The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Major Challenges Impede	 
Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; Systematic Assessment 
of Progress Is Needed (06-MAR-08, GAO-08-562T). 		 
                                                                 
During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of	 
the Congo (DRC)--one of the world's poorest countries--led	 
directly or indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million 
Congolese. A U.S.-supported peace process began in 2001, and the 
country's first democratically elected president in 40 years was 
inaugurated in 2006. However, conflict in the country has	 
continued. In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo	 
Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), 
Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives that address	 
humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource  
management, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act
mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support	 
these policy objectives. In this testimony, based on its December
2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that
support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the 
accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO obtained	 
and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agencies--the	 
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and	 
Human Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and	 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also  
met with officials of these agencies and nongovernmental	 
organizations (NGO) active in the DRC.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-562T					        
    ACCNO:   A81223						        
  TITLE:     The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Major Challenges   
Impede Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; Systematic	 
Assessment of Progress Is Needed				 
     DATE:   03/06/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Development systems				 
	     Economic development				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign economic assistance			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Human rights violations				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International economic relations			 
	     International law					 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Peacekeeping					 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Democratic Republic of the Congo			 

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GAO-08-562T

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entitled 'The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: Major Challenges Impede 
Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; Systematic Assessment of 
Progress Is Needed' which was released on March 6, 2008.

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Testimony: 

Before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus: 

United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST: 
Thursday, March 6, 2008: 

The Democratic Republic Of The Congo: 

Major Challenges Impede Efforts to Achieve U.S. Policy Objectives; 
Systematic Assessment of Progress Is Needed: 

Statement of David Gootnick, Director: 

International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-08-562T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-562T, testimony before the Congressional Human 
Rights Caucus. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC)ï¿½one of the worldï¿½s poorest countriesï¿½led directly or 
indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. A U.S.-
supported peace process began in 2001, and the countryï¿½s first 
democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 2006. 
However, conflict in the country has continued. 

In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and 
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. 
policy objectives that address humanitarian, social development, 
economic and natural resource management, governance, and security 
concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in 
the DRC that support these policy objectives. In this testimony, based 
on its December 2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and 
activities that support the Actï¿½s objectives, (2) major challenges 
hindering the accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO 
obtained and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agenciesï¿½the 
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also met with 
officials of these agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 
active in the DRC. 

What GAO Found: 

In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, seven agencies allocated a 
total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 
percent of these funds supported the Actï¿½s humanitarian and social 
development objectives and about 30 percent supported its economic and 
natural resource management, governance, and security objectives. 
Agenciesï¿½ programs and activities included, for example, USAIDï¿½s 
provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation 
improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasuryï¿½s provision of interim 
debt relief; and Stateï¿½s provision of training and other assistance for 
professionalizing members of the DRCï¿½s military. 

Several major, interrelated challengesï¿½an unstable security 
environment, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and 
lack of basic infrastructureï¿½have impeded efforts to achieve the Actï¿½s 
policy objectives. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security forces 
have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and NGO 
staff to curtail some efforts. At the same time, corruption and other 
governance problems have impeded efforts to reform the security sector 
and hold human rights violators accountable. Meanwhile, mismanagement 
of natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption, and 
a lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, 
developmental, and governance programs. 

The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall 
progress toward the Actï¿½s policy objectives. As a result, it cannot be 
assured that it has allocated U.S. resources in the most effective 
manner. In its December 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary 
of State work with the heads of the other agencies implementing 
programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the 
U.S. governmentï¿½s overall progress in achieving the Actï¿½s policy 
objectives. State agreed with GAOï¿½s recommendation. 

Figure: U.S. Funding Allocations for the DRC, Fiscal Years 2006-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains two pie-charts depicting the following data: 

Funding allocations by agency: 
State/USAID emergency assistance: 44% ($173.7 million); 
State/USAID nonemergency: 36% ($142 million); 
Treasury: 11% ($44.6 million); 
HHS: 6% ($23.6 million); 
USDA: 2% ($9.6 million); 
DOL: 1% ($5.5 million); 
DOD: less than 1% ($0.4 million). 

Source: GAO analysis of executive agencies' data. 

Funding allocations by category: 
Humanitarian assistance: 43%; 
Social development: 27%; 
Economic/natural resource management: 19%; 
Governance: 6%; 
Security: 5%. 

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data. 

[End of figure] 

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-562T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 
512-3194 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Members of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on U.S. assistance in 
the Democratic of the Congo (DRC). Because of its large size, central 
location in sub-Saharan Africa, and abundant natural resources, the DRC 
is important to the stability of central Africa and the interests of 
the United States. However, since achieving independence in 1960, the 
DRC--one of the world's poorest countries--has suffered from despotic 
rule, underdevelopment, and economic problems. Further, during the last 
decade, conflict in the DRC resulted directly or indirectly in the 
deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. 

According to the Department of State, Western aid to the DRC fell in 
the early 1990s because of concerns about human rights abuses and the 
need for internal reforms, but the United States began to increase its 
support in 2001 after the initiation of U.S.-supported peace talks. A 
transitional DRC government was installed in 2003, and the country's 
first democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 
December 2006. However, conflict in the country has continued. In 
December 2006, Congress enacted the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy 
Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act),[Footnote 1] establishing 15 policy 
objectives related to humanitarian, social development, economic and 
natural resource, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act 
mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support these 
policy objectives. 

My statement today is based on our December 2007 report[Footnote 2] 
that identified (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's 
objectives, [Footnote 3] (2) major impediments hindering accomplishment 
of these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward 
accomplishing the objectives.[Footnote 4] (See app. I for a description 
of our methodology.) 

Summary: 

U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities that 
support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, 
respectively, USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and USAID allocated 
a total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 
70 percent of the funds supported the Act's humanitarian and social 
development objectives and about 30 percent of the funds supported the 
Act's economic and natural resources, governance, and security 
objectives. The agencies' programs and activities have included, for 
example, USAID's provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and 
sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury's 
provision of interim debt relief; and State's provision of training and 
other assistance aimed at professionalizing members of the DRC's 
military. 

Several major challenges impede U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's 
policy objectives, according to U.S., nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), and other officials and experts: (1) unstable security 
environment, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3) 
mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic 
infrastructure. These challenges are interrelated and have hindered 
progress in multiple areas. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security 
forces have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and 
NGO staff to curtail some efforts; the lack of security has also 
discouraged investment, negatively affecting the country's economic 
potential. At the same time, corruption and other governance problems 
have impeded efforts to reform the security sector and hold human 
rights violators accountable and have discouraged private-sector 
investment, thus hindering economic growth. Meanwhile, mismanagement of 
the DRC's natural resources has fueled continued conflict and 
corruption, and a lack of basic infrastructure, such as buildings, 
equipment, and roads, has hindered progress in humanitarian, 
developmental, and governance programs. 

The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall 
progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives in the DRC. 
Although State and the National Security Council (NSC) have developed 
mechanisms to coordinate executive branch agencies' activities in the 
DRC, neither of these mechanisms systematically assesses overall 
progress. As a result, the U.S. government cannot be fully assured that 
it has allocated its resources in the DRC in the most effective manner. 
To ensure a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for 
assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral 
actions, we recommended in our 2007 report that the Secretary of State 
work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs in 
the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the extent to 
which the U.S. government as a whole is making progress in achieving 
the Act's policy objectives. State agreed with our recommendation. 

Background: 

The DRC's size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to 
its importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more 
than 900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United 
States east of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa, 
the DRC borders nine nations. Its abundant natural resources, which 
constitute its primary export products, include 34 percent of the 
world's cobalt reserves, 10 percent of the world's copper reserves, and 
64 percent of the world's coltan reserves, as well as diamonds, gold, 
cassiterite, and other minerals. Moreover, the DRC's rain forests 
provide 8 percent of the world's carbon.[Footnote 5] 

The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after 
the nation achieved independence from Belgium, a military regime seized 
control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than 3 decades. 
It was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups and 
neighboring countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda, after 
dissident Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent efforts 
by a new DRC government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan 
troops prompted a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the armies of 
three more African nations into the DRC. Beginning in 1999, a United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed to the DRC. After a series 
of U.S.-supported peace talks that began in 2001, the other nations 
withdrew all or most of their troops and an interim government was 
established. Elections held in 2006 with logistical support provided by 
UN peacekeepers culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the 
DRC's first democratically elected president in more than 40 years. 
However, conflict in the DRC has continued. According to the 
International Rescue Committee, from 1998 through 2007, 5.4 million 
Congolese died as the direct or indirect consequence of conflict in the 
country, with an estimated 2.1 million of those deaths since 2002. 

The DRC suffers from a wide range of problems, including acute poverty 
and limited economic prospects. It is one of the poorest and least 
developed countries in the world:[Footnote 6] the current life 
expectancy is 43 years, in part because the DRC suffers from high rates 
of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. USAID reports that 2 of every 
10 children born in the DRC die before their fifth birthday and that 
the maternal death rate is the world's highest. An international group 
of donor nations recently concluded that the DRC's educational system 
is failing and that most rural children do not attend school. In 
addition, wars and turmoil have reduced its economy to dependence on 
subsistence agriculture and informal activities. The DRC's prospects 
are also encumbered by an external debt load of around $8 
billion,[Footnote 7] which is three times greater than the level of 
debt that the World Bank and the IMF consider sustainable. Moreover, 
the DRC has not fully qualified for debt relief under the enhanced 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative.[Footnote 8] 

The DRC receives assistance from a number of donor nations and 
organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC 
were the World Bank's International Development Association, the 
European Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, France, Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The United 
States' goal for its assistance to the DRC, as characterized by State, 
is to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and 
democratization to promote a stable, developing, and democratic 
DRC.[Footnote 9] As described by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, U.S. policy is to support, but not lead, the efforts 
of the DRC to address its problems. 

Table 1 shows the Act's 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC, linked 
to the five categories of assistance--humanitarian, social development, 
economic and natural resource management, governance, and security. 

Table 1: Policy Objectives in the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy 
Promotion Act of 2006, by Category: 

Policy objective: Help promote, reinvigorate, and support the political 
process in the DRC to press all parties in the Transitional National 
Government and the succeeding government to implement fully and to 
institutionalize mechanisms--including national and international 
election observers, fair and transparent voter registration procedures, 
and a significant civic awareness and public education campaign created 
for the July 30, 2006--elections and future elections in the DRC to 
ensure that elections are carried out in a fair and democratic manner; 
Category: Governance. 

Policy objective: Urge the DRC government to recognize and act upon its 
responsibilities to immediately bring discipline to its security 
forces; hold those individuals responsible for atrocities and other 
human rights violations, particularly the rape of women and girls as an 
act of war, accountable and bring such individuals to justice; 
Category: Governance, security. 

Policy objective: Help ensure that, once a stable national government 
is established in the DRC, it is committed to multiparty democracy, 
open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious 
freedom, ending the violence throughout the country, promoting peace 
and stability with its neighbors, rehabilitating the national judicial 
system and enhancing the rule of law, combating corruption, instituting 
economic reforms to promote development, and creating an environment to 
promote private investment; 
Category: Governance, economic and natural resource management. 

Policy objective: Assist the DRC government as it seeks to meet the 
basic needs of its citizens, including security, safety, and access to 
health care, education, food, shelter, and clean drinking water; 
Category: Humanitarian, social development, and security. 

Policy objective: Support security sector reform by assisting the DRC 
government to establish a viable and professional national army and 
police force that respects human rights and the rule of law, is under 
effective civilian control, and possesses a viable presence throughout 
the entire country, provided the DRC meets all requirements for U.S. 
military assistance under existing law; 
Category: Security. 

Policy objective: Help expedite planning and implementation of programs 
associated with the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, 
reintegration, and rehabilitation process in the DRC; 
Category: Security. 

Policy objective: Support efforts of the DRC government, the UN 
peacekeeping force, and other entities, as appropriate, to disarm, 
demobilize, and repatriate the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda and other illegally armed groups; 
Category: Security. 

Policy objective: Make all efforts to ensure that the DRC government 
(a) is committed to responsible and transparent management of natural 
resources across the country; and (b) takes active measures to (i) 
promote economic development; (ii) hold accountable individuals who 
illegally exploit the country's natural resources; and (iii) implement 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative by enacting laws 
requiring disclosure and independent auditing of company payments and 
government receipts for natural resource extraction; 
Category: Economic and natural resource management. 

Policy objective: Promote a viable civil society and to enhance 
nongovernmental organizations and institutions, including religious 
organizations, the media, political parties, trade unions, and trade 
and business associations, that can act as a stabilizing force and 
effective check on the government; 
Category: Governance. 

Policy objective: Help rebuild and enhance infrastructure, 
communications, and other mechanisms that will increase the ability of 
the central government to manage internal affairs, encourage economic 
development, and facilitate relief efforts of humanitarian 
organizations; 
Category: Humanitarian, social development. 

Policy objective: Help halt the high prevalence of sexual abuse and 
violence perpetrated against women and children in the DRC and mitigate 
the detrimental effects from acts of this type of violence by 
undertaking health, education, and psycho-social support programs; 
Category: Social development. 

Policy objective: Work aggressively on a bilateral basis to urge 
governments of countries contributing troops to MONUC to enact and 
enforce laws on trafficking in persons and sexual abuse that meet 
international standards, promote codes of conduct for troops serving as 
part of UN peacekeeping missions, and immediately investigate and 
punish citizens who are responsible for abuses in the DRC; 
Category: Security. 

Policy objective: Assist the DRC as it undertakes steps to (a) protect 
internally displaced persons and refugees in the DRC and border regions 
from all forms of violence, including gender-based violence and other 
human rights abuses; (b) address other basic needs of vulnerable 
populations with the goal of allowing these conflict-affected 
individuals to ultimately return to their homes; and (c) assess the 
magnitude of the problem of orphans from conflict and HIV/AIDS in the 
DRC and work to establish a program of national support; 
Category: Security, social development, humanitarian. 

Policy objective: Engage with governments working to promote peace and 
security throughout the DRC and hold accountable individuals, entities, 
and countries working to destabilize the country; 
Category: Security. 

Policy objective: Promote appropriate use of the forests of the DRC in 
a manner that benefits the rural populations in that country who depend 
on the forests for their livelihoods and protects national and 
environmental interests; 
Category: Economic and natural resource management. 

Source: GAO analysis of Section 102 of the DRC Relief, Security, and 
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006. 

[End of table] 

U.S. Programs and Activities That Support the Act's Policy Objectives: 

U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities that 
support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, 
about 70 percent of U.S. funding for the DRC was allocated for programs 
that would support the Act's emergency humanitarian and social 
development objectives and about 30 percent was allocated for programs 
and activities that would support the Act's economic, governance, and 
security objectives (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Category, Fiscal 
Years 2006-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains both a pie-chart and a table. The following 
information is presented: 

Funding allocations by category: 
Humanitarian assistance: 43%; 
Social development: 27%; 
Economic/natural resource management: 19%; 
Governance: 6%; 
Security: 5%. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Humanitarian: $85.3 million; 
Social development: $51.9 million; 
Economic: $66.4[A] million; 
Governance: $7.5 million; 
Security: $6.9 million; 
Total: $217.9 million. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Humanitarian: $88.4 million; 
Social development: $58.2 million; 
Economic: $9.6 million; 
Governance: $14.5 million; 
Security: $10.8 million; 
Total: $181.5 million. 

Fiscal year: Total; 
Humanitarian: $1733.7 million; 
Social development: $110.1 million; 
Economic: $76.0 million; 
Governance: $22.1 million; 
Security: $17.7 million; 
Total: $399.4 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch data. 

Notes: Because of rounding, figures in rows and columns may not sum to 
totals shown. 

[A] Includes $44.6 million allocated by the Treasury to help address 
costs of DRC debt relief. The DRC has received interim debt relief but 
must meet additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced. 

[End of figure] 

Seven U.S. agencies--USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and USAID--
allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, with State and USAID 
providing the majority of these funds (see fig. 2).[Footnote 10] 

Figure 2: Allocation of U.S. Funding for the DRC by Agency, Fiscal 
Years 2006-2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Funding allocations by agency: 
State/USAID emergency assistance: 44% ($173.7 million); 
State/USAID nonemergency: 36% ($142 million); 
Treasury: 11% ($44.6 million); 
HHS: 6% ($23.6 million); 
USDA: 2% ($9.6 million); 
DOL: 1% ($5.5 million); 
DOD: less than 1% ($0.4 million). 

Source: GAO analysis of executive agencies' data. 

Note: According to HHS, its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) obligates funds for projects that are part of research that can 
be conducted in different countries, rather than allocating funds by 
country. Our summary figures incorporate total CDC funding for the DRC 
for the 2 years depicted. For fiscal year 2008, State and USAID 
estimate that they will allocate a total of $105.6 million for the DRC, 
and for fiscal year 2009, they are requesting a total of $95.1 million. 
The Treasury requested $178.3 million for fiscal year 2008 in the event 
that the DRC qualifies for debt relief. OPIC has approved $400 million 
in financing and insurance for a U.S. company to invest in the DRC's 
mining sector and will seek fiscal year 2008 funding to support this 
project. 

[End of figure] 

Examples of U.S. agencies' programs and activities in each category 
include the following (see app. II for more information). 

Humanitarian. USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance to 
help the DRC meet its citizens' and vulnerable populations' basic 
needs. 

* USAID has provided emergency assistance to vulnerable populations in 
the DRC. Working primarily through the UN World Food Program and an 
NGO, USAID has supported distribution of food to internally displaced 
persons; people infected with, and orphans affected by, HIV/AIDS; and 
victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. Working primarily through NGOs, 
USAID has provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition programs, 
water and sanitation improvements, food, and agricultural assistance to 
other vulnerable populations, such as malnourished children and war-
affected populations. 

* USAID has provided emergency assistance to support road 
rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction projects; schools; and the 
socioeconomic reintegration of ex-child soldiers, adult combatants, and 
their families. 

* State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate, 
integrate, and resettle refugees in the DRC. In fiscal year 2007, this 
assistance was implemented primarily by the UN High Commissioner on 
Refugees, other international organizations, and NGOs. 

Social development. USAID, HHS, and DOL have provided assistance to 
support the Act's social development and rehabilitation objectives. 

* USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care, and 
family planning. For instance, USAID has funded efforts to reduce 
abandonment of children; provide psychosocial support, medical 
assistance, and reintegration support to survivors of sexual and 
gender-based violence in the eastern DRC; train teachers; and increase 
access to education for vulnerable children. 

* USAID has funded efforts to train medical staff and nurses in the 
management of primary health care, distribute bed nets to prevent the 
spread of malaria and polio, provide family planning services, and 
support voluntary counseling and testing centers for HIV/AIDS. 

* HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the 
surveillance and control of, infectious diseases such as polio, 
measles, and HIV/AIDS. 

* DOL has allocated funds to address children's involvement in mining 
and related services, small-scale commerce, child soldiering, and other 
forms of child labor in the DRC. 

Economic and natural resource management. Treasury, USAID, State, and 
USDA have provided support for the Act's economic objectives. 

* Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to relieve the 
DRC of some of its foreign debt. The United States provided the DRC 
interim debt relief (primarily through reduced interest payments) in 
fiscal years 2005 through 2007, following the DRC's admittance into the 
HIPC debt relief program. Once the DRC qualifies for the completion of 
its HIPC debt relief, Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of 
fully relieving the DRC's $1.3 billion debt to the United 
States.[Footnote 11] 

* USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural resource 
management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the DRC through the 
Central African Regional Program for the Environment. 

* State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the DRC's 
natural resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which deals with rough diamond 
trade,[Footnote 12] and to the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI).[Footnote 13] 

* USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity, 
increase rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness and 
rural infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and water 
for irrigation in the DRC. 

Governance. USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that 
support the Act's governance objectives. 

* USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions 
intended to bring justice institutions closer to citizens, facilitate 
greater access to justice for vulnerable people, and provide quality 
legal assistance to the population in relatively inaccessible parts of 
the DRC. 

* USAID has supported an NGO's establishment of democracy resource 
centers to assist political party leaders, civic activists, elected 
local and national officials, and government institutions in promoting 
good governance and democracy. 

* USAID, to promote judicial independence, supported an NGO's efforts 
by fostering improvements to the DRC's legal framework, such as laws on 
sexual violence and the rights of women, and providing legal assistance 
activities for victims of sexual and gender-based violence. 

* State allocated funds in 2006 for more than 30 programs by the 
National Endowment for Democracy, including programs aimed at informing 
women of their rights, addressing issues of abuse and corruption, and 
promoting political participation. 

Security. State, USAID, and DOD have provided security-related 
assistance in the DRC. 

* State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus 
Commission, for the DRC and nations on its troubled eastern border--
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi--to discuss regional security issues, 
including militias operating illegally in the eastern DRC. 

* USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some 
former fighters into Congolese society. 

* State is refurbishing the DRC's military officer training school and 
training multiple levels of the military, including brigade-and 
battalion-staff level officers, on military justice reform, civil-
military relations, and other issues of concern. 

Major Challenges Hindering Achievement of the Act's Policy Objectives 
in the DRC: 

U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major 
challenges that are impeding U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's policy 
objectives. These challenges include (1) an unstable security 
environment, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3) 
mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic 
infrastructure.[Footnote 14] Because these challenges are 
interrelated, they negatively impact progress in multiple areas. 

* Unstable security environment. The DRC's weak and abusive security 
forces have been unable to quell continuing militia activities in the 
DRC's eastern regions, where security worsened during 2007. For 
example, the UN reported that the DRC army is responsible for 40 
percent of recently reported human rights violations--including rapes, 
mass killings of civilians, and summary executions--and DRC police and 
other security forces have killed and tortured civilians with total 
impunity.[Footnote 15] State reported that government and other armed 
forces in the DRC have committed a wide range of human rights abuses, 
including forcing children into the security forces.[Footnote 16] 
Further, the DRC's unstable security situation has worsened the DRC's 
humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address these 
problems. For instance, U.S. agency officials reported that the 
conflict has forced them to curtail some emergency assistance programs, 
and NGOs implementing development and humanitarian assistance 
activities in the DRC reported that the lack of security has resulted 
in attacks on their staff or led them to suspend site visits and cancel 
and reschedule work. In addition, the DRC's unstable security situation 
has negatively affected the country's economic potential by 
discouraging investment, which in turn could worsen security through 
renewed conflict.[Footnote 17] 

* Weak governance and corruption. By many accounts, corruption in the 
DRC is widespread. For example, Transparency International's 2007 
Corruption Perceptions Index identifies the DRC as one of the 10th most 
corrupt countries in the world.[Footnote 18] Further, weak governance 
and corruption in the DRC have hindered efforts to reform the security 
sector and hold human rights violators accountable. For instance, 
according to U.S. officials, the DRC lacks a government office with 
clear authority on security issues, and efforts to reform the DRC's 
police may be impeded by lack of support from corrupt DRC institutions. 
According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective judiciary 
impedes efforts to hold human rights violators accountable for their 
actions, which in turn promotes a "culture of impunity." Moreover, 
governance problems have hindered efforts to implement economic reforms 
required for debt relief and promote economic growth. For example, 
according to Treasury officials and IMF documents, the government's 
lack of commitment to meet certain requirements has jeopardized the 
DRC's ability to receive some interim debt relief, qualify for full 
debt relief, and improve the country's overall economic prospects. 
[Footnote 19] Finally, the judiciary's ineffective enforcement of 
commercial contracts in the DRC has likely discouraged private sector 
investment and hence economic growth. The World Bank rated the DRC's 
enforcement of contracts as among the weakest in the world, such that a 
company might need to expend roughly 150 percent of a typical 
contract's value to ensure enforcement through court proceedings. 

* Mismanagement of natural resources. Governance and capacity 
challenges in the DRC have limited the ability of international donors, 
NGOs, and the DRC government to improve natural resource management. 
For example, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has criticized 
the DRC for weak internal controls, customs capacity, and ability to 
track diamonds extracted by large number of self-employed 
miners.[Footnote 20] According to U.S. and NGO officials, the DRC also 
conducted a national mining contract review without publishing its 
terms of reference or all of the contracts or clearly defining the role 
of civil society representatives. Further, mismanagement of the DRC's 
natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption. 
According to U.S. officials, international donors, and NGOs, the DRC's 
abundant natural resources fuel conflict between neighboring countries' 
militias and armed domestic factions and foster corruption among 
government officials. 

* Lack of basic infrastructure. The DRC lacks many key elements of 
basic infrastructure, such as buildings, equipment, and transportation. 
For example, according to a recent study by 17 donor nations, no roads 
link 9 of the DRC's 10 provincial capitals to the national capital and 
no roads link the DRC's northern and southern regions or its eastern 
and western regions. International observers have reported that the 
DRC's educational and penal infrastructures are dilapidated, and an 
international group of donor nations stated that the DRC's 
electrification, communications, and supplies of clean water have major 
deficiencies. Moreover, the DRC's lack of basic infrastructure has 
hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance 
programs. According to U.S. officials, the lack of an adequate in-
country transportation system increases the time required to get 
supplies to those in need and, according to U.S. and NGO officials, 
increases the expense or difficulty associated with their programs. 
International donors and organizations said that the lack of 
infrastructure has made economic development impossible in many areas 
and may stifle the potential for economic growth and private sector 
activity in most DRC provinces. 

U.S. Efforts to Assess Overall Progress toward Achieving the Act's 
Policy Objectives: 

Although U.S. agencies monitor their efforts in the DRC, the U.S. 
government has not established a process to assess overall progress 
toward achieving the Act's policy objectives in the DRC. Further, 
although State and NSC have developed mechanisms to coordinate some of 
the agencies' activities in the DRC, neither mechanism systematically 
assesses overall progress. 

Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their respective 
programs. For example, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who regularly visit project 
sites and publish quarterly reports on OFDA activities. Their partner 
organizations, or implementers, also provide reports and updates on 
their projects.[Footnote 21] 

However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide 
process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S. 
progress in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed mechanisms 
aimed at providing some degree of coordination among executive branch 
agencies active in the DRC, neither mechanism currently provides for 
the systematic assessment of overall U.S. progress toward its goals. 

* In 2006, to ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance 
provided to the DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad 
foreign policy objectives, the Secretary of State appointed a Director 
of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of 
USAID.[Footnote 22] Under DFA's guidance, State and USAID have begun to 
develop a joint planning and budgeting process that, according to State 
officials, may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, 
as of February 2008, the Office of the DFA had not completed its DRC 
operations plan for fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30, 
2007. 

* To focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of 
central Africa, which encompasses the DRC, the National Security 
Council established an interagency working group, comprising officials 
from DOD, State, and USAID. The group's mission is to establish a 
coordinated approach, policies, and actions to address issues, such as 
security, in the DRC and other countries in the region. However, 
according to NSC and State officials, the group has not developed 
systematic tools for assessing the impact of all U.S. agencies' efforts 
to achieve the Act's objectives. Also, the group does not include 
several agencies providing assistance to the DRC, such as DOL, HHS, and 
USDA. 

The lack of a governmentwide process for assessing its overall progress 
in the DRC limits the U.S. government's ability to ensure that it has 
allocated its resources in the most effective manner. At the same time, 
given the DRC's significance to Africa's stability, the scope, 
complexity, and urgency of the challenges to achieving U.S. policy 
objectives in the DRC warrant a governmentwide response. To ensure a 
basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for assistance 
in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral actions, we 
recommended in December 2007 that the Secretary of State, through the 
Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. 
agencies implementing programs and activities in the DRC to develop a 
plan for systematically assessing the extent to which the U.S. 
government as a whole is making progress in achieving the Act's policy 
objectives. Commenting on a draft of our 2007 report, State endorsed 
our recommendation, noting that it would likely be met as DFA's joint 
planning and budgeting processes are extended to include all U.S. 
agencies engaged in the DRC.[Footnote 23] 

This completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to 
any questions that Members of the Caucus may have at this time. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

For our December 2007 report, we identified (1) U.S. programs and 
activities that support the objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and 
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act),[Footnote 24] (2) major 
challenges hindering accomplishment of these objectives, and (3) U.S. 
efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing these objectives. 

To identify U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's 
objectives, we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming 
documents describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by 
key U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense 
(DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the 
Treasury; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We identified the 
amount of funding each agency allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal 
years 2006 and 2007; we did not determine the extent to which each 
agency obligated or expended its allocated funds. We also met with 
representatives from each of these agencies, the National Security 
Council (NSC), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other 
organizations with expertise on DRC-related issues. 

To identify key impediments hindering accomplishment of the Act's 
policy objectives, we analyzed relevant policy and program documents; 
interviewed U.S. agency officials; conducted a round-table session with 
a nonprobability sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of experience and 
expertise implementing programs and projects in the DRC; and 
interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience in 
the DRC. 

To identify U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the 
Act's policy objectives, we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and 
implementation documents. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we 
conducted several telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID 
mission staff in the DRC. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to December 2007, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements: 

GAO Contact: 

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgements: 

In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant 
Director), Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer, Martin 
De Alteriis, Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz Kermalli made key 
contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided technical assistance. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384. 

[2] GAO, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Systematic Assessment Is 
Needed to Determine Agencies' Progress toward U.S. Policy Objectives, 
GAO-08-188 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). 

[3] We grouped the Act's 15 objectives in five categories: 
humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource 
management, governance, and security. 

[4] Because the Act directed us to review actions taken by U.S. 
agencies to achieve its objectives, we focused on the fiscal year in 
which the Act was enacted and, for context, the fiscal year before its 
enactment. 

[5] Coltan and cassiterite are metals used in the electronics industry. 

[6] The DRC was ranked 167th of 177 nations surveyed by the UN 
Development Program in terms of life expectancy, education, and 
standard of living, and its ranking on these measures has declined by 
more than 10 percent over the past decade. The Fund for Peace ranked 
the DRC second, after Sudan, in its Failed States Index. 

[7] We state external debt in present value terms, which take into 
account the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and 
principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate. 

[8] The DRC qualified for partial debt relief in 2003 through HIPC, a 
joint bilateral and multilateral effort to relieve poor countries of 
debt to promote long-term economic growth and debt sustainability. In 
qualifying for HIPC, the DRC has been able to receive interim debt 
relief, primarily in terms of lower debt-service payments. The DRC must 
meet certain additional criteria before its debt is fully reduced 
through HIPC. 

[9] State has also reported that the United States is seeking to ensure 
that the DRC professionalizes its security forces and is at peace; 
develops democratic institutions; supports private-sector economic 
growth and achieves macroeconomic stability; meets the basic needs of 
its people; and, with its international partners, provides relief in 
humanitarian crises. 

[10] We did not determine the extent to which the agencies had 
obligated and expended the funds they allocated. In addition to 
providing the funding shown, the United States also contributed funds 
to international organizations that conducted activities in the DRC 
during 2006 and 2007. For example, it contributed about $236 million 
and $300 million in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, for the 
support of UN peacekeeping activities in the DRC. As one of the largest 
donors to the DRC, the World Bank has funded a wide range of programs-
-including macroeconomic management, infrastructure, and disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration of militia fighters--that have 
totaled around $366 million in fiscal year 2006 and $180 million in 
fiscal year 2007. The United States provides around 14 percent of donor 
funds to the World Bank for such operations. It is also the largest 
contributor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
which is active in the DRC. 

[11] Treasury estimates that the budgetary cost of reducing the $1.3 
billion of DRC bilateral debt owed to the United States is about $300 
million, based on the Office of Management and Budget's Circular Number 
A-11. According to Treasury officials, Treasury intends to use $44.6 
million allocated in fiscal year 2006, about $80 million in previously 
appropriated funds, and about $178 million in fiscal year 2008 funds. 

[12] The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme aims to control the 
international rough diamond trade and assure customers that diamonds 
purchased have not helped to finance violent conflicts. 

[13] Under EITI, countries publish and verify payments and government 
revenues in the natural resource sector. 

[14] In addition to the challenges in the DRC that we describe, the NGO 
representatives who participated in our round-table session identified 
challenges outside the DRC relating to the level of U.S. engagement and 
commitment in the DRC as well as to the prioritization of U.S. 
resources and the lack of demonstrated results. 

[15] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, MONUC Human 
Rights Division, The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) during the period of July to December 2006 (Feb. 8, 
2007). 

[16] State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., March 6, 
2007). 

[17] The DRC country assistance framework document notes that an 
additional 2 percent of economic growth sustained over 10 years could 
reduce the risk of renewed civil war by about one-third. See also Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Oxford 
Economic Papers, vol. 56 (2004). Other researchers have estimated that 
a democratic nation is roughly 10 times more likely to be overthrown if 
its economy experiences negative growth 2 years in a row; see Adam 
Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Josï¿½ Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando 
Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-
Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 

[18] The DRC, with three other countries, has a score of 1.9 on the 
corruption index's 10-point scale, in which a score of zero would be 
given for a highly corrupt state and 10 would be given for a "clean" 
state. The index includes 179 nations (see [hyperlink, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)]. 

[19] To receive the estimated $6.3 billion in debt relief for which it 
may qualify under HIPC, the DRC must meet various conditions that 
include satisfactory macroeconomic performance under an IMF-supported 
program, improved public sector management, and implementation of 
structural reforms. Although donors had expected the DRC to qualify for 
full debt relief in 2006, the government instead fell into arrears and 
failed to implement needed policies; as a result, the IMF has suspended 
its program assistance to the DRC in 2007. Having determined that the 
DRC cannot sustain its current debt levels, the IMF is consulting with 
the DRC regarding a new debt-relief program, according to Treasury 
officials. However, the DRC will not qualify for full debt relief until 
at least 2009. 

[20] These challenges are common to many developing country members. 
For further discussion of such challenges, see GAO, International 
Trade: Critical Issues Remain in Deterring Conflict Diamond Trade, 
GAO-02-678 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002). 

[21] For example, in one report, OFDA noted that work conditions are 
extremely difficult because many health centers are accessible only by 
foot and that the local population is often too fearful of attacks by 
armed groups operating in the area to make full use of the centers 

[22] DFA is charged with developing a coordinated U.S. government 
foreign assistance strategy; creating and directing consolidated 
policy, planning, budget, and implementation mechanisms and staff 
functions required to provide umbrella leadership to foreign 
assistance; and providing guidance to foreign assistance delivered 
through other agencies and entities of the U.S. government, including 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator. 

[23] See GAO-08-188, appendix III, for State's comments regarding a 
draft of our report. 

[24] Pub. L. No. 109-456, 120 Stat. 3384. 

[End of section] 

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