Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some	 
Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers (17-APR-08,	 
GAO-08-636T).							 
                                                                 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local	 
governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to	 
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or	 
terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical  
mechanism for sharing information, the federal			 
government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the	 
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary	 
responsibility for governmentwide information sharing--is taking 
steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on  
(1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of September 2007	 
and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges centers	 
identified. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2007 report 
on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them 
as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by	 
reviewing plans describing selected federal efforts and attending
the second annual national fusion center conference.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-636T					        
    ACCNO:   A81712						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address
Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers 	 
     DATE:   04/17/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Federal intelligence agencies			 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Government information dissemination		 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Information centers				 
	     Information management				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Law enforcement information systems		 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Security clearances				 
	     State programs					 
	     State-administered programs			 
	     State/local relations				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Data centers					 
	     Domestic intelligence				 
	     Information sharing				 
	     program goals or objectives			 

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GAO-08-636T

   

     * [1]Summary
     * [2]Most States and Several Local Jurisdictions Have or Are Plan
     * [3]Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help Add

          * [4]DHS, DOJ, and PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address
          * [5]DHS and the FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Official
          * [6]DHS and DOJ Continue to Provide Guidance, Technical Assistan
          * [7]Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with Personnel and

     * [8]Contact Information
     * [9]GAO's Mission
     * [10]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [11]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [12]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [13]Congressional Relations
     * [14]Public Affairs

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Testimony: 

Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector 
Preparedness and Integration, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT: 
Thursday, April 17, 2008: 

Homeland Security: 

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State 
and Local Fusion Centers: 

Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director: Homeland Security and Justice 
Issues: 

GAO-08-636T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-636T, a testimony before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee 
on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local 
governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, 
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. 
Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing 
information, the federal governmentï¿½including the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program 
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has 
primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharingï¿½is taking 
steps to partner with fusion centers. 

This testimony focuses on (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as 
of September 2007 and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges 
centers identified. This testimony is based on GAOï¿½s October 2007 
report on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them 
as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by reviewing 
plans describing selected federal efforts and attending the second 
annual national fusion center conference. 

What GAO Found: 

Almost all states and several local governments have established or are 
in the process of establishing fusion centers that vary in their 
characteristics. Centers were generally established to address gaps in 
information sharing, and the majority of the centers GAO contacted had 
adopted broad missions that could include both counterterrorism and law 
enforcementï¿½related information. While law enforcement entities, such 
as state police, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of 
the centers GAO contacted, the centers varied in their staff sizes and 
partnerships with other agencies. The majority of the operational 
fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel, including from DHS 
or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assigned to them as of 
September 2007. 

DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address 
challenges fusion center officials identified. 

* DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their 
information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges 
accessing and managing multiple information systems. 

*Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and 
local personnel and set timeliness goals for granting clearances. 
However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using clearances. 

*DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have also taken steps to develop guidance and 
provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by 
issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, 
officials at 21 centers cited challenges with the availability of 
training for mission-specific issues. DHS and DOJ have continued 
providing a technical assistance program for fusion centers and 
disseminated a baseline capabilities draft in March 2008 that outlines 
minimum operational standards for fusion centers. While this support 
and guidance is promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to 
which it will address challenges identified by officials contacted. 

* Finally, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported 
facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 
centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these 
centersï¿½ sustainability. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the 
FBI have assigned, and continue to assign, personnel to the centers. To 
help address funding issues, DHS has provided funding for fusion-center 
related activities. 

The National Strategy for Information Sharing, issued in October 2007 
by the President, states that the federal government will support the 
establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant 
funding, technical assistance, and training. However, some fusion 
center officials raised concerns about how specifically the federal 
government was planning to assist state and local governments to 
sustain fusion centers as it works to incorporate fusion centers into 
the ISE and to implement the strategy. 

What GAO Recommends: 

While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has 
recommended that the federal government define and articulate its long-
term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to 
help ensure their sustainability. PM-ISE agreed with the recommendation 
and is in the process of implementing it. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-636T]. For more 
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on fusion 
centers. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, most states and 
several local governments have established fusion centers to address 
gaps in homeland security and law enforcement information sharing by 
the federal government and to provide a conduit of this information 
within the state. While fusion centers vary, reflecting differences in 
state and local needs, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) defines a fusion center as 
a "collaborative effort of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal 
government agencies that combine resources, expertise, or information 
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, 
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist 
activity."[Footnote 1] 

With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing 
factor in the nation's lack of preparedness for the September 11 
attacks, a number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated in 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(Intelligence Reform Act). For example, the Intelligence Reform Act, as 
amended in August 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, requires the 
President to take action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related 
information by establishing an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to 
combine policies, procedures, and technologies that link people, 
systems, and information among all appropriate federal, state, local, 
and tribal entities and the private sector.[Footnote 2] To oversee 
development and implementation of the ISE, the act also required the 
President to appoint a program manager, which the President did in 
April 2005.[Footnote 3] 

The Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE), the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking steps to 
partner with fusion centers as part of the information sharing 
environment. In November 2006, the PM-ISE issued a plan for 
implementing the ISE that incorporated presidentially approved 
recommendations for federal, state, local, and private-sector 
information sharing. The implementation plan acknowledges that the 
collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal government 
marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity 
that can be used to combat terrorism, and it identifies the creation of 
an integrated nationwide network of fusion centers as a way to promote 
two-way information sharing with the federal government. Under the 
plan, DHS and DOJ are to assume responsibility for technical assistance 
and training to support fusion centers. Both DHS and DOJ have 
established program offices to oversee their relationships with fusion 
centers. In October 2007, the President issued the first National 
Strategy for Information Sharing: Success and Challenges in Improving 
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (National Strategy), which 
further highlights the importance of state and local fusion centers as 
valuable information-sharing resources to be incorporated into the 
national information sharing framework. 

In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions 
related to fusion centers.[Footnote 4] For example, in accordance with 
the act, DHS established a fusion center program office. This office is 
responsible for providing operational and intelligence advice and 
assistance to fusion centers, facilitating coordination and information 
flow between fusion centers and DHS, and deploying DHS personnel to 
fusion centers. In addition, the act requires that the Secretary of 
DHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, establish guidelines 
for fusion centers that include standards related to privacy policies 
and training. 

My testimony today discusses (1) the characteristics of state and local 
fusion centers as of September 2007[Footnote 5] and (2) the extent to 
which efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ are helping to 
address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers. My 
statement is based on (1) the results of our October 2007 report 
[Footnote 6] that discusses the status and characteristics of 58 state 
and local fusion centers as well as federal efforts underway to help 
address challenges the centers identified; and (2) updated information 
we obtained in March 2008 about selected federal efforts to support 
fusion centers.[Footnote 7] To obtain updated information, we reviewed 
plans and documents describing these federal efforts and attended the 
second annual national fusion center conference.[Footnote 8] We 
conducted this work according to generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

Fusion centers, which vary in their characteristics, are operating or 
being established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions 
across the country. Specifically, officials in many (43 of 58) of the 
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as 
of September 2007.[Footnote 9] These centers were generally created by 
state and local governments to improve information sharing across 
levels of government and to prevent terrorism or other threats. While 9 
of these operational centers had opened within the couple of years 
after September 11, 2001, 34 had opened since January 2004. The 
majority of the centers had scopes of operations and missions that 
included more than just counterterrorism-related activities, such as a 
focus on all crimes or all hazards. Adopting a broader focus helped 
provide information about all threats and increased the center's 
sustainability, for instance, by including additional stakeholders who 
could provide staff and support, and is consistent with the definition 
of a fusion center in the 9/11 Commission Act. Law enforcement 
entities, such as state police, were the lead or managing agencies in 
the majority of the operational centers we contacted. While the centers 
varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies, as of 
September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we 
contacted reported that they had federal personnel assigned to their 
centers. Twelve of the centers were colocated with Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) field units. Many of the operational centers 
reported having access to unclassified and, to a lesser extent, 
classified DHS and FBI systems and networks. Thus far, products 
disseminated and services provided varied from daily bulletins to in- 
depth reports or assessments. 

We reported in October 2007 that fusion centers face challenges in 
several areas and that--in light of the importance of fusion centers in 
facilitating information sharing among levels of government--federal 
efforts are under way that begin to address these challenges.[Footnote 
10] As of March 2008, many of these efforts are still ongoing. 

* DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to provide fusion centers 
access to federal information systems, but some fusion center officials 
cited challenges accessing relevant, actionable information and 
managing multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems. For 
example, officials in 30 of the 58 centers we contacted reported 
challenges related to volume of information or managing multiple 
systems. As a result, these center officials said that their ability to 
receive and share information with those who need it may be limited. 
Ongoing efforts to improve the quality and flow of information include 
the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group's efforts to 
provide a nonfederal perspective to the intelligence community and its 
products. 

* Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances to numerous state and 
local officials and have set timeliness goals for the issuance of new 
clearances. However, obtaining and using security clearances 
represented a challenge for 44 of the 58 centers we contacted, which 
could limit their ability to access and use some information. In 
addition, while law and executive order provide that a security 
clearance granted by one federal agency should generally be accepted by 
other agencies, officials in 19 of the centers encountered difficulties 
with federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each 
others' clearances. DHS and DOJ officials reported that they were not 
aware of recent fusion center challenges with reciprocity of 
clearances. However, they said that there were complications in the 
clearance process, for instance, because several federal agencies 
conduct their own processes without central coordination. 

* Fusion center officials also cited challenges obtaining guidance and 
training. In particular, they cited the need for clearer and more 
specific guidance in a variety of areas, including standards for 
analyst training and information-sharing policies and procedures, to 
help address operational challenges. DHS, DOJ, along with the PM-ISE, 
continue to take steps to develop guidance and provide technical 
assistance and training. For instance, DHS and DOJ disseminated a draft 
baseline capabilities document that outlines minimum operational 
standards for fusion centers to state and local officials in March 2008 
for feedback. 

* Notwithstanding DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion 
centers and DHS's grant funding to support their establishment and 
enhancement, fusion center officials reported challenges obtaining and 
retaining qualified personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to 
sustain the centers. To improve efforts to create a national network of 
fusion centers, in our October 2007 report we recommended--and DHS and 
the PM-ISE concurred--that the federal government determine and 
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to 
provide resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability. The 
National Strategy, issued by the President in October 2007, states that 
the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers 
and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and 
training. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the 
national conference about how specifically the federal government plans 
to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers as it 
works to incorporate these centers into the ISE and to implement the 
strategy. 

Most States and Several Local Jurisdictions Have or Are Planning Fusion 
Centers That Vary in Their Characteristics: 

Almost all states and several local governments have established or are 
in the process of establishing a fusion center. Specifically, officials 
in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their centers as 
operational, and officials in 15 centers considered their centers to be 
in the planning or early stages of development as of September 2007. 
Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local area 
established a fusion center. To improve information sharing--related to 
homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement--among federal, 
state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the 
attacks of September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons for 
establishing a fusion center. Several officials cited the need to 
enhance information sharing within their own jurisdictions across 
disciplines as the reason why they established a center. While 9 
centers opened in the couple of years after the attacks of September 
11, 2001, 34 of the 43 operational centers have opened since January 
2004 as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Number of Operational Fusion Centers GAO Contacted Opened by 
Year: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a horizontal bar graph depicting the following data: 

Number of Operational Fusion Centers GAO Contacted Opened by Year: 

Year Opened: 2001; 
Number of centers: 2. 

Year Opened: 2002; 
Number of centers: 1. 

Year Opened: 2003; 
Number of centers: 6. 

Year Opened: 2004; 
Number of centers: 7. 

Year Opened: 2005; 
Number of centers: 12. 

Year Opened: 2006; 
Number of centers: 10. 

Year Opened: 2007; 
Number of centers: 5. 

Source: GAO analysis, information from fusion centers. 

[End of figure] 

Consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act's definition of a fusion center 
and the purpose of a fusion center, as defined in the Fusion Center 
Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we contacted 
said that their scopes of operations focused on more than just 
counterterrorism. For instance, officials in 22 of these centers 
described their centers' scope as all crimes or all crimes and 
counterterrorism, and officials in 19 operational centers said that 
their scopes of operations included all-hazards information (such as 
related to public health and safety or emergency response). Further, 23 
of the 36 operational fusion centers that provided us mission 
statements had missions that involved collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-related information. Eleven 
other fusion centers had missions that involved enhancing, supporting, 
or coordinating information and intelligence dissemination to both law 
enforcement and homeland security agencies. Officials told us that 
adopting a broader focus helped provide information about all threats 
because of the link of many crimes to terrorist activity and also 
increased the centers' sustainability, for instance, by including 
additional stakeholders. Indeed, the National Strategy highlights the 
importance of the centers fostering a culture that recognizes the 
importance of fusing "all crimes with national security implications" 
and "all hazards" information, which often involves identifying 
criminal activity and other information that might be a precursor to a 
terrorist plot. 

Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of 
investigation, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of 
the operational centers we contacted. The centers varied in their staff 
sizes and partnerships with other agencies, ranging from fewer than 5 
employees to over 80. In addition to a variety of state and local law 
enforcement agencies, some centers included personnel detailed from 
emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners. As 
of September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we 
contacted reported that they had personnel from at least one federal 
agency assigned to their centers. For example, DHS had deployed full- 
time intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion centers 
we contacted and was in the process of staffing 8 additional centers. 
About three quarters of the operational centers we contacted reported 
that the FBI had assigned personnel, including intelligence analysts 
and special agents, to their centers. Additionally, 12 of the 
operational centers we contacted were colocated in an FBI field office 
or with an FBI task force, such as a Joint Terrorism Task Force or a 
Field Intelligence Group. Further, 19 of the operational centers 
reported that they had other DHS or DOJ components represented in their 
centers, such as personnel from Customs and Border Protection; 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Transportation Security 
Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; or Drug 
Enforcement Administration. 

Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's 
unclassified networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), 
containing, among other things, terrorism-related information.[Footnote 
11] For example, as of September 2007, 40 of the 43 operational centers 
reported they had access to HSIN, and 39 reported having access to LEO. 
In addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the process 
of obtaining access to DHS's classified network of secret-level 
homeland security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process 
of obtaining access to the FBI's classified systems containing, among 
other things, secret-level investigative case files. 

Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also varied. 
Fusion centers reported that they issued a variety of products, such as 
daily and weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence 
information and assessments that, in general, provided in-depth 
reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime. 

Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help Address Some 
Reported Challenges: 

Fusion center officials identified challenges in establishing and 
operating their centers in several areas, such as accessing and 
managing multiple information systems, obtaining and using security 
clearances, finding sufficient guidance and training, obtaining and 
retaining personnel, and obtaining funding. DHS and DOJ, recognizing 
the importance of fusion centers in information sharing, have efforts 
under way that begin to address many of these challenges. 

DHS, DOJ, and PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Fusion 
Center Challenges with Accessing and Managing Information Systems: 

Fusion center officials reported challenges accessing and managing 
multiple information systems. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and 
the FBI had provided many operational fusion centers access to their 
primary unclassified information systems (HSIN and LEO) and had 
outlined plans to provide access to their primary classified networks 
to state and local centers that had federal personnel at the center. 
However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported 
challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or networks. 
For instance, officials in some centers cited challenges with DHS and 
the FBI not providing fusion center personnel with direct access to 
their classified systems. Fusion center personnel in these centers had 
to rely on federal personnel who were assigned to the center or other 
state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, 
obtain the relevant information, and share it with them. Further, 
officials in 12 fusion centers reported challenges meeting system 
security requirements or establishing the technical capabilities 
necessary to access information systems, and DHS and the FBI had taken 
some steps to address these challenges. For example, we reported that 
DHS reviews the fusion centers' security status and assesses its 
adequacy in light of its intention to deploy personnel and information 
systems to the center. In March 2008, the DHS Under Secretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis stated that DHS planned to deploy its secret- 
level homeland security data network to 41 fusion centers by the end of 
fiscal year 2008. 

While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining 
access to systems, primarily classified ones, officials in 30 of the 58 
fusion centers we contacted reported that the heavy volume of 
information or the existence of multiple systems with often redundant 
information was a challenge to manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers 
said that they had difficulty with what they perceived to be the high 
volume of information their center receives, variously describing the 
flow of information as "overwhelming," "information overload," and 
"excessive." For example, officials described how center personnel must 
sort through the large amount of information, much of which is not 
relevant to the center, to find information that is useful or important 
to them. In addition, officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of 
integration among these multiple, competing, or duplicative information 
systems challenging, or said they wanted a single mechanism or system 
through which to receive or send information. 

In October 2007, we reported that officials from the PM-ISE's office 
were collaborating with other agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to 
identify potential opportunities to streamline system access and 
improve the quality and flow of information. For example, PM-ISE 
officials reported that these entities had completed a review of the 
most commonly used systems, such as HSIN, LEO, and the Regional 
Information Sharing Systems,[Footnote 12] that included an examination 
of users' needs to identify potential areas to streamline system 
access. In October 2007, we also reported that such a review was in 
accordance with recommendations that fusion centers made during the 
first annual national fusion center conference in March 2007 and with 
what several officials we contacted told us. Specifically, officials in 
23 of the 58 fusion centers told us that DHS and DOJ, to facilitate 
implementation of a national network of fusion centers, should reduce 
the number of existing systems or develop a unified platform or 
mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In addition, the 
PM-ISE, along with DHS, DOJ, and other federal agencies, are taking 
steps to improve the quality and flow of information through the 
establishment of an Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination 
Group (ITACG), which was made a statutorily mandated body by the 9/11 
Commission Act.[Footnote 13] This group, which is to include state, 
local, and tribal representatives detailed to work with the National 
Counterterrorism Center, is to provide advice, counsel, and subject- 
matter expertise to the intelligence community about the types of 
terrorism-related information needed by state, local, and tribal 
governments and how these entities use that terrorism-related 
information to fulfill their counterterrorism responsibilities. In 
doing so, the PM-ISE reported that the ITACG is to enable the timely 
production by the National Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant, 
and federally coordinated terrorism-related information products 
intended for dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials. In 
October 2007, we reported that PM-ISE officials indicated that the 
ITACG had achieved an initial operational capability. As of March 2008, 
four state and local law enforcement representatives had been detailed 
to the ITACG to provide a nonfederal perspective to the intelligence 
community in its situational and threat reporting and intelligence 
products, by, for example, requesting changes to report language to 
better address state and local needs. According to one of the 
representatives, these changes have involved requesting that specific 
tactical information be included in reports or that, where possible, 
the security classification of a report be lowered so that it could be 
disseminated more broadly to state and local officials. While these 
efforts to improve the quality and flow of information to state and 
local users are promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to 
which they will address the challenges in accessing and managing 
information reported to us by fusion center officials. 

DHS and the FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials, but 
Officials Cited Some Challenges with Obtaining and Using Clearances: 

Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for numerous 
state and local personnel in order to access classified information and 
have set goals to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a 
security clearance. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete 
a Secret clearance, and the FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete 
a Secret clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret 
clearance. DHS and the FBI have also provided centers with information 
about the security clearance process and time frames, stating that 
processing time for individual security clearances can vary, depending 
on complexity. However, obtaining and using security clearances 
represented a challenge for many of the fusion centers (44 of 58) we 
contacted. For instance, officials at 32 of the centers cited 
difficulties with the length of time it takes to receive a security 
clearance from DHS or the FBI. However, some fusion center officials 
acknowledged that that the length of time to conduct the required 
background checks was necessary to ensure that clearances were only 
given to individuals who meet the requirements. 

In October 2007, we also reported that while law and executive order 
provide that a security clearance granted by one government agency 
should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of the 
centers we contacted encountered difficulties with federal agencies, 
particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others' clearances. This 
reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the centers' ability to 
access facilities, computer systems, and information from multiple 
agencies. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion 
centers encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security 
clearances. However, they said that there were complications in the 
clearance process because, for example, multiple federal agencies carry 
out their own processes and grant clearances without central 
coordination. 

DHS and DOJ Continue to Provide Guidance, Technical Assistance, and 
Training to Fusion Centers: 

DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE continue to provide fusion centers with 
guidance, technical assistance, and training to help address their 
challenges in these areas. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and 
DOJ had, in August 2006, issued jointly developed Fusion Center 
Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and 
operating fusion centers. Intended to help ensure that fusion centers 
were set up and operated consistently, they cover elements such as 
ensuring appropriate security measures are in place for facility, data, 
and personnel. Officials in many (48 of 58) of the fusion centers we 
contacted said that they found the guidelines generally good and 
useful, however others said they were not specific enough to address 
their challenges. In addition, officials at 19 fusion centers said that 
they lacked guidance on specific information-sharing policies and 
procedures, such as privacy and civil liberties issues. Furthermore, 
officials at 21 of the centers we contacted said that the availability 
of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as training on 
intelligence analysis, was a challenge. Officials in 11 centers, most 
of which were operational centers that had been in existence for more 
than 2 years, expressed a need for the federal government to establish 
standards for training fusion center analysts. This could help ensure 
that analysts are trained in a similar way nationwide, thereby 
facilitating communication amongst fusion center analysts. 

DHS and DOJ provide a technical assistance service program for fusion 
centers, which, among other services, includes assistance developing a 
comprehensive privacy and civil liberties policy,[Footnote 14] and have 
ongoing efforts to provide training to fusion centers. Additionally, 
along with the PM-ISE and others, DHS and DOJ have sponsored regional 
and national conferences, including the second annual national fusion 
center conference in March 2008, which was designed to support fusion 
centers in building capabilities and understanding their roles and 
responsibilities as described in the National Strategy. In addition, 
DHS and DOJ, in collaboration with others, disseminated in March 2008 a 
draft baseline capabilities document.[Footnote 15] Building on the 
Fusion Center Guidelines, the document outlines baseline capabilities 
and steps that fusion centers could take to ensure compliance in 12 
topic areas, including management and governance, security, 
intelligence analysis and production, and intelligence and information 
dissemination. The document states that when a fusion center achieves 
all of these standards, it is considered to have the standards, 
structures, and tools in place to support the gathering, analysis, and 
dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement 
information. Such a baseline level of capability is critical to 
establishing a national, integrated network of fusion centers, 
according to the National Strategy. DHS and DOJ solicited the feedback 
of state and local officials on this document at the national fusion 
center conference--the results of which have yet to be compiled and 
released. 

Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; 
DHS and the FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent: 

Many fusion center officials we contacted reported challenges related 
to obtaining personnel (43 of 58) and obtaining and maintaining funding 
when establishing and operating their centers (54 of 58)--challenges 
that some of these officials also said affected their centers' 
sustainability. For example, officials in 37 centers said they 
encountered challenges with federal, state, or local agencies not being 
able to detail personnel to their fusion center, particularly in the 
face of resource constraints. Fusion centers rely on such details as a 
means of staffing the centers and enhancing information sharing with 
other state and local agencies. Furthermore, officials in 20 of the 
centers we contacted said that they faced challenges finding, 
attracting, and retaining qualified personnel. For instance, one 
official said that it was challenging to find personnel with the 
expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the 
center and to use the tools to build the center. While many of these 
reported challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and 
local level, we reported that DHS and the FBI had ongoing efforts to 
assign personnel to support centers and facilitate information sharing. 
Both DHS and the FBI have continued to support fusion centers by 
deploying personnel, consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act. As of 
March 2008, DHS had deployed 23 officers to fusion centers and has 
plans to place officers in as many as 35 centers by the end of fiscal 
year 2008, and the FBI had assigned about 200 personnel to 44 fusion 
centers, according to DHS and FBI officials respectively.[Footnote 16] 

In terms of funding, officials encountered challenges obtaining both 
federal and state funding. Specifically, officials in 35 of the 58 
centers encountered challenges with the complexity of the federal grant 
process, uncertainty as to whether they would receive federal funds, or 
declining federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers 
reported having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said 
that these issues created confusion for their centers over the steps 
needed to secure federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the 
future, and created concerns about the fusion centers' abilities to 
sustain their capabilities for the long term. Fusion center officials 
also identified challenges with restrictions on the use of federal 
grant funds, unclear and changing grant guidance, and a lack of 
understanding of how federal funding decisions are made.[Footnote 17] 
For example, officials in 21 fusion centers said that obtaining 
adequate funding for personnel was difficult, and officials in 17 
fusion centers found federal time limits on the use of grant funds for 
personnel challenging.[Footnote 18] 

In October 2007, we reported that DHS had provided grant funding for 
fusion-related activities and had made some changes to ease the grant 
process and adjust some of the restrictions on the timing and use of 
grant funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 
2006 in the area of allowable costs for information sharing and 
collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by states to develop and 
enhance fusion centers, particularly by hiring contract or government 
employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing information-technology 
equipment; or hiring consultants to develop and enhance fusion centers. 
However, we also reported that, despite this funding, fusion center 
officials were concerned about the extent of federal support they could 
expect over the long term, especially in relation to the role of their 
state or local jurisdictions. Given that at the time, federal plans or 
guidance did not articulate the long-term role the federal government 
expected to play in fusion centers, we recommended, and the PM-ISE and 
DHS concurred, that the federal government determine and articulate its 
long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide 
resources to help ensure their sustainability. Further, we stated that 
particular emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those 
fusion center functions that support a national information-sharing 
capability as critical nodes of the ISE. 

In promoting that fusion centers achieve a baseline level of 
capability, the National Strategy states that the federal government 
will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them 
through grant funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve 
such a baseline level of capability. The strategy outlines specific 
roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, and tribal 
authorities in five areas that are related to the establishment and 
continued operations of fusion centers and for establishing a national 
integrated network of centers. It notes that these roles and 
responsibilities were developed in partnership with state and local 
officials and represent a collective view. While the strategy 
acknowledges that fusion centers are owned and managed by state and 
local governments, it identifies the objective is to assist state and 
local governments in the establishment and sustained operation of these 
centers. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the 
national fusion center conference about how specifically the federal 
government was planning to assist state and local governments to 
sustain fusion centers. For example, whether federal funding for fusion 
centers would continue to be available through DHS's homeland security 
grant program or whether in the future there would be fusion-center 
specific funding has yet to be determined. In addition, some officials 
raised questions about limits on federal funding for personnel. For 
example, according to the fiscal year 2008 homeland security grant 
program guidance, costs associated with hiring new intelligence 
analysts are still allowable for 2 years. After which, the states and 
urban areas will be responsible for supporting the sustainment costs of 
those intelligence analysts (as well as providing a budget plan for 
doing so) after the 2-year federal funding period is over. In our 
October 2007 report, we reported on challenges that officials found 
with federal time limits on the use of grant funds for personnel. In 
particular, some of these officials expressed concerns about 
maintaining their personnel levels, and one official told us that the 2-
year limit on the use of DHS grant funds for personnel made retaining 
personnel challenging because state and local agencies may lack the 
resources to continue funding the position, which could hinder the 
center's ability to continue to operate. In discussing the 
implementation of the National Strategy at the fusion center 
conference, a Homeland Security Council official stated that the 
question of federal versus state and local roles in sustaining fusion 
centers is a very difficult question and one that is not yet resolved 
but is ongoing. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, fusion centers are operating or are being 
established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions. 
Although fusion centers were primarily established to meet or enhance 
information sharing within a state or local area, they have become a 
critical component of the federal government's plans as it works to 
improve information sharing in accordance with law and policy. Indeed, 
the National Strategy recognizes fusion centers as vital assets to 
information sharing and critical in the creation of an integrated 
national network to promote two-way sharing of terrorism-related 
information. Given the federal interest in fusion centers and the 
centers' interest in supporting such a national network, it is 
important that the federal government continue to provide fusion 
centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a network. 
In October 2007 we reported that DHS's and DOJ's efforts to assist 
fusion centers, such as providing access to information systems, 
security clearances, guidance and technical assistance, personnel, and 
funding, had begun to address a number of the challenges fusion center 
directors identified to us. Several of those efforts are continuing and 
evolving, including the establishment of ITACG to improve the quality 
of information provided to state and local users and the release of 
baseline capabilities for the operation of fusion centers. These 
efforts are promising; however, it is too soon to determine the extent 
to which they will address all of the challenges reported to us by 
fusion center officials. It is also important for fusion center 
management to understand the federal government's role with respect to 
these centers since this affects state and local governments' support 
to centers. In this regard, we recommended in our October 2007 report 
that the federal government define and articulate its long-term fusion 
center role. The National Strategy clearly articulates a vision for the 
federal government's role in supporting centers--that is by helping to 
sustain centers through grant funding, technical assistance, and 
training. However, fusion center officials raised some concerns about 
sustainability of funding and personnel as the federal government 
continues work to incorporate fusion centers into the information 
sharing environment and implement the National Strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at 
this time. 

Contact Information: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen 
Larence at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at [email protected]. Individuals 
making key contributions to this testimony include Mary Catherine Hult, 
Tom Lombardi, and Jeffrey Niblack. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 110-53, ï¿½ 511, 121 Stat. 266, 322 (2007). 

[2] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, ï¿½ 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, ï¿½ 504, 121 Stat. at 313-17. 

[3] On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM- 
ISE and its staff within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. 

[4] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53 ï¿½ 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding 
section 210A to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135). 

[5] For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer 
to centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and 
intrastate regions. 

[6] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate 
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion 
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35] 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

[7] Because we selected a non-probability sample of fusion centers to 
include in our review, the results of our work are not generalizable to 
the population of all fusion centers. However, because we selected all 
state-operated fusion centers, as well as local fusion centers on the 
basis of their stage of development and geographic diversity, the 
information we gathered from these centers provided us with an overview 
of challenges encountered and federal efforts to support the centers. 

[8] Over 900 federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland 
security officials attended the conference, according to its sponsors, 
which included the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
DOJ, DHS, FBI, PM-ISE, and the Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative. 

[9] We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local 
areas. However, 1 state did not plan a fusion center. For that reason, 
we reported responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15 in 
the planning or early stages of development. 

[10] We presented information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion 
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing 
and operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more 
than one challenge related to a particular area, for example, related 
to guidance and training. 

[11] HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool 
for communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security 
information. LEO serves as a real-time online controlled-access 
communications and information-sharing data repository for sensitive 
but unclassified information about, among other things, antiterrorism, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice. 

[12] The Regional Information Sharing Systems is a nationwide 
initiative to share sensitive but unclassified criminal intelligence 
among stakeholders in law enforcement, first responders, and the 
private sector. 

[13] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, ï¿½ 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section 
210D to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135). 

[14] The 9/11 Commission Act requires that the guidelines established 
by DHS for fusion centers include standards for centers to develop, 
publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy that is 
consistent with federal, state, and local, law, and standards for 
providing privacy and civil liberties training for all representatives 
at the fusion center. Further, the act requires that DHS employees who 
are detailed to fusion centers receive privacy and civil liberties 
training. 

[15] DHS, DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, A Companion 
Document to the Fusion Center Guidelines (March 2008). 

[16] These deployments may be to fusion centers other than the 58 
centers that were included in our October 2007 report. 

[17] A primary federal funding source for fusion centers is DHS's 
Homeland Security Grant Program, which awards funds to state, local, 
and tribal governments to enhance their ability to prepare for, 
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters. 

[18] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS homeland security grant 
program guidance, Urban Areas Security Initiative and Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention Program funds could be used to hire new staff or 
contractor positions to serve as intelligence analysts to enable 
information and intelligence sharing capabilities. The costs associated 
with hiring the new intelligence analysts were allowable for 2 years, 
after which states and urban areas shall be responsible for supporting 
the costs to sustain those intelligence analysts. 

[End of section] 

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