Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border	 
Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain 	 
(06-MAR-08, GAO-08-542T).					 
                                                                 
Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has	 
increased in importance and attracted greater public and	 
Congressional attention. The Department of Homeland Security	 
(DHS) has spent billions of dollars to prevent the illegal entry 
of individuals and contraband between ports of			 
entry--government-designated locations where DHS inspects persons
and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted into
the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of  
such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more	 
enter the country illegally and undetected. The U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal 
agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. This testimony
summarizes GAO's work on DHS's efforts on selected border	 
security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting	 
travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals	 
attempting to enter the country illegally between ports of entry,
and (3) screening of international travelers before they arrive  
in the United States and challenges remaining in these areas.	 
GAO's observations are based on products issued from May 2006	 
through February 2008. In prior reports, GAO has recommended	 
various actions to DHS to, among other things, help address	 
weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and processes, and
challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and	 
documents. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and 
has taken various actions to address them.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-542T					        
    ACCNO:   A81219						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen   
Border Security Programs and Operations, but Challenges Remain	 
     DATE:   03/06/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Biometric identification				 
	     Border patrols					 
	     Border security					 
	     Counterterrorism					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Documentation					 
	     Employee training					 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Identification cards				 
	     Immigration					 
	     Inspection 					 
	     Passenger screening				 
	     Policy evaluation					 
	     Port security					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Technology assessment				 
	     Training utilization				 
	     Policies and procedures				 
	     Program implementation				 
	     DHS Visitor and Immigrant Status			 
	     Indicator Technology Program			 
                                                                 
	     Secure Border Initiative				 
	     Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative		 

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GAO-08-542T

   

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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST: 
Thursday, March 6, 2008: 

Homeland Security: 

DHS Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Border Security Programs and 
Operations, but Challenges Remain: 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director: 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-08-542T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-542T, a report to Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Since September 11, 2001, the need to secure U.S. borders has increased 
in importance and attracted greater public and Congressional attention. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent billions of dollars 
to prevent the illegal entry of individuals and contraband between 
ports of entryï¿½government designated locations where DHS inspects 
persons and goods to determine whether they may be lawfully admitted 
into the country. Yet, while DHS apprehends hundreds of thousands of 
such individuals each year, several hundreds of thousands more enter 
the country illegally and undetected. U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, is the lead federal agency in 
charge of securing our nationï¿½s borders. 

This testimony summarizes GAOï¿½s work on DHSï¿½s efforts on selected 
border security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting 
travelers at U.S. ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting 
to enter the country illegally between ports of entry, and (3) 
screening of international travelers before they arrive at U.S. ports 
and challenges remaining in these areas. GAOï¿½s observations are based 
on products issued from May 2006 through February 2008. In prior 
reports, GAO recommended various actions to DHS to, among other things, 
help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection programs and 
processes. DHS has generally agreed with our recommendations and has 
taken various actions to address them. 

What GAO Found: 

CBP has taken actions to improve traveler inspections at U.S. ports of 
entry, but challenges remain. First, CBP has stressed the importance of 
effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in 
interviewing travelers. Yet, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures 
and lack of physical infrastructure and staff have hampered CBPï¿½s 
ability to inspect travelers thoroughly and detect fraudulent 
documents. Second, CBP is implementing an initiative requiring citizens 
of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico to present certain 
identification documents when entering the United States. As of 
December 2007, actions taken to meet the initiativeï¿½s requirements 
include selecting technology to be used at land ports of entry and 
developing plans to train officers to use it. Finally, DHS has 
developed a program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected 
foreign nationals entering and exiting the country. As of October 2007, 
DHS has invested more than $1.5 billion on the program since 2003 and 
biometrically-enabled entry capabilities now operate at more than 300 
ports of entry. However, though allocating about $250 million since 
2003 to exit-related efforts, DHS has not yet detailed how it will 
verify when travelers exit the country. 

In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of a multiyear, multibillion-
dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration 
of individuals who enter the United States illegally and undetected 
between ports of entry. One component of this program, which DHS 
accepted as complete in February 2008, was an effort to secure 28 miles 
along the southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras 
and radars. DHS plans to apply the lessons learned to future projects. 
Another program component, 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles 
of vehicle fence, has not yet been completed and DHS will be challenged 
to do so by its December 2008 deadline due to various factors, such as 
acquiring rights to border lands. Additionally, DHS is unable to 
estimate the total cost of this component because various factors are 
not yet known such as the type of terrain where the fencing is to be 
constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced unprecedented growth in the 
number of its Border Patrol agents. While initial training at the 
academy is being provided, Border Patrol officials expressed concerns 
about the agencyï¿½s ability to provide sufficient field training. 

To screen international travelers before they arrive in the United 
States, the federal government has implemented new policies and 
programs, including enhancing visa security and providing 
counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. As GAO 
previously recommended, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by a 
program that allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United 
States without a visa for certain durations and purposes. Regarding the 
prescreening of international passengers bound for the United States, 
CBP has a pilot program that provides additional scrutiny of passengers 
and their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their 
departure. CBP has reported several successes through the pilot but has 
not yet determined whether to make the program permanent. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[Hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-542T]. For more information, contact Rich 
Stana at (202) 512-8816 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to 
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to secure 
our nation's borders. In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, 
the need to secure U.S. borders has taken on added importance and has 
received increasing attention from Congress and the public. In August 
of last year, we issued our report on the progress DHS has made in 
implementing its mission and management functions.[Footnote 1] We 
reported that while DHS made some level of progress in all of its 
mission and management areas, more work remains. Regarding the border 
security mission area, we reported that DHS had made modest progress in 
achieving border security performance expectations. My testimony today 
summarizes the results of our work on DHS's efforts on selected border 
security operations and programs related to (1) inspecting travelers at 
our nation's ports of entry, (2) detecting individuals attempting to 
enter the country illegally between the ports of entry and (3) 
screening of international travelers before they arrive in the United 
States. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--a major component within DHS-
-is the lead federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders. 
CBP employs nearly 18,000 CBP officers responsible for inspecting 
travelers seeking to enter the United States at 326 air, land, and sea 
ports of entry. To prevent individuals and contraband from illegally 
entering the country between the ports of entry, CBP's Office of Border 
Patrol employs nearly 15,000 agents responsible for patrolling our 
northern and southwest land borders as well as our coastal areas. In 
addition, DHS, along with the Department of State, is responsible for 
screening international travelers before they arrive in the United 
States, including mitigating any risk associated with the Visa Waiver 
Program (VWP), which enables citizens of participating countries to 
travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa. The 
administration has requested about $9.5 billion for CBP for fiscal year 
2009. 

My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from May 
2006 through February 2008 addressing border security operations and 
programs. We conducted these performance audits in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards from September 2005 
through February 2008. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary: 

DHS has taken various actions to improve the inspection of travelers at 
our nation's ports of entry, but challenges remain. For example, we 
reported that CBP management has emphasized the importance of carrying 
out effective inspections and trained CBP supervisors and officers in, 
among other things, interviewing travelers and checking travel 
documents. Nevertheless, weaknesses in travel inspection procedures, 
lack of physical infrastructure, and lack of staff have hampered CBP's 
ability to inspect travelers. Specifically, although passports and 
visas contain newly-added security features, some CBP officers lack the 
technology and training that would enable them to take full advantage 
of these features. DHS has worked with the Department of State to 
implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) in response 
to post-9/11 legislation requiring citizens of the United States, 
Bermuda, Canada, and Mexico, who previously had not been required to do 
so, to present certain identification documents or combinations thereof 
when entering the United States. As of December 2007, actions taken to 
meet WHTI requirements include finalizing and implementing document 
requirements at air ports of entry and selecting technology to be used 
with a new passport card at the 39 highest-volume land ports of entry. 
DHS plans to move forward by deploying the selected technology and 
staffing and training officers to use it. Finally, DHS has developed 
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), a 
program designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected 
foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, 
and land ports of entry. As of October 2007, DHS has invested more than 
$1.5 billion on US-VISIT since 2003. Biometrically-enabled entry 
capabilities now operate at more than 300 ports of entry but this 
represents delivery of one-half of the program. That is, DHS has 
allocated about $250 million since 2003 to exit-related efforts but 
lacks the ability to verify when travelers exit the United States. 
Today, because no detailed exit program plans are available, prospects 
for successfully delivering this half of US-VISIT remain unclear. 

DHS also faces challenges securing the border between land ports of 
entry. In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at 
securing U.S. borders and reducing immigration of individuals who enter 
the United States illegally and undetected between ports of entry. One 
component of this program, Project 28, is to secure 28 miles along the 
southwest border using, among other means, improved cameras and radars. 
DHS has formally accepted Project 28 from its contractor, Boeing, at a 
cost of about $20.6 million. However, DHS officials told us that 
Project 28 has not fully met their expectations. Boeing developed the 
system with very little input from the border patrol agents that are to 
use the system. Another component of the program, 370 miles of 
pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence, will be challenging to 
complete by its December 2008 deadline because of various factors, 
including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. 
Furthermore, DHS is unable to estimate the total cost of this component 
because various factors are not yet known, such as the type of terrain 
where the fencing is to be constructed. Finally, CBP has experienced 
unprecedented growth in the number of its Border Patrol agents. Between 
the end of fiscal year 2006 and December 2008, the total number of new 
Border Patrol agents is expected to increase by 6,000. CBP officials 
believe that CBP's training academy can handle the influx of new 
agents, but expressed concerns about the agency's ability to provide 
sufficient training to new agents in the field. 

The federal government has done a creditable job screening 
international travelers before they arrive in the United States by 
implementing several measures to strengthen the visa process. 
Specifically, new policies and programs have been implemented to, among 
other things, enhance visa security, improve applicant screening, and 
provide counterterrorism training to overseas consular officials. 
Nevertheless, DHS could better manage risks posed by VWP, which allows 
nationals from 27 countries to travel to the United States without a 
visa for certain durations and purposes. One DHS screening program, the 
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), is a pilot program that provides 
additional scrutiny of passengers and their travel documents at foreign 
airports prior to their departure. CBP has reported several successes 
through the pilot but has not taken steps to determine whether to make 
the program permanent. 

We have recommended various actions to enhance DHS's ability to better 
secure the border and enhance our nation's security. Among them are 
actions to help address weaknesses in the traveler inspection program 
and challenges in training officers to inspect travelers and the 
documents they present for inspection; to develop a comprehensive 
strategy detailing how DHS will develop and deploy US-VISIT exit 
capabilities at air, sea, and land ports of entry; and to enhance 
controls over to VWP to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities posed by 
Visa Waiver travelers. DHS has generally agreed with our 
recommendations and has taken various actions to address them. 

Inspecting Travelers at Ports of Entry: 

CBP's ability to inspect travelers at our nation's ports of entry has 
been hampered by weaknesses in travel inspection procedures, inadequate 
physical infrastructure, and lack of staff at the air, land, and sea 
ports of entry. The use of fraudulent identity and citizenship 
documents by some travelers to the United States as well as limited 
availability or use of technology and lack of timely and recurring 
training have also hampered CBP's efforts in carrying out thorough 
inspections. DHS has taken several actions to implement WHTI at air, 
land, and sea ports of entry nationwide so that it can better secure 
the border by requiring citizens of the United States, Bermuda, Canada, 
and Mexico to present documents to show identity and citizenship when 
entering the United States from certain countries in North, Central, or 
South America. DHS plans to move forward to deploy technology to 
implement WHTI at land ports of entry, and staff and train officers to 
use it. Finally, DHS has enhanced border security by deploying US-VISIT 
biometric entry capability at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of 
entry nationwide, but the prospects for successfully delivering an 
operational exit solution remain uncertain because DHS has not detailed 
how it plans to develop and deploy an exit capability at the ports. 

Traveler Inspection Procedures and Physical Infrastructure: 

Each year individuals make hundreds of millions of border crossings 
into the United States through the 326 land, air, and sea ports of 
entry. About three-fourths of these crossings occur at land ports of 
entry. In November 2007, we reported that while CBP has had some 
success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and other violators, 
weaknesses in its traveler inspection procedures and related physical 
infrastructure increase the potential that dangerous people and illegal 
goods could enter the country.[Footnote 2] For example, CBP's analyses 
indicated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators 
entered the country at land and air ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. 

One factor that contributed to failed inspections was weaknesses in 
travel inspection procedures. In mid-2006, CBP reviewed videotapes from 
about 150 large and small ports of entry and, according to CBP 
officials, determined that while CBP officers carried out thorough 
traveler inspections in many instances, they also identified numerous 
instances where traveler inspections at land ports of entry were weak 
in that they did not determine the citizenship and admissibility of 
travelers entering the country as required by law, such as officers not 
stopping vehicles for inspection and pedestrians crossing the border 
without any visual or verbal contact from a CBP officer despite 
operating procedures that required officers to do so. In the summer of 
2006, CBP management took actions to place greater management emphasis 
on traveler inspections by holding meetings with senior management to 
reinforce the importance of carrying out effective inspections and by 
providing training to all supervisors and officers on the importance of 
interviewing travelers, checking travel documents, and having adequate 
supervisory presence. However, tests our investigators conducted in 
October 2006 and January 2007--as many as 5 months after CBP issued 
guidance and conducted the training--showed similar weaknesses as those 
on the videotape were still occurring in traveler inspections at ports 
of entry. At two ports, our investigators were not asked to provide a 
travel document to verify their identity--a procedure that management 
had called on officers to carry out--as part of the inspection. The 
extent of continued noncompliance is unknown, but these results point 
to the challenge CBP management faces in ensuring its directives are 
carried out. 

In July 2007, CBP issued new internal policies and procedures for 
agency officials responsible for its traveler inspection program at 
land ports of entry. The new policies and procedures require field 
office managers to conduct periodic audits and assessments to ensure 
compliance with the new inspection procedures. However, they do not 
call on managers to share the results of their assessments with 
headquarters management. Without this communication, CBP management may 
be hindering its ability to efficiently use the information to overcome 
weaknesses in traveler inspections. 

Another weakness involved inadequate physical infrastructure. While we 
could not generalize our findings, at several ports of entry of entry 
that we examined, barriers designed to ensure that vehicles pass 
through a CBP inspection booth were not in place, increasing the risk 
that vehicles could enter the country without inspection. CBP 
recognizes that it has infrastructure weaknesses and has estimated it 
needs about $4 billion to make the capital improvements needed at all 
163 land crossings. CBP has prioritized the ports with the greatest 
need. Each year, depending upon funding availability, CBP submits its 
proposed capital improvement projects based upon the prioritized list 
it has developed. Several factors affect CBP's ability to make 
improvements, including the fact that some ports of entry are owned by 
other governmental or private entities, potentially adding to the time 
needed to agree on infrastructure changes and put them in place. As of 
September 2007, CBP had infrastructure projects related to 20 different 
ports of entry in various stages of development. 

Lack of inspection staff was also a problem. Based upon a staffing 
model it developed, CBP estimated it may need several thousand more CBP 
officers at its ports of entry. According to CBP field officials, lack 
of staff affected their ability to carry out border security 
responsibilities. For example, we examined requests for resources from 
CBP's 20 field offices and its pre-clearance headquarters office for 
January 2007 and reported that managers at 19 of the 21 offices cited 
examples of anti-terrorism activities not being carried out, new or 
expanded facilities that were not fully operational, and radiation 
monitors and other inspection technologies not being fully used because 
of staff shortages. At seven of the eight major ports we visited, 
officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff 
contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support, and 
safety issues when officers inspect travelers--increasing the potential 
that terrorists, inadmissible travelers, and illicit goods could enter 
the country. 

CBP also had difficulty in providing required training to its officers. 
CBP developed 37 courses on such topics as how to carry out inspections 
and detect fraudulent documents and has instituted national guidelines 
for a 12-week on-the-job training program that new officers should 
receive at land ports of entry. However, managers at seven of the eight 
ports of entry we visited said that they were challenged in putting 
staff through training because staffing shortfalls force the ports to 
choose between performing port operations and providing training. 
Lastly, although CBP has developed strategic goals that call for, among 
other things, establishing ports of entry where threats are deterred 
and inadmissible people and goods are intercepted--a key goal related 
to traveler inspections--it faces challenges in developing a 
performance measure that tracks progress in achieving this goal. 

We made a number of recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to help address weaknesses in traveler inspections, challenges 
in training, and problems with using performance data. DHS said it is 
taking steps to address our recommendations. 

Identifying Fraudulent Travel Documents: 

We also reported that CBP's ability to do thorough inspections is made 
more difficult by a lack of technology and training to help CBP 
officers identify foreign nationals who attempt to enter the United 
States using fraudulent travel documents. In July 2007, we reported 
that although the State Department had improved the security features 
in the passports and visas it issues, CBP officers in primary 
inspection--the first and most critical opportunity at U.S. ports of 
entry to identify individuals seeking to enter the United States with 
fraudulent travel documents--were unable to take full advantage of the 
security features in passports and visas.[Footnote 3] This was due to 
(1) limited availability or use of technology at primary inspection and 
(2) lack of timely and recurring training on the security features and 
fraudulent trends for passports and visas. For example, at the time of 
our review, DHS had provided the technology tools to make use of the 
electronic chips in electronic passports, also known as e-passports, to 
the 33 airports of entry with the highest volume of travelers from Visa 
Waiver Program countries. However, not all inspection lanes at these 
air ports of entry had the technology nor did the remaining ports of 
entry. Further, CBP did not have a process in place for primary 
inspection officers to utilize the fingerprint features of visas, 
including Border Crossing Cards (BCC) which permit limited travel by 
Mexican citizens--without additional documentation--25 miles inside the 
border of the United States (75 miles if entering through certain ports 
of entry in Arizona) for fewer than 30 days. For example, although BCC 
imposter fraud is fairly pervasive, primary officers at southern land 
ports of entry were not able to use the available fingerprint records 
of BCC holders to confirm the identity of travelers and did not 
routinely refer BCC holders to secondary inspection,[Footnote 4] where 
officers had the capability to utilize fingerprint records. Moreover, 
training materials provided to officers were not updated to include 
exemplars--genuine documents used for training purposes--of the e-
passport and the emergency passport in advance of the issuance of these 
documents. As a consequence, CBP officers were not familiar with the 
look and feel of security features in these new documents before 
inspecting them. Without updated and ongoing training on fraudulent 
document detection, officers told us they felt less prepared to 
understand the security features and fraud trends associated with all 
valid generations of passports and visas. 

Although CBP faces an extensive workload at many ports of entry and has 
resource constraints, there are opportunities to do more to utilize the 
security features in passports and visas during the inspection process 
to detect their fraudulent use. We recommended that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security make better use of the security features in passports 
and visas in the inspection process and improve training for inspection 
officers on the features and fraud trends for these travel documents. 
We recommended that DHS take steps, including developing a schedule for 
deploying technology to other ports of entry and updating training. DHS 
generally concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions it 
had taken or planned to take to implement them. 

We currently have work ongoing to examine DHS efforts to identify and 
mitigate fraud associated with DHS documents used for travel and 
employment verification purposes, such as the Permanent Resident Card 
and the Employment Authorization Document. We expect to issue a report 
on efforts to address fraud with these DHS documents later this year. 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative: 

One of the major challenges for CBP officers at our nation's ports of 
entry is the ability to determine the identity and citizenship of those 
who present themselves for inspection. For years, millions of citizens 
of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda could enter the United States 
from certain parts of the Western Hemisphere using a wide variety of 
documents, including a driver's license issued by a state motor vehicle 
administration or a birth certificate, or in some cases for U.S. and 
Canadian citizens, without showing any documents. To help provide 
better assurance that border officials have the tools and resources to 
establish that people are who they say they are, section 7209 of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, 
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, to develop and implement a plan that requires a 
passport or other document or combination of documents that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security deems sufficient to show identity and 
citizenship for U.S. citizens and citizens of Bermuda, Canada, and 
Mexico when entering the United States from certain countries in North, 
Central, or South America.[Footnote 5] DHS' and the State Department's 
effort to specify acceptable documents and implement these document 
requirements is called the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). 

In May 2006, we reported that DHS and State had not made decisions 
about what documents would be acceptable, had not begun to finalize 
those decisions, and were in the early stages of studying costs and 
benefits of WHTI. In addition, DHS and State needed to choose a 
technology to use with the new passport card--which State is developing 
specifically for WHTI. DHS also faced an array of implementation 
challenges, including training staff and informing the public.[Footnote 
6] In December 2007, we reported that DHS and State had taken important 
actions toward implementing WHTI document requirements.[Footnote 7] DHS 
and State had taken actions in the five areas we identified in our 2006 
report: 

* DHS and State published a final rule for document requirements at air 
ports of entry. The agencies also published a notice of proposed rule 
making for document requirements at land and sea ports of entry. 

* By publishing a final rule for document requirements at air ports of 
entry, DHS and State have established acceptable documents for air 
travel. DHS has also published a notice of proposed rule making which 
includes proposed documents for land and sea travel. Under current law, 
DHS cannot implement WHTI land and sea document requirements until June 
1, 2009, or 3 months after the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Secretary of State have certified compliance with specified 
requirements, whichever is later.[Footnote 8] In the meantime, in 
January 2008, CBP ended the practice of oral declaration. According to 
CBP, until the WHTI document requirements are fully implemented, all 
U.S. and Canadian citizens are required to show one of the documents 
described in the proposed rule or a government issued photo 
identification, such as a driver's license, and proof of citizenship, 
such as a birth certificate.[Footnote 9] 

* DHS has performed a cost-benefit study, but data limitations 
prevented DHS from quantifying the precise effect that WHTI will have 
on wait times at land ports of entry--a substantial source of 
uncertainty in its analysis. DHS plans to do baseline studies at 
selected ports before WHTI implementation so that it can compare the 
effects of WHTI document requirements on wait times after the 
requirements are implemented. 

* DHS and State have selected technology to be used with the passport 
card. To support the card and other documents that use the same 
technology, DHS is planning technological upgrades at land ports of 
entry. These upgrades are intended to help reduce traveler wait times 
and more effectively verify identity and citizenship. DHS has outlined 
a general strategy for the upgrades at the 39 highest volume land 
ports, beginning in January 2008 and continuing over roughly the next 2 
years. 

* DHS has developed general strategies for implementing WHTI--including 
staffing and training. According to DHS officials, they also planned to 
work with a contractor on a public relations campaign to communicate 
clear and timely information about document requirements. In addition, 
State has approved contracting with a public relations firm to assist 
with educating the public, particularly border resident communities 
about the new passport card and the requirements of WHTI in general. 

Earlier this year, DHS selected a contractor for the public relations 
campaign and began devising specific milestones and deadlines for 
testing and deploying new hardware and training officers on the new 
technology. 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT): 

Another major initiative underway at the ports of entry is a program 
designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign 
nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land 
ports of entry, called the US-VISIT Program. These data, including 
biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to 
screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record 
arrival and departure. The purpose of US-VISIT is to enhance the 
security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel 
and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and 
protect visitors' privacy. 

As of October 2007, after investing about $1.5 billion since 2003, DHS 
has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that 
biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at more than 300 
air, sea, and land ports of entry, but comparable operational exit 
capabilities are not. That is, DHS still does not have the other half 
of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its 
funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars 
since 2003 to exit-related efforts.[Footnote 10] 

To the department's credit, operational entry capabilities have 
produced results, including, as of June 2007, more than 1,500 people 
having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. 
Another likely consequence is the deterrent effect of having an 
operational entry capability, which officials have cited as a byproduct 
of having a publicized capability at the border to screen entry on the 
basis of identity verification and matching against watch lists of 
known and suspected terrorists. Related to identity verification, DHS 
has also taken steps to implement US-VISIT's Unique Identity program to 
enable CBP and other agencies to be better equipped to identify persons 
of interest and generally enhance law enforcement. Integral to Unique 
Identity is the capability to capture 10 fingerprints and match them 
with data in DHS and FBI databases. The capability to capture and match 
10 fingerprints at ports of entry is not only intended to enhance CBP's 
ability to verify identity, but, according to DHS, is intended to 
quicken processing times and eliminate the likelihood of misidentifying 
a traveler as being on a US-VISIT watchlist. 

Nonetheless, the prospects for successfully delivering an operational 
exit solution remain uncertain. In June 2007, we reported that DHS's 
documentation showed that, since 2003, little has changed in how DHS is 
approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit 
efforts.[Footnote 11] As of that time, DHS indicated that it intended 
to spend about $27.3 million on air and sea exit capabilities. However, 
it had not produced either plans or analyses that adequately defined 
and justified how it intended to invest these funds. Rather, it had 
only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for 
biometric exit capabilities at air and sea ports of entry. Beyond this 
high-level schedule, no other exit program plans were available that 
defined what would be done by what entities and at what cost. In the 
absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit 
intentions, it is unclear whether the department's efforts to deliver 
near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different 
from the past. 

The prospect for an exit capability at land ports of entry is also 
unclear. DHS has acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for 
land ports of entry is currently not feasible. According to DHS, at 
this time, the only proven technology available for biometric land exit 
verification would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use 
for entry at these ports of entry, which would create costly staffing 
demands and infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade, 
commerce, and environmental impacts. A pilot project to examine an 
alternative technology at land ports of entry did not produce a viable 
solution. US-VISIT officials stated that they believe that 
technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it 
possible to utilize alternative technologies that provide biometric 
verification of persons exiting the country without major changes to 
facility infrastructure and without requiring those exiting to stop 
and/or exit their vehicles, thereby precluding traffic backup, 
congestion, and resulting delays. 

US-VISIT also faces technological and management challenges. In March 
2007, we reported that while US-VISIT has improved DHS's ability to 
process visitors and verify identities upon entry, we found that 
management controls in place to identify and evaluate computer and 
other operational problems at land ports of entry were insufficient and 
inconsistently administered.[Footnote 12] In addition, DHS had not 
articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land border 
security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that these 
programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost 
effectively. DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an overall 
immigration and border management strategy and the plan has been under 
review by OMB. Further, critical acquisition management processes had 
not been established to ensure that program capabilities and expected 
mission outcomes are delivered on time and within budget. These 
processes include effective project planning, requirements management, 
contract tracking and oversight, test management, and financial 
management. 

We currently have work underway examining DHS' strategic solution, 
including a comprehensive exit capability, and plan to issue a report 
on the results of our work in Spring 2008. 

Between the Ports of Entry: 

As part of its Secure Border Initiative (SBI), DHS recently announced 
final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million dollar project designed 
to secure 28 miles of southwestern border. However, DHS officials said 
that the project did not fully meet agency expectations and will not be 
replicated. Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been 
using the system since December 2007 and 312 agents had received 
updated training. Still, some had not been trained to use the system at 
all. Deployment of fencing along the southwest border is on schedule, 
but meeting CBP's December 2008 goal to deploy 370 miles of pedestrian 
and 300 miles of vehicle fencing will be challenging because of factors 
that include difficulties acquiring rights to border land and an 
inability to estimate costs for installation. Besides undergoing 
technological and infrastructure improvements along the border, the 
Border Patrol has experienced unprecedented growth and plans to 
increase its number of agents by 6,000 by December 2008. Border Patrol 
officials are confident that the academy can accommodate this influx 
but are also concerned about the sectors' ability to provide sufficient 
field training. 

The Secure Border Initiative: 

In November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI aimed at securing 
U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Elements of SBI are to 
be carried out by several organizations within DHS. One component is 
CBP's SBI program office[Footnote 13] which is responsible for 
developing a comprehensive border protection system using people, 
technology, known as SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing, 
roads, and lighting. 

In February 2008, we testified that DHS had announced its final 
acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles 
along the southwest border, and was gathering lessons learned to inform 
future border security technology development.[Footnote 14] The scope 
of the project, as described in the task order between DHS and Boeing-
-the prime contractor DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain the 
SBInet system across the U.S. borders--was to provide a system with the 
detection, identification, and classification capabilities required to 
control the border, at a minimum, along 28 miles in the Border Patrol's 
Tucson sector.[Footnote 15] After working with Boeing to resolve 
problems identified with Project 28, DHS formally accepted the system, 
noting that it met contract requirements. Officials from the SBInet 
program office said that although Project 28 did not fully meet their 
expectations, they are continuing to develop SBInet with a revised 
approach and have identified areas for improvement based on their 
experience with Project 28. For example, both SBInet and Border Patrol 
officials reported that Project 28 was initially designed and developed 
by Boeing with limited input from the Border Patrol, whose agents are 
now operating Project 28 in the Tucson sector; however, they said that 
future SBInet development will include increased input from the 
intended operators. The schedule for future deployments of technology 
to the southwest border that are planned to replace most Project 28 
capabilities has been extended and officials estimated that the first 
planned deployment of technology will occur in other areas of the 
Tucson sector by the end of calendar year 2008. In February 2008, the 
SBI program office estimated that the remaining deployments of the 
first phase of technology development planned for the Border Patrol's 
Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso sectors are expected to be completed by the 
end of calendar year 2011. 

Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have been using the 
system as they conduct their border security activities since December 
2007, and as of January 2008, 312 agents in the Project 28 location had 
received updated training. According to Border Patrol agents, while 
Project 28 is not an optimal system to support their operations, it has 
provided them with greater technological capabilities--such as improved 
cameras and radars--than the legacy equipment that preceded Project 28. 
Not all of the Border Patrol agents in the Project 28 location have 
been trained to use the system's equipment and capabilities, as it is 
expected to be replaced with updated technologies developed for SBInet. 

Deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest 
border is on schedule, but meeting the SBI program office's goal to 
have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence in 
place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging and the total cost is 
not yet known. As of February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported 
that it had constructed 168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of 
vehicle fence. Although the deployment is on schedule, SBI program 
office officials reported that keeping on schedule will be challenging 
because of various factors, including difficulties in acquiring rights 
to border lands. In addition, SBI program office officials are unable 
to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because of 
various factors that are not yet known, such as the type of terrain 
where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, and 
the cost to acquire the land. Furthermore, as the SBI program office 
moves forward with tactical infrastructure construction, it is making 
modifications based on lessons learned from previous fencing efforts. 
For example, for future fencing projects, the SBI program office plans 
to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use approved fence 
designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair of the tactical 
infrastructure. 

The SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for 
fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal, and published 
its human capital plan in December 2007; however, the SBI program 
office is in the early stages of implementing this plan. As of February 
1, 2008, SBI program office reported having 142 government staff and 
163 contractor support staff for a total of 305 employees. SBI program 
office officials told us that they believe they will be able to meet 
their staffing goal of 470 staff by the end of September 2008. In 
December 2007, the SBI program office published the first version of 
its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in its early 
implementation phase. The plan outlines seven main goals for the office 
and activities to accomplish those goals, which align with federal 
government best practices. 

Border Patrol: 

In addition to technological and infrastructure improvements along the 
border, the Border Patrol has experienced an unprecedented growth in 
the number of its agents. As we reported last year, in a little over 2 
years, between fiscal year 2006 and December 2008, the Border Patrol 
plans to increase its number of agents by 6,000.[Footnote 16] This is 
nearly equivalent to the increase in the number of agents over the 
previous 10 years, from 1996 through 2006. As of September 30, 2007, 
CBP had 14,567 Border Patrol agents onboard. It plans to have 18,319 
Border Patrol agents on board by the end of calendar year 2008. While 
Border Patrol officials are confident that the academy can accommodate 
the large influx of new trainees anticipated, they have expressed 
concerns over the sectors' ability to provide sufficient field 
training. For example, officials are concerned with having a sufficient 
number of experienced agents available in the sectors to serve as field 
training officers and first-line supervisors. The large influx of new 
agents and the planned transfer of more experienced agents from the 
southwest border to the northern border could further exacerbate the 
already higher than desired agent-to-supervisor ratio in some southwest 
border sectors. 

Screening of International Travelers Before They Arrive in the United 
States: 

Because citizens of other countries seeking to enter the United States 
on a temporary basis generally must apply for and obtain a nonimmigrant 
visa, the visa process is important to homeland security. While it is 
generally acknowledged that the visa process can never be entirely 
failsafe, the government has done a creditable job since September 11 
in strengthening the visa process as a first line of defense to prevent 
entry into the country by terrorists.[Footnote 17] Before September 11, 
U.S. visa operations focused primarily on illegal immigration concerns-
-whether applicants sought to reside and work illegally in the country. 
Since the attacks, Congress, the State Department, and DHS have 
implemented several measures to strengthen the entire visa process as a 
tool to combat terrorism. New policies and programs have since been 
implemented to enhance visa security, improve applicant screening, 
provide counterterrorism training to consular officials who administer 
the visa process overseas, and help prevent the fraudulent use of visas 
for those seeking to gain entry to the country. The State Department 
also has taken steps to mitigate the potential for visa fraud at 
consular posts by deploying visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies 
and consulates and conducting more in-depth analysis of the visa 
information collected by consulates to identify patterns that may 
indicate fraud, among other things. (Notably, 2 of the 19 terrorist 
hijackers on September 11th used passports that were manipulated in a 
fraudulent manner to obtain visas.) 

The Visa Waiver Program allows nationals from 27 countries to travel to 
the United States for 90 days or less for business and tourism purposes 
without first having to obtain a visa.[Footnote 18] The program's 
purpose is to facilitate international travel for millions of people 
each year and promote the effective use of government resources. While 
valuable, the program can pose risks to U.S. security, law enforcement, 
and immigration interests because some foreign citizens may try to 
exploit the program to enter the United States. Effective oversight of 
the program entails balancing the benefits against the program's 
potential risks. To find this balance, we reported in July 2006 that 
the U.S. government needs to fully identify the vulnerabilities posed 
by visa waiver travelers, and be in a position to mitigate them. 
[Footnote 19] In particular, we recommended that DHS provide the 
program's oversight unit with additional resources to strengthen 
monitoring activities and improve DHS's communication with U.S. 
officials overseas regarding security concerns of visa waiver 
countries. We also recommended that DHS communicate to visa waiver 
countries clear reporting requirements for lost and stolen passports 
and that the department implement a plan to make Interpol's lost and 
stolen passport database automatically available during the primary 
inspection process at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 20] DHS is in the 
process of implementing these recommendations and we plan to report 
later this year on the department's progress. 

Until recently, U.S. law required that a country may be considered for 
admission into the Visa Waiver Program if its nationals' refusal rate 
for short-term business and tourism visas was less than 3 percent in 
the prior fiscal year. According to DHS, some of the countries seeking 
admission to the program are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have 
high expectations that they will join the program due to their close 
economic, political, and military ties to the United States. The 
executive branch has supported more flexible criteria for admission, 
and, in August 2007, Congress passed legislation that provides DHS with 
the authority to admit countries with refusal rates between 3 percent 
and 10 percent, if the countries meet certain conditions.[Footnote 21] 
For example, countries must meet all mandated Visa Waiver Program 
security requirements and cooperate with the United States on 
counterterrorism initiatives. 

Before DHS can exercise this new authority, the legislation also 
requires that the department complete certain actions aimed at 
enhancing security of the Visa Waiver Program. These actions include: 

Electronic Travel Authorization System: 

The August 2007 law requires that DHS certify that a "fully 
operational" electronic travel authorization (ETA) system is in place 
before expanding Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal rates 
between 3 and 10 percent. This system would require nationals from visa 
waiver countries to provide the United States with biographical 
information before boarding a U.S.-bound flight to determine the 
eligibility of, and whether there exists a law enforcement or security 
risk in permitting, the foreign national to travel to the United States 
under the program. In calling for an ETA, members of Congress and the 
administration stated that this system was an important tool to help 
mitigate security risks in the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion. 
DHS has not yet announced when or how it will roll out the ETA system. 

Air Exit System: 

The August 2007 law also required that, before DHS can admit countries 
with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent to the Visa Waiver 
Program, DHS must certify that an air exit system is in place that can 
verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals 
who depart through U.S. airports.[Footnote 22] Last month, we testified 
that DHS's plan to implement this provision had several weaknesses. 
[Footnote 23] Using this methodology, DHS stated that it can attain a 
match rate above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify 
compliance with the air exit system requirement in the legislation. On 
December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records, 
reported by airlines, of visitors departing the country to the 
department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration status 
changes, or prior departures from the United States. On February 21, 
2008, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the 
methodology the department would use to certify compliance. 
Nevertheless, the department confirmed that the basic structure of its 
methodology would not change, and that it would use departure records 
as the starting point. Because DHS's approach does not begin with 
arrival records to determine if those foreign nationals stayed in the 
United States beyond their authorized periods of admission, information 
from this system will not inform overall and country-specific overstay 
rates--key factors in determining illegal immigration risks in the Visa 
Waiver Program. The inability of the U.S. government to track the 
status of visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their 
authorized period of visit, and to use these data to compute overstay 
rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa 
Waiver Program. We reported that DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent" 
requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address 
these weaknesses. 

DHS Pilot on the Immigration Advisory Program: 

DHS has also has begun to pilot the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), 
which is designed to provide additional scrutiny to passengers and 
their travel documents at foreign airports prior to their departure for 
the United States.[Footnote 24] This pilot program began in 2004 and 
was designed to identify and target potential high-risk passengers. 
Under the IAP pilot, CBP has assigned trained officers to foreign 
airports where they personally interview pre-identified high-risk 
passengers, conduct behavioral assessments, and evaluate the 
authenticity of travel documents prior to the passenger's departure to 
the United States. The pilot program has been tested in several foreign 
airports, and CBP is negotiating with other countries to expand it 
elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites permanent. 

CBP has reported several successes through the IAP pilot. According to 
CBP documents, from the start of the IAP pilot in June 2004 through 
February 2006, IAP teams made more than 700 no-board recommendations 
for inadmissible passengers and intercepted approximately 70 fraudulent 
travel documents. CBP estimated that these accomplishments equate to 
about $1.1 million in cost avoidance for the U.S. government associated 
with detaining and removing passengers who would have been turned away 
after their flights landed, and $1.5 million in air carrier savings in 
avoided fines and passenger return costs. According to CBP, these 
monetary savings have defrayed the costs of implementing the program. 

In May 2007, we reported that CBP has not taken all of the steps 
necessary to fully learn from its pilot sites in order to determine 
whether the program should be made permanent and the number of sites 
that should exist.[Footnote 25] These steps are part of a risk 
management approach to developing and evaluating homeland security 
programs. A risk management framework includes such elements as 
formally outlining the goals of the program, setting measurable 
performance measures, and evaluating program effectiveness. Although 
CBP is currently taking steps to make its IAP sites permanent and to 
expand the program to other foreign locations, CBP has not finalized a 
strategic plan for the program that delineates program goals, 
objectives, constraints, and evaluative criteria. CBP officials told us 
that they have drafted a strategic plan for the IAP, which contains 
program goals and performance measures. CBP stated that the plan has 
not yet been finalized. 

Concluding Remarks: 

CBP has made progress in taking actions to secure our nation's borders. 
It has enhanced its ability to screen travelers before they arrive in 
the United States as well as once they arrive at a port of entry. 
Nevertheless, vulnerabilities still exist and additional actions are 
required to address them. How long it will take and how much it will 
cost are two questions that plague two of DHS's major border security 
initiatives. Whether DHS can implement the exit portion of US-VISIT is 
uncertain. For land ports of entry, according to DHS, there is no near- 
term solution. Completing the SBI initiative within time and cost 
estimates will be challenging, including the building of nearly 700 
miles of fencing. These issues underscore Congress' need to stay 
closely attuned to DHS's progress in these programs to help ensure 
performance, schedule, and cost estimates are achieved and the nation's 
border security needs are fully addressed. 

This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to 
any questions that you or members of subcommittees may have. 

Contact and Acknowledgments: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Richard M. Stana at 
(202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this statement. Other key contributors to this statement were 
John Brummet, Assistant Director; Deborah Davis, Assistant Director; 
Michael Dino, Assistant Director; John Mortin, Assistant Director; 
Teresa Abruzzo; Richard Ascarate; Katherine Bernet; Jeanette Espinola; 
Adam Hoffman; and Bintou Njie. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on 
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454 
(Washington, D.C.: August 2007). 

[2] See GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler 
Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry, GAO-08-219 
(Washington, D.C.: November 2007). 

[3] See GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas 
Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, 
GAO-07-1006, (Washington, D.C.: July 2007). 

[4] A secondary inspection occurs when persons whose admissibility 
cannot be readily determined and those selected as part of a random 
selection process are subjected to a more detailed review. This 
involves a closer inspection of travel documents and possessions, 
additional questioning and checks of multiple law enforcement databases 
to verify the traveler's identity, background, purpose for entering the 
country, and other corroborating information. This process may result 
in an individual being admitted, refused entry, returned to the country 
of origin, or detained. 

[5] Pub. L. No. 108-458, ï¿½ 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823 (2004), amended 
by Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 109-295, ï¿½ 546, 120 Stat. 1355, 1386-87 (2006) and Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, ï¿½ 545, 121 Stat. 1844, 
2080 (2007). This provision applies to citizens of Bermuda, Canada and 
Mexico entering the United States as nonimmigrant visitors. 

[6] See GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada, GAO-06-
741R (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

[7] See GAO, Observations on Implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative, GAO-08-274R (Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2007). 

[8] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, ï¿½ 545, 
121 Stat. 1844, 2080 (2007). These requirements include (1) National 
Institute of Standards and Technology certification that DHS and State 
have selected a card architecture that meets or exceeds the security 
standards set by the International Organization for Standardization, 
(2) sharing the technology used for the passport card with the 
governments of Canada and Mexico, (3) submitting a detailed 
justification to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations 
concerning the fee that will be charged to individuals by the U.S. 
Postal Service for the passport card, (4) developing an alternative 
procedure for groups of children entering the United States under adult 
supervision and with parental consent, (5) ensuring that the 
infrastructure needed to process the passport cards has been installed 
at ports of entry, (6) training CBP officers at those ports of entry to 
use the new technology, (7) ensuring that the passport card is 
available to U.S. citizens, and (8) establishing a single date for 
implementing the program at sea and land ports of entry. 

[9] According to CBP officials at the ports of entry we visited at the 
time of our review, they did not expect the end of oral declaration to 
represent a significant operational change for them, because the 
majority of people crossing at their ports already present documents 
rather than attempt entry by oral declaration alone. 

[10] See GAO, Homeland Security: Prospects for US-VISIT Biometric Exit 
Capability Remain Unclear, GAO-07-1044T (Washington, D.C.: June 2007). 

[11] See GAO-07-1044T. 

[12] See GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational, 
Technological, and Management Challenges, GAO-07-632T (Washington, 
D.C.: March 2007). 

[13] The CBP SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this 
testimony as the SBI program office, is responsible for overseeing all 
SBI activities; for acquisition and implementation, including 
establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules; for 
overseeing contractor performance; and for coordinating among DHS 
agencies. 

[14] See GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance 
of Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, GAO-08-508T 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2008). 

[15] The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors responsible for detecting, 
interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt illegal entry or 
smuggle people--including terrorists or contraband, including weapons 
of mass destruction--across U.S. borders between official ports of 
entry. 

[16] See GAO, Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border 
Patrol Agents, GAO-07-540R (Washington, D.C.: May 2007). 

[17] See GAO Homeland Security: Progress has been Made to Address the 
Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action is Needed 
to Further Mitigate Security Risks, GAO-07-375 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007). 

[18] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99- 
603, 100 Stat. 3359, created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot 
program. In 2000, the program became permanent under the Visa Waiver 
Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637. 

[19] GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and 
Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: 
July, 2006). 

[20] Interpol is the world's largest international police organization, 
with 184 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border 
police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations, 
authorities, and services whose mission is to prevent or combat 
international crime. In July 2002, Interpol established a database on 
lost and stolen travel documents. As of June 2006, the database 
contained about 11.6 million records of lost and stolen passports 

[21] Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
Pub .L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 267. 

[22] In addition, Public Law 110-53 required the implementation of a 
biometric exit system at U.S. airports. If this is not in place by mid- 
2009, the flexibility DHS could have obtained to admit countries with 
refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent will be suspended until 
it is in place. 

[23] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland 
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, GAO-08-458T 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2008). 

[24] See GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International 
Prescreening are Underway, but Planning and Implementation Issues 
Remain, GAO-07-346 (Washington, D.C.: May 2007). 

[25] See GAO-07-346. 

[End of section] 

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