Information Technology: Significant Problems of Critical	 
Automation Program Contribute to Risks Facing 2010 Census	 
(05-MAR-08, GAO-08-550T).					 
                                                                 
Of the $11 billion total estimated cost of the 2010 Census, the  
Census Bureau planned (as of 2007) to spend about $3 billion on  
automation and information technology in order to improve census 
coverage, accuracy, and efficiency. Among other things, the	 
Bureau is planning to automate many of its planned field data	 
collection activities as a way to reduce costs and improve data  
quality and operational efficiency. Known as Field Data 	 
Collection Automation (FDCA), this initiative is acquiring	 
handheld mobile computing devices that, along with other	 
technology, are undergoing operational testing during a Census	 
"Dress Rehearsal" that is taking place from February 2006 to June
2009. The $600 million FDCA program is a crucial component of the
reengineered processes envisioned for the 2010 Census. In March  
2006, GAO reported on the management capabilities of the FDCA	 
program, and in October 2007, it reported on FDCA's status and	 
plans. As requested, this testimony summarizes key findings from 
these two reports, as well as subsequent Bureau actions.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-550T					        
    ACCNO:   A81213						        
  TITLE:     Information Technology: Significant Problems of Critical 
Automation Program Contribute to Risks Facing 2010 Census	 
     DATE:   03/05/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Census						 
	     Contract costs					 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Information management				 
	     Information technology				 
	     IT acquisitions					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk factors					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems testing					 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Waste, fraud, and abuse				 
	     2010 Decennial Census				 
	     GAO High Risk Series				 

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GAO-08-550T

   

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United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
U.S. Senate: 

For Release on Delivery: 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST Wednesday, March 5, 2008: 

Information Technology: 

Significant Problems of Critical Automation Program Contribute to Risks 
Facing 2010 Census: 

Statement of David A. Powner: 

Director, Information Technology Management Issues: 

Mathew J. Scirï¿½: 

Director, Strategic Issues: 

GAO-08-550T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-550T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Of the $11 billion total estimated cost of the 2010 Census, the Census 
Bureau planned (as of 2007) to spend about $3 billion on automation and 
information technology in order to improve census coverage, accuracy, 
and efficiency. Among other things, the Bureau is planning to automate 
many of its planned field data collection activities as a way to reduce 
costs and improve data quality and operational efficiency. Known as 
Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA), this initiative is acquiring 
handheld mobile computing devices that, along with other technology, 
are undergoing operational testing during a Census ï¿½ï¿½Dress Rehearsalï¿½ï¿½ 
that is taking place from February 2006 to June 2009. The $600 million 
FDCA program is a crucial component of the reengineered processes 
envisioned for the 2010 Census. In March 2006, GAO reported on the 
management capabilities of the FDCA program, and in October 2007, it 
reported on FDCAï¿½s status and plans. As requested, this testimony 
summarizes key findings from these two reports, as well as subsequent 
Bureau actions. 

What GAO Found: 

In March 2006, GAO reported that the FDCA project office had not 
implemented the full set of acquisition management capabilities (such 
as project and acquisition planning and requirements development and 
management) that were needed to effectively manage the program. For 
example, although the project office had developed baseline functional 
requirements for the acquisition, the Bureau had not yet validated and 
approved them. Valid baseline requirements are crucial for success, 
because they are the basis for the detailed operational requirements 
that determine system development. Without well-defined requirements, 
system acquisitions are at risk of cost increases, schedule delays, or 
performance shortfalls. Accordingly, GAO recommended that the Bureau 
validate and approve baseline requirements for FDCA. In October 2007, 
GAO reported that changes to requirements had been a contributing 
factor to both cost increases and schedule delays experienced by the 
FDCA program. Increases in the number of requirements led to the need 
for additional work and staffing. In addition, an initial underestimate 
of the contract costs caused both cost and schedule revisions. In 
response to the cost and schedule changes, the Bureau decided to delay 
certain system functionality, which increased the likelihood that the 
systems testing at the Dress Rehearsal would not be as comprehensive as 
planned. In addition, despite reports from Census field staff during 
spring Dress Rehearsal operations that data transmissions from handheld 
mobile computing devices were slow and inconsistent, the project team 
did not adequately identify performance issues with these devices as a 
risk. The magnitude of the performance difficulties was not clear, and 
the Bureau had not fully specified how it planned to measure the 
devicesï¿½ performance, as GAO had recommended. Without effective 
management of these and other key risks, the FDCA program faced an 
increased probability that the system would not be delivered on 
schedule and within budget or perform as expected. Accordingly, GAO 
recommended that the FDCA project team strengthen its risk management 
activities, including risk identification and oversight. The Bureau has 
recently made efforts to further define the requirements for the FDCA 
program, and it has estimated that the revised requirements will result 
in significant cost increases. Rough estimates shared with the Congress 
and the Administration range from $600 million to $2 billion; however, 
specific programs and operations affected have not been identified, nor 
has the Bureau decided on a clear approach to address these issues. In 
view of the time frames for the 2010 Census, it is essential that the 
Bureau act rapidly to make decisions and to implement GAOï¿½s 
recommendations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In its reports, GAO made several recommendations to improve acquisition 
management capabilities, including approving baseline requirements for 
FDCA and strengthening risk management. The Bureau generally agreed 
with them, but it has not yet fully implemented these and other 
recommendations. 

2010 Census: 

Automation Problems and Uncertain Costs and Plans May Jeopardize the 
Success of the Decennial and Warrant Immediate Attention: 

Why GAO Assigns High Risk: 

GAO audits and evaluations identify federal programs and operations 
that are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, 
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Increasingly, GAO also is identifying 
high-risk areas to focus on the need for broad-based transformations to 
address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. In 
January 2007, GAO presented the 110th Congress with the latest status 
of existing and new high-risk areas warranting attention by both the 
Congress and the administration. Lasting solutions to high-risk 
problems could save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service 
to the public, strengthen confidence and trust in the performance and 
accountability of the U.S. government, and ensure the ability of 
government to deliver on its promises. The decennial census is a 
Constitutionally-mandated activity that produces critical data used to 
apportion congressional seats and allocate billions of dollars in 
federal assistance. 

Designation as High Risk: 

Today GAO is designating the 2010 Census as a high-risk area. The 
Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in 
which the Bureau has the opportunity to test, for the last time under 
census-like conditions, its plans for 2010. GAOï¿½s work and Census have 
highlighted a number of long-standing and emerging challenges facing 
the 2010 Census. Because the census is one of the foundations for many 
government decisions, threats to a timely and reliable census can 
affect the publicï¿½s confidence in government. GAO has reported long-
standing weaknesses in the Bureauï¿½s management of information 
technology. To control costs and improve accuracy, the Bureau is 
relying as never before on contractor provided technology, including 
the use of handheld mobile computing devices. In October 2007, GAO 
concluded that without effective management of key risks, the Field 
Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program responsible for the devices 
faced an increased probability that the system would not be delivered 
on schedule and within budget or perform as expected. GAO recommended 
that the Bureau strengthen its system testing and risk management 
activities. Today the Bureau and its contractor are finalizing the FDCA 
program and have not yet agreed on requirements for FDCA, and system 
interface testing has been delayed. In the spring of 2007, the Bureau 
tested the device under census-like conditions for the first time as 
part of its address canvassing dress rehearsal. Field staff reported 
technical problems with the handheld devices. The magnitude of these 
problems is not clear and the Bureau still has not fully specified how 
it will measure the performance of the handheld devices, as GAO 
recommended. In addition, the Bureau has not performed recommended 
analysis or provided sufficient information to provide a level of 
confidence in its $11.5 billion life-cycle cost estimate of the 
decennial census. The Bureau has not itemized the estimated costs of 
each component operation, conducted sensitivity analysis on cost 
drivers, or provided an explanation of significant changes in the 
assumptions on which these costs are based. More recently, the Bureau 
has delayed the dress rehearsal and dropped several operations. 
Together, these weaknesses and actions raise serious questions about 
the Bureauï¿½s preparations for conducting the 2010 Census. In 2005 GAO 
highlighted the 2010 Census as an emerging area for possible high-risk 
designation. GAO has recommended numerous corrective actions to address 
the risks associated with the 2010 Census, but many of them have not 
been implemented. GAO recommended that the Bureau (1) strengthen its 
systems testing and risk management activities, (2) define specific 
measurable performance requirements for the handheld mobile computing 
device, and (3) develop an integrated and comprehensive plan to control 
its costs and manage operations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In its reports, GAO has recommended that the Bureau improve acquisition 
management capabilities, operational planning, cost estimation, and 
performance measurement. The Bureau agreed with most of these 
recommendations, but has not fully implemented them. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-550T]. For more information, contact 
Mathew Scire, 202-512-6806, [email protected] or David A. Powner, 202-512-
9286, [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to 
discuss our past work on the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) 
program--a key information technology acquisition that includes 
systems, equipment, and infrastructure for field staff to use in 
collecting census data for the 2010 Decennial Census. As you know, the 
decennial census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides data 
that are vital to the nation. These data are used to apportion the 
seats of the U.S. House of Representatives; realign the boundaries of 
the legislative districts of each state; allocate billions of dollars 
in federal financial assistance; and provide social, demographic, and 
economic profiles of the nation's people to guide policy decisions at 
each level of government. 

Carrying out the census is the responsibility of the Department of 
Commerce's Census Bureau, which is now preparing for the 2010 Census. 
The next decennial census date is April 1, 2010, and the Secretary of 
Commerce is required to report to the President the tabulation of total 
population by states by December 31.[Footnote 1] 

The Bureau plans to rely on automation and technology to improve the 
coverage, accuracy, and efficiency of the 2010 Census. The Bureau 
estimated that its information technology (IT) acquisitions would 
account for about $3 billion of the currently estimated total $11.5 
billion cost of the entire census. It is also holding what it refers to 
as a Dress Rehearsal, a period centering around a mock Census Day on 
May 1, 2008. Planned Dress Rehearsal activities include operational 
testing of the 2010 Census systems in a census-like environment. 

The Census Bureau has recently indicated that the FDCA program is 
likely to incur significant cost overruns. As requested, our testimony 
today will summarize our past reports on the FDCA program,[Footnote 2] 
including our observations on the performance of the FDCA handheld 
mobile computing devices, which were used during the April 2007 address 
canvassing activities for the Dress Rehearsal, as well as subsequent 
Bureau actions. In addition, we will discuss our designation of the 
2010 Census as a high-risk program. 

The work on which this testimony is based was performed in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

We have previously reported on weaknesses in FDCA's IT acquisition 
management activities. 

* In March 2006, we reported that the FDCA project office had not 
implemented the full set of acquisition management capabilities (such 
as project and acquisition planning, and requirements development and 
management) that were needed to effectively manage the 
program.[Footnote 3] Specifically, the FDCA project had completed most 
of its solicitation activities, but activities in other management 
areas had been initiated but not completed. Further, although the 
project office had developed baseline functional requirements for the 
acquisition, the Bureau had not yet validated and approved them. Valid 
baseline requirements are crucial for success, because they are the 
basis for the detailed operational requirements that determine system 
development. Without well-defined requirements, system acquisitions are 
at risk of cost increases, schedule delays, or performance shortfalls. 
Finally, the project office had identified risks, but it had not yet 
implemented a risk management process. Until these and other basic 
management activities were fully implemented, the project faced 
increased risks that the system would experience cost overruns, 
schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. We made recommendations to 
the Director of the Census Bureau to ensure that the project office 
completed key activities needed to effectively manage its acquisitions, 
including activities associated with effective requirements management. 

* In October 2007, we reported that changes to requirements had been a 
contributing factor to both schedule delays and cost increases 
experienced by the FDCA program.[Footnote 4] The schedule had been 
revised--resulting in delays in system development and testing of 
interfaces--and the life-cycle cost estimates for this program had 
increased to $647 million, with additional cost increases anticipated. 
According to the contractor, the overrun was due primarily to an 
increase in the number of system requirements. We also reported that 
the FDCA project team had not adequately identified risks associated 
with performance issues experienced by handheld mobile computing 
devices. In May and June 2007, both we and the Census Bureau had 
observed the use of the handheld mobile computing device in Census-like 
conditions, which revealed a number of performance issues with the 
devices, such as slow and inconsistent data processing. The magnitude 
of these performance issues was not clear. If the project team did not 
implement key risk management activities, it would face an increased 
probability that the system would not be delivered on schedule and 
within budget or perform as expected. To help ensure that the program 
operates as intended, we recommended that the project team strengthen 
risk management activities, including those associated with risk 
identification, mitigation, and oversight. In written comments on a 
draft of both reports, the department generally agreed with our 
recommendations for the FDCA project. 

The Bureau has recently made efforts to further define the requirements 
for the FDCA program, and it has estimated that the revised 
requirements will result in significant cost increases. Rough estimates 
that have been shared with the Congress and the Administration range 
from $600 million to $2 billion; however, specific programs and 
operations affected have not been identified, nor has the Bureau 
decided on a clear approach to address these issues. In view of the 
timeframes for the 2010 Census, it is essential that the Bureau act 
rapidly to make decisions and to implement our previous 
recommendations. 

In 2005 we highlighted the 2010 Census as an emerging area for possible 
high-risk designation. In addition to the recommendations discussed 
above, we have recommended other corrective actions to address the 
risks associated with the 2010 Census, but many of these have not yet 
been fully implemented. Among these are recommendations that the Bureau 
strengthen its systems testing, define specific measurable performance 
requirements for the handheld mobile computing device, and develop an 
integrated and comprehensive plan to control its costs and manage 
operations.[Footnote 5] More recently, the Bureau has delayed the Dress 
Rehearsal and dropped several operations, some of which are designed to 
reach historically undercounted populations and measure census 
coverage. Together, these concerns raise serious questions about the 
Bureau's preparations for conducting the 2010 Census. Because the 
census is one of the foundations for many government decisions, threats 
to a timely and reliable census can affect the public's confidence in 
government. We are, therefore, today designating the 2010 Census as 
high risk. 

Background: 

Conducting the decennial census is a major undertaking involving many 
interrelated steps, including: 

* identifying and correcting addresses for all known living quarters in 
the United States (known as "address canvassing"); 

* sending questionnaires to housing units; 

* following up with nonrespondents through personal interviews; 

* identifying people with nontraditional living arrangements; 

* managing a voluminous workforce responsible for follow-up activities; 

* collecting census data by means of questionnaires, calls, and 
personal interviews; 

* tabulating and summarizing census data; and: 

* disseminating census analytical results to the public. 

The decennial census program is the responsibility of the bureau's 
Decennial Census organization, which is made up of several divisions 
and offices. In particular, the Decennial Management Division is 
responsible for implementing the decennial census. The Decennial 
Systems and Contracts Management Office manages selected system 
contracts supporting the decennial census including FDCA. 

FDCA Plays Crucial Role in the Decennial Census: 

The Bureau estimated that it would spend about $3 billion on automation 
and IT for the 2010 Census to improve coverage, accuracy, and 
efficiency. Figure 1 shows the key systems and interfaces supporting 
the 2010 Census. 

Figure 1: Key 2010 Census Systems and Interfaces: 

This figure is a flowchart showing key 2010 census systems and 
interfaces. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 

Note: Shaded boxes indicate major IT decennial systems. 

[End of figure] 

To collect respondent information (a process depicted in the middle 
section of fig. 1), the Bureau is pursuing the FDCA program. FDCA is 
expected to provide automation support for field data collection 
operations, as well as reduce costs and improve data quality and 
operational efficiency. As the figure shows, the FDCA technology is 
central to the reengineered processes that are envisioned for the 2010 
Census. The acquisition includes the systems, equipment, and 
infrastructure that field staff will use to collect census data, 
including handheld mobile computing devices.[Footnote 6] The program is 
expected to provide office automation for regional and local census 
offices; the telecommunications infrastructure for headquarters, 
regional, and local offices; and mobile computing devices for field 
workers. 

The bureau plans to have field-based enumerators use nearly 500,000 
mobile computing devices to support decennial census field operations. 
Enumerators from local census offices will use these mobile computing 
devices to complete activities including address canvassing (visiting 
households to update address lists and collect global positioning 
coordinates to update maps) and conducting nonresponse follow-up 
(visiting households to obtain information from households that do not 
provide responses via mail, Internet, or phone).[Footnote 7] 

In preparation for the 2010 Census, the Bureau plans a series of tests 
of its (new and existing) operations and systems in different 
environments, as well as to conduct what it refers to as the Dress 
Rehearsal. During the Dress Rehearsal period, which runs from February 
2006 through June 2009, the Bureau plans to conduct development and 
testing of systems, run a mock Census Day, and prepare for Census 2010, 
which will include opening offices and hiring staff. These Dress 
Rehearsal activities are to provide an operational test of the 
available system functionalities in a census-like environment, as well 
as other operational and procedural activities. 

Previously Reported Weaknesses in Acquisition Management Activities 
Increase Risks to Census: 

In previous reports, we have described weaknesses in FDCA's IT 
acquisition management activities that pose serious risks to the 
success of the 2010 Census. In March 2006, we testified that the FDCA 
project office had not implemented the full set of acquisition 
management capabilities that were needed to effectively manage the 
program; we noted in particular that although baseline functional 
requirements had been developed, they had not been validated and 
approved.[Footnote 8] Subsequently, in October 2007, we reported that 
changes to requirements had been a contributing factor to both schedule 
delays and cost increases experienced by the FDCA program.[Footnote 9] 
Further, although the FDCA project team had performed many practices 
associated with establishing sound and capable risk management 
processes, critical weaknesses remained. For example, despite reports 
of performance issues with handheld mobile computing devices, the 
project team did not adequately identify these as a risk. 

The FDCA Program Had Not Initiated Key Management Activities: 

In March 2006, we reported that the FDCA project office had initiated 
many key processes to oversee and manage the program, but had not yet 
implemented the full set of acquisition management capabilities it 
needed to fully manage the acquisition. Table 1 provides a summary of 
the status of the FDCA project in each of the process areas we 
evaluated. 

Table 1: Summary of the Status of FDCA Acquisition Management 
Capabilities as of March 2006: 

Capability: Project and acquisition planning; 
Status: Initiated, but key activities remained to be completed, such as 
identifying deliverables and milestones, and obtaining stakeholder buy-
in on a project plan that included the project's estimated costs, 
budget, and schedules. 

Capability: Solicitation; 
Status: Key activities completed; bureau officials said that they were 
on schedule to award the contract in March 2006. 

Capability: Requirements development and management; Status: Initiated, 
but key activities remained to be completed, such as validating 
requirements. 

Capability: Risk management; 
Status: Initiated, but key activities remained to be performed, such as 
assigning responsibilities for risks and preparing mitigation plans. 

Capability: Contract tracking and oversight/project monitoring and 
control; 
Status: Initiated, but key performance measures had not yet been 
established; bureau officials said that they expected to define these 
metrics after contract award. 

Capability: Process and product quality assurance; 
Status: Initiated; the quality assurance process was expected to be 
implemented after contract award. 

Capability: Executive oversight/governance; 
Status: Initiated, but key governance activities remained to be 
completed. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of table] 

The FDCA project office had made some progress in building management 
capabilities, but more remained to be done in key areas. For example, 
the project office completed many key solicitation activities and 
planned to award a contract in March 2006. In the requirements 
development and management area, the project office and the Decennial 
Management Division developed some FDCA-specific functional 
requirements with participation from stakeholders. The office had also 
drafted a requirements management plan. However, the division had not 
yet validated and approved a baseline set of operational requirements 
nor ensured traceability between its operational requirements and the 
FDCA request for proposals. Until the bureau finalized its operational 
requirements for the census and ensured that the FDCA request for 
proposal was consistent with the baseline requirements, the project 
would be at risk of having changes to the requirements, potentially 
affecting its ambitious development and implementation schedule. 

Additionally, in the contract and project monitoring area, the project 
office had initiated efforts to oversee the contractor's performance, 
such as requiring earned value management reporting and hiring staff 
with contract tracking and oversight experience. However, the project 
office had not yet selected detailed performance measures for tracking 
the contractor or its own internal progress (such as progress against 
planned milestones, number of risks opened and closed, number and 
frequency of changes to requirements, and frequency of quality 
assurance reviews). Without such practices in place, the project team 
would not be able to ensure that it could identify problems and take 
appropriate corrective actions in a timely manner. 

We said that sound acquisition and management processes were needed to 
minimize risks and thereby maximize chances for success. Such processes 
have been identified and endorsed by such leading organizations as the 
Software Engineering Institute and the Chief Information Officers' 
Council, as well as in our prior work analyzing best practices in 
industry and government. Our work has shown that such processes are 
significant factors in successful systems acquisitions and development 
programs, and they improve the likelihood of meeting cost and schedule 
estimates as well as performance. 

To ensure that the bureau adequately managed the FDCA project, we 
recommended that the Director of the Census Bureau direct the project 
office to take four actions, including validating and approving 
baseline requirements. The Bureau generally agreed with our 
recommendations and stated that time constraints and budgets had driven 
it to proceed with its acquisitions before all the recommended 
activities had been completed. 

The FDCA Program Had Delayed Functionality and Was Experiencing Cost 
Increases: 

As of October 2007, we reported that FDCA had experienced schedule 
delays and cost increases. Specifically, the life cycle cost estimates 
for this program had increased to $647 million, and additional cost 
increases were anticipated. In response to schedule delays as well as 
other factors, including cost, the Bureau made schedule adjustments and 
planned to delay certain system functionality. As a result of the FDCA 
schedule changes, the likelihood had increased that the systems testing 
at the Dress Rehearsal would not be as comprehensive as planned. 

In October 2007, we reported that the contractor was in the process of 
developing and testing FDCA software for the Dress Rehearsal Census 
Day, and had delivered 1,388 handheld mobile computing devices to be 
used in address canvassing[Footnote 10] for the Dress Rehearsal. Also, 
key FDCA support infrastructure had been installed, including the 
Security Operation Center. In future contract phases, the project was 
to continue development, deploy systems and hardware, support census 
operations, and perform operational and contract closeout activities. 

However, the Bureau revised FDCA's original schedule and delayed or 
eliminated some of its key functionality from the Dress Rehearsal, 
including the automated software distribution system. According to the 
Bureau, it revised the schedule because it realized that it had 
underestimated the costs for the early stages of the contract, and that 
it could not meet the contractor's estimated level of first-year 
funding because the fiscal year 2006 budget was already in place. 
According to the Bureau, this initial underestimate led to schedule 
changes and overall cost increases. 

In particular, the project life-cycle costs had increased. At contract 
award in March 2006, the total cost of FDCA was estimated not to exceed 
$596 million. As of September 2006, the cost estimate had increased to 
$624 million. In May 2007, the life-cycle cost rose by a further $23 
million because of increasing system requirements, which resulted in an 
estimated life-cycle cost of about $647 million. Table 2 shows the life-
cycle cost estimates for FDCA as of October 2007. 

Table 2: FDCA Life-Cycle Cost Estimates as of October 2007: 

Execution period: Baseline planning period; 
Start date: March 31, 2006; 
End date: June 30, 2006; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: $11; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: $11. 

Execution period: Execution Period 1; 
Start date: July 1, 2006; 
End date: December 31, 2008; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: 200; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: 225. 

Execution period: Execution Period 2; 
Start date: January 1, 2009; 
End date: September 30, 2011; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: 319; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: 318. 

Execution period: Execution Period 3; 
Start date: August 1, 2010; 
End date: End of contract; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: 10; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: 10. 

Execution period: Leased equipment; 
Start date: N/A; 
End date: N/A; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: 12; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: 12. 

Execution period: Management reserve; 
Start date: N/A; 
End date: N/A; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: 7; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: 5. 

Execution period: Award fee; 
Start date: N/A; 
End date: N/A; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: 65; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: 65. 

Execution period: Total; 
Start date: [Empty]; 
End date: [Empty]; 
Cost estimates (in millions): September 2006: $624; 
Cost estimates (in millions): May 2007: $647. 

Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data. 

Note: Total may not add due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

In addition, FDCA had already experienced $6 million in cost overruns, 
and both our analysis and the contractor's analysis expected FDCA to 
experience additional cost overruns. Based on our analysis of cost 
performance reports (from July 2006 to May 2007), we projected that the 
FDCA project would experience further cost overruns by December 2008. 

According to the contractor, the major cause of projected cost overruns 
was the system requirements definition process. For example, in 
December 2006, the contractor noted a significant increase in the 
requirements for the Dress Rehearsal Paper Based Operations in 
Execution Period 1. According to the cost performance reports, this 
increase meant that more work had to be conducted and more staffing 
assigned to meet the Dress Rehearsal schedule. 

The Bureau agreed that cost increases occurred in some cases because of 
the addition of new requirements, most of which related to the security 
of IT systems, but added that in other cases, increases occurred from 
the process of the contractor converting high-level functional 
requirements into more detailed specific requirements. However, the 
process of developing detailed requirements from high-level functional 
requirements does not inevitably lead to cost increases if the 
functional requirements were initially well-defined. 

We reported that the FDCA schedule changes had increased the likelihood 
that the systems testing at the Dress Rehearsal would not be as 
comprehensive as planned. The inability to perform comprehensive 
operational testing of all interrelated systems increases the risk that 
further cost overruns will occur and that decennial systems will 
experience performance shortfalls. 

The FDCA Project Team Was Making Progress in Risk Management 
Activities, but Critical Weaknesses Remained: 

According to the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), the purpose of 
risk management is to identify potential problems before they occur. 
When problems are identified, risk-handling activities can be planned 
and invoked as needed across the life of a project in order to mitigate 
adverse impacts on objectives. Effective risk management involves early 
and aggressive risk identification through the collaboration and 
involvement of relevant stakeholders. Based on SEI's Capability 
Maturity Modelï¿½ Integration (CMMIï¿½), risk management activities can be 
divided into four key areas: 

* preparing for risk management, 

* identifying and analyzing risks, 

* mitigating risks, and: 

* executive oversight. 

The discipline of risk management is important to help ensure that 
projects are delivered on time, within budget, and with the promised 
functionality. It is especially important for the 2010 Census, given 
the established timeframe. 

In October 2007, we reported that the FDCA project had made progress in 
implementing risk management practices, but some weaknesses remained. 
For example, the project team had developed strategies to identify the 
scope of the risk management effort. However, the project team had 
weaknesses in identifying risks, establishing adequate mitigation 
plans, and reporting risk status to executive-level officials. These 
weaknesses in completing key risk management activities can be 
attributed in part to the absence of Bureau policies for managing major 
acquisitions, as we described in earlier reports.[Footnote 11] Without 
effective risk management practices, the likelihood of project success 
is decreased. 

Weaknesses in identifying risks. As of July 2007, the FDCA project team 
had not identified or documented any significant risks related to the 
handheld computers that will be used in the 2010 Census, despite 
problems arising during the Dress Rehearsal. The computers are designed 
to automate operations for field staff and eliminate the need to print 
millions of paper questionnaires and maps used by temporary field staff 
to conduct address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up. Automating 
operations may allow the Bureau to reduce the cost of operations; thus, 
it is critical that the risks surrounding the use of the handheld 
computers be closely monitored and effectively managed to ensure their 
success. 

However, the Bureau had not identified or documented risks associated 
with a variety of handheld computers' performance problems that we 
identified through field work.[Footnote 12] Specifically, we found that 
during Dress Rehearsal activities between May 2007 and June 2007, as 
the Bureau tested a prototype of the handheld computers, field staff 
experienced multiple problems. For example, the field staff told us 
that they experienced slow and inconsistent data transmissions from the 
handheld computers to the central data processing center. The field 
staff reported that the device was slow to process addresses that were 
a part of a large assignment area.[Footnote 13] Bureau staff reported 
similar problems with the handheld computers in observation reports, 
help desk calls, and debriefing reports. In addition, a time and motion 
study conducted by the Census Bureau indicated that field staff 
reported significant downtime in two test locations--about 23 percent 
in one location and about 27 percent in another location. The study 
also described occurrences of failed transmissions and field staff 
attempts to resolve transmission problems. 

Collectively, the observation reports, help desk calls, debriefing 
reports, and time-and-motion study raised serious questions about the 
performance of the handheld computers during the address canvassing 
operation. According to the Bureau, the contractor used these 
indicators to identify and address underlying problems during the Dress 
Rehearsal. Still, the magnitude of the handheld computers' performance 
issues throughout the Dress Rehearsal was not clear. For example, the 
Bureau received analyses from the contractor on average transmission 
times. However, the contractor had not provided analyses that show the 
full range of transmission times, nor how this might have changed 
throughout the whole operation. 

In addition, the Bureau has not fully specified how it will measure 
performance of the handheld computers, even though the FDCA contract 
anticipates the Bureau's need for data on the performance of the 
handheld computers. The FDCA program outlines the type of data the 
contractor is to provide the Bureau on the performance of the handheld 
computers. Specifically, sections of the FDCA contract require the 
handheld computers to have a transmission log showing what was 
transmitted, the date, time, user, destination, content/data type, and 
the outcome status. Another section of the Bureau's FDCA contract 
states that the FDCA contractor shall provide near real time reporting 
and monitoring of performance metrics and a "control panel/dash board" 
application to visually report those metrics from any Internet-enabled 
computer. However, the contractor and the Bureau are not using a 
dashboard for Dress Rehearsal activities. Rather, during the Dress 
Rehearsal, the Bureau plans to identify what data and performance it 
would need for tracking the performance of the handheld computers in 
2010 operations. 

In order for the Bureau to ensure that the FDCA handheld computers are 
ready for full scale operations, it will have to be able to measure 
performance. We recommended in a report on the Bureau's earlier version 
of the handheld computers that the Bureau define specific, measurable 
performance requirements for the handheld computer and other census- 
taking activities that address such important measures as productivity, 
cost savings, reliability, and durability, and that the Bureau test the 
device's ability to meet those requirements in 2006.[Footnote 14] We 
also recommended in a March 2006 testimony that the Bureau validate and 
approve FDCA baseline requirements.[Footnote 15] To get these things 
done, the Bureau must work within a time frame that has now been 
compressed. By law, the decennial census date is April 1, 2010, and the 
results must be submitted to the President in December 2010. Access to 
real-time performance metrics via a "control panel/dash board" would 
assist Bureau management in assessing the handheld computer's 
performance and maximize the amount of time the Bureau and the 
contractor would have to remedy any problems that are identified during 
any operations. 

Further, the Bureau's tight 2010 decennial operations schedule allows 
little time for fixing problems with the device, raising the importance 
of the Bureau's access to these performance indicators. Such data would 
help fully inform stakeholders of the risks associated with the 
handheld computer and allow project teams to develop mitigation 
activities to help avoid, reduce, and control the probability of these 
risks occurring. 

Finally, the FDCA project team did not provide evidence that specific 
system interface risks were being adequately identified to ensure that 
risk handling activities would be invoked should the systems fail 
during the 2010 Census. If risks are not adequately identified and 
analyzed, management may be prevented from monitoring and tracking 
risks and taking the appropriate mitigation actions, increasing the 
probability that the risks will materialize and magnifying the extent 
of damage incurred in such an event. 

Weaknesses in establishing adequate mitigation plans. The FDCA project 
team had developed mitigation plans that were often untimely or 
included incomplete activities and milestones for addressing the risks. 
For example, the FDCA project team had developed mitigation plans for 
the most significant risks, but the plans did not always identify 
milestones for implementing mitigation activities. Moreover, the plans 
did not identify any commitment of resources, several did not establish 
a period of performance, and the team did not always update the plans 
with the latest information on the status of the risk. In addition, the 
FDCA project team did not provide evidence of developing mitigation 
plans to handle the other significant risks as described in its risk 
mitigation strategy. (These risks included a lack of consistency in 
requirements definition and insufficient FDCA project office staffing 
levels). 

Further, the project team did not always implement the mitigation plans 
as appropriate. For example, the project team did not identify system 
interface risks nor prepare adequate mitigation plans to ensure that 
systems would operate as intended. Because they did not develop 
complete mitigation plans, the project team could not ensure that for a 
given risk, techniques and methods would be invoked to avoid, reduce, 
and control the probability of occurrence. 

Weaknesses in reporting risk status to executive-level officials. 
Reviews of the project teams' risk management activities, status, and 
results should be held on a periodic and event-driven basis. The 
reviews should include appropriate levels of management, such as key 
Bureau executives, who can provide visibility into the potential for 
project risk exposure and appropriate corrective actions. The FDCA 
project team did not provide sufficient evidence to document that the 
status of risks was discussed with executive-level officials or what 
the discussions covered. Failure to report a project's risks to 
executive-level officials reduces the visibility of risks to executives 
who should be playing a role in mitigating them. 

To strengthen the FDCA program risk management activities, we 
recommended that the Director of the Census Bureau ensure that the 
project teams, including FDCA, implement actions to address weaknesses 
in risk management. The Bureau generally agreed with our 
recommendations, but disagreed with our assessment with regard to risk 
identification, pointing out that the FDCA project identified risks 
associated with handheld mobile computing devices and assigned 
responsibility to the contractors. In addition, the Bureau said that it 
had identified risks related to system interfaces. However, the project 
did not identify significant risks for the project office to monitor 
and track related to problems arising during the address canvassing 
component of the Dress Rehearsal. Also, although this project 
identified a general risk related to system interfaces, it did not 
identify specific risks related to particular interfaces. 

In June 2007, an independent assessment of the FDCA program reported on 
requirements management problems similar to those we reported in March 
2006. Specifically, the study reported that the contractor is 
overwhelmed by a substantial increase in requirements, having thousands 
of unreconciled (that is, not validated) requirements. According to the 
study, reconciliation of requirements was impeded by many factors, 
including the number of requirements and lack of agreement among 
stakeholders on what to include in requirements. Similar to our 
recommendation in the March 2006 report, the study recommended that the 
Bureau immediately stabilize requirements by defining and refining 
them. 

The Bureau has recently made efforts to further define the requirements 
for the FDCA program, and it has estimated that the revised 
requirements will result in significant cost increases. Rough estimates 
that have been shared with the Congress and the Administration range 
from $600 million to $2 billion; however, specific programs and 
operations affected have not been identified, nor has the Bureau 
decided on a clear approach to address these issues. 

2010 Census Is at Risk: 

The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress 
Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has the opportunity to test, for the 
last time, its plans for 2010. Our work, over the years, and the Bureau 
itself have highlighted a number of challenges facing the 2010 Census. 
These include (as discussed above) weaknesses in the Bureau's IT 
acquisition management capabilities and risks associated with the 
performance of the handheld mobile computing device. In addition to 
these challenges, concerns have been raised in two other areas: the 
uncertainty over the ultimate cost of the 2010 Census and the 
elimination of several operations from the 2008 Dress Rehearsal: 

* The Bureau has not performed the analysis or provided sufficient 
information to provide a level of confidence in its $11.5 billion life- 
cycle cost estimate of the decennial census. The Bureau has not 
itemized the estimated costs of each component operation, conducted a 
sensitivity analysis on cost drivers, or provided an explanation of 
significant changes in the assumptions on which these costs are based. 

* The Dress Rehearsal, designed to be a dry run of the census, is the 
Bureau's last opportunity to ensure that all the various operations and 
systems are in sync before the 2010 Census. However, the Bureau has 
delayed the dress rehearsal and dropped several operations, including 
operations that are designed to reach populations that are typically 
undercounted, measure census coverage, and enumerate people living in 
rural areas. Although the Bureau has carried out these operations 
before, in some cases they now involve new procedures and system 
interfaces that, as a result of their exclusion, will not be tested 
under census-like conditions. Further, end-to-end testing of the 
various IT systems will not be performed under census-like conditions 
because such testing will not occur during the Dress Rehearsal. 

Given its size and complexity, the Census presents significant risks, 
and implementing our recommendations would help the Bureau effectively 
manage the myriad interrelated operations needed to ensure an accurate 
and complete count in 2010. The success of this effort is put in 
jeopardy by the risks discussed above. Managing these risks is critical 
to the timely completion of a reliable and cost-effective census. 

We have recommended numerous corrective actions to address the risks 
associated with the 2010 Census, but many of them have not been 
implemented. Besides those already discussed, in January 2004 we made 
recommendations that the Bureau control the costs of the census and 
develop an integrated and comprehensive plan to manage 
operations.[Footnote 16] Specifically, to understand and manage the 
assumptions that drive the cost of the Decennial Census, we asked the 
Bureau to annually update the cost of the 2010 Census and conduct 
sensitivity analysis on the $11.5 billion estimate. However, while the 
Bureau understands the utility of sensitivity analysis, it has not 
conducted such analysis. To effectively manage operations, we 
recommended that the Bureau develop a comprehensive, integrated project 
plan for the 2010 Census. In response, the Bureau developed a 2010 
Census Operations and Systems Plan. This document includes inputs and 
outputs and describes linkages among operations and systems. However, 
it does not yet include a risk mitigation plan, a detailed 2010 Census 
timeline, and the cost for each operation. 

In 2005, we highlighted the 2010 Census as an emerging area to be 
monitored for possible high-risk designation, and in 2006, we listed it 
as a key oversight issue for the 110TH Congress.[Footnote 17] To 
determine whether the 2010 Census is high risk, we have considered a 
set of quantitative and qualitative factors.[Footnote 18] Those factors 
relevant to the 2010 Census include whether the investment is large, 
exceeding $1 billion; whether the risk is detrimental to service 
delivery and citizens' rights; and whether the risk could result in 
unreliable decision-making data and a reduced confidence in government. 
Based on our work, the 2010 Census meets those criteria. As noted 
above, the decennial census is a large investment, and there is a 
potential risk for an incomplete or inaccurate census, which would be 
detrimental to the administration of federal financial assistance for 
government programs and to the enforcement, for example, of citizens' 
rights under the Voting Rights Act. Furthermore, because the census is 
a foundation for elected government, threats to a timely and reliable 
census can affect the public's confidence in government. We are 
therefore designating the 2010 Census as high risk. 

In summary, the FDCA program was expected to support the goal of a 
reengineered 2010 Decennial Census to reduce costs and improve data 
quality and operational efficiency. Because the Bureau did not validate 
and approve the FDCA program requirements, it faces a crisis, including 
increased costs and schedule delays. In this emergency, the Bureau will 
have to make quick decisions to ensure that the project can achieve its 
purpose. Continued attention by this Committee, Commerce, the Bureau, 
us, and others will be essential to helping ensure a cost-effective and 
efficient 2010 census. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes our 
statement. We would be happy to respond to any questions that you or 
members of the committee may have at this time. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, 
please contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or Mathew Scirï¿½ at 
(202) 512-6806 or by e-mail at [email protected] or [email protected]. 
Other key contributors to this testimony include Mathew Bader, Thomas 
Beall, Barbara Collier, Jeffrey DeMarco, Elizabeth Hosler, Richard 
Hung, Franklin Jackson, Barbara Lancaster, Andrea Levine, Signora May, 
Lisa Pearson, Cynthia Scott, Niti Tandon, Jonathan Ticehurst, and 
Timothy Wexler. 

Footnotes:  

[1] 13 U.S.C. ï¿½ï¿½141(a) and (b). 

[2] GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management 
of Key 2010 Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2006) and Information Technology: Census 
Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk Management of Decennial Systems, GAO- 
08-79 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2007). 

[3] We also reported on the Decennial Response Integration System, 
which is to provide a system for collecting and integrating census 
responses from all sources, including forms, telephone interviews, and 
handheld computing devices in the field. 

[4] GAO-08-79. 

[5] GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to be Addressed Soon, 
GAO-04-37 (Washington, D.C.: Jan 15, 2004) and 2010 Census: Basic 
Design Has Potential But Remaining Challenges Need Prompt Resolution, 
GAO-05-9 (Washington, D.C. : Jan. 12, 2005). 

[6] Handheld mobile computing devices will be used to update the 
Bureau's address list, to perform follow-up at addresses for which no 
questionnaire was returned, and to perform activities to measure census 
coverage. 

[7] Further details of mobile computing devices are provided in GAO, 
2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress, GAO- 
06-465T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2006). 

[8] GAO-06-444T. 

[9] GAO-08-79. 

[10] Address canvassing is a field operation to build a complete and 
accurate address list. In this operation, census field workers go door 
to door verifying and correcting addresses for all households and 
street features contained on decennial maps. 

[11] GAO, Information Technology Management: Census Bureau Has 
Implemented Many Key Practices, but Additional Actions Are Needed, GAO- 
05-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2005) and Census Bureau: Important 
Activities for Improving Management of Key 2010 Decennial Acquisitions 
Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2006). 

[12] We testified on the preliminary results from this field work, as 
well as the results of our October report, in GAO, Information 
Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk Management of 
Decennial Systems, GAO-08-259T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2007). 

[13] A small geographic area, usually a block or group of blocks, 
established by the Census Bureau as a basic unit for data collection by 
a single enumerator, lister, or other field staff. 

[14] GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining 
Challenges Need Prompt Resolution, GAO-05-9 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.12, 
2005). 

[15] GAO-06-444T. 

[16] GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed 
Soon, GAO-04-37 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004). 

[17] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07- 
235R (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). 

[18] GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and 
High Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: November 2007). 


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