Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide
Implementation and Assess Progress (23-JUL-08, GAO-08-637T).
In 2005, GAO placed the issue of information sharing for homeland
security on its high-risk list of federal functions needing
broad-based transformation and since then has monitored the
government's progress in resolving barriers to sharing. This
testimony discusses three key information sharing efforts: (1)
the actions that have been taken to guide the design and
implementation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and
to report on its progress, (2) the characteristics of state and
local fusion centers and the extent to which federal efforts are
helping to address some of the challenges centers reported, and
(3) the progress made in developing streamlined policies and
procedures for designating, marking, safeguarding, and
disseminating sensitive but unclassified information. This
testimony is based on GAO's products issued from March 2006
through July 2008 and selected updates conducted in July 2008.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-08-637T
ACCNO: A83035
TITLE: Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be
Achieved in Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to
Guide Implementation and Assess Progress
DATE: 07/23/2008
SUBJECT: Accountability
Confidential information
Counterterrorism
Federal aid to states
Federal intelligence agencies
Federal/state relations
Government information dissemination
Homeland security
Information access
Information centers
Information disclosure
Information infrastructure
Information management
Information resources management
Internal controls
Performance measures
Personnel management
Personnel recruiting
Program management
Skilled labor
Standards
Strategic planning
Terrorism
Information sharing
Policies and procedures
Program goals or objectives
Program implementation
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GAO-08-637T
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 23, 2008:
Information Sharing:
Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in Terrorism-Related
Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess
Progress:
Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-08-637T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-637T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2005, GAO placed the issue of information sharing for homeland
security on its high-risk list of federal functions needing broad-based
transformation and since then has monitored the government�s progress
in resolving barriers to sharing. This testimony discusses three key
information sharing efforts: (1) the actions that have been taken to
guide the design and implementation of the Information Sharing
Environment (ISE) and to report on its progress, (2) the
characteristics of state and local fusion centers and the extent to
which federal efforts are helping to address some of the challenges
centers reported, and (3) the progress made in developing streamlined
policies and procedures for designating, marking, safeguarding, and
disseminating sensitive but unclassified information. This testimony is
based on GAO�s products issued from March 2006 through July 2008 and
selected updates conducted in July 2008.
What GAO Found:
In a report being released today, GAO concludes that the ISE, under the
leadership of a designated Program Manager, has had a measure of
success, but lacks a road map for guiding the ISE, ensuring
accountability, and assessing progress. The Program Manager�s Office
issued an implementation plan in November 2006 to guide the design of
the ISE, has carried out a number of steps in that plan, and has
leveraged existing efforts and resources agencies independently pursued
for improving information sharing. However, this plan lacks important
elements essential to effectively implement the ISE. Gaps exist in (1)
defining the ISE�s scope, such as determining all the terrorism-related
information that should be part of the ISE; (2) clearly communicating
and distinguishing the role of the Program Manager and other
stakeholders; and (3) determining the results to be achieved by the ISE
(that is, how information sharing is improved) along with associated
milestones, performance measures, and the individual projects. Two
annual reports on progress have been issued. Each identifies annual
goals and individual ISE efforts, but neither reports on the extent to
which the ISE has improved information sharing.
GAO reported in October 2007 that fusion centers, established by states
and localities to collaborate with federal agencies to improve
information sharing, vary widely but face similar challenges�especially
related to funding and sustaining operations�that the federal
government is helping to address but are not yet resolved. While the
centers varied in their level of maturity, capability, and
characteristics, most fusion centers focused on processing information
on crimes and hazards, as well as terrorism-related information. Fusion
center officials reported facing challenges such as obtaining specific,
clear guidance and training; obtaining and retaining qualified
personnel; and securing funding for center operations over the long
term. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation were helping to address these challenges by, for example,
providing technical assistance and training, personnel, and grant
funding. Also, legislation has been proposed to clarify how funding may
be used to hire and retain intelligence analysts.
Although the myriad of sensitive but unclassified designations has been
a long-standing problem, progress has been made in establishing
processes for designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating
this information. In March 2006, GAO reported that each federal agency
determined sometimes inconsistent designations to apply to its
sensitive but unclassified information and this could lead to
challenges in information sharing, such as confusion on how to protect
the information. Thus, GAO recommended that the Directors of National
Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget issue a policy
that consolidates sensitive but unclassified designations. In a May
2008 memorandum, the President adopted �controlled unclassified
information� (CUI) to be the single categorical designation for
sensitive but unclassified information throughout the executive branch
and provided a framework for designating, marking, safeguarding, and
disseminating CUI.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the ISE Program Manager more fully define the
ISE�s scope, results to be achieved, and stakeholders� roles and
responsibilities, including the development of performance measures and
defining the federal government�s long-term role in relation to fusion
centers, including the provision of resources. The ISE Program Manager
generally agreed with these recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-637T]. For more
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or
larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to summarize the results of our recent
reviews of the government's efforts to better share information about
possible terrorist threats to protect the homeland. As you know, in
2005, GAO placed the issue of information sharing for homeland security
on its high-risk list of federal programs or functions needing broad-
based transformation and since then has conducted work to monitor the
government's progress in resolving barriers to sharing. What we found
is that in the wake of 9/11 and the passage of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) and
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act), agencies at the federal, state, and local levels are
taking steps to better share information about possible terrorist
threats.[Footnote 1] New organizations whose mission is information
sharing and fusion have been created. New processes, information
systems, and networks have evolved to handle the sharing and to
encourage communication among the partners who must analyze and act on
this information. And Congress and the administration have enacted new
laws and issued new policies, guidance, and standards to promote better
sharing. But there is still important and critical work left to do.
This includes better integrating all of these changes and initiatives
into a set of functioning policies, processes, and procedures for
sharing; continuing to break down agency stovepipes and cultures that
promoted protection over sharing; monitoring and measuring progress;
and maintaining momentum.
Among the many efforts begun to improve information sharing is the
creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), a governmentwide
"approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and homeland
security information, which may include any method determined necessary
and appropriate.[Footnote 2]" In implementing this initiative, the
Program Manager for the ISE--appointed by the President and responsible
for planning, overseeing, and managing this new approach with
participation of other federal departments and agencies, such as the
Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security--envisions an
ISE that will be comprised of policies, procedures, and technologies
that link people, systems, and information among all critical
stakeholders. In addition, most states and some local areas have
created fusion centers to address gaps in homeland security and law
enforcement information sharing by the federal government and to
provide a conduit for this information within each state. While they
vary--reflecting differences in state and local needs--a fusion center
is generally a "collaborative effort of two or more federal, state,
local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources,
expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of
such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond
to criminal or terrorist activity." One of the barriers to information
sharing with these entities was the many different and sometimes
confusing and contradictory ways that agencies were identifying and
protecting sensitive but unclassified information. This information
encompasses a large but unquantifiable amount of information--for
example, sensitive law enforcement information, information about a
narcotics-smuggling ring, and terrorism financing information--that
does not meet the standards established by executive order for
classified national security information, but that an agency
nonetheless considers sufficiently sensitive to warrant restricted
dissemination.
My testimony today summarizes the findings of our work on the following
three information sharing initiatives: (1) the actions that have been
taken to guide the design and implementation of the ISE and to report
on its progress, (2) the characteristics of state and local fusion
centers and the extent to which federal efforts are helping to address
some of the challenges centers reported, and (3) the progress made in
developing streamlined policies and procedures for designating,
marking, safeguarding, and disseminating sensitive but unclassified
information. The information in this testimony is based on GAO reports
and testimonies issued from March 2006 through June 2008 addressing
these three terrorism-related information sharing issues.[Footnote 3]
We also conducted selected updates in July 2008 by obtaining and
reviewing the Annual Report to the Congress on the Information Sharing
Environment, dated June 30, 2008, released after our report on the ISE
was issued, and the May 2008 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Designation and Sharing Controlled
Unclassified Information, released since our work on that issue. We
conducted this work according to generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
In a report we are releasing today, we conclude that one of the primary
ways in which Congress and the administration intended to promote
sharing--through the ISE under the leadership of a designated Program
Manager--has had a measure of success, but lacks a road map that
defines the scope of the ISE, roles and responsibilities and the
desired results to be achieved (i.e., how information sharing should be
improved), and measures for assessing progress. The Program Manager's
Office issued an implementation plan in November 2006 to guide the
design of the ISE, has achieved a number of steps in that plan, has
incorporated into the ISE a number of initiatives that agencies
independently pursued to leverage resources, and has issued two annual
reports on its progress. However, this progress is tempered by several
gaps to be filled, such as:
* The Program Manger and participating agencies have not yet fully
defined the scope of the ISE--or what the ISE is and is not to include-
-and completely answered fundamental questions, such as what
information should be shared, where does the information reside, and
what systems and networks will be integrated into the ISE. Addressing
these gaps is important and necessary to establish a clear road map to
guide implementation for all entities involved, ensure that progress is
made based on needs, and facilitate future measurement of progress in
information sharing.
* The role and responsibilities of the Program Manager versus those of
the key agencies involved were not clearly distinguished and
communicated, slowing progress. Delineating clear roles and
responsibilities will minimize confusion over what each stakeholder is
accountable for in implementing and operating the ISE and help minimize
unnecessary delays that result.
* The Program Manager and stakeholders have yet to fully define the
results to be achieved and milestones, performance measures, and
individual projects for assessing progress. Linking measurable long-
term and interim goals and clearly defining measurable results to be
achieved can help the Program Manager and stakeholders track progress
of implementation and improved sharing as well as hold stakeholders
accountable for meeting their responsibilities and contributions in
ensuring the ISE's success.
The ISE and information sharing for protecting the homeland against
terrorism is a complex and ever-evolving challenge. Addressing these
gaps, while difficult, is nevertheless necessary to provide Congress
and the public reassurance that the flaws leading to 9/11 have been or
are being corrected. Therefore, to address these gaps and help ensure
that the ISE is on a measurable track to success, we recommended that
the Program Manager, with full participation of relevant stakeholders
(e.g., agencies and departments on the ISE), (1) more fully define the
scope and specific results to be achieved by the ISE along with the key
milestones and individual projects or initiatives needed to achieve
these results, and (2) develop a set of performance measures that show
the extent to which the ISE has been implemented and sharing has been
improved--including, at a minimum, what has been and remains to be
accomplished--so as to more effectively account for and communicate
progress and results. The Program Manager generally agreed with these
recommendations. The recently issued 2008 annual report comes closer to
addressing these gaps, but acknowledges that work remains to be done to
move from measuring individual agency actions and progress to measuring
the overall performance of the ISE and the results and outcomes
achieved.[Footnote 4] But our work shows that there are still important
questions for the administration and Congress to answer: Does the
federal government know where it is going and what it is trying to
achieve in the end? How far has it come and how much is left to do? Is
this progress good enough? How much better is the sharing and what
difference has it made? What will it cost? Finding these answers will
be challenging but critical for ensuring homeland security.
With respect to our work on information fusion centers, we reported in
October 2007 that these centers vary widely and that a number of them
face several similar challenges--especially related to funding and
sustaining operations--that the federal government is helping to
address but that are not yet resolved. More specifically, our work
showed that states and localities generally created these centers to
improve information sharing across levels of government and to prevent
terrorism or other threats. At the time of our review, the centers
varied in level of maturity and capability, but most focused on
processing information related to crimes or hazards, not just terrorism-
related information. As we reported, most were led by law enforcement
entities; had a variety of partnerships with other federal, state, and
local agencies; and had federal personnel assigned. Among the
challenges fusion center officials reported that they faced were
managing a high volume of information from multiple systems, obtaining
specific and clear guidance and training on operational issues,
obtaining and retaining qualified personnel, and securing federal grant
or state and local funding for center operations over the long term. We
reported in October 2007 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were helping to address
these challenges by, among other things, providing access to
information systems and networks as well as technical assistance and
training, deploying personnel to centers, and providing grant funding.
However, to improve efforts to create a national network of fusion
centers as envisioned for the ISE, we recommended that the federal
government determine and articulate its long-term fusion center role
and whether it expects to provide resources to centers to help ensure
their sustainability. To some extent, the administration did so in the
National Strategy for Information Sharing: Success and Challenges in
Improving Terrorism-Related Information, issued in October 2007, by
stating that the federal government will support the establishment of
fusion centers and help sustain them. The 9/11 Commission Act further
reflects this and legislation has been proposed to clarify how Homeland
Security Grant Program funding may be used to hire and retain
intelligence analysts.
Finally, as to the barriers to sharing posed by agency practices in
protecting sensitive information, we found that although the myriad of
sensitive but unclassified designations has been a long-standing
problem, a recently issued policy should help to streamline and
standardize the process for designating, marking, safeguarding, and
disseminating this information. In March 2006, we reported that U.S.
government agencies had varying and disparate designations--such as law
enforcement sensitive, for official use only, and unclassified
controlled nuclear information--for identifying sensitive but
unclassified information. At that time, there were no governmentwide
policies or procedures that described the basis on which agencies
should designate, mark, and handle this type of unclassified
information, resulting in each agency deciding how to do this on its
own. We reported that such inconsistency could lead to challenges in
information sharing, such as confusing those receiving the information-
-including local and state law enforcement agencies--who in turn must
understand and safeguard the information according to each federal
agency's rules. Consequently, we recommended the issuance of a policy
that consolidates sensitive but unclassified designations where
possible and addresses their consistent application across agencies, as
well as a directive requiring that agencies have in place internal
controls for the designation and use of this information. To address
this concern and in line with our recommendations, in a May 2008
memorandum, the President adopted "controlled unclassified information"
(CUI) to be the single categorical designation for sensitive but
unclassified information throughout the executive branch; outlined a
framework for identifying, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating
this information; and made the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) responsible, through its new CUI Office, for
implementation and oversight. While the new policy is a good start, our
work has demonstrated that monitoring agencies' compliance to ensure
that they implement guidelines, training, and internal controls will
help ensure that the policy is employed consistently across the federal
government. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) program
on managing information it designates as sensitive security information
could serve as a model to guide other agencies' implementation of CUI.
We found that the program institutes many of these key components, such
as employee training on how to decide what information to designate as
sensitive security information, and internal controls, such as
supervisory review to ensure that employees are appropriately making
these designations.
Stakeholders Are Taking Steps to Improve Terrorism-Related Information
Sharing, but Existing Gaps Present Challenges for Implementing the ISE
and Measuring Its Progress:
ISE stakeholders are taking steps to improve terrorism-related
information sharing, but work remains to define the scope of the ISE,
roles and responsibilities, the desired results to be achieved--that
is, how information sharing should be improved--and measures for
assessing progress, all elements in establishing a road map for meeting
information sharing needs and implementing the ISE. For example,
because these gaps, such as the need to better define roles and
responsibilities, have not been fully addressed, additional effort has
been spent reinforcing that all stakeholders are accountable for
defining the ISE, not just the Program Manager. For example, in
response to the Intelligence Reform Act, the President appointed a
Program Manager for the ISE and on December 16, 2005, issued a
memorandum to implement guiding principles--the presidential
guidelines--consistent with establishing and supporting the ISE.
[Footnote 5] In addition, an Information Sharing Council (ISC), chaired
by the Program Manager and currently composed of 16 other members--
including designees of the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland
Security--has been established to provide interagency support and
advice to the Program Manager on the development of the ISE. A step in
planning for the ISE and putting it into operation included the
issuance of the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan in
November 2006. This plan provides an initial structure and approach for
designing and implementing the ISE and addresses ways to meet the ISE
requirements set forth in the Intelligence Reform Act as well as the
presidential guidelines. For example:
* The plan includes steps toward standardizing procedures for
protecting information privacy. One such activity identified in the
plan includes having the Program Manager and key stakeholders establish
a process for ensuring that nonfederal organizations participating in
the ISE implement appropriate policies and procedures for providing
protections.
* The plan maps out a timeline for further defining what information,
processes, and technologies are to be included in the ISE and exploring
approaches for implementing these processes and technologies. The plan
consists of a two-phased approach for implementing the ISE by June
2009. Phase 1, originally scheduled to be completed by June 2007,
generally covers setup activities such as investigating existing or
emerging search technologies for use in the ISE, and relationship
building among stakeholders through participation on the ISC. Phase 2,
that was to commence in July 2007, covers design as well as
implementation of the ISE. The two phases are comprised of 89 total
action items organized by priority areas, such as improved terrorism
information handling. While 48 action items were to be completed by
June 2007, by the end of Phase 1, only 18 were completed. Completed
activities include development of proposed common terrorism information
sharing standards--a set of standard operating procedures intended to
govern how information is to be acquired, accessed, shared, and used
within the ISE--and implementation of electronic directory services
pages to help identify sources where terrorism information may be
located within the federal government and whom to contact to access it.
* Design and implementation also incorporate independent initiatives
that federal, state, and local agencies had under way to enhance
information sharing across the government. This is in accordance with
the Intelligence Reform Act's call to build upon existing systems
capabilities in use across the government. These initiatives include
the fusion centers state and local governments created and plans to
develop a national network of these centers to improve sharing among
federal, state, and local entities. They also include the FBI's
Terrorist Screening Center, which consolidates information on known or
suspected terrorists who operate within the United States for
dissemination to federal agencies that use the information to screen
individuals for possible terrorist links.
The plan also includes several gaps, however, which have tempered
progress in implementing the ISE. Components needed to remediate these
gaps include more fully defining the scope of the ISE, clarifying
stakeholder roles and responsibilities (i.e., that of the Program
Manager as distinguished from those of the departments and agencies
that own and must share terrorism-related information), and defining
the results to be achieved by the ISE as well as the associated
milestones, performance measures, and projects needed for effective
program planning and performance measurement. These are all important
elements for establishing a road map for and ensuring stakeholders are
held accountable in meeting information sharing needs, implementing the
ISE, and measuring progress.
To expand on each of these three points, first, the Program Manager and
the federal agencies that are key to making the ISE work--such as the
Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State--still
have work to do to define the scope of the ISE, or what is and is not
to be included in it. For instance, the Program Manager and
stakeholders are still addressing fundamental questions, such as what
information should be shared, where the information resides, how the
information will be shared yet protected, how to provide access to
information yet respect privacy, and what systems and networks will be
used as part of the ISE. We recognize that the ISE will evolve over
time and that these questions will need to be revisited and the answers
updated and incorporated into the ISE. Answering these questions, at
least for the near term, is important and necessary because it helps
determine the elements critical for conveying what the ISE is to
include and identifying available stakeholder resources--all components
needed to establish a clear road map to successfully implement the ISE.
Second, the implementation plan did not clearly communicate and
distinguish the role and responsibilities of the Program Manager from
those of the key agencies in implementing the ISE and improving
information sharing. This has ultimately led to confusion over what
each stakeholder will be held accountable for in implementing and
operating the ISE. In describing the role of the Program Manager,
officials at the Office of the Program Manager noted that his role is
primarily as a facilitator and, for example, one who focuses on
improving existing business processes or remaining barriers that affect
information sharing among two or more of the five ISE communities
[Footnote 6] that make up the ISE. However, the Program Manager does
not focus on processes that are internal to ISE members unless they
directly impact the wider ISE. Agencies, on the other hand, are
accountable for identifying and sharing the terrorism information they
own if the ISE is to succeed. However, at the time of our review
agencies reported that they were unclear about the Program Manager's
role or what their agencies were to provide in support of the ISE.
Meanwhile, program officials reported that agencies were not
participating consistently and effectively. As a result, this conflict
has slowed progress in implementing the ISE, as evidenced by the fact
that 30 of 48 Phase 1 implementing action items remained incomplete at
the end of the phase in June 2007. To address these concerns, the
President in October 2007 released the National Strategy for
Information Sharing[Footnote 7] that reaffirmed that stakeholders at
all levels of government, the private sector, and foreign allies play a
role in the ISE and further defined the role of the Program Manager as
also assisting in the development of ISE standards and practices.
However, the strategy did not further clarify the parameters of the
Program Manager's role and what is within the scope of his
responsibilities in "managing" the ISE versus other ISE stakeholders.
In November 2007, the Program Manager held a first-time, off-site
meeting with ISC members to focus on ISE priorities, clarify
responsibilities, and emphasize the importance of everyone's active
participation and leadership--with the intent of rectifying any
misperceptions and reinforcing that all ISE stakeholders are
responsible for the ISE. Further delineating clear roles and
responsibilities will minimize confusion over what each stakeholder is
accountable for in implementing and operating the ISE and help minimize
unnecessary delays that result.
Finally, work also remains in further defining the results to be
achieved by the ISE, the projects needed for implementing the ISE, and
the milestones to be attained--all important elements for effective
program planning and performance measurement. Existing federal guidance
as well as our work and the work of others indicates that programs
should have overarching strategic goals that state the program's aim or
purpose, that define how it will be carried out over a period of time,
are outcome oriented, and that are expressed so that progress in
achieving the goals can be tracked and measured.[Footnote 8] Moreover,
these longer-term strategic goals should be supported by interim
performance goals (e.g., annual performance goals) that are also
measurable, define the results to be achieved within specified time
frames, and provide for a way to track annual and overall progress
(e.g., through measures and metrics). Following these practices can
help the Program Manager and stakeholders track progress and hold
stakeholders accountable for meeting their responsibilities and
contributions in ensuring the ISE's success. The Program Manager and
stakeholders have taken action in accordance with these program
management principles, but gaps remain. For example, the implementation
plan identifies six longer-term strategic ISE goals. For example, one
of these goals is that to the maximum extent possible, the ISE is to
function in a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated manner.
However, the plan does not define what this goal means or set up
interim or annual goals and associated time-sensitive milestones to be
built upon to achieve the overall goal. Furthermore, the plan does not
define how agencies will measure and ensure progress in meeting the
strategic goal in the interim or overall. Instead, the plan notes that
performance measures will be developed at a later date. Moreover, with
regard to identifying the steps to be taken in implementing the ISE,
the plan does not present the projects and the sequence in which they
need to be implemented to achieve this strategic goal in the near term
or in the future, or the specific resources needed and stakeholder
responsibilities. Therefore, work remains in developing the road map
for achieving this strategic goal.
Since the issuance of the implementation plan, the Program Manager and
participating agencies have taken steps to assess progress and improve
the ISE's road map by issuing two annual reports and defining annual
goals and performance measures, in part consistent with federal
guidance for program planning and performance measurement. But taken
together, these efforts do not yet provide methods to hold agencies
accountable for ensuring that the necessary sharing of terrorism
information is under way and effective. More specifically, the first
annual report issued by the Program Manager in September 2007 describes
overall progress by citing advancements in implementing individual
initiatives that contribute to the ISE. Some of these were accomplished
under the implementation plan--such as the formation of the electronic
directory services--and others were achieved prior to or separate from
efforts to create the ISE--such as the establishment of the FBI's
Terrorist Screening Center. However, the report does not show how much
measurable progress has been made toward implementing the ISE, how much
remains to be done, or a road map for completion. For example, the only
means to track progress that was set up in the implementation plan was
the two-phased approach and the 89 action items. But the progress
report did not provide an accounting of the status of these action
items or identify how much of the implementation had been completed.
Moreover, while the 2007 annual report identifies four performance
goals for 2008, information necessary for assessing progress in meeting
these goals--such as a defined starting point or baseline against which
to assess progress, targets to be reached, or supporting performance
measures and interim milestones to be achieved in implementing the ISE-
-is not identified.
In the fall of 2007 the Program Manger, with input from ISE
participating agencies, developed performance measures in support of
the four performance goals identified in the annual report. These
measures are intended to improve reporting on progress in implementing
the ISE and represent an important first step in providing quantitative
data for assessing progress made in information sharing and in helping
to inform Congress and other stakeholders of specific information
sharing improvements. However, there are several gaps in these
measures. For instance, they focus on counting activities accomplished
rather than results achieved to show the extent to which ISE strategic
goals and implementation have been attained. The performance measures
include, for example, the number of ISE organizations with a procedure
in place for acquiring and processing reports on suspicious activities
potentially related to terrorism, but not how the reports are used and
what difference they are making in sharing to help prevent terrorist
attacks. Similarly, the measures attempt to assess the creation of a
culture of sharing by tabulating the percentage of relevant ISE
organizations that have an information sharing governance body or
process in place, but not by measuring the outcome--such as how and to
what extent cultural change is being achieved. Taking the next step--
from counting activities to measuring results or outcomes--will be
difficult, particularly since the program is still being designed, but
critical for accurately providing Congress and policymakers with the
information they need to assess the amount and rate of progress,
remaining gaps, and the need for any intervening strategies.
Though issued after we completed our June 2008 report,[Footnote 9] we
subsequently reviewed the second ISE annual report dated June 30, 2008
and determined that the Program Manager has taken steps to improve
assessments of progress in the ISE as program officials noted they
would during our review. However, gaps still remain in defining key
aspects of a road map--such as its scope, roles and responsibilities,
and results to be achieved. One improvement, for instance, is that the
Program Manager tried to better align agency activities according to
the five guidelines and two requirements presented by the President in
his 2005 memorandum[Footnote 10] rather than listing them
independently. For example, toward addressing guideline 2--"Develop
common standards for the sharing of information between and among
executive departments and agencies and state, local, and tribal
governments, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector"--the
2008 annual report identifies the status of efforts to generate,
disseminate, and receive terrorism-related alerts, warnings, and
notifications between the federal government and state, local, and
tribal stakeholders. Also, the Program Manager laid out annual
performance goals that list specific and measurable activities to be
accomplished in 2009, such as completing initial efforts to implement
the new suspicious activity reporting process--an initiative for
streamlining the process for sharing information on suspicious
activities or incident information with a potential terrorism nexus
between federal, state, local, and tribal partners. Nevertheless, while
the performance goals incorporate some quantitative data for assessing
progress, they continue to focus on counting activities rather than
measuring outcomes. For example, one performance goal states that
agencies will increase fusion centers' access to terrorism-related
information and ISE capabilities but does not define what this goal
means and provide information on how it will be measured. Such
information might include identifying the level of access centers
currently have to information for use as a baseline from which to
measure progress, the target increase agencies are expected to achieve,
and how much achieving this goal is expected to improve sharing. While
the activities identified in the performance goals and the information
provided through the performance measures will likely enhance the
fabric of what will ultimately be the ISE, they do not yet identify the
overall road map for the ISE and provide answers to key questions
regarding what the ISE will include and will not include and how the
ISE will function in, for example, the next 3 years.
We appreciate that the ISE and information sharing for protecting the
homeland against terrorism is a complex and ever-evolving challenge,
making development of a road map for the ISE with which to assess
progress, hold stakeholders accountable, and provide Congress and the
public with assurance that efforts are being taken to strengthen
information sharing ever more important. Therefore, to help ensure that
the ISE is on a measurable track to success, we recommended that the
Program Manager, with full participation of relevant stakeholders
(e.g., agencies and departments on the ISE), (1) more fully define the
scope and specific results to be achieved by the ISE along with the key
milestones and individual projects or initiatives needed to achieve
these results; and (2) develop a set of performance measures that show
the extent to which the ISE has been implemented and sharing improved-
-including, at a minimum, what has been and remains to be accomplished-
-so as to more effectively account for and communicate progress and
results. The Program Manager generally agreed with these
recommendations. In an effort to address these concerns, the Program
Manager recently noted in the 2008 annual report that as the ISE
matures, he expects the performance management approach will itself
mature to move from measuring individual agency progress to measuring
the overall performance of the ISE.
Fusion Centers Vary in Their Characteristics, and Federal Efforts Are
Under Way That Address Many of the Challenges That Centers Reported
Encountering:
After September 2001, state and local governments began to establish
fusion centers to improve information sharing across levels of
government and varying disciplines and to prevent terrorism or other
threats. By September 2007, almost all states and several local
governments had established, or were in the process of establishing,
fusion centers. As we reported in October 2007, these centers varied in
their level of maturity, capability, and characteristics. For example,
while some centers were just starting out, officials in many (43 of the
58) fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational.
Of these operational centers, 9 opened in the couple of years after
September 2001, while 34 opened since January 2004. In terms of
capability, we reported that these centers ranged from a center with
analysts and access to networks and systems from DHS, FBI, and state
and local entities operating at a Top Secret level to a center that had
just appointed an officer in charge and lacked access to any of these
federal networks and systems. However, our work showed that most of the
operational fusion centers we contacted had adopted scopes of
operations and missions that included more than just counterterrorism-
related activities. For instance, officials in just over half of the
operational centers we contacted said that their scopes of operations
included all-crimes or all-crimes and terrorism, and several noted the
link between crimes and terrorism as a rationale for adopting a broader
scope of operations. Officials in about half of the operational centers
said that their centers included all-hazards information, such as that
related to public health and safety or emergency response. Overall,
center officials we contacted during our review told us that adopting a
broader focus than counterterrorism helped provide information about
all threats, and including additional stakeholders that could provide
staff and support could help increase the centers' sustainability. In
terms of organization and partnerships, law enforcement entities, such
as state police, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of
the centers we contacted. While the centers varied in their staff sizes
and partnerships with other agencies, the majority of the operational
fusion centers we contacted had federal personnel, including staff from
DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis or the FBI, assigned to them
as of September 2007.
In our October 2007 report, we identified a variety of challenges--many
of which were related to information sharing--that fusion center
officials reported encountering in establishing and operating their
centers. Among these challenges were managing the high volume of
information and the multiple systems and networks, obtaining specific
and clear guidance and training on operational issues, obtaining and
retaining qualified personnel, and securing federal grant or state and
local funding for center operations over the long term. We also
reported that to help address these challenges, the Program Manager for
the ISE, DHS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had several efforts
under way, and as we reported in April 2008,[Footnote 11] many of these
efforts were ongoing.
* The Program Manager for the ISE along with DHS and DOJ have efforts
under way to streamline systems, including reviewing the most commonly
used sensitive but unclassified systems to examine users' needs to
identify potential areas in which to streamline system access.[Footnote
12] In addition, these agencies are taking steps to improve the quality
and flow of information through the establishment of the Interagency
Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, which became a statutorily
mandated body by the 9/11 Commission Act.[Footnote 13] The group is to
include state, local, and tribal representative detailees who are to
provide a nonfederal perspective to the intelligence community to
produce clear, relevant, federally coordinated terrorism-related
information products intended for dissemination to state, local, and
tribal officials and to the private sector. In April 2008, we reported
that four state and local law enforcement representatives had been
detailed to this group. Further, the group's advisory council has been
focusing on recruitment for next year's detailees and determining a
concept of operations for a detailee fellowship program, according to
the ISE 2008 annual report.
* The Program Manager, DHS, and DOJ have taken steps to develop
specific, clear guidance and provide technical assistance and training.
For example, they have outlined federal and fusion center roles and
responsibilities in the National Strategy for Information Sharing:
Success and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information,
which the administration issued in October 2007. They have also
disseminated specific guidance in the form of baseline capabilities
that outline minimum operational standards for centers to ensure that
they have the necessary structures, procedures, and tools in place to
support gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism-
related information. In addition, DHS and DOJ's technical assistance
program for fusion centers offers training and guidance on, among other
things, operational issues such as establishing a privacy and civil
liberties policy. These agencies along with the Program Manager for the
ISE and others have also sponsored regional and national conferences
designed to support fusion centers and provide information about
ongoing federal efforts.
* To facilitate information sharing and support fusion centers, DHS and
the FBI have deployed personnel, including intelligence officers and
special agents. We reported in April 2008 that according to these
agencies, DHS had deployed 23 officers to fusion centers and had plans
to place officers in as many as 35 centers by the end of fiscal year
2008, and the FBI had assigned about 200 personnel to 44 fusion
centers.[Footnote 14]
* In terms of funding, DHS reported that from fiscal years 2004 through
2007, about $257 million in DHS grant funds supported information
sharing and intelligence activities,[Footnote 15] including 415
projects designated by states and territories for intelligence and
fusion center initiatives.
Despite DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion centers and
DHS's grant funding, fusion center officials were concerned about long-
term sustainability--both the extent of federal support they could
expect as well as the roles of their state or local jurisdictions. For
example, we reported in October 2007 that challenges for fusion centers
included uncertain or declining federal funding, finding adequate
funding for specific components of their centers' operations, and
obtaining state or local funding. One of the specific funding
challenges fusion center officials cited was time limits on the use of
grant funds for personnel. Some officials expressed concerns about
maintaining their personnel levels, such as the 2-year limit on the use
of fiscal year 2007 DHS grant funds for personnel. This limit made
retaining personnel challenging because state and local agencies may
lack the resources to continue funding the position, which could affect
the centers' ability to continue to operate. In our October 2007
report, we recommended that the federal government determine and
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to
provide resources to help ensure their sustainability. The National
Strategy for Information Sharing stated that the federal government
will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them
through grant funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve a
baseline level of capability. Similarly, the 9/11 Commission Act
includes provisions for allowing grant funding through the State
Homeland Security and Urban Areas Security Initiative grant programs to
be used for a variety of fusion-related activities, including paying
salaries for personnel. However, we reported in April 2008 that there
was still uncertainty among fusion center officials about how
specifically the federal government was planning to assist state and
local governments in sustaining their fusion centers, in particular
with respect to grant funding for intelligence analysts. Specifically,
under the fiscal year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance,
costs associated with hiring intelligence analysts were allowable for 2
years but were limited to the hiring of new analysts. After 2 years,
states and urban areas are responsible for supporting the sustainment
costs of those intelligence analysts. Legislation introduced in May
2008, and reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security July 10,
2008, seeks to clarify what constitutes allowable costs under these
grants.[Footnote 16] The committee found that the federal government
has placed restrictions on the use of these funds that make long-term
planning for fusion centers unmanageable. The proposed legislation
would, among other things, permit states and localities receiving funds
under either the State Homeland Security Program or the Urban Areas
Security Initiative program to use grant funds toward salaries for
analysts regardless of whether the analysts are current or new full-
time employees or contract employees and without limitations on the
period of time that these analysts can serve under the awarded grants.
In addition, to support the establishment and sustainment of a national
integrated network of fusion centers, among the federal government's
planned activities, the ISE 2008 annual report includes the development
of a national investment strategy to sustain fusion center operations,
including a delineation of current and recommended future federal and
nonfederal costs.
A New Policy Is Intended to Streamline Processes for Sharing Sensitive
but Unclassified Information:
In March 2006, we reported on a survey of 26 federal agencies[Footnote
17] that showed they were using more than 50 different designations to
protect information that they deem critical to their missions--such as
law enforcement sensitive, for official use only, and unclassified
controlled nuclear information. At that time, there were no
governmentwide policies or procedures that described the basis on which
agencies should designate, mark, and handle this information. In this
absence, each agency determined what designations to apply. We reported
that such inconsistency can lead to challenges in information sharing.
In fact, more than half of the agencies reported encountering
challenges in sharing sensitive but unclassified information. For
example, 11 of the 26 agencies reported concerns about the ability of
other parties to protect sensitive but unclassified information, while
another 6 of these agencies said that the lack of standardized criteria
for defining what constitutes sensitive but unclassified information
was a challenge in their sharing efforts. In addition, we found that
the prevalence of designations can confuse those receiving the
information, such as local and state law enforcement agencies, which in
turn must understand and safeguard the information according to each
federal agency's rules. This is problematic because, as we found, most
agencies did not determine who and how many employees could make
sensitive but unclassified designations, provide them training on how
to do so, or perform periodic reviews of how well their practices are
working. Moreover there were no governmentwide policies that required
such internal control practices.[Footnote 18] We reported that if
guidance and monitoring is not provided, there is a probability that
the designation will be misapplied, potentially restricting material
unnecessarily or resulting in dissemination of information that should
be restricted. Therefore, we recommended the issuance of a policy that
consolidates sensitive but unclassified designations where possible and
addresses their consistent application across agencies, as well as a
directive requiring that agencies have in place internal controls that
meet our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government--
including implementing guidance, training, and review processes.
[Footnote 19]
Consistent with our recommendations and the President's December 2005
mandates calling for standardization of sensitive but unclassified
information designations, on May 9, 2008, the President issued a
memorandum that adopted CUI as the single categorical designation used
for sensitive but unclassified information throughout the executive
branch.[Footnote 20] Specifically, CUI refers to information that is
outside the standard National Security Classification system (e.g.,
Secret, Top Secret, etc.) but that is (1) pertinent to the national
interests of the United States or to the important interests of
entities outside the federal government and (2) under law or policy
requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, special handling
safeguards, or set limits on exchange or dissemination. Furthermore,
the memo outlined a framework for designating, marking, safeguarding,
and disseminating information identified as CUI. In doing so, the memo
outlines the following three markings:
* Controlled with standard dissemination, meaning the information
requires standard safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of
unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. Dissemination is permitted to
the extent that it is reasonably believed that it would further the
execution of a lawful or official purpose.
* Controlled with specific dissemination, meaning the information
requires safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent disclosure. Material contains additional instructions on
what dissemination is permitted.
* Controlled enhanced with specified dissemination, meaning the
information requires safeguarding measures more stringent than those
normally required since the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure
would create the risk of substantial harm. Material contains additional
instructions on what dissemination is permitted.
The memo made NARA responsible for overseeing and managing the
implementation of the CUI framework. In response, NARA established the
CUI Office to accomplish the new tasks associated with implementing the
CUI policy. The new office is to undertake nine steps for the
implementation and standardization governing CUI policy. Chief among
these are (1) establishing new safeguards and dissemination controls,
(2) publishing standards in a new official CUI Registry, (3) monitoring
department and agency compliance with CUI policy and standards, (4)
establishing required training and an associated training program for
departments and agencies, and (5) providing appropriate documentation
regarding the CUI framework to Congress; state, local, tribal, and
private entities; and foreign partners. Issuing the new policy and
laying out responsibilities is a good first step. Our work has
demonstrated that monitoring agencies' compliance with CUI policies and
standards to ensure that they implement guidelines, training, and
internal controls will help ensure that the policy is employed
consistently across the federal government and facilitate the sharing
of terrorism-related information.
Our November 2007 review of TSA's program on managing sensitive
security information[Footnote 21] showed that in response to our prior
recommendations on establishing guidance and procedures for using TSA
regulations to determine what constitutes sensitive security
information, TSA's program had instituted key components critical for
the sharing of unclassified sensitive information and could serve as a
model to guide other agencies' implementation of CUI. TSA has also
shared its criteria and examples used to help employees determine what
is sensitive security information with other DHS components.
Representatives we interviewed from these other DHS components have
recognized opportunities to adapt TSA's criteria to their offices'
unique needs. Furthermore, TSA has appointed sensitive security
information coordinators at all program offices, such as the Office of
Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, among other things, to
implement sensitive security information determination policies. TSA's
Office for Sensitive Security Information is in the process of
providing training to all TSA employees and contractors on how to
handle sensitive security information in accordance with its newly
adopted policies and procedures. The office has a "train the trainer"
program that instructs sensitive security information program managers
and coordinators who are then expected to train appropriate staff in
their respective agencies and programs. Several aspects of the
sensitive security information training program that we evaluated are
consistent with GAO-identified components of a strategic training
program.[Footnote 22] Within this effort, TSA also has processes for
responding to requests for sensitive security information from federal,
state, local, and tribal government entities. Furthermore, TSA's
sensitive security information program has internal controls in place
that are consistent with governmentwide requirements and respond to our
recommendation. For example, TSA is in the process of conducting an
audit to identify existing sensitive security information and its use,
as well as evaluating a portion of records marked as containing such
information.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at
this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen
Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions
to this testimony include Susan Quinlan, Assistant Director; Mary
Catherine Hult, Assistant Director; Joseph Cruz; and Anish R. Bhatt.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007); Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (2004). See also Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002).
[2] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, � 1016, 118 Stat. at 3664-70, amended by
Pub. L. No. 110-53 � 504, 121 Stat. at 313-17.
[3] See GAO, Information Sharing Environment: Definition of the Results
to Be Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is
Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-492] (Washington, D.C.: June
25, 2008); Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007); Homeland Security: Federal Efforts
Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-636T]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008); Transportation Security
Administration's Processes for Designating and Releasing Sensitive
Security Information, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
08-232R] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2007); and Information Sharing:
The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for
Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-385] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006).
[4] Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Annual Report to
the Congress on the Information Sharing Environment (Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2008).
[5] See Presidential Memorandum, Memorandum from the President for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Guidelines and
Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE)
(Dec. 16, 2005).
[6] As described in the ISE implementation plan, the ISE is comprised
of five "communities of interest," encompassing intelligence, law
enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs. Each
community may comprise multiple federal organizations and other
stakeholders; information is to be shared across these communities.
[7] The White House, National Strategy For Information Sharing:
Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information
Sharing (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).
[8] See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has
Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-38] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004); GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing
the Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.:
June 1996); Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11,
Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget (July 2007); and
The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management�
(2006).
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-492].
[10] See Presidential Memorandum, Memorandum from the President for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Guidelines and
Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE)
(Dec. 16, 2005).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-636T].
[12] These systems include DHS's Homeland Security Information Network,
DOJ's Law Enforcement Online, and the Regional Information Sharing
Systems, which is a nationwide initiative to share sensitive but
unclassified criminal intelligence among law enforcement, first
responders, and private sector stakeholders.
[13] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, � 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section
210D to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
[14] These deployments may be to fusion centers other than the 58
centers that were included in our October 2007 report.
[15] This includes State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas
Security Initiative, Urban Area Security Initiative Transit Security
Program, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, Citizen Corps
Program, Emergency Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical
Response System, Buffer Zone Protection Program, Trucking Security
Grant Program, and Transit Security Program grant funding.
[16] Personal Reimbursement for Intelligence Cooperation and
Enhancement of Homeland Security Act, H.R. 6098, 110th Cong. (2008)
(proposing amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, to improve the financial assistance provided
to state, local, and tribal governments for information sharing
activities). See also H.R. Rep. No. 110-752 (July 10, 2008).
[17] As identified in our March 2006 report (see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-385]), these federal agencies
were generally selected because they are defined as those subject to
the Chief Financial Officers Act. In addition, we also included the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Postal Service
because our previous experience with these agencies indicated that they
used sensitive but unclassified designations.
[18] Internal controls are an integral component of an organization's
management that provides reasonable assurance that the following
objectives are achieved: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of
operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. See GAO, Standards for Internal
Controls in Federal Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-385].
[20] See Presidential Memorandum, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Designation and Sharing Controlled
Unclassified Information (May 9, 2008).
[21] Sensitive security information is a statutorily established
category of sensitive but unclassified information that includes
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities
that, for example, would be detrimental to transportation security. See
49 U.S.C. � 114(s); see also 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520. Sensitive security
information is not subject to the CUI requirements.
[22] GAO, A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development
Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2004).
[End of section]
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