Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to Ensure	 
Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National	 
Airspace System (15-MAY-08, GAO-08-511).			 
                                                                 
Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned	 
aircraft systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as  
U.S. border protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and 
real estate photography. However, UASs can fly only after the	 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case	 
safety analysis. GAO's research questions included (1) What are  
the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What	 
challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the	 
national airspace system? and (3) What is the federal		 
government's response to these challenges? To address these	 
questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency	 
officials and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-511 					        
    ACCNO:   A82121						        
  TITLE:     Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to     
Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National
Airspace System 						 
     DATE:   05/15/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Access control					 
	     Agency missions					 
	     Aircraft						 
	     Aircraft industry					 
	     Aircraft safety					 
	     Aviation						 
	     Border security					 
	     Data collection					 
	     Federal regulations				 
	     International airspace law 			 
	     International relations				 
	     Operational testing				 
	     Private sector					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Research and development				 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     State governments					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Surveys						 
	     Systems analysis					 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Unmanned aerial systems				 
	     Program coordination				 

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GAO-08-511

   

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material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

May 2008: 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 

Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses 
within the National Airspace System: 

GAO-08-511: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-511, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border 
protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate 
photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAOâs 
research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses 
and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs 
safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is 
the federal governmentâs response to these challenges? To address these 
questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials 
and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO suggests that Congress create an overarching body within FAA to 
coordinate UAS development and integration efforts. To realize public 
benefits from UASs as soon as possible, GAO recommends that FAA issue 
its program plan and analyze the data it has collected, and that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assess the security implications 
of routine UAS access to the airspace. Relevant agencies reviewed a 
draft of this report. The Department of Transportation agreed to 
consider its relevant recommendations. DHS agreed with its relevant 
recommendation. 

What GAO Recommends: 

UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security, 
science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential 
uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees 
potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey 
states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such 
government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could 
perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer 
emissions. 

UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination 
challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in 
the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety 
requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack 
security protectionâa potential challenge if UASs proliferate as 
expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA 
regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals 
by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a 
workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address 
these challenges is yet another challenge. 

FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological 
challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of 
routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS 
safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued 
its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for 
providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to 
have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS 
testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop 
regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already 
collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more 
automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an 
overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal, 
academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a 
similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation 
air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the 
private sector. 

Figure: Photograph of Predator B UASs used for border security. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DHS. 

[End of figure] 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-511]. For more 
information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, (202) 512-2834 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government 
and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future: 

Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological, 
Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges: 

Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could 
Take a Decade or Longer: 

Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown: 

Conclusion: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methods: 

Appendix II: Survey Methods: 

Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of UAS Integration Efforts in Other Countries: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Conceptual Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Figure 2: Examples of UASs: 

Figure 3: CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007: 

Figure 4: UASs Used as Communications Relays: 

Figure 5: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection: 

Figure 6: Forecast of Civil UASs Produced, 2008 through 2017: 

Figure 7: Applications for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization, 
Received in Calendar Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010: 

Figure 8: Applications for Special Airworthiness Certificates, Received 
in Fiscal Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010: 

Figure 9: UAS Test Center at New Mexico State University: 

Abbreviations: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

COA: Certificate of Waiver or Authorization: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

EUROCAE: European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment: 

EUROCONTROL: European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization: 

JPDO: Joint Planning and Development Office: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NextGen: next generation air transportation system: 

NOAA: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration: 

RTCA: Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

UAPO: Unmanned Aircraft Program Office: 

UAS: unmanned aircraft system: 

TCAS: Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance System: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 15, 2008: 

The Honorable John Mica: 
Ranking Republican Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jerry F. Costello: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Government and private-sector interest in unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) is growing, due in large part to the U.S. military's expanded 
development and use of these systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
absence of a pilot on board the aircraft allows unmanned aircraft to 
perform a variety of missions not generally considered favorable for 
manned aircraft. Some unmanned aircraft can remain aloft for 30 hours 
or more, because there is no need for them to land to change pilots. 
Unmanned aircraft can also perform dangerous missions without risking 
loss of life. 

The federal government has used UASs for a number of years for various 
purposes, such as collecting scientific data, assisting with border 
security, and gathering weather data from inside hurricanes. Federal 
agencies are planning to increase their use of UASs and state and local 
governments envision using UASs to aid in law enforcement or 
firefighting. Potential commercial uses are also possible, for example, 
in real estate photography or pipeline inspection. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) is responsible for ensuring that UASs operate 
safely in the national airspace system and is working to develop a 
regulatory framework to address the unique characteristics of UASs. For 
example, current regulations do not indicate how, in the absence of an 
on-board pilot, UASs should detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft to 
avoid collisions. FAA's long-range goal is to permit, to the greatest 
extent possible, routine government and commercial UAS operations in 
the national airspace system while ensuring safety. Presently, because 
of safety concerns, FAA authorizes civil government and military UAS 
operations in the national airspace system on a limited basis after 
conducting a case-by-case safety review. Regulations do not currently 
permit commercial UAS operations. 

You asked us to assess efforts to safely integrate UASs into the 
national airspace system and the potential impact of those UASs after 
such integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the 
following research questions: (1) What are the current and potential 
uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs 
safely and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the 
federal government's response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming 
that UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, how 
might they impact the system and the environment? 

To address these questions, we reviewed the literature, FAA and 
Department of Defense (DOD) documents, and aviation trade association 
reports. We also interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) about their operations and plans to operate UASs 
in the national airspace system. We interviewed officials in 
associations that represent UAS manufacturers and users of the national 
airspace system. To determine the expected growth of UASs, we obtained 
industry forecasts. Additionally, we administered a Web-based survey to 
23 UAS experts, selected with the assistance of the National Academies, 
to obtain their opinions of the steps that FAA could take to accelerate 
UAS integration in the national airspace system and the impact that 
UASs might have on the system and the environment after integration 
occurs.[Footnote 1] We conducted this performance audit from October 
2006 to May 2008, in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
(See app. I for additional information on our scope and methods.) 

Results in Brief: 

Federal agencies such as DHS, the Department of Commerce, and NASA use 
UASs in many areas, such as border security, weather research, and 
forest fire monitoring. These agencies have plans to expand their UAS 
use in domestic airspace, and local governments and commercial entities 
also have interest in using UASs. Many factors support the potential 
for expanded use of UASs. For example, the nation's industrial base has 
expanded to support military operations and the number of trained UAS 
operators is increasing as personnel return from overseas duty. 
Moreover, some of the technology used in military UAS operations could 
be applied to civil uses. DHS is expanding its use of UASs for border 
security and NASA is likely to continue using UASs to gather scientific 
data. Additionally, local law enforcement and firefighting agencies 
have expressed interest in using UASs to assist at crime scenes and 
wildfire locations, and commercial users envision using UASs for tasks 
such as photographing real estate or inspecting pipelines. According to 
an industry forecast, the market for government and commercial-use UASs 
could grow in the future. The forecast also indicates that the United 
States could account for 73 percent of the world's research and 
development investment for UAS technology over the coming decade. 
According to a UAS study and experts we surveyed, UAS development could 
lead to technological advances that could benefit all national airspace 
users. For example, some experts we surveyed noted that improved 
collision avoidance technologies developed for UASs could lead to 
reduced aircraft separation requirements, which could increase airspace 
capacity. Additionally, UASs could produce environmental benefits if 
they assume some missions currently performed by manned aircraft by 
using quieter engines that produce fewer emissions, according to 
experts we surveyed. 

Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses technological, 
regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges. A key technological 
challenge is providing the capability for UASs to meet the safety 
requirements of the national airspace system. For example, a person 
operating an aircraft must maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid 
other aircraft. However, because UASs have no person on board the 
aircraft, on-board equipment, radar, or direct human observation must 
substitute for this capability. No technology has been identified as a 
suitable substitute for a person on board the aircraft in seeing and 
avoiding other aircraft. Additionally, UASs' communications and control 
links are vulnerable to unintentional or intentional radio interference 
that can lead to loss of control of an aircraft and an accident, 
[Footnote 2] and in the future, ground control stations--the UAS 
equivalent to a manned aircraft cockpit--may need physical security 
protection to guard against hostile takeover. Although DOD has achieved 
operational successes with its use of UASs in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
accidents of varying degrees of severity have resulted from UAS 
reliability problems and human factors issues, i.e., equipment designs 
that did not fully account for human abilities, characteristics, and 
limitations. Our analysis of 4Â½ years of DOD's data indicates that UAS 
component failures caused about 65 percent of the accidents and human 
factors issues--a common challenge in new technology--caused about 17 
percent of the accidents. Because a regulatory framework to ensure UAS 
safety does not exist, UASs have had only limited access to the 
national airspace, which, in turn, has created additional challenges. 
For example, UAS developers have faced a lack of airspace for testing 
and evaluating their products, and data on UAS operations in the 
national airspace, which could aid in developing regulations, is 
scarce. In the coming years, FAA could face a workload challenge in 
responding to increasing requests from federal agencies to operate UASs 
in the national airspace system. However, FAA's future workload is 
uncertain because there is no accurate inventory of federally-owned and 
-leased UASs. GSA has responsibility for maintaining the inventory of 
federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but its regulations have not been 
updated to require federal agencies to report UASs. Coordinating the 
efforts of federal agencies with those of academic institutions that 
have UAS expertise, and with the private sector, which has a stake in 
UASs obtaining routine airspace access, serves as another challenge. 

Addressing the challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the 
national airspace system involves the efforts of several federal 
agencies and could require a decade or more of additional work. FAA is 
addressing technological challenges by sponsoring research on topics 
such as detect, sense, and avoid, and taking steps to obtain dedicated 
radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations, which could address UAS 
communications and control vulnerabilities. DOD is addressing UAS 
reliability challenges by urging manufacturers to use redundant, fail 
safe designs, and has made some progress in addressing human factors 
challenges by standardizing some UAS ground control stations. 
Additionally, a federal advisory body is developing technical standards 
for UASs. However, DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
has not yet examined the security implications of routine UAS 
operations in the national airspace. Fully addressing regulatory 
challenges to allowing all UASs to have routine access to the national 
airspace system may not occur until 2020, after the aforementioned 
advisory body completes its technical standards work and FAA 
incorporates those standards in its regulations. In the interim, FAA 
has created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to coordinate efforts 
to develop standards and regulations. FAA is also developing a UAS 
program plan that would inform the aviation community of the steps and 
time frames required for providing routine UAS access. Although the 
plan was being developed in December 2006, it had not been approved for 
issuance as of March 2008. Additionally FAA is developing regulatory 
procedures to allow small UAS operations in the national airspace under 
low-risk conditions. FAA has established a 12,000 square mile UAS test 
center to provide airspace for testing and evaluating UASs and to 
provide data for use in developing regulations. FAA expects to obtain 
additional data from increased coordination with DOD. However, FAA has 
not yet analyzed the limited data that it has already accumulated on 
recent UAS operations in the national airspace system, citing resource 
constraints. To address expected workload increases, FAA is introducing 
more automation into its work processes and has granted DOD authority 
to operate small UASs, weighing 20 pounds or less, over its 
installations without receiving prior FAA approval. Additionally, GSA 
is updating its regulations to require federal agencies to report their 
owned and leased UASs, which could help FAA plan for its future 
workload. Given the variety of federal entities involved with UAS 
issues, as well as the stake that the private sector has in routine UAS 
operations in the national airspace system, experts and stakeholders 
suggested that an overarching entity be established to coordinate and 
expedite these efforts. Congress used a similar approach in 2003 when 
it passed legislation to create the Joint Planning and Development 
Office (JPDO), within FAA, to coordinate planning for the next 
generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies 
and the private sector. 

Because data on UAS operations in the national airspace system are 
scarce and routine operations are many years away, the impact of 
routine access on the system and the environment remains generally 
speculative. The impact will depend on a number of factors that, today, 
are unpredictable due to a lack of data. For example, one study notes 
that, while more needs to be known about the needs and capabilities of 
future UASs, their operations could have a disruptive impact on 
aviation by introducing more complexity. A federal advisory body has 
reported that UASs will create unique challenges because, in comparison 
to manned aircraft, UAS missions often involve hovering or circling in 
one location and UASs' speed, maneuverability, and climb rates, may 
differ from manned aircraft. These differences could affect air traffic 
flow, air traffic controller workload, and departure and arrival 
procedures. Many of the experts we surveyed predicted that UASs would 
add to the number of aircraft and therefore affect airspace and airport 
capacity and add to the workload of air traffic control in the same 
manner as additional manned aircraft. However, our experts also noted 
that, if UASs assume some missions currently performed by manned 
aircraft, and perform them with smaller and quieter engines, UASs could 
benefit the environment. 

We suggest that Congress consider creating an overarching body within 
FAA, as it did when it established JPDO, to coordinate the diverse 
efforts of federal agencies, academia, and the private sector in 
meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the 
national airspace system. We also recommend that FAA issue its UAS 
program plan, analyze the UAS operations data that it has collected, 
and establish a process to analyze DOD's data on UAS research, 
development, and operations. In addition, we recommend that DHS examine 
and fully address the security implications of routine civil UAS access 
in the national airspace system. We provided a draft of this report to 
the Department of Transportation (DOT), DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the 
Department of Commerce. DOT agreed to consider the relevant 
recommendations and DHS agreed with our recommendation to it. GSA 
commented that it will continue its efforts to ensure that FAA has 
accurate information on the number of federally-owned and -leased UASs. 
DOT commented that the report would benefit from additional information 
on the impact of UASs on airports. We revised the report to include 
DOT's concern that the impact of UASs on safety and capacity at 
airports requires further study. DOT, DOD, and DHS provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NASA and the Department 
of Commerce had no comments. 

Background: 

FAA defines an unmanned aircraft as one that is operated without the 
possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the 
aircraft. In the past, these aircraft were sometimes called "unmanned 
aerial vehicles," "remotely piloted vehicles," or "unmanned aircraft." 
FAA and the international community have adopted the term "unmanned 
aircraft system" to designate them as aircraft and to recognize that a 
UAS includes not only the airframe, but also the associated elements-- 
the control station and communications links--as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Conceptual Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of a conceptual unmanned aircraft 
system. The following information is provided with the illustration: 

Over the horizon link: between satellite and aircraft; 
Line of sight link: between aircraft and ground radar. 

Data and voice communications element: 
* Landline or communication relay services; 
* Uplink/downlink spectrum. 

Air vehicle element: 
* Airframe and structure; 
* Propulsion system; 
* Flight control system; 
* Communications suite; 
* Conflict avoidance system; 
* Navigation system; 
* Electrical system; 
* Flight recovery system. 

Control element: 
* Mission planning; 
* Mission control and operations; 
* Conflict avoidance monitoring; 
* Weather avoidance monitoring; 
* Maintenance and logistics; 
* Supply and provisioning; 
* Support and training; 
* Launch and recovery; 
* Towing and taxiing. 

Source: GAO and NASA. 

[End of figure] 

The capabilities of UASs differ from manned aircraft in several ways. A 
UAS can operate for far longer periods than an onboard pilot could 
safely operate an aircraft. Future scenarios envision UASs remaining 
aloft for weeks or even months using fuel cell technology or airborne 
refueling operations. UASs may fly at slower speeds than most manned 
aircraft; some operate at low altitude (between buildings) while others 
fly well above piloted aircraft altitudes. Some UASs can fly 
autonomously based on pre-programmed data or flight paths, while others 
fly based on commands from pilot-operated ground stations. UASs also 
vary widely in size, shape, and capabilities. Some UASs, such as the 
Global Hawk, have a wingspan as large as that of a Boeing 737. Others, 
because they do not need the power or physical size to carry a pilot, 
can be small and light enough to be launched by hand, as is the case 
for the SkySeer UAS shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Examples of UASs: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains six photographs with the following accompanying 
information: 

AerosondeÂ®[A]: 
Weight: 33.5 pounds; 
Launch mechanism: catapult or from roof of fast moving ground vehicle; 
Wingspan: 9.5 feet; 
Maximum speed: 60 knots; 
Maximum altitude: 15,000 feet; 
Mission duration: up to 30 hours; 
Current application: civil and military. 

SkySeer: 
Weight: 4 pounds; 
Launch mechanism: hand launch; 
Maximum speed: 24 knots; 
Maximum altitude: 11,000 feet; 
Mission duration: 50 minutes; 
Current application: civil. 

Predator B[B]: 
Weight: 10,000 pounds; 
Launch mechanism: runway; 
Wingspan: 66 feet; 
Maximum speed: over 220 knots; 
Maximum altitude: 50,000 feet; 
Mission duration: 30 hours; 
Current application: civil and military. 

ScanEagleâ¢: 
Weight: 38 pounds; 
Launch mechanism: catapult; 
Wingspan: 10.2 feet; 
Maximum speed: 70 knots; 
Maximum altitude: 16,400 feet; 
Mission duration: 20 hours; 
Current application: civil and military. 

RQ-4A[C]: 
Weight: 26,750 pounds; 
Launch mechanism: runway; 
Wingspan: 116 feet; 
Maximum speed: 350 knots; 
Maximum altitude: 65,000 feet; 
Mission duration: 32 hours; 
Current application: civil and military. 

Fire Scout: 
Weight: 3,150 pounds; 
Launch mechanism: vertical; 
Wingspan: 27.5 feet (rotor diameter); 
Maximum speed: 125 knots; 
Maximum altitude: 20,000 feet; 
Mission duration: up to 8 hours; 
Current application: military. 

Sources: AAI Corporation, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and Octatron Inc. 

[A] AerosondeÂ® is a registered trademark of Aerosonde Pty Ltd. 

[B] The civil version of the Predator B is shown. The military version 
of the Predator B is known as the Reaper (MQ-9). 

[C] Model shown is RQ-4A. The Air Force has begun procuring model 4B 
for which some characteristics differ. Model 4B's weight is 32,250 
pounds; wingspan is 131 feet; maximum speed is 340 knots; maximum 
altitude is 60,000 feet; and mission duration is 28 hours. 

[End of figure] 

DOD has pioneered UAS applications for wartime use and, in 2007, was 
the major user of UASs, primarily for ongoing conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. While many of DOD's UAS operations currently take place 
outside the United States, DOD needs access to the national airspace 
system for UASs to, among other things, transit from their home bases 
for training in restricted military airspace or for transit to overseas 
deployment locations.[Footnote 3] DOD officials stated that the need 
for military UAS access to the national airspace system is under 
review, and also noted that increased access would also allow their 
UASs to be more easily used to aid in fighting wildfires. 

Several federal agencies have roles related to UASs. FAA is responsible 
for ensuring UASs are safely integrated into the national airspace 
system's air traffic control procedures, airport operations, and 
infrastructure, and with existing commercial, military, and general 
aviation users of the system. When UASs operate in that system, they 
must meet the safety requirements of the U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations, Title 14, parts 61 and 91.[Footnote 4] FAA approves, on a 
case-by-case basis, applications from government agencies and private- 
sector entities for authority to operate UASs in the national airspace 
system. Federal, state, and local government agencies must apply for 
Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), while private-sector 
entities must apply for special airworthiness certificates. In either 
case, FAA examines the facts and circumstances of proposed UAS 
operations to ensure that the prospective operator has acceptably 
mitigated safety risks. Special airworthiness certificates are the only 
means through which private-sector entities can operate UASs in the 
national airspace system. Because special airworthiness certificates do 
not allow commercial operations, there is currently no means for 
authorizing commercial UAS operations. 

NASA has conducted UAS research in the past. NASA led the 9-year 
Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology Program that 
focused on UAS technology for high altitude, long-endurance aircraft 
engines, sensors, and integrated vehicles. NASA also played a key role 
in a partnership with other federal agencies and industry called 
"Access-5." Access-5 incorporated the efforts of the UAV National 
Industry Team, known as UNITE, formed by six private-sector aerospace 
firms, as well as FAA, DOD, and other industry participants. The Access-
5 partnership sought to achieve routine operations for high-level, long-
endurance UASs in the national airspace system. NASA contributed about 
75 percent of the funding for this effort and the partnership had laid 
out plans through 2010. Although the partnership ended in fiscal year 
2006 when NASA canceled its funding, the project claimed a number of 
accomplishments, including creating productive and cohesive working 
relationships among key stakeholders and recommendations to advance the 
introduction of UASs into the national airspace system. 

Other agencies and organizations have roles or interests relating to 
UASs. For example, DHS's TSA has authority to regulate security of all 
transportation modes, including non-military UASs, to ensure that 
appropriate security safeguards are in place. GSA has the 
responsibility for maintaining an inventory of all federally-owned or - 
leased aircraft, as reported by federal agencies. Additionally, a 
number of associations, representing private-sector aviation 
industries, such as airframe and components manufacturers, and users of 
the national airspace system, have interest in UASs progressing toward 
routine access to the system. We refer to officials of these 
associations as stakeholders in this report. 

Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government 
and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future: 

Several federal agencies are using UASs of varying sizes for missions 
ranging from forest fire monitoring to border security. These agencies 
are interested in expanded use of UASs and state and local governments 
would also like to begin using UASs for law enforcement or 
firefighting. UASs also could eventually have commercial applications. 

Federal Agencies Are Benefiting from Using UASs: 

Federal agencies use UASs for many purposes. NASA, for example, uses 
UASs as platforms for gathering scientific research data and has 
partnered with other government agencies to demonstrate and use UASs' 
unique capabilities. At its Wallops Island, Virginia, Flight Facility, 
NASA operates a small fleet of AerosondeÂ® UASs on a lease-to-fly basis 
for researchers. NASA also operates a modified Predator B UAS from its 
Dryden Flight Research Center, in California, and used it to aid 
firefighting efforts in southern California in 2007. During 2005, the 
Department of Commerce's National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) partnered with NASA and industry to use a UAS to 
fill data gaps in several areas, including climate research, weather 
and water resources forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management, 
and coastal mapping. During 2007, NOAA partnered with NASA to use an 
AerosondeÂ® UAS to gather data from Hurricane Noel and reported 
receiving valuable low-altitude data that could aid future weather 
forecasts and potentially reduce property damage and save lives. 

Several other federal agencies have benefited from using UASs. DHS's 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses Predator B UASs to help 
conduct surveillance along portions of the U.S. border with Mexico. 
(See fig. 3.) CBP credits its UAS operations as helping its agents make 
over 4,000 arrests and seize nearly 20,000 pounds of illegal drugs 
between September 2005 and March 2008. In the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, UASs searched for survivors in an otherwise inaccessible area 
of Mississippi. Additionally, in 2004, the U.S. Geological Survey and 
the U.S. Forest Service used a UAS to study renewed volcanic activity 
at Mount St. Helens, Washington. The UAS proved useful in this study 
because it could operate above the extreme heat and toxic gases and 
solids emitted by the volcano. 

Figure 3: CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007. 

Source: DHS. 

[End of figure] 

Interest Exists in Expanding UAS Operations to Obtain More Benefits: 

Recent events have contributed to increasing interest in expanding UAS 
operations. The nation's industrial base has expanded to support 
current overseas conflicts. Moreover, personnel returning from duty in 
war theaters provide a growing number of trained UAS operators. 
Advances in computer technology, software development, light weight 
materials, global navigation, advanced data links, sophisticated 
sensors, and component miniaturization also contribute to the 
heightened interest in using UASs in civilian roles. 

In addition, the military's use of UASs has raised the visibility of 
the possible benefits of using UASs in non-military applications. For 
example, the military recently demonstrated how operators can use UASs 
as communications platforms to bridge rugged terrain as shown in figure 
4. Disaster recovery officials could use UASs in a similar manner to 
help establish and maintain communications when the infrastructure is 
disabled or overloaded. The latter was an issue in the hours 
immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Figure 4: UASs Used as Communications Relays: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of how UASs are used as communications 
relays. The following information is depicted: 

Ground station 1: 
Link of sight link to UAS 1. 

UAS 1: 
Line of sight link to UAS 2 (above rugged terrain). 

UAS 2: 
Line of sight link to Ground station 2. 

Source: GAO and DOD. 

[End of figure] 

An industry forecast anticipates that federal agencies will continue to 
be the main users of large UASs for much of the coming decade. CBP is 
expanding its fleet of Predator B UASs. The agency received its fourth 
aircraft in February 2008 and expects to acquire two more during fiscal 
year 2008. CBP also plans to expand its UAS operations along the 
southern U.S. border, and in the spring of 2008, begin operations along 
the northern U.S. border, and then eventually expand operations to the 
Great Lakes and Caribbean. CBP's Air and Marine Operations Center in 
Riverside, California, will eventually control most of the agency's 
UASs via satellite link. DHS's Coast Guard is evaluating various UAS 
designs for future use in maritime border protection, law and treaty 
enforcement, and search and rescue. 

Expanded UAS use for scientific applications is also possible. 
According to NOAA, UASs have the potential to continue to fill critical 
observation gaps in climate change research, weather and water 
resources forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management, and coastal 
mapping. NOAA also anticipates further use of UASs for hurricane 
observation. Figure 5 illustrates how a high-altitude UAS might obtain 
hurricane data. The National Academies recently recommended that NASA 
should increasingly factor UAS technology into the nation's strategic 
plan for Earth science. In 2007, NASA acquired two Global Hawk UASs 
from the Air Force for potential use in long endurance missions 
monitoring polar ice melt or for gathering data on hurricane 
development 2,500 miles off the U.S. Atlantic coast. 

Figure 5: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection: 

[See PDF for image] 

The figure is an illustration of UAS use for hurricane data collection. 

The following is illustrated: 

* Base of operations link to satellite which links to UAS; 
* UAS climbs to an altitude of 60,000 feet; 
* UAS flies 1,500 nautical miles in transit to hurricane (12-24 hours); 
* UAS flies above hurricane collecting real-time data; 
- Expendable sensors collect air and ocean data; 
* UAS returns to base of operations. 

Sources: GAO and AeroVironment. 

[End of figure] 

State and local agencies and commercial users envision using smaller 
UAS models. To facilitate more rapid resolution of emergency 
situations, an official with the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police envisions police and firefighting units having small, hand- 
deployed UASs available to assist at crime scenes and wildfire 
locations. According to FAA, as of January 2008, about a dozen law 
enforcement agencies had contacted the agency to discuss potential use 
of UASs. An industry forecast of UAS growth from 2008 to 2017 predicts 
that interest among local law enforcement agencies in operating UASs 
could increase late in the forecast period.[Footnote 5] 

In the private sector, some entrepreneurs have become interested in 
obtaining authorization to use small UASs to provide real estate 
photography services. Small UASs could also help companies survey 
pipeline or transportation infrastructure. However, an industry 
forecast noted that, for commercial applications, manned aircraft 
continue to be less costly than UASs. Consequently, demand for 
commercial applications will be limited in the near term. While the 
forecast indicates that civil and commercial UAS markets will 
eventually emerge, the forecast notes that, for the next several years, 
a more likely scenario would be for a UAS leasing industry to emerge to 
serve the needs of businesses that do not want to invest in UAS 
ownership. 

UASs also could provide benefits to manned aviation. Efforts to move 
toward routine access for UASs could produce technological improvements 
in areas such as materials, fuel cells, antennae, and laser 
communications, which could also benefit manned aviation, according to 
one study of UAS impact.[Footnote 6] Some experts we surveyed had 
similar observations, noting that advancements in see and avoid 
technology could lead to reduced aircraft separation requirements and, 
in turn, to increased airspace capacity. Five experts indicated that 
technological improvements could benefit the airspace, and four 
indicated that such improvements could benefit airports.[Footnote 7] 
Additionally, five experts predicted that UASs could provide a variety 
of benefits by assuming some of the missions currently performed by 
manned aircraft or surface vehicles. These experts predicted that UASs 
might perform these missions in less congested airspace or with engines 
that burn less fuel or produce less air pollution. 

Some experts view the routine use of UASs in the national airspace 
system as a revolutionary change in aviation. According to one study, 
the state of UASs today resembles the early days of manned aviation 
where innovation and entrepreneurial spirit spawned a new market and 
permanently changed the transportation landscape. The UAS industry is 
poised to meet the potential demand for UASs. A 2004 study, prepared 
for JPDO, reported that 49 UAS manufacturers operated in the United 
States.[Footnote 8] According to a 2007 industry estimate, UAS 
development and components manufacturing involved over 400 companies in 
the United States.[Footnote 9] An industry forecast for UASs indicates 
that, over the coming decade, the United States will account for 73 
percent of the world's research and development investment for UAS 
technology.[Footnote 10] The aforementioned 2004 JPDO report notes that 
the emergence of a civil UAS industry could provide a number of 
economic, social, and national security benefits, such as extending 
U.S. aerospace leadership in the global UAS market; sustaining, and 
perhaps increasing, employment in the U.S. aerospace industry; 
contributing to expanding the U.S. economy by increasing domestic 
productivity and aerospace exports; and creating the potential for a 
UAS civil reserve fleet for use in major national and international 
emergencies.[Footnote 11] 

Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological, 
Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges: 

Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses a variety of 
technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges. 
Technological challenges include developing a capability for UASs to 
detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft; addressing communications and 
physical security vulnerabilities; improving UAS reliability; and 
improving human factors considerations in UAS design. A lack of 
regulations for UASs limits their operations and leads to a lack of 
airspace for UAS testing and evaluation and a lack of data that would 
aid in setting standards. Increased workload would stem from FAA's 
expectation of increased demand for UAS operations in the national 
airspace system without a regulatory framework in place. In addition, 
coordination of efforts is lacking among diverse federal agencies as 
well as academia and the private sector in moving UASs toward meeting 
the safety requirements of the national airspace system. 

Several Technological Issues Must Be Addressed before UASs Can 
Routinely Access the National Airspace System: 

FAA requires UASs to meet the national airspace system's safety 
requirements before they routinely access the system. However, UASs do 
not currently have the capability to detect, sense, and avoid other 
aircraft and airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft. 
UASs also have communications and physical security vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, some UASs have demonstrated reliability problems and lack 
human-machine interface considerations in their design. 

UASs Cannot Detect, Sense, and Avoid Other Aircraft in a Manner Similar 
to Manned Aircraft: 

Although research, development, and testing of sense and avoid 
technologies has been ongoing for several years, no suitable technology 
has been identified that would provide UASs with the capability to meet 
the detect, sense, and avoid requirements of the national airspace 
system. These requirements call for a person operating an aircraft to 
maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Without a 
pilot on board to scan the sky, UASs do not have an on-board capability 
to directly "see" other aircraft. Consequently, the UAS must possess 
the capability to sense and avoid the object using on-board equipment, 
or do so with assistance of a human on the ground or in a chase 
aircraft, or by using other means, such as radar. Many UASs, 
particularly smaller models, will likely operate at altitudes below 
18,000 feet, sharing airspace with other objects, such as gliders. 
Sensing and avoiding these other objects represents a particular 
challenge for UASs, since the other objects normally do not transmit an 
electronic signal to identify themselves and FAA cannot mandate that 
all aircraft or objects possess this capability so that UASs can 
operate safely. Many small UAS models do not have equipment to detect 
such signals and, in some cases, are too small to carry such equipment. 
The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association,[Footnote 12] in a 2006 
survey of its membership, found that UASs' inability to see and avoid 
manned aircraft is a priority concern. Additionally, the experts we 
surveyed suggested, more frequently than any other alternative, 
conducting further work on detect, sense, and avoid technology as an 
interim step to facilitate UAS integration into the national airspace 
system while FAA develops a regulatory structure for routine UAS 
operations. 

The effort to develop the Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance 
System (TCAS), used widely in manned aircraft to help prevent 
collisions, demonstrates the challenge of developing a detect, sense, 
and avoid capability for UASs. Although FAA, airlines, and several 
private-sector companies developed TCAS over a 13-year period, at a 
cost of more than $500 million, FAA officials point out that the 
designers did not intend for TCAS to act as the sole means of avoiding 
collisions and that the on board pilot still has the responsibility for 
seeing and avoiding other aircraft. FAA officials also point out that 
TCAS computes collision avoidance solutions based on characteristics of 
manned aircraft, and does not incorporate UASs' slower turn and climb 
rates in developing conflict solutions. Consequently, FAA officials and 
stakeholders we interviewed believe that developing the detect, sense, 
and avoid technology that UASs would need to operate routinely in the 
national airspace system poses an even greater challenge than TCAS did. 
FAA officials believe that an acceptable detect, sense, and avoid 
system for UASs could cost up to $2 billion to complete and is still 
many years away. 

UASs Have Communications, Command, Control, and Physical Security 
Vulnerabilities: 

Ensuring uninterrupted command and control for a UAS is important 
because without it, the UAS could collide with another aircraft or, if 
it crashes to the earth, cause injury or property damage. The lack of 
protected radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations heightens the 
possibility that an operator could lose command and control of the UAS. 
Unlike manned aircraft, which use dedicated, protected radio 
frequencies, UASs currently use unprotected radio spectrum and, like 
any other wireless technology, remain vulnerable to unintentional or 
intentional interference. This remains a key security vulnerability for 
UASs, because in contrast to a manned aircraft where the pilot has 
direct, physical control of the aircraft, interruption of radio 
frequency, such as by jamming, can sever the UASs' only means of 
control. One of the experts we surveyed listed providing security and 
protected spectrum among the critical UAS integration technologies. 

To address the potential interruption of command and control, UASs 
generally have pre-programmed maneuvers to follow if the command and 
control link becomes interrupted (called a "lost-link scenario") and a 
means for safe return to the ground if operators cannot reestablish the 
communications link before the UAS runs out of fuel. However, these 
procedures are not standardized across all types of UASs and, 
therefore, remain unpredictable to air traffic controllers. 
Predictability of UAS performance under a lost link scenario is 
particularly important for air traffic controllers who have 
responsibility for ensuring safe separation of aircraft in their 
airspace. 

Ensuring continuity of UAS command and control also depends on the 
physical security provided to UASs. Presently, UAS operations in the 
national airspace are limited and take place under closely controlled 
conditions. However, this could change if UASs have routine access to 
the national airspace. One study identifies security as a significant 
issue that could be exacerbated with the proliferation of UASs. TSA 
notes that in 2004, terrorists flew a UAS over northern Israel. 
[Footnote 13] One stakeholder questioned how we could prevent this from 
happening in the United States. UASs have the capability to deliver 
nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads, and can be launched 
undetected from virtually any site. In response to the events of 
September 11, 2001, entry doors to passenger airplane cockpits were 
hardened to prevent unauthorized entry. However, no similar security 
requirements exist to prevent unauthorized access to UAS ground control 
stations--the UAS equivalent of the cockpit. Security is a latent issue 
that could impede UAS developments even after all the other challenges 
have been addressed, according to one study. 

UASs Have Shown a Lack of Reliability: 

Although DOD has obtained benefits from its UAS operations overseas, 
the agency notes in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap[Footnote 14] that UAS 
reliability is a key factor in integrating UASs into the national 
airspace system.[Footnote 15] Our analysis of information that DOD 
provided on 199 military UAS accidents, of varying degrees of severity, 
that occurred over 4Â½ years during operations Enduring Freedom and 
Iraqi Freedom, indicates that reliability continues to be a challenge. 
About 65 percent of the accidents resulted from materiel issues, such 
as failures of UAS components.[Footnote 16] 

Studies indicate that a number of factors could contribute to UAS 
reliability problems. Many UASs have been designed primarily as 
expendable or experimental vehicles, where factors such as cost, 
weight, function, and performance outweigh reliability concerns, 
according to a 2004 study.[Footnote 17] The Congressional Research 
Service reported in 2006 that the lack of reliability stems from the 
fact that UAS technology is still evolving, and, consequently, less 
redundancy is built into the operating system of UASs than of manned 
aircraft, and until redundant systems are perfected, accident rates are 
expected to remain high.[Footnote 18] Reliability issues also stem from 
the nature of the components used in some UASs. A DOD report notes that 
there has been a tendency to design UASs at low cost using readily 
available materials that were not intended for use in an aviation 
environment. For example, one UAS used by DOD was equipped with a 
wooden propeller that could disintegrate in the rain.[Footnote 19] A 
composite or metal propeller could cost two to three times more than a 
wooden propeller. 

Human Factors Deficiencies in UAS Design Have Caused Accidents: 

UAS developers have not yet fully incorporated human factors 
engineering in their products. Such engineering incorporates what is 
known about people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations 
in the design of the equipment they use, the environments in which they 
function, and the jobs they perform. According to researchers and 
agency officials we interviewed, technology in its early developmental 
stages typically lacks human factors considerations. Researchers noted 
that UASs, similar to any new technology, have been designed by 
engineers who focused on getting the technology to work, without 
considering human factors, such as ease of use by non-engineers. FAA 
officials noted that UASs today are at a similar stage as personal 
computers in their early years before newer, more user-friendly 
operating systems became standard. Studies indicate that human factors 
issues have contributed to military UAS accidents and DOD has indicated 
the need for further work in this area.[Footnote 20] Our analysis of 
DOD's data on UAS accidents during Operation Enduring Freedom and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that 17 percent were due to human 
factors issues. 

Several human factors issues have yet to be resolved. For example, the 
number of UASs that a single ground-based pilot can safely operate 
remains undetermined, as some future scenarios envision a single pilot 
operating several UASs simultaneously. Other unresolved issues include 
how pilots or air traffic controllers respond to the lag in 
communication of information from the UAS, the skill set and medical 
qualifications required for UAS pilots,[Footnote 21] and UAS pilot 
training requirements.[Footnote 22] 

The variety of ground control station designs across UASs is another 
human factors concern. For example, pilots of the Predator B UAS 
control the aircraft by using a stick and pedals, similar to the 
actions of pilots of manned aircraft. In contrast, pilots of the Global 
Hawk UAS use a keyboard and mouse to control the aircraft. Differences 
in UAS missions could require some variation among control station 
designs, but the extent to which regulations should require 
commonalities across all ground control stations awaits further 
research. 

The transition from one crew to another while UASs are airborne serves 
as another human factors issue needing resolution. Because UASs have 
the capability of extended flight, one crew can hand off control to 
another during a mission. Several military UAS accidents have occurred 
during these handoffs, according to a 2005 research study.[Footnote 23] 
The National Transportation Safety Board cited a similar issue in its 
report on the April 26, 2006, crash of CBP's Predator B UAS. According 
to the report, the pilot inadvertently cut off the UAS's fuel supply 
when he switched from a malfunctioning console to a functioning 
one.[Footnote 24] When the switch was made, a lever on the second 
console remained in a position that would cut off the fuel supply if an 
operator used the console to control the aircraft. Although procedures 
required that the controls on the two consoles be matched prior to 
making such a switch, this procedure was not followed. CBP reports that 
it has taken action to address this issue and has also addressed nearly 
all of the board's other recommendations stemming from this accident. 

A remote pilot's lack of situational awareness serves as another human 
factors-related challenge for the safe operation of UASs. For example, 
FAA officials have noted that situational awareness remains a key 
factor for operators to detect and appropriately respond to turbulence. 
A pilot on board an aircraft can physically sense and assess the 
severity of turbulence being encountered, whereas a remote pilot 
cannot. A UAS could break apart and become a hazard to other aircraft 
or to persons or property on the ground if the pilot has no indication 
of turbulence or its severity. Even if a remote pilot had an awareness 
of the turbulence, the level of risk that the pilot might accept needs 
further study. Because a pilot does not risk his own safety when 
operating a UAS, the pilot may operate the UAS in situations unsuitable 
for the aircraft, such as flying through turbulence strong enough to 
destroy the UAS's airframe. 

Although many experts and aviation stakeholders believe that the 
technical issues discussed above represent difficult challenges for UAS 
integration into the national airspace system, others do not. For 
example, DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap asserts that the technology for 
detecting and maneuvering to avoid objects does not present a major 
obstacle. Some experts responding to our survey expressed similar 
opinions. For example, one noted that technology needed to safely 
integrate UASs into the national airspace system exists today and that 
implementation should be the focus. Another said that FAA is too slow 
in adopting new technology and that sense and avoid techniques are 
available today that, when used in combination with a qualified pilot 
at the ground station's controls, would be sufficient to allow free 
access for larger UASs. However, FAA expects to continue its current 
practice of allowing UAS access to the national airspace system on a 
case-by-case basis, after a safety review, until technology, research, 
and regulations mature. 

A Lack of Regulations Limits UAS Operations: 

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations[Footnote 25] prescribes rules 
governing the operation of most aircraft in the national airspace 
system. However, these regulations were developed for manned aircraft. 
Minimum performance standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and 
communications, command, and control capabilities, as well as 
regulations that incorporate these minimum standards, do not exist. 
Moreover, existing regulations may need changes or additions to address 
the unique characteristics of UASs. For example, because UASs do not 
need to be large or powerful enough to carry a pilot, they can be much 
smaller than any aircraft that today routinely operates in the national 
airspace system. Existing regulations were developed for aircraft large 
enough to carry a human. 

The lack of a regulatory framework has limited the amount of UAS 
operations in the national airspace system, which has, in turn, 
contributed to a lack of operational data on UASs and a lack of 
airspace in which developers can test and evaluate their products. An 
industry forecast indicates that growth in a civil UAS market is not 
likely until regulations exist that allow UASs to operate routinely. 
The forecast assumes that such regulations would be in place by 2012, 
but notes that few civil-use UASs would be produced in the near term, 
with numbers increasing towards 2017. (See fig. 6.) 

Figure 6: Forecast of Civil UASs Produced, 2008 through 2017: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Year: 2008; 
Civil UASs produced: 7. 

Year: 2009; 
Civil UASs produced: 7. 

Year: 2010; 
Civil UASs produced: 7. 

Year: 2011; 
Civil UASs produced: 7. 

Year: 2012; 
Civil UASs produced: 35. 

Year: 2013; 
Civil UASs produced: 67. 

Year: 2014; 
Civil UASs produced: 69. 

Year: 2015; 
Civil UASs produced: 84. 

Year: 2016; 
Civil UASs produced: 111. 

Year: 2017; 
Civil UASs produced: 161. 

Source: Teal Group Corporation, 2008. 

[End of figure] 

Studies indicate that the lack of regulations can affect liability risk 
of UAS operations, which can increase insurance costs. For example, 
without airworthiness standards, insurers would be even more concerned 
about the liability hazard of UASs crashing in a dense urban 
environment. The lack of regulations to govern access to airspace has 
also posed challenges for developers of civil UASs. Officials of 
associations representing UAS developers told us of difficulties in 
finding airspace in which to test and evaluate UASs. One of these 
officials noted that some manufacturers have their own test ranges, and 
some have access to restricted military airspace, but other UAS 
developers have not had this access. Additionally, because UAS 
operations in the national airspace have been limited, operational data 
is scarce. Having data on UAS operations is an important element in 
developing regulations. 

Because UASs have never routinely operated in the national airspace 
system, the level of public acceptance is unknown. One researcher 
observed that as UASs expand into the non-defense sector, there will 
inevitably be public debate over the need for and motives behind such 
proliferation. One expert we surveyed commented that some individuals 
may raise privacy concerns about a small aircraft that is "spying" on 
them, whether operated by law enforcement officials or by private 
organizations, and raised the question of what federal agency would 
have the responsibility for addressing these privacy concerns. On the 
other hand, a study for JPDO noted that if UASs were increasingly used 
to produce public benefits in large-scale emergency response efforts, 
public acceptance could grow as the public notes the benefits that UASs 
can provide.[Footnote 26] 

Coordinating with Other Countries' Efforts to Integrate UASs Is a Key 
Task: 

As other countries work toward integrating UASs in their respective 
airspaces, FAA faces a challenge to work with the international 
community in developing harmonized standards and operational procedures 
so that UASs can seamlessly cross international borders and U.S. 
manufacturers can sell their products in the global marketplace. 
International bodies such as the European Organization for Civil 
Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), and the European Organization for the 
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), as well as individual countries 
face challenges similar to those that the United States faces in 
integrating UASs into their respective airspaces. 

EUROCAE formed a working group--WG-73--in 2006 to focus on UAS issues. 
The working group completed its first product in January 2007--a 
preliminary inventory of airworthiness certification and operational 
approval items that need to be addressed. The working group also plans 
to develop a work plan that lays out work packages and timelines; a 
concept for UAS airworthiness certification and operational approval 
that will provide recommendations and a framework for safe UAS 
operations in non-segregated airspace[Footnote 27]; requirements for 
command, control, and communications, as well as for sense and avoid 
systems; and a catalog of UAS-air traffic management incompatibility 
issues that need to be addressed. 

EUROCONTROL has established a UAS Air Traffic Management Activity and 
is hosting workshops to seek feedback, suggestions, and advice from a 
broad range of aviation stakeholders on its approach to UAS integration 
into European airspace. The second workshop is scheduled for May 2008 
and is open to all interested civil and military stakeholders, 
including air navigation service providers, UAS operators and 
manufacturers, regulators, as well as associations and professional 
bodies. EURCONTROL has also established an Operational Air Traffic Task 
Force that has developed high-level specifications for military UASs 
operating outside segregated airspace in a form suitable for European 
states to incorporate into their national regulations. The 
specifications state that UAS operations should not increase the risk 
to other airspace users, that air traffic management procedures should 
mirror those applicable to manned aircraft, and that the provision of 
air traffic services to UASs should be transparent to air traffic 
controllers. 

Table 1 illustrates the variety of individual country efforts to 
integrate UASs into their respective airspaces. With the variety of 
ongoing efforts around the world, FAA and other countries face a 
challenge in harmonizing UAS standards and procedures. 

Table 1: Examples of UAS Integration Efforts in Other Countries: 

Country: United Kingdom; 
UAS integration efforts: "The Autonomous Systems Technology Related 
Airborne Evaluation and Assessment" project is focusing on the 
technologies, systems, facilities, and procedures that will allow UASs 
to operate safely and routinely in United Kingdom airspace. The project 
has received funding from the British government, industries, and 
universities and work has commenced to address topics such as 
communications, collision avoidance, operating rules and procedures, 
and integration with the operating environment. 

Country: Australia/New Zealand; 
UAS integration efforts: An Australian aerospace firm has commissioned 
a program, Unmanned Aircraft Technology Applications Research, to 
organize efforts to address UAS issues. The program has, in turn, 
established an Australian/New Zealand working group to use 
demonstration programs to solve the critical issues currently 
inhibiting commercial UAS operations. The working group includes 
global, regional, and Australian UAS manufacturers and operators, 
researchers, military aviation, and an international insurance 
underwriter. 

Country: Japan; 
UAS integration efforts: In 2004, a consortium of Japanese 
manufacturers and a government ministry completed formulation of safety 
guidelines for using unmanned helicopters for commercial purposes over 
unpopulated areas. This consortium became an association that includes 
additional manufacturers and individuals from universities and research 
agencies and plans to develop safety guidelines for UASs. Japan 
currently uses unmanned helicopters for pesticide spraying. 

Country: Canada; 
UAS integration efforts: In 2007, Transport Canada issued the Final 
Report of its Unmanned Air Vehicle Working Group. The working group 
developed a plan to safely integrate unmanned air vehicles into the 
Canadian airspace system. The working group included representation 
from government, defense, and private-sector entities. 

Country: Germany; 
UAS integration efforts: Germany has established a working group called 
"UAS-Deutschland" to facilitate the operation of UASs in German 
airspace. The working group is tasked with developing a national 
opinion concerning enabling the integration of UAS operations in non-
segregated airspace and preparing for and fostering international 
harmonization. Another working group called "UAV DACH" has been 
established for German-speaking countries--Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland--to develop standards for national and 
international regulations for civil and military UAS flights. The group 
is also charged with finding solutions for UAS technical challenges 
such as sensing and avoiding other aircraft. 

Source: FAA documents, Internet Web pages, a press release, and a UAS 
expert. 

[End of table] 

FAA Faces Increased Workload to Process COA and Special Airworthiness 
Certificate Applications for UAS Operations: 

FAA could face a workload challenge in conducting an increasing number 
of case-by-case safety reviews for proposed UAS operations in the 
national airspace system. FAA is already having difficulty in meeting 
its 60-calendar day goal for processing COAs, used for government 
requests to operate UASs. From December 2006 through January 2008, 
FAA's COA processing time averaged 66 calendar days[Footnote 28]. FAA 
anticipates a substantial increase in requests for COAs, as well as for 
special airworthiness certificates, used by private-sector entities 
proposing UAS operations in the national airspace system, by 2010. (See 
figs. 7 and 8.) Increased demand could result in even longer processing 
times for COAs. 

Figure 7: Applications for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization, 
Received in Calendar Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Year: 2005; 
Applications received: 24. 

Year: 2005; 
Applications received: 64. 

Year: 2006; 
Applications received: 102. 

Year: 2007; 
Applications received: 109. 

Year: 2008; 
Applications received: 153. 

Year: 2009; 
Applications received: 229. 

Year: 2010; 
Applications received: 343. 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 8: Applications for Special Airworthiness Certificates, Received 
in Fiscal Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data: 

Year: 2005; 
Applications received: 0. 

Year: 2005; 
Applications received: 1. 

Year: 2006; 
Applications received: 3. 

Year: 2007; 
Applications received: 15. 

Year: 2008; 
Applications received: 17. 

Year: 2009; 
Applications received: 24. 

Year: 2010; 
Applications received: 32. 

Source: FAA. 

[End of figure] 

A lack of knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs 
adds uncertainty to FAA's expected future workload. The number of COAs 
does not provide a count of federally-owned or -leased UASs because 
each COA reflects an authorization to operate a UAS, not the number of 
UASs owned or leased by an agency. According to FAA, an agency could 
have multiple copies of the same type of UAS whose operation is 
approved in a COA. Moreover, having multiple UASs of the same type 
could drive additional workload for FAA if the agency requests 
authorization to operate its UASs under different operating scenarios, 
each of which would require a separate COA. An agency could also have 
only one UAS, but more than one COA, if the agency required and 
received approval for the UAS to operate under different sets of 
conditions. GSA has responsibility for maintaining the inventory of 
federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but its regulations on reporting 
these aircraft have not been updated to require federal agencies to 
report UASs. 

Coordination among Federal Agencies and Others Is Lacking: 

Coordinating the efforts of numerous federal agencies, academic 
institutions, and private-sector entities that have UAS expertise or a 
stake in routine access to the national airspace system is a challenge. 
As discussed above, several federal agencies are involved to varying 
degrees in UAS issues. Additionally, academic institutions have UAS 
expertise to contribute and UAS manufacturers have a stake in supplying 
the demand for UASs that routine access could create. FAA and experts 
referenced the Access-5 program that, in the past, served as an 
overarching coordinating body and provided a useful community forum. 
While some experts believe that Access-5's focus on high-altitude, long-
endurance UASs is no longer appropriate, the program's institutional 
arrangements demonstrated how federal government and the private-sector 
resources could be combined to focus on a common goal. 

Stakeholders and experts we surveyed believe that coordination and 
focus are lacking among the diverse entities working on UAS issues, and 
expressed concerns that the potential public and economic benefits of 
UASs could be delayed while FAA develops the safety regulations 
required to enable routine UASs operations in the national airspace 
system. They noted the numerous potential uses in public safety, law 
enforcement, weather forecasting, and national security, discussed 
previously, stating that these benefits will be delayed until standards 
are developed. Some also noted that economic benefits realized through 
industry growth and productivity gains in the commercial sector would 
also be delayed. Additionally, some experts believe that, at the 
current pace of progress, the United States would lose its leadership 
position and manufacturers would move to other countries where the 
regulatory climate is more receptive. However, as previously noted, an 
industry forecast indicates that the United States will account for 
about two-thirds of the worldwide UAS research and development in the 
coming decade. 

Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could 
Take a Decade or Longer: 

FAA and other agencies have roles in addressing technological, 
regulatory, and workload challenges, but no entity is in charge of 
coordinating these efforts. FAA and DOD are addressing some 
technological challenges, but TSA has not addressed the security 
implications of routine UAS operations. FAA is establishing a 
regulatory framework, but routine UAS access to the national airspace 
may not occur for over a decade. FAA is mitigating its expected 
increased workload by automating some of its COA processing steps. GSA 
is updating its federal aircraft reporting requirements to include 
UASs. Experts and stakeholders believe that an overarching entity could 
add focus to these diverse efforts and facilitate routine UAS access to 
the national airspace system. 

Federal Agencies Are Addressing Some Technological Issues: 

FAA is addressing technological issues by sponsoring research and 
taking steps to address UAS vulnerabilities in communications, command, 
and control. DOD is taking steps toward improving UAS reliability and 
the extent of human factors consideration in UAS design. An FAA- 
sponsored federal advisory committee is developing technical standards 
for FAA to use in developing UAS regulations. Although TSA issued an 
advisory circular in 2004 on UAS security concerns, it has not 
addressed the security implications of routine UAS access in the 
national airspace system. 

FAA Is Sponsoring Research on Detect, Sense, and Avoid Technologies and 
Other Topics: 

FAA has budgeted $4.7 million for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for 
further UAS research on topics such as detect, sense, and avoid; 
command and control; and system safety management. NASA, FAA, and 
others have conducted tests to determine the capabilities of and 
potential improvements to detect, sense, and avoid technology. For 
example, in 2003, NASA installed radar on a manned aircraft that was 
equipped for optional control from the ground. The tests indicated that 
the radar detected intruding aircraft earlier than the onboard pilot, 
but also revealed the need for further work on the onboard sensing 
equipment to ensure adequate response time for the remote pilot. In 
another example, FAA and the Air Force Research Laboratory collaborated 
to execute flight tests for sense and avoid technology between October 
2006 and January 2007. According to a summary of the lessons learned 
from these tests, the results showed some promise, but indicated that 
much work and technology maturation would need to occur before the 
tested system could be deemed ready for operational use. 

FAA Has Begun to Address Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocation for UASs 
to Ensure Uninterrupted Communications, Command, and Control: 

Addressing the challenge of radio frequency allocation for UAS 
operations is moving forward, but may not be completed for several 
years. The International Telecommunication Union allocates radio 
frequency spectrum and deliberates such issues at periodic World 
Radiocommunication Conferences, the most recent of which was held in 
the fall of 2007. To obtain spectrum allocation for UASs, FAA has 
participated with the Department of Commerce in a national preparation 
process to place spectrum allocation decisions on the conference's 
future agenda. At the 2007 conference, delegates agreed to discuss at 
the next conference, in 2011, the spectrum requirements and possible 
regulatory actions, including spectrum allocations, needed to support 
the safe operation of UASs. The Department of Commerce and the Federal 
Communications Commission would jointly implement and manage the 
spectrum allocation decisions made at the 2011 conference, as these 
agencies manage, respectively, federal and non-federal use of frequency 
spectrum.[Footnote 29] 

DOD Is Working to Improve UAS Reliability and Incorporate Human Factors 
in UAS Design: 

DOD is urging manufacturers to increase UAS reliability while keeping 
costs low by using such practices as standard systems engineering, 
ensuring that replacement parts are readily available, and using 
redundant, fail-safe designs. DOD also notes in its Unmanned Systems 
Roadmap that, although UASs suffer accidents at one to two orders of 
magnitude greater than the rate incurred by manned military aircraft, 
accident rates have declined as operational experience increased. For 
some UASs, the accident rates have become similar to or lower than that 
of the manned F-16 fighter jet, according to the roadmap. According to 
a study by The MITRE Corporation, General Atomics designed the Predator 
B UAS with reliability in mind, and the Altair UAS, which is a modified 
version of the Predator, has, among other things, triple redundant 
avionics to increase reliability. 

The Army has made some progress in limiting the variety of ground 
control station designs for unmanned aircraft--a human factors concern-
-by developing its "One SystemÂ®," which involves a single ground 
control station capable of operating a variety of UASs. Further 
increasing standardization and interoperability across all unmanned 
systems is a continuing DOD goal. 

A Federal Advisory Body Is Developing Technical Standards: 

The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), a federal 
advisory committee sponsored by FAA,[Footnote 30] is establishing 
minimum performance standards for FAA to use in developing UAS 
regulations. RTCA established Special Committee 203 in October 2004 to 
develop such standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and for UAS 
communications, command, and control. Individuals from academia and the 
private sector serve on the committee without government compensation 
along with FAA, NASA, and DOD officials. 

Special Committee 203 has begun assessing the technological and 
regulatory landscape as it pertains to UASs to determine the scope of 
its task. The committee published guidance materials to provide a 
framework for its standards development effort and to help UAS 
designers, manufacturers, installers, service providers, and users 
understand the breadth of operational concepts and systems being 
considered for integration into the national airspace system.[Footnote 
31] The committee anticipates that the guidance will be further refined 
and validated as the standards development process moves along. 

According to a committee co-chair, the committee did not realize, at 
the outset, that developing technical standards for UASs would be a 
project of unprecedented complexity and scope for RTCA. RTCA's projects 
have been narrower in scope in the past, he said. Although the 
committee officials had previously estimated that the standards would 
be completed by 2011 or 2012, the completion date is now between 2017 
and 2019. The additional time has been added to apply a data-driven, 
systems engineering approach that will require the collaborative 
efforts of FAA, DOD, and MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System 
Development.[Footnote 32] 

RTCA anticipates that reliability and human factors requirements will 
be integrated into its minimum performance standards. The guidance 
materials note that UASs must meet the same reliability as manned 
aircraft, and that reliability is an important component of safety; 
flight control systems; certification requirements for detect, sense, 
and avoid avionics; and for command and control systems such as the 
UAS's autopilot. According to RTCA officials, human factors will be an 
overarching consideration in standards development. 

Security Implications of Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace 
System Have Not Been Addressed: 

Although UASs remain vulnerable to many of the same security risks as 
manned aircraft, little attention has been afforded to UAS security. In 
2004, TSA issued an advisory that described possible terrorist interest 
in using UASs as weapons. The advisory noted the potential for UASs to 
carry explosives or disperse chemical or biological weapons. However, 
the advisory noted that there was no credible evidence to suggest that 
terrorist organizations plan to use UASs in the United States and 
advised operators to stay alert for UASs with unusual or unauthorized 
modifications or persons observed loitering in the vicinity of UAS 
operations, loading unusual cargo into a UAS, appearing to be under 
stress, showing identification that appeared to be altered, or asking 
detailed questions about UAS capabilities. In 2007, the agency advised 
model aircraft clubs to fly their aircraft only at chartered club 
facilities or at administered sites and to notify local authorities of 
scheduled flying events. 

TSA considers these actions appropriate to address the security threat 
posed by UASs. According to TSA, the agency uses a threat based, risk 
management approach to prioritize risk, threats, and vulnerabilities in 
order to appropriately apply resources and implement security 
enhancements. TSA informed us that the agency continues to monitor 
threat information regarding UASs and has processes in place to act 
quickly to mitigate and respond to any identified vulnerabilities. 
While these actions may be appropriate for the low tempo of today's UAS 
operations, growth forecasts indicate that UASs could proliferate in 
the national airspace in the future. Such a proliferation could 
increase the risk of UASs being used by terrorists for attacks in the 
United States. A lack of analysis of security issues, while FAA 
develops the regulatory framework, could lead to further delays in 
allowing UASs routine access to the national airspace system. 

FAA Is Establishing a Regulatory Framework, but Routine UAS Access to 
the National Airspace May Not Occur for a Decade or More: 

FAA has established a UAS program office and is reviewing the body of 
manned aviation regulations to determine the modifications needed to 
address UASs, but these modifications may not be completed until 2020. 
As an interim step, FAA has begun an effort to provide increased access 
to the national airspace system for small UASs. FAA is taking steps to 
develop data to use in developing standards, but has been slow to 
analyze the data that it has already collected. FAA is also 
coordinating with other countries to harmonize regulations. 

FAA Has Created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to Ensure That UASs 
Operate Safely: 

In February 2006, FAA created the Unmanned Aircraft Program Office 
(UAPO) to develop policies and regulations to ensure that UASs operate 
safely in the national airspace system. With 19 staff, UAPO serves as 
FAA's focal point to coordinate efforts to address UAS technical and 
regulatory challenges and for outreach to other government agencies, 
the private sector, and other countries and international bodies 
working on UASs integration challenges. UAPO is developing a program 
plan to inform the aviation community of FAA's perspective on all that 
needs to be accomplished and the time frames required to create a 
regulatory framework that will ensure UAS safety and allow UASs to have 
routine access to the national airspace system. Although officials 
informed us that this plan was in progress in December 2006, as of 
March 2008 the plan was awaiting final approval for release. Issuing 
the program plan could provide industry and potential UAS users with a 
framework that describes FAA's vision and plans for integrating UASs 
into the national airspace system. 

While RTCA is developing minimum performance standards for UASs, FAA 
has begun to review the existing body of regulations for manned 
aviation to determine what regulations need to be modified or whether 
new regulations are needed to address the unique characteristics of 
UASs. Some of the rules for manned aircraft may not apply to UASs. For 
example, the rule requiring that oxygen be on board for passenger use 
on all aircraft operating above 14,000 feet would not apply to a UAS. 
On the other hand, new standards may be needed. For example, while FAA 
has developed standards for manned airframe stress, no similar standard 
exists for UASs. UASs may require unique standards because, as 
mentioned previously in this report, a remote pilot cannot physically 
experience and judge the severity of turbulence that could potentially 
harm the airframe and cause an accident. 

However, UASs may not receive routine access to the national airspace 
system until 2020. FAA's final step in developing UAS regulations must 
wait until the 2017 to 2019 time frame, after RTCA's Special Committee 
203 develops minimum technical standards for UASs. FAA would then 
conduct a rulemaking to adopt the committee's standards, which would 
require an additional year, according to an FAA official. 

As an interim effort to increase UAS access to the national airspace 
system, FAA began an effort in 2007 to establish regulations to 
incrementally allow small UASs to operate in the national airspace 
system, under low-risk conditions without undergoing the case-by-case 
approval process that is currently required. FAA has established a plan 
to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking by July 2009 and a final 
rule by 2010 or 2011. Although FAA has not reached any final decisions, 
FAA may limit these regulations to UASs weighing less than 30 pounds, 
operating within line of sight, and traveling at speeds less than 40 
knots, according to an FAA official.[Footnote 33] FAA is considering 
using a nontraditional certification approach that would allow 
applicants to register small UASs using a Web-based tool. FAA 
anticipates that, following the rulemaking, it will obtain data and 
experience with UAS operations that could lead to further gradual 
expansion of small UAS access to the national airspace system. 

Allowing incremental access of certain UASs that pose low risks is 
consistent with pending legislation[Footnote 34] and local government 
agencies and potential commercial operators have expressed much 
interest in operating small UASs. However, FAA recognizes that some 
small UASs may never have routine access to the national airspace 
system because their small size limits their ability to carry detect, 
sense, and avoid equipment. Additionally, FAA notes that, like all 
UASs, small UASs will require secure radio frequency spectrum for 
command and control, and this issue has not yet been resolved. 

FAA Seeks Data on UAS Operations, but Progress Is Slow: 

The absence of a comprehensive database on UAS safety and reliability 
that could inform the standards and regulations development process 
hinders FAA's efforts to establish a regulatory framework for UASs. FAA 
has been working to leverage DOD's decades of experience with UASs. 
Collaboration between FAA and DOD could provide mutual benefits. DOD 
plans to spend over $7 billion in research, development, test, and 
evaluation funds for UASs between fiscal years 2007 and 2013. Data from 
these efforts could facilitate FAA's development of a regulatory 
framework to allow UASs to have routine access to the national airspace 
system. DOD would benefit from this access by being able to operate its 
UASs in the national airspace, without first obtaining a COA, as UASs 
transit from home bases to training areas or to overseas deployment. To 
this end, FAA and DOD finalized a memorandum of agreement in September 
2007 that provides a formal mechanism for FAA to request, and DOD to 
provide, data on UAS operations to support safety studies. Through the 
memorandum, FAA will share the results of its studies with DOD and vice 
versa. FAA also participates with DOD on a joint integrated product 
team that is focusing on obtaining military UAS access to the national 
airspace system. According to DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the 
team's activities include modeling and simulation, technology 
development, acquisition, demonstrations, and flight tests. 

While DOD's extensive experience with UAS operations and its 
accumulated data represent potentially rich sources of information on 
UAS operations, regulators should use such information with the 
understanding that it comes from a wartime operating environment. FAA 
and DOD officials acknowledge that military experience and operational 
data on UASs are not always directly transferable to operations in the 
national airspace system. The military's use of UASs is focused on 
mitigating the danger to troops. Safety and reliability risks that may 
be appropriate in a war zone to protect troops may not be acceptable in 
the national airspace system. 

FAA's efforts to develop and analyze UAS operations data are a good 
start, but FAA has not yet analyzed the data that it has already 
collected. The COA requires the applicant to provide FAA with a variety 
of operational data, such as the number of flights conducted, the pilot 
duty time per flight, equipment malfunctions, and information on any 
accidents. FAA has been archiving this information as it is received, 
but has not analyzed it because of resource constraints, according to a 
UAPO official. Analyzing this data could add to the information 
available for developing standards. 

As a vehicle for collecting data on UAS operations and to address the 
challenge that UAS developers have had in finding airspace for testing 
and evaluating their products, FAA has established a UAS test center at 
New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico. FAA expects that 
UAS operations at the test center, which opened in the spring of 2008, 
will provide FAA with some of the data needed to develop standards and 
regulations for allowing routine UAS access to the national airspace 
system. The university will operate the 12,000 square mile test center, 
where UASs can operate at altitudes up to 18,000 feet. (See fig. 9.) 
The university has several years of experience in demonstrating, 
testing, and evaluating UAS technologies. The New Mexico environment 
has the advantage of a very low population density and a low volume of 
air traffic, and the test center is located over mostly undeveloped 
government-owned land. FAA will provide oversight of the test center 
operation by way of announced and unannounced visits, according to an 
FAA official. 

Figure 9: UAS Test Center at New Mexico State University: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of New Mexico with an area of detail shown 
indicating the UAS test center at New Mexico State University. 

Source: GAO and FAA. 

[End of figure] 

FAA Is Coordinating with Other Countries to Harmonize Regulations: 

To address the challenge of coordinating U.S. efforts with those of 
other countries, FAA is working with international aviation bodies and 
maintaining contact with other countries as they also work to overcome 
the challenges of integrating UASs into their respective airspaces. For 
example, the manager of FAA's UAPO serves as a vice chairman of 
EUROCAE's WG-73,[Footnote 35] and FAA has established a collaborative 
effort with EUROCONTROL to leverage mutual expertise and resources. FAA 
told us that the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO)[Footnote 36] has formed a study group to identify changes needed 
in global standards and practices to address UAS issues. FAA has also 
established a memorandum of cooperation with the Netherlands' Civil 
Aviation Authority to work on UAS technology, hazards, and risks. FAA 
plans to contribute, subject to appropriations, $1 million during 
fiscal years 2007 through 2011, to provide the Netherlands with data 
and expertise, while the Netherlands plans to contribute â¬160,000 
($251,279).[Footnote 37] FAA has received briefings on Japan's use of 
UASs for pesticide spraying and has collaborated with several countries 
to address UAS issues with ICAO. 

FAA's efforts to work with the international community could facilitate 
mutual sharing of experiences and substantially increase the amount of 
information available to all countries. One stakeholder suggested 
Israel as a potential source of data, as that country has had extensive 
experience with UAS operations. An Israel Space Agency official, noting 
the growing importance of UASs in that country, stated that the numbers 
of unmanned aircraft in the Israel Air Force will outnumber manned 
aircraft within 20 years. The official also stated that in a recent 
conflict, Israel's UASs compiled more flying hours than manned 
aircraft. 

FAA Is Mitigating Anticipated Workload Increase by Automating Some COA 
Processing Steps, and GSA Is Working to Develop an Inventory of Federal 
UASs: 

FAA has taken some actions to mitigate the workload challenge stemming 
from an anticipated increase in requests for COAs to operate UASs in 
the national airspace system. During the spring of 2007, FAA began to 
introduce more automation into its COA review process for UASs and has 
plans for increasing automation. For example, FAA established a Web- 
based COA application, which became mandatory for applicants' use on 
July 1, 2007. FAA officials believe that the Web-based process allows 
applicants to more easily determine the application's requirements, 
thereby eliminating rework and repeated reviews before FAA accepts the 
application. FAA also expects that the September 2007 memorandum of 
agreement with DOD will reduce the number of COA applications because 
it allows DOD to conduct certain operations with UASs weighing 20 
pounds or less over military installations and in other specified 
airspace without obtaining a COA.[Footnote 38] Additionally, FAA is 
working to identify characteristics of routine COA applications, which 
FAA estimates constitute up to 80 percent of total COA applications, 
enabling agency staff to focus limited resources on non routine cases. 
Focusing less attention on routine cases is consistent with comments 
from three of our experts who noted the need for an expedited process 
for obtaining COAs and special airworthiness certificates. FAA 
officials also stated that because applicants are becoming more 
familiar with COA requirements, a higher percentage of applications do 
not need additional work and review. 

Knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs could help 
FAA to plan for future workload. Forecasters indicate that UASs 
operated by federal agencies could be a major component of UAS growth 
in the immediate future. Although the current number of federally-owned 
or federally-leased UASs is unknown, GSA is taking steps to obtain this 
information. In response to our requests for data on the number of 
federally-owned or federally-leased UASs, GSA sent letters to federal 
agencies in February 2008, clarifying that FAA defines a UAS as an 
aircraft and requesting agencies to report their UASs by March 31, 
2008. GSA is also in the process of revising regulations to require 
federal agencies to include owned or leased UASs in their aircraft 
inventory reports. GSA expects to have its regulation updated by 
February 2009. GSA anticipates that the first public reporting of UASs 
will be in the fiscal year 2008 Federal Aviation Report, due by March 
31, 2009. This report could add a degree of certainty to FAA's future 
workload requirements. 

Experts and Stakeholders Believe an Overarching Entity Could Facilitate 
Efforts to Achieve Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace System: 

In addition to FAA, DOD, TSA, and GSA, other federal agencies, 
academia, and the private sector also have UAS expertise or a stake in 
obtaining routine UAS access to the national airspace system. For 
example, RTCA notes that developing standards will require 
collaboration with DOD's joint integrated product team and technical 
expertise from staff in MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System 
Development. DOD seeks expanded access to the national airspace and, as 
previously discussed, has extensive experience with operating its own 
UASs. Beyond DOD and FAA, other entities also have UAS expertise or a 
stake in achieving routine UAS access to the national airspace system. 
For example, DHS's CBP and Coast Guard need UAS access to the national 
airspace system to perform their missions. Several academic 
institutions have been involved in developing UAS technology in areas 
such as vehicle design and detect, sense, and avoid capability. 
Additionally, the private sector has a stake in being ready to respond 
to the anticipated market that could emerge when FAA makes routine 
access available to most UASs. Although FAA's UAPO serves as a focal 
point within FAA, the office has no authority over other agencies' 
efforts. 

Experts and stakeholders suggested that an overarching body might 
facilitate progress toward integrating UASs into the national airspace 
system. DOD, as the major user of UASs, is taking such an approach. DOD 
has recognized the need for coordination of UAS activities within its 
own sphere of influence, as each service has recognized the value of 
UASs for its respective missions. Consequently, DOD established an 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force to coordinate critical issues 
related to UAS acquisition and management within DOD. According to DOD, 
the task force will establish new teams or lead or coordinate existing 
Army, Navy, and Air Force teams to enhance operations, enable 
interdependencies, and streamline acquisitions. FAA is participating in 
a joint integrated product team that is part of this task force, and 
DOD has invited DHS to join the task force. 

The European Defense Agency has also recognized the challenge of 
channeling diverse entities, as well as multiple nation-states, toward 
the common goal of UAS access to non-segregated airspace. In January 
2008, the agency announced that it had awarded a contract to a 
consortium of defense and aerospace companies to develop a detailed 
roadmap for integrating, by 2015, UASs into European airspace. The 
project is intended to help European stakeholders such as airworthiness 
authorities, air traffic management bodies, procurement agencies, 
industry, and research institutes to develop a joint agenda for common 
European UAS activities. The consortium held its first workshop in 
February 2008 and has since prepared a roadmap outline based on the 
needs and requirements expressed by the stakeholders. The consortium 
has also identified as a baseline, key actions to be undertaken and key 
topics for further investigation. The consortium has invited 
stakeholders to discuss this common baseline at a second workshop, 
scheduled for May 2008. 

Congress addressed a similar coordination challenge in 2003 when it 
passed legislation to create JPDO to plan for and coordinate a 
transformation of the nation's current air traffic control system to 
the next generation air transportation system (NextGen) by 2025. 
NextGen involves a complex mix of precision satellite navigation; 
digital, networked communications; an integrated weather system; 
layered, adaptive security; and more. 

NextGen's coordination and planning challenges are similar to those 
posed by UASs. For example, as required for UAS integration, the 
expertise and technology required for NextGen resides in several 
federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. DOD has expertise 
in "network centric" systems, originally developed for the battlefield, 
which are being considered as a framework to provide all users of the 
national airspace system with a common view of that system. JPDO's 
responsibilities include coordinating goals, priorities, and research 
activities of several partner agencies, including DOD, FAA, the 
Department of Commerce, DHS, and NASA with aviation and aeronautical 
firms. Congress directed JPDO to prepare an integrated plan that would 
include, among other things, a national vision statement and a 
multiagency research and development roadmap for creating NextGen. The 
legislation called for the roadmap to identify obstacles, the research 
and development necessary to overcome them, and the roles of each 
agency, corporations, and universities. 

Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown: 

The impact of routine UAS operations on the national airspace system 
and the environment depends on a number of factors and remains 
generally speculative. UAS impact will depend on factors such as the 
number of UASs purchased for civil uses and the altitudes and 
geographic locations where they are used. Stakeholders whom we 
interviewed provided a variety of perspectives on UASs' potential 
impact. One official told us that UASs that use airports will impact 
air traffic control, while the impact of small UASs that do not need to 
use airports is less clear. Officials also noted that the level of risk 
depends on factors such as the UAS's weight and horsepower. For 
example, a small, 2-or 3-pound UAS would pose little risk to aircraft 
or people on the ground, but UASs weighing more than 20 pounds could do 
significant damage to an aircraft. Officials also noted that a UAS used 
over a sparsely populated area would have less impact than UAS 
operations over densely populated areas. 

Predictions of the impact of UASs on the national airspace system are 
speculative because there are few data upon which to base predictions. 
Predictions become even more speculative in view of RTCA's recent 
estimate that minimum standards for UASs--a prerequisite for routine 
UAS access to the national airspace system--will require about another 
10 years to complete. One study notes that more needs to be known about 
the needs and capabilities of future UASs as well as the potential 
market, but concluded that their operations could have a significant 
and potentially disruptive impact on aviation by affecting capacity and 
introducing more complexity. In 2007, RTCA's Special Committee 203 
reported similar concerns, indicating that UASs will create some unique 
challenges because they operate differently from typical manned 
aircraft. While manned aircraft generally go from one location to 
another, UASs may hover or circle in one location for a significant 
time. Additionally, UAS speed, maneuverability, climb rate and other 
performance characteristics may differ substantially from those of 
conventional aircraft. The committee believes that these 
characteristics could affect air traffic flow, air traffic controller 
workload, and departure and arrival procedures, among other things. 
Similarly, FAA officials noted that UASs pose airport safety and 
capacity questions that require further analysis. 

Most of the experts stated that the impact of UAS's would be at least 
as significant as that of additional manned aircraft on airspace, 
airports, and air traffic control. For example, they predicted that, as 
with manned aircraft, UASs would add to the number of aircraft and, 
therefore, affect airspace and airport capacity and add to the workload 
of air traffic controllers. However, the experts also predicted that 
UASs could have a beneficial impact on the environment. The experts 
predicted that UASs could assume some missions currently performed by 
manned aircraft, but could perform these missions using engines that 
burn less fuel or produce less air pollution. 

Conclusion: 

Although ensuring that UASs operate safely in the national airspace 
system is a new and complex challenge for FAA, the national airspace 
system should be prepared to accommodate them. Understanding the 
issues, trends, and influences of UASs will be critical in 
strategically planning for the future airspace system. FAA is making 
progress in addressing the challenges. Establishing a UAS test center 
to provide UAS developers with airspace in which to test, evaluate, and 
refine their aircraft designs, and initiating efforts to increase 
airspace access for small UASs are significant steps. Moving forward, 
issuing FAA's long-awaited program plan should benefit the aviation 
community by communicating FAA's strategy of how it plans to address 
the interactive complexities and unique properties of UASs and how it 
plans to leverage the resources of multiple entities that have 
expertise and experience in this area. FAA's efforts to accumulate and 
analyze data will be important to facilitate the regulatory development 
process. However, analyzing the data that it already has collected from 
recent UAS operations would further support decisions on the new 
regulations. FAA's new estimate that the regulatory framework is not 
likely to be completed until sometime near 2020--about 8 years later 
than the date assumed by the industry forecast cited in this report-- 
could further delay the time frame when civil-use UAS production begins 
to increase. While TSA's risk assessment of UASs may be appropriate for 
today's UAS environment, a national airspace system that allows routine 
UAS access for all government and private UASs will require increased 
safeguards to protect against security vulnerabilities like those 
exposed in the events of September 11, 2001. Proactively assessing and 
addressing these issues will help ensure that the benefits of UASs are 
not further delayed pending resolution of security challenges. 
Additionally, it will be important for GSA to follow through and ensure 
that federal agencies report all of their owned or leased UASs, so that 
FAA has a more accurate basis for workload planning. It remains to be 
seen whether Europe will be successful in integrating UASs into its 
airspace by 2015, which is considerably sooner than the 2020 time frame 
expected in the United States. An overarching entity, modeled after 
JPDO and set up to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector 
entities, could facilitate progress in moving toward UASs having 
routine access to our national airspace system. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To coordinate and focus the efforts of federal agencies and harness the 
capabilities of the private sector so that the nation may obtain 
further benefits from UASs as soon as possible, Congress should 
consider creating an overarching body within FAA, as it did when it 
established JPDO, to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector 
efforts in meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access 
to the national airspace system. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To obtain further benefits from UASs, we are recommending that the 
Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to expedite 
efforts to ensure that UASs have routine access to the national 
airspace system by taking the following two actions: 

1. Finalize and issue a UAS program plan to address the future of UASs. 

2. Analyze the data FAA collects on UAS operations under its COAs and 
establish a process to analyze DOD data on its UAS research, 
development, and operations. 

To ensure that appropriate UAS security controls are in place when 
civil-use UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, we 
are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA 
Administrator to examine the security implications of future, non- 
military UAS operations in the national airspace system and take any 
actions deemed appropriate. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOT, DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the 
Department of Commerce. DOT agreed to consider our recommendations as 
it moves forward in addressing UASs and DHS agreed with our 
recommendation to it. GSA commented that, although our report contained 
no recommendations to the agency, it will continue to work with federal 
agencies to ensure that FAA has accurate information on the number of 
federally-owned or -leased UASs. DOT commented that the report would 
benefit from additional information on the impact of UASs on airports. 
We revised the report to include DOT's concern that the impact of UASs 
on safety and capacity at airports requires further study. DOT, DOD, 
and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. NASA and the Department of Commerce had no comments. 

We are sending electronic copies of this report to FAA, DHS, DOD, GSA, 
NASA, the Department of Commerce, and interested congressional 
committees. We also will make electronic copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methods: 

Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 
efforts to ensure that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are safely 
integrated into the national airspace system and the potential impact 
of UASs on the national airspace system and the environment after 
integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the following 
research questions: (1) What are the current and potential uses and 
benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely 
and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the federal 
government's response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming that UASs 
have routine access to the national airspace system, how might they 
impact the system and the environment? 

To address these questions, we surveyed the literature and also 
obtained and reviewed documents and interviewed officials of 
government, academic, and private-sector entities involved with UAS 
issues. We discussed current and future use of UASs with officials at 
FAA, Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We 
interviewed leaders of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics' 
(RTCA) Special Committee 203, which is developing UAS standards, and 
met with officials from a federally-funded research and development 
center. We discussed potential use of UASs for cargo transport with the 
United Parcel Service and Federal Express. We also discussed our 
questions with officials of associations of UAS manufacturers and users 
of the national airspace system, specifically, the Air Transport 
Association; Aerospace Industries Association; Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International; Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; 
Air Line Pilots Association, International; American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics; ASTM International, originally known as 
the American Society for Testing and Materials; Palm Bay Police 
Department; and Los Angeles Sheriff Department. We discussed UAS 
operations with officials and observed UAS operations at Fort Huachuca, 
Arizona, and met with DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
officials in Arizona to discuss UAS use in border protection. 
Additionally, we obtained industry forecasts of UAS growth and 
interviewed a senior analyst involved in preparing Teal Group 
Corporation's UAS market profile and forecast. We also observed a 
demonstration of unmanned systems at Webster Field, St. Inigoes, 
Maryland. 

To obtain additional information on the challenges that must be 
overcome before UASs can safely and routinely operate in the national 
airspace system, we leveraged information that was originally obtained 
and analyzed for a related GAO engagement.[Footnote 39] For that 
engagement, we contacted the Army Combat Readiness Center, Naval Safety 
Center, and Air Force Safety Center to obtain data on each service's 
UAS accidents from October 2001 to April or May 2006, depending on when 
the services queried their databases. The services provided data on 
class A, B, C, and D accidents.[Footnote 40] Using the descriptive 
information that the services provided for each accident, we determined 
whether human, materiel, environmental, or undetermined factors caused 
the accident and categorized each accordingly. We used the definitions 
of human, materiel, and environmental factors provided in Army 
Regulation 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records. We classified 
accidents as "undetermined" when descriptive information did not fall 
within one of the first three categories of factors. We discussed the 
results of our analysis with DOD officials and incorporated their 
comments as appropriate. 

To obtain additional information on the federal response to the 
challenge of integrating UASs into the national airspace system and the 
impact that UASs might have on the system after they have routine 
access, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials of the 
General Services Administration and the Department of Commerce's 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration. We also 
obtained information from DHS's Transportation Security Administration. 
Additionally, we surveyed 23 UAS experts, whose names were identified 
with the assistance of the National Academies. We asked the experts to 
provide, in narrative format, their views on the interim regulatory, 
technological, research, or other efforts that could be undertaken for 
UASs to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible 
in the national airspace system while FAA develops the regulatory 
structure to enable all UASs to have routine access to the system. We 
also asked the experts to provide their predictions on how small and 
large UASs might impact the national airspace, airports, air traffic 
control, noise, and air quality, using a 7-point scale from large 
adverse impact to large beneficial impact, and asked that they explain 
their answers. Appendix II discusses how we developed and conducted the 
survey. The complete survey instrument appears as appendix III. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2006 to May 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Survey Methods: 

We administered a Web-based survey to gather the professional views of 
experts on the impact of UASs on the national airspace system and the 
actions needed to move toward safe and routine UAS operations. The 
structured survey questions ensured that all individuals had the 
opportunity to provide information in response to the same questions 
and enabled us to quantify the results. 

We contracted with the National Academies to identify experts to 
participate in our survey. Using criteria to ensure adequate 
representation across the criteria that we had specified, the National 
Academies identified 26 experts. The criteria ensured that we achieved: 

* balance in terms of the type of expertise (i.e., aircraft and 
avionics manufacturing officials, association representatives, 
engineers, academics, foreign civil aviation authorities, and 
researchers involved in aviation safety); 

* balance of knowledge across relevant content areas (i.e., aviation 
regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air 
transportation system planning, airport operations, human factors, and 
international issues); and: 

* balance in representation of relevant organizations (i.e., academia, 
business, government, and professional organizations). 

The survey responses represent the professional views of the experts. 
Their expertise can be derived from formal education, professional 
experience, or both. The experts were identified by the National 
Academies as individuals who are recognized by others who work in the 
same subject matter area as having knowledge that is greater in scope 
or depth than that of most people working in the area. The experts 
included researchers, consultants, vice presidents, directors, and 
professors who were associated with private sector firms, associations, 
or academic institutions involved with UASs. Some of the experts were 
retired federal officials. 

We recognize that it is likely that no one individual possessed 
complete knowledge in each of the content areas addressed in the 
survey. However, through our selection criteria, we attempted to 
identify a set of individuals who, when their responses were considered 
in the aggregate, could be viewed as representing the breadth of 
knowledge in each of the areas addressed in the survey. 

We identified the information to collect in our surveys based on our 
congressional request, Internet and literature searches, professional 
conferences we attended, background interviews, and through discussions 
with external expert advisors. A social science survey specialist 
collaborated with staff with subject matter expertise on the 
development of the surveys. 

We pretested the survey to ensure that the questions appropriately 
addressed the topics, were clearly stated, easy to comprehend, 
unbiased, and did not place undue burden on respondents. We also 
evaluated the usability of the Web-based survey. Based on the pretest 
results, we made necessary changes to the survey prior to 
implementation. 

We administered the Web-based survey during August and September 2007. 
We used email to inform the respondents of the survey administration, 
and provided them with the Web link for the survey and their log-in 
name and password. In the email message, we informed respondents that 
our report will not contain individual survey responses; instead, it 
may present the aggregated results of all participants. To maximize the 
response rate, we sent follow up email reminders and followed up by 
telephone as necessary to encourage survey participation. 

The survey was sent to 26 experts; three did not respond, giving the 
survey a response rate of 89 percent. 

The narrative responses in question 1 and the explanations for the 
closed-ended items in questions 2 and 3 were analyzed and coded into 
categories. A reviewer checked the resulting categories and coded 
responses and, where interpretations differed, agreement was reached 
between the initial coder and the reviewer. The coded results were 
tallied and provide the basis for our survey findings for these items. 
Because we did not report on aggregate responses to question 4, we did 
not perform content analysis on this question. 

The number of responses reported for the closed-ended questions may 
vary by question because a number of experts responded "Don't know" or 
"No basis to judge," or did not answer specific questions. 

The survey was administered via the Web and is reproduced as a graphic 
image in appendix III. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 

Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Welcome to the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Survey of 
Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). GAO is conducting this 
survey as a part of our study on the future of UASs in the national 
airspace system which was requested by the Aviation Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. The purpose of 
the survey is to collect information on the impact of UASs on the 
national airspace system and the actions needed to move toward safe and 
routine UAS operations. 

To begin, you will need the user name and password from the e-mail 
message we sent you. In addition, please click here to download 
important information that will help you complete the questionnaire.
The questionnaire will be available on the web for one week. During 
this time, you may log into the questionnaire to enter and edit 
information as often as you like. It will take between 30 and 45 
minutes to complete the questionnaire. 

You may bookmark this page to make it easier to start the questionnaire 
again. 

If you want to print a blank questionnaire for reference, you will need 
the Adobe Acrobat Reader software to do this. If you do not already 
have this software, click on the Adobe icon to download the software.
If you want to print a blank questionnaire for reference, click here to 
download a copy. You will not be able to enter responses into this PDF 
file. 

If you have questions, please contact: Ed Menoche ([email protected]) at 
202-512-3420 or Teresa Spisak ([email protected]) at 202-512-3952. 

Click on the button below [Start log in] to start this questionnaire. 

Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:	Page 1 of 12 

Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Click here to learn more about navigating, saving, and exiting the 
survey, copying and pasting text responses, and printing all your 
survey responses at one time. 

Please be aware that you can print your responses to all the questions 
at one time using the link at the end of the survey. 

Interim Efforts Until UAS Operations are Safe and Routine: 

1. Our review of the literature and discussions with knowledgeable 
individuals indicates that it could be at least four years before a 
technological and regulatory framework exists to permit UASs to operate 
safely and routinely in the national airspace system. By safe, we mean 
that UASs operate at a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft. 
By routine, we mean that they operate within existing regulations 
without the case-by-case review that exists today. 

In your opinion, between now and when UASs can operate safely and 
routinely in the national airspace system, what regulatory, 
technological, research, or other efforts could be undertaken for UASs 
to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible in 
the national airspace system? 

Impact of Smaller UASs Once They Are Safely and Routinely Operating in 
the National Airspace System: 

2. In the future, when smaller UASs are safely and routinely operating, 
how do you think they will impact the following areas? (Choose one 
answer for each row.) 

2a. Airspace: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

2b. Airports: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

2c. Air traffic control: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

2d. Environmental noise: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

2e. Air quality: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

If there are other areas that would be impacted by smaller UASs, list 
them in the space below and explain their expected impact: 

Impact of Larger UASs Once They Are Safely and Routinely Operating in 
the National Airspace System: 

3. In the future, when larger UASs are safely and routinely operating, 
how do you think they will impact the following areas? (Choose one 
answer for each row.) 

3a. Airspace: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

3b. Airports: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

3c. Air traffic control: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

3d. Environmental noise: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

3e. Air quality: 
Large adverse impact: 
Moderate adverse impact: 
Limited adverse impact: 
Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact: 
Limited beneficial impact: 
Moderate beneficial impact: 
Large beneficial impact: 
Don't know/No basis to judge: 

Please explain your answer: 

If there are other areas that would be impacted by larger UASs, list 
them in the space below and explain their expected impact: 

Other Countries' UAS Efforts: 

4. To your knowledge, what regulatory, technological, research, or 
other approaches to integrating UASs that are used by other countries 
are potentially transferable to the United States? 

Additional Observations or Comments: 

5. Please provide any additional observations or comments you may have 
on the safe and routine operation of UASs in the national airspace 
system: 

Submit Your Completed Questionnaire: 

6. Are you ready to submit your completed questionnaire for the first 
phase of the survey to GAO now? (Check one.) 

1. Yes, I have completed the questionnaire. 

2. No, the questionnaire is not yet complete. 

7. Would you like to print all of your answers? (Check one.) 

1. Yes. Click here to get a copy of your responses. 

2. No (Click on the "Save responses and close" button below to send 
your answers to GAO). 

Get a Copy of Your Responses: 

Click here to get a copy of your responses. Once you open the copy of 
your responses, scroll to the end of the document and click on "Print". 

Click on "Save responses and close" below to send your answers to GAO. 

Thank you for your participation in the first survey on unmanned 
aircraft systems. We will recontact you soon to complete the second 
phase of the survey. 

Print this page: 

Save Responses and Close: 

Close this page: 

[End of survey] 

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Definition of smaller unmanned aircraft systems: 

For purposes of this survey, we are defining smaller UASs as those 
similar to model aircraft, which have traditionally been covered under 
FAA's Advisory Circular for Model Aircraft Operation (AC 91-57). We are 
focusing on the size dimension because, to a great extent, size is 
associated with the UAS capabilities, such as range and type of 
operations, that may have varied impacts on the national airspace 
system. 

Click here to close this page: 

Definition of safe and routine: 

By safe, we mean that UASs operate at a level of safety equivalent to 
manned aircraft. By routine, we mean that they operate within existing 
regulations without the case-by-case review that exists today. 

Click here to close this page: 

Definition of larger unmanned aircraft systems: 

For purposes of this survey, larger UASs include all UASs not covered 
by our small UAS definition. We define smaller UASs as those similar to 
model aircraft, which have traditionally been covered under FAA's 
Advisory Circular for Model Aircraft Operation (AC 91-57) We are 
focusing on the size dimension because, to a great extent, size is 
associated with the UAS capabilities, such as range and type of 
operations, that may have varied impacts on the national airspace 
system. 

Click here to close this page: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgements: 

In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak, Assistant 
Director; Edmond Menoche, Senior Analyst; Colin Fallon; Jim Geibel; 
Evan Gilman; David Hooper; Jamie Khanna; Patty Lentini; Josh Ormond; 
Manhav Panwar; and Larry Thomas made significant contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] At our request, the National Academies provided names of 26 experts 
in aviation regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air 
transportation system planning, airport operations, human factors, and 
international issues. Three experts did not respond to the survey. 

[2] Although DOD often uses the term "mishap" to refer to UAS 
accidents, we use accidents throughout this report. 

[3] DOD has more than 5,000 UASs, ranging in size from the Raven, a 
hand-launched UAS, to large UASs such as the Global Hawk and Predator. 
Most of DOD's UASs are currently deployed overseas. 

[4] Part 61 addresses certification requirements for pilots, flight 
instructors, and ground instructors. Part 91 addresses general 
operating and flight rules. 

[5] Teal Group Corporation, World Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems 
(Fairfax, Va: 2008). 

[6] Matthew T. DeGarmo, Issues Concerning Integration of Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles in Civil Airspace (McLean, Va: The MITRE Corporation, 
Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, November 2004). 

[7] Three of these experts indicated that technology improvements could 
be applied to both airspace and airports. 

[8] In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office 
to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a 
transformation from the current air traffic control system to the next 
generation air transportation system by 2025. 

[9] Testimony of Steven M. Silwa, Chief Executive Officer and President 
of Insitu Inc., before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure (Mar. 22, 2007). 

[10] Teal Group Corporation, 2008. 

[11] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle National Task Force, The Impact of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System: Preliminary Assessment (Oct. 22, 2004). 

[12] The Airline Owners and Pilots Association is a not-for-profit 
organization representing the interests of general aviation. 

[13] Transportation Security Administration, Advisory - Security 
Information Regarding Remote Controlled Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (Arlington, Va: Nov. 22, 2004). 

[14] Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007 - 2032, 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007). We did not evaluate the validity of 
information contained in the roadmap. 

[15] DOD defines reliability as (1) the probability that an item will 
perform its intended function for a specified time under stated 
conditions or (2) the ability of a system and its parts to perform its 
mission without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system. 

[16] DOD classifies accidents according to severity. The accident data 
that DOD provided included accidents in class A, B, C, and D. See 
appendix I for accident class definitions and further details on our 
methodology. We also determined that 17 percent of the accidents were 
due to human factors (i.e., issues associated with how humans interact 
with machines); 6 percent of the accidents were caused by environmental 
issues; and 12 percent of the accidents' causes were undetermined. We 
did not evaluate the validity of the accident information that DOD 
provided. 

[17] The MITRE Corporation, 2004. 

[18] Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles and Border Surveillance (Washington, D.C.: 2006). 

[19] A DOD official commented that wooden propeller damage is managed 
by adding treatments to the wood and by regular maintenance and 
inspection. 

[20] Human factors, such as pilot error, have also been significant 
contributors to manned aircraft accidents. 

[21] FAA currently requires that UAS pilots and observers have in their 
possession a current second class or higher airman medical certificate 
issued under chapter 14, Code of Federal Regulations part 67. 

[22] Jason S. McCarley and Christopher D. Wickens, Human Factors 
Implications of UAVs in the National Airspace (Institute of Aviation, 
Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana- 
Champaign, 2005). 

[23] McCarley and Wickens, 2005. 

[24] The second console can be used to operate the Predator's camera or 
to control the aircraft. 

[25] Part 91 of title 14. 

[26] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle National Task Force, 2004. 

[27] Non-segregated airspace is airspace that is available for all 
aircraft. 

[28] FAA does not start calculating the processing time until officials 
have determined that the application is administratively correct and 
that the proposed UAS operation is feasible. 

[29] The National Telecommunications and Information Administration of 
the Department of Commerce manages federal use of spectrum. 

[30] RTCA is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops 
consensus-based performance standards regarding communications, 
navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management system issues. 
RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee, and its recommendations 
are the basis for a number of FAA's policy, program, and regulatory 
decisions. 

[31] RTCA Special Committee 203, Guidance Material and Considerations 
for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Washington, D.C.: 2007). 

[32] MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development is a 
federally-funded research and development center that performs systems 
research and development work for FAA and other civil aviation 
authorities. 

[33] DOD defines a small UAS as one that weighs less than 55 pounds, 
flies slower than 100 knots, and operates at altitudes below 1,000 
feet. 

[34] H.R. 2881, Â§ 322. 

[35] EUROCAE formed WG-73 in 2006 to focus on UAS issues. 

[36] ICAO is the global forum for civil aviation. ICAO works to achieve 
its vision of safe, secure, and sustainable development of civil 
aviation through the cooperation of its member States. 

[37] Based on conversion rate as of April 9, 2008. 

[38] Previously, UAS operations could occur without a COA only within 
DOD's restricted airspace or warning areas. 

[39] See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and 
Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July 
11, 2007). The data, although not used in this report, was obtained and 
analyzed using generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[40] DOD classifies accidents in categories A, B, and C, based on the 
severity of resulting injury, occupational illness, or property damage. 
Property damage severity is generally expressed in terms of cost and is 
calculated as the sum of the costs associated with DOD property and non-
DOD property that is damaged in a DOD accident. Class A accidents 
result in damages of $1 million or more, total loss of a DOD aircraft, 
or a fatality or permanent total disability. Class B accidents result 
in damages of $200,000 or more, but less than $1 million, a permanent 
partial disability, or hospitalization of three or more personnel. 
Class C accidents result in damages of $20,000 or more, but less than 
$200,000, a nonfatal injury that causes any loss of time from work 
beyond the day or shift on which it occurred, or a nonfatal 
occupational illness or disability that causes loss of time from work 
or disability at any time. Additionally, the services have varying 
classifications of less severe accidents. Only the Army provided 
accident data for Class D accidents, which the Army defines as those 
which result in property damage of $2,000 or more but less than 
$20,000, or a nonfatal injury that does not meet the criteria of a 
Class C accident. 

[End of section] 

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