents place ANA re-enlistment rates into three 
categories: (1) greater than 65 percent; (2) 50-65 percent; and (3) 
less than 50 percent. 

[31] The requirement for the number and types of U.S. embedded trainers 
needed to assist in the development of the ANA and U.S. military 
mentors to assist in the development of the ANP is defined in detail by 
Defense in a classified, formal request for forces submitted to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. GAO did not assess the adequacy of these 
requirements, but rather focused on whether the U.S. has been able to 
fill these requirements and the effects, if any, of not being able to 
do so. 

[32] The number of personnel assigned to assist the development of ANA 
units varies, depending on the type of ANA unit. As of April 2008, the 
required number of personnel for an embedded training team assisting an 
ANA maneuver battalion, combat support battalion, or combat services 
support battalion was 16. 

[33] Given the current U.S. embedded trainer shortage, Defense 
officials have advocated that NATO members field greater numbers of 
mentor teams to meet the rising demand for more trainers and mentors as 
the number of ANA forces completing basic training rises. Defense 
officials have cautioned, however, that increased numbers of mentoring 
teams may not necessarily correspond to decreased requirements for U.S. 
personnel, especially when mentoring teams operate with restrictions 
that will not allow them to accompany ANA units into combat operations. 

[34] Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, funds were provided to support 
the training and equipping of the ANA through a variety of budget 
accounts, with the majority provided through the Afghan Security Forces 
Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding allocations are reported to Congress in four 
categories: equipment and transportation, infrastructure development, 
sustainment activities, and training. The $3.7 billion figure 
represents the amount of ASFF funding directed toward equipment and 
transportation for the Afghan army. 

[35] The 82,000-person end-strength for the ANP includes over 6,000 
authorized positions in the Afghan Ministry of Interior, which oversees 
the police force. 

[36] CSTC-A provided us with capability ratings for 433 police units, 
which include uniformed police districts, civil order and border police 
battalions, and counter narcotics police units. 

[37] This does not include 57 uniformed police districts that Defense 
assessed as not formed or not reporting. 

[38] According to Defense, the number of police assigned includes 
personnel who were already employed as police prior to coalition 
operations in Afghanistan and have not necessarily been trained by 
coalition forces. By contrast, since Afghanistan's army had largely 
dissolved under the Taliban, nearly all army personnel listed as 
assigned have been trained by coalition forces. 

[39] Additionally, DynCorp officials stated that moving around 
Afghanistan to conduct mentoring operations is difficult due to the 
size of the country and the lack of roads. GAO is currently performing 
a separate review of U.S. and donor efforts to build roads in 
Afghanistan. 

[40] In January 2008, Defense announced the approved deployment of 
3,200 additional Marines to Afghanistan--1,000 to assist in training 
and development of the ANP and 2,200 to conduct security operations in 
Afghanistan under the command of the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. 

[41] Prior work by the State and Defense inspectors general highlighted 
the same challenge over a year ago. 

[42] The $5.9 billion figure includes approximately $736 million of 
fiscal year 2008 funding requests. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, 
funds were provided to support the training and equipping of the ANP 
through a variety of budget accounts, with the majority provided 
through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). ASFF funding 
allocations are reported to Congress in four categories: equipment and 
transportation, infrastructure development, sustainment activities, and 
training. The $1.3 billion figure represents the amount of ASFF funding 
allocated toward equipment and transportation of the Afghan police. 

[43] CSTC-A stated that they worked in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Interior to develop equipment requirements for the ANP, which are 
listed in a document referred to as a Tashkil. 

[44] We limited our analysis to 2007 reporting because State was unable 
to provide a complete set of weekly reports for prior years. Instances 
discussed in more than one report were only categorized and counted the 
first time they appeared. 

[45] GAO is currently performing a separate review on the 
accountability of equipment provided to the ANSF. 

[46] Training in supply and property accountability procedures is being 
provided to the police by U.S. contractors. 

[47] The security situation in Afghanistan, police performance, and 
retaining and recruiting police were other top issues identified in our 
analysis. These topics are discussed elsewhere in this report. 

[48] GAO is currently performing a separate review of U.S. efforts to 
reform the Afghan Ministry of Interior and National Police. 

[49] Defense documents indicate that the Afghan border police will also 
eventually be reconstituted through the Focused District Development 
initiative; however, according to a Defense official, it is uncertain 
when such efforts will begin. 

[50] Defense documents indicate that in addition to being trained, a 
district police force undergoing Focused District Development will also 
have corrupt leaders replaced by nationally vetted ones, receive new 
salaries on parity with Afghan army salary rates, and have electronic 
funds transfer accounts established. Defense has also identified 
development of the Afghan justice system as a goal of Focused District 
Development. 

[51] According to State, the first cycle of training at the regional 
training centers was completed in February. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-801SP]. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: [email protected]: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

*** End of document. ***