    Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats
    Are Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost
    and Longer Term Sustainability Is Unknown (23-JUN-08,
    GAO-08-660).

    The Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats are used for a number of
    missions, such as enforcement of fisheries laws, and the
    interdiction of migrants and illicit drugs. As part of the Coast
    Guard's initial plans to replace many of its vessels, it intended
    to convert its 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats
    with increased capabilities until the replacement vessel, the
    Fast Response Cutter (FRC), became operational. However,
    structural problems on the eight converted 123-foot boats led the
    Coast Guard to remove these boats from service. Faced with a loss
    of operational hours, especially in the Coast Guard's
    Florida-based District 7 where these boats operated, the Coast
    Guard implemented mitigation strategies to recover lost
    operational hours. This report provides information on Coast
    Guard patrol boat operations and, in particular, addresses: (1)
    operational challenges created by the removal from service of the
    123-foot patrol boats and the Coast Guard's strategies for
    mitigating their loss; (2) effects these mitigation strategies
    have had on overall Coast Guard operational hours, as well as
    operating and maintenance costs, patrol boat crews, and mission
    performance; and (3) issues that could affect the sustainability
    of these strategies. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed data and
    other documentation on patrol boat operations and mitigation
    strategies, and interviewed Coast Guard officials.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-660
        ACCNO:   A82480
      TITLE:     Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol
    Boats Are Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a
    Cost and Longer Term Sustainability Is Unknown
         DATE:   06/23/2008
      SUBJECT:   Agency missions
    	     Coast Guard personnel
    	     Combat readiness
    	     Continuity of operations
    	     Homeland security
    	     Losses
    	     Maintenance (upkeep)
    	     Maintenance costs
    	     Military forces
    	     Military operations
    	     Military training
    	     Military vessels
    	     Mission essential operations
    	     Municipal governments
    	     Naval operations
    	     Performance measures
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Ships
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Operations and maintenance costs
    	     Program goals or objectives
    	     Coast Guard Deepwater Project
    	     Fast Response Cutter

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    GAO-08-660

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    Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast
    Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    GAO:

    June 2008:

    Coast Guard:

    Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats Are Achieving
    Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost and Longer Term
    Sustainability Is Unknown:

    GAO-08-660:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-660, a report to the Subcommittee on Oceans,
    Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science,
    and Transportation, U.S. Senate.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    The Coast Guard�s 110-foot patrol boats are used for a number of
    missions, such as enforcement of fisheries laws, and the interdiction
    of migrants and illicit drugs. As part of the Coast Guard's initial
    plans to replace many of its vessels, it intended to convert its 110-
    foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats with increased
    capabilities until the replacement vessel, the Fast Response Cutter
    (FRC), became operational. However, structural problems on the eight
    converted 123-foot boats led the Coast Guard to remove these boats from
    service. Faced with a loss of operational hours, especially in the
    Coast Guard�s Florida-based District 7 where these boats operated, the
    Coast Guard implemented mitigation strategies to recover lost
    operational hours.

    This report provides information on Coast Guard patrol boat operations
    and, in particular, addresses: (1) operational challenges created by
    the removal from service of the 123-foot patrol boats and the Coast
    Guard�s strategies for mitigating their loss; (2) effects these
    mitigation strategies have had on overall Coast Guard operational
    hours, as well as operating and maintenance costs, patrol boat crews,
    and mission performance; and (3) issues that could affect the
    sustainability of these strategies.

    To conduct its work, GAO analyzed data and other documentation on
    patrol boat operations and mitigation strategies, and interviewed Coast
    Guard officials.

    What GAO Found:

    The removal from service of eight 123-foot patrol boats in November
    2006 created operational challenges by reducing patrol boat operational
    hours across the Coast Guard and exacerbating an existing gap between
    the Coast Guard�s operational hour target for its fleet of patrol boats
    and what it was achieving. To mitigate the loss of the District 7-based
    123-foot patrol boats and their associated operational hours in fiscal
    year 2007 and beyond, the Coast Guard implemented a number of
    strategies. These mitigation strategies include: using the crews from
    the eight patrol boats removed from service to augment the crews of
    eight District 7-based patrol boats (i.e., double-crewing);
    periodically deploying vessels from other districts to perform missions
    in District 7; increasing the operational hours of 87-foot patrol boats
    in District 7; and acquiring four new 87-foot patrol boats, among
    others.

    The mitigation strategies have had a number of impacts on Coast Guard
    operations�both positive and negative. On the positive side, these
    strategies collectively provided approximately 21,000 additional
    operational hours to District 7 in fiscal year 2007, and are projected
    to provide additional operational hours in future years. On the
    negative side, these strategies have increased operating and
    maintenance costs; reduced the availability for some on-board crew
    training; and affected the performance of some missions, such as
    fisheries enforcement, in districts providing vessel support to
    District 7.

    Several issues, such as greater resource and maintenance needs, can
    affect the longer-term sustainability of the mitigation strategies. The
    Coast Guard notes that sustainment of the operational hour gains it
    achieved through double-crewing patrol boats is dependent, in large
    part, on continued funding at current levels. Similarly, any
    operational hour gains it plans to achieve by revising the patrol boat
    maintenance and upgrade project could be impacted by any reductions in
    funding. Sustaining the mitigation strategies is also dependent on the
    Coast Guard�s continued ability to delay performing certain missions in
    some districts to increase mission performance in District 7. Finally,
    any potential delays in the delivery of the replacement FRC vessel,
    expected in 2010, will make sustainment more difficult. The Department
    of Homeland Security, of which the Coast Guard is a component,
    concurred with our report.

    Figure: One of the Coast Guard�s 110-foot Patrol Boats:

    [See PDF for image]

    Photograph of one of the Coast Guard�s 110-foot Patrol Boats.

    Source: Photo courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.

    [End of figure]

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-660]. For more
    information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-8777 or
    caldwells@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    Loss of Patrol Boats Has Exacerbated the Coast Guard's Operational Hour
    Shortage, and the Coast Guard Has Implemented a Number of Strategies to
    Mitigate This Loss:

    The Coast Guard's Mitigation Strategies Have Replaced Some Lost
    Operational Hours, but Have Adversely Affected Coast Guard Resources
    and the Performance of Some Missions:

    Several Issues, Including Greater Resource and Maintenance Needs, Could
    Affect Longer Term Sustainability of Mitigation Strategies:

    Agency Comments:

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

    Appendix II: Number of 110-foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S.
    Coast Guard District:

    Appendix III: Periodic Deployment of Vessels from Other Districts to
    District 7, Fiscal Year 2007:

    Appendix IV: Condition Measures for the Coast Guard's Eight Double-
    crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:

    Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:

    Related GAO Products:

    Tables:

    Table 1: Information on the Vessel Classes Used to Provide Operational
    Hours in District 7 to Offset the Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats:

    Table 2: The Coast Guard's Homeland Security and Nonhomeland Security
    Missions:

    Table 3: Operational Hour Increases Resulting from the Strategies to
    Mitigate the Loss of the 123-Foot Patrol Boats in District 7:

    Table 4: Information on Periodic Vessel Deployments to District 7 and
    the Estimated Impacts on the Donating Districts' Missions During Fiscal
    Year 2007:

    Figures:

    Figure 1: Locations of the Coast Guard's Area Commands and Districts:

    Figure 2: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for All
    Coast Guard 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007:

    Figure 3: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for
    District 7 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007:

    Figure 4: Contributions of 110-foot and 123-foot Patrol Boats and 179-
    foot Patrol Coastals Toward Meeting the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat
    Operational Hour Targets during Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007:

    Figure 5: Impact of the Mitigation Strategies on Replacing 123-foot
    Patrol Boat Operational Hours for Fiscal Year 2007:

    Figure 6: Domestic Patrol Boat Operational Hours Coast Guard-wide,
    Including Mitigation Strategy Contributions, Fiscal Years 2003 through
    2007:

    Figure 7: Number of 110-Foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S. Coast
    Guard District:

    Figure 8: Periodic Deployment of Area and District Vessels from Other
    Districts and Joint Interagency Task Force-South to District 7 in
    Fiscal Year 2007:

    Figure 9: Capacity for Double-Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal
    Years 2004 through 2007:

    Figure 10: Unscheduled Maintenance Days (UMD) for Double-Crewed 110-
    foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:

    Figure 11: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC) for Double-
    Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:

    Figure 12: Average Number of Casualties per Operational Day (ANOCOP)
    for Double-crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through
    2007:

    [End of section]

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    June 23, 2008:

    The Honorable Maria Cantwell:
    Chair:
    The Honorable Olympia Snowe:
    Ranking Member:
    Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard:
    Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
    United States Senate:

    The Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats serve as key assets for a
    number of Coast Guard missions, particularly living marine resources,
    ports, waterways, and coastal security, and the interdiction of illicit
    drugs and undocumented migrants. In 2002, as part of the Coast Guard's
    initial plan to replace or modernize existing aircraft, vessels, and
    information management capabilities--also known as the Deepwater
    Program--the Coast Guard intended to convert all 49 of its aging and
    deteriorating 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot patrol boats with
    increased capabilities. This conversion was to serve as a bridging
    strategy until a replacement vessel, the Fast Response Cutter (FRC),
    became operational. Conversion of the first eight 110-foot patrol boats
    began in February 2003; however, hull buckling and other structural
    problems among the eight converted patrol boats led the Coast Guard to
    first impose operating restrictions and then, ultimately, halt all
    future patrol boat conversions in June 2005. As the 123-foot patrol
    boats continued to experience structural and mechanical problems
    leading to operational and safety concerns, the Coast Guard decided to
    remove all eight of the 123-foot patrol boats from service in November
    2006. Then, in April 2007, the Coast Guard announced its decision to
    permanently decommission these patrol boats.

    Because all of the converted patrol boats that were removed from
    service came from one district--District 7, based in Miami, Florida,
    and generally covering the coasts and adjacent waters of South
    Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Puerto Rico--the Coast Guard was faced
    with a loss of operational hours in that district, leading it to
    develop strategies for mitigating the loss of these patrol boats'
    operational hours until the replacement vessel, the FRC, is delivered
    and becomes operational.[Footnote 1] According to the Coast Guard, the
    first FRC is currently anticipated to be delivered in late fiscal year
    2010.

    This report, prepared at your request, examines Coast Guard patrol boat
    operations and the actions taken to mitigate the loss of patrol boat
    operational hours brought about by the removal from service of the
    eight 123-foot patrol boats. Specifically, this report addresses:

    * the operational challenges created by the removal from service of the
    123-foot patrol boats, and strategies the Coast Guard has implemented
    to mitigate these challenges;

    * effects these mitigation strategies have had on overall Coast Guard
    operational hours, as well as operating and maintenance costs, patrol
    boat crews, and mission performance; and:

    * issues that could affect the sustainability of these mitigation
    strategies.

    In conducting our work, we analyzed reports, memoranda, operational
    hour data, relevant asset condition measures, and other documentation
    on Coast Guard patrol boat operations and mitigation strategies. Part
    of our analyses included a review of the types of vessels the Coast
    Guard has in its fleet that have been used to mitigate the loss of 123-
    foot patrol boat operational hours. Table 1 details some of the
    operating characteristics of the 110-foot patrol boats, the 87-foot
    coastal patrol boats, and 179-foot patrol coastals on loan from the
    Navy, which have all been used to assist District 7 in fulfilling its
    mission requirements.[Footnote 2]

    Table 1: Information on the Vessel Classes Used to Provide Operational
    Hours in District 7 to Offset the Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats:

    This table includes photographs of each vessel type.

    Capability: 87-foot coastal patrol boat;
    Number in fleet: 65;
    Crew size: 1 officer or officer in charge, 9 enlisted;
    Maximum speed: 25 knots;
    Endurance[A]: 3 days;
    Fuel capacity: 2,800 gallons;
    Missions:
    * Search and rescue;
    * Marine environmental protection;
    * Ports, waterways, and coastal security;
    * Migrant interdiction;
    * Counter drug;
    * Living marine resources.

    Capability: 110-foot patrol boat;
    Number in fleet: 41;
    Crew size: 2 officers, 14 enlisted;
    Maximum speed: 30 knots;
    Endurance[A]: 5 days;
    Fuel capacity: 10,380 gallons;
    Missions:
    * Search and rescue;
    * Marine environmental protection;
    * Ports, waterways, and coastal security;
    * Migrant interdiction;
    * Counter drug;
    * Living marine resources;
    * Defense readiness.

    Capability: 179-foot patrol coastal;
    Number in fleet: 5;
    Crew size: 2 officers, 24 enlisted;
    Maximum speed: 35+ knots;
    Endurance[A]: 10 days;
    Fuel capacity: 14,500 gallons, plus 5,632 additional reserve;
    Missions:
    * Search and rescue;
    * Marine environmental protection;
    * Ports, waterways, and coastal security;
    * Migrant interdiction;
    * Counter drug;
    * Living marine resources;
    * Defense readiness.

    Source: U. S. coast Guard.

    [A] Endurance is the total amount of time a vessel is capable of
    patrolling with the amount of fuel, food, and water that it carries on
    board.

    Note: Photographs were located on the U.S. Coast Guard Pier System Web
    site and U.S. Coast Guard Visual Information Server, both of which
    provide photographs for public use. The 87-foot patrol boat photo was
    taken by PA2 Tiffany Powell, and the 110-foot patrol boat photo was
    taken by Petty Officer 3rd Class David R. Marin.

    [End of table]

    In addition to our data analyses, we also interviewed Coast Guard
    officials responsible for managing patrol boat operations, developing
    and implementing mitigation strategies, and gathering and reporting
    data on patrol boat condition measures. Specifically, we met with
    officials from the Coast Guard's headquarters and various field
    locations who have either developed and implemented mitigation
    strategies, experienced the loss of the 123-foot patrol boats, or
    deployed vessels to assist District 7 in achieving its operational
    missions.

    To assess the reliability of the operational hour and vessel condition
    data obtained from the Coast Guard, we questioned knowledgeable
    officials about the data and the systems that produced the data and
    performed electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and
    completeness. On the basis of our assessments, we determined that the
    data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
    Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in greater detail.

    We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through June 2008 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
    based on our audit objectives.

    Results in Brief:

    The removal from service of the Coast Guard's eight 123-foot patrol
    boats in November 2006 created operational challenges by reducing
    patrol boat operational hours and exacerbating a gap between the Coast
    Guard's operational hour target for its patrol boat fleet and what it
    was achieving, so the Coast Guard implemented six strategies to
    mitigate the loss of these operational hours. The Coast Guard
    originally established a target of 99,400 operational hours that would
    be provided by new vessels as part of the Deepwater program based on
    the capacity of its 110-foot patrol boat fleet in 1998. However, since
    fiscal year 2000, the Coast Guard has fallen short of this target, with
    operational hours declining from approximately 88,000 domestic 110-foot
    patrol boat operational hours in fiscal year 2003 to 63,000 hours in
    fiscal year 2006. The 123-foot patrol boats--all of which were
    stationed in District 7--had provided approximately 10,000 operational
    hours in fiscal year 2006, and had a total operational hour target of
    20,000 hours. In an effort to mitigate the loss of the 123-foot patrol
    boats and their associated operational hours, the Coast Guard
    implemented a number of strategies to replace the lost operational
    hours in District 7, for fiscal year 2007 and future years. These
    mitigation strategies included (1) using the crews from the eight 123-
    foot patrol boats that had been removed from service to augment the
    existing crews of eight 110-foot patrol boats in District 7, thereby
    providing two crews that can alternate time operating each of the eight
    patrol boats (i.e., double crewing); (2) periodically deploying vessels
    from other districts to perform missions in District 7; (3) retaining
    the use of three Navy patrol boats through September 2011, (4)
    increasing the operational hours of each of the 87-foot patrol boats in
    District 7; (5) acquiring four new 87-foot patrol boats to be stationed
    in District 7 beginning in September 2008; and (6) shortening the
    amount of time to conduct a maintenance and upgrade project on 110-foot
    patrol boats so that fewer are off-line at any one time.

    The mitigation strategies implemented by the Coast Guard have had a
    number of impacts on operational hours, operating and maintenance
    costs, patrol boat crews, and mission performance, both positive and
    negative. On the positive side, these mitigation strategies
    collectively added approximately 21,000 operational hours to District 7
    in fiscal year 2007. Its mitigation strategy to double crew eight 110-
    foot patrol boats, for example, added approximately 5,200 of the 21,000
    operational hours. While these mitigation strategies have replaced lost
    operational hours to District 7 in fiscal year 2007, and are projected
    to provide additional operational hours in future years, they have also
    had some negative effects Coast Guard-wide, in terms of operating and
    maintenance costs, crew training, and mission performance. For
    instance, double crewing the eight 110-foot patrol boats increased
    operations, fuel, and maintenance costs by approximately $2.6 million
    over a 1-year period. Additional operating and maintenance costs for
    implementing these mitigation strategies include (1) $10.5 million
    annually to extend the use of three Navy 179-foot patrol coastals for 3
    years through fiscal year 2011; (2) $0.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to
    support efforts to increase the operational hours of the 87-foot patrol
    boats in District 7; (3) $30 million in fiscal year 2008 to acquire
    four new 87-foot patrol boats, plus an additional $7 million to $9
    million annually to operate; and (4) $8 million to shorten the duration
    of the maintenance and upgrade project for the 110-foot patrol boat
    fleet. While the patrol boat crews in District 7 have generally held a
    positive view of double crewing in terms of the reduced number of
    operational hours for each crew and the enhanced maintenance support,
    officers from two of the four double-crewed patrol boats we spoke with
    said that this strategy has resulted in less time for certain training
    that crews can only complete while they have access to a vessel.
    Finally, given the Coast Guard's limited assets, increasing the
    operational hours in District 7 has reduced the operational hours in
    some other districts and has adversely affected the performance of some
    missions in other districts. For example, officials from districts that
    periodically deploy some of their vessels to District 7 told us that
    this has challenged their ability to fully enforce domestic fishing
    laws and regulations in their own districts.

    While the mitigation strategies the Coast Guard has implemented are
    achieving results in the near-term, the Coast Guard faces a number of
    issues, such as greater resource and maintenance needs, that could
    potentially affect its ability to sustain these strategies for the
    longer-term. First, according to the Coast Guard, the continued
    operation of District 7's eight double-crewed patrol boats for a higher
    number of operational hours will depend largely on the success and
    funding of its augmented maintenance support program. Second, any
    unexpected delays or reductions in funding in the maintenance and
    upgrade project for its 110-foot patrol boats could potentially result
    in some patrol boats remaining in maintenance longer, thus further
    reducing the number of available operational hours. Potential delays
    are a valid concern given that the maintenance and upgrade project for
    two of the five patrol boats completed to date were extended beyond the
    originally scheduled dates. The Coast Guard is also challenged to
    determine the extent to which it can continue to sacrifice or delay the
    performance of certain missions in some districts to bolster mission
    performance in District 7. Further, while the Coast Guard is using $30
    million it was appropriated via emergency supplemental appropriations
    in 2007[Footnote 3] to mitigate its patrol boat operational hour gap to
    purchase four new 87-foot patrol boats that are to be operational in
    fiscal year 2009, these boats are not as capable as the 110-foot patrol
    boats. Thus, longer-term sustainability of the mitigation strategies
    will be more difficult if the Coast Guard faces any potential delays
    beyond 2010 in acquiring and deploying the first FRCs. Finally, these
    mitigation strategies are being implemented at the same time that the
    Coast Guard is also facing expanding requirements across various Coast
    Guard missions that will require additional resources. For example, in
    March 2008, we testified that the Coast Guard is facing a need to hire
    and train new staff for a variety of maritime security missions.
    [Footnote 4]

    We provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard for review. In an e-mail
    received June 11, 2008, the DHS liaison stated that DHS concurred with
    the report. The U.S. Coast Guard provided written technical comments
    that were incorporated into the report as appropriate.

    Background:

    Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard and Its 110-foot Patrol Boats:

    The Coast Guard is an Armed Service of the United States and the only
    military organization within DHS. It is the principle federal agency
    responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental
    stewardship through multimission resources, authorities, and
    capabilities. In its fiscal year 2009 posture statement, the Coast
    Guard reported having over 49,100 full-time positions--about 42,000
    military and 7,100 civilians. In addition, the agency reported that it
    has about 8,100 reservists who support the national military strategy
    or provide additional operational support and surge capacity during
    times of emergency, such as natural disasters. The Coast Guard also
    reported that it uses the services of about 29,000 volunteer auxiliary
    personnel who conduct a wide array of activities, ranging from search
    and rescue to boating safety education. As discussed earlier, the Coast
    Guard's two major commands (Pacific Area and Atlantic Area) are
    organized into nine districts which, in turn, are organized into 35
    sectors that are responsible for the command and control of field units
    and resources. Figure 1 shows the locations of the Coast Guard's Area
    Commands and districts.

    Figure 1: Locations of the Coast Guard's Area Commands and Districts:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a map of the United States depicting the locations of
    the Coast Guard's Area Commands and Districts. The following specific
    locations are noted:

    Headquarters:
    Washington, DC.

    District One: Atlantic area;
    District office: Boston, MA.

    District 5: Atlantic area;
    District and area office: Portsmouth, VA.

    District 7: Atlantic area;
    District office: Miami, FL.

    District 8: Atlantic area;
    District office: New Orleans, LA.

    District 9: Atlantic area;
    District Office: Cleveland, OH.

    District 11: Pacific area;
    District and area office: Alameda, CA.

    District 13: Pacific area;
    District office: Seattle, WA.

    District 14: Pacific area;
    District office: Honolulu, HA.

    District 17: Pacific area;
    District office: Juneau, AK.

    Source: GAO (map art, analysis); MapResources (map); U.S. Coast Guard
    (data).

    [End of figure]

    The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under two broad
    missions--homeland security and nonhomeland security. The Coast Guard
    responsibilities are further divided into 11 programs, as shown in
    table 2.

    Table 2: The Coast Guard's Homeland Security and Nonhomeland Security
    Missions:

    Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: Ports,
    waterways, and coastal security;
    Program activities and functions: Conducting harbor patrols,
    vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and
    other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage
    from attacks that occur.

    Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: Migrant
    interdiction;
    Program activities and functions: Deploying cutters and aircraft to
    reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the United States by
    maritime routes.

    Mission and program: Homeland security mission-programs: Defense
    readiness;
    Program activities and functions: Participating with the Department of
    Defense (DOD) in global military operations, deploying cutters and
    other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force mobilization
    operations.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Search and
    rescue;
    Program activities and functions: Operating multimission stations and a
    national distress and response communication system, conducting search
    and rescue operations for mariners in distress.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Living
    marine resources;
    Program activities and functions: Enforcing domestic fishing laws and
    regulations through inspections and fishery patrols.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Aids to
    navigation;
    Program activities and functions: Managing U.S. waterways and providing
    a safe, efficient, and navigable marine transportation system,
    maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids, monitoring marine
    traffic through vessel traffic service centers.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Ice
    operations;
    Program activities and functions: Conducting polar operations to
    facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in support of
    scientific and national security activity, conducting domestic
    icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round commerce, conducting
    international ice operations to track icebergs below the 48th north
    latitude.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Marine
    environmental protection;
    Program activities and functions: Preventing and responding to marine
    oil and chemical spills, preventing the illegal dumping of plastics and
    garbage in U.S. waters, preventing biological invasions by aquatic
    nuisance species.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Marine
    safety;
    Program activities and functions: Setting standards and conducting
    vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers and crew
    aboard commercial vessels, partnering with states and boating safety
    organizations to reduce recreational boating deaths.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Drug
    interdiction;
    Program activities and functions: Deploying cutters and aircraft in
    high drug-trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to reduce the
    flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes.

    Mission and program: Nonhomeland security mission-programs: Other law
    enforcement;
    Program activities and functions: Protecting U.S. fishing grounds by
    ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally harvest U.S. fish
    stocks. (Note: Prior to fiscal year 2005, the Other Law Enforcement
    mission area contained the Enforcement of Laws and Treaties-Other
    employment category which captured those law enforcement activities
    that did not fall under drug interdiction, fisheries enforcement, or
    migration interdiction operations).

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    [End of table]

    The Coast Guard uses its 110-foot patrol boats to perform a wide
    variety of missions, most notably interdiction of illicit drugs and
    undocumented migrants; defense operations (via six selected patrol
    boats deployed to the Persian Gulf); ports, waterways, and coastal
    security; and living marine resources (i.e., enforcement of domestic
    fishing laws and regulations). The 110-foot patrol boats have
    traditionally each had an annual operational hour ceiling of 1,800
    hours,[Footnote 5] except for those stationed ("homeported") in
    District 7 (Miami, Florida), which are supported by maintenance
    augmentation teams to support an operational hour ceiling of up to
    2,200 hours per year.[Footnote 6] Figures 2 and 3 show the operational
    hours provided by the 110-foot patrol boat fleet, by mission, for
    fiscal years 2003 through 2007, both Coast Guard-wide and in District 7
    only.

    Figure 2: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for All
    Coast Guard 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:

    Defense readiness: 23.26%;
    Migrant interdiction: 21.59%;
    Living marine resource: 18%;
    Ports, waterways, and coastal security: 12.15%;
    Drug interdiction: 10.3%;
    Support: 8.93%;
    Other: 5.77%.

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data).

    Notes: "Other" includes the following missions:
    Other law enforcement (foreign fisheries enforcement): 2.52%;
    Search and rescue: 2.37%;
    Marine safety: 0.82%;
    Aids to navigation: 0.03%;
    Marine environmental protection: 0.03%.

    The Support mission includes training; public affairs; and cooperation
    with federal, state, and local agencies.

    The Defense readiness hours include the six patrol boats operating in
    the Persian Gulf. These vessels account for 96.92 percent of the total
    110-foot patrol boat Defense readiness hours for fiscal years 2003-
    2007.

    While this chart shows the percentage of total operational hours logged
    by the 110-foot patrol boats over a 5-year period, there can be
    significant year-to-year variation in operational hour totals due to
    shifting mission priorities, the use of other vessels in filling
    certain missions, and other factors.

    In conducting missions, Coast Guard vessels log the amount of
    operational hours deployed by mission while on patrol. However, the
    Coast Guard's system for tracking operational hours only captures hours
    logged in support of the primary mission that a vessel conducts while
    on patrol; thus, any secondary missions that may have been performed on
    a patrol by these multimission vessels would not necessarily be
    reflected in operational hour data.

    [End of figure]

    Figure 3: Percentage of Operational Hours Logged by Mission for
    District 7 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:

    Migrant interdiction: 47.01%;
    Drug interdiction: 17.84%;
    Defense readiness: 16.34%;
    Other: 9.64%;
    Support: 9.17%.

    Notes: "Other" includes the following missions:
    Living marine resources: 3.45%;
    Other law enforcement (foreign fisheries enforcement): 2.70%;
    Search and rescue: 1.86%;
    Ports, waterways, and coastal security: 1.14%;
    Marine safety: 0.46%;
    Aids to navigation: 0.03%.

    The Support mission includes training; public affairs; and cooperation
    with federal, state, and local agencies.

    The Defense readiness hours include the two District 7 patrol boats
    operating in the Persian Gulf. These two patrol boats account for 96.7
    percent of all District 7 110-foot patrol boat Defense readiness hours.

    While this chart shows the percentage of total operational hours logged
    by the 110-foot patrol boats over a 5-year period, there can be
    significant year-to-year variation in operational hour totals due to
    shifting mission priorities, the use of other vessels in filling
    certain missions, and other factors.

    In conducting missions, Coast Guard vessels log the amount of
    operational hours deployed by mission while on patrol. However, the
    Coast Guard's system for tracking operational hours only captures hours
    logged in support of the primary mission that a vessel conducts while
    on patrol; thus, any secondary missions that may have been performed on
    a patrol by these multimission vessels would not necessarily be
    reflected in operational hour data.

    [End of figure]

    Evolution of the Deepwater Program:

    The Coast Guard began the Deepwater program in the mid-1990s as the
    largest acquisition program in the Coast Guard's history and it has
    evolved over time in terms of the mix and number of assets to be
    acquired, and the schedule for delivery. The Deepwater program involves
    modernizing and acquiring a number of aircraft; vessels; and command,
    control, communications, computer, intelligence surveillance, and
    reconnaissance systems to improve the Coast Guard's ability to achieve
    its variety of missions. Rather than using a traditional acquisition
    approach of replacing individual classes of legacy vessels and aircraft
    through a series of individual acquisitions, the Coast Guard chose a
    system-of-systems strategy that would replace the legacy assets with a
    single, integrated package.[Footnote 7] To carry out this acquisition,
    the Coast Guard awarded the competitive contract to a systems
    integrator, which for the Deepwater program, was a contractor composed
    of two major companies acting as a joint venture, responsible for
    designing, constructing, deploying, supporting, and integrating the
    various assets to meet projected Deepwater operational requirements at
    the lowest possible costs, either directly or through subcontractors.
    However, after experiencing a number of management challenges under the
    systems integrator approach, the Coast Guard has recognized that it
    needs to increase government oversight and has begun to transfer system
    integration and program management responsibilities back to the Coast
    Guard. Our prior reports on the Deepwater program are listed in the
    Related GAO Products section at the end of this report.

    The Coast Guard currently operates 41 110-foot patrol boats that will
    ultimately be replaced under the Deepwater program. Of the 41 110-foot
    patrol boats in the Coast Guard's fleet, 28 are homeported in districts
    within the Atlantic Area Command's area of responsibility (17 of those
    in District 7), while the remaining 13 are homeported in districts
    within the Pacific Area Command's area of responsibility. See appendix
    II for further details on the location of the Coast Guard's 110-foot
    patrol boat fleet.

    Conversion of 110-foot Patrol Boats to 123-foot Patrol Boats:

    Between January 2001 and November 2006, numerous events contributed to
    the difficulties the Coast Guard experienced with its strategy to
    convert its legacy 110-foot patrol boats into more capable 123-foot
    patrol boats. In January 2001, an independent study found that the 110-
    foot patrol boats based in south Florida and Puerto Rico were
    experiencing severe hull corrosion and that their structural integrity
    was deteriorating rapidly.[Footnote 8] To address these structural
    issues, the Coast Guard's original (2002) Deepwater plan included a
    strategy to convert all of its fleet of then 49 110-foot patrol boats
    into 123-foot patrol boats to repair the hulls and provide additional
    capabilities, such as small boat launch-and-recovery capabilities from
    a stern ramp; and enhanced and improved command, control,
    communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance. The first patrol boat conversion was completed in March
    2004, on the Matagorda, with additional post-delivery maintenance
    taking place from May through September 2004.

    Despite the additional maintenance, however, the Matagorda and other
    converted 123-foot patrol boats experienced structural and operational
    problems that ultimately led to their removal from service in late
    2006. On September 10, 2004, while in transit from Key West to Miami,
    Florida, to evade a hurricane, the Matagorda experienced hull and deck
    buckling. By March 2005, five other converted 123-foot patrol boats
    also began experiencing similar hull deformations. As a result of
    structural deformations experienced on these five converted patrol
    boats, in April 2005, the Coast Guard imposed operational restrictions
    on all of its 123-foot patrol boats, which it had previously lifted
    after completing a structural upgrade developed and installed after the
    September 2004 Matagorda hull and deck buckling. These restrictions
    specified that the converted patrol boats could not operate and were
    required to return to port in seas with wave heights exceeding 8 feet
    (they were originally intended to operate in seas up to roughly 13
    feet) and that they had to operate at reduced speeds for any seas
    greater than 3 to 4 feet. In June 2005, due to continued problems with
    the hulls and their inability to meet post-9/11 mission requirements,
    the Coast Guard halted the 123-foot patrol boat conversions. Despite
    the operational restrictions in place, a number of the converted 123-
    foot patrol boats continued to experience hull and deck buckling and
    other issues affecting operational capabilities, leading the Coast
    Guard to ultimately remove all eight boats from service on November 30,
    2006, because of continued operational and safety concerns. Then, on
    April 17, 2007, the Coast Guard announced its decision to permanently
    decommission the 123-foot patrol boats.

    Patrol Boat Sustainment Efforts:

    Prior to and during the patrol boat conversions, the Coast Guard took
    measures to strengthen the condition of its patrol boat fleet.
    Specifically, in 2002, the Coast Guard initiated its Hull Sustainment
    Project as an extended drydock developed to target the deteriorating
    hulls of its 110-foot patrol boats. As time went on, the Hull
    Sustainment Project grew to include other work beyond hull replacement
    and its name was changed to the Hull Bridging Sustainment Project. From
    March 2002 to June 2006, 11 of the 110-foot patrol boats went through
    the Hull Bridging Sustainment Project.

    In April 2006, in an effort to mitigate increased maintenance hours and
    costs, the Coast Guard initiated the Mission Effectiveness Project
    (MEP) for the 110-foot patrol boats. The MEP was designed to modernize
    or replace obsolete and unsupportable hull, mechanical, and electrical
    equipment--such as hull plating and underwater appendages, pumps,
    motors, piping, generators, and power distribution equipment. The Coast
    Guard plans to induct a total of 20 110-foot patrol boats into the MEP
    through February 2013.[Footnote 9] As of May 2008, five 110-foot patrol
    boats have completed the MEP. Through fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard
    has been funded a total of $109.7 million for this initiative and
    estimates that it will need an additional $56.3 million through fiscal
    year 2012, for a total estimated MEP cost of $166 million.[Footnote 10]

    Development and Procurement of the FRC:

    The ultimate long-term replacement for the 110-foot patrol boat fleet,
    the FRC, has experienced challenges in its development. The FRC,
    originally envisioned as a 140-foot cutter built largely of composite
    materials rather than steel, was initially scheduled to be delivered
    beginning in 2018.[Footnote 11] In light of the problems encountered
    with the patrol boat conversions in 2005, the Coast Guard accelerated
    the design and delivery of the first FRC to 2007. However, in February
    2006, design work on a composite-hulled FRC was suspended due to design
    risks, including excessive weight and horsepower requirements compared
    with standard patrol boats.[Footnote 12]

    To address the FRC delays, the Coast Guard elected to move ahead with a
    dual path approach. First, the Coast Guard plans to acquire a
    commercial "off-the-shelf" patrol boat design (the FRC-B) that it can
    modify to meet its requirements. In June 2007, the Coast Guard issued a
    Request for Proposals for the FRC-B, and expects to award the FRC-B
    contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008, with the lead
    vessel to be delivered by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. Coast
    Guard officials have stated that the goal is to acquire 12 FRC-Bs by
    2012 and have the last of these 12 FRC-Bs operational by the second
    quarter of fiscal year 2013.

    The second part of the Coast Guard's dual path approach is to acquire a
    redesigned FRC (the FRC-A) that would meet all of its requirements. In
    March 2008, we reported that Coast Guard officials recommended that the
    Coast Guard not pursue acquisition of an FRC-A design that includes
    unproven composite hull technology.[Footnote 13] This recommendation
    was based largely on a third-party analysis that found the composite
    technology unlikely to meet the desired 35-year service life under the
    Coast Guard's operational conditions. Further, officials believe that
    the use of the proposed composite materials would not offset high
    initial acquisition costs, as initially proposed.

    We have reported on the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program, as well as
    related maintenance and operational issues, since 1998. A complete list
    of related GAO products can be found at the end of this report.

    Loss of Patrol Boats Has Exacerbated the Coast Guard's Operational Hour
    Shortage, and the Coast Guard Has Implemented a Number of Strategies to
    Mitigate This Loss:

    For years, the Coast Guard has faced a gap between the expected and
    actual operational hours provided by its fleet of 110-foot and 123-foot
    patrol boats. The loss of the 123-foot patrol boats has only served to
    worsen this gap. As a result of this loss, the Coast Guard implemented
    a number of strategies in fiscal year 2007 designed to mitigate the
    loss of the 123-foot patrol boats and help fill the patrol boat
    operational hour gap.

    Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats Has Heightened the Coast Guard's
    Patrol Boat Operational Hour Gap:

    The loss of the 123-foot patrol boats has exacerbated the existing gap
    between the Coast Guard's operational hour targets for its fleet of
    patrol boats and what it was achieving. In particular, in 1998, the
    Coast Guard established an annual target of 99,400 operational hours to
    achieve from its then fleet of 49 110-foot patrol boats. Then, in 2004,
    the Coast Guard updated its annual patrol boat operational hour target
    to 174,000 hours based on its plan to achieve 3,000 operational hours
    from each of the 58 new Fast Response Cutters to be deployed as part of
    the Deepwater Program.[Footnote 14] Data provided by the Coast Guard
    show that since fiscal year 2000, the Coast Guard has fallen short of
    both target levels, with domestic 110-foot patrol boat operational
    hours declining from approximately 87,719 hours in fiscal year 2003 to
    63,318 hours in fiscal year 2006, before increasing slightly in fiscal
    year 2007, as shown in figure 4.

    Figure 4: Contributions of 110-foot and 123-foot Patrol Boats and 179-
    foot Patrol Coastals Toward Meeting the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat
    Operational Hour Targets during Fiscal Years 2003 through 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a stacked line chart depicting the following data:

    1998 target: 99,400 hours;
    2004 revised target: 174,000 hours;
    Operational hour gap: difference between actual operational hours and
    target levels.

    Year: 2003;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 87,719 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 0 operational hours.
    179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours.

    Year: 2004;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 75,654 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 251 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours.

    Year: 2005;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 64,821 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 7,184 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 9,004 operational hours.

    Year: 2006;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 63,318 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 10,749 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 10,728 operational hours.

    Year: 2007;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 66,603 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 2,165 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 13,396 operational hours.

    Notes:

    This figure excludes the operational hours of 110-foot patrol boats
    currently deployed to the Persian Gulf.

    The 1998 target (99,400 hours) refers to the patrol boat operational
    hour target, as defined by the Coast Guard, that was used as the
    original basis for patrol boat capacity replacement under the original
    Deepwater system approach.

    The 2004 revised target is based on the Coast Guard's post-9/11
    reassessment of its patrol boat mission needs. This reassessment
    established a new annual patrol boat target of 174,000 operational
    hours, which the Coast Guard planned to achieve by acquiring 58 FRCs to
    operate 3,000 hours each annually.

    [End of figure]

    In addition to this overall decrease in operational hours by the 110-
    foot patrol boat fleet, the 123-foot patrol boats, when they operated,
    also faced a gap between expected and actual operational hours.
    Specifically, the eight 123-foot patrol boats were expected to
    collectively provide 20,000 annual operational hours. However, due to
    structural and mechanical problems, the 123-foot patrol boats provided
    only about half that target--approximately 10,000 operational hours--in
    fiscal year 2006, the last full fiscal year in which they operated,
    before being removed from service in early fiscal year 2007.

    Two additional factors have affected the patrol boat operational gap
    since fiscal year 2003. First, beginning in March 2003, up to six 110-
    foot patrol boats have contributed to the joint U.S. Navy and Coast
    Guard National Fleet Policy and the Coast Guard's general defense
    mission by operating in the Persian Gulf. Two of these six vessels were
    previously stationed and operating in District 7, while the other four
    were previously based in other Atlantic Area Districts. While these
    vessels have provided operational hours in support of this mission,
    these vessels have not been available to the Coast Guard for planned
    domestic missions. As a result, their loss also contributes to the gap
    in patrol boat operational hours. Second, as many as four 110-foot
    patrol boats have been unavailable at any one time because they were
    undergoing planned maintenance and upgrades as part of the 110-foot
    patrol boat MEP. As discussed earlier, the MEP was implemented in April
    2006 to modernize or replace obsolete and unsupportable hull,
    mechanical, and electrical equipment for select 110-foot patrol boats.
    Going forward, three rather than four 110-foot patrol boats are
    projected to undergo the MEP at any given time through fiscal year
    2013. During this period, at least one vessel in the program is
    expected to be from District 7.

    The loss of the 123-foot patrol boats, when combined with the two
    factors mentioned above, left the Coast Guard--and District 7 in
    particular--about 20,000 operational hours short of the 1998
    operational hour baseline each year from fiscal years 2003 through
    2007. Further, in addition to the loss of operational hours--which the
    Coast Guard has taken steps to mitigate, as discussed later--having
    eight fewer vessels available to perform operations has negative
    effects that are difficult to quantify. For example, having eight fewer
    vessels means that the deterrence factor of having more vessels visible
    on the water is lost, and there are fewer vessels available to surge to
    areas of high demand, if needed. Officials from one District noted that
    the Coast Guard can surge resources well when needed, but having eight
    fewer vessels leaves the Coast Guard "thin to barren" in other areas
    should additional threats emerge. In addition, a Coast Guard official
    has noted that in the event of a major failure (e.g., major hole in the
    hull or the vessel running aground) on one of the double-crewed 110-
    foot patrol boats, the impact would be even greater, as District 7
    would then temporarily lose the services of two patrol boat crews
    rather than just one.

    The Coast Guard Has Implemented a Number of Strategies to Mitigate the
    Loss of the 123-foot Patrol Boats:

    Upon the removal of the 123-foot patrol boats from service in November
    2006, the Coast Guard took action to implement a number of strategies
    to mitigate the loss of the patrol boats and their operational hours.
    These strategies include the following:

    * Double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats stationed in District 7:
    The double crewing concept began in February 2007 and has become one of
    the most significant strategies in terms of increasing patrol boat
    operational hours in District 7. Under this strategy, the eight crews
    that previously operated each of the 123-foot patrol boats are being
    used to alternate operational time with the crews already operating
    eight 110-foot patrol boats. For example, a St. Petersburg crew will
    operate a 110-foot patrol boat--stationed in St. Petersburg--on a 21-
    day patrol and then bring the vessel into port at Key West, Florida.
    For 7 days, the St. Petersburg crew and maintenance staff will perform
    maintenance on the vessel and prepare it to change command over to the
    Key West-based crew. The Key West-based crew will then operate the
    vessel for 21 days and bring it into port at St. Petersburg, beginning
    the crew rotation cycle again. The Coast Guard implemented this
    strategy expecting to gain additional operational hours from these 110-
    foot patrol boats. During fiscal year 2008, this strategy has evolved
    into what the Coast Guard calls a "high tempo, high maintenance"
    organization for its double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats in District 7.
    The Coast Guard is also using a new approach to contract for major
    maintenance and providing additional staff to conduct patrol boat
    maintenance in support of District 7, to provide a greater level of
    maintenance support to the double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats.
    Specifically, the Coast Guard plans to accelerate the maintenance cycle
    of the double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats by hiring 45 new maintenance
    and engineering support staff.[Footnote 15] The explanatory statement
    [Footnote 16] accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008
    directed additional funding in fiscal year 2008 to pilot this more
    intensive maintenance regime.[Footnote 17] The Coast Guard expects that
    this "high tempo, high maintenance" approach will provide an even
    greater number of operational hours than the double-crewing model
    implemented during fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 18]

    * Periodic deployment of vessels from other districts: The Coast
    Guard's Atlantic Area Command coordinated the deployment of a number of
    vessels under its operational command to District 7 in an effort to
    increase operational hours and help meet mission requirements for
    District 7 during fiscal year 2007. Specifically, medium endurance
    cutters and the 179-foot patrol coastals were periodically deployed
    from Districts 1, 5, and 8, and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South
    to District 7's areas of responsibility to increase the available
    operational hours and help perform certain important missions, such as
    interdiction of undocumented migrants.[Footnote 19] In addition, each
    of these districts periodically deployed vessels under its own control-
    -such as seagoing buoy tenders and 87-foot patrol boats--to District 7
    to assist in missions, such as undocumented migrant interdiction and
    search and rescue.[Footnote 20] The Coast Guard is continuing to
    implement some of these deployments during fiscal year 2008.

    * Retaining three Navy vessels through fiscal year 2011: The Coast
    Guard renewed an existing Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S. Navy to
    retain three of the five 179-foot patrol coastal class cutters on loan
    from the Navy through September 2011.[Footnote 21]

    * Increasing the operational hours of some 87-foot patrol boats: As
    another strategy to increase the availability of operational hours, in
    fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard increased the total number of hours
    each of the 11 87-foot patrol boats homeported in District 7 could
    operate annually from 1,800 to 2,000 hours.

    * Procuring four new 87-foot patrol boats: The Coast Guard has procured
    four new 87-foot patrol boats that are to be homeported in District 7.
    The Coast Guard estimates that these new patrol boats will be delivered
    beginning in September 2008, and anticipates operating each of these
    vessels at 1,800 hours per year, for a total of 7,200 hours.

    * Amending the 110-foot patrol boat MEP schedule: The Coast Guard is
    also amending the 110-foot patrol boat MEP schedule to reduce the
    number of patrol boats inducted each year into the MEP from four to
    three hulls and decrease the time of the MEP from 12 to 9 months.

    The Coast Guard's Mitigation Strategies Have Replaced Some Lost
    Operational Hours, but Have Adversely Affected Coast Guard Resources
    and the Performance of Some Missions:

    The mitigation strategies discussed have yielded some positive and
    negative impacts for the Coast Guard to date. On the positive side,
    these strategies have allowed the Coast Guard to recoup approximately
    21,000 operational hours towards replacing lost 123-foot patrol boat
    hours and filling its patrol boat operational hour gap. However, these
    strategies were not without adverse impacts. Particularly, some of
    these strategies have adversely affected operations and maintenance
    costs, time available for crew training, and mission performance in
    districts donating assets to District 7.

    The Coast Guard's Mitigation Strategies Have Provided Operational Hours
    towards the Patrol Boat Operational Hour Gap:

    As detailed in table 3, the mitigation strategies that the Coast Guard
    began to employ in fiscal year 2007 provided approximately 21,000
    additional operational hours toward District 7 operations.

    Table 3: Operational Hour Increases Resulting from the Strategies to
    Mitigate the Loss of the 123-Foot Patrol Boats in District 7:

    Strategy: Double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats in District 7
    (using crews originally on 123-foot patrol boats);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 5,220 hours; (Using February-September 2007 data on total
    operational hours minus District 7 operational hour ceiling);
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 11,200 hours annually; (Based on operational hour ceiling
    increase of 1,400 hours per cutter) under original double-crew
    initiative for fiscal year 2008; However, under the new high tempo,
    high maintenance model that has been adopted, the Coast Guard estimates
    this operational hour gain to be 14,400 hours annually, beginning in
    fiscal year 2009.

    Strategy: Periodic deployment of Area/District assets to District 7, as
    follows:[B,C];
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 6,521 hours; (Note: these hours were provided at the expense
    of the donor districts, as shown below);
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: N/A for Area assets; The impact of Area asset deployments
    cannot be estimated, as hours were apportioned before fiscal year 2008
    based on district need, whereas for fiscal year 2007, some hours had
    been allotted to districts but were deployed by Atlantic Area in
    support of District 7; District assets: 2,150 hours in fiscal year
    2008.

    Strategy: District 1: Seagoing buoy tender (District asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 500 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: District 1: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 264 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: District 5: Seagoing buoy tender (District asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]:419 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: District 5: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 540 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 500 hours in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: District 8: Seagoing buoy tender (District asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 548 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 350 hours in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: District 8: Six Coastal patrol boats (District asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 1,130 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 800 hours in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: District 8: Medium endurance cutters; (Area asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 2,420 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: [Empty].

    Strategy: District 8: Three U.S. Navy patrol coastals (Area asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 1,608 hours; (Note: These hours are not included in the
    Area/District periodic deployment total, as they are included in the
    "Renewal of Navy MOA" strategy above. These hours in this context
    simply reflect a loss of programmed hours to District 8);
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: [Empty].

    Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Medium endurance
    cutter; (Area asset);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 700 hours;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: No deployment in fiscal year 2008.

    Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Renewal of Memorandum
    of Agreement with U.S. Navy, to extend the use of three 179-foot patrol
    coastals from September 2008 until Sept 2011.[D];
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 6,743 hours; (Based on operational hour data. These three 179s
    are homeported in a District 8 homeport, but provided all fiscal year
    2007 hours in support of District 7);
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 7,500 hours annually; (Based on operational hour ceilings of
    2,500 hours for three vessels) from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal
    year 2011. (Note: These are Atlantic Area hours, and thus will likely
    be divided between District 7 and District 8).

    Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Increasing operational
    hour ceilings for 11 District 7 87- foot patrol boats (from 1,800 to
    2,00 hours);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 2,783 hours; (Using June-September 2007 operational hour data
    versus normal operational hour ceilings, as this strategy was formally
    approved on May 30, 2007);
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 2,200 hours; (Increase of 200 hours per vessel for 11
    vessels, assuming this option is carried forward for fiscal year 2008,
    which is still under discussion).

    Strategy: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Purchasing of four
    additional 87-foot patrol boats;
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: N/A; The first of these patrol boats is not projected to be
    delivered until September 2008;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 7,200 hours; (Likely not fully until fiscal year 2009, as
    they are being delivered in late fiscal year 2008).

    Strategy: MEP schedule alteration--reducing number of 110-foot patrol
    boats at any time from 4 to 3, and reducing their duration from 12
    months to 9 months;
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: N/A for fiscal year 2007; (Shortened MEP cycle not fully in
    effect until fiscal year 2008);
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 3,000 hours; (The impact of this operational hour gain will
    be spread throughout the Coast Guard, as many other Districts will have
    110-foot patrol boats in the MEP).

    Strategy: Total District 7 gain;
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 21,267;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 33,250 to 36,450[E].

    Strategy: Net overall gain; (excludes periodic deployment hours);
    Estimated operational hour increases in District 7 in fiscal year
    2007[A]: 14,746;
    Estimated annual operational hour increases in District 7 beyond fiscal
    year 2007: 31,100 to 34,300[E].

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data).

    [A] The Coast Guard allocates resource hours on an annual basis. Some
    figures in this table (estimated increases from double crewing and
    increasing District 7 87-foot patrol boat operational hour ceilings)
    were calculated by dividing annual resource hour allocations evenly
    across all months. It should be noted that actual resource hour usage
    is affected by seasonal factors and therefore, the operational hour
    gains shown would likely be different if seasonal trends (e.g.,
    increase in summer recreational boating activity, fishing season) were
    taken into account.

    [B] Certain vessels are under the command of the Area (e.g., high and
    medium endurance cutters, the patrol coastals from the Navy), while
    other vessels (e.g., buoy tenders, patrol boats) are under the command
    of districts. As such, deployment of area assets is dictated by the
    area command, while districts control the deployment and use of their
    own assets.

    [C] Operational hours do not include transit time from the donor
    districts to District 7 for fiscal year 2007. When transit time is
    added, District 1 estimated an additional 96 operational hours lost,
    District 5 estimated an additional 130 operational hours lost, and
    District 8 estimated an additional 599 operational hours lost in fiscal
    year 2007.

    [D] While the extension of the Memorandum of Agreement is considered
    one of the mitigation strategies, the use of the Navy 179-foot patrol
    coastals actually began in fiscal year 2005, with two 179-foot patrol
    coastals in District 8, and two in District 11. One additional 179-foot
    patrol coastal was added in District 8 for fiscal year 2006. While the
    hours received by the 179-foot patrol coastals in fiscal year 2007 were
    not technically a "new" result of the mitigation strategy, they do
    represent additional hours available to the Coast Guard to mitigate the
    loss of patrol boats. Any hours received from fiscal year 2009 forward
    (when the Memorandum of Agreement extension takes effect), could
    technically be considered part of the mitigation strategies.

    [E] The estimated operational hour gains for future years are presented
    as a range, depending on whether the original double-crewing model or
    high tempo, high maintenance model is in effect.

    [End of table]

    More details on the realized and projected operational hour gains of
    these mitigation strategies are as follows:

    * Double crewing of 110-foot patrol boats added 5,220 operational hours
    in District 7 in fiscal year 2007: From February 2007, when the Coast
    Guard formally implemented the double-crewing model on eight 110-foot
    patrol boats, through September 2007, double crewing provided the Coast
    Guard with approximately 5,220 operational hours above the standard
    number of operational hours targeted for District 7 patrol boats for 8
    months. When adopting the double-crewing approach, the Coast Guard
    expected that this strategy would allow it to increase the number of
    annual operational hours from 2,200 to 3,600 per vessel, for a total
    projected increase of 11,200 hours. Conversely, the personnel tempo for
    the crews is reduced, as each crew now operates at 1,800 hours per
    year.[Footnote 22] The 5,220 hour gain fell short of the Coast Guard's
    anticipated gain over an 8-month period, which a Coast Guard official
    attributed to the fact that several of the vessels did not begin double
    crewing until late February or March 2007, and that one of the double-
    crewed vessels was in an extended maintenance period.[Footnote 23]
    However, the high tempo, high maintenance model discussed earlier--
    which the Coast Guard expects to be fully implemented by the start of
    fiscal year 2009--has increased this operational hour target even
    further. Specifically, the Coast Guard expects that this initiative
    will allow it to operate the eight double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats
    at 4,000 operational hours per year (with each crew providing 2,000
    hours). This projects to a total increase of 3,200 operational hours
    over the original double-crewing approach (400 additional hours for
    eight vessels). Overall, the high tempo, high maintenance model is
    projected to result in a total operational hour gain of 14,400
    operational hours over normal District 7 110-foot patrol boat
    operational hour standards.[Footnote 24] The Coast Guard anticipates
    that this strategy will remain in place until all 12 of the FRC-Bs are
    obtained--which is currently estimated in fiscal year 2012--as long as
    funding remains available in the out years.[Footnote 25]

    * Periodic deployment of vessels from other districts added 6,521
    operational hours in District 7 in fiscal year 2007: As shown in table
    3, the periodic deployment of Area and District assets contributed
    6,521 hours to District 7 operations in fiscal year 2007. Periodic
    deployments of vessels into District 7 from other districts are
    expected to continue in fiscal year 2008. While table 3 provides
    current estimates of these transfers for fiscal year 2007, the
    contributions of Atlantic Area Command assets to District 7 at the
    expense of other Atlantic Area districts in fiscal year 2008 cannot be
    estimated. The Atlantic Area Command already took programmed
    operational hours into account when planning its asset allocation for
    fiscal year 2008. For a graphical representation of the fiscal year
    2007 vessel deployments to District 7, see appendix III.

    * Three Navy vessels added 6,743 operational hours in District 7 in
    fiscal year 2007: The three 179-foot Navy patrol coastals under
    Atlantic Area control provided 6,743 operational hours, all for
    District 7 operations, in fiscal year 2007. The Coast Guard estimates
    that these vessels will annually provide an additional 7,500
    operational hours to the Area Command during fiscal years 2008 through
    2011. In addition to the operational hour gains, Coast Guard analysis
    of the 179-foot patrol coastals indicates that these vessels have
    superior range, speed, and endurance compared to the 110-foot and 123-
    foot patrol boats and are considered outstanding assets to combat
    illegal "go-fast" smuggling vessels that typically run 40+ knots.
    According to one District official, the 179-foot patrol coastals could
    also be used for ports, waterways, and coastal security; living marine
    resources; and other law enforcement missions. The 179-foot patrol
    coastals were used primarily in support of the migrant interdiction
    mission in District 7 in fiscal year 2007.

    * Increasing the operational hour ceiling of some 87-foot patrol boats
    added 2,783 operational hours in District 7 in fiscal year 2007: Adding
    200 hours to the operational hour ceiling of each of the 11 District 7
    87-foot patrol boats would annually add 2,200 operational hours. As
    shown in table 3, the District 7 87-foot patrol boats provided 2,783
    hours above normal operational hour ceilings for the time frame in
    which this strategy was formally approved (i.e., June-September 2007)
    in fiscal year 2007.[Footnote 26] District 7 intends to keep the 2,000
    operational hour ceiling for its 87-foot patrol boats in fiscal year
    2008, but is awaiting approval from the Atlantic Area Command.

    * Procuring four new 87-foot patrol boats may add 7,200 operational
    hours annually in District 7: These four patrol boats, all of which
    will be stationed in District 7, could collectively provide an
    additional 7,200 operational hours annually (i.e., four patrol boats
    operating at 1,800 hours each) to help offset the lost 123-foot patrol
    boat operational hours.

    * Amending the 110-foot patrol boat MEP schedule may add 3,000
    operational hours annually Coast Guard-wide: Amending the MEP schedule
    will reduce both the number of patrol boats in the MEP at any one time,
    as well as the amount of time that the patrol boats spend in the MEP.
    The Coast Guard estimates that this will recoup approximately 3,000
    operational hours per year, but not limited to District 7. Since the
    first vessel to go through the amended MEP was in the program from June
    2007 through February 2008, the amended MEP schedule will not provide
    significant additional operational hours to the Coast Guard until later
    in fiscal year 2008.

    These strategies have provided a number of operational hours to replace
    lost 123-foot patrol boat hours, and in turn, help to fill the Coast
    Guard's patrol boat operational hour gap. Figure 5 shows how the
    mitigation strategies have helped District 7 replace the 123-foot
    patrol boat operational hour target of 20,000 hours in fiscal year
    2007.

    Figure 5: Impact of the Mitigation Strategies on Replacing 123-foot
    Patrol Boat Operational Hours for Fiscal Year 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:

    Fiscal year: 2007;
    123-foot patrol boats target: 20,000 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 6743 operational hours;
    Vessel deployments: 6521 operational hours;
    Double-crewing gains: 5220 operational hours;
    Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 2783 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 2165 operational hours;
    Total: 23,432 operational hours.

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Cost Guard (data).

    According to a Coast Guard official, the three 179-foot patrol coastals
    homeported in Pascagoula, Mississippi (District 8) provided all fiscal
    year 2007 operational hours in support of District 7.

    The vessel deployments refer to Area (medium endurance cutters, patrol
    coastals) and District (buoy tenders, patrol boats) vessel deployments
    that were shifted to District 7, primarily in support of the migrant
    interdiction mission, and were done at the expense of the "donor"
    districts.

    [End of figure]

    These mitigation strategies helped District 7 to recover operational
    hours from the loss of the 123-foot patrol boats, and also helped the
    Coast Guard fill some of its overall patrol boat operational hour gap
    in fiscal year 2007, as illustrated in figure 6. However, any hours
    gained from periodic vessel deployments came at the expense of other
    districts in the Coast Guard, and hours gained from additional 87-foot
    patrol boat operations, while important, do not provide as many
    capabilities (e.g., endurance, fuel capacity, crew size) as 110-foot
    patrol boats.

    Figure 6: Domestic Patrol Boat Operational Hours Coast Guard-wide,
    Including Mitigation Strategy Contributions, Fiscal Years 2003 through
    2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a stacked line graph depicting the following data:

    1998 target: 99,400 hours;
    2004 revised target: 174,000 hours;
    Operational hour gap: difference between actual operational hours and
    target levels.

    Fiscal year: 2003;
    Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours;
    Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 0 operational hours;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 87,719 operational hours.

    Fiscal year: 2004;
    Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours;
    Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 0 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 251 operational hours;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 75,654 operational hours.

    Fiscal year: 2005;
    Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours;
    Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 9,004 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 7,184 operational hours;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 64821 operational hours.

    Fiscal year: 2006;
    Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 0 operational hours;
    Vessel deployments: 0 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 10,728 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 10,749 operational hours;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 63,318 operational hours.

    Fiscal year: 2007;
    Increased 87-foot patrol boat hours: 2,783 operational hours;
    Vessel deployments: 6,521 operational hours;
    179-foot patrol coastals: 13,396 operational hours;
    123-foot patrol boats: 2,165 operational hours;
    Domestic 110-foot patrol boats: 66,603 operational hours;

    Notes: Any gains from 110-foot patrol boat double crewing are reflected
    in the operational hour totals.

    The vessel deployments refer to Area (medium endurance cutters, patrol
    coastals) and District (buoy tenders, and patrol boats) vessel
    deployments that were shifted to District 7, primarily in support of
    the migrant interdiction mission, and were done at the expense of the
    "donor" districts.

    Though the Coast Guard considers the increase in 87-foot patrol boat
    operational hours part of the mitigation strategies, it must be noted
    that these vessels do not possess the capabilities (e.g., on-scene
    endurance, fuel capacity, crew size) of the 110-foot patrol boats, and
    thus are not a full replacement of those lost capabilities. As such,
    the Coast Guard does not include 87-foot patrol boat hours when
    presenting information to Congress regarding its patrol boat
    operational hour gap.

    [End of figure]

    The Mitigation Strategies Have Adversely Affected Operating and
    Maintenance Costs, Crew Training, and Mission Performance:

    In contrast with the operational hour gains discussed, the mitigation
    strategies have had Coast Guard-wide effects, including increased
    operating and maintenance costs; limited onboard, in port training for
    patrol boat crews; and a reduced capacity to perform some missions,
    such as living marine resources, in other districts.

    Mitigation Strategies Have Increased Operating and Maintenance Costs:

    Although the Coast Guard has broadened its use of existing assets and
    made plans to acquire new patrol boats to recover lost operational
    hours and vessels, these mitigation strategies have increased operating
    and maintenance costs. These operating and maintenance costs include
    the following:

    * Double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats has increased operating
    and maintenance costs: To support the increase in operational hours by
    double crewing eight 110-foot patrol boats in District 7, the Coast
    Guard reported spending $2.6 million more for operations, fuel, and
    maintenance from February 2007 through February 2008 compared to what
    it spent during a comparable period to support these eight patrol boats
    before double crewing. These costs were funded from existing 110-foot
    and 123-foot patrol boat accounts. In addition to increasing the number
    of maintenance personnel, other costs associated with double crewing
    the eight 110-foot patrol boats included increasing the amount of
    scheduled maintenance to improve patrol boat reliability and enhance
    the probability of reaching a targeted 3,600 operational hours per hull
    in fiscal year 2007. For fiscal year 2008, $11.5 million was
    congressionally directed to provide the Coast Guard additional
    maintenance support, which the Coast Guard stated it is using to
    support funding for 6 months of additional personnel and 9 months of
    operation and maintenance costs. This is intended to further increase
    the number of operational hours gained by double crewing 110-foot
    patrol boats in District 7 to 4,000 hours annually per hull.

    * Extended use of three Navy vessels will increase operating and
    personnel costs: The Coast Guard extended its memorandum of agreement
    with the U.S. Navy to use three Navy 179-foot patrol coastals through
    2011. The operating and personnel expenses to be paid by the Coast
    Guard are approximately $10.5 million annually for these three vessels.
    [Footnote 27]

    * Increasing operational hour ceilings for 87-foot patrol boats in
    District 7 increased operational, fuel, and maintenance costs: In
    fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard spent approximately $500,000 for
    operational, fuel, and maintenance costs to increase the annual
    operational hours of the 87-foot patrol boats homeported in District 7
    from 1,800 to 2,000. According to the Coast Guard, if this practice
    were to continue, it does not know exactly what the effects of the
    increased operational tempo will be on the condition and service lives
    of the 87-foot patrol boats. The Coast Guard added, though, that it
    anticipates that an increase in maintenance funding, as well as days to
    complete the maintenance, would be needed to combat the accelerated
    wear on the 87-foot patrol boats.

    * Purchasing four additional 87-foot patrol boats will increase
    operations and maintenance costs: The Coast Guard was provided $30
    million in supplemental funding to mitigate the patrol boat operational
    gap.[Footnote 28] The Coast Guard used the funding to acquire four new
    87-foot patrol boats in fiscal year 2008 for use in District 7.
    According to the Coast Guard, these four vessels cumulatively will cost
    an additional $7 million to $9 million annually to operate. While these
    new patrol boats should be of use in helping to close the operational
    gap by freeing up other, larger assets for missions, the 87-foot patrol
    boats have fewer capabilities and endurance than the 110-foot or 123-
    foot patrol boats. For example, 87-foot patrol boats are typically used
    closer to shore and cannot operate away from their homeports for as
    long as 110-foot patrol boats. While District 7 will benefit from
    having these vessels, the Coast Guard does not consider the 87-foot
    patrol boats to be adequate replacements for the larger, more capable
    110-foot patrol boats and, therefore, does not include their hours in
    calculating its patrol boat operational hour gap.

    * Amending the MEP schedule will increase maintenance costs: The Coast
    Guard anticipates a cost increase of approximately $500,000 per vessel,
    for a total of $8 million (16 vessels out of the total of 20 110-foot
    patrol boats that have been or are to be inducted in the MEP program
    are currently slated to go through the amended cycle).[Footnote 29]
    This cost increase was necessary to hire additional shift workers to
    shorten the MEP cycle. The Coast Guard states that this cost will be
    offset by not including the three 110-foot patrol boats homeported in
    District 14 (Hawaii or Guam) as part of the MEP.

    Mitigation Strategies Limit Onboard Crew Training:

    Coast Guard officers we interviewed who were assigned to the double-
    crewed 110-foot patrol boats in District 7 generally held a positive
    view of double crewing in terms of the reduced number of operational
    hours for each crew and the enhanced maintenance support; however,
    officers from two of the four double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats that
    we spoke with noted that this strategy has resulted in less time for
    certain onboard training that can only be completed while they have
    access to a vessel in port or underway. According to these officials,
    110-foot patrol boat crews in District 7 previously logged 2,200
    operational hours at sea away from port; however, crews on double-
    crewed patrol boats will each have about 1,800 hours at sea away from
    port, which is 400 fewer hours in which to train at sea onboard a
    vessel. For example, Coast Guard patrol boat crew members told us that
    double crewing has adversely affected training for some crew members,
    such as deck watch officers.[Footnote 30] To qualify as a deck watch
    officer, a crew member must generally work for a qualification period
    of 3 to 6 months, provided the crew member is underway on a vessel for
    8 to 12 days per month. Double crewing may extend this qualification
    period to about 6 to 9 months. However, potential delays may occur in
    the deck watch officer qualification process for a crew member because
    their vessel has been scheduled for a major maintenance overhaul. If a
    person has a 2 to 3 month delay because of maintenance, they may not be
    able to qualify prior to the transfer season, which may leave their
    crew short of deck watch officers. While some crew members may be
    assigned temporary duty to another patrol boat to log training hours,
    the Coast Guard acknowledges that this option is not always possible.
    Despite this concern though, officials from the Coast Guard's Office of
    Cutter Forces state that 1,800 operational hours is consistent with the
    same amount of time that all other non-District 7 110-foot patrol boats
    in the Coast Guard have to train members.

    Mitigation Strategies Adversely Affect Mission Performance in Districts
    Periodically Deploying Assets to District 7:

    Coast Guard officials indicated that the Coast Guard's strategy to
    periodically deploy Atlantic Area and district assets to District 7
    adversely affected the donating districts' ability to perform some
    missions. Coast Guard officials have also indicated that the living
    marine resources (i.e., fisheries enforcement) mission has seen the
    largest adverse impact from deployments of vessels from other districts
    to District 7. Additionally, in some instances, aids-to-navigation
    mission work was delayed. Table 4 provides more detailed information on
    the effects on mission performance for Districts 1, 5, and 8 as a
    result of periodically deploying vessels to District 7 in fiscal year
    2007.

    Table 4: Information on Periodic Vessel Deployments to District 7 and
    the Estimated Impacts on the Donating Districts' Missions During Fiscal
    Year 2007:

    Vessel deployments: District 1: 225-foot Seagoing buoy tender (District
    asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately three law enforcement
    boardings in support of living marine resources mission.

    Vessel deployments: District 1: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately seven law enforcement
    boardings in support of living marine resources mission.

    Vessel deployments: District 5: 225-foot Seagoing buoy tender (District
    asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Deferment of preventative maintenance for
    approximately 32 navigational aids a and repair of 7 aid discrepancies
    (malfunctions or "broken" aids) in support of aids to navigation
    mission.

    Vessel deployments: District 5: Medium endurance cutter (Area asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 24 boardings and 17
    violation notices in support of living marine resources mission.

    Vessel deployments: District 8: 225-foot Seagoing buoy tender (District
    asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Deferments of preventative maintenance for
    approximately 13 navigational aids and repair of 1 navigational aid in
    support of the Aids-to-Navigation mission.

    Vessel deployments: District 8: Six coastal patrol boats (District
    asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 125 boardings in
    support of the following missions: Recreational Boating Safety, Living
    Marine Resources, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security.

    Vessel deployments: District 8: Medium endurance cutters (Area asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 40 to 50 boardings in
    support of living marine resources mission.

    Vessel deployments: District 8: Three U.S. Navy patrol coastals (Area
    asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 70 boardings in
    support of the following missions: Recreational Boating Safety, Living
    Marine Resources, and Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security.

    Vessel deployments: Joint Interagency Task Force - South: Medium
    endurance cutters (Area asset);
    Estimated mission impacts: Loss of approximately 2,145 kilograms of
    cocaine seized (based on their average amount of cocaine seized per
    ship day in fiscal year 2007) in the counter drug mission.

    Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

    [A] Navigational aids refer to buoys and beacons used for navigation
    purposes.

    [End of table]

    In fiscal year 2007, Districts 1, 5, and 8 provided over 6,000
    operational hours and a variety of vessels to District 7 to help recoup
    lost operational capacity. Districts 1, 5, and 8 each donated a
    seagoing buoy tender and also collectively contributed almost 5,000
    operational hours from Atlantic Area vessels (i.e., medium endurance
    cutters and Navy 179-foot patrol coastals) to District 7; however, the
    impact of these periodic deployments varies in each of these three
    districts. For example, District 1 redeployed Willow, a 225-foot buoy
    tender, to District 7 where it was used as a holding station for
    interdicted migrants. A Coast Guard official in District 1 estimated
    that dispatching the Willow to District 7 resulted in not being able to
    perform three law enforcement boardings in support of the living marine
    resources mission in District 1. According to this official, District 1
    also lost medium endurance cutter operational hours to District 7 in
    fiscal year 2007 for approximately 13 days, likely preventing the
    district from attempting seven additional law enforcement boardings.
    Law enforcement boardings are not only used to enforce fisheries law,
    but they also serve as a deterrent for illegal living marine resources
    activity. District 5 officials told us that deploying the Elm, their
    225-foot buoy tender, to District 7 not only limited their ability to
    perform tasks related to their aids to navigation mission, such as
    immediately repairing the seven navigational aids that were either out-
    of-position or malfunctioning during this period, but also resulted in
    deferring preventive maintenance for the Elm for 20 days. Additionally,
    Coast Guard officials told us that the Atlantic Area medium endurance
    cutters that were deployed from District 5 to District 7 would have
    primarily conducted living marine resources operations in District 5,
    and estimated that losing 540 medium endurance cutter operational hours
    to District 7 in fiscal year 2007 likely caused District 5 to miss
    approximately 17 living marine resources mission violations.

    District 8 contributed the greatest number of assets and operational
    hours to District 7 in fiscal year 2007. In addition to dispatching the
    Cypress, a 225-foot buoy tender to District 7 in fiscal year 2007,
    District 8 also deployed six 87-foot patrol boats to District 7 for a
    combined 1,130 operational hours. In addition, District 8 lost access
    to roughly 1,600 operational hours from the 179-foot patrol coastals on
    loan from the U. S. Navy when these vessels were reprogrammed from
    performing missions in District 8 to District 7. Further, District 8
    lost approximately 2,400 medium endurance cutter operational hours to
    District 7 in fiscal year 2007. District 8 officials estimate that the
    loss of the medium endurance cutter operational hours probably resulted
    in about 40 to 50 lost boardings for the living marine resources
    mission. According to District 8 officials, losing a portion of its
    medium endurance cutter operational hours was a significant loss
    because these vessels are the primary vessels used for this mission.
    With the exception of its buoy tender, District 8 does not currently
    have any vessels in its fleet larger than its 87-foot patrol boats,
    which limits the district's ability to conduct off-shore missions in
    District 8 because, according to the Coast Guard, the 87-foot patrol
    boats do not have the range nor the endurance to operate in distant
    fisheries, and also have a harder time sustaining a high boarding rate
    during living marine resources missions.

    Additionally, one Coast Guard official cited that another effect that
    could not be quantified or measured was the loss of a deterrence effect
    by having fewer vessels patrolling the waters in their area of
    responsibility. According to an official in District 8, while it is
    virtually impossible to quantify the effect of having vessels on
    patrol, it is very important not to underestimate the importance of
    patrolling the coast because he believes that Coast Guard patrols do
    lead to more safety compliance and, therefore, safer waters.

    According to the Coast Guard, periodic vessel deployments are expected
    to continue in fiscal year 2008 and future fiscal years until the FRCs-
    -the replacement for the patrol boats--are delivered. The Coast Guard,
    in its Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget Justification, stated that
    its mission performance in the living marine resources and other law
    enforcement (foreign fisheries) missions will be "temporarily affected"
    by the reduction in available patrol boats. Thus, the Coast Guard is
    mindful of its need to find a proper balance between homeland security
    and nonhomeland security missions, as well as the extent to which it
    can continue to delay or forego the performance of certain missions in
    some districts to provide additional vessels and operational hours in
    District 7.

    Several Issues, Including Greater Resource and Maintenance Needs, Could
    Affect Longer Term Sustainability of Mitigation Strategies:

    The Coast Guard faces several issues that could potentially affect its
    ability to sustain these mitigation strategies for the longer term.
    While the double-crewed patrol boats performed well in fiscal year
    2007, Coast Guard officials have stated that it will be critical to
    continue to receive sufficient funding to support this initiative in
    future years. Other issues, such as continued periodic deployment of
    assets to District 7 and related mission effects, delivery of the FRCs,
    and the Coast Guard's expanding mission demands, could challenge the
    Coast Guard's ability to successfully sustain these mitigation
    strategies.

    Condition of Vessels Being Double Crewed, Maintenance Costs, and
    Availability of Maintenance Funds Will Affect Mitigation Strategies'
    Sustainability:

    Residual funding available through the 123-foot patrol boat operating
    and maintenance accounts has allowed the Coast Guard to sustain the
    double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats to date, but sustainment is
    contingent on sufficient funding to pay for the augmented maintenance
    and personnel. Coast Guard officials have indicated that through fiscal
    year 2007, double crewing had not adversely affected the condition of
    the double-crewed patrol boats, and its measures support this
    contention. In particular, our analysis of the measures the Coast Guard
    uses to monitor the condition of its vessels shows that all four
    measures (capacity, unscheduled maintenance days, percent of time fully
    mission capable, and average number of casualties per operational day)
    improved for the double-crewed patrol boats in fiscal years 2007 over
    fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 31] See appendix IV for further details on
    the trend in these condition measures for the eight double-crewed
    patrol boats from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. Coast Guard officials
    attribute the improvement reflected by these measures to increased
    focus and planning of maintenance activities for these patrol boats, as
    well as greater parts availability. However, Coast Guard officials have
    also stated that they will not be able to thoroughly assess the effects
    of double crewing on the condition of its eight 110-foot patrol boats
    until they have gone through a complete maintenance cycle, which is now
    taking 18 months under the new "high tempo, high maintenance" model.

    While the effects of double crewing on the condition of the eight 110-
    foot patrol boats are not fully known, Coast Guard officials have
    cautioned that maintaining the condition of the double-crewed patrol
    boats would be contingent on receiving sufficient resources for
    maintenance support. Under the high tempo, high maintenance model, the
    Coast Guard expects to retain the double-crewing concept and achieve an
    even greater level of operational hours through additional maintenance
    support. In this regard, for fiscal year 2008, $11.5 million was
    congressionally-directed to pilot an intensive maintenance regime that
    the Coast Guard expects will support funding for 6 months of additional
    personnel and 9 months of operation and maintenance costs, and
    estimates that it will need greater levels of funding--approximately
    $14.9 and $15.2 million--in the next 2 fiscal years. However, the Coast
    Guard may likely not know whether this level of funding will be
    adequate until maintenance contracts are signed and the higher
    operational hour levels are pursued.

    Scheduling and Funding of the Mission Effectiveness Project Affect
    Strategies' Sustainability:

    Sustainment of the Coast Guard's revised and shortened MEP schedule is
    contingent on completion of the maintenance and upgrades on schedule
    and sufficient funding. Any delays in the Coast Guard's new shortened
    MEP schedule, or reductions in anticipated funding, could extend the
    MEP and reduce any gains realized by the shortened schedule. The Coast
    Guard plans to regain some 110-foot patrol boat operational hours by
    having fewer vessels going through the MEP at one time and shortening
    the length of the MEP from 12 months to 9 months. To realize these
    gains, it will be important that the Coast Guard is able to keep the
    vessels on track with this amended schedule. This is a legitimate
    concern, as the Coast Guard has already seen two of the five 110-foot
    patrol boat boats that completed the MEP have their time in MEP
    extended by approximately 1 to 2 months due to the need to complete
    unexpected work required outside of the scope of the MEP. While the
    Coast Guard has stated that the patrol boats have come out of MEP on
    time and on budget for all standard MEP work items, if unexpected work
    of this sort were to occur again, this could lengthen the MEP process
    beyond 9 months and negate some of the advantages of the shortened
    schedule. In addition, if the Coast Guard does not receive the
    anticipated level of funding, this could also affect the Coast Guard's
    ability to get vessels through the MEP as scheduled.

    Deployment of Assets from Other Districts Will Continue to Affect the
    Coast Guard's Ability to Meet Certain Missions:

    As stated earlier, the Coast Guard is mindful of its need to balance
    missions across districts and is aware that continued periodic
    deployment of assets to District 7 may continue to adversely affect
    mission performance in the donor districts. We have already discussed
    how deployment of Area and District assets to District 7 from other
    districts has adversely affected Coast Guard mission performance in
    those districts, particularly in the living marine resources mission.
    Some periodic asset deployments are expected to continue in fiscal year
    2008 and perhaps in future fiscal years until replacement patrol boats
    are delivered. The Coast Guard acknowledges this and, in its Fiscal
    Year 2009 Congressional Budget Justification, has stated that its
    mission performance in the living marine resources and other missions
    (e.g., foreign fisheries enforcement) will be temporarily affected by
    the reduction in available patrol boats.

    Longer Term Sustainability of the Mitigation Strategies Could Become an
    Even Larger Issue Depending on FRC Delivery:

    One of the biggest factors that affects the sustainability of the
    mitigation strategies is the timely delivery of the FRCs that will
    replace the 110-foot patrol boats. While the Coast Guard has purchased
    four new 87-foot patrol boats that are to be delivered by the first
    quarter of fiscal year 2009 using $30 million it was appropriated via
    emergency supplemental appropriations in 2007, the Coast Guard notes
    that these can not substitute for either 110-foot or 123-foot patrol
    boats since they do not have the same capacity or capabilities.
    [Footnote 32] Coast Guard officials have emphasized that the mitigation
    strategies represent their best efforts to make the best use of the
    assets they have available until the FRC is delivered--the first of
    which is anticipated by the end of fiscal year 2010, with all 12 to be
    delivered by the end of fiscal year 2012. Any potential delays in the
    construction and delivery of the FRC will likely force the agency to
    continue these mitigation strategies for an even longer period of time,
    which could result in additional costs for operations and maintenance
    support to sustain its 110-foot patrol boats.

    Increasing Mission Demands across the Coast Guard Could Also Affect
    Sustainability of Mitigation Strategies:

    Longer-term sustainability could also be affected by increased demands
    the Coast Guard is facing across various homeland security and
    nonhomeland security missions, as we reported in March 2008.[Footnote
    33] For example, with respect to the Coast Guard's missions to protect
    America's ports, waterways, and waterside facilities, we cited a need
    to hire and train new staff to address increases in the pace of foreign
    port inspections and in the demand to provide security for vessels
    arriving at domestic liquefied natural gas import facilities. In
    nonhomeland security missions, the Coast Guard has recently been given
    responsibility for providing assistance for surveillance and monitoring
    of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve,
    called Papahanaumokuakea.[Footnote 34] According to the Coast Guard,
    surveillance of this monument--which includes monitoring fishing
    activities and law enforcement, marine species protection, debris
    recovery, and oil spill clean-up and prevention--has added an
    additional enforcement responsibility onto an existing mission workload
    without the benefit of increased funding, personnel, or vessels and
    aircraft. These additional resource needs could affect the Coast
    Guard's ability to continue to fund the current mitigation strategies
    in the years to come.

    Agency Comments:

    We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS and the Coast
    Guard. DHS declined to provide official written comments to include in
    our report. However, in an e-mail received June 11, 2008, the DHS
    liaison stated that DHS concurred with the report. The Coast Guard
    provided written technical comments that were incorporated into the
    report as appropriate.

    We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of DHS, the
    Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and interested congressional
    committees. This report will also be made available to others upon
    request. In addition, the report will also be made available at no
    charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or
    your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at
    (202) 512-9610, or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
    page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
    report are listed in appendix V.

    Signed by:

    Stephen L. Caldwell:
    Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

    This report examines Coast Guard patrol boat operations and the actions
    taken to mitigate the loss of patrol boat operational hours brought
    about by the removal from service of eight 123-foot patrol boats. Our
    work focused on three key questions: (1) What operational challenges
    were created by the removal from service of the 123-foot patrol boats,
    and what strategies has the Coast Guard implemented to mitigate these
    challenges? (2) What effects have these mitigation strategies had on
    overall Coast Guard operational hours, as well as operating and
    maintenance costs, patrol boat crews, and mission performance? (3) What
    are some issues that could affect the sustainability of these
    mitigation strategies?

    In responding to the first question, we reviewed data and documentation
    such as patrol boat operational hour data, memoranda, other internal
    reports, and communications with Congress, and spoke with knowledgeable
    Coast Guard officials. Specifically, we obtained data on Coast Guard-
    wide operational hours provided by 110-foot, 123-foot, and 179-foot
    patrol boats from fiscal years 2003 through 2007. We also obtained data
    from the Coast Guard on the operational hour target of its 1998 patrol
    boat fleet--which the Coast Guard viewed as the baseline needed for new
    vessel replacement under the original Deepwater implementation plan--as
    well the revised 2004 patrol boat operational hour target established
    in the Coast Guard's Revised Mission Needs Statement, which took into
    account the Coast Guard's greater mission responsibilities post-9/
    11.[Footnote 35] We reviewed operational hour data specific to the
    Coast Guard's six 110-foot patrol boats deployed to the Persian Gulf in
    support of defense operations to determine how their operations
    contributed to the domestic patrol boat operational hour gap. We also
    reviewed the schedule of 110-foot patrol boats going through the
    Mission Effectiveness Project.[Footnote 36] We also discussed these
    operational data with officials from the Coast Guard's Office of Cutter
    Forces to gain clarification and further details as needed. To assess
    the reliability of the operational hour data, we consulted with
    knowledgeable Coast Guard officials on the system responsible for
    gathering and reporting this data. We also performed electronic testing
    of the data for obvious errors in accuracy or completeness. On the
    basis of this assessment, we determined that the data were sufficiently
    reliable for the purposes of this report. Additionally, to gain an
    understanding of how the mitigation strategies were developed and
    implemented across various levels of the Coast Guard, we spoke with
    officials from the following entities: Office of Cutter Forces, Office
    of Naval Engineering, Office of Performance Management and Assessment
    (all at Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C.); Coast Guard Yard
    (Baltimore, Maryland); Atlantic Area Command (Portsmouth, Virginia) and
    Atlantic Area Maintenance and Logistics Command (Norfolk, Virginia);
    District 7 Command (Miami, Florida); Naval Engineering Support Unit
    (Miami, Florida); Sector St. Petersburg, Florida; Sector Miami,
    Florida; District 1 Command (Boston, Massachusetts); District 5 Command
    (Portsmouth, Virginia); District 8 Command (New Orleans, Louisiana);
    and Joint Interagency Task Force - South (Key West, Florida). We
    corroborated the information gathered from these officials with Coast
    Guard memoranda, internal reports, and communications with Congress
    that detailed the development and status of implementation of these
    strategies.

    In responding to our second objective, we spoke with officials from
    these many entities to discuss how the various mitigation strategies
    were affecting Coast Guard operational hours, operations, maintenance,
    costs, and mission performance. Specifically, in assessing the
    operational hour effects of the mitigation strategies, we spoke with
    officials from these entities and also analyzed the operational hour
    data discussed. To estimate the operational hour gains of the double-
    crewing strategy, we compared operational hour data for the eight
    double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats with prorated operational hour
    targets for February 2007 (when double crewing began) through September
    2007. To determine the effects on operations and maintenance of assets,
    we spoke with officials from these many entities, as well as crew
    members from four of the double-crewed 110-foot patrol boats in St.
    Petersburg and Miami, Florida, to gain their views of how double
    crewing has affected their operations, work tempo, and training
    opportunities.

    To assess the costs of the Coast Guard's mitigation strategies, we
    relied on data reported to us by the Coast Guard on the costs of:
    double crewing the eight 110-foot patrol boats, as well as increased
    funding for fiscal year 2008 to expand the operational hour targets of
    this approach; acquisition and operations of new 87-foot patrol boats;
    acceleration of the Mission Effectiveness Project schedule; extending
    the operations of three Navy 179-foot patrol coastals for 3 additional
    fiscal years; and supporting additional operational hours for 87-foot
    patrol boats in District 7 during fiscal year 2007. We corroborated
    these data with other sources--such as the congressional direction for
    the use of funds to support double crewing and supplemental
    appropriations to mitigate the patrol boat operational gap relating to
    the 87-foot patrol boat acquisitions--to the extent possible.

    Regarding the costs incurred during the first 13 months of double
    crewing (February 2007-February 2008), we spoke with and gathered
    information from Coast Guard officials responsible for gathering this
    data and determined that these data are sufficiently reliable for the
    purposes of this report. We also spoke with officials from all the
    districts listed, and Joint Interagency Task Force-South, to gain their
    estimates of how deploying both area-and district-controlled assets
    have affected their abilities to fully perform their missions. We
    obtained some district-level mission performance data on some of the
    missions that may have been affected by the mitigation strategies
    (e.g., living marine resources, drug interdiction operations); however,
    through speaking with officials from the Coast Guard's Office of
    Performance Management and Assessment, we determined that it would be
    very difficult to link any changes in these data with the effects of
    any of the mitigation strategies, since these data values may be
    affected by a large number of factors. Thus, we relied on estimates
    from district officials, as well as interviews with the Coast Guard's
    Office of Performance Management and Assessment, to assess the effects
    of the mitigation strategies.

    In responding to our third objective, we relied largely on the
    information collected from our data gathering and interviews, in
    conjunction with our prior work on larger Coast Guard-wide challenges.
    In assessing issues that may affect the sustainability of the double-
    crewing effort, we explored how double crewing may have affected the
    condition of the eight 110-foot patrol boats by interviewing officials
    with the Office of Naval Engineering, Sectors St. Petersburg and Miami,
    and Naval Engineering Support Unit, Miami, as well as by reviewing
    measures (capacity, unscheduled maintenance days, percent of time fully
    mission capable, and average number of casualties per operational day)
    used by the Coast Guard to track the condition of its vessels. We
    assessed the reliability of these condition measures, and the data and
    the systems that produced the data, through communications with
    knowledgeable officials in the Coast Guard's Office of Naval
    Engineering. On the basis of this assessment, we determined that these
    data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

    [End of section]

    Appendix II: Number of 110-foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S.
    Coast Guard District:

    This appendix provides details on the areas and districts that host the
    Coast Guard's fleet of 41 110-foot patrol boats. District 7, including
    Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, hosts almost half of the Coast
    Guard's fleet of 110-foot patrol boats. District 8, including much of
    the Gulf of Mexico, does not host any 110-foot patrol boats.

    Figure 7: Number of 110-Foot Patrol Boats Stationed in Each U.S. Coast
    Guard District:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a map of the United States depicting the U.S. Coast
    Guard districts and the number of 110-foot Patrol Boats stationed in
    each, as follows:

    District: 1 (Atlantic area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 8.

    District: 5 (Atlantic area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 3.

    District: 7 (Atlantic area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 17;

    District: 11 (Pacific area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 1.

    District: 13 (Pacific area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 2.

    District: 14 (Pacific area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 4.

    District: 17 (Pacific area);
    Number of 110-foot patrol boats: 6.

    Source: GAO (map art, analysis); MapResources (map); U.S. Coast Guard
    (photo images, data).

    Note: Six 110-foot patrol boats are currently operating away from their
    home districts in support of defense operations in the Persian Gulf as
    follows: three from District 1, one from District 5, and two from
    District 7.

    [End of figure]

    [End of section]

    Appendix III: Periodic Deployment of Vessels from Other Districts to
    District 7, Fiscal Year 2007:

    This appendix provides information on the periodic deployment of
    certain Area-and District-controlled vessels to support District 7
    operations in fiscal year 2007. Figure 8 illustrates the vessels and
    their operational hours that deployed from certain Atlantic Area
    districts and Joint Interagency Task Force-South to support District 7
    operations in fiscal year 2007.

    Figure 8: Periodic Deployment of Area and District Vessels from Other
    Districts and Joint Interagency Task Force-South to District 7 in
    Fiscal Year 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a map of the Atlantic area depicting the periodic
    deployment of area and district vessels from other districts and Joint
    Interagency Task Force-South to District 7 in fiscal year 2007. The
    figure also includes photographs of the following donated boats:
    Buoy Tender;
    Medium Endurance Cutter;
    87-foot Patrol Boat;
    Navy 179-foot Patrol Coastal.

    District: 1;
    Periodic deployment to District 7:
    * (1) Buoy Tender (500 hours);
    * Medium Endurance Cutter (264 hours).

    District: 5;
    Periodic deployment to District 7:
    * (1) Buoy Tender (419 hours);
    * Medium Endurance Cutter (540 hours).

    District: 8;
    Periodic deployment to District 7:
    * (1) Buoy Tender (548 hours);
    * (6) 87-foot Patrol Boats (1,130 hours);
    * Medium Endurance Cutter (2,420 hours);
    * Navy 179-foot Patrol Coastal (1,608 hours).

    District: Joint Interagency Task Force-South;
    Periodic deployment to District 7:
    * Medium Endurance Cutter (700 hours).

    Source: GAO (map art, analysis); MapResources (map); U.S. Coast Guard
    (photo images, data).

    Notes: Photographs were located on the U.S. Coast Guard Pier System Web
    site and U.S. Coast Guard Visual Information Server, both of which
    provide photographs for public use. The buoy tender photo was taken by
    PA3 John Edwards, the medium endurance cutter photo was taken by Petty
    Officer First Class NyxoLyno Cangemi, and the 87-foot patrol boat photo
    was taken by PA2 Tiffany Powell.

    This figure illustrates a change in tactical control for these deployed
    vessels from the donating entity to District 7, not necessarily the
    geographic area of operation of the vessels (i.e., the vessels did not
    necessarily operate in Miami, but under the control of the District 7
    Command, which extends from the coast of South Carolina south to Puerto
    Rico).

    [End of figure]

    [End of section]

    Appendix IV: Condition Measures for the Coast Guard's Eight Double-
    Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:

    This appendix provides more details on the condition of the Coast
    Guard's 110-foot double-crewed patrol boats. Specifically, the figures
    illustrate the values, for the eight double-crewed 110-foot patrol
    boats, of four specific measures used by the Coast Guard to monitor the
    condition of its vessels. Note that double crewing of these eight
    patrol boats began in February 2007. In general, they show that the
    condition and availability of these vessels improved during the year of
    double crewing (fiscal year 2007) over prior years for nearly all of
    these measures.

    Figure 9: Capacity for Double-Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal
    Years 2004 through 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:

    Target: 60%/65%.

    Fiscal year: 2004;
    Capacity: 48.7%.

    Fiscal year: 2005;
    Capacity: 44.7%.

    Fiscal year: 2006;
    Capacity: 34.4%.

    Fiscal year: 2007;
    Capacity: 52.1%.

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data).

    Note: Capacity refers to the percentage of time that a vessel is not in
    maintenance status.

    [End of figure]

    Figure 10: Unscheduled Maintenance Days (UMD) for Double-Crewed 110-
    foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:

    Target: 0.8%.

    Fiscal year: 2004;
    UMD: 1.3%.

    Fiscal year: 2005;
    UMD: 0.7%.

    Fiscal year: 2006;
    UMD: 3.2%.

    Fiscal year: 2007;
    UMD: 1.5%.

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data).

    Note: Unscheduled Maintenance Days refers to the percentage of time
    that a vessel class spends in unscheduled maintenance status over the
    time period being measured.

    [End of figure]

    Figure 11: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable (PTFMC) for Double-
    Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:

    Target: 95%.

    Fiscal year: 2004;
    PTFMC: 19.5%.

    Fiscal year: 2005;
    PTFMC: 17.1%.

    Fiscal year: 2006;
    PTFMC: 25.3%.

    Fiscal year: 2007;
    PTFMC: 46.2%.

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data).

    Note: Percent of Time Fully Mission Capable refers to the percentage of
    operational time that a vessel has no open major casualties (i.e.,
    deficiencies in mission-essential equipment that cause the major
    degradation of a primary mission or loss of at least one primary
    mission).

    [End of figure]

    Figure 12: Average Number of Casualties per Operational Day (ANOCOP)
    for Double-Crewed 110-foot Patrol Boats, Fiscal Years 2004 through
    2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:

    Target: 0.3%.

    Fiscal year: 2004;
    ANOCOP: 1.7%.

    Fiscal year: 2005;
    ANOCOP: 2.1%.

    Fiscal year: 2006;
    ANOCOP: 1.7%.

    Fiscal year: 2007;
    ANOCOP: 0.9%.

    Source: GAO (analysis); U.S. Coast Guard (data).

    Note: Average Number of Casualties per Operational Day refers to the
    number of major casualties that remain open each operational day.

    [End of figure]

    [End of section]

    Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Stephen L. Caldwell (202) 512-9610, or caldwells@gao.gov:

    Acknowledgments:

    This report was prepared under the direction of Christopher Conrad,
    Assistant Director. Key contributors to this report also included
    William Bates, Adam Couvillion, Katherine Davis, Michele Fejfar, Geoff
    Hamilton, and Landis Lindsey.

    [End of section]

    Related GAO Products:

    Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater Program.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-270R]. Washington,
    D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008.

    Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent
    Performance, and Related Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-08-494T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008.

    Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Management Initiatives and Key Homeland
    Security Missions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-
    531T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008.

    Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
    Management and Efforts to Address Them. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-874]. Washington, D.C.: June
    18, 2007.

    Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management
    and Address Operational Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-07-575T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2007.

    Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets and
    Management Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
    bin/getrpt?GAO-07-446T]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2007.

    Coast Guard: Coast Guard Efforts to Improve Management and Address
    Operational Challenges in the Deepwater Program. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-460T]. Washington, D.C.: Feb.
    14, 2007.

    Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland
    Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's Deepwater
    Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-453T].
    Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007.

    Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764]. Washington,
    D.C.: June 23, 2006.

    Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program
    Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring Is Warranted.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-546]. Washington,
    D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006.

    Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset
    Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges
    Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-757].
    Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005.

    Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
    Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-651T]. Washington, D.C.: June
    21, 2005.

    Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
    Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-307T]. Washington, D.C.: Apr.
    20, 2005.

    Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-695]. Washington,
    D.C.: June 14, 2004.

    Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs Increased
    Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-380]. Washington, D.C.: Mar.
    9, 2004.

    Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks.
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-659T]. Washington,
    D.C.: May 3, 2001.

    Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks
    Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-564].
    Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001.

    Coast Guard's Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project's Justification
    and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly. [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-6]. Washington, D.C.:
    Oct. 26, 1998.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] To accomplish its responsibilities, the Coast Guard is organized
    into two major commands that are responsible for overall mission
    execution--one in the Pacific area and the other in the Atlantic area.
    These commands are divided into nine districts which, in turn, are
    organized into 35 sectors that unify command and control of field units
    and resources, such as multimission stations and patrol boats.

    [2] Since fiscal year 2005, the Coast Guard has had operational command
    of three to five Navy 179-foot patrol coastal vessels, established via
    a Memorandum of Agreement with the Navy.

    [3] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
    Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat.
    112 (2007)).

    [4] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget,
    Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-494T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
    6, 2008).

    [5] The Coast Guard sets these operational hour ceilings by total
    annual hours, and does not break down these ceilings by mission. In
    addition, the Coast Guard can increase operational hour ceilings for
    its vessels as needed, if it determines that it has the resources in
    place to operate the vessels at a higher number of hours while
    sustaining their service lives.

    [6] Prior to fiscal year 2004, three 110-foot patrol boats were
    stationed in San Diego, California and supported by a maintenance
    augmentation team. While receiving this support, these three 110-foot
    patrol boats were allocated 2,200 annual operational hours.

    [7] The Coast Guard's "system of systems" approach integrates vessels,
    aircraft, sensors, and communication links together as a system to
    accomplish mission objectives.

    [8] CSC Advanced Marine, Evaluation of the 110' WPB Class Cutter Fleet
    (January 2001).

    [9] According to Coast Guard officials, they arrived at a total of 20
    110-foot patrol boats for the MEP as follows: 29 of the 41 vessels use
    an engine type that the Coast Guard considers to be more capable and
    reliable, and thus worth preserving through the MEP process. Six of
    these 29 are currently serving in the Persian Gulf, where they are
    being maintained through supplemental funding; three additional vessels
    are homeported in District 14 (Guam or Hawaii), and the Coast Guard has
    determined not to place these vessels in the MEP due to high costs of
    transit and loss of operational time. Thus, 20 110-foot patrol boats
    remain for the MEP.

    [10] Of the $109.7 million, $49.2 million was from the Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,
    and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005)) and
    was used for the first six cutters entering MEP. This supplemental
    funding was not included in the Deepwater Acquisition Program Baseline
    cost.

    [11] As used in shipbuilding, composite materials are typically plies
    of various reinforcing fabrics laminated together.

    [12] GAO, Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design
    Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764]
    (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006).

    [13] GAO, Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater
    Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-270R]
    (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).

    [14] This 174,000 operational hour target represents what the Coast
    Guard calculated it needed from its patrol boat fleet as part of the
    post-9/11 2004 Deepwater Mission Needs Statement. The post-9/11 Mission
    Needs Statement was approved by the Commandant and DHS in January 2005,
    but has always been referred to as the 2004 Mission Needs Statement
    because the document was prepared and routed within the Coast Guard
    during 2004.

    [15] A standard patrol boat maintenance cycle consists of one drydock
    availability (major maintenance work that can only be completed when a
    vessel is out of the water, typically lasting 6 weeks) every 3 years,
    with one dockside availability (major maintenance work that can be
    completed while a vessel is in the water, typically lasting 3 weeks)
    every 2 years. The high tempo, high maintenance approach will shorten
    this to one drydock availability every 18 months, with one dockside
    availability every 9 months between drydock availabilities.

    [16] House Committee on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Legislative Text
    and Explanatory Statement 1057 (Committee Print 2008).

    [17] Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007).

    [18] In addition, under the high tempo, high maintenance approach,
    crews will be located in the same homeport as the cutters they work on,
    thus eliminating the need to switch command between homeports.

    [19] District 1 (Boston, Massachusetts), District 5 (Portsmouth,
    Virginia), and District 8 (New Orleans, Louisiana) are part of the
    Coast Guard's Atlantic Area Command along with District 7. The Joint
    Interagency Task Force-South in Key West, Florida, under the U.S.
    Southern Command, has primary responsibility for U.S. detection and
    monitoring of drug trafficking activities in the transit zone, which
    encompasses Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of
    Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. The Coast Guard has primary
    operational control for most interdiction operations. The Department of
    Defense provides maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, and ships; the
    Department of Homeland Security--primarily, the Coast Guard and the
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection--provides maritime patrol aircraft,
    ships, and law enforcement assistance; and the Department of Justice
    provides prosecutorial and law enforcement assistance. Joint
    Interagency Task Force-South also receives some operational support
    from various countries within the transit zone, and France, the
    Netherlands, and the United Kingdom also provide air and maritime
    assistance in the eastern Caribbean Sea.

    [20] A buoy tender is a vessel used by the Coast Guard in its aids to
    navigation mission, which involves establishing and maintaining a large
    number of navigational aids, such as buoys or beacons, to assist
    mariners and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks.

    [21] The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-
    295, 116 Stat. 2064, 2106 (2002)) provided that the Secretary of the
    department in which the Coast Guard is operating may accept, by direct
    transfer without cost, for use by the Coast Guard primarily for
    expanded drug interdiction activities required to meet national supply
    reduction performance goals, up to 7 PC-170 patrol craft from the
    Department of Defense if it offers to transfer such craft. These
    vessels, originally 170 feet in length, were later fitted with a stern
    ramp modification that extended their length to 179 feet; thus, we
    refer to these vessels as the 179-foot patrol coastals. Per the
    amendment to the original Navy-Coast Guard Patrol Coastal Inter-Service
    Transfer Memorandum of Agreement signed in 2004, the Coast Guard will
    return operational control of the Tempest, homeported in Pascagoula,
    Mississippi; and the Monsoon, homeported in San Diego, California to
    the Navy in September 2008. The Zephyr, homeported in San Diego, and
    the Shamal and Tornado, homeported in Pascagoula, will remain under the
    operational control of the Coast Guard until September 2011. The Coast
    Guard plans to relocate the Zephyr to Pascagoula in October 2008.

    [22] Personnel tempo, in this context, refers to the amount of time
    that each crew actually serves underway on the vessel annually.

    [23] Though the Coast Guard considers February 2007 as the start of
    double-crewing, not all eight 110-foot patrol boats began double-
    crewing that month, but were phased in throughout February and March
    2007.

    [24] Specifically, the new 4,000 hour ceiling provides an increase of
    1,800 hours per vessel, given that the District 7 110-foot patrol boat
    ceiling was previously 2,200 hours. For eight vessels, that leads to a
    gain of 14,400 operational hours.

    [25] According to the Coast Guard, the high tempo, high maintenance
    approach will be phased out of operation on individual 110-foot patrol
    boats as FRCs become operational in District 7.

    [26] Coast Guard officials attribute the gain, which was greater than
    the projected operational hour increase, to the fact that the June-
    September time frame represents a period of greater migrant activity--
    and thus higher operating tempos--for District 7 assets.

    [27] The Navy has provided additional funds of $2 million per vessel
    for major maintenance work.

    [28] Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007).

    [29] The other four 110-foot patrol boats have already been through the
    longer (12 month) cycle.

    [30] A deck watch officer is the commissioned, warrant, or petty
    officer on watch in charge of the vessel and is responsible for the
    safety of the vessel and for the performance of the duties prescribed
    by the commanding officer and Coast Guard regulations. Every person
    onboard who is subject to the orders of the commanding officer, except
    the executive officer, is subordinate to the deck watch officer.

    [31] Capacity refers to the percentage of time that a vessel is not in
    maintenance status. Unscheduled maintenance days refer to the
    percentage of time that a vessel class spends in unscheduled
    maintenance status over the time period being measured. Percent of time
    fully mission capable refers to the percentage of operational time that
    a vessel has no open major casualties (i.e., deficiencies in mission-
    essential equipment that cause the major degradation of a primary
    mission or loss of at least one primary mission). Average number of
    casualties per operational day refers to the number of major casualties
    that remain open each operational day.

    [32] U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
    Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat.
    112 (2007)).

    [33] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget,
    Recent Performance, and Related Challenges, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-494T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
    6, 2008).

    [34] In December 2000, Executive Order 13178 authorized the creation of
    Papahanaumokuakea, which is about 140,000 square miles. In 2006, the
    President declared this region a national monument to be monitored by
    the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration, with support from the State of Hawaii and the Coast
    Guard. To ensure that commercial fishing limitations are observed until
    its prohibition in 2011, several Coast Guard vessels patrol the region
    and conduct search and rescue missions, protect threatened species, and
    respond to potential hazards, such as debris or damaged vessels.

    [35] The Deepwater Program is the Coast Guard's plan to replace or
    modernize existing aircraft, vessels, and information management
    capabilities.

    [36] The Mission Effectiveness Project is designed to modernize or
    replace obsolete and unsupportable hull, mechanical, and electrical
    equipment--such as hull plating and underwater appendages, pumps,
    motors, piping, generators, and power distribution equipment--for
    selected 110-foot patrol boats.

    [End of section]

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