Department of Energy: Office of Science Has Kept Majority of	 
Projects within Budget and on Schedule, but Funding and Other	 
Challenges May Grow (30-MAY-08, GAO-08-641).			 
                                                                 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has long suffered from contract	 
and management oversight weaknesses. Since 1990 DOE contract	 
management has been on GAO's list of programs at high risk for	 
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 2003 DOE's Office of  
Science (Science) unveiled its 20-year plan to acquire and	 
upgrade potentially costly research facilities. In light of DOE's
history and the potential cost of this ambitious plan, GAO was	 
asked to examine Science's project management performance. GAO	 
determined (1) the extent to which Science has managed its	 
projects within cost and schedule targets, (2) the factors	 
affecting project management performance, and (3) challenges that
may affect Science's future performance. GAO reviewed DOE and	 
Science's project management guidance and 42 selected Science	 
projects and also interviewed DOE and laboratory officials.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-641 					        
    ACCNO:   A82232						        
  TITLE:     Department of Energy: Office of Science Has Kept Majority
of Projects within Budget and on Schedule, but Funding and Other 
Challenges May Grow						 
     DATE:   05/30/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Budgeting						 
	     Contract administration				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Financial management				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Laboratories					 
	     Performance management				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Research and development facilities		 
	     Risk factors					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Program implementation				 
	     Waste, fraud, and abuse				 
	     GAO High Risk Series				 

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GAO-08-641

   

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Report to the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee 
on Science and Technology, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2008: 

Department of Energy: 

Office of Science Has Kept Majority of Projects within Budget and on 
Schedule, but Funding and Other Challenges May Grow: 

GAO-08-641: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-641, a report to the Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, 
House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) has long suffered from contract and 
management oversight weaknesses. Since 1990 DOE contract management has 
been on GAOï¿½s list of programs at high risk for fraud, waste, abuse, 
and mismanagement. In 2003 DOEï¿½s Office of Science (Science) unveiled 
its 20-year plan to acquire and upgrade potentially costly research 
facilities. In light of DOEï¿½s history and the potential cost of this 
ambitious plan, GAO was asked to examine Scienceï¿½s project management 
performance. GAO determined (1) the extent to which Science has managed 
its projects within cost and schedule targets, (2) the factors 
affecting project management performance, and (3) challenges that may 
affect Scienceï¿½s future performance. GAO reviewed DOE and Scienceï¿½s 
project management guidance and 42 selected Science projects and also 
interviewed DOE and laboratory officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Of the 42 projects GAO reviewed that were completed by Science or under 
way from fiscal years 2003 through 2007, more than two-thirds were 
completed or being carried out according to original cost and schedule 
targets. Of the 27 projects that were completed during this period, 24 
were completed within the original committed cost. Science also largely 
succeeded in achieving its original committed schedules, with 21 of the 
27 projects completed on or ahead of time. Two of Scienceï¿½s completed 
projects were both over cost and late. Fifteen of the 42 projects 
reviewed were still under way in February 2008. Nine of these 15 
projects appeared to be on track to meet their cost and schedule 
targets; the rest were likely to be completed over cost, late, or both. 

Scienceï¿½s ability to generally achieve projectsï¿½ original cost and 
schedule targets is due in part to factors often considered fundamental 
to effective project management: leadership commitment to meeting cost 
and schedule targets; appropriate management and technical expertise; 
and disciplined, rigorous implementation of project management 
policies. Scienceï¿½s frequent independent reviews, in particular, were 
cited by DOE officials as a key reason for Scienceï¿½s project management 
performance. To achieve cost or schedule targets, Science also trimmed 
selected components from some projects, a practice that has sometimes 
raised concerns. Specifically, DOEï¿½s Office of Engineering and 
Construction Management, which develops DOEï¿½s project management 
policy, and DOEï¿½s Inspector General have expressed the concern that 
changes in scope may not always preserve a projectï¿½s technical goals. 
Construction Management officials told GAO that if a projectï¿½s 
technical goals are not detailed enough, it can be difficult to 
determine the effects of changes in scope. They are therefore 
considering clarifying project management guidance regarding this 
issue, perhaps by 2009. 

Given forecasts of increasingly constrained discretionary spending, 
plus a workforce fast approaching retirement, Science is likely to face 
two primary challenges to maintaining future performance: budgetary and 
market uncertainties, and a shrinking pool of qualified project 
management and technical expertise. First, achieving targets could 
become more difficult for Science as future federal budget constraints 
interrupt anticipated flows of funding to projects already under way or 
labor and commodity prices rise unexpectedly. Several projects GAO 
reviewed exceeded or will exceed their cost targets because expected 
funding did not materialize or prices increased after cost and schedule 
targets had been established. Second, finding knowledgeable staff to 
lead and carry out projects may become harder, since an estimated 21 
percent to 43 percent of Scienceï¿½s engineers, scientists, and contract 
specialists will become eligible for retirement within the next 5 
years. Similar large-scale retirements are expected at Scienceï¿½s 
contractor laboratories. Science will need to remain diligent to ensure 
future success in the face of these potentially intensifying 
challenges. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOE (1) consider adopting, department-wide, 
selected practices from Scienceï¿½s independent project reviews and (2) 
review and strengthen, as appropriate, DOEï¿½s departmentwide project 
management guidance to ensure that each projectï¿½s technical goals are 
clearly defined. DOE generally agreed with these recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-641]. For more information, 
contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Office of Science Managed Majority of Projects within Committed Cost 
and Schedule Targets: 

Several Factors Contributed to Science's Cost and Schedule Performance: 

Maintaining Successful Project Performance in the Future Will Require 
Continued Attention to Challenges Affecting Funding and Human 
Resources: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Summary of Office of Science Projects Reviewed: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Projects Under Way or Completed from Fiscal Year 2003 through 
Fiscal Year 2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The Five Critical Decision Points in DOE's Project Management 
Process: 

Figure 2: Expected or Actual Performance of 42 Reviewed Office of 
Science Projects, Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2007: 

Abbreviations: 

CERN: European Organization for Nuclear Research: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

GLAST: Gamma-Ray Large Area Space Telescope: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

May 30, 2008: 

The Honorable Brad Miller: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight: 
Committee on Science and Technology: 
House of Representatives: 

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science (Science) and its 
predecessor agency[Footnote 1] have long served the nation in the quest 
for scientific knowledge and innovation. From the construction of long 
tunnels where subatomic particles collide with targets at nearly the 
speed of light to the design and launch of a satellite telescope that 
reveals stellar explosions in the deepest parts of space, projects 
overseen by the Office of Science have broadened our understanding of 
the cosmos and of the fundamental components of life on Earth. With a 
$4 billion annual budget, Science has historically been the nation's 
single largest funding source for basic research in the physical 
sciences, energy sciences, advanced scientific computing, and other 
fields, most of which is carried out at 10 national laboratories and 42 
research and development facilities nationwide. Contractors to DOE-- 
primarily research consortia or nonprofit institutions--perform the day-
to-day operations at each of these laboratories and facilities. DOE 
site offices, located at or near the laboratories and facilities, are 
responsible for overseeing the laboratory and facility contractors, 
including monitoring the progress of scientific projects and the 
maintenance and upgrade of buildings. 

In 2003, Science unveiled an ambitious 20-year plan to upgrade its 
existing portfolio of research facilities and to pioneer the design and 
construction of potentially costly new scientific instruments and 
facilities. These projects include the Linac Coherent Light Source, an 
advanced, laser-based X-ray light source that will illuminate the 
structure of molecules never previously visible, and the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, a facility to test the feasibility 
of fusion, a process in which nuclei are combined to generate energy 
like that produced naturally by the sun. Science's contractor 
laboratories and facilities will ultimately be charged with executing 
Science's 20-year plan, which, if carried out in its entirety, could 
cost many billions of dollars. 

Since 1990, we have reported that the Department of Energy as a whole 
has suffered from substantial and continual weaknesses in overseeing 
contractors and managing large, expensive, and technically complex 
projects effectively. Some projects, such as DOE's planned waste 
treatment and immobilization plant at its Hanford site in Washington 
State, have been fraught with problems that caused project expenses to 
soar beyond estimated costs and project schedules to exceed completion 
dates, sometimes by many years. DOE's environmental cleanup and 
construction projects, in particular, have significantly and 
consistently overrun both cost and schedule targets, occasionally 
requiring cutbacks so severe that facilities do not function as 
intended or, worse, delaying projects so long that, upon completion, 
they no longer serve the intended purpose. Because of problems like 
these, GAO in 1990 included DOE's contracting and project management on 
the list of federal programs and functions at high risk of fraud, 
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. While DOE has since implemented 
various management improvements, including a 2000 policy directive 
outlining the steps required for project planning and execution, some 
of the department's projects continue to experience major cost overruns 
and delays. As of May 30, 2008, DOE contracting and project management 
remain on GAO's high-risk list. 

Although our recent work has focused on DOE projects experiencing cost 
and schedule difficulties at program offices other than the Office of 
Science--particularly the Office of Environmental Management and the 
National Nuclear Security Administration--in light of Science's plan to 
invest billions of dollars in the coming years to acquire or upgrade 
facilities and equipment at its sites, we are reporting on (1) the 
extent to which Science manages its projects within cost and schedule 
commitments, (2) the key factors affecting Science's project management 
performance, and (3) the main challenges that could affect Science's 
ability to maintain project management performance in the future. 

In conducting our work, we reviewed DOE project management policies and 
guidance and interviewed headquarters officials at DOE's Office of 
Engineering and Construction Management, which provides project 
management policy and oversight departmentwide, and at Science's Office 
of Project Assessment, which provides guidance and oversight for 
Science's projects. We also obtained performance information on the 42 
Science projects at 10 national laboratories that, from fiscal year 
2003 through fiscal year 2007, were either completed (27 projects) or 
still under way at the time of our study and for which Science had 
committed to cost and schedule targets (15 projects). Because we did 
not consider as fully reliable DOE's Project Assessment Reporting 
System, the database DOE uses to track project performance, we obtained 
project cost and schedule data and other information directly from the 
laboratories responsible for the projects.[Footnote 2] From these 42 
Science projects, we selected for more detailed review a 
nongeneralizable sample of 12 projects overseen by four laboratories 
with diverse scientific missions: Argonne National Laboratory and Fermi 
National Accelerator Laboratory in Illinois, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory in Tennessee, and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in 
California. We selected these 12 projects to ensure that our sample 
included completed and ongoing projects, scientific projects and 
infrastructure improvement projects, and a wide range of project costs. 
Together, the 12 projects represent about $2.9 billion, or 75 percent, 
of the total value of the 42 projects. To understand how these projects 
were managed and the reasons that projects did or did not meet their 
cost and schedule commitments, we visited the four laboratories, 
reviewed project data and documentation for the selected projects, and 
interviewed the contract laboratories' project managers and Science's 
on-site federal project directors.[Footnote 3] For each of the 30 
projects we did not review in depth, we obtained and analyzed project 
performance documentation from the responsible laboratories. In 
assessing whether projects had achieved their cost and schedule 
targets, we followed Office of Management and Budget guidance and DOE 
performance goals, which regard projects completed at less than 10 
percent above their original cost targets as achieving satisfactory 
performance. Because Office of Management and Budget guidance includes 
performance standards for project schedule, we considered projects to 
be on time if they were or are expected to be completed at less than 10 
percent past their original target completion date. DOE's performance 
goals, developed in coordination with the Office of Management and 
Budget, do not address project schedule. To determine Science's main 
future challenges, we interviewed officials at the four laboratories, 
DOE regional site offices, and DOE headquarters. We reviewed relevant 
studies on human capital planning by GAO, DOE's Inspector General, and 
the National Science Foundation. We also reviewed recent GAO studies on 
federal budgetary constraints. Appendix I describes our scope and 
methodology in more detail, and appendix II summarizes the 42 projects 
we reviewed. We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through 
May 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

Of the 42 projects we reviewed that were completed by Science or under 
way from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, more than two- 
thirds were completed or being carried out in accordance with original 
cost and schedule targets. Of the 27 projects that were completed 
during this period, 24 (89 percent) were completed within the original 
committed cost. For purposes of this analysis, given DOE's performance 
goals and Office of Management and Budget guidance, we considered any 
Science project completed at less than 10 percent beyond its original 
cost or schedule baseline as completed within the committed cost and 
schedule targets. These completed projects represented a wide range of 
efforts--from conventional construction projects costing a few million 
dollars, such as improvements to heating and air-conditioning systems, 
to the design and construction of sophisticated scientific equipment 
costing more than a billion dollars. Science also largely succeeded in 
achieving its original committed schedules, with 21 (78 percent) of the 
27 projects completed on or ahead of time. Two (7 percent) of Science's 
completed projects, however, were both over budget and late. These 
projects included one to construct a device to measure the activity of 
subatomic particles called neutrinos and another to upgrade the 
performance of an existing particle accelerator. Fifteen of the 42 
projects we reviewed were still under way as of the end of February 
2008. Nine of these 15 projects appear to be on track to meet both 
their cost and schedule commitments, whereas 4 of them are expected to 
finish late, and 2 are expected to miss both their cost and schedule 
commitments. 

Science's ability to manage a majority of projects within original cost 
and schedule commitments is due in part to factors generally considered 
fundamental to effective project management: leadership commitment to 
meeting cost and schedule targets; appropriate management and technical 
expertise; and disciplined, rigorous implementation of project 
management policies through processes that focus on results. Science's 
practice of trimming selected technical or other components from 
projects also sometimes played a role in achieving cost and schedule 
commitments, although this practice has raised some concerns. 

* Strong leadership commitment to meeting cost and schedule targets: 
Science's leadership is strongly committed to holding projects to their 
original cost and schedule baselines and has made it clear to the rank 
and file at its laboratories that they are accountable for staying 
within these limits. Officials we spoke with said that requesting 
additional funding was normally not an option if problems arose. 

* Appropriate project management and technical expertise: Science and 
laboratory officials said that finding experienced staff to manage and 
carry out projects can be challenging, but they have generally 
succeeded by implementing recruitment and retention incentives, 
collaborating with other Science laboratories to secure the expertise 
and management skills lacking on the project team, and training skilled 
scientists in effective project management techniques. For example, Oak 
Ridge Laboratory officials said they initially had problems attracting 
people with the right skill mix to work on the Spallation Neutron 
Source, including finding a capable management team. As a result, the 
laboratory developed a "human resources tool kit," which provided 
recruiting and retention incentives that allowed the lab to efficiently 
hire needed personnel. Furthermore, both the Oak Ridge and Fermi 
laboratories have obtained additional scientific expertise by 
partnering with other Science laboratories and arranging for 
knowledgeable staff to work from their home laboratories rather than 
relocate. 

* Disciplined, more-rigorous application of DOE policies: Science has 
developed more-rigorous project oversight policies and processes than 
required under a DOE project management directive issued in 
2000.[Footnote 4] This rigor enhanced Science's ability to identify 
potential problems and to take timely corrective actions to help keep 
projects on track. DOE's directive requires independent internal 
reviews at key decision points--all told, one or two reviews during a 
project's life span. Science, however, conducts reviews much more 
often, with some projects receiving as many as 17 reviews each, 
depending on the project's nature and complexity. Science's independent 
review panels consist of as many as 30 technical and management experts 
from other Science field sites, including contractor laboratories 
external to the project. The review panels rigorously assess 
management, cost, schedule, technical, and safety issues. Lessons that 
panel members have learned from experience on prior projects often lead 
to specific actions to address emerging problems, such as potentially 
difficult procurements and technical design issues or overly optimistic 
initial cost estimates. 

In addition, Science's practice of occasionally trimming away selected 
components from a project's scope (the sum total of a project's 
requirements and features) when facing budgetary constraints also 
helped to achieve cost or schedule targets. Such reductions to scope 
are permitted, with the proper DOE or laboratory approval, as long as 
the changes do not adversely affect Science's key technical goals for a 
project. But concerns have been raised by DOE's Office of Engineering 
and Construction Management and its Inspector General that changes in 
scope may not always preserve a project's technical goals. For example, 
the Spallation Neutron Source project team cut a number of items from 
the project's scope--including 5 scientific instruments--to achieve its 
cost baseline. The Inspector General and the Office of Science 
disagreed over the effect these changes had on the project's technical 
goals, in part because those technical goals were so broadly defined 
that it was unclear how acquiring the 5 instruments, rather than the 10 
described in the project baseline, may have affected the facility's 
performance, if at all. Although we did not find other projects where 
concerns about scope reductions appeared, we did find differences in 
the level of detail spelled out in projects' technical goals, even 
among similar projects. Office of Engineering and Construction 
Management officials we spoke with are concerned enough about this 
vulnerability departmentwide that they are considering clarifying 
project management guidance on defining projects' technical goals, 
perhaps by 2009. 

Given continued budgetary pressures, which have been forecast to 
increasingly constrain the nation's discretionary spending, plus an 
aging workforce nearing retirement, Science is likely to face two 
primary challenges to its project performance in the future: heightened 
funding and market uncertainties and a shrinking pool of qualified 
people to manage projects. 

* Uncertainties in funding and market forces: Achieving cost and 
schedule targets could become more difficult for Science in the future 
if growing federal budgetary constraints further interrupt anticipated 
flows of funding to projects already under way. Some projects we 
reviewed experienced interruptions in funding for two primary reasons: 
tightened federal budgets reduced discretionary funding available to 
support the projects, or an international partner failed to provide 
support as planned. Given that federal budgets are likely to remain 
tight, Science can expect to face continued funding difficulties. 
Science's fiscal year 2008 appropriations, for example, totaled less 
than the amount required to support the year's anticipated expenditures 
for ongoing projects. A number of Science's projects already under way 
could be delayed as a result, possibly raising total costs. Since a 
sudden increase in prices can render well-considered cost estimates 
obsolete, uncertainties in prices for labor and manufactured goods, 
which have sometimes fluctuated widely, may make it still more 
difficult to achieve cost and schedule targets. A project to implement 
seismic and utility upgrades at the Stanford Linear Accelerator, for 
example, has faced unanticipated labor price increases in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, which, according to federal officials, has 
threatened the project's ability to achieve its original cost and 
schedule targets. 

* Shrinking pool of experienced and knowledgeable staff: Although 
Science and laboratory officials said that to date they have generally 
been able to find experienced and knowledgeable staff to lead and carry 
out projects, doing so may become increasingly difficult in the future, 
as an estimated 21 percent to 43 percent of Science's workforce becomes 
eligible for retirement by 2011. Similar large-scale retirements are 
expected at Science's contractor laboratories. Of the 12 projects we 
reviewed in depth, Science officials reported that for 2 of them, 
contractors initially had trouble securing adequately experienced 
project managers, although only 1 breached its cost and schedule 
baseline as a result. Experienced management personnel were unavailable 
for this project--to create and study the behavior of subatomic 
particles called neutrinos--because they had been assigned to other, 
higher-priority projects. This issue is of substantial concern to DOE's 
Inspector General, who in 2007 identified human capital as a 
"significant management challenge" requiring priority long-term 
attention. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Energy consider whether other 
program offices would benefit from adopting selected practices from 
Science's independent project reviews, such as the frequency and focus 
of reviews for technically complex projects. We are also recommending 
that DOE review and strengthen, as appropriate, its project management 
guidance to help better ensure each project's technical goals, 
including the project's expected scientific performance and 
functionality of its facilities and infrastructure. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. 
DOE generally agreed with our findings and stated that it would 
consider incorporating recommendations as part of its Root Cause 
Analysis: Corrective Action Plan to improve contract and project 
management. DOE also provided a number of general and project-specific 
comments that we incorporated throughout this report as appropriate. 

Background: 

Created in 1977 from diverse agencies, DOE manages the nation's nuclear 
weapons production complex, cleans up the environmental legacy of 
nuclear weapons development, and conducts research in both energy and 
basic sciences. DOE carries out its work at numerous sites and 
facilities around the country, primarily through private entities that 
manage the facilities and implement program and project activities 
under contract to DOE. About 90 percent of DOE's annual budget of $24 
billion goes into contracts. The department has established an 
extensive network of site offices to directly oversee the work of these 
contractors. 

DOE's Office of Science is one of several program offices within the 
department. It is the third largest in annual funding, after the Office 
of Environmental Management, which leads the national effort to clean 
up toxic and nuclear waste sites left by nuclear weapons manufacture, 
and the National Nuclear Security Administration, which conducts 
nuclear weapons research and manages the nation's nuclear weapons 
stockpile. Science's $4 billion in annual funding is used primarily to 
support scientific research conducted under contract with private 
entities, many of which are educational or other nonprofit 
institutions. For example, UT-Battelle--a limited-liability partnership 
formed by the University of Tennessee and Battelle Memorial Institute--
manages and operates the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. In 
addition to managing research, contractors are responsible for carrying 
out major repairs or upgrades to existing facilities, equipment, and 
site infrastructure; fabricating or procuring needed technological 
components; and designing and constructing additions to the facilities. 
The vast majority of the scientists, engineers, and others who manage 
research funded by the Office of Science work directly for the facility 
contractors. 

DOE has a consistent record of poorly estimating costs and managing 
projects. We reported in 1997 that over a 16-year period, 80 DOE 
projects costing over $100 million were started, but only 15 were 
completed, with most of these experiencing cost overruns and delays. 
Thirty-one of the 80 projects were terminated before completion. For 
example, we reported that the Office of Environmental Management's 
efforts to clean up a disposal area for hazardous waste at the Idaho 
National Laboratory were running 2 years behind schedule and that 
estimated costs had nearly doubled to $400 million. Problems were so 
severe that DOE eventually terminated all work on this project. The 
cleanup effort has recently been renewed--more than 10 years after we 
first reported problems--as the state of Idaho enforces DOE agreements 
to mitigate hazardous wastes buried at the site. DOE's Office of 
Engineering and Construction Management was established in 1999 mainly 
to implement project management reforms that would address such 
problems. The Construction Management office is responsible for 
providing consistent guidance on project management policy and 
processes and for facilitating oversight of the department's project 
management efforts. As part of these responsibilities, the office in 
2000 issued DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the 
Acquisition of Capital Assets, which was updated in 2006. All DOE 
program offices must comply with the updated order if their projects 
involve acquisitions totaling $20 million or more, although the 
principles set forth in the order apply to projects costing $5 million 
or more. This directive defines DOE's project management and oversight 
principles, including requirements for both external project reviews 
led by the Construction Management office and internal project reviews 
led by DOE program offices; these internal and external reviews assess 
each project's costs, schedule, and technical issues. The order also 
prescribes a series of DOE management reviews and approvals, called 
critical decision points, required to move a project forward (see fig. 
1). In general, DOE management reviews and approvals at these decision 
points are to ensure that the project requirements are met. 

Figure 1: The Five Critical Decision Points in DOE's Project Management 
Process: 

This figure is a flowchart showing the five critical decision points in 
DOE's project management process. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and DOE. 

[End of figure] 

Before a project may begin construction, the sponsoring DOE program 
office must develop and obtain departmental approval for the project's 
"performance baseline." This baseline represents the organization's 
commitment to completing a project at a certain cost and by a specific 
date. Also included as part of the performance baseline are the 
project's technical goals, which define the scope of work and the 
project's expected performance at completion. The scope and performance 
standards define in general terms what facilities and equipment will be 
purchased or upgraded within the agreed cost and schedule targets, as 
well as the project's minimum capability to perform the desired 
function at completion, such as a research facility's ability to 
accommodate people and equipment or a particle accelerator's minimum 
energy level. 

Sometimes problems arise during a project's implementation that prevent 
the project from achieving its original cost, schedule, or technical 
baselines. If so, the project generally must be "rebaselined" to 
reflect needed changes. In essence, a revised baseline allows a project 
that is running over budget or late, or requires a change in scope, to 
establish new performance targets. The performance baseline may be 
changed only with Science or DOE management review and approval. In 
rare instances, DOE may decide to terminate the project rather than 
approve a change, particularly if the project's technical goals cannot 
be achieved without spending substantially more money. 

Office of Science Managed Majority of Projects within Committed Cost 
and Schedule Targets: 

Of the 42 projects we reviewed that were completed by Science or under 
way from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, around 70 percent 
adhered to their original cost and schedule targets (see fig. 2). 
Twenty-seven of the projects we reviewed were completed during this 
period, and 15 were still under way. Our analysis found that 24 (89 
percent) of these 27 projects met their original cost targets and 21 
(78 percent) were completed on or ahead of schedule. Similarly, as of 
the end of February 2008, 9 (60 percent) of the 15 projects that were 
still under way were on track to meet their original cost and schedule 
targets. For purposes of this analysis, in accordance with Office of 
Management and Budget guidance and DOE performance goals, we considered 
as within budget any Science project that exceeded or will exceed its 
original cost baseline by less than 10 percent. Although DOE 
performance goals do not address project schedule, the Office of 
Management and Budget's guidance addresses both cost and schedule; we 
therefore also evaluated Science's performance in meeting its schedule 
baseline, considering as on time the projects that exceeded or will 
exceed the original completion date by less than 10 percent. 

Figure 2: Expected or Actual Performance of 42 Reviewed Office of 
Science Projects, Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2007: 

This figure is a flowchart showing expected or actual performance of 42 
reviewed office of science projects, fiscal year 2003 through fiscal 
year 2007. The bars represent met cost target and completed on time, 
met cost or schedule target but not both, and exceeded cost target and 
completed late. 

Ongoing projects; 
Met cost target and completed on time: 9; 
Met cost or schedule target but not both: 4; 
Exceeded cost target and completed late: 15; 
Total: 15.  

Completed projects; 
Met cost target and completed on time: 20; 
Met cost or schedule target but not both: 5; 
Exceeded cost target and completed late: 2. 
Total: 27.  

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Science data. 

[End of figure] 

Among the completed projects, the 20 that successfully met their 
original cost targets and were on time ranged in nature from 
construction jobs costing a few million dollars to cutting-edge 
scientific facilities and equipment costing more than a billion 
dollars. While a few of these projects finished well below their 
original cost and schedule targets, most were at or near the targets, 
including the following: 

* Run IIb CDF Detector, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, 
Illinois: In July 2006, scientists and engineers successfully completed 
a 3.5-year effort[Footnote 5] to upgrade a highly complex device used 
for detecting the presence of subatomic particles at the laboratory's 
main particle accelerator. The project was completed for around $10.9 
million--64 percent less than the $30.4 million cost target--and 4 
months ahead of schedule. The upgraded device was capable of supplying 
critical evidence of certain particles thought to exist but 
undetectable by current particle detectors; confirmation of these 
particles could help resolve fundamental questions about the nature of 
energy and matter. A concurrent project to upgrade a similar detector 
at the Fermi Laboratory's main accelerator, the Run IIb D-Zero 
Detector, was also completed well below (39 percent) its original $29 
million target; it was also completed on schedule. 

* Nanoscale Science Research Centers at Argonne National Laboratory, 
Illinois; Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York; Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, California; Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Tennessee; and Sandia and Los Alamos national laboratories, New Mexico: 
All five of the nanoscale science research center construction projects 
included in our review came in at or below their original cost and 
schedule targets or are on track to do so.[Footnote 6] The Center for 
Nanoscale Materials at the Argonne National Laboratory, finished in 
September 2007, for example, took 47 months to complete. The project 
was completed on schedule and within its original committed cost target 
of $72 million.[Footnote 7] The 88,000-square-foot facility, used for 
researching and developing materials at the molecular or atomic level 
(such as those found within computer microchips), houses wet and dry 
laboratories and sterile "clean rooms" outfitted with $36 million of 
specialized research instruments and equipment, as well as a computing 
center, offices, meeting rooms, and other supporting infrastructure. 

* Laboratory facilities HVAC upgrades, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Tennessee: A project to upgrade heating, ventilation, and air- 
conditioning systems was finished in November 2003 (4 months ahead of 
schedule) for about $150,000 less than the project's original target 
cost of $7.2 million. The project, which took 23 months to complete, 
involved upgrading and replacing deteriorated equipment and piping 
serving 13 buildings in the central research complex. 

In addition, 5 of the 27 completed projects (19 percent) met either 
their cost or schedule target but not both. Those that missed their 
schedule targets finished 3 to 15 months late. The projects in this 
group included lower-cost infrastructure improvement projects and 
higher-cost projects to acquire advanced research equipment. The 
following projects met their cost targets but missed their schedule 
targets: 

* Electrical systems upgrade, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee: 
This $5.9 million project was completed in April 2003 slightly under 
budget but took about 26 months to complete, 3 months longer than 
scheduled. The project included replacing damaged electrical poles and 
about 3 miles of feeder lines around the laboratory complex, installing 
a computer-based electrical metering system, and replacing or 
installing additional breakers and substations throughout the 
laboratory complex. 

* Central supply facility, Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois: This 
$5.9 million project met its original cost target when it was completed 
in October 2002. Design began around June 1999,[Footnote 8] and 
construction was completed in 40 months, about 15 months later than 
originally scheduled. The focus of this project was to expand a storage 
facility and make other improvements to site infrastructure. 

Finally, only 2 of the 27 completed projects (7 percent) were both over 
cost and late. These 2 projects finished 18 percent and 23 percent over 
cost and over 1 year late. With costs ranging from $58 million to $168 
million, they were among the more costly of the projects we reviewed 
and generally had longer lead times, taking up to 6 years to complete 
after their original cost and schedule estimates were established. Both 
projects aimed to expand Science's research capabilities, rather than 
to improve site infrastructure. The projects that were both over cost 
and late follow: 

* Neutrinos at the Main Injector, Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory, Illinois: The neutrinos project included designing and 
constructing two particle detectors--one sited at Fermi Laboratory in 
Batavia, Illinois, and the other in Soudan, Minnesota--and a tunnel in 
which a proton beam instrument could be aimed through solid earth at 
the Soudan detector, more than 450 miles away. This $168 million 
project took 72 months and was completed 17 months late at more than 23 
percent over its committed cost. 

* Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR 3 Upgrade), 
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, California: This project, to 
upgrade the scientific capability of the SPEAR 3 device, was completed 
in 2003 for $58 million--14 months late and nearly 18 percent over its 
original cost target of $49 million. The upgrade project, which lasted 
over 5 years, increased the device's ability to produce x-rays useful 
for research in a variety of disciplines, including biology and 
medicine. Science partnered with the National Institutes of Health, 
which provided half of the project's funding. 

For Science's 15 projects still under way as of the end of February 
2008, Science or laboratory officials reported that they expected to 
complete 9 (60 percent) within their cost and schedule targets. In 
contrast, managers of 4 of the 15 projects (27 percent) told us that as 
of the end of February 2008, they expected to meet their cost targets 
but not their target completion dates. And 2 (13 percent) of these 
projects--specifically, the National Compact Stellarator Experiment at 
the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, New Jersey, and the Linac 
Coherent Light Source project at the Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center--are expected to miss both their cost and schedule targets. 

Several Factors Contributed to Science's Cost and Schedule Performance: 

That Science has been able to deliver most projects within their 
committed cost and scheduled targets is due in part to practicing sound 
management principles: leadership commitment to achieving these 
targets, ensuring that each project has the necessary management and 
technical expertise, and approaching project management with discipline 
and rigor so that processes focus on results. Science's practice of 
trimming selected technical or other components from some projects 
helped in achieving cost and schedule commitments, although this 
practice has sometimes raised concerns. 

Leadership Commitment to Achieving Cost and Schedule Targets Played a 
Key Role: 

In our prior work reviewing practices that promote effective project 
management, we identified committed leadership as an important 
contributing factor.[Footnote 9] An organization's leaders play a 
pivotal role because they serve as the primary proponents of the 
organization's values and culture, including commitment to consistently 
achieving project cost and schedule targets. When the top tier of an 
organization embraces a particular performance goal, the rest of the 
organization is more likely to follow suit. Shortly after assuming 
office in 2002, the Under Secretary of Science issued a memorandum to 
Science staff articulating his commitment to achieving project cost and 
schedule targets, stating that "the Office of Science expectation is 
that all projects be completed on schedule and within budget" and that 
senior-level managers and project staff would be held accountable for 
doing so. Most recently, in a March 2007 testimony before Congress, the 
Under Secretary emphasized Science's continued commitment to "a careful 
process" of preparing project cost and schedule targets to ensure that 
they are realistic.[Footnote 10] Science leadership's consistent 
emphasis on achieving cost and schedule goals appears to have been 
adopted by Science and contractor laboratory management and staff, many 
of whom told us they believed that requesting more money or more time 
to complete a project was typically not an option, as the following 
examples illustrate: 

* National Compact Stellarator Experiment, Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory, New Jersey: This experiment to develop an alternative 
method for harnessing fusion energy is facing design problems that are 
likely to increase the cost by 91 percent and delay completion by 4.5 
years. In an August 2007 letter to the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory 
Committee, which advises the Office of Science on fusion energy 
research, the Under Secretary requested that the committee evaluate the 
feasibility of continuing the project. "These overruns are large enough 
to add new burdens on the limited resources of the U.S. fusion energy 
sciences program, as well as undermine confidence of the Administration 
and Congress in the ability of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences and 
the Office of Science to manage large and technically challenging 
construction projects. Given the magnitude of the increases projected 
for the NCSX (National Compact Stellarator Experiment), all options, 
including termination of the project, must be considered," the Under 
Secretary wrote. As of November 2007, the project team had requested to 
increase the cost target and extend the completion schedule, but the 
Under Secretary had not approved the request. 

* Center for Nanoscale Materials, Argonne National Laboratory, 
Illinois: The Argonne National Laboratory project staff managing the 
construction of this $72 million office and laboratory facility said 
that the Director of Basic Energy Sciences, who was responsible for 
project oversight, repeatedly made it clear that the team could not 
exceed its cost target. According to the laboratory project manager for 
construction, basic energy sciences officials were "breathing down our 
necks" to ensure that the project would be completed on time and within 
cost; it was. 

* Neutrinos at the Main Injector, Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory, Illinois: The federal project director said that the 
project team felt pressured to maintain a fixed budget target even 
before a firm baseline was established. The project included designing 
and constructing two particle detectors and a tunnel. He pointed out 
that an early Fermi Laboratory plan to construct three modules for the 
Neutrinos at the Main Injector project was trimmed back to two modules 
to save on costs, even though the project had not yet committed to a 
cost target. According to the federal project director, suggesting that 
the project's budget expand for the modules was not an option. 

Management and Technical Expertise Was Generally Available to Lead and 
Carry Out Projects: 

Another factor important to effective project management is having 
people in the right numbers with the right skills to accomplish an 
agency's goals. Science and laboratory officials said that finding 
experienced staff to manage and carry out projects can be challenging, 
but they have generally succeeded by supporting and implementing 
recruitment and retention incentives, collaborating with other Science 
laboratories to secure expertise and management skills lacking on the 
project team, and training skilled scientists in effective project 
management techniques. For example: 

* Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee: 
Oak Ridge Laboratory officials said problems assigning people with the 
right skills to support construction of the Spallation Neutron Source, 
the world's most powerful neutron-scattering device, were significant. 
Not only did the project face problems hiring a project manager, but it 
also faced problems securing other needed staff. When initial work on 
the spallation project did not progress adequately, threatening cost 
and schedule targets, the project manager was replaced. The laboratory, 
which had developed a "human resources tool kit" to assist in 
recruiting and retaining staff, was eventually able to secure needed 
personnel. According to officials, they offered key personnel pay 
incentives, including recruiting bonuses and employment service credit 
for employees transferring from other DOE laboratories. 

* U.S. components of the Large Hadron Collider, Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory, Illinois: Science officials said that many 
laboratories have been able to secure scientific expertise they lacked 
by partnering with other Science laboratories, so that experienced 
staff could lend their knowledge and expertise to a project without 
having to relocate themselves and their families. The hadron collider 
project is a collaboration among the member states of the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research,[Footnote 11] the United States, and 
others to construct a new high-energy physics facility outside Geneva, 
Switzerland. The United States is contributing components to an 
accelerator and two very large general-purpose detectors. Because the 
project's complexity and size required a wide range of technical 
expertise not readily available at the Fermi site alone, the laboratory 
collaborated with two additional laboratories, Lawrence Berkeley and 
Brookhaven national laboratories. Fermi Laboratory, with experience 
constructing and operating particle detectors, was given responsibility 
for overseeing U.S. contributions to one of the two detectors and the 
accelerator; Brookhaven took responsibility for the other detector. 

* Center for Nanoscale Materials, Argonne National Laboratory, 
Illinois: Science officials said that laboratories generally assign a 
project leader with science background and a project manager with 
project management background to manage projects jointly. In one 
instance, they assigned a scientist as project manager. For the 
nanoscience research facility at Argonne Laboratory, the project 
manager was a trained physicist. He said that although his interest and 
expertise lay in scientific research, the laboratory assigned him to 
spearhead construction of the nanoscience facility. To successfully do 
so, he said, he received sufficient training in project management 
skills to be certified by the Project Management Institute, a national 
organization that sets professional project management standards. 
Similarly, according to Oak Ridge officials, 12 federal and laboratory 
staff completed project management training and were professionally 
certified by the Project Management Institute during construction of 
the Spallation Neutron Source. 

Rigorous Project Oversight Policies and Processes Helped Identify 
Potential Problems: 

Another factor fundamental to effective project management is the 
quality of project monitoring and oversight. Office of Science project 
monitoring and oversight practices are more frequent, focused, and 
rigorous than those required under DOE project management 
guidance.[Footnote 12] 

DOE requires that, at selected stages, projects receive independent 
peer reviews, called independent project reviews, directed by each 
responsible program office.[Footnote 13] Generally, DOE guidance states 
that independent peer reviews are to be done by individuals with no 
vested interest in a project's outcome. Depending on the total project 
scope, cost and schedule estimates, and other factors, such internal 
reviews may be required to validate the mission need for the project 
(at critical decision point 0), the project's costs and schedule 
estimates (at critical decision point 2), and the project's readiness 
to be executed or begin construction (at critical decision point 3). 
For projects involving high-risk or high-hazard nuclear facilities, a 
technical review at critical decision point 1 may also be required to 
validate the safety of the project's design. Guidance regarding 
independent peer review suggests only when and why reviews should 
occur; it does not provide specific requirements for how the reviews 
should be conducted or how each project should be evaluated. 

Science not only follows this overall guidance but has developed more 
explicit guidelines, laid out in its Independent Review Handbook. For 
each Science project, a review panel is convened, consisting of up to 
30 technical and management experts from Science field sites and 
contractor laboratories other than the project site; more-complex 
projects have larger review panels, and less-complex projects have 
smaller panels. The handbook lays out the documentation each project 
team should provide reviewers, expected areas of reviewer expertise and 
their respective responsibilities, and follow-up procedures for 
addressing any problems identified during review. For example, the 
handbook calls for assessing, among other things: 

* how a project conforms to Science's mission needs; 

* cost estimates, including the estimates' basis and level of detail, 
associated risks, and contingency planning in the event of unexpected 
events, such as changes to labor market rates; 

* planned schedules and how schedules could affect cost estimates; 

* the proposed strategy for procuring goods and services to support the 
project; 

* the project's business management, including organization, project 
controls, staffing, risk mitigation, quality issues, and environmental 
and safety compliance issues; and: 

* how problems or recommendations identified in previous reviews were 
or are being addressed. 

For most of the Science projects we reviewed, DOE guidance required 
only one or two independent peer reviews. Nevertheless, Science 
reviewed many of these projects more than the requisite once or twice 
and issued review reports that appeared to be comprehensive. Many 
officials we spoke with, including DOE Construction Management 
officials, federal project directors, and laboratory officials, said 
that Science's peer reviews are thorough; often improve cost and 
schedule estimates; and lead to corrective measures that address 
procurement, design, and other problems. In fact, a number of these 
officials pointed to these reviews as key to Science's strong 
performance relative to that of other DOE offices. 

DOE and laboratory officials told us that the technical expertise 
provided by Science's internal review panels was key to providing 
effective review and oversight, particularly since the Office of 
Engineering and Construction Management, which develops guidance on 
project management policy and processes, depends on internal reviews to 
evaluate technical issues that lie beyond its own capabilities. DOE 
Construction Management and other officials explained that Science's 
internal reviews are valuable because the panel members' experience and 
expertise help to identify and resolve potential difficulties before 
they become problems affecting cost, schedule, or technical goals. The 
following examples illustrate the effectiveness of internal reviews: 

* The Center for Nanophase Materials Sciences, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, Tennessee: Under DOE guidance, this $65 million project to 
construct a four-story office and laboratory complex to study materials 
on the nanoscale should have received two independent internal reviews, 
one at the stage in which cost and schedule targets and work scope were 
validated and another when the project was nearly ready to begin 
construction. Science, however, conducted four reviews--on average, one 
each year. Among the concerns identified during these internal reviews 
were questions about whether a planned "clean room" would adequately 
limit the number and size of airborne environmental pollutants, such as 
dust, microbes, and vapors, and whether the costs of achieving industry 
standards for a sterile laboratory environment had been accurately 
projected. The review panel for this project suggested hiring a private 
consultant to evaluate the laboratory's construction plans, and 
numerous changes were ultimately implemented. In addition, the review 
panel validated cost estimates that had been revised on the basis of an 
earlier review. Ultimately, this project averted cost overruns and was 
completed 1 month early. 

* U.S. contributions to the Large Hadron Collider, Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory, Illinois: Under DOE guidance, the three 
projects (components of two particle detectors and an 
accelerator)[Footnote 14] comprising the $531 million U.S. contribution 
to the international Large Hadron Collider would have required only one 
internal review each to validate readiness for construction at critical 
decision point 3. Instead, Science conducted 17 reviews of each 
component. According to project managers for the detector components, 
the first internal independent review found that the estimated cost 
allowance to cover unexpected occurrences was deficient, given the 
project's complexity. The review panel directed the project teams to 
develop a higher cost estimate to better account for unexpected 
problems. Ultimately, each of these projects was or will be completed 
within 2 percent of its committed cost (the two detector projects are 
still under way), although our analysis suggests that all three were or 
will be completed late, in part because of installation delays 
resulting from problems with tunnel construction, which was a 
responsibility of the European consortium. 

Science Modified Project Scope to Meet Cost and Schedule Targets, but 
This Practice Sometimes Raised Concerns: 

Some of the projects we reviewed were able to achieve original cost or 
schedule targets, in part because they trimmed away selected components 
from the project's scope. DOE's project management order 413.3 and 
associated guidance allow revisions in project scope to control costs 
and stay on schedule, as long as the project will still meet its 
technical goals and the proper laboratory or DOE officials approve the 
changes. DOE guidance defines technical goals to include the minimum 
level of performance that a project must attain--the essential 
capabilities, design features, functions, and other characteristics 
present at the project's completion--to fulfill the mission need 
motivating DOE to pursue the project.[Footnote 15] 

The scope of several projects we reviewed was revised to help meet cost 
or schedule targets, without apparent adverse effect on technical 
goals, including:[Footnote 16] 

* Argonne National Laboratory trimmed scope from a project to expand 
its central supply facility when it decided not to remove aboveground 
pipes from the laboratory grounds. The funds saved by this decision 
offset the unexpected additional costs resulting from higher-than- 
expected construction bids. Removing the pipes was considered the 
project's lowest priority. 

* Similarly, Oak Ridge National Laboratory eliminated a planned upgrade 
of the electrical connections between two laboratory buildings, in part 
because electricity use had declined and the upgrade was no longer 
essential. Eliminating this work helped offset increased costs 
associated with other components of the project.[Footnote 17] 

* At the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, a plan to construct an 
administrative office building was deleted from the Linac Coherent 
Light Source project and replaced by a plan to renovate existing space 
to help offset costs associated with high construction bids resulting 
from labor market pressures in the San Francisco Bay Area. 

DOE policies and guidance, as well as other organizations' guidance 
related to effective project management, emphasize the importance of 
clearly defining a project's performance or technical goals. 
Specifically, DOE guidance requires that minimum performance goals 
clearly define what new facilities or functions a project will consist 
of. These goals are then used as a measure for evaluating project 
performance. Our own cost assessment guide and studies of DOE's project 
management by the National Research Council also discuss the importance 
of defining a project's technical goals appropriately to enable 
adequate oversight.[Footnote 18] The underlying rationale is that if 
technical goals are too broad or vaguely stated, it can be difficult to 
assess whether or to what extent trimming certain aspects of project 
scope undermines the project's ability to accomplish its mission. 

In fact, concerns have been raised within DOE that projects' goals may 
not always be adequately defined. An April 2008 DOE report--which cited 
the findings of a recent workshop to identify systemic challenges in 
planning and managing DOE projects--found that DOE often fails to plan 
thoroughly before committing to project costs, schedules, scope, and 
technical goals. This shortcoming was identified as the primary root 
cause for long-standing project management problems.[Footnote 19] 
Project management oversight officials at DOE's Office of Engineering 
and Construction Management said that projects, including Science's, 
sometimes include overly broad technical goals, making it difficult to 
determine the effects of a change in project scope. According to DOE, 
descriptions of project scope do not always articulate technical goals 
in terms of required facilities, whose costs generally make up a 
significant share of overall expenditures. Facility requirements, as 
well as technical goals, must be well defined in project scope to 
establish reliable cost and schedule targets. Officials added that they 
believe that DOE guidance could be clarified to help ensure that 
project technical goals are sufficiently detailed to permit effective 
oversight. 

DOE's Inspector General has also raised concerns about project scope. 
Specifically, changes in the scope of the Spallation Neutron Source 
project led the Inspector General to conclude that Science had 
compromised the project's scientific mission and technical goals to 
achieve cost and schedule commitments and avoid requesting more funding 
from Congress. In its November 2001 report, the Inspector General found 
that, among other scope reductions, Science had trimmed both the range 
of capabilities and the number of planned scientific instruments it had 
committed to in the original baseline.[Footnote 20] Science countered 
that it had never committed to procuring the 10 instruments described 
in the project's performance goals and was clear in its intention to 
delay selecting instruments until later in the project. Science 
officials explained that the 5 instruments ultimately selected were 
chosen on scientific, rather than budgetary, grounds and were 
technically superior to the 10 "proxy" instruments in the original 
performance goals. Science and the Inspector General disagreed over the 
effect these changes may have had on the project's technical goals, in 
part because those goals were so broadly defined that it was unclear 
how acquiring the 5 instruments, rather than the original 10, may have 
affected the facility's performance. 

We did not find such concerns in the other projects we reviewed, 
although we did find differences in the level of detail spelled out in 
technical goals, such as the goals listed for five similar nanoscience 
research centers in five states. For example, the center in Illinois 
defined "completion" as a completed laboratory building approved for 
occupancy, with all scientific instruments delivered, installed, 
verified, and tested. The technical goals for the centers in California 
and New York went so far as to specify the number of users their 
facilities would accommodate. All of these facilities were or are on 
track to successful completion, but if any of them found it necessary 
to reduce scope to stay on track, it might be difficult to discern the 
effect of any reductions on the overarching technical goals unless 
those goals were explicitly detailed. The effect of a midproject 
reduction in how many researchers and staff a facility could 
accommodate, for example, might only be apparent for the centers whose 
technical goals spelled out how many users were originally envisioned 
for the facility. An Office of Engineering and Construction Management 
official explained that a scope description clearly laying out a 
building's expected functionality, not just its square footage, can 
make it easier for interested parties to understand key project goals 
and the effects of any modifications in scope. Engineering and 
Construction Management officials we spoke with are concerned enough 
about this vulnerability departmentwide that they are considering 
developing and issuing additional guidance on defining projects' 
technical goals, perhaps by 2009. 

Maintaining Successful Project Performance in the Future Will Require 
Continued Attention to Challenges Affecting Funding and Human 
Resources: 

Science is likely to face two primary challenges to maintaining its 
project performance in the future: heightened funding and market 
uncertainties, and a shrinking pool of qualified people to manage 
projects. Interruptions in expected funding that in the past have 
increased project costs or caused schedule delays will doubtless 
continue, given the ongoing decline in federal funding available for 
discretionary projects, including Science's programs. Meanwhile, as the 
nation's population ages and both federal and laboratory staff retire 
in increasing numbers, the pool of experienced scientists and project 
managers available to carry out Science's program of work is likely to 
shrink, and difficulties replacing them are likely to continue. 

Heightened Funding and Market Uncertainties Could Make Cost and 
Schedule Targets More Difficult to Achieve in the Future: 

Achieving cost and schedule targets could become more difficult for 
Science in the future, as growing federal budgetary constraints 
potentially exacerbate interruptions in anticipated flows of funding to 
projects already under way and volatile market conditions in some areas 
of the country unexpectedly drive up the costs of the labor and 
commodities needed to complete those projects. When projects do not 
receive funding as anticipated, officials said, projects take longer to 
complete. Labor expenses accumulate over the longer period, and prices 
for commodities may increase, driving total project costs upward. The 
experiences of the following projects at the Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Center in California help illustrate how these forces have 
affected Science's ability to meet cost and schedule targets: 

* Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR 3 Upgrade): This 
project experienced a slowdown in the expected stream of funding during 
the years when a large share of the project's costs were to be 
allocated for major aspects of the work, such as fabricating 
components. As a result, Science had to extend its schedule and revise 
its cost estimates to ensure sufficient funding and staff to carry out 
the remaining work. Total project costs increased 9 percent--from $53 
million to $58 million--and instead of 4 years, the project took over 5 
years to complete. This followed an earlier but unrelated cost increase 
from the project's original $49 million target cost, resulting from a 
decision by Science and the National Institutes of Health, which funded 
half of the project's costs, to further boost the scientific capability 
of the upgraded device beyond the level planned in the baseline. 

* Large Area Telescope: This telescope is the primary scientific 
instrument to be flown on the Gamma-Ray Large Area Space Telescope 
(GLAST), which is due to launch in May 2008. The telescope, DOE's 
contribution to GLAST and a joint effort of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and a host of other U.S. and foreign 
institutions, was completed in March 2006.[Footnote 21] Once in orbit, 
the telescope will be used to explore the dynamics of extreme 
environments in space and could lead to major discoveries about the 
universe. When the cost and schedule targets were first established, 
this project included an in-kind contribution by the French space 
agency to design and fabricate the telescope's calorimeter--a device 
for measuring the energy picked up by the telescope's sensors. When the 
French government withdrew its participation, the project managers at 
the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center had to procure the component 
elsewhere and pay for it out of the project's budget. That procurement 
contributed to the overall increase in costs from $121 million to $188 
million, and DOE's direct financial contribution to the project 
increased from $37 million to $45 million. 

* Safety and operational reliability improvements: This $15.7 million 
project will upgrade utilities and improve the aging Stanford 
laboratory's ability to withstand earthquakes. When construction prices 
in the San Francisco Bay Area rose dramatically and unexpectedly 
between approval of the project's cost baseline and DOE's authorization 
to begin construction, Stanford postponed some planned improvements 
until other, higher-priority work was completed. If sufficient funding 
is unavailable to complete those improvements, they will be cut from 
the project. Officials told us they do not plan to request additional 
funding. If, near the end of construction, residual project funding is 
available, Stanford will then contract for the postponed work, adding 
at least 3 months to this 3.5-year project. 

Although the future cannot be predicted with certainty, it seems that 
current federal fiscal constraints on discretionary funding will likely 
make Science's ability to meet its future cost and schedule targets 
increasingly more challenging. Lower-than-expected appropriations for 
fiscal year 2008 are already forcing Science to end or slow progress on 
several projects and curtail operation or use of a number of scientific 
facilities and items of equipment obtained earlier. According to 
Science's assessment, for example, shortfalls in funding for one of the 
ongoing projects in our review--a $33 million effort to construct 
additional space at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
California, to accommodate the growing number of researchers using the 
Advanced Light Source facility--could delay this 3.5-year project by 
more than 1 year beyond the original committed schedule. For the U.S. 
contribution to the International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor--an 
internationally led fusion energy demonstration project currently in 
planning and design and the subject of our prior work[Footnote 22]-- 
$10.7 million in funding for fiscal year 2008 was provided, rather than 
the $160 million requested. 

Over the long term, fiscal constraints on discretionary funding are 
also likely to affect Science's 20-year plan to acquire new research 
equipment and facilities. In our work assessing the nation's long-term 
fiscal outlook, we have reported that continued budget deficits-- 
exacerbated by the aging of the American population and rising related 
Social Security and health care costs--could soon lead to a protracted 
decline in the availability of federal funding for discretionary 
programs, including scientific research.[Footnote 23] The Director of 
Science's Office of Project Assessment said that interruptions in 
project funding arising from federal fiscal constraints represent the 
primary challenge Science faces in meeting cost and schedule targets in 
the future. In a February 2008 presentation to the High Energy Physics 
Advisory Panel, the Under Secretary for Science echoed this concern. He 
said he expected that recent flat and declining budgets for the agency 
would continue unless Science and its advocates successfully convinced 
Congress of the need for long-term high-energy physics research. 

Finally, recent sustained increases in the prices for crude oil, steel, 
and other commodities and a weakening dollar could have inflationary 
effects on the nation, leading to higher prices for many things--from 
manufactured goods to facility construction.[Footnote 24] Unexpected 
increases in prices add continued uncertainty to the cost of Science's 
planned long-term research and facility construction programs, raising 
questions about Science's ability to meet cost and schedule targets in 
the future. 

Forthcoming Retirements Could Deplete Scientific, Technical, and 
Management Expertise Available for Future Projects: 

Large-scale retirements as the nation's workforce ages are likely to 
continue challenging Science's ability to staff future projects 
effectively and, ultimately, achieve cost and schedule goals. Two of 
the 12 projects we reviewed in depth have faced difficulties securing 
adequately experienced project managers, although only 1 breached its 
cost and schedule baseline as a result. This 72-month project, 
Neutrinos at the Main Injector, was completed 17 months late and 23 
percent over its committed cost, in large part because expertise in two 
areas was not available in a timely manner. First, the management team 
overseeing the project had little experience in tunneling, which was 
needed to house an underground proton-beam device. Staff qualified to 
oversee tunneling work were not brought on board the project until 
after the contractor encountered technical and safety problems. Second, 
the project's cost target had been established before engineering was 
completed, and the design did not fully account for the underground 
environment. Other factors, including higher-than-expected construction 
prices, also contributed to the cost increase and delay. 

Such problems securing adequate management and technical expertise will 
doubtless continue, given expected retirements within Science and its 
contractor laboratories and growing competition for scientific 
expertise, as these examples demonstrate: 

* Office of Science: According to the most recent analysis from the 
Office of Science, about 21 percent of the agency's workforce was 
eligible for retirement in 2005, and that number is expected to 
increase to 43 percent by 2011. Technical occupations are expected to 
be most seriously affected, although Science also is facing the 
imminent departure of much of its senior executive staff. Science has 
reported that almost all of its nuclear, chemical, and mechanical 
engineers will be eligible for retirement by 2011, as well as one-third 
or more of its technical specialists, such as physical scientists, 
health physicists, and chemists. In addition, more than half of 
Science's senior management staff is already eligible to retire. These 
people include senior project management officials, as well as 
Science's most senior leadership in basic energy sciences, fusion 
energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics. Looming 
retirements are of substantial concern to DOE's Inspector General, 
which has identified human capital as a "significant management 
challenge" requiring priority long-term attention.[Footnote 25] The 
Inspector General reported in 2007 that recent reductions in overall 
staffing at the department--staffing levels at Science have declined by 
almost 15 percent since 1999--combined with an aging workforce 
approaching retirement will create difficulties ensuring that the 
department has sufficient skills and knowledge in place to carry out 
its future responsibilities. 

* Contractor laboratories: Officials at three of the four laboratories 
we visited--Fermi, Oak Ridge, and Argonne--said that, like the federal 
government, they also anticipate large-scale retirements in the near 
future, although budget reductions have already caused layoffs of many 
staff with management and technical expertise.[Footnote 26] The vast 
majority of staff working on Science projects (about 23,000 people) are 
employed by DOE's 10 contractor laboratories and facilities across the 
country. In anticipation of future retirements, workforce-planning 
officials at the laboratories we visited said they had recently begun 
succession planning. None, however, had yet estimated the resulting 
shortfall in project management and scientific expertise because they 
have not completed comprehensive analyses comparing their expected 
capabilities with their future workforce needs. 

Nevertheless, laboratory officials said that replacing retiring staff 
will present a challenge because the labor market demand for expertise 
in key science and engineering fields currently exceeds the supply. 
Colleges and universities are not generating enough graduates to 
replace staff who are retiring. An Argonne National Laboratory 
preliminary analysis of its workforce needs, for example, recently 
identified a shortage of expertise in the computational sciences, 
superconducting technology, nanoscience, nuclear engineering, and 
health physics. Argonne's experience underscores the findings of a 2008 
National Science Foundation report, which revealed that science and 
engineering occupations grew at an average annual rate of 3.6 percent 
between 1990 and 2000--more than triple the growth rate of other 
occupations.[Footnote 27] According to the foundation, growth in the 
science and engineering labor force in the past has been supported by 
an influx of foreign-born graduates. But global competition for such 
expertise is rising, and fewer immigrants can be expected to fill those 
skill gaps in the future. The director of Fermi Laboratory's human 
resources organization said that the laboratory has already faced 
problems retaining its foreign-born scientists, many of whom have 
returned to their home countries for higher pay and better professional 
opportunities. In addition, laboratory officials said they often face 
stiff competition for new graduates with for-profit private sector 
firms, where salaries can be substantially higher and hiring 
incentives, such as relocation packages, are often better. The combined 
effects of retirements and a labor market in which demand for 
experienced and knowledgeable scientists and technicians far outstrips 
the supply will be a formidable challenge for Science in the future as 
it seeks not only to implement its future plan of work, but also to do 
so within budget and on time. 

Conclusions: 

The ability of DOE's Office of Science to deliver a majority of its 
projects since 2003 within their original committed cost targets and on 
time stands in clear contrast to the struggle of other DOE program 
offices, in particular, the Office of Environmental Management. Science 
has encountered challenges common to many large federal projects, 
including unexpected interruptions in funding and difficulties in 
securing appropriately qualified staff. Yet the office has addressed 
such challenges, in large part by instilling a strong organizational 
commitment to meeting cost and schedule targets, implementing a 
rigorous approach to project oversight, and appropriately addressing 
staffing problems it has encountered. Some of Science's practices--in 
particular, the frequency and focus of its independent reviews--may 
offer practical lessons for DOE's Office of Engineering and 
Construction Management, which this office could consider implementing 
in other DOE program offices. The wide range of expertise that internal 
review panels are able to supply--from pointing out design flaws and 
potential procurement obstacles to professional skepticism of overly 
optimistic cost and schedule estimates--appears to be especially 
effective in helping projects stay on track to meet their performance 
targets. Still, Science will need to remain diligent to ensure future 
success despite continuing, and potentially intensifying, challenges in 
funding and the impending retirement of large numbers of experienced 
technical and project management staff. These growing pressures might 
lead Science to more often consider trimming selected components from a 
project's planned scope of work to achieve cost and schedule targets-- 
a practice that has the potential, without due diligence, of eventually 
weakening some of a project's technical goals. In our view, concerns 
about scope reduction expressed by DOE's Inspector General, differences 
we found in the level of detail describing technical goals for similar 
projects, and DOE's own concerns about inadequate project definition 
could, when taken together, indicate potential vulnerabilities 
associated with trimming project scope. To help ensure that 
vulnerabilities do not materialize as problems, Science and other DOE 
offices could benefit from DOE project management guidance to ensure 
that a project's scientific mission and technical goals are clearly 
defined, so that before reducing scope, organizations have fully 
weighed the scientific and technical effects of the reductions and have 
ensured that scope-altering trade-offs are clear to key interested 
parties, including Congress. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help improve the potential for projects throughout DOE to achieve 
their cost and schedule targets, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Energy direct the Director of the Office of Engineering and 
Construction Management, which develops DOE's project management policy 
and facilitates project management oversight, to consider whether other 
DOE program offices would benefit from adopting selected practices from 
Science's independent project reviews, such as the frequency and focus 
of reviews for technically complex projects. 

In addition, to lessen the possibility that changes in work scope could 
undermine some projects' ability to meet their mission need, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Office of Engineering 
and Construction Management to review DOE's project management guidance 
and consider whether it could be strengthened to help ensure that each 
project's technical goals, including the project's expected scientific 
performance and corresponding facility requirements, are clearly and 
sufficiently defined. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided copies of our draft report to DOE for comment. The 
department generally concurred with our findings and stated that it 
would consider incorporating our recommendations into its Root Cause 
Analysis: Corrective Action Plan. DOE also wished to clarify the 
utility of trimming project scope, stating that our report appeared to 
imply that trimming project scope was an inappropriate practice. On the 
contrary, we believe that trimming scope can be a useful tool to help 
keep projects on schedule and within cost targets when internal or 
external events affect a project's cost or progress. We described 
several projects in the report where scope was trimmed without apparent 
adverse effect on the projects' overall technical goals. Officials 
within DOE, however, have raised concerns that projects' goals may not 
always be adequately defined, which can make it more difficult to 
assess the effects of a change in project scope. In addition, officials 
within the Office of Engineering and Construction Management said they 
believed that DOE guidance could be clarified to help ensure that 
project technical goals are sufficiently detailed to facilitate 
effective oversight. We agree, and we believe that if and when 
difficult choices must be made, the effect of those choices should be 
clear to all interested parties, including Congress. The department 
also provided numerous technical clarifications, which we incorporated 
as appropriate. Appendix III contains DOE's comment letter. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents 
of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, 
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also 
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report 
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 

Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
Office of Science (Science) manages its projects within cost and 
schedule commitments, we obtained performance information on the 42 
Science projects at 10 national laboratories that, from fiscal year 
2003 through fiscal year 2007, were either completed (27 projects) or 
still under way at the time of our study and for which Science had 
committed to cost and schedule targets (15 projects). The 42 projects 
excluded information technology acquisitions and projects that met our 
selection criteria but were suspended at the time we selected projects 
for review in October 2007. Because we did not consider DOE's Project 
Assessment Reporting System a fully reliable source for performance 
information on individual projects, we obtained project cost and 
schedule data and other information directly from the responsible 
laboratories.[Footnote 28] 

For the 42 Science projects, we reviewed selected documents providing 
information about the projects' scope and purpose, estimated and actual 
costs, and proposed and actual time frames. We compared the cost or 
schedule commitments in the original project baselines with the actual 
performance of the 27 completed projects and the expected performance-
-as of February 29, 2008--for the 15 projects still under way. For most 
of the 27 completed projects, we compared the cost targets in the 
documents establishing the project baseline (at critical decision point 
2, or CD-2) with the actual costs, as provided in the documents 
certifying project completion (at critical decision point 4, or CD-4). 
We then compared the proposed time frames in the CD-2 documents with 
the CD-4 document approval dates.[Footnote 29] In a few cases, these 
documents were not available, and alternative documents were used 
instead. For the 15 projects still under way, we compared the cost and 
schedule targets in the CD-2 documents with project performance reports 
as of February 29, 2008, provided by the responsible laboratories. In 
recognition of Office of Management and Budget guidance and DOE's 
recent project performance goals, we characterized projects that met or 
exceeded (or are expected to meet or exceed) their original cost or 
schedule goals by less than 10 percent as completed within budget or on 
time, whereas we considered projects that exceeded (or will exceed) 
their goals by 10 percent or more to be over cost or late.[Footnote 30] 
The Office of Management and Budget requires that federal agencies 
monitor the performance of capital acquisitions and that agency heads 
review major acquisitions that exceed their cost, schedule, and 
performance goals by 10 percent or more.[Footnote 31] In coordination 
with the Office of Management and Budget, DOE in 2008 adopted a goal of 
completing individual projects within 10 percent of the original cost 
baseline, with certain exceptions that were beyond the scope of this 
report.[Footnote 32] DOE did not adopt a performance goal for projects' 
schedule baselines. 

To evaluate the key factors affecting Science's project management 
performance, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 out of the 42 
projects overseen by four laboratories with diverse scientific 
missions--Argonne National Laboratory and Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory in Illinois, Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, and 
the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California--for more detailed 
review. The projects were the Center for Nanoscale Materials; Neutrinos 
at the Main Injector; U.S. ATLAS; U.S. Compact Muon Solenoid; U.S. 
Large Hadron Collider Accelerator; Center for Nanophase Material 
Sciences; SNS Instruments: Next Generation; Spallation Neutron Source; 
Large Area Telescope; Linac Coherent Light Source; safety and 
operational reliability improvements at the Stanford Linear 
Accelerator; and Stanford Positron-Electron Asymmetric Ring (SPEAR 3) 
upgrade. Results from nongeneralizable samples, including our sample of 
12 projects, cannot be used to make inferences about Science's overall 
project performance. Our interest was in gathering information on the 
selected Science projects to identify material factors that may not 
exist across all projects but could help us understand Science's 
organizational strengths and potential future challenges. We selected 
these 12 projects to ensure that our sample included completed and 
ongoing projects, scientific projects and infrastructure improvement 
projects, and a wide range of project costs. Together, the 12 projects 
represented about $2.9 billion, or 75 percent, of the total value of 
the 42 projects. 

For these 12 projects, we visited the responsible laboratory and 
reviewed selected documents providing information about the project's 
scope and purpose, estimated and actual costs, and proposed and actual 
time frames. We also examined reviews of the 12 projects conducted by 
Science's Office of Project Assessment, which provides guidance and 
oversight for Science's projects.[Footnote 33] We interviewed federal 
project directors, laboratory project managers, and other knowledgeable 
staff to gather their perspectives on their projects' performance and 
reasons for it. We also discussed key factors affecting Science's 
project management performance with headquarters officials at DOE's 
Office of Engineering and Construction Management, which provides 
project management policy and oversight departmentwide; at Science's 
Office of Project Assessment; and Science's principal subprogram 
offices. In addition, to evaluate projects' technical goals, we 
reviewed the project execution plans for projects within and outside 
our nongeneralizable sample. 

To determine the main challenges that could affect Science's ability to 
maintain project management performance in the future, we interviewed 
federal and laboratory officials at the four laboratories we visited, 
as well as officials at DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction 
Management and Science's Office of Project Assessment. We interviewed 
workforce-planning officials at the four laboratories, Science's 
headquarters, and regional administrative offices in Illinois and 
Tennessee. We also reviewed relevant studies by GAO, DOE's Inspector 
General, and the National Science Foundation about fiscal challenges 
facing the United States and challenges to maintaining a skilled 
federal workforce and to securing technical expertise across a variety 
of scientific fields. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through May 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Summary of Office of Science Projects Reviewed: 

We obtained and reviewed performance information on 42 Science projects 
at 10 national laboratories, summarized in table 1. 

Table 1: Projects Under Way or Completed from Fiscal Year 2003 through 
Fiscal Year 2007: 

Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Center for Nanoscale 
Materials[D]; 
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
9/1/2007; 
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 9/1/2007; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 0%; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: $72.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
$72.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
0%. 

Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Central supply facility; 
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
7/1/2001; 
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
10/1/2002; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 60.00; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 5.90; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
5.90; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Fire safety 
improvements; 
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
6/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 11/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 16.13; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 8.43; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 8.38; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
(0.59). 

Site and project: Argonne National Laboratory: Mechanical and control 
systems upgrade; 
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
6/1/2005; 
Actual completion date[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 6/1/2005; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Argonne National 
Laboratory: 9.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
8.96; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
(0.44). 

Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Center for Functional 
Nanomaterials; 
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
4/1/2008; 
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 3/1/2008; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: (2.08); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 81.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
81.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Electrical system 
modifications: phase II; 
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
9/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 11/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 7.41; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 6.77; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
6.73; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
(0.59). 

Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Electron Beam Ion 
Source; 
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
3/1/2010; 
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
9/1/2010; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 14.29; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 14.80; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
14.80; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Ground and surface 
water protection upgrade; 
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
12/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
11/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: (3.33); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 6.05; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
6.03; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
(0.33). 

Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Research support 
building; 
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
3/1/2007; 
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
2/1/2007; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: (2.94); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 18.27; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
18.27; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Brookhaven National Laboratory: STAR Electromagnetic 
Calorimeter; 
Project type: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Brookhaven National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
9/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 9/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Brookhaven National 
Laboratory: 8.60; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
8.60; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Brookhaven National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: MINERvA; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 4/1/2010; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
9/1/2010; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 13.51; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 16.80; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 16.80; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Neutrinos at 
the Main Injector[D]; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 9/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
2/1/2005; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 30.91; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 136.10; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 167.97; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 23.42. 

Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Run IIb CDF 
Detector; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 11/1/2006; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
7/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: (8.89); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 30.40; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 10.90; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: (64.14). 

Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Run IIb D-Zero 
Detector; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 11/1/2006; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
11/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 28.60; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 17.40; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: (39.16). 

Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: U.S. ATLAS[D]; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 9/1/ 2005; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
9/1/ 2008[E]; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 40.45; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 163.75; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 163.75; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: U.S. Compact 
Muon Solenoid[D]; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 9/1/2005; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
9/1/2008[E]; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 40.91; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 167.25; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 167.25; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: U.S. Large 
Hadron Collider Accelerator[D]; 
Project type: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 9/1/2005; 
Actual completion date[B]: Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory: 
7/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 12.05; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Fermi National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 200.00[F]; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 200.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advanced Light 
Source molecular environmental science facility; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 10/1/2002; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
12/1/2002; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 5.26; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 6.75; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 6; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: (11.11). 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Advanced Light 
Source user support building; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 5/1/2010; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
5/1/2010; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 32.80; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 32.80; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Building 77 
rehabilitation: phase II; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Argonne National Laboratory: 
Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 11/1/2009; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
11/1/2009; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 13.61; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 13.61; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Gamma-Ray 
Energy-Tracking Array; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 3/1/2011; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
3/1/2011; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 18.80; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 18.80; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: The Molecular 
Foundry; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 12/1/2006; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
12/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 85.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 84.90; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: (0.12). 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Transmission 
Electron Aberration-Corrected Microscope; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 9/1/2009; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
9/1/2009; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 27.09; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 27.09; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Sitewide water 
distribution upgrade: phase I; 
Project type: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 12/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: 
12/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory: 8.26; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory: 8.26; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Center for Nanophase 
Materials Sciences[D]; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
9/1/2006; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 8/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: (2.08); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 65.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
64.74; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
(0.40). 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Electrical system 
upgrade; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
1/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 4/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 13.04; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 5.99; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
5.90; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
(1.50). 

Site and project: Facilities heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning 
upgrade; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
3/1/2004; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 11/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: (14.81); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 7.20; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
7.05; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
(2.08). 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Fire protection system 
upgrade; 
Project type: Argonne National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
9/1/2004; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 5/1/2004[G]; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: (12.50); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 6.02; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
5.89; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
(2.16). 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Fundamental neutron 
physics beamline; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
6/1/2010; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 4/1/2010; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: (2.56); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 9.20; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
9.20; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Laboratory for 
Comparative and Functional Genomics; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
9/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 10/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 4; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 13.90; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
13.86; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
(0.29). 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Research support 
center; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
8/1/2004; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 10/1/2004; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 9.52; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 16.26; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
16.04; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
(1.35). 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: SNS instruments: next 
generation (SING I)[D]; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
9/1/2011; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 8/1/2010; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: (15.66); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 68.50; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
68.50; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Spallation Neturon 
Source[D]; 
Project type: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
9/1/2005; 
Actual completion date[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 5/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 8.60; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory: 1332.80; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
1405.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 
5.92. 

Site and project: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Physical 
sciences facility; 
Project type: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Infrastructure; 
Status: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory: 2/1/2011; 
Actual completion date[B]: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: 
2/1/2011; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory: 224.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory: 224.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory: 0. 

Site and project: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Alcator C-Mod 
lower drive upgrade; 
Project type: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 3/1/2003; 
Actual completion date[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: 
4/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 5.26; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 5.20; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 5.14; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: (1.15). 

Site and project: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: National Compact 
Stellarator Experiment; 
Project type: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Scientific; 
Status: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 5/1/2008; 
Actual completion date[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory: 
12/1/2012; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 107.84; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 86.30; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 165.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory: 91.19. 

Site and project: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: Center 
for Integrated Nanotechnologies; 
Project type: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: Scientific; 
Status: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Sandia And Los Alamos National 
Laboratories: 5/1/2007; 
Actual completion date[B]: Sandia And Los Alamos National Laboratories: 
5/1/2007; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Sandia And Los Alamos 
National Laboratories: 0; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Sandia And Los Alamos 
National Laboratories: 75.80; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Sandia And Los Alamos National 
Laboratories: 75.75; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Sandia And Los Alamos National 
Laboratories: (0.07). 

Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Large Area 
Telescope[D]; 
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Scientific; 
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
3/1/2006; 
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
2/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: (2.5); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Center: 121.20; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 188.06[H]; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 55.17. 

Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Linac Coherent 
Light Source[D]; 
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Scientific; 
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
3/1/2009; 
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
7/1/2010; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 34.04; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Center: 379.00; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 420.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 10.82. 

Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Safety and 
operational reliability improvements[D]; 
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Infrastructure; 
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Under way; 
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
9/1/2009; 
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
12/1/2009; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 7.32; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Center: 15.72; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 15.72; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Argonne National Laboratory: 
0. 

Site and project: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: SPEAR 3 
upgrade[D]; 
Project type: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Scientific; 
Status: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
9/1/2002; 
Actual completion date[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator Center: 
11/1/2003; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 29.17; 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Stanford Linear 
Accelerator Center: 49.20; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 58.00; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center: 9.23. 

Site and project: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Laboratory: 
CEBAF center addition: phase I; 
Project type: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Laboratory: 
Scientific; 
Status: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Laboratory: Completed; 
Original target completion date[A]: Thomas Jefferson National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 6/1/2006; 
Actual completion date[B]: Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator 
Laboratory: 4/1/2006; 
Percentage over (under) completion date[C]: Thomas Jefferson National 
Accelerator Laboratory: (6.25); 
Original target cost (dollars in millions)[A]: Thomas Jefferson 
National Accelerator Laboratory: 10.94; 
Final cost (dollars in millions)[B]: Thomas Jefferson National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 10.94; 
Percentage over (under) target cost[C]: Thomas Jefferson National 
Accelerator Laboratory: 0. 

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Science data. 

Note: DOE data typically expressed target completion dates as month and 
year; for consistency, we recorded and calculated target and actual 
completion dates from the first of the month. 

[A] Original completion date and cost targets were committed to at 
critical decision point 2, when cost and schedule targets are set. For 
projects baselined before DOE's project management order 413.3 was 
fully implemented, we used an equivalent project milestone or, if such 
a milestone was not available, we instead used estimates at conceptual 
design. Estimates made at conceptual design lack the precision possible 
when design has progressed further. 

[B] For projects under way, the actual completion date and final cost 
reflect Science's projections as of February 29, 2008. 

[C] To determine the extent to which each project finished before or 
exceeded its original target completion date, we computed percentage 
change from the planned project length (the period between DOE's 
approval of critical decision point 2, which is not shown in the table, 
and the original target completion date) to the actual project length 
(the period between critical decision point 2 approval and critical 
decision point 4, when DOE certifies that a project is complete). To 
determine the extent to which each project finished under or exceeded 
its original target cost, we computed the percentage change from the 
original target cost to the final cost. 

[D] Part of our nongeneralizable sample of 12 projects selected for in- 
depth review. 

[E] DOE completed 97 percent of this project on time. The remaining 3 
percent will not be completed until September 2008 because of tunneling 
problems at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) site 
in Switzerland. 

[F] DOE funding included $90 million paid to CERN to purchase parts 
made in the United States. 

[G] Date corresponds to date of project's critical decision point 4 
memorandum, our criterion for project completion. Documentation for 
this project, however, indicates that the upgrades were completed in 
March 2004, 2 months earlier. 

[H] DOE's direct financial contribution to this project amounted to $45 
million. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

May 21, 2008: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street. NW: 
Washington. DC 20584: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report. entitled Office of Science Has Kept 
Majority of Projects on Schedule and within Budget, but Funding and 
Other Challenges May Grow (GAO-08- 641). Generally, the Department of 
Energy agrees with your findings and recommendations. The 
recommendations will be considered as part of the agency's Root Cause 
Analysis Corrective Action Plan to improve contract and project 
management. 

The Office of Science (SC) has a culture of effective project 
management that stems from a shared belief in delivering the maximum 
science capability in each of its projects. SC appreciates that GAO has 
recognized elements of its culture (leadership, expertise, and rigorous 
oversight) contributing to successful project outcomes. This is helpful 
in communicating SC's commitment to scientific excellence throughout 
the science communities, DOE laboratory complex, and other stakeholders 
ï¿½ especially SC oversight organizations. 

SC understands that its large projects use precious, limited public 
resources and must always be appropriately prioritized, well defined, 
and effectively managed from concept formulation to operations. This is 
a legacy that has been built by SC and its predecessors over many 
decades. Today. SC managers and staff take pride in passing this legacy 
on by promoting effective project management as a signature SC 
experience that gives meaning to daily project work. 

SC also agrees with GAO's description of challenges (availability of 
funding and talent) confronting the organization that may impact future 
project outcomes. 

Finally, we would like to clarify the utility of "trimming" of project 
scope as a means of meeting project cost and schedule targets. Although 
GAO accurately reports that DOE's project management directives allow 
reductions in scope, the implication appears to be that this approach 
is inappropriate. DOE considers this practice to be in keeping with the 
principles of responsible project management. We are often required to 
make difficult choices in the face of internal and external events that 
affect project costs. These choices can result in reductions to scope 
in order to ensure meeting the primary technical goals within cost and 
schedule constraints. Further, when a change of this type is proposed a 
rigorous review is done to ensure that the change is appropriately 
defined, justified, and approved. 

Please find two attachments to this letter which provide additional 
general and project- specific comments on the draft report. Many of 
these comments were provided to GAO in response to their initial 
Statement of Facts, but were not reflected in the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Daniel R. Lehman: 
Director: 
Office of Project Assessment Office of Science: 
Enclosure: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Janet Frisch, Assistant 
Director; Ellen W. Chu; Elizabeth Deyo; Kevin Jackson; Omari Norman; 
Jeff Rueckhaus; and Ginny Vanderlinde made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The predecessor agency to the Office of Science was the Office of 
Energy Research within DOE. 

[2] GAO, Department of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen 
Project Management for Major Projects, GAO-05-123 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 18, 2005). 

[3] Results from nongeneralizable samples, including the sample of 12 
projects we selected for in-depth review, cannot be used to make 
inferences about Science's project performance overall. Our interest 
was in gathering information on the selected Science projects to 
identify material factors that may not exist across all projects but 
can help expand our understanding of Science's organizational strengths 
and potential future challenges. 

[4] DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition 
of Capital Assets (Oct. 13, 2000), and the update, Order 413.3A (July 
28, 2006), establish a framework for managing projects costing over $5 
million. 

[5] Unless otherwise noted, for ease of discussion in this report, 
project length has been measured from DOE's critical decision point 2, 
when the cost and schedule baselines are established for a project, to 
critical decision point 4, when DOE certifies that the project is 
complete. 

[6] Construction of the nanoscience research facility with components 
at the Sandia and Los Alamos national laboratories, New Mexico, was 
carried out as a single project. Additionally, the project to construct 
the facility at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, New York, was the 
only project of the five that was still under way as of the end of 
February 2008. 

[7] The state of Illinois provided half of this project's funding. 

[8] Argonne National Laboratory could not document the date of critical 
decision point 2 because this project's cost and schedule targets were 
set before DOE's project management order 413.3 was issued. 

[9] GAO, Department of Energy: Consistent Application of Requirements 
Needed to Improve Project Management, GAO-07-518 (Washington, D.C.: May 
11, 2007), and GAO, Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at 
Federal Agencies, GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 2005). 

[10] House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and 
Water Development, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget for the 
Department of Energy's Office of Science, March 14, 2007. 

[11] The organization is known by its acronym, CERN. 

[12] DOE Order 413.3 and Order 413.3A. 

[13] Other reviews are also required, including those conducted by 
organizations within and outside of Science, such as external 
independent reviews by DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction 
Management, peer reviews of project designs, "earned-value management 
systems" reviews, and quarterly project reviews. These reviews were 
outside the scope of our report. 

[14] U.S. funding for the Large Hadron Collider project was provided by 
both the National Science Foundation and DOE. U.S. funding supported 
three primary components: two particle detectors and an accelerator. 
Funding for the accelerator included $90 million paid to CERN to 
purchase U.S. manufactured parts for that instrument. The total 
combined DOE and National Science Foundation commitment to the project 
was $531 million. DOE regards the U.S. contributions to the collider as 
one project. For purposes of analysis, we have characterized these 
contributions in this report as three separate projects because they 
had separate budgets and schedules and were tracked separately under 
DOE's Project Assessment Reporting System. 

[15] Although technical goals may exist for a project's various 
components and subcomponents, we are referring here to the technical 
goals of a project as a whole, as defined in the project baseline. 

[16] Each of the changes in scope we report here was approved by the 
appropriate DOE or laboratory officials. 

[17] Although this project met its original committed cost target, it 
was completed 3 months late for reasons unrelated to the described 
change in scope. 

[18] GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and 
Managing Program Costs, GAO-07-1134SP (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2007), 
and National Research Council, Progress in Improving Project Management 
in the Department of Energy: 2003 Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academies Press, 2004). 

[19] Department of Energy, Root-Cause Analysis: Contract and Project 
Management (Washington, D.C., April 2008). 

[20] Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, Progress of 
the Spallation Neutron Source Project, DOE-IG/0532 (Washington, D.C., 
November 2001). 

[21] Although Science managed the large-area telescope project, DOE's 
direct financial contribution totaled $45 million of the $188 million 
project cost. 

[22] GAO, Fusion Energy: Definitive Cost Estimates for U.S. 
Contributions to an International Experimental Reactor and Better 
Coordinated DOE Research Are Needed, GAO-08-30 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
26, 2007). 

[23] GAO, A Call for Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's 
Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st-Century Challenges, GAO-08-
93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007), and GAO, The Nation's Long-Term 
Fiscal Outlook: January 2008 Update, GAO-08-591R (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 21, 2008). 

[24] Congressional Research Service, Weak Dollar, Strong Dollar: Causes 
and Consequences (Washington, D.C., Oct. 18, 2007). 

[25] Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Special Report: 
Management Challenges at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0782 
(Washington, D.C., December 2007). 

[26] The Stanford Linear Accelerator Center is undergoing a change in 
mission that has caused it to encourage early retirements and voluntary 
separations. The center's director of human resources said he 
anticipates that retirements will not present a near-term challenge. 

[27] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 
2008 (Arlington, Va., January 2008). 

[28] GAO, Department of Energy: Consistent Application of Requirements 
Needed to Improve Project Management, GAO-07-518 (Washington, D.C.: May 
11, 2007), and GAO, Department of Energy: Further Actions are Needed to 
Strengthen Project Management for Major Projects, GAO-05-123 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18, 2005). 

[29] For some projects baselined before the implementation of DOE's 
project management directive, DOE Order 413.3, approved in October 
2000, the committed cost and schedule targets were established early in 
project development, typically, at conceptual design. 

[30] In a prior GAO report, Department of Energy: Major Construction 
Projects Need a Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness 
to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays, GAO-07-336 (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 27, 2007), the Spallation Neutron Source was characterized as 
exceeding its original baseline. At the time of our 2007 report, the 
project was 2 percent over its original cost target. 

[31] Office of Management and Budget, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, 
and Management of Capital Assets, circular A-11, part 7 (Washington, 
D.C., July 2007). 

[32] Department of Energy, Root-Cause Analysis: Contract and Project 
Management (Washington, D.C., April 2008). 

[33] Although many different types of reviews of Science's projects 
were conducted by organizations within or outside of DOE, we limited 
our assessment to Science's independent project reviews and, to a 
lesser extent, external independent reviews conducted by DOE's Office 
of Engineering and Construction Management. 

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