Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats  
Are Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost  
and Longer Term Sustainability Is Unknown (23-JUN-08,		 
GAO-08-660).							 
                                                                 
The Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats are used for a number of 
missions, such as enforcement of fisheries laws, and the	 
interdiction of migrants and illicit drugs. As part of the Coast 
Guard's initial plans to replace many of its vessels, it intended
to convert its 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats  
with increased capabilities until the replacement vessel, the	 
Fast Response Cutter (FRC), became operational. However,	 
structural problems on the eight converted 123-foot boats led the
Coast Guard to remove these boats from service. Faced with a loss
of operational hours, especially in the Coast Guard's		 
Florida-based District 7 where these boats operated, the Coast	 
Guard implemented mitigation strategies to recover lost 	 
operational hours. This report provides information on Coast	 
Guard patrol boat operations and, in particular, addresses: (1)  
operational challenges created by the removal from service of the
123-foot patrol boats and the Coast Guard's strategies for	 
mitigating their loss; (2) effects these mitigation strategies	 
have had on overall Coast Guard operational hours, as well as	 
operating and maintenance costs, patrol boat crews, and mission  
performance; and (3) issues that could affect the sustainability 
of these strategies. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed data and  
other documentation on patrol boat operations and mitigation	 
strategies, and interviewed Coast Guard officials.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-660 					        
    ACCNO:   A82480						        
  TITLE:     Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol
Boats Are Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a 
Cost and Longer Term Sustainability Is Unknown			 
     DATE:   06/23/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Agency missions					 
	     Coast Guard personnel				 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Continuity of operations				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Losses						 
	     Maintenance (upkeep)				 
	     Maintenance costs					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military training					 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Mission essential operations			 
	     Municipal governments				 
	     Naval operations					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Ships						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Operations and maintenance costs			 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Coast Guard Deepwater Project			 
	     Fast Response Cutter				 

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GAO-08-660

   

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Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast 
Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

June 2008: 

Coast Guard: 

Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats Are Achieving 
Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost and Longer Term 
Sustainability Is Unknown: 

GAO-08-660: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-660, a report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, 
Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Coast Guardï¿½s 110-foot patrol boats are used for a number of 
missions, such as enforcement of fisheries laws, and the interdiction 
of migrants and illicit drugs. As part of the Coast Guard's initial 
plans to replace many of its vessels, it intended to convert its 110-
foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats with increased 
capabilities until the replacement vessel, the Fast Response Cutter 
(FRC), became operational. However, structural problems on the eight 
converted 123-foot boats led the Coast Guard to remove these boats from 
service. Faced with a loss of operational hours, especially in the 
Coast Guardï¿½s Florida-based District 7 where these boats operated, the 
Coast Guard implemented mitigation strategies to recover lost 
operational hours. 

This report provides information on Coast Guard patrol boat operations 
and, in particular, addresses: (1) operational challenges created by 
the removal from service of the 123-foot patrol boats and the Coast 
Guardï¿½s strategies for mitigating their loss; (2) effects these 
mitigation strategies have had on overall Coast Guard operational 
hours, as well as operating and maintenance costs, patrol boat crews, 
and mission performance; and (3) issues that could affect the 
sustainability of these strategies. 

To conduct its work, GAO analyzed data and other documentation on 
patrol boat operations and mitigation strategies, and interviewed Coast 
Guard officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The removal from service of eight 123-foot patrol boats in November 
2006 created operational challenges by reducing patrol boat operational 
hours across the Coast Guard and exacerbating an existing gap between 
the Coast Guardï¿½s operational hour target for its fleet of patrol boats 
and what it was achieving. To mitigate the loss of the District 7-based 
123-foot patrol boats and their associated operational hours in fiscal 
year 2007 and beyond, the Coast Guard implemented a number of 
strategies. These mitigation strategies include: using the crews from 
the eight patrol boats removed from service to augment the crews of 
eight District 7-based patrol boats (i.e., double-crewing); 
periodically deploying vessels from other districts to perform missions 
in District 7; increasing the operational hours of 87-foot patrol boats 
in District 7; and acquiring four new 87-foot patrol boats, among 
others. 

The mitigation strategies have had a number of impacts on Coast Guard 
operationsï¿½both positive and negative. On the positive side, these 
strategies collectively provided approximately 21,000 additional 
operational hours to District 7 in fiscal year 2007, and are projected 
to provide additional operational hours in future years. On the 
negative side, these strategies have increased operating and 
maintenance costs; reduced the availability for some on-board crew 
training; and affected the performance of some missions, such as 
fisheries enforcement, in districts providing vessel support to 
District 7. 

Several issues, such as greater resource and maintenance needs, can 
affect the longer-term sustainability of the mitigation strategies. The 
Coast Guard notes that sustainment of the operational hour gains it 
achieved through double-crewing patrol boats is dependent, in large 
part, on continued funding at current levels. Similarly, any 
operational hour gains it plans to achieve by revising the patrol boat 
maintenance and upgrade project could be impacted by any reductions in 
funding. Sustaining the mitigation strategies is also dependent on the 
Coast Guardï¿½s continued ability to delay performing certain missions in 
some districts to increase mission performance in District 7. Finally, 
any potential delays in the delivery of the replacement FRC vessel, 
expected in 2010, will make sustainment more difficult. The Department 
of Homeland Security, of which the Coast Guard is a component, 
concurred with our report. 

Figure: One of the Coast Guardï¿½s 110-foot Patrol Boats: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of one of the Coast Guardï¿½s 110-foot Patrol Boats. 

Source: Photo courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard. 

[End of figure] 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-660]. For more 
information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-8777 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Loss of Patrol Boats Has Exacerbated the Coast Guard's Operational Hour 
Shortage, and the Coast Guard Has Implemented a Number of Strategies to 
Mitigate This Loss: 

The Coast Guard's Mitigation Strategies Have Replaced Some Lost 
Operational Hours, but Have Adversely Affected Coast Guard Resources 
and the Performance of Some Missions: 

Several Issues, Including Greater Resource and Maintenance Needs, Could 
Affect Longer Term Sustainability of Mitigation Strategies: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Number of 110-foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S. 
Coast Guard District: 

Appendix III: Periodic Deployment of Vessels from Other Districts to 
District 7, Fiscal Year 2007: 

Appendix IV: Condition Measures for the Coast Guard's Eight Double-
crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007: 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Information on the Vessel Classes Used to Provide Operational 
Hours in District 7 to Offset the Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats: 

Table 2: The Coast Guard's Homeland Security and Nonhomeland Security 
Missions: 

Table 3: Operational Hour Increases Resulting from the Strategies to 
Mitigate the Loss of the 123-Foot Patrol Boats in District 7: 

Table 4: Information on Periodic Vessel Deployments to District 7 and 
the Estimated Impacts on the Donating Districts' Missions During Fiscal 
Year 2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Locations of the Coast Guard's Area Commands and Districts: 

Figure 2: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for All 
Coast Guard 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007: 

Figure 3: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for 
District 7 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007: 

Figure 4: Contributions of 110-foot and 123-foot Patrol Boats and 179- 
foot Patrol Coastals Toward Meeting the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat 
Operational Hour Targets during Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007: 

Figure 5: Impact of the Mitigation Strategies on Replacing 123-foot 
Patrol Boat Operational Hours for Fiscal Year 2007: 

Figure 6: Domestic Patrol Boat Operational Hours Coast Guard-wide, 
Including Mitigation Strategy Contributions, Fiscal Years 2003 through 
2007: 

Figure 7: Number of 110-Foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S. Coast 
Guard District: 

Figure 8: Periodic Deployment of Area and District Vessels from Other 
Districts and Joint Interagency Task Force-South to District 7 in 
Fiscal Year 2007: 

Figure 9: Capacity for Double-Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal 
Years 2004 through 2007: 

Figure 10: Unscheduled Maintenance Days (UMD) for Double-Crewed 110- 
foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007: 

Figure 11: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC) for Double- 
Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007: 

Figure 12: Average Number of Casualties per Operational Day (ANOCOP) 
for Double-crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 
2007: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 23, 2008: 

The Honorable Maria Cantwell: 
Chair: 
The Honorable Olympia Snowe: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats serve as key assets for a 
number of Coast Guard missions, particularly living marine resources, 
ports, waterways, and coastal security, and the interdiction of illicit 
drugs and undocumented migrants. In 2002, as part of the Coast Guard's 
initial plan to replace or modernize existing aircraft, vessels, and 
information management capabilities--also known as the Deepwater 
Program--the Coast Guard intended to convert all 49 of its aging and 
deteriorating 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats with 
increased capabilities. This conversion was to serve as a bridging 
strategy until a replacement vessel, the Fast Response Cutter (FRC), 
became operational. Conversion of the first eight 110-foot patrol boats 
began in February 2003; however, hull buckling and other structural 
problems among the eight converted patrol boats led the Coast Guard to 
first impose operating restrictions and then, ultimately, halt all 
future patrol boat conversions in June 2005. As the 123-foot patrol 
boats continued to experience structural and mechanical problems 
leading to operational and safety concerns, the Coast Guard decided to 
remove all eight of the 123-foot patrol boats from service in November 
2006. Then, in April 2007, the Coast Guard announced its decision to 
permanently decommission these patrol boats. 

Because all of the converted patrol boats that were removed from 
service came from one district--District 7, based in Miami, Florida, 
and generally covering the coasts and adjacent waters of South 
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Puerto Rico--the Coast Guard was faced 
with a loss of operational hours in that district, leading it to 
develop strategies for mitigating the loss of these patrol boats' 
operational hours until the replacement vessel, the FRC, is delivered 
and becomes operational.[Footnote 1] According to the Coast Guard, the 
first FRC is currently anticipated to be delivered in late fiscal year 
2010. 

This report, prepared at your request, examines Coast Guard patrol boat 
operations and the actions taken to mitigate the loss of patrol boat 
operational hours brought about by the removal from service of the 
eight 123-foot patrol boats. Specifically, this report addresses: 

* the operational challenges created by the removal from service of the 
123-foot patrol boats, and strategies the Coast Guard has implemented 
to mitigate these challenges; 

* effects these mitigation strategies have had on overall Coast Guard 
operational hours, as well as operating and maintenance costs, patrol 
boat crews, and mission performance; and: 

* issues that could affect the sustainability of these mitigation 
strategies. 

In conducting our work, we analyzed reports, memoranda, operational 
hour data, relevant asset condition measures, and other documentation 
on Coast Guard patrol boat operations and mitigation strategies. Part 
of our analyses included a review of the types of vessels the Coast 
Guard has in its fleet that have been used to mitigate the loss of 123- 
foot patrol boat operational hours. Table 1 details some of the 
operating characteristics of the 110-foot patrol boats, the 87-foot 
coastal patrol boats, and 179-foot patrol coastals on loan from the 
Navy, which have all been used to assist District 7 in fulfilling its 
mission requirements.[Footnote 2] 

Table 1: Information on the Vessel Classes Used to Provide Operational 
Hours in District 7 to Offset the Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats: 

This table includes photographs of each vessel type. 

Capability: 87-foot coastal patrol boat; 
Number in fleet: 65; 
Crew size: 1 officer or officer in charge, 9 enlisted; 
Maximum speed: 25 knots; 
Endurance[A]: 3 days; 
Fuel capacity: 2,800 gallons; 
Missions: 
* Search and rescue; 
* Marine environmental protection; 
* Ports, waterways, and coastal security; 
* Migrant interdiction; 
* Counter drug; 
* Living marine resources. 

Capability: 110-foot patrol boat; 
Number in fleet: 41; 
Crew size: 2 officers, 14 enlisted; 
Maximum speed: 30 knots; 
Endurance[A]: 5 days; 
Fuel capacity: 10,380 gallons; 
Missions: 
* Search and rescue; 
* Marine environmental protection; 
* Ports, waterways, and coastal security; 
* Migrant interdiction; 
* Counter drug; 
* Living marine resources; 
* Defense readiness. 

Capability: 179-foot patrol coastal; 
Number in fleet: 5; 
Crew size: 2 officers, 24 enlisted; 
Maximum speed: 35+ knots; 
Endurance[A]: 10 days; 
Fuel capacity: 14,500 gallons, plus 5,632 additional reserve; 
Missions: 
* Search and rescue; 
* Marine environmental protection; 
* Ports, waterways, and coastal security; 
* Migrant interdiction; 
* Counter drug; 
* Living marine resources; 
* Defense readiness. 

Source: U. S. coast Guard. 

[A] Endurance is the total amount of time a vessel is capable of 
patrolling with the amount of fuel, food, and water that it carries on 
board. 

Note: Photographs were located on the U.S. Coast Guard Pier System Web 
site and U.S. Coast Guard Visual Information Server, both of which 
provide photographs for public use. The 87-foot patrol boat photo was 
taken by PA2 Tiffany Powell, and the 110-foot patrol boat photo was 
taken by Petty Officer 3rd Class David R. Marin. 

[End of table] 

In addition to our data analyses, we also interviewed Coast Guard 
officials responsible for managing patrol boat operations, developing 
and implementing mitigation strategies, and gathering and reporting 
data on patrol boat condition measures. Specifically, we met with 
officials from the Coast Guard's headquarters and various field 
locations who have either developed and implemented mitigation 
strategies, experienced the loss of the 123-foot patrol boats, or 
deployed vessels to assist District 7 in achieving its operational 
missions. 

To assess the reliability of the operational hour and vessel condition 
data obtained from the Coast Guard, we questioned knowledgeable 
officials about the data and the systems that produced the data and 
performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and 
completeness. On the basis of our assessments, we determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 
Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in greater detail. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through June 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 
based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

The removal from service of the Coast Guard's eight 123-foot patrol 
boats in November 2006 created operational challenges by reducing 
patrol boat operational hours and exacerbating a gap between the Coast 
Guard's operational hour target for its patrol boat fleet and what it 
was achieving, so the Coast Guard implemented six strategies to 
mitigate the loss of these operational hours. The Coast Guard 
originally established a target of 99,400 operational hours that would 
be provided by new vessels as part of the Deepwater program based on 
the capacity of its 110-foot patrol boat fleet in 1998. However, since 
fiscal year 2000, the Coast Guard has fallen short of this target, with 
operational hours declining from approximately 88,000 domestic 110-foot 
patrol boat operational hours in fiscal year 2003 to 63,000 hours in 
fiscal year 2006. The 123-foot patrol boats--all of which were 
stationed in District 7--had provided approximately 10,000 operational 
hours in fiscal year 2006, and had a total operational hour target of 
20,000 hours. In an effort to mitigate the loss of the 123-foot patrol 
boats and their associated operational hours, the Coast Guard 
implemented a number of strategies to replace the lost operational 
hours in District 7, for fiscal year 2007 and future years. These 
mitigation strategies included (1) using the crews from the eight 123- 
foot patrol boats that had been removed from service to augment the 
existing crews of eight 110-foot patrol boats in District 7, thereby 
providing two crews that can alternate time operating each of the eight 
patrol boats (i.e., double crewing); (2) periodically deploying vessels 
from other districts to perform missions in District 7; (3) retaining 
the use of three Navy patrol boats through September 2011, (4) 
increasing the operational hours of each of the 87-foot patrol boats in 
District 7; (5) acquiring four new 87-foot patrol boats to be stationed 
in District 7 beginning in September 2008; and (6) shortening the 
amount of time to conduct a maintenance and upgrade project on 110-foot 
patrol boats so that fewer are off-line at any one time. 

The mitigation strategies implemented by the Coast Guard have had a 
number of impacts on operational hours, operating and maintenance 
costs, patrol boat crews, and mission performance, both positive and 
negative. On the positive side, these mitigation strategies 
collectively added approximately 21,000 operational hours to District 7 
in fiscal year 2007. Its mitigation strategy to double crew eight 110- 
foot patrol boats, for example, added approximately 5,200 of the 21,000 
operational hours. While these mitigation strategies have replaced lost 
operational hours to District 7 in fiscal year 2007, and are projected 
to provide additional operational hours in future years, they have also 
had some negative effects Coast Guard-wide, in terms of operating and 
maintenance costs, crew training, and mission performance. For 
instance, double crewing the eight 110-foot patrol boats increased 
operations, fuel, and maintenance costs by approximately $2.6 million 
over a 1-year period. Additional operating and maintenance costs for 
implementing these mitigation strategies include (1) $10.5 million 
annually to extend the use of three Navy 179-foot patrol coastals for 3 
years through fiscal year 2011; (2) $0.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to 
support efforts to increase the operational hours of the 87-foot patrol 
boats in District 7; (3) $30 million in fiscal year 2008 to acquire 
four new 87-foot patrol boats, plus an additional $7 million to $9 
million annually to operate; and (4) $8 million to shorten the duration 
of the maintenance and upgrade project for the 110-foot patrol boat 
fleet. While the patrol boat crews in District 7 have generally held a 
positive view of double crewing in terms of the reduced number of 
operational hours for each crew and the enhanced maintenance support, 
officers from two of the four double-crewed patrol boats we spoke with 
said that this strategy has resulted in less time for certain training 
that crews can only complete while they have access to a vessel. 
Finally, given the Coast Guard's limited assets, increasing the 
operational hours in District 7 has reduced the operational hours in 
some other districts and has adversely affected the performance of some 
missions in other districts. For example, officials from districts that 
periodically deploy some of their vessels to District 7 told us that 
this has challenged their ability to fully enforce domestic fishing 
laws and regulations in their own districts. 

While the mitigation strategies the Coast Guard has implemented are 
achieving results in the near-term, the Coast Guard faces a number of 
issues, such as greater resource and maintenance needs, that could 
potentially affect its ability to sustain these strategies for the 
longer-term. First, according to the Coast Guard, the continued 
operation of District 7's eight double-crewed patrol boats for a higher 
number of operational hours will depend largely on the success and 
funding of its augmented maintenance support program. Second, any 
unexpected delays or reductions in funding in the maintenance and 
upgrade project for its 110-foot patrol boats could potentially result 
in some patrol boats remaining in maintenance longer, thus further 
reducing the number of available operational hours. Potential delays 
are a valid concern given that the maintenance and upgrade project for 
two of the five patrol boats completed to date were extended beyond the 
originally scheduled dates. The Coast Guard is also challenged to 
determine the extent to which it can continue to sacrifice or delay the 
performance of certain missions in some districts to bolster mission 
performance in District 7. Further, while the Coast Guard is using $30 
million it was appropriated via emergency supplemental appropriations 
in 2007[Footnote 3] to mitigate its patrol boat operational hour gap to 
purchase four new 87-foot patrol boats that are to be operational in 
fiscal year 2009, these boats are not as capable as the 110-foot patrol 
boats. Thus, longer-term sustainability of the mitigation strategies 
will be more difficult if the Coast Guard faces any potential delays 
beyond 2010 in acquiring and deploying the first FRCs. Finally, these 
mitigation strategies are being implemented at the same time that the 
Coast Guard is also facing expanding requirements across various Coast 
Guard missions that will require additional resources. For example, in 
March 2008, we testified that the Coast Guard is facing a need to hire 
and train new staff for a variety of maritime security missions. 
[Footnote 4] 

We provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard for review. In an e-mail 
received June 11, 2008, the DHS liaison stated that DHS concurred with 
the report. The U.S. Coast Guard provided written technical comments 
that were incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Background: 

Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard and Its 110-foot Patrol Boats: 

The Coast Guard is an Armed Service of the United States and the only 
military organization within DHS. It is the principle federal agency 
responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental 
stewardship through multimission resources, authorities, and 
capabilities. In its fiscal year 2009 posture statement, the Coast 
Guard reported having over 49,100 full-time positions--about 42,000 
military and 7,100 civilians. In addition, the agency reported that it 
has about 8,100 reservists who support the national military strategy 
or provide additional operational support and surge capacity during 
times of emergency, such as natural disasters. The Coast Guard also 
reported that it uses the services of about 29,000 volunteer auxiliary 
personnel who conduct a wide array of activities, ranging from search 
and rescue to boating safety education. As discussed earlier, the Coast 
Guard's two major commands (Pacific Area and Atlantic Area) are 
organized into nine districts which, in turn, are organized into 35 
sectors that are responsible for the command and control of field units 
and resources. Figure 1 shows the locations of the Coast Guard's Area 
Commands and districts. 

Figure 1: Locations of the Coast Guard's Area Commands and Districts: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the United States depicting the locations of 
the Coast Guard's Area Commands and Districts. The following specific 
locations are noted: 

Headquarters: 
Washington, DC. 

District One: Atlantic area; 
District office: Boston, MA. 

District 5: Atlantic area; 
District and area office: Portsmouth, VA. 

District 7: Atlantic area; 
District office: Miami, FL. 

District 8: Atlantic area; 
District office: New Orleans, LA. 

District 9: Atlantic area; 
District Office: Cleveland, OH. 

District 11: Pacific area; 
District and area office: Alameda, CA. 

District 13: Pacific area; 
District office: Seattle, WA. 

District 14: Pacific area; 
District office: Honolulu, HA. 

District 17: Pacific area; 
District office: Juneau, AK. 

Source: GAO (map art, analysis); MapResources (map); U.S. Coast Guard 
(data). 

[End of figure] 

The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under two broad 
missions--homeland security and nonhomeland security. The Coast Guard 
responsibilities are further divided into 11 programs, as shown in 
table 2. 

Table 2: The Coast Guard's Homeland Security and Nonhomeland Security 
Missions: 

Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: Ports, 
waterways, and coastal security; 
Program activities and functions: Conducting harbor patrols, 
vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and 
other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage 
from attacks that occur. 

Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: Migrant 
interdiction; 
Program activities and functions: Deploying cutters and aircraft to 
reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the United States by 
maritime routes. 

Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: Defense 
readiness; 
Program activities and functions: Participating with the Department of 
Defense (DOD) in global military operations, deploying cutters and 
other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force mobilization 
operations. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Search and 
rescue; 
Program activities and functions: Operating multimission stations and a 
national distress and response communication system, conducting search 
and rescue operations for mariners in distress. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Living 
marine resources; 
Program activities and functions: Enforcing domestic fishing laws and 
regulations through inspections and fishery patrols. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Aids to 
navigation; 
Program activities and functions: Managing U.S. waterways and providing 
a safe, efficient, and navigable marine transportation system, 
maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids, monitoring marine 
traffic through vessel traffic service centers. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Ice 
operations; 
Program activities and functions: Conducting polar operations to 
facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in support of 
scientific and national security activity, conducting domestic 
icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round commerce, conducting 
international ice operations to track icebergs below the 48th north 
latitude. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Marine 
environmental protection; 
Program activities and functions: Preventing and responding to marine 
oil and chemical spills, preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and 
garbage in U.S. waters, preventing biological invasions by aquatic 
nuisance species. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Marine 
safety; 
Program activities and functions: Setting standards and conducting 
vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers and crew 
aboard commercial vessels, partnering with states and boating safety 
organizations to reduce recreational boating deaths. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Drug 
interdiction; 
Program activities and functions: Deploying cutters and aircraft in 
high drug-trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to reduce the 
flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes. 

Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Other law 
enforcement; 
Program activities and functions: Protecting U.S. fishing grounds by 
ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally harvest U.S. fish 
stocks. (Note: Prior to fiscal year 2005, the Other Law Enforcement 
mission area contained the Enforcement of Laws and Treaties-Other 
employment category which captured those law enforcement activities 
that did not fall under drug interdiction, fisheries enforcement, or 
migration interdiction operations). 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

[End of table] 

The Coast Guard uses its 110-foot patrol boats to perform a wide 
variety of missions, most notably interdiction of illicit drugs and 
undocumented migrants; defense operations (via six selected patrol 
boats deployed to the Persian Gulf); ports, waterways, and coastal 
security; and living marine resources (i.e., enforcement of domestic 
fishing laws and regulations). The 110-foot patrol boats have 
traditionally each had an annual operational hour ceiling of 1,800 
hours,[Footnote 5] except for those stationed ("homeported") in 
District 7 (Miami, Florida), which are supported by maintenance 
augmentation teams to support an operational hour ceiling of up to 
2,200 hours per year.[Footnote 6] Figures 2 and 3 show the operational 
hours provided by the 110-foot patrol boat fleet, by mission, for 
fiscal years 2003 through 2007, both Coast Guard-wide and in District 7 
only. 

Figure 2: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for All 
Coast Guard 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Defense readiness: 23.26%; 
Migrant interdiction: 21.59%; 
Living marine resource: 18%; 
Ports, waterways, and coastal security: 12.15%; 
Drug interdiction: 10.3%; 
Support: 8.93%; 
Other: 5.77%. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data). 

Notes: "Other" includes the following missions: 
Other law enforcement (foreign fisheries enforcement): 2.52%; 
Search and rescue: 2.37%; 
Marine safety: 0.82%; 
Aids to navigation: 0.03%; 
Marine environmental protection: 0.03%. 

The Support mission includes training; public affairs; and cooperation 
with federal, state, and local agencies. 

The Defense readiness hours include the six patrol boats operating in 
the Persian Gulf. These vessels account for 96.92 percent of the total 
110-foot patrol boat Defense readiness hours for fiscal years 2003- 
2007. 

While this chart shows the percentage of total operational hours logged 
by the 110-foot patrol boats over a 5-year period, there can be 
significant year-to-year variation in operational hour totals due to 
shifting mission priorities, the use of other vessels in filling 
certain missions, and other factors. 

In conducting missions, Coast Guard vessels log the amount of 
operational hours deployed by mission while on patrol. However, the 
Coast Guard's system for tracking operational hours only captures hours 
logged in support of the primary mission that a vessel conducts while 
on patrol; thus, any secondary missions that may have been performed on 
a patrol by these multimission vessels would not necessarily be 
reflected in operational hour data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for 
District 7 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Migrant interdiction: 47.01%;
Drug interdiction: 17.84%; 
Defense readiness: 16.34%; 
Other: 9.64%; 
Support: 9.17%. 

Notes: "Other" includes the following missions: 
Living marine resources: 3.45%; 
Other law enforcement (foreign fisheries enforcement): 2.70%; 
Search and rescue: 1.86%; 
Ports, waterways, and coastal security: 1.14%; 
Marine safety: 0.46%; 
Aids to navigation: 0.03%. 

The Support mission includes training; public affairs; and cooperation 
with federal, state, and local agencies. 

The Defense readiness hours include the two District 7 patrol boats 
operating in the Persian Gulf. These two patrol boats account for 96.7 
percent of all District 7 110-foot patrol boat Defense readiness hours. 

While this chart shows the percentage of total operational hours logged 
by the 110-foot patrol boats over a 5-year period, there can be 
significant year-to-year variation in operational hour totals due to 
shifting mission priorities, the use of other vessels in filling 
certain missions, and other factors. 

In conducting missions, Coast Guard vessels log the amount of 
operational hours deployed by mission while on patrol. However, the 
Coast Guard's system for tracking operational hours only captures hours 
logged in support of the primary mission that a vessel conducts while 
on patrol; thus, any secondary missions that may have been performed on 
a patrol by these multimission vessels would not necessarily be 
reflected in operational hour data. 

[End of figure] 

Evolution of the Deepwater Program: 

The Coast Guard began the Deepwater program in the mid-1990s as the 
largest acquisition program in the Coast Guard's history and it has 
evolved over time in terms of the mix and number of assets to be 
acquired, and the schedule for delivery. The Deepwater program involves 
modernizing and acquiring a number of aircraft; vessels; and command, 
control, communications, computer, intelligence surveillance, and 
reconnaissance systems to improve the Coast Guard's ability to achieve 
its variety of missions. Rather than using a traditional acquisition 
approach of replacing individual classes of legacy vessels and aircraft 
through a series of individual acquisitions, the Coast Guard chose a 
system-of-systems strategy that would replace the legacy assets with a 
single, integrated package.[Footnote 7] To carry out this acquisition, 
the Coast Guard awarded the competitive contract to a systems 
integrator, which for the Deepwater program, was a contractor composed 
of two major companies acting as a joint venture, responsible for 
designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and integrating the 
various assets to meet projected Deepwater operational requirements at 
the lowest possible costs, either directly or through subcontractors. 
However, after experiencing a number of management challenges under the 
systems integrator approach, the Coast Guard has recognized that it 
needs to increase government oversight and has begun to transfer system 
integration and program management responsibilities back to the Coast 
Guard. Our prior reports on the Deepwater program are listed in the 
Related GAO Products section at the end of this report. 

The Coast Guard currently operates 41 110-foot patrol boats that will 
ultimately be replaced under the Deepwater program. Of the 41 110-foot 
patrol boats in the Coast Guard's fleet, 28 are homeported in districts 
within the Atlantic Area Command's area of responsibility (17 of those 
in District 7), while the remaining 13 are homeported in districts 
within the Pacific Area Command's area of responsibility. See appendix 
II for further details on the location of the Coast Guard's 110-foot 
patrol boat fleet. 

Conversion of 110-foot Patrol Boats to 123-foot Patrol Boats: 

Between January 2001 and November 2006, numerous events contributed to 
the difficulties the Coast Guard experienced with its strategy to 
convert its legacy 110-foot patrol boats into more capable 123-foot 
patrol boats. In January 2001, an independent study found that the 110- 
foot patrol boats based in south Florida and Puerto Rico were 
experiencing severe hull corrosion and that their structural integrity 
was deteriorating rapidly.[Footnote 8] To address these structural 
issues, the Coast Guard's original (2002) Deepwater plan included a 
strategy to convert all of its fleet of then 49 110-foot patrol boats 
into 123-foot patrol boats to repair the hulls and provide additional 
capabilities, such as small boat launch-and-recovery capabilities from 
a stern ramp; and enhanced and improved command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. The first patrol boat conversion was completed in March 
2004, on the Matagorda, with additional post-delivery maintenance 
taking place from May through September 2004. 

Despite the additional maintenance, however, the Matagorda and other 
converted 123-foot patrol boats experienced structural and operational 
problems that ultimately led to their removal from service in late 
2006. On September 10, 2004, while in transit from Key West to Miami, 
Florida, to evade a hurricane, the Matagorda experienced hull and deck 
buckling. By March 2005, five other converted 123-foot patrol boats 
also began experiencing similar hull deformations. As a result of 
structural deformations experienced on these five converted patrol 
boats, in April 2005, the Coast Guard imposed operational restrictions 
on all of its 123-foot patrol boats, which it had previously lifted 
after completing a structural upgrade developed and installed after the 
September 2004 Matagorda hull and deck buckling. These restrictions 
specified that the converted patrol boats could not operate and were 
required to return to port in seas with wave heights exceeding 8 feet 
(they were originally intended to operate in seas up to roughly 13 
feet) and that they had to operate at reduced speeds for any seas 
greater than 3 to 4 feet. In June 2005, due to continued problems with 
the hulls and their inability to meet post-9/11 mission requirements, 
the Coast Guard halted the 123-foot patrol boat conversions. Despite 
the operational restrictions in place, a number of the converted 123- 
foot patrol boats continued to experience hull and deck buckling and 
other issues affecting operational capabilities, leading the Coast 
Guard to ultimately remove all eight boats from service on November 30, 
2006, because of continued operational and safety concerns. Then, on 
April 17, 2007, the Coast Guard announced its decision to permanently 
decommission the 123-foot patrol boats. 

Patrol Boat Sustainment Efforts: 

Prior to and during the patrol boat conversions, the Coast Guard took 
measures to strengthen the condition of its patrol boat fleet. 
Specifically, in 2002, the Coast Guard initiated its Hull Sustainment 
Project as an extended drydock developed to target the deteriorating 
hulls of its 110-foot patrol boats. As time went on, the Hull 
Sustainment Project grew to include other work beyond hull replacement 
and its name was changed to the Hull Bridging Sustainment Project. From 
March 2002 to June 2006, 11 of the 110-foot patrol boats went through 
the Hull Bridging Sustainment Project. 

In April 2006, in an effort to mitigate increased maintenance hours and 
costs, the Coast Guard initiated the Mission Effectiveness Project 
(MEP) for the 110-foot patrol boats. The MEP was designed to modernize 
or replace obsolete and unsupportable hull, mechanical, and electrical 
equipment--such as hull plating and underwater appendages, pumps, 
motors, piping, generators, and power distribution equipment. The Coast 
Guard plans to induct a total of 20 110-foot patrol boats into the MEP 
through February 2013.[Footnote 9] As of May 2008, five 110-foot patrol 
boats have completed the MEP. Through fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard 
has been funded a total of $109.7 million for this initiative and 
estimates that it will need an additional $56.3 million through fiscal 
year 2012, for a total estimated MEP cost of $166 million.[Footnote 10] 

Development and Procurement of the FRC: 

The ultimate long-term replacement for the 110-foot patrol boat fleet, 
the FRC, has experienced challenges in its development. The FRC, 
originally envisioned as a 140-foot cutter built largely of composite 
materials rather than steel, was initially scheduled to be delivered 
beginning in 2018.[Footnote 11] In light of the problems encountered 
with the patrol boat conversions in 2005, the Coast Guard accelerated 
the design and delivery of the first FRC to 2007. However, in February 
2006, design work on a composite-hulled FRC was suspended due to design 
risks, including excessive weight and horsepower requirements compared 
with standard patrol boats.[Footnote 12] 

To address the FRC delays, the Coast Guard elected to move ahead with a 
dual path approach. First, the Coast Guard plans to acquire a 
commercial "off-the-shelf" patrol boat design (the FRC-B) that it can 
modify to meet its requirements. In June 2007, the Coast Guard issued a 
Request for Proposals for the FRC-B, and expects to award the FRC-B 
contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008, with the lead 
vessel to be delivered by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. Coast 
Guard officials have stated that the goal is to acquire 12 FRC-Bs by 
2012 and have the last of these 12 FRC-Bs operational by the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

The second part of the Coast Guard's dual path approach is to acquire a 
redesigned FRC (the FRC-A) that would meet all of its requirements. In 
March 2008, we reported that Coast Guard officials recommended that the 
Coast Guard not pursue acquisition of an FRC-A design that includes 
unproven composite hull technology.[Footnote 13] This recommendation 
was based largely on a third-party analysis that found the composite 
technology unlikely to meet the desired 35-year service life under the 
Coast Guard's operational conditions. Further, officials believe that 
the use of the proposed composite materials would not offset high 
initial acquisition costs, as initially proposed. 

We have reported on the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program, as well as 
related maintenance and operational issues, since 1998. A complete list 
of related GAO products can be found at the end of this report. 

Loss of Patrol Boats Has Exacerbated the Coast Guard's Operational Hour 
Shortage, and the Coast Guard Has Implemented a Number of Strategies to 
Mitigate This Loss: 

For years, the Coast Guard has faced a gap between the expected and 
actual operational hours provided by its fleet of 110-foot and 123-foot 
patrol boats. The loss of the 123-foot patrol boats has only served to 
worsen this gap. As a result of this loss, the Coast Guard implemented 
a number of strategies in fiscal year 2007 designed to mitigate the 
loss of the 123-foot patrol boats and help fill the patrol boat 
operational hour gap. 

Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats Has Heightened the Coast Guard's 
Patrol Boat Operational Hour Gap: 

The loss of the 123-foot patrol boats has exacerbated the existing gap 
between the Coast Guard's operational hour targets for its fleet of 
patrol boats and what it was achieving. In particular, in 1998, the 
Coast Guard established an annual target of 99,400 operational hours to 
achieve from its then fleet of 49 110-foot patrol boats. Then, in 2004, 
the Coast Guard updated its annual patrol boat operational hour target 
to 174,000 hours based on its plan to achieve 3,000 operational hours 
from each of the 58 new Fast Response Cutters to be deployed as part of 
the Deepwater Program.[Footnote 14] Data provided by the Coast Guard 
show that since fiscal year 2000, the Coast Guard has fallen short of 
both target levels, with domestic 110-foot patrol boat operational 
hours declining from approximately 87,719 hours in fiscal year 2003 to 
63,318 hours in fiscal year 2006, before increasing slightly in fiscal 
year 2007, as shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: Contributions of 110-foot and 123-foot Patrol Boats and 179- 
foot Patrol Coastals Toward Meeting the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat 
Operational Hour Targets during Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked line chart depicting the following data: 

1998 target: 99,400 hours; 
2004 revised target: 174,000 hours; 
Operational hour gap: difference between actual operational hours and 
target levels. 

Year: 2003; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 87,719 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 0 operational hours. 
179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours. 

Year: 2004; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 75,654 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 251 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours. 

Year: 2005; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 64,821 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 7,184 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 9,004 operational hours. 

Year: 2006; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 63,318 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 10,749 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 10,728 operational hours. 

Year: 2007; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 66,603 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 2,165 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 13,396 operational hours. 

Notes: 

This figure excludes the operational hours of 110-foot patrol boats 
currently deployed to the Persian Gulf. 

The 1998 target (99,400 hours) refers to the patrol boat operational 
hour target, as defined by the Coast Guard, that was used as the 
original basis for patrol boat capacity replacement under the original 
Deepwater system approach. 

The 2004 revised target is based on the Coast Guard's post-9/11 
reassessment of its patrol boat mission needs. This reassessment 
established a new annual patrol boat target of 174,000 operational 
hours, which the Coast Guard planned to achieve by acquiring 58 FRCs to 
operate 3,000 hours each annually. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to this overall decrease in operational hours by the 110- 
foot patrol boat fleet, the 123-foot patrol boats, when they operated, 
also faced a gap between expected and actual operational hours. 
Specifically, the eight 123-foot patrol boats were expected to 
collectively provide 20,000 annual operational hours. However, due to 
structural and mechanical problems, the 123-foot patrol boats provided 
only about half that target--approximately 10,000 operational hours--in 
fiscal year 2006, the last full fiscal year in which they operated, 
before being removed from service in early fiscal year 2007. 

Two additional factors have affected the patrol boat operational gap 
since fiscal year 2003. First, beginning in March 2003, up to six 110- 
foot patrol boats have contributed to the joint U.S. Navy and Coast 
Guard National Fleet Policy and the Coast Guard's general defense 
mission by operating in the Persian Gulf. Two of these six vessels were 
previously stationed and operating in District 7, while the other four 
were previously based in other Atlantic Area Districts. While these 
vessels have provided operational hours in support of this mission, 
these vessels have not been available to the Coast Guard for planned 
domestic missions. As a result, their loss also contributes to the gap 
in patrol boat operational hours. Second, as many as four 110-foot 
patrol boats have been unavailable at any one time because they were 
undergoing planned maintenance and upgrades as part of the 110-foot 
patrol boat MEP. As discussed earlier, the MEP was implemented in April 
2006 to modernize or replace obsolete and unsupportable hull, 
mechanical, and electrical equipment for select 110-foot patrol boats. 
Going forward, three rather than four 110-foot patrol boats are 
projected to undergo the MEP at any given time through fiscal year 
2013. During this period, at least one vessel in the program is 
expected to be from District 7. 

The loss of the 123-foot patrol boats, when combined with the two 
factors mentioned above, left the Coast Guard--and District 7 in 
particular--about 20,000 operational hours short of the 1998 
operational hour baseline each year from fiscal years 2003 through 
2007. Further, in addition to the loss of operational hours--which the 
Coast Guard has taken steps to mitigate, as discussed later--having 
eight fewer vessels available to perform operations has negative 
effects that are difficult to quantify. For example, having eight fewer 
vessels means that the deterrence factor of having more vessels visible 
on the water is lost, and there are fewer vessels available to surge to 
areas of high demand, if needed. Officials from one District noted that 
the Coast Guard can surge resources well when needed, but having eight 
fewer vessels leaves the Coast Guard "thin to barren" in other areas 
should additional threats emerge. In addition, a Coast Guard official 
has noted that in the event of a major failure (e.g., major hole in the 
hull or the vessel running aground) on one of the double-crewed 110- 
foot patrol boats, the impact would be even greater, as District 7 
would then temporarily lose the services of two patrol boat crews 
rather than just one. 

The Coast Guard Has Implemented a Number of Strategies to Mitigate the 
Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats: 

Upon the removal of the 123-foot patrol boats from service in November 
2006, the Coast Guard took action to implement a number of strategies 
to mitigate the loss of the patrol boats and their operational hours. 
These strategies include the following: 

* Double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats stationed in District 7: 
The double crewing concept began in February 2007 and has become one of 
the most significant strategies in terms of increasing patrol boat 
operational hours in District 7. Under this strategy, the eight crews 
that previously operated each of the 123-foot patrol boats are being 
used to alternate operational time with the crews already operating 
eight 110-foot patrol boats. For example, a St. Petersburg crew will 
operate a 110-foot patrol boat--stationed in St. Petersburg--on a 21- 
day patrol and then bring the vessel into port at Key West, Florida. 
For 7 days, the St. Petersburg crew and maintenance staff will perform 
maintenance on the vessel and prepare it to change command over to the 
Key West-based crew. The Key West-based crew will then operate the 
vessel for 21 days and bring it into port at St. Petersburg, beginning 
the crew rotation cycle again. The Coast Guard implemented this 
strategy expecting to gain additional operational hours from these 110- 
foot patrol boats. During fiscal year 2008, this strategy has evolved 
into what the Coast Guard calls a "high tempo, high maintenance" 
organization for its double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats in District 7. 
The Coast Guard is also using a new approach to contract for major 
maintenance and providing additional staff to conduct patrol boat 
maintenance in support of District 7, to provide a greater level of 
maintenance support to the double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats. 
Specifically, the Coast Guard plans to accelerate the maintenance cycle 
of the double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats by hiring 45 new maintenance 
and engineering support staff.[Footnote 15] The explanatory statement 
[Footnote 16] accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 
directed additional funding in fiscal year 2008 to pilot this more 
intensive maintenance regime.[Footnote 17] The Coast Guard expects that 
this "high tempo, high maintenance" approach will provide an even 
greater number of operational hours than the double-crewing model 
implemented during fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 18] 

* Periodic deployment of vessels from other districts: The Coast 
Guard's Atlantic Area Command coordinated the deployment of a number of 
vessels under its operational command to District 7 in an effort to 
increase operational hours and help meet mission requirements for 
District 7 during fiscal year 2007. Specifically, medium endurance 
cutters and the 179-foot patrol coastals were periodically deployed 
from Districts 1, 5, and 8, and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South 
to District 7's areas of responsibility to increase the available 
operational hours and help perform certain important missions, such as 
interdiction of undocumented migrants.[Footnote 19] In addition, each 
of these districts periodically deployed vessels under its own control-
-such as seagoing buoy tenders and 87-foot patrol boats--to District 7 
to assist in missions, such as undocumented migrant interdiction and 
search and rescue.[Footnote 20] The Coast Guard is continuing to 
implement some of these deployments during fiscal year 2008. 

* Retaining three Navy vessels through fiscal year 2011: The Coast 
Guard renewed an existing Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Navy to 
retain three of the five 179-foot patrol coastal class cutters on loan 
from the Navy through September 2011.[Footnote 21] 

* Increasing the operational hours of some 87-foot patrol boats: As 
another strategy to increase the availability of operational hours, in 
fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard increased the total number of hours 
each of the 11 87-foot patrol boats homeported in District 7 could 
operate annually from 1,800 to 2,000 hours. 

* Procuring four new 87-foot patrol boats: The Coast Guard has procured 
four new 87-foot patrol boats that are to be homeported in District 7. 
The Coast Guard estimates that these new patrol boats will be delivered 
beginning in September 2008, and anticipates operating each of these 
vessels at 1,800 hours per year, for a total of 7,200 hours. 

* Amending the 110-foot patrol boat MEP schedule: The Coast Guard is 
also amending the 110-foot patrol boat MEP schedule to reduce the 
number of patrol boats inducted each year into the MEP from four to 
three hulls and decrease the time of the MEP from 12 to 9 months. 

The Coast Guard's Mitigation Strategies Have Replaced Some Lost 
Operational Hours, but Have Adversely Affected Coast Guard Resources 
and the Performance of Some Missions: 

The mitigation strategies discussed have yielded some positive and 
negative impacts for the Coast Guard to date. On the positive side, 
these strategies have allowed the Coast Guard to recoup approximately 
21,000 operational hours towards replacing lost 123-foot patrol boat 
hours and filling its patrol boat operational hour gap. However, these 
strategies were not without adverse impacts. Particularly, some of 
these strategies have adversely affected operations and maintenance 
costs, time available for crew training, and mission performance in 
districts donating assets to District 7. 

The Coast Guard's Mitigation Strategies Have Provided Operational Hours 
towards the Patrol Boat Operational Hour Gap: 

As detailed in table 3, the mitigation strategies that the Coast Guard 
began to employ in fiscal year 2007 provided approximately 21,000 
additional operational hours toward District 7 operations. 

Table 3: Operational Hour Increases Resulting from the Strategies to 
Mitigate the Loss of the 123-Foot Patrol Boats in District 7: 

Strategy: Double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats in District 7 
(using crews originally on 123-foot patrol boats); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 5,220 hours; (Using February-September 2007 data on total 
operational hours minus District 7 operational hour ceiling); 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 11,200 hours annually; (Based on operational hour ceiling 
increase of 1,400 hours per cutter) under original double-crew 
initiative for fiscal year 2008; However, under the new high tempo, 
high maintenance model that has been adopted, the Coast Guard estimates 
this operational hour gain to be 14,400 hours annually, beginning in 
fiscal year 2009. 

Strategy: Periodic deployment of Area/District assets to District 7, as 
follows:[B,C]; 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 6,521 hours; (Note: these hours were provided at the expense 
of the donor districts, as shown below); 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: N/A for Area assets; The impact of Area asset deployments 
cannot be estimated, as hours were apportioned before fiscal year 2008 
based on district need, whereas for fiscal year 2007, some hours had 
been allotted to districts but were deployed by Atlantic Area in 
support of District 7; District assets: 2,150 hours in fiscal year 
2008. 

Strategy: District 1: Seagoing buoy tender (District asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 500 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: District 1: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 264 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: District 5: Seagoing buoy tender (District asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]:419 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: District 5: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 540 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: District 8: Seagoing buoy tender (District asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 548 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 350 hours in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: District 8: Six Coastal patrol boats (District asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 1,130 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 800 hours in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: District 8: Medium endurance cutters; (Area asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 2,420 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: [Empty]. 

Strategy: District 8: Three U.S. Navy patrol coastals (Area asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 1,608 hours; (Note: These hours are not included in the 
Area/District periodic deployment total, as they are included in the 
"Renewal of Navy MOA" strategy above. These hours in this context 
simply reflect a loss of programmed hours to District 8); 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: [Empty]. 

Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Medium endurance 
cutter; (Area asset); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 700 hours; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: No deployment in fiscal year 2008. 

Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Renewal of Memorandum 
of Agreement with U.S. Navy, to extend the use of three 179-foot patrol 
coastals from September 2008 until Sept 2011.[D]; 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 6,743 hours; (Based on operational hour data. These three 179s 
are homeported in a District 8 homeport, but provided all fiscal year 
2007 hours in support of District 7); 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 7,500 hours annually; (Based on operational hour ceilings of 
2,500 hours for three vessels) from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal 
year 2011. (Note: These are Atlantic Area hours, and thus will likely 
be divided between District 7 and District 8). 

Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Increasing operational 
hour ceilings for 11 District 7 87- foot patrol boats (from 1,800 to 
2,00 hours); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 2,783 hours; (Using June-September 2007 operational hour data 
versus normal operational hour ceilings, as this strategy was formally 
approved on May 30, 2007); 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 2,200 hours; (Increase of 200 hours per vessel for 11 
vessels, assuming this option is carried forward for fiscal year 2008, 
which is still under discussion). 

Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Purchasing of four 
additional 87-foot patrol boats; 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: N/A; The first of these patrol boats is not projected to be 
delivered until September 2008; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 7,200 hours; (Likely not fully until fiscal year 2009, as 
they are being delivered in late fiscal year 2008). 

Strategy: MEP schedule alteration--reducing number of 110-foot patrol 
boats at any time from 4 to 3, and reducing their duration from 12 
months to 9 months; 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: N/A for fiscal year 2007; (Shortened MEP cycle not fully in 
effect until fiscal year 2008); 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 3,000 hours; (The impact of this operational hour gain will 
be spread throughout the Coast Guard, as many other Districts will have 
110-foot patrol boats in the MEP). 

Strategy: Total District 7 gain; 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 21,267; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 33,250 to 36,450[E]. 

Strategy: Net overall gain; (excludes periodic deployment hours); 
Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year 
2007[A]: 14,746; 
Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal 
year 2007: 31,100 to 34,300[E]. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data). 

[A] The Coast Guard allocates resource hours on an annual basis. Some 
figures in this table (estimated increases from double crewing and 
increasing District 7 87-foot patrol boat operational hour ceilings) 
were calculated by dividing annual resource hour allocations evenly 
across all months. It should be noted that actual resource hour usage 
is affected by seasonal factors and therefore, the operational hour 
gains shown would likely be different if seasonal trends (e.g., 
increase in summer recreational boating activity, fishing season) were 
taken into account. 

[B] Certain vessels are under the command of the Area (e.g., high and 
medium endurance cutters, the patrol coastals from the Navy), while 
other vessels (e.g., buoy tenders, patrol boats) are under the command 
of districts. As such, deployment of area assets is dictated by the 
area command, while districts control the deployment and use of their 
own assets. 

[C] Operational hours do not include transit time from the donor 
districts to District 7 for fiscal year 2007. When transit time is 
added, District 1 estimated an additional 96 operational hours lost, 
District 5 estimated an additional 130 operational hours lost, and 
District 8 estimated an additional 599 operational hours lost in fiscal 
year 2007. 

[D] While the extension of the Memorandum of Agreement is considered 
one of the mitigation strategies, the use of the Navy 179-foot patrol 
coastals actually began in fiscal year 2005, with two 179-foot patrol 
coastals in District 8, and two in District 11. One additional 179-foot 
patrol coastal was added in District 8 for fiscal year 2006. While the 
hours received by the 179-foot patrol coastals in fiscal year 2007 were 
not technically a "new" result of the mitigation strategy, they do 
represent additional hours available to the Coast Guard to mitigate the 
loss of patrol boats. Any hours received from fiscal year 2009 forward 
(when the Memorandum of Agreement extension takes effect), could 
technically be considered part of the mitigation strategies. 

[E] The estimated operational hour gains for future years are presented 
as a range, depending on whether the original double-crewing model or 
high tempo, high maintenance model is in effect. 

[End of table] 

More details on the realized and projected operational hour gains of 
these mitigation strategies are as follows: 

* Double crewing of 110-foot patrol boats added 5,220 operational hours 
in District 7 in fiscal year 2007: From February 2007, when the Coast 
Guard formally implemented the double-crewing model on eight 110-foot 
patrol boats, through September 2007, double crewing provided the Coast 
Guard with approximately 5,220 operational hours above the standard 
number of operational hours targeted for District 7 patrol boats for 8 
months. When adopting the double-crewing approach, the Coast Guard 
expected that this strategy would allow it to increase the number of 
annual operational hours from 2,200 to 3,600 per vessel, for a total 
projected increase of 11,200 hours. Conversely, the personnel tempo for 
the crews is reduced, as each crew now operates at 1,800 hours per 
year.[Footnote 22] The 5,220 hour gain fell short of the Coast Guard's 
anticipated gain over an 8-month period, which a Coast Guard official 
attributed to the fact that several of the vessels did not begin double 
crewing until late February or March 2007, and that one of the double- 
crewed vessels was in an extended maintenance period.[Footnote 23] 
However, the high tempo, high maintenance model discussed earlier-- 
which the Coast Guard expects to be fully implemented by the start of 
fiscal year 2009--has increased this operational hour target even 
further. Specifically, the Coast Guard expects that this initiative 
will allow it to operate the eight double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats 
at 4,000 operational hours per year (with each crew providing 2,000 
hours). This projects to a total increase of 3,200 operational hours 
over the original double-crewing approach (400 additional hours for 
eight vessels). Overall, the high tempo, high maintenance model is 
projected to result in a total operational hour gain of 14,400 
operational hours over normal District 7 110-foot patrol boat 
operational hour standards.[Footnote 24] The Coast Guard anticipates 
that this strategy will remain in place until all 12 of the FRC-Bs are 
obtained--which is currently estimated in fiscal year 2012--as long as 
funding remains available in the out years.[Footnote 25] 

* Periodic deployment of vessels from other districts added 6,521 
operational hours in District 7 in fiscal year 2007: As shown in table 
3, the periodic deployment of Area and District assets contributed 
6,521 hours to District 7 operations in fiscal year 2007. Periodic 
deployments of vessels into District 7 from other districts are 
expected to continue in fiscal year 2008. While table 3 provides 
current estimates of these transfers for fiscal year 2007, the 
contributions of Atlantic Area Command assets to District 7 at the 
expense of other Atlantic Area districts in fiscal year 2008 cannot be 
estimated. The Atlantic Area Command already took programmed 
operational hours into account when planning its asset allocation for 
fiscal year 2008. For a graphical representation of the fiscal year 
2007 vessel deployments to District 7, see appendix III. 

* Three Navy vessels added 6,743 operational hours in District 7 in 
fiscal year 2007: The three 179-foot Navy patrol coastals under 
Atlantic Area control provided 6,743 operational hours, all for 
District 7 operations, in fiscal year 2007. The Coast Guard estimates 
that these vessels will annually provide an additional 7,500 
operational hours to the Area Command during fiscal years 2008 through 
2011. In addition to the operational hour gains, Coast Guard analysis 
of the 179-foot patrol coastals indicates that these vessels have 
superior range, speed, and endurance compared to the 110-foot and 123- 
foot patrol boats and are considered outstanding assets to combat 
illegal "go-fast" smuggling vessels that typically run 40+ knots. 
According to one District official, the 179-foot patrol coastals could 
also be used for ports, waterways, and coastal security; living marine 
resources; and other law enforcement missions. The 179-foot patrol 
coastals were used primarily in support of the migrant interdiction 
mission in District 7 in fiscal year 2007. 

* Increasing the operational hour ceiling of some 87-foot patrol boats 
added 2,783 operational hours in District 7 in fiscal year 2007: Adding 
200 hours to the operational hour ceiling of each of the 11 District 7 
87-foot patrol boats would annually add 2,200 operational hours. As 
shown in table 3, the District 7 87-foot patrol boats provided 2,783 
hours above normal operational hour ceilings for the time frame in 
which this strategy was formally approved (i.e., June-September 2007) 
in fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 26] District 7 intends to keep the 2,000 
operational hour ceiling for its 87-foot patrol boats in fiscal year 
2008, but is awaiting approval from the Atlantic Area Command. 

* Procuring four new 87-foot patrol boats may add 7,200 operational 
hours annually in District 7: These four patrol boats, all of which 
will be stationed in District 7, could collectively provide an 
additional 7,200 operational hours annually (i.e., four patrol boats 
operating at 1,800 hours each) to help offset the lost 123-foot patrol 
boat operational hours. 

* Amending the 110-foot patrol boat MEP schedule may add 3,000 
operational hours annually Coast Guard-wide: Amending the MEP schedule 
will reduce both the number of patrol boats in the MEP at any one time, 
as well as the amount of time that the patrol boats spend in the MEP. 
The Coast Guard estimates that this will recoup approximately 3,000 
operational hours per year, but not limited to District 7. Since the 
first vessel to go through the amended MEP was in the program from June 
2007 through February 2008, the amended MEP schedule will not provide 
significant additional operational hours to the Coast Guard until later 
in fiscal year 2008. 

These strategies have provided a number of operational hours to replace 
lost 123-foot patrol boat hours, and in turn, help to fill the Coast 
Guard's patrol boat operational hour gap. Figure 5 shows how the 
mitigation strategies have helped District 7 replace the 123-foot 
patrol boat operational hour target of 20,000 hours in fiscal year 
2007. 

Figure 5: Impact of the Mitigation Strategies on Replacing 123-foot 
Patrol Boat Operational Hours for Fiscal Year 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
123-foot patrol boats target: 20,000 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 6743 operational hours; 
Vessel deployments: 6521 operational hours; 
Double-crewing gains: 5220 operational hours; 
Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 2783 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 2165 operational hours; 
Total: 23,432 operational hours. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Cost Guard (data). 

According to a Coast Guard official, the three 179-foot patrol coastals 
homeported in Pascagoula, Mississippi (District 8) provided all fiscal 
year 2007 operational hours in support of District 7. 

The vessel deployments refer to Area (medium endurance cutters, patrol 
coastals) and District (buoy tenders, patrol boats) vessel deployments 
that were shifted to District 7, primarily in support of the migrant 
interdiction mission, and were done at the expense of the "donor" 
districts. 

[End of figure] 

These mitigation strategies helped District 7 to recover operational 
hours from the loss of the 123-foot patrol boats, and also helped the 
Coast Guard fill some of its overall patrol boat operational hour gap 
in fiscal year 2007, as illustrated in figure 6. However, any hours 
gained from periodic vessel deployments came at the expense of other 
districts in the Coast Guard, and hours gained from additional 87-foot 
patrol boat operations, while important, do not provide as many 
capabilities (e.g., endurance, fuel capacity, crew size) as 110-foot 
patrol boats. 

Figure 6: Domestic Patrol Boat Operational Hours Coast Guard-wide, 
Including Mitigation Strategy Contributions, Fiscal Years 2003 through 
2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a stacked line graph depicting the following data: 

1998 target: 99,400 hours; 
2004 revised target: 174,000 hours; 
Operational hour gap: difference between actual operational hours and 
target levels. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours; 
Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 0 operational hours; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 87,719 operational hours. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours; 
Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 251 operational hours; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 75,654 operational hours. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours; 
Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 9,004 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 7,184 operational hours; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 64821 operational hours. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours; 
Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 10,728 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 10,749 operational hours; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 63,318 operational hours. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 2,783 operational hours; 
Vessel deployments: 6,521 operational hours; 
179-foot patrol coastals: 13,396 operational hours; 
123-foot patrol boats: 2,165 operational hours; 
Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 66,603 operational hours; 

Notes: Any gains from 110-foot patrol boat double crewing are reflected 
in the operational hour totals. 

The vessel deployments refer to Area (medium endurance cutters, patrol 
coastals) and District (buoy tenders, and patrol boats) vessel 
deployments that were shifted to District 7, primarily in support of 
the migrant interdiction mission, and were done at the expense of the 
"donor" districts. 

Though the Coast Guard considers the increase in 87-foot patrol boat 
operational hours part of the mitigation strategies, it must be noted 
that these vessels do not possess the capabilities (e.g., on-scene 
endurance, fuel capacity, crew size) of the 110-foot patrol boats, and 
thus are not a full replacement of those lost capabilities. As such, 
the Coast Guard does not include 87-foot patrol boat hours when 
presenting information to Congress regarding its patrol boat 
operational hour gap. 

[End of figure] 

The Mitigation Strategies Have Adversely Affected Operating and 
Maintenance Costs, Crew Training, and Mission Performance: 

In contrast with the operational hour gains discussed, the mitigation 
strategies have had Coast Guard-wide effects, including increased 
operating and maintenance costs; limited onboard, in port training for 
patrol boat crews; and a reduced capacity to perform some missions, 
such as living marine resources, in other districts. 

Mitigation Strategies Have Increased Operating and Maintenance Costs: 

Although the Coast Guard has broadened its use of existing assets and 
made plans to acquire new patrol boats to recover lost operational 
hours and vessels, these mitigation strategies have increased operating 
and maintenance costs. These operating and maintenance costs include 
the following: 

* Double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats has increased operating 
and maintenance costs: To support the increase in operational hours by 
double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats in District 7, the Coast 
Guard reported spending $2.6 million more for operations, fuel, and 
maintenance from February 2007 through February 2008 compared to what 
it spent during a comparable period to support these eight patrol boats 
before double crewing. These costs were funded from existing 110-foot 
and 123-foot patrol boat accounts. In addition to increasing the number 
of maintenance personnel, other costs associated with double crewing 
the eight 110-foot patrol boats included increasing the amount of 
scheduled maintenance to improve patrol boat reliability and enhance 
the probability of reaching a targeted 3,600 operational hours per hull 
in fiscal year 2007. For fiscal year 2008, $11.5 million was 
congressionally directed to provide the Coast Guard additional 
maintenance support, which the Coast Guard stated it is using to 
support funding for 6 months of additional personnel and 9 months of 
operation and maintenance costs. This is intended to further increase 
the number of operational hours gained by double crewing 110-foot 
patrol boats in District 7 to 4,000 hours annually per hull. 

* Extended use of three Navy vessels will increase operating and 
personnel costs: The Coast Guard extended its memorandum of agreement 
with the U.S. Navy to use three Navy 179-foot patrol coastals through 
2011. The operating and personnel expenses to be paid by the Coast 
Guard are approximately $10.5 million annually for these three vessels. 
[Footnote 27] 

* Increasing operational hour ceilings for 87-foot patrol boats in 
District 7 increased operational, fuel, and maintenance costs: In 
fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard spent approximately $500,000 for 
operational, fuel, and maintenance costs to increase the annual 
operational hours of the 87-foot patrol boats homeported in District 7 
from 1,800 to 2,000. According to the Coast Guard, if this practice 
were to continue, it does not know exactly what the effects of the 
increased operational tempo will be on the condition and service lives 
of the 87-foot patrol boats. The Coast Guard added, though, that it 
anticipates that an increase in maintenance funding, as well as days to 
complete the maintenance, would be needed to combat the accelerated 
wear on the 87-foot patrol boats. 

* Purchasing four additional 87-foot patrol boats will increase 
operations and maintenance costs: The Coast Guard was provided $30 
million in supplemental funding to mitigate the patrol boat operational 
gap.[Footnote 28] The Coast Guard used the funding to acquire four new 
87-foot patrol boats in fiscal year 2008 for use in District 7. 
According to the Coast Guard, these four vessels cumulatively will cost 
an additional $7 million to $9 million annually to operate. While these 
new patrol boats should be of use in helping to close the operational 
gap by freeing up other, larger assets for missions, the 87-foot patrol 
boats have fewer capabilities and endurance than the 110-foot or 123- 
foot patrol boats. For example, 87-foot patrol boats are typically used 
closer to shore and cannot operate away from their homeports for as 
long as 110-foot patrol boats. While District 7 will benefit from 
having these vessels, the Coast Guard does not consider the 87-foot 
patrol boats to be adequate replacements for the larger, more capable 
110-foot patrol boats and, therefore, does not include their hours in 
calculating its patrol boat operational hour gap. 

* Amending the MEP schedule will increase maintenance costs: The Coast 
Guard anticipates a cost increase of approximately $500,000 per vessel, 
for a total of $8 million (16 vessels out of the total of 20 110-foot 
patrol boats that have been or are to be inducted in the MEP program 
are currently slated to go through the amended cycle).[Footnote 29] 
This cost increase was necessary to hire additional shift workers to 
shorten the MEP cycle. The Coast Guard states that this cost will be 
offset by not including the three 110-foot patrol boats homeported in 
District 14 (Hawaii or Guam) as part of the MEP. 

Mitigation Strategies Limit Onboard Crew Training: 

Coast Guard officers we interviewed who were assigned to the double- 
crewed 110-foot patrol boats in District 7 generally held a positive 
view of double crewing in terms of the reduced number of operational 
hours for each crew and the enhanced maintenance support; however, 
officers from two of the four double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats that 
we spoke with noted that this strategy has resulted in less time for 
certain onboard training that can only be completed while they have 
access to a vessel in port or underway. According to these officials, 
110-foot patrol boat crews in District 7 previously logged 2,200 
operational hours at sea away from port; however, crews on double- 
crewed patrol boats will each have about 1,800 hours at sea away from 
port, which is 400 fewer hours in which to train at sea onboard a 
vessel. For example, Coast Guard patrol boat crew members told us that 
double crewing has adversely affected training for some crew members, 
such as deck watch officers.[Footnote 30] To qualify as a deck watch 
officer, a crew member must generally work for a qualification period 
of 3 to 6 months, provided the crew member is underway on a vessel for 
8 to 12 days per month. Double crewing may extend this qualification 
period to about 6 to 9 months. However, potential delays may occur in 
the deck watch officer qualification process for a crew member because 
their vessel has been scheduled for a major maintenance overhaul. If a 
person has a 2 to 3 month delay because of maintenance, they may not be 
able to qualify prior to the transfer season, which may leave their 
crew short of deck watch officers. While some crew members may be 
assigned temporary duty to another patrol boat to log training hours, 
the Coast Guard acknowledges that this option is not always possible. 
Despite this concern though, officials from the Coast Guard's Office of 
Cutter Forces state that 1,800 operational hours is consistent with the 
same amount of time that all other non-District 7 110-foot patrol boats 
in the Coast Guard have to train members. 

Mitigation Strategies Adversely Affect Mission Performance in Districts 
Periodically Deploying Assets to District 7: 

Coast Guard officials indicated that the Coast Guard's strategy to 
periodically deploy Atlantic Area and district assets to District 7 
adversely affected the donating districts' ability to perform some 
missions. Coast Guard officials have also indicated that the living 
marine resources (i.e., fisheries enforcement) mission has seen the 
largest adverse impact from deployments of vessels from other districts 
to District 7. Additionally, in some instances, aids-to-navigation 
mission work was delayed. Table 4 provides more detailed information on 
the effects on mission performance for Districts 1, 5, and 8 as a 
result of periodically deploying vessels to District 7 in fiscal year 
2007. 

Table 4: Information on Periodic Vessel Deployments to District 7 and 
the Estimated Impacts on the Donating Districts' Missions During Fiscal 
Year 2007: 

Vessel deployments: District 1: 225-foot Seagoing buoy tender (District 
asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately three law enforcement 
boardings in support of living marine resources mission. 

Vessel deployments: District 1: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately seven law enforcement 
boardings in support of living marine resources mission. 

Vessel deployments: District 5: 225-foot Seagoing buoy tender (District 
asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Deferment of preventative maintenance for 
approximately 32 navigational aids a and repair of 7 aid discrepancies 
(malfunctions or "broken" aids) in support of aids to navigation 
mission. 

Vessel deployments: District 5: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 24 boardings and 17 
violation notices in support of living marine resources mission. 

Vessel deployments: District 8: 225-foot Seagoing buoy tender (District 
asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Deferments of preventative maintenance for 
approximately 13 navigational aids and repair of 1 navigational aid in 
support of the Aids-to-Navigation mission. 

Vessel deployments: District 8: Six coastal patrol boats (District 
asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 125 boardings in 
support of the following missions: Recreational Boating Safety, Living 
Marine Resources, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. 

Vessel deployments: District 8: Medium endurance cutters (Area asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 40 to 50 boardings in 
support of living marine resources mission. 

Vessel deployments: District 8: Three U.S. Navy patrol coastals (Area 
asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 70 boardings in 
support of the following missions: Recreational Boating Safety, Living 
Marine Resources, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security. 

Vessel deployments: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Medium 
endurance cutters (Area asset); 
Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 2,145 kilograms of 
cocaine seized (based on their average amount of cocaine seized per 
ship day in fiscal year 2007) in the counter drug mission. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

[A] Navigational aids refer to buoys and beacons used for navigation 
purposes. 

[End of table] 

In fiscal year 2007, Districts 1, 5, and 8 provided over 6,000 
operational hours and a variety of vessels to District 7 to help recoup 
lost operational capacity. Districts 1, 5, and 8 each donated a 
seagoing buoy tender and also collectively contributed almost 5,000 
operational hours from Atlantic Area vessels (i.e., medium endurance 
cutters and Navy 179-foot patrol coastals) to District 7; however, the 
impact of these periodic deployments varies in each of these three 
districts. For example, District 1 redeployed Willow, a 225-foot buoy 
tender, to District 7 where it was used as a holding station for 
interdicted migrants. A Coast Guard official in District 1 estimated 
that dispatching the Willow to District 7 resulted in not being able to 
perform three law enforcement boardings in support of the living marine 
resources mission in District 1. According to this official, District 1 
also lost medium endurance cutter operational hours to District 7 in 
fiscal year 2007 for approximately 13 days, likely preventing the 
district from attempting seven additional law enforcement boardings. 
Law enforcement boardings are not only used to enforce fisheries law, 
but they also serve as a deterrent for illegal living marine resources 
activity. District 5 officials told us that deploying the Elm, their 
225-foot buoy tender, to District 7 not only limited their ability to 
perform tasks related to their aids to navigation mission, such as 
immediately repairing the seven navigational aids that were either out- 
of-position or malfunctioning during this period, but also resulted in 
deferring preventive maintenance for the Elm for 20 days. Additionally, 
Coast Guard officials told us that the Atlantic Area medium endurance 
cutters that were deployed from District 5 to District 7 would have 
primarily conducted living marine resources operations in District 5, 
and estimated that losing 540 medium endurance cutter operational hours 
to District 7 in fiscal year 2007 likely caused District 5 to miss 
approximately 17 living marine resources mission violations. 

District 8 contributed the greatest number of assets and operational 
hours to District 7 in fiscal year 2007. In addition to dispatching the 
Cypress, a 225-foot buoy tender to District 7 in fiscal year 2007, 
District 8 also deployed six 87-foot patrol boats to District 7 for a 
combined 1,130 operational hours. In addition, District 8 lost access 
to roughly 1,600 operational hours from the 179-foot patrol coastals on 
loan from the U. S. Navy when these vessels were reprogrammed from 
performing missions in District 8 to District 7. Further, District 8 
lost approximately 2,400 medium endurance cutter operational hours to 
District 7 in fiscal year 2007. District 8 officials estimate that the 
loss of the medium endurance cutter operational hours probably resulted 
in about 40 to 50 lost boardings for the living marine resources 
mission. According to District 8 officials, losing a portion of its 
medium endurance cutter operational hours was a significant loss 
because these vessels are the primary vessels used for this mission. 
With the exception of its buoy tender, District 8 does not currently 
have any vessels in its fleet larger than its 87-foot patrol boats, 
which limits the district's ability to conduct off-shore missions in 
District 8 because, according to the Coast Guard, the 87-foot patrol 
boats do not have the range nor the endurance to operate in distant 
fisheries, and also have a harder time sustaining a high boarding rate 
during living marine resources missions. 

Additionally, one Coast Guard official cited that another effect that 
could not be quantified or measured was the loss of a deterrence effect 
by having fewer vessels patrolling the waters in their area of 
responsibility. According to an official in District 8, while it is 
virtually impossible to quantify the effect of having vessels on 
patrol, it is very important not to underestimate the importance of 
patrolling the coast because he believes that Coast Guard patrols do 
lead to more safety compliance and, therefore, safer waters. 

According to the Coast Guard, periodic vessel deployments are expected 
to continue in fiscal year 2008 and future fiscal years until the FRCs-
-the replacement for the patrol boats--are delivered. The Coast Guard, 
in its Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget Justification, stated that 
its mission performance in the living marine resources and other law 
enforcement (foreign fisheries) missions will be "temporarily affected" 
by the reduction in available patrol boats. Thus, the Coast Guard is 
mindful of its need to find a proper balance between homeland security 
and nonhomeland security missions, as well as the extent to which it 
can continue to delay or forego the performance of certain missions in 
some districts to provide additional vessels and operational hours in 
District 7. 

Several Issues, Including Greater Resource and Maintenance Needs, Could 
Affect Longer Term Sustainability of Mitigation Strategies: 

The Coast Guard faces several issues that could potentially affect its 
ability to sustain these mitigation strategies for the longer term. 
While the double-crewed patrol boats performed well in fiscal year 
2007, Coast Guard officials have stated that it will be critical to 
continue to receive sufficient funding to support this initiative in 
future years. Other issues, such as continued periodic deployment of 
assets to District 7 and related mission effects, delivery of the FRCs, 
and the Coast Guard's expanding mission demands, could challenge the 
Coast Guard's ability to successfully sustain these mitigation 
strategies. 

Condition of Vessels Being Double Crewed, Maintenance Costs, and 
Availability of Maintenance Funds Will Affect Mitigation Strategies' 
Sustainability: 

Residual funding available through the 123-foot patrol boat operating 
and maintenance accounts has allowed the Coast Guard to sustain the 
double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats to date, but sustainment is 
contingent on sufficient funding to pay for the augmented maintenance 
and personnel. Coast Guard officials have indicated that through fiscal 
year 2007, double crewing had not adversely affected the condition of 
the double-crewed patrol boats, and its measures support this 
contention. In particular, our analysis of the measures the Coast Guard 
uses to monitor the condition of its vessels shows that all four 
measures (capacity, unscheduled maintenance days, percent of time fully 
mission capable, and average number of casualties per operational day) 
improved for the double-crewed patrol boats in fiscal years 2007 over 
fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 31] See appendix IV for further details on 
the trend in these condition measures for the eight double-crewed 
patrol boats from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. Coast Guard officials 
attribute the improvement reflected by these measures to increased 
focus and planning of maintenance activities for these patrol boats, as 
well as greater parts availability. However, Coast Guard officials have 
also stated that they will not be able to thoroughly assess the effects 
of double crewing on the condition of its eight 110-foot patrol boats 
until they have gone through a complete maintenance cycle, which is now 
taking 18 months under the new "high tempo, high maintenance" model. 

While the effects of double crewing on the condition of the eight 110- 
foot patrol boats are not fully known, Coast Guard officials have 
cautioned that maintaining the condition of the double-crewed patrol 
boats would be contingent on receiving sufficient resources for 
maintenance support. Under the high tempo, high maintenance model, the 
Coast Guard expects to retain the double-crewing concept and achieve an 
even greater level of operational hours through additional maintenance 
support. In this regard, for fiscal year 2008, $11.5 million was 
congressionally-directed to pilot an intensive maintenance regime that 
the Coast Guard expects will support funding for 6 months of additional 
personnel and 9 months of operation and maintenance costs, and 
estimates that it will need greater levels of funding--approximately 
$14.9 and $15.2 million--in the next 2 fiscal years. However, the Coast 
Guard may likely not know whether this level of funding will be 
adequate until maintenance contracts are signed and the higher 
operational hour levels are pursued. 

Scheduling and Funding of the Mission Effectiveness Project Affect 
Strategies' Sustainability: 

Sustainment of the Coast Guard's revised and shortened MEP schedule is 
contingent on completion of the maintenance and upgrades on schedule 
and sufficient funding. Any delays in the Coast Guard's new shortened 
MEP schedule, or reductions in anticipated funding, could extend the 
MEP and reduce any gains realized by the shortened schedule. The Coast 
Guard plans to regain some 110-foot patrol boat operational hours by 
having fewer vessels going through the MEP at one time and shortening 
the length of the MEP from 12 months to 9 months. To realize these 
gains, it will be important that the Coast Guard is able to keep the 
vessels on track with this amended schedule. This is a legitimate 
concern, as the Coast Guard has already seen two of the five 110-foot 
patrol boat boats that completed the MEP have their time in MEP 
extended by approximately 1 to 2 months due to the need to complete 
unexpected work required outside of the scope of the MEP. While the 
Coast Guard has stated that the patrol boats have come out of MEP on 
time and on budget for all standard MEP work items, if unexpected work 
of this sort were to occur again, this could lengthen the MEP process 
beyond 9 months and negate some of the advantages of the shortened 
schedule. In addition, if the Coast Guard does not receive the 
anticipated level of funding, this could also affect the Coast Guard's 
ability to get vessels through the MEP as scheduled. 

Deployment of Assets from Other Districts Will Continue to Affect the 
Coast Guard's Ability to Meet Certain Missions: 

As stated earlier, the Coast Guard is mindful of its need to balance 
missions across districts and is aware that continued periodic 
deployment of assets to District 7 may continue to adversely affect 
mission performance in the donor districts. We have already discussed 
how deployment of Area and District assets to District 7 from other 
districts has adversely affected Coast Guard mission performance in 
those districts, particularly in the living marine resources mission. 
Some periodic asset deployments are expected to continue in fiscal year 
2008 and perhaps in future fiscal years until replacement patrol boats 
are delivered. The Coast Guard acknowledges this and, in its Fiscal 
Year 2009 Congressional Budget Justification, has stated that its 
mission performance in the living marine resources and other missions 
(e.g., foreign fisheries enforcement) will be temporarily affected by 
the reduction in available patrol boats. 

Longer Term Sustainability of the Mitigation Strategies Could Become an 
Even Larger Issue Depending on FRC Delivery: 

One of the biggest factors that affects the sustainability of the 
mitigation strategies is the timely delivery of the FRCs that will 
replace the 110-foot patrol boats. While the Coast Guard has purchased 
four new 87-foot patrol boats that are to be delivered by the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2009 using $30 million it was appropriated via 
emergency supplemental appropriations in 2007, the Coast Guard notes 
that these can not substitute for either 110-foot or 123-foot patrol 
boats since they do not have the same capacity or capabilities. 
[Footnote 32] Coast Guard officials have emphasized that the mitigation 
strategies represent their best efforts to make the best use of the 
assets they have available until the FRC is delivered--the first of 
which is anticipated by the end of fiscal year 2010, with all 12 to be 
delivered by the end of fiscal year 2012. Any potential delays in the 
construction and delivery of the FRC will likely force the agency to 
continue these mitigation strategies for an even longer period of time, 
which could result in additional costs for operations and maintenance 
support to sustain its 110-foot patrol boats. 

Increasing Mission Demands across the Coast Guard Could Also Affect 
Sustainability of Mitigation Strategies: 

Longer-term sustainability could also be affected by increased demands 
the Coast Guard is facing across various homeland security and 
nonhomeland security missions, as we reported in March 2008.[Footnote 
33] For example, with respect to the Coast Guard's missions to protect 
America's ports, waterways, and waterside facilities, we cited a need 
to hire and train new staff to address increases in the pace of foreign 
port inspections and in the demand to provide security for vessels 
arriving at domestic liquefied natural gas import facilities. In 
nonhomeland security missions, the Coast Guard has recently been given 
responsibility for providing assistance for surveillance and monitoring 
of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve, 
called Papahanaumokuakea.[Footnote 34] According to the Coast Guard, 
surveillance of this monument--which includes monitoring fishing 
activities and law enforcement, marine species protection, debris 
recovery, and oil spill clean-up and prevention--has added an 
additional enforcement responsibility onto an existing mission workload 
without the benefit of increased funding, personnel, or vessels and 
aircraft. These additional resource needs could affect the Coast 
Guard's ability to continue to fund the current mitigation strategies 
in the years to come. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS and the Coast 
Guard. DHS declined to provide official written comments to include in 
our report. However, in an e-mail received June 11, 2008, the DHS 
liaison stated that DHS concurred with the report. The Coast Guard 
provided written technical comments that were incorporated into the 
report as appropriate. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of DHS, the 
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and interested congressional 
committees. This report will also be made available to others upon 
request. In addition, the report will also be made available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or 
your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-9610, or [email protected]. Contact points for our Office of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Stephen L. Caldwell: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report examines Coast Guard patrol boat operations and the actions 
taken to mitigate the loss of patrol boat operational hours brought 
about by the removal from service of eight 123-foot patrol boats. Our 
work focused on three key questions: (1) What operational challenges 
were created by the removal from service of the 123-foot patrol boats, 
and what strategies has the Coast Guard implemented to mitigate these 
challenges? (2) What effects have these mitigation strategies had on 
overall Coast Guard operational hours, as well as operating and 
maintenance costs, patrol boat crews, and mission performance? (3) What 
are some issues that could affect the sustainability of these 
mitigation strategies? 

In responding to the first question, we reviewed data and documentation 
such as patrol boat operational hour data, memoranda, other internal 
reports, and communications with Congress, and spoke with knowledgeable 
Coast Guard officials. Specifically, we obtained data on Coast Guard- 
wide operational hours provided by 110-foot, 123-foot, and 179-foot 
patrol boats from fiscal years 2003 through 2007. We also obtained data 
from the Coast Guard on the operational hour target of its 1998 patrol 
boat fleet--which the Coast Guard viewed as the baseline needed for new 
vessel replacement under the original Deepwater implementation plan--as 
well the revised 2004 patrol boat operational hour target established 
in the Coast Guard's Revised Mission Needs Statement, which took into 
account the Coast Guard's greater mission responsibilities post-9/ 
11.[Footnote 35] We reviewed operational hour data specific to the 
Coast Guard's six 110-foot patrol boats deployed to the Persian Gulf in 
support of defense operations to determine how their operations 
contributed to the domestic patrol boat operational hour gap. We also 
reviewed the schedule of 110-foot patrol boats going through the 
Mission Effectiveness Project.[Footnote 36] We also discussed these 
operational data with officials from the Coast Guard's Office of Cutter 
Forces to gain clarification and further details as needed. To assess 
the reliability of the operational hour data, we consulted with 
knowledgeable Coast Guard officials on the system responsible for 
gathering and reporting this data. We also performed electronic testing 
of the data for obvious errors in accuracy or completeness. On the 
basis of this assessment, we determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. Additionally, to gain an 
understanding of how the mitigation strategies were developed and 
implemented across various levels of the Coast Guard, we spoke with 
officials from the following entities: Office of Cutter Forces, Office 
of Naval Engineering, Office of Performance Management and Assessment 
(all at Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C.); Coast Guard Yard 
(Baltimore, Maryland); Atlantic Area Command (Portsmouth, Virginia) and 
Atlantic Area Maintenance and Logistics Command (Norfolk, Virginia); 
District 7 Command (Miami, Florida); Naval Engineering Support Unit 
(Miami, Florida); Sector St. Petersburg, Florida; Sector Miami, 
Florida; District 1 Command (Boston, Massachusetts); District 5 Command 
(Portsmouth, Virginia); District 8 Command (New Orleans, Louisiana); 
and Joint Interagency Task Force - South (Key West, Florida). We 
corroborated the information gathered from these officials with Coast 
Guard memoranda, internal reports, and communications with Congress 
that detailed the development and status of implementation of these 
strategies. 

In responding to our second objective, we spoke with officials from 
these many entities to discuss how the various mitigation strategies 
were affecting Coast Guard operational hours, operations, maintenance, 
costs, and mission performance. Specifically, in assessing the 
operational hour effects of the mitigation strategies, we spoke with 
officials from these entities and also analyzed the operational hour 
data discussed. To estimate the operational hour gains of the double- 
crewing strategy, we compared operational hour data for the eight 
double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats with prorated operational hour 
targets for February 2007 (when double crewing began) through September 
2007. To determine the effects on operations and maintenance of assets, 
we spoke with officials from these many entities, as well as crew 
members from four of the double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats in St. 
Petersburg and Miami, Florida, to gain their views of how double 
crewing has affected their operations, work tempo, and training 
opportunities. 

To assess the costs of the Coast Guard's mitigation strategies, we 
relied on data reported to us by the Coast Guard on the costs of: 
double crewing the eight 110-foot patrol boats, as well as increased 
funding for fiscal year 2008 to expand the operational hour targets of 
this approach; acquisition and operations of new 87-foot patrol boats; 
acceleration of the Mission Effectiveness Project schedule; extending 
the operations of three Navy 179-foot patrol coastals for 3 additional 
fiscal years; and supporting additional operational hours for 87-foot 
patrol boats in District 7 during fiscal year 2007. We corroborated 
these data with other sources--such as the congressional direction for 
the use of funds to support double crewing and supplemental 
appropriations to mitigate the patrol boat operational gap relating to 
the 87-foot patrol boat acquisitions--to the extent possible. 

Regarding the costs incurred during the first 13 months of double 
crewing (February 2007-February 2008), we spoke with and gathered 
information from Coast Guard officials responsible for gathering this 
data and determined that these data are sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. We also spoke with officials from all the 
districts listed, and Joint Interagency Task Force-South, to gain their 
estimates of how deploying both area-and district-controlled assets 
have affected their abilities to fully perform their missions. We 
obtained some district-level mission performance data on some of the 
missions that may have been affected by the mitigation strategies 
(e.g., living marine resources, drug interdiction operations); however, 
through speaking with officials from the Coast Guard's Office of 
Performance Management and Assessment, we determined that it would be 
very difficult to link any changes in these data with the effects of 
any of the mitigation strategies, since these data values may be 
affected by a large number of factors. Thus, we relied on estimates 
from district officials, as well as interviews with the Coast Guard's 
Office of Performance Management and Assessment, to assess the effects 
of the mitigation strategies. 

In responding to our third objective, we relied largely on the 
information collected from our data gathering and interviews, in 
conjunction with our prior work on larger Coast Guard-wide challenges. 
In assessing issues that may affect the sustainability of the double- 
crewing effort, we explored how double crewing may have affected the 
condition of the eight 110-foot patrol boats by interviewing officials 
with the Office of Naval Engineering, Sectors St. Petersburg and Miami, 
and Naval Engineering Support Unit, Miami, as well as by reviewing 
measures (capacity, unscheduled maintenance days, percent of time fully 
mission capable, and average number of casualties per operational day) 
used by the Coast Guard to track the condition of its vessels. We 
assessed the reliability of these condition measures, and the data and 
the systems that produced the data, through communications with 
knowledgeable officials in the Coast Guard's Office of Naval 
Engineering. On the basis of this assessment, we determined that these 
data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Number of 110-foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S. 
Coast Guard District: 

This appendix provides details on the areas and districts that host the 
Coast Guard's fleet of 41 110-foot patrol boats. District 7, including 
Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, hosts almost half of the Coast 
Guard's fleet of 110-foot patrol boats. District 8, including much of 
the Gulf of Mexico, does not host any 110-foot patrol boats. 

Figure 7: Number of 110-Foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S. Coast 
Guard District: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the United States depicting the U.S. Coast 
Guard districts and the number of 110-foot Patrol Boats stationed in 
each, as follows: 

District: 1 (Atlantic area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 8. 

District: 5 (Atlantic area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 3. 

District: 7 (Atlantic area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 17; 

District: 11 (Pacific area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 1. 

District: 13 (Pacific area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 2. 

District: 14 (Pacific area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 4. 

District: 17 (Pacific area); 
Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 6. 

Source: GAO (map art, analysis); MapResources (map); U.S. Coast Guard 
(photo images, data). 

Note: Six 110-foot patrol boats are currently operating away from their 
home districts in support of defense operations in the Persian Gulf as 
follows: three from District 1, one from District 5, and two from 
District 7. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Periodic Deployment of Vessels from Other Districts to 
District 7, Fiscal Year 2007: 

This appendix provides information on the periodic deployment of 
certain Area-and District-controlled vessels to support District 7 
operations in fiscal year 2007. Figure 8 illustrates the vessels and 
their operational hours that deployed from certain Atlantic Area 
districts and Joint Interagency Task Force-South to support District 7 
operations in fiscal year 2007. 

Figure 8: Periodic Deployment of Area and District Vessels from Other 
Districts and Joint Interagency Task Force-South to District 7 in 
Fiscal Year 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the Atlantic area depicting the periodic 
deployment of area and district vessels from other districts and Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South to District 7 in fiscal year 2007. The 
figure also includes photographs of the following donated boats: 
Buoy Tender; 
Medium Endurance Cutter; 
87-foot Patrol Boat; 
Navy 179-foot Patrol Coastal. 

District: 1; 
Periodic deployment to District 7: 
* (1) Buoy Tender (500 hours); 
* Medium Endurance Cutter (264 hours). 

District: 5; 
Periodic deployment to District 7: 
* (1) Buoy Tender (419 hours); 
* Medium Endurance Cutter (540 hours). 

District: 8; 
Periodic deployment to District 7: 
* (1) Buoy Tender (548 hours); 
* (6) 87-foot Patrol Boats (1,130 hours); 
* Medium Endurance Cutter (2,420 hours); 
* Navy 179-foot Patrol Coastal (1,608 hours). 

District: Joint Interagency Task Force-South; 
Periodic deployment to District 7: 
* Medium Endurance Cutter (700 hours). 

Source: GAO (map art, analysis); MapResources (map); U.S. Coast Guard 
(photo images, data). 

Notes: Photographs were located on the U.S. Coast Guard Pier System Web 
site and U.S. Coast Guard Visual Information Server, both of which 
provide photographs for public use. The buoy tender photo was taken by 
PA3 John Edwards, the medium endurance cutter photo was taken by Petty 
Officer First Class NyxoLyno Cangemi, and the 87-foot patrol boat photo 
was taken by PA2 Tiffany Powell. 

This figure illustrates a change in tactical control for these deployed 
vessels from the donating entity to District 7, not necessarily the 
geographic area of operation of the vessels (i.e., the vessels did not 
necessarily operate in Miami, but under the control of the District 7 
Command, which extends from the coast of South Carolina south to Puerto 
Rico). 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Condition Measures for the Coast Guard's Eight Double- 
Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007: 

This appendix provides more details on the condition of the Coast 
Guard's 110-foot double-crewed patrol boats. Specifically, the figures 
illustrate the values, for the eight double-crewed 110-foot patrol 
boats, of four specific measures used by the Coast Guard to monitor the 
condition of its vessels. Note that double crewing of these eight 
patrol boats began in February 2007. In general, they show that the 
condition and availability of these vessels improved during the year of 
double crewing (fiscal year 2007) over prior years for nearly all of 
these measures. 

Figure 9: Capacity for Double-Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal 
Years 2004 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: 

Target: 60%/65%. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Capacity: 48.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Capacity: 44.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Capacity: 34.4%. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Capacity: 52.1%. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data). 

Note: Capacity refers to the percentage of time that a vessel is not in 
maintenance status. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Unscheduled Maintenance Days (UMD) for Double-Crewed 110- 
foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: 

Target: 0.8%. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
UMD: 1.3%. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
UMD: 0.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
UMD: 3.2%. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
UMD: 1.5%. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data). 

Note: Unscheduled Maintenance Days refers to the percentage of time 
that a vessel class spends in unscheduled maintenance status over the 
time period being measured. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 11: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC) for Double- 
Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: 

Target: 95%. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
PTFMC: 19.5%. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
PTFMC: 17.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
PTFMC: 25.3%. 

Fiscal year: 2007;
PTFMC: 46.2%. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data). 

Note: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable refers to the percentage of 
operational time that a vessel has no open major casualties (i.e., 
deficiencies in mission-essential equipment that cause the major 
degradation of a primary mission or loss of at least one primary 
mission). 

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Average Number of Casualties per Operational Day (ANOCOP) 
for Double-Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 
2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a line graph depicting the following data: 

Target: 0.3%. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
ANOCOP: 1.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
ANOCOP: 2.1%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
ANOCOP: 1.7%. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
ANOCOP: 0.9%. 

Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data). 

Note: Average Number of Casualties per Operational Day refers to the 
number of major casualties that remain open each operational day. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Stephen L. Caldwell (202) 512-9610, or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

This report was prepared under the direction of Christopher Conrad, 
Assistant Director. Key contributors to this report also included 
William Bates, Adam Couvillion, Katherine Davis, Michele Fejfar, Geoff 
Hamilton, and Landis Lindsey. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-270R]. Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent 
Performance, and Related Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-494T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Management Initiatives and Key Homeland 
Security Missions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-
531T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008. 

Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and 
Management and Efforts to Address Them. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874]. Washington, D.C.: June 
18, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management 
and Address Operational Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-575T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and 
Management Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-446T]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Efforts to Improve Management and Address 
Operational Challenges in the Deepwater Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-460T]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
14, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland 
Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater 
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-453T]. 
Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007. 

Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 23, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 
Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546]. Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset 
Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges 
Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-757]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater 
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-651T]. Washington, D.C.: June 
21, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater 
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-307T]. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
20, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-695]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 14, 2004. 

Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased 
Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
9, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-659T]. Washington, 
D.C.: May 3, 2001. 

Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks 
Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-564]. 
Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001. 

Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification 
and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-6]. Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 26, 1998. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] To accomplish its responsibilities, the Coast Guard is organized 
into two major commands that are responsible for overall mission 
execution--one in the Pacific area and the other in the Atlantic area. 
These commands are divided into nine districts which, in turn, are 
organized into 35 sectors that unify command and control of field units 
and resources, such as multimission stations and patrol boats. 

[2] Since fiscal year 2005, the Coast Guard has had operational command 
of three to five Navy 179-foot patrol coastal vessels, established via 
a Memorandum of Agreement with the Navy. 

[3] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 
112 (2007)). 

[4] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, 
Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-494T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
6, 2008). 

[5] The Coast Guard sets these operational hour ceilings by total 
annual hours, and does not break down these ceilings by mission. In 
addition, the Coast Guard can increase operational hour ceilings for 
its vessels as needed, if it determines that it has the resources in 
place to operate the vessels at a higher number of hours while 
sustaining their service lives. 

[6] Prior to fiscal year 2004, three 110-foot patrol boats were 
stationed in San Diego, California and supported by a maintenance 
augmentation team. While receiving this support, these three 110-foot 
patrol boats were allocated 2,200 annual operational hours. 

[7] The Coast Guard's "system of systems" approach integrates vessels, 
aircraft, sensors, and communication links together as a system to 
accomplish mission objectives. 

[8] CSC Advanced Marine, Evaluation of the 110' WPB Class Cutter Fleet 
(January 2001). 

[9] According to Coast Guard officials, they arrived at a total of 20 
110-foot patrol boats for the MEP as follows: 29 of the 41 vessels use 
an engine type that the Coast Guard considers to be more capable and 
reliable, and thus worth preserving through the MEP process. Six of 
these 29 are currently serving in the Persian Gulf, where they are 
being maintained through supplemental funding; three additional vessels 
are homeported in District 14 (Guam or Hawaii), and the Coast Guard has 
determined not to place these vessels in the MEP due to high costs of 
transit and loss of operational time. Thus, 20 110-foot patrol boats 
remain for the MEP. 

[10] Of the $109.7 million, $49.2 million was from the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 
and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005)) and 
was used for the first six cutters entering MEP. This supplemental 
funding was not included in the Deepwater Acquisition Program Baseline 
cost. 

[11] As used in shipbuilding, composite materials are typically plies 
of various reinforcing fabrics laminated together. 

[12] GAO, Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design 
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006). 

[13] GAO, Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater 
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-270R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008). 

[14] This 174,000 operational hour target represents what the Coast 
Guard calculated it needed from its patrol boat fleet as part of the 
post-9/11 2004 Deepwater Mission Needs Statement. The post-9/11 Mission 
Needs Statement was approved by the Commandant and DHS in January 2005, 
but has always been referred to as the 2004 Mission Needs Statement 
because the document was prepared and routed within the Coast Guard 
during 2004. 

[15] A standard patrol boat maintenance cycle consists of one drydock 
availability (major maintenance work that can only be completed when a 
vessel is out of the water, typically lasting 6 weeks) every 3 years, 
with one dockside availability (major maintenance work that can be 
completed while a vessel is in the water, typically lasting 3 weeks) 
every 2 years. The high tempo, high maintenance approach will shorten 
this to one drydock availability every 18 months, with one dockside 
availability every 9 months between drydock availabilities. 

[16] House Committee on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Legislative Text 
and Explanatory Statement 1057 (Committee Print 2008). 

[17] Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). 

[18] In addition, under the high tempo, high maintenance approach, 
crews will be located in the same homeport as the cutters they work on, 
thus eliminating the need to switch command between homeports. 

[19] District 1 (Boston, Massachusetts), District 5 (Portsmouth, 
Virginia), and District 8 (New Orleans, Louisiana) are part of the 
Coast Guard's Atlantic Area Command along with District 7. The Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South in Key West, Florida, under the U.S. 
Southern Command, has primary responsibility for U.S. detection and 
monitoring of drug trafficking activities in the transit zone, which 
encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The Coast Guard has primary 
operational control for most interdiction operations. The Department of 
Defense provides maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and ships; the 
Department of Homeland Security--primarily, the Coast Guard and the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection--provides maritime patrol aircraft, 
ships, and law enforcement assistance; and the Department of Justice 
provides prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance. Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South also receives some operational support 
from various countries within the transit zone, and France, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom also provide air and maritime 
assistance in the eastern Caribbean Sea. 

[20] A buoy tender is a vessel used by the Coast Guard in its aids to 
navigation mission, which involves establishing and maintaining a large 
number of navigational aids, such as buoys or beacons, to assist 
mariners and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks. 

[21] The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107- 
295, 116 Stat. 2064, 2106 (2002)) provided that the Secretary of the 
department in which the Coast Guard is operating may accept, by direct 
transfer without cost, for use by the Coast Guard primarily for 
expanded drug interdiction activities required to meet national supply 
reduction performance goals, up to 7 PC-170 patrol craft from the 
Department of Defense if it offers to transfer such craft. These 
vessels, originally 170 feet in length, were later fitted with a stern 
ramp modification that extended their length to 179 feet; thus, we 
refer to these vessels as the 179-foot patrol coastals. Per the 
amendment to the original Navy-Coast Guard Patrol Coastal Inter-Service 
Transfer Memorandum of Agreement signed in 2004, the Coast Guard will 
return operational control of the Tempest, homeported in Pascagoula, 
Mississippi; and the Monsoon, homeported in San Diego, California to 
the Navy in September 2008. The Zephyr, homeported in San Diego, and 
the Shamal and Tornado, homeported in Pascagoula, will remain under the 
operational control of the Coast Guard until September 2011. The Coast 
Guard plans to relocate the Zephyr to Pascagoula in October 2008. 

[22] Personnel tempo, in this context, refers to the amount of time 
that each crew actually serves underway on the vessel annually. 

[23] Though the Coast Guard considers February 2007 as the start of 
double-crewing, not all eight 110-foot patrol boats began double- 
crewing that month, but were phased in throughout February and March 
2007. 

[24] Specifically, the new 4,000 hour ceiling provides an increase of 
1,800 hours per vessel, given that the District 7 110-foot patrol boat 
ceiling was previously 2,200 hours. For eight vessels, that leads to a 
gain of 14,400 operational hours. 

[25] According to the Coast Guard, the high tempo, high maintenance 
approach will be phased out of operation on individual 110-foot patrol 
boats as FRCs become operational in District 7. 

[26] Coast Guard officials attribute the gain, which was greater than 
the projected operational hour increase, to the fact that the June- 
September time frame represents a period of greater migrant activity-- 
and thus higher operating tempos--for District 7 assets. 

[27] The Navy has provided additional funds of $2 million per vessel 
for major maintenance work. 

[28] Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007). 

[29] The other four 110-foot patrol boats have already been through the 
longer (12 month) cycle. 

[30] A deck watch officer is the commissioned, warrant, or petty 
officer on watch in charge of the vessel and is responsible for the 
safety of the vessel and for the performance of the duties prescribed 
by the commanding officer and Coast Guard regulations. Every person 
onboard who is subject to the orders of the commanding officer, except 
the executive officer, is subordinate to the deck watch officer. 

[31] Capacity refers to the percentage of time that a vessel is not in 
maintenance status. Unscheduled maintenance days refer to the 
percentage of time that a vessel class spends in unscheduled 
maintenance status over the time period being measured. Percent of time 
fully mission capable refers to the percentage of operational time that 
a vessel has no open major casualties (i.e., deficiencies in mission- 
essential equipment that cause the major degradation of a primary 
mission or loss of at least one primary mission). Average number of 
casualties per operational day refers to the number of major casualties 
that remain open each operational day. 

[32] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 
112 (2007)). 

[33] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, 
Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-494T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
6, 2008). 

[34] In December 2000, Executive Order 13178 authorized the creation of 
Papahanaumokuakea, which is about 140,000 square miles. In 2006, the 
President declared this region a national monument to be monitored by 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, with support from the State of Hawaii and the Coast 
Guard. To ensure that commercial fishing limitations are observed until 
its prohibition in 2011, several Coast Guard vessels patrol the region 
and conduct search and rescue missions, protect threatened species, and 
respond to potential hazards, such as debris or damaged vessels. 

[35] The Deepwater Program is the Coast Guard's plan to replace or 
modernize existing aircraft, vessels, and information management 
capabilities. 

[36] The Mission Effectiveness Project is designed to modernize or 
replace obsolete and unsupportable hull, mechanical, and electrical 
equipment--such as hull plating and underwater appendages, pumps, 
motors, piping, generators, and power distribution equipment--for 
selected 110-foot patrol boats. 

[End of section] 

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