Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Making Progress to Rapidly Deliver Low
Cost Space Capabilities, but Challenges Remain (25-APR-08,	 
GAO-08-516).							 
                                                                 
The Department of Defense (DOD) invests heavily in space assets  
to provide the warfighter with intelligence, navigation, and	 
other information critical to conducting military operations. In 
fiscal year 2008 alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion	 
dollars on space systems. Despite this investment, senior	 
military commanders have reported shortfalls in tactical space	 
capabilities in each recent major conflict over the past decade. 
To provide short-term tactical capabilities as well as identify  
and implement long-term solutions to developing low cost	 
satellites, DOD initiated operationally responsive space (ORS).  
Following a 2006 GAO review of ORS, the Congress directed DOD to 
submit a report that sets forth a plan for providing quick	 
acquisition of low cost space capabilities. This report focuses  
on the status of DOD's progress in responding to the Congress and
is based on GAO's review and analyses of ORS documentation and	 
interviews with DOD and industry officials.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-516 					        
    ACCNO:   A81894						        
  TITLE:     Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Making Progress to Rapidly    
Deliver Low Cost Space Capabilities, but Challenges Remain	 
     DATE:   04/25/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Aerospace industry 				 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense industry					 
	     Defense operations 				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Emerging technologies				 
	     Funds management					 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military systems analysis				 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Research and development				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Systems evaluation 				 
	     Program costs					 
	     Program goals or objectives			 

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GAO-08-516

   

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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 
Services, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2008: 

Space Acquisitions: 

DOD Is Making Progress to Rapidly Deliver Low Cost Space Capabilities, 
but Challenges Remain: 

GAO-08-516: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-516, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) invests heavily in space assets to 
provide the warfighter with intelligence, navigation, and other 
information critical to conducting military operations. In fiscal year 
2008 alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion dollars on space 
systems. Despite this investment, senior military commanders have 
reported shortfalls in tactical space capabilities in each recent major 
conflict over the past decade. 

To provide short-term tactical capabilities as well as identify and 
implement long-term solutions to developing low cost satellites, DOD 
initiated operationally responsive space (ORS). Following a 2006 GAO 
review of ORS, the Congress directed DOD to submit a report that sets 
forth a plan for providing quick acquisition of low cost space 
capabilities. 

This report focuses on the status of DODï¿½s progress in responding to 
the Congress and is based on GAOï¿½s review and analyses of ORS 
documentation and interviews with DOD and industry officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Since GAO last reported on DODï¿½s ORS efforts in 2006, the department 
has taken several steps toward establishing a program management 
structure for ORS and executing research and development efforts. On 
the programmatic side, DOD provided Congress with a plan that lays out 
an organizational structure and defines the responsibilities of the 
newly created Joint ORS Office, and describes an approach for 
satisfying warfightersï¿½ needs. DOD has also begun staffing the office. 
On the research and development side, DOD has launched one of its 
TacSat satellitesï¿½small experimental satellites intended to quickly 
provide a capability that meets an identified need within available 
resourcesï¿½and has begun developing several others. It has also made 
progress in developing interface standards for satellite busesï¿½the 
platform that provides power, attitude, temperature control, and other 
support to the satellite in spaceï¿½and continued its sponsorship of 
efforts aimed at acquiring low cost launch vehicles. Despite this 
progress, it is too early to determine the overall success of these 
efforts because most are still in their initial phases. 

Achieving success in ORS will be challenging. With relatively modest 
resources, the Joint ORS Office must quickly respond to the 
warfighterï¿½s urgent needs, while continuing research and development 
efforts that are necessary to help reduce the cost and time of future 
space acquisitions. As it negotiates these priorities, the office will 
need to coordinate its efforts with a broad array of programs and 
agencies in the science and technology, acquisition, and operational 
communities. Historically, it has been difficult to transition programs 
from the science and technology environment to the acquisition and 
operational environment. At this time, DOD lacks a plan that lays out 
how it will direct its investments to meet current operational needs 
while pursuing innovative approaches and new technologies. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force develop an 
investment planï¿½approved by stakeholdersï¿½that identifies how to achieve 
future capabilities, establishes funding priorities, and implements 
mechanisms to measure progress. DOD concurred with the recommendation. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-516]. For more 
information, contact. Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4859, 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Made Progress to Develop a Management Structure and Build a 
Technological Foundation for ORS: 

ORS Challenges Magnified by Lack of a Plan to Guide Investments and 
Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix I: Comment from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Efforts to Develop a Management Structure by Action: 

Table 2: Status of Efforts to Develop and Demonstrate TacSat 
Experimental Satellites: 

Table 3: Status of Efforts to Develop and Test Satellite Interface and 
Bus Standards: 

Table 4: Efforts to Develop a Launch Infrastructure: 

Abbreviations: 

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Project Agency: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

ORS: operationally responsive space: 

SpaceX: Space Explorations Technologies: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: 

April 25, 2008: 

The Honorable Bill Nelson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jeff Sessions: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing heavily in large, complex 
satellites and other space assets to provide the warfighter with 
communications, intelligence, navigation, missile-warning, and other 
information critical to conducting military operations. In fiscal year 
2008 alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion dollars to develop 
and procure satellites and other space systems. Yet, for the past two 
decades, major satellite programs have been beset with significant cost 
overruns and schedule delays. Moreover, in each major conflict over the 
past decade, senior military commanders reported shortfalls in tactical 
space capabilities, such as those intended to provide communications 
and imagery data to the warfighter in theater. 

To help address these issues, DOD recently initiated an effort known as 
operationally responsive space (ORS). The ORS initiative encompasses 
several separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical 
capabilities as well as identifying and implementing long-term 
technology and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of 
developing and delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. More 
specifically, these include developing and launching small-size 
satellites, acquiring lower cost launch systems, developing 
standardized satellite components, as well as exploring a variety of 
new common design techniques. Though DOD has tried to make space 
acquisition more responsive in the past, the current ORS initiative is 
a concerted effort to create an environment where new concepts and 
ideas can be fostered and transitioned to users. 

We reviewed aspects of the ORS initiative in 2006 and concluded that 
DOD needed a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low cost, responsive 
tactical capabilities--both satellite and launch--for the warfighter, 
and to identify corresponding funding.[Footnote 1] Subsequently, the 
Congress directed DOD to submit a report that sets forth a plan for 
providing quick acquisition of low cost space capabilities.[Footnote 2] 
Given the potential these efforts offer for changing the way DOD 
acquires and fields space capabilities, you asked us to report on the 
status of DOD's progress to date in implementing the program and 
assessing associated challenges. We also reviewed DOD's development of 
a higher level strategy to guide the ORS initiative, an action that we 
reported separately to you in March 2008. Further, we are reviewing 
ORS' requirements setting process and its integration into warfighting 
concepts of operation, which we will report on later in June 2008. 
[Footnote 3] 

To conduct our work for this report, we reviewed and analyzed ORS 
documentation and interviewed officials representing the ORS initiative 
as well as officials from the warfighting, acquisition, science, and 
technology communities and industry. We conducted this performance 
audit from May 2007 to February 2008 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD is making progress in putting a program management structure in 
place for ORS as well as executing ORS-related research and development 
efforts. On the programmatic side, DOD provided Congress with a plan 
that lays out an organizational structure and defines the 
responsibilities of the newly created Joint ORS Office, and describes 
an approach for satisfying warfighters' needs. DOD has also begun 
staffing the office. On the research and development side, DOD has 
launched one of its small-sized satellites and begun developing several 
others, made progress in developing interface standards for satellite 
buses, and continued its sponsorship of efforts aimed at acquiring low 
cost launch vehicles. It is too early to determine how successful these 
efforts will be because most are still in their initial stages. 

As DOD moves forward, it will be challenged on many fronts as ORS is 
expected to execute a range of efforts within relatively modest 
resources and amid competing demands and pressure to produce quick 
results. For example, rapid development and deployment of small 
satellites is being currently considered as a potential solution for 
various capability gaps that may occur because of schedule delays on 
larger acquisition programs. But concentrating efforts to fill just one 
gap could be relatively expensive and time consuming for the ORS 
initiative and divert resources from other ORS efforts. For example, 
some officials we spoke with asserted that not enough attention was 
being paid to acquiring low cost launch vehicles--a linchpin to 
reducing satellite development costs in the future. At this time, DOD 
currently lacks tools needed to negotiate these challenges--primarily, 
a plan that lays out how it will direct its investments to meet 
existing gaps while at the same time pursuing innovative approaches and 
new technologies to rapidly respond to future warfighter needs. To help 
DOD successfully negotiate this challenge, we are recommending that DOD 
develop an investment plan. 

Background: 

In May 2003, the Office of Force Transformation began funding small 
experimental satellites to enhance the responsiveness to the warfighter 
and to create a new business model for developing and employing space 
systems.[Footnote 4] As we have reported over the past two decades, 
DOD's space portfolio has been dominated by larger space system 
acquisitions, which have taken longer, cost more, and delivered fewer 
quantities and capabilities than planned.[Footnote 5] The ORS 
initiative is a considerable departure from DOD's large space 
acquisition approach. The initiative aims to quickly deliver low cost, 
short-term tactical capabilities to address unmet needs of the 
warfighter. Unlike traditional large satellite programs, the ORS 
initiative is intended to address only a small number of unmet tactical 
needs--one or two--with each delivery of capabilities. It is not 
designed to replace current satellite capabilities or major space 
programs in development. Also, the initiative potentially aims to 
identify and facilitate ways to reduce the time and cost for all future 
space development efforts. 

As we have previously reported, managing requirements so that their 
development is matched with resources offers an opportunity to mature 
technologies in the science and technology environment--a best 
acquisition practice.[Footnote 6] We also have reported that the ORS 
initiative could provide opportunities for small companies--who often 
have a high potential to introduce novel solutions and innovations into 
space acquisitions--to compete for DOD contracts. Consolidations within 
the defense industrial base for space programs have made it difficult 
for such companies to compete. ORS could broaden the defense industrial 
base and thereby promote competition and innovation. 

DOD Has Made Progress to Develop a Management Structure and Build a 
Technological Foundation for ORS: 

Since we last reported on DOD's ORS efforts in 2006, the department has 
taken several steps toward establishing a program management structure 
for ORS and executing research and development efforts. Despite this 
progress, it is too early to determine the overall success of these 
efforts because most are still in their initial phases. 

Program Management Structure: 

Congress directed that DOD submit a report that sets forth a plan for 
the quick acquisition of low cost space capabilities and establish a 
Joint ORS Office to coordinate and manage the ORS initiative. In the 
first half of 2007, DOD delivered an ORS plan to Congress and 
established a Joint ORS Office. DOD created the Joint ORS Office to 
coordinate and manage specific science and technology efforts to 
fulfill joint military operational requirements for on-demand space 
support and reconstitution. In addition, DOD is working with other 
government agencies to staff the office, developing an implementation 
plan, and establishing a process for determining which existing 
requirements for short-term tactical capabilities the office should 
pursue. Responsiveness is an attribute desired by the entire space 
community, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the military service laboratories. Most of the efforts under the 
ORS initiative are being executed by science and technology 
organizations and other DOD agencies. The office will be responsible 
for coordinating, planning, acquiring, and transitioning those efforts. 
Its work is to be guided by an executive committee, comprised of senior 
officials from DOD, the military services, the intelligence community, 
and other government agencies. Most requirements for needed short-term 
tactical capabilities are expected to come through the U.S. Strategic 
Command. To respond to unmet warfighter needs, ORS requirements will be 
based on existing validated requirements. Table 1 summarizes the status 
of some of DOD's efforts related to the management structure. 

Table 1: Status of Efforts to Develop a Management Structure by Action: 

Status: Deliver a plan to Congress as required by the 2007 National 
Defense Authorization Act: Completed; DOD submitted the plan in April 
2007; 
Description: 
* The plan identifies a general approach for establishing the 
responsive space initiative and establishes an office to coordinate and 
execute ORS activities; 
* The Joint ORS Office, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, was officially activated in May 2007. 

Status: Staff the Joint ORS Office: Status: In progress; 8 of the 20 
expected government positions have been filled as of February 2008; 
Description: 
* The office is to be staffed with up to 20 government (military and 
civilian) positions to be provided by the various military services and 
agencies associated with responsive space activities; 
* As of February 1, 2008, 8 government positions were staffed by 
personnel from the United States Air Force, Army, and Navy; the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National 
Reconnaissance Office; the National Security Agency; the Air National 
Guard; and Sandia Laboratory; 
* Additional support is being provided by 14 Federally Funded Research 
and Development Centers[A] and Systems Engineering and Technical 
Assistance[B] contractors. 

Status: Develop an implementation plan: In progress; the plan is 
expected to be approved in February 2008; 
Description: 
* In July 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Executive 
Agent for Space to develop an implementation plan that describes how 
the office will deliver existing space capabilities, evolve new 
capabilities, and leverage innovative approaches to meet requirements 
identified by the U.S. Strategic Command; 
* DOD established a working group with five subgroups tasked with 
making recommendations on requirements, acquisitions, manpower, lead 
service, and executive committee. One of the subgroups is tasked with 
developing a charter for the Executive Committee that would define the 
roles and responsibilities of the committee members from the various 
and diverse agencies. 

Description: Establish a requirements process; In progress; 
Description: 
* ORS requirements are to be based on existing but unsatisfied 
validated requirements to respond to combatant commanders' needs. The 
Joint ORS Office received a request from U.S. Strategic Command to 
develop a communications capability that cannot be satisfied by the 
current ultra high frequency system. The requested capability falls 
within the validated requirements set for the Mobile User Objective 
System, currently under development.[C]. 

Source: DOD data and GAO analysis. 

[A] Federally Funded Research and Development Centers conduct research 
for the U.S. government. 

[B] Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance contractors are 
civilian employees of government contractors who are contracted to 
assist DOD components and acquisition programs. 

[C] The Navy's Mobile User Objective System is expected to provide low 
data rate voice and data communications capable of penetrating most 
weather, foliage, and man-made structures beginning in late 2009. 

[End of table] 

Research and Development Efforts: 

DOD is continuing to make progress in developing TacSats--its small 
experimental satellite projects. In addition, DOD is funding research 
efforts by industry to facilitate the development of future 
capabilities and is working with industry and academia to develop 
standards for building satellite components. Finally, DOD is working to 
improve the capabilities of existing small launch vehicles and 
providing some funding for future launch vehicles. 

Development of Small-Sized Satellites: 

The TacSat experiments aim to quickly provide the warfighter with a 
capability that meets an identified need within available resources-- 
time, funding, and technology. Limiting the TacSats' scope allows DOD 
to trade off higher reliability and performance[Footnote 7] for speed, 
responsiveness, convenience, and customization. Once each TacSat 
satellite is launched, DOD plans to test its level of utility to the 
warfighter in theater. If military utility is established, DOD will 
assess the acquisition plan required to procure and launch numerous 
TacSats--forming constellations--to provide wider coverage over a 
specific theater. As a result, each satellite's capability does not 
need to be as complex as that of DOD's larger satellites and does not 
carry with it the heightened consequence of failure as if each 
satellite alone were providing total coverage. DOD currently has five 
TacSat experiments in different stages of development (see table 2). 

Table 2: Status of Efforts to Develop and Demonstrate TacSat 
Experimental Satellites: 

Status: TacSat 1: In progress; satellite has been developed but not 
demonstrated; 
Description: 
* The Naval Research Laboratory led a year-long effort to develop 
TacSat 1, at a cost of $23 million; 
* TacSat 1 was completed in May 2004, but has yet to be demonstrated 
because of delays incurred with the development and testing of a low 
cost launch vehicle; 
* Given the launch delay, the Naval Research Laboratory decided to add 
a new sensor--an automated identification system to support maritime 
missions. The new sensor and other new capabilities are estimated to 
cost $10.5 million; 
* The Joint ORS Office, the Navy, Coast Guard, and Department of 
Defense Research and Engineering are currently working to develop a 
cost sharing agreement. 

Status: TacSat 2: Complete; satellite developed and demonstrated in 
2006 through 2007; 
Description: 
* TacSat 2 development, led by the Air Force Research Laboratory, was 
completed in 29 months at a cost of $39 million; 
* Its payload includes tactical imaging and radio frequency equipment, 
and an automated identification sensor; 
* TacSat 2 was launched in December 2006 on a Minotaur I launch vehicle 
and participated in military exercises during the summer of 2007; 
* The Air Force Research Laboratory ended the demonstration in December 
2007. 

Status: TacSat 3: In progress; satellite expected to be launched in 
August 2008; 
Description: 
* The Air Force Research Laboratory is leading the effort to develop 
TacSat 3 which will provide the first implementation of selected bus 
standards; 
* Its primary payload is a hyperspectral imager for tactical targeting 
of camouflaged and hard-to-detect targets; 
* The cost is estimated to be $62.7 million, and the planned launch 
date is August 2008 on a Minotaur I launch vehicle. 

Status: TacSat 4: In progress; expected to be launched in September 
2009; 
Description: 
* The Naval Research Laboratory is leading the effort to develop TacSat 
4, which will include equipment to demonstrate mobile data 
communications services, friendly forces tracking, and data relay from 
terrestrial sensor; 
* It will also evaluate the DOD system bus standards effort in a 
realistic launch-and-flight operations environment; 
* The cost is estimated to be $114 million, and the planned launch date 
is September 2009 on a Minotaur IV launch vehicle. 

Status: TacSat 5: In progress; launch date to be determined; 
Description: 
* The Army Space and Missile Defense Center, the Joint ORS Office, the 
Air Force Research Laboratory, and Space and Missile Systems Center 
will lead the development of TacSat 5; 
* Payload experiments have not been finalized; 
* The cost and schedule are to be determined. 

Source: DOD data. 

[End of table] 

In addition, DOD is sponsoring the development of new capabilities 
provided mostly by the small satellite industry. These efforts include 
the ORS Payload Technology Initiative, which awarded 15 contracts to 
satellite industry contractors for payload technology concepts that may 
be developed in the future. The Air Force has been funding additional 
research conducted by small technology companies that could provide ORS 
capabilities, such as faster ways of designing satellites, and 
identifying the types and characteristics of components based on 
mission requirements. 

Efforts to Develop and Test Satellite Interface and Bus Standards: 

DOD is also working to establish standards for the "bus"--the platform 
that provides power, attitude, temperature control, and other support 
to the satellite in space.[Footnote 8] Establishing interface standards 
for bus development would allow DOD to create a "plug and play" 
approach to building satellites--similar to the way personal computers 
are built. According to DOD officials, interface standards would allow 
the development of modular or common components and would facilitate 
building satellites--both small and large--more quickly and at a lower 
cost. DOD's service laboratories, industry, and academia have made 
significant progress to develop satellite bus standards. The service 
labs expect to test some standardized components on the TacSat 3 bus 
and system standards on the TacSat 4 bus. Table 3 provides a 
description of the bus standardization efforts and their status. 

Table 3: Status of Efforts to Develop and Test Satellite Interface and 
Bus Standards: 

Status: Demonstrate "plug and play" architecture: In progress; 
Description: 
* The Air Force Research Laboratory is demonstrating capabilities of a 
"plug and play" architecture that accelerates satellite production 
through the use of standardized computer-like ports to connect 
standardized components; 
* For example, the Air Force Research Laboratory is developing standard 
bus panels with an embedded wiring system and standard ports for easy 
assembly and integration. 

Status: Determine class of ORS satellites needed: Complete; report 
issued in March 2005; 
Description: 
* This effort, led by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln 
Laboratory, determined the class of satellite needed to be militarily 
useful. 

Status: Develop interface standards, and develop TacSat 3 bus: In 
progress; 
Description: 
* This effort, being led by the Air Force Research Laboratory, is to 
provide interface standards between the bus and the payload, and to 
rapidly provide a bus for the TacSat 3 hyperspectral payload 
experiment. 

Status: Develop bus standards for initial blocks of operational 
satellites, and transition plan: In progress; 
Description: 
* This effort, being led by the Naval Research Laboratory and the John 
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, is using a broad 
consortium of industry and government members to develop bus standards 
along with the associated costs and business considerations for 
acquisition; 
* The consortium is also working to develop a plan that explains how to 
transition from a science and technology environment to an acquisition 
phase. The transition plan is in final coordination within DOD. 

Status: Acquire initial standardized satellite buses: Slated to begin 
after bus standards have been developed; 
Description: 
* This effort, to be carried out by the Joint ORS Office, will be the 
acquisition of the initial block of standard satellite buses. 

Source: DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Launch Infrastructure: 

To get new tactical space capabilities to the warfighter sooner, DOD 
must secure a small, low cost launch vehicle on demand. Current 
alternatives include Minotaur launch vehicles, ranging in cost from 
about $21 million to $28 million, and an Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle--DOD's primary satellite launch vehicles--at an average cost of 
roughly $65 million (for medium and intermediate launchers). DOD is 
looking to small launch vehicles, unlike current systems, that could be 
launched in days, if not hours, and whose cost would better match the 
small budgets of experiments. Both DOD and private industry are working 
to develop small, low cost, on-demand launch vehicles. Notably, DOD 
expects the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) FALCON 
launch program to flight-test hypersonic technologies and be capable of 
launching small satellites such as TacSats. In addition to securing low 
cost launch vehicles, DOD plans to acquire a more responsive, reliable, 
and affordable launch tracking system to complement the existing launch 
infrastructure. Table 4 describes DOD's efforts to develop a launch 
infrastructure and their status. 

Table 4: Efforts to Develop a Launch Infrastructure: 

Status: Develop low cost launch vehicles through DOD's FALCON program: 
In progress; 
Description: 
* DARPA, along with the Air Force, established FALCON, to accelerate 
efforts to develop a vehicle that can send 1,000 pounds to low-earth 
orbit for less than $5 million with an operational cost basis of 20 
flights per year for 10 years; 
* DARPA contracted with Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) to 
develop a two-stage vehicle for launches into space. According to DOD, 
SpaceX completed its activity for the FALCON program with a test launch 
of their rocket in March 2007; 
* For fiscal year 2008, the Appropriations conferees encouraged ORS to 
continue to work with the FALCON program to develop a small launch 
vehicle. Another SpaceX flight demonstration is expected to occur in 
mid 2008; 
* According to DARPA, between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, it provided 
SpaceX with a total of more than $15.6 million dollars for advanced 
technology development, facilities, test-range and mission support, and 
program office support. 

Status: Develop new launch vehicle capabilities through the Air Force 
Research Laboratory: In progress; 
Description: 
* The Air Force Research Laboratory continues its work on spacecraft 
payload shock protection and noise reduction technologies during 
launch; 
* The laboratory has developed technologies to reduce vibration in 
launch vehicles that have been used on the Minotaurs; 
* The laboratory has also funded science and technology research on 
solid rocket motors. 

Status: Develop other elements that support responsive launch systems: 
In progress; 
Description: 
* In September 2006, the DOD Executive Agent for Space signed a 
memorandum stating that by January 1, 2011, all DOD, civil, and 
commercial vehicles launched will need to be tracked through use of the 
Global Positioning System.[A] The DOD Executive Agent for Space sees 
this as the first logical step towards a space-based control system 
that is more responsive, reliable, and affordable than the current 
terrestrially based system. 

Source: DOD data. 

[A] The Global Positioning System is a space-based radio-positioning 
system nominally consisting of a 24-satellite constellation providing 
navigation and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. 

[End of table] 

ORS Challenges Magnified by Lack of a Plan to Guide Investments and 
Efforts: 

DOD faces several challenges in succeeding in its ORS efforts. With 
relatively modest resources, the Joint ORS Office must quickly respond 
to the warfighter's urgent needs, including gaps in capabilities, as 
well as continue its longer-term research and development efforts that 
are necessary to help reduce the cost and time of future space 
acquisitions. As the office negotiates these priorities, it will need 
to coordinate its efforts with a broad array of programs and agencies 
in the science and technology, acquisition, and operational 
communities. Historically it has been difficult to transition programs 
initiated in the science and technology environment to the acquisition 
and operational environment. At this time, DOD lacks tools which would 
help the program office navigate within this environment--primarily, a 
plan that lays out how the office will direct its investments to meet 
current operational needs while at the same time pursuing innovative 
approaches and new technologies. 

The Joint ORS Office has a budget totaling about $646 million for 
fiscal years 2008 through 2013 and with no more than 20 government 
staff. These resources are relatively modest when compared with the 
resources provided major space programs. For example, the ORS fiscal 
year 2008 budget represents less than 12 percent of the budget of the 
Transformational Satellite Communications System program[Footnote 9] 
which is in the concept development phase, and staffing is about a 
quarter of that program's staff. While the Joint ORS Office's 
responsibilities are not the same as those of large, complex 
acquisition programs, it is expected to address urgent tactical needs 
that have not been met by the larger space programs. At this time, for 
example, the office has been asked to develop a solution to meet 
current communications shortfalls that cannot be met by the current 
Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite system.[Footnote 10] And, 
while the office has not yet been asked, officials have told us that 
ORS could potentially satisfy a gap in early missile warning 
capabilities because of delays in the Space Based Infrared Systems 
program, as well as gaps in communications and navigation capabilities. 
Taking on any one of these efforts will be challenging for ORS as there 
are constraints in available technologies, time, money, and other 
resources that can be used to fill capability gaps. 

At the same time, the Joint ORS Office will be pressured to continue to 
sponsor longer term research and development efforts. According to the 
Air Force Research Laboratory, the average cost of a small satellite is 
about $87 million. This is substantially higher than the target 
acquisition cost of about $40 million for an integrated ORS satellite 
in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act.[Footnote 11] In 
addition, concerns are being expressed that not enough funding and 
support are being devoted to acquiring low cost launch capabilities. 
Some government and industry officials believe that achieving such 
capabilities is a linchpin to reducing satellite development costs in 
the future. The current alternatives for launching ORS satellites--an 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle and Minotaur launch vehicles--do not 
meet DOD's low cost goal. DARPA expects its responsive launch 
capabilities, currently in development, will total about $5 million to 
produce--a significantly lower cost than that of current capabilities. 
However, in order to achieve the lower cost launch capability, DOD will 
have to continue to fund research beyond the $15.6 million already 
spent on advanced technology development, facilities, test-range and 
mission support, and program office support. 

To execute both its short-and long-term efforts, the Joint ORS Office 
will also need to gain cooperation and consensus from a diverse array 
of officials and organizations. These include science and technology 
organizations, the acquisition community, the U.S. Strategic Command, 
the intelligence community, and industry. We have previously reported 
on difficulties DOD has encountered in bringing these organizations 
together, particularly when it comes to setting requirements for new 
acquisitions and transitioning technologies from the science and 
technology community to acquisition programs. As a new and relatively 
small organization, the Joint ORS Office may well find it does not have 
the clout to gain cooperation and consensus on what short-and long-term 
projects should get the highest priority. 

Despite the significant expectations placed on the Joint ORS Office and 
the challenges it faces, DOD does not have an investment plan to guide 
its ORS decisions. DOD has begun to develop an ORS strategy that is to 
identify the investments needed to achieve future capabilities. 
However, the strategy is not intended to become a formalized investment 
plan that would (1) help DOD identify how to achieve these 
capabilities, (2) prioritize funding, and (3) identify and implement 
mechanisms to enforce the plan. At the same time, there are other 
science and technology projects in DOD's overall space portfolio 
competing for the same resources, including those focused on 
discovering and developing technologies and materials that could 
enhance U.S. superiority in space. Further, as DOD's major space 
acquisition programs continue to experience cost growth and schedule 
delays, DOD could be pressured to divert funds from ORS. We have 
previously recommended that DOD prioritize investments for both its 
acquisitions and science and technology projects--the ORS plan could be 
seamlessly woven into an overall DOD investment plan for space. 
However, DOD has yet to develop this overall investment plan. 

Conclusions: 

Providing the warfighter with needed space capabilities in a fiscally 
constrained and rapidly changing technological environment is a 
daunting task. ORS provides DOD with a unique opportunity to work 
outside the typical acquisition channels to more quickly and less 
expensively deliver these capabilities. However, even at lower costs, 
pressure on ORS funding will come in DOD's competition for its 
resources. As DOD moves forward, decisions on using constrained 
resources to meet competing demand will need to be made and reevaluated 
on a continuing basis. Until DOD develops an investment plan, it will 
risk forgoing an opportunity to get continuing success out of the ORS 
initiative. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To better ensure that DOD meets the ORS initiative's goal, we recommend 
that the Secretary of the Air Force develop an investment plan to guide 
the Joint ORS Office as it works to meet urgent needs and develops a 
technological foundation to meet future needs. The plan should be 
approved by the stakeholders and identify how to achieve future 
capabilities, establish funding priorities, and identify and implement 
mechanisms to ensure progress is being achieved. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 
concurred with our findings and our recommendation but clarified that 
the Secretary of the Air Force, specifically the Executive Agent for 
Space, would be responsible for developing an investment plan since the 
Under Secretary of the Air Force position is vacant. Full comments can 
be found in appendix I. 

Scope and Methodology: 

To assess DOD's progress to date in implementing its ORS goal and 
addressing associated challenges, we interviewed and reviewed documents 
from officials in Washington, D.C., at the Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts; National 
Security Space Office; Office of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering; Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation; 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition. We also interviewed and reviewed 
documents from officials in Virginia at the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Networks Information and Integration; Office 
of the Under Secretary of the Air Force; Defense Advanced Research 
Project Agency; and U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. In 
addition, we interviewed and reviewed documents from officials at the 
Navy Blossom Point Satellite Tracking Facility in Maryland; Air Force 
Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; Space and Missile 
Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; the U.S. 
Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory and Joint Operationally Responsive Space Office, 
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. We also interviewed officials from 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., 
and industry representatives involved in developing small satellites 
and commercial launch vehicles. We reviewed and analyzed the documents 
that we received. 

We will send copies of the letter to the Department of Defense and 
other interested congressional committees. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in 
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4859 or [email protected]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Principal 
contributors to this report were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; 
Maria Durant; Jean Harker; Arturo Holguin; and Karen Sloan. 

Signed by: 

Cristina Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comment from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Networks And Information Integration: 
6000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-6000: 

Ms. Christina T. Chaplain: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Ms. Chaplain: 

The Department of Defense (DoD) concurs with the GAO Draft Report. GAO-
08-516, 'Space Acquisitions: DoD Is Making Progress to Rapidly Deliver 
Low Cost Space Capabilities. but Challenges Remain,' dated March 14, 
2008 (GAO Code 120648). For clarification, the investment plan should 
be worked by the DoD Executive Agent for Space, currently the Secretary 
of the Air Force, and not the Under Secretary of the Air Force as that 
position is vacant. Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment 
on this report. 

Sincerely. 

Signed by: 

Steven M. Huybrechts: 
Director. Space Programs and Policy: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Contact: 

Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4859 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition, key contributors to the report include Maria Durant, Art 
Gallegos, Jean Harker, Arturo Holguin, and Karen Sloan. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for 
Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-449] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
14, 2006). 

[2] The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 913(c) (2006). 

[3] GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy 
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-431R] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
27, 2008). 

[4] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (September 
2001). 

[5] GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems 
Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-626T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
6, 2006). 

[6] GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD 
Technology Transition Processes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-883] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2006). 

[7] Existing systems have been designed for longer life and increased 
reliability, requiring years to develop and a significant investment of 
resources. 

[8] Satellites primarily consist of the payload and the bus. Currently, 
DOD's buses are custom-made for each space program. 

[9] The Air Force's Transformational Satellite Communications System is 
expected to provide high data rate military satellite communications 
services to DOD users. 

[10] This system is expected to be replaced by the Navy's Mobile User 
Objective System. 

[11] The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, Pub. L.No. 109-364 ï¿½ 913(b)(1)(2006)(codified at 10 U.S.C. ï¿½ 
2273a(e)(5)). 

[End of section] 

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