    Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to Ensure
    Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National
    Airspace System (15-MAY-08, GAO-08-511).

    Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned
    aircraft systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as
    U.S. border protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and
    real estate photography. However, UASs can fly only after the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case
    safety analysis. GAO's research questions included (1) What are
    the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What
    challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the
    national airspace system? and (3) What is the federal
    government's response to these challenges? To address these
    questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency
    officials and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-511
        ACCNO:   A82121
      TITLE:     Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Federal Actions Needed to
    Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses within the National
    Airspace System
         DATE:   05/15/2008
      SUBJECT:   Access control
    	     Agency missions
    	     Aircraft
    	     Aircraft industry
    	     Aircraft safety
    	     Aviation
    	     Border security
    	     Data collection
    	     Federal regulations
    	     International airspace law
    	     International relations
    	     Operational testing
    	     Private sector
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Research and development
    	     Safety regulation
    	     Safety standards
    	     State governments
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Surveys
    	     Systems analysis
    	     Transportation safety
    	     Unmanned aerial systems
    	     Program coordination

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    ******************************************************************
    GAO-08-511

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
    in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
    may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
    material separately.

    Report to Congressional Requesters:

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    GAO:

    May 2008:

    Unmanned Aircraft Systems:

    Federal Actions Needed to Ensure Safety and Expand Their Potential Uses
    within the National Airspace System:

    GAO-08-511:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-511, a report to congressional requesters.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft
    systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border
    protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate
    photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAO’s
    research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses
    and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs
    safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is
    the federal government’s response to these challenges? To address these
    questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials
    and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts.

    What GAO Found:

    GAO suggests that Congress create an overarching body within FAA to
    coordinate UAS development and integration efforts. To realize public
    benefits from UASs as soon as possible, GAO recommends that FAA issue
    its program plan and analyze the data it has collected, and that the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assess the security implications
    of routine UAS access to the airspace. Relevant agencies reviewed a
    draft of this report. The Department of Transportation agreed to
    consider its relevant recommendations. DHS agreed with its relevant
    recommendation.

    What GAO Recommends:

    UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security,
    science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential
    uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees
    potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey
    states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such
    government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could
    perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer
    emissions.

    UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination
    challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in
    the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety
    requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack
    security protection—a potential challenge if UASs proliferate as
    expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA
    regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals
    by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a
    workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address
    these challenges is yet another challenge.

    FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological
    challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of
    routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS
    safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued
    its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for
    providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to
    have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS
    testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop
    regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already
    collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more
    automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an
    overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal,
    academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a
    similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation
    air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the
    private sector.

    Figure: Photograph of Predator B UASs used for border security.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: DHS.

    [End of figure]

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-511]. For more
    information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, (202) 512-2834
    dillinghamg@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government
    and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future:

    Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological,
    Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges:

    Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could
    Take a Decade or Longer:

    Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown:

    Conclusion:

    Matter for Congressional Consideration:

    Recommendations for Executive Action:

    Agency Comments:

    Appendix I: Scope and Methods:

    Appendix II: Survey Methods:

    Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    Tables:

    Table 1: Examples of UAS Integration Efforts in Other Countries:

    Figures:

    Figure 1: Conceptual Unmanned Aircraft System:

    Figure 2: Examples of UASs:

    Figure 3: CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007:

    Figure 4: UASs Used as Communications Relays:

    Figure 5: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection:

    Figure 6: Forecast of Civil UASs Produced, 2008 through 2017:

    Figure 7: Applications for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization,
    Received in Calendar Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:

    Figure 8: Applications for Special Airworthiness Certificates, Received
    in Fiscal Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:

    Figure 9: UAS Test Center at New Mexico State University:

    Abbreviations:

    CBP: Customs and Border Protection:

    COA: Certificate of Waiver or Authorization:

    DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

    DOD: Department of Defense:

    DOT: Department of Transportation:

    EUROCAE: European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment:

    EUROCONTROL: European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation:

    FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:

    ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:

    JPDO: Joint Planning and Development Office:

    NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

    NextGen: next generation air transportation system:

    NOAA: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration:

    RTCA: Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics:

    TSA: Transportation Security Administration:

    UAPO: Unmanned Aircraft Program Office:

    UAS: unmanned aircraft system:

    TCAS: Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance System:

    [End of section]

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    May 15, 2008:

    The Honorable John Mica:
    Ranking Republican Member:
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
    Chairman:
    Subcommittee on Aviation:
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
    House of Representatives:

    Government and private-sector interest in unmanned aircraft systems
    (UAS) is growing, due in large part to the U.S. military's expanded
    development and use of these systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
    absence of a pilot on board the aircraft allows unmanned aircraft to
    perform a variety of missions not generally considered favorable for
    manned aircraft. Some unmanned aircraft can remain aloft for 30 hours
    or more, because there is no need for them to land to change pilots.
    Unmanned aircraft can also perform dangerous missions without risking
    loss of life.

    The federal government has used UASs for a number of years for various
    purposes, such as collecting scientific data, assisting with border
    security, and gathering weather data from inside hurricanes. Federal
    agencies are planning to increase their use of UASs and state and local
    governments envision using UASs to aid in law enforcement or
    firefighting. Potential commercial uses are also possible, for example,
    in real estate photography or pipeline inspection. The Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) is responsible for ensuring that UASs operate
    safely in the national airspace system and is working to develop a
    regulatory framework to address the unique characteristics of UASs. For
    example, current regulations do not indicate how, in the absence of an
    on-board pilot, UASs should detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft to
    avoid collisions. FAA's long-range goal is to permit, to the greatest
    extent possible, routine government and commercial UAS operations in
    the national airspace system while ensuring safety. Presently, because
    of safety concerns, FAA authorizes civil government and military UAS
    operations in the national airspace system on a limited basis after
    conducting a case-by-case safety review. Regulations do not currently
    permit commercial UAS operations.

    You asked us to assess efforts to safely integrate UASs into the
    national airspace system and the potential impact of those UASs after
    such integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the
    following research questions: (1) What are the current and potential
    uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs
    safely and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the
    federal government's response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming
    that UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, how
    might they impact the system and the environment?

    To address these questions, we reviewed the literature, FAA and
    Department of Defense (DOD) documents, and aviation trade association
    reports. We also interviewed officials from DOD, the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA) about their operations and plans to operate UASs
    in the national airspace system. We interviewed officials in
    associations that represent UAS manufacturers and users of the national
    airspace system. To determine the expected growth of UASs, we obtained
    industry forecasts. Additionally, we administered a Web-based survey to
    23 UAS experts, selected with the assistance of the National Academies,
    to obtain their opinions of the steps that FAA could take to accelerate
    UAS integration in the national airspace system and the impact that
    UASs might have on the system and the environment after integration
    occurs.[Footnote 1] We conducted this performance audit from October
    2006 to May 2008, in accordance with generally accepted government
    auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
    the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
    reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
    objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
    basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    (See app. I for additional information on our scope and methods.)

    Results in Brief:

    Federal agencies such as DHS, the Department of Commerce, and NASA use
    UASs in many areas, such as border security, weather research, and
    forest fire monitoring. These agencies have plans to expand their UAS
    use in domestic airspace, and local governments and commercial entities
    also have interest in using UASs. Many factors support the potential
    for expanded use of UASs. For example, the nation's industrial base has
    expanded to support military operations and the number of trained UAS
    operators is increasing as personnel return from overseas duty.
    Moreover, some of the technology used in military UAS operations could
    be applied to civil uses. DHS is expanding its use of UASs for border
    security and NASA is likely to continue using UASs to gather scientific
    data. Additionally, local law enforcement and firefighting agencies
    have expressed interest in using UASs to assist at crime scenes and
    wildfire locations, and commercial users envision using UASs for tasks
    such as photographing real estate or inspecting pipelines. According to
    an industry forecast, the market for government and commercial-use UASs
    could grow in the future. The forecast also indicates that the United
    States could account for 73 percent of the world's research and
    development investment for UAS technology over the coming decade.
    According to a UAS study and experts we surveyed, UAS development could
    lead to technological advances that could benefit all national airspace
    users. For example, some experts we surveyed noted that improved
    collision avoidance technologies developed for UASs could lead to
    reduced aircraft separation requirements, which could increase airspace
    capacity. Additionally, UASs could produce environmental benefits if
    they assume some missions currently performed by manned aircraft by
    using quieter engines that produce fewer emissions, according to
    experts we surveyed.

    Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses technological,
    regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges. A key technological
    challenge is providing the capability for UASs to meet the safety
    requirements of the national airspace system. For example, a person
    operating an aircraft must maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid
    other aircraft. However, because UASs have no person on board the
    aircraft, on-board equipment, radar, or direct human observation must
    substitute for this capability. No technology has been identified as a
    suitable substitute for a person on board the aircraft in seeing and
    avoiding other aircraft. Additionally, UASs' communications and control
    links are vulnerable to unintentional or intentional radio interference
    that can lead to loss of control of an aircraft and an accident,
    [Footnote 2] and in the future, ground control stations--the UAS
    equivalent to a manned aircraft cockpit--may need physical security
    protection to guard against hostile takeover. Although DOD has achieved
    operational successes with its use of UASs in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    accidents of varying degrees of severity have resulted from UAS
    reliability problems and human factors issues, i.e., equipment designs
    that did not fully account for human abilities, characteristics, and
    limitations. Our analysis of 4½ years of DOD's data indicates that UAS
    component failures caused about 65 percent of the accidents and human
    factors issues--a common challenge in new technology--caused about 17
    percent of the accidents. Because a regulatory framework to ensure UAS
    safety does not exist, UASs have had only limited access to the
    national airspace, which, in turn, has created additional challenges.
    For example, UAS developers have faced a lack of airspace for testing
    and evaluating their products, and data on UAS operations in the
    national airspace, which could aid in developing regulations, is
    scarce. In the coming years, FAA could face a workload challenge in
    responding to increasing requests from federal agencies to operate UASs
    in the national airspace system. However, FAA's future workload is
    uncertain because there is no accurate inventory of federally-owned and
    -leased UASs. GSA has responsibility for maintaining the inventory of
    federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but its regulations have not been
    updated to require federal agencies to report UASs. Coordinating the
    efforts of federal agencies with those of academic institutions that
    have UAS expertise, and with the private sector, which has a stake in
    UASs obtaining routine airspace access, serves as another challenge.

    Addressing the challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the
    national airspace system involves the efforts of several federal
    agencies and could require a decade or more of additional work. FAA is
    addressing technological challenges by sponsoring research on topics
    such as detect, sense, and avoid, and taking steps to obtain dedicated
    radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations, which could address UAS
    communications and control vulnerabilities. DOD is addressing UAS
    reliability challenges by urging manufacturers to use redundant, fail
    safe designs, and has made some progress in addressing human factors
    challenges by standardizing some UAS ground control stations.
    Additionally, a federal advisory body is developing technical standards
    for UASs. However, DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    has not yet examined the security implications of routine UAS
    operations in the national airspace. Fully addressing regulatory
    challenges to allowing all UASs to have routine access to the national
    airspace system may not occur until 2020, after the aforementioned
    advisory body completes its technical standards work and FAA
    incorporates those standards in its regulations. In the interim, FAA
    has created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to coordinate efforts
    to develop standards and regulations. FAA is also developing a UAS
    program plan that would inform the aviation community of the steps and
    time frames required for providing routine UAS access. Although the
    plan was being developed in December 2006, it had not been approved for
    issuance as of March 2008. Additionally FAA is developing regulatory
    procedures to allow small UAS operations in the national airspace under
    low-risk conditions. FAA has established a 12,000 square mile UAS test
    center to provide airspace for testing and evaluating UASs and to
    provide data for use in developing regulations. FAA expects to obtain
    additional data from increased coordination with DOD. However, FAA has
    not yet analyzed the limited data that it has already accumulated on
    recent UAS operations in the national airspace system, citing resource
    constraints. To address expected workload increases, FAA is introducing
    more automation into its work processes and has granted DOD authority
    to operate small UASs, weighing 20 pounds or less, over its
    installations without receiving prior FAA approval. Additionally, GSA
    is updating its regulations to require federal agencies to report their
    owned and leased UASs, which could help FAA plan for its future
    workload. Given the variety of federal entities involved with UAS
    issues, as well as the stake that the private sector has in routine UAS
    operations in the national airspace system, experts and stakeholders
    suggested that an overarching entity be established to coordinate and
    expedite these efforts. Congress used a similar approach in 2003 when
    it passed legislation to create the Joint Planning and Development
    Office (JPDO), within FAA, to coordinate planning for the next
    generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies
    and the private sector.

    Because data on UAS operations in the national airspace system are
    scarce and routine operations are many years away, the impact of
    routine access on the system and the environment remains generally
    speculative. The impact will depend on a number of factors that, today,
    are unpredictable due to a lack of data. For example, one study notes
    that, while more needs to be known about the needs and capabilities of
    future UASs, their operations could have a disruptive impact on
    aviation by introducing more complexity. A federal advisory body has
    reported that UASs will create unique challenges because, in comparison
    to manned aircraft, UAS missions often involve hovering or circling in
    one location and UASs' speed, maneuverability, and climb rates, may
    differ from manned aircraft. These differences could affect air traffic
    flow, air traffic controller workload, and departure and arrival
    procedures. Many of the experts we surveyed predicted that UASs would
    add to the number of aircraft and therefore affect airspace and airport
    capacity and add to the workload of air traffic control in the same
    manner as additional manned aircraft. However, our experts also noted
    that, if UASs assume some missions currently performed by manned
    aircraft, and perform them with smaller and quieter engines, UASs could
    benefit the environment.

    We suggest that Congress consider creating an overarching body within
    FAA, as it did when it established JPDO, to coordinate the diverse
    efforts of federal agencies, academia, and the private sector in
    meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access to the
    national airspace system. We also recommend that FAA issue its UAS
    program plan, analyze the UAS operations data that it has collected,
    and establish a process to analyze DOD's data on UAS research,
    development, and operations. In addition, we recommend that DHS examine
    and fully address the security implications of routine civil UAS access
    in the national airspace system. We provided a draft of this report to
    the Department of Transportation (DOT), DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the
    Department of Commerce. DOT agreed to consider the relevant
    recommendations and DHS agreed with our recommendation to it. GSA
    commented that it will continue its efforts to ensure that FAA has
    accurate information on the number of federally-owned and -leased UASs.
    DOT commented that the report would benefit from additional information
    on the impact of UASs on airports. We revised the report to include
    DOT's concern that the impact of UASs on safety and capacity at
    airports requires further study. DOT, DOD, and DHS provided technical
    comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NASA and the Department
    of Commerce had no comments.

    Background:

    FAA defines an unmanned aircraft as one that is operated without the
    possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the
    aircraft. In the past, these aircraft were sometimes called "unmanned
    aerial vehicles," "remotely piloted vehicles," or "unmanned aircraft."
    FAA and the international community have adopted the term "unmanned
    aircraft system" to designate them as aircraft and to recognize that a
    UAS includes not only the airframe, but also the associated elements--
    the control station and communications links--as shown in figure 1.

    Figure 1: Conceptual Unmanned Aircraft System:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is an illustration of a conceptual unmanned aircraft
    system. The following information is provided with the illustration:

    Over the horizon link: between satellite and aircraft;
    Line of sight link: between aircraft and ground radar.

    Data and voice communications element:
    * Landline or communication relay services;
    * Uplink/downlink spectrum.

    Air vehicle element:
    * Airframe and structure;
    * Propulsion system;
    * Flight control system;
    * Communications suite;
    * Conflict avoidance system;
    * Navigation system;
    * Electrical system;
    * Flight recovery system.

    Control element:
    * Mission planning;
    * Mission control and operations;
    * Conflict avoidance monitoring;
    * Weather avoidance monitoring;
    * Maintenance and logistics;
    * Supply and provisioning;
    * Support and training;
    * Launch and recovery;
    * Towing and taxiing.

    Source: GAO and NASA.

    [End of figure]

    The capabilities of UASs differ from manned aircraft in several ways. A
    UAS can operate for far longer periods than an onboard pilot could
    safely operate an aircraft. Future scenarios envision UASs remaining
    aloft for weeks or even months using fuel cell technology or airborne
    refueling operations. UASs may fly at slower speeds than most manned
    aircraft; some operate at low altitude (between buildings) while others
    fly well above piloted aircraft altitudes. Some UASs can fly
    autonomously based on pre-programmed data or flight paths, while others
    fly based on commands from pilot-operated ground stations. UASs also
    vary widely in size, shape, and capabilities. Some UASs, such as the
    Global Hawk, have a wingspan as large as that of a Boeing 737. Others,
    because they do not need the power or physical size to carry a pilot,
    can be small and light enough to be launched by hand, as is the case
    for the SkySeer UAS shown in figure 2.

    Figure 2: Examples of UASs:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure contains six photographs with the following accompanying
    information:

    Aerosonde®[A]:
    Weight: 33.5 pounds;
    Launch mechanism: catapult or from roof of fast moving ground vehicle;
    Wingspan: 9.5 feet;
    Maximum speed: 60 knots;
    Maximum altitude: 15,000 feet;
    Mission duration: up to 30 hours;
    Current application: civil and military.

    SkySeer:
    Weight: 4 pounds;
    Launch mechanism: hand launch;
    Maximum speed: 24 knots;
    Maximum altitude: 11,000 feet;
    Mission duration: 50 minutes;
    Current application: civil.

    Predator B[B]:
    Weight: 10,000 pounds;
    Launch mechanism: runway;
    Wingspan: 66 feet;
    Maximum speed: over 220 knots;
    Maximum altitude: 50,000 feet;
    Mission duration: 30 hours;
    Current application: civil and military.

    ScanEagle™:
    Weight: 38 pounds;
    Launch mechanism: catapult;
    Wingspan: 10.2 feet;
    Maximum speed: 70 knots;
    Maximum altitude: 16,400 feet;
    Mission duration: 20 hours;
    Current application: civil and military.

    RQ-4A[C]:
    Weight: 26,750 pounds;
    Launch mechanism: runway;
    Wingspan: 116 feet;
    Maximum speed: 350 knots;
    Maximum altitude: 65,000 feet;
    Mission duration: 32 hours;
    Current application: civil and military.

    Fire Scout:
    Weight: 3,150 pounds;
    Launch mechanism: vertical;
    Wingspan: 27.5 feet (rotor diameter);
    Maximum speed: 125 knots;
    Maximum altitude: 20,000 feet;
    Mission duration: up to 8 hours;
    Current application: military.

    Sources: AAI Corporation, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and Octatron Inc.

    [A] Aerosonde® is a registered trademark of Aerosonde Pty Ltd.

    [B] The civil version of the Predator B is shown. The military version
    of the Predator B is known as the Reaper (MQ-9).

    [C] Model shown is RQ-4A. The Air Force has begun procuring model 4B
    for which some characteristics differ. Model 4B's weight is 32,250
    pounds; wingspan is 131 feet; maximum speed is 340 knots; maximum
    altitude is 60,000 feet; and mission duration is 28 hours.

    [End of figure]

    DOD has pioneered UAS applications for wartime use and, in 2007, was
    the major user of UASs, primarily for ongoing conflicts in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. While many of DOD's UAS operations currently take place
    outside the United States, DOD needs access to the national airspace
    system for UASs to, among other things, transit from their home bases
    for training in restricted military airspace or for transit to overseas
    deployment locations.[Footnote 3] DOD officials stated that the need
    for military UAS access to the national airspace system is under
    review, and also noted that increased access would also allow their
    UASs to be more easily used to aid in fighting wildfires.

    Several federal agencies have roles related to UASs. FAA is responsible
    for ensuring UASs are safely integrated into the national airspace
    system's air traffic control procedures, airport operations, and
    infrastructure, and with existing commercial, military, and general
    aviation users of the system. When UASs operate in that system, they
    must meet the safety requirements of the U.S. Code of Federal
    Regulations, Title 14, parts 61 and 91.[Footnote 4] FAA approves, on a
    case-by-case basis, applications from government agencies and private-
    sector entities for authority to operate UASs in the national airspace
    system. Federal, state, and local government agencies must apply for
    Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), while private-sector
    entities must apply for special airworthiness certificates. In either
    case, FAA examines the facts and circumstances of proposed UAS
    operations to ensure that the prospective operator has acceptably
    mitigated safety risks. Special airworthiness certificates are the only
    means through which private-sector entities can operate UASs in the
    national airspace system. Because special airworthiness certificates do
    not allow commercial operations, there is currently no means for
    authorizing commercial UAS operations.

    NASA has conducted UAS research in the past. NASA led the 9-year
    Environmental Research Aircraft and Sensor Technology Program that
    focused on UAS technology for high altitude, long-endurance aircraft
    engines, sensors, and integrated vehicles. NASA also played a key role
    in a partnership with other federal agencies and industry called
    "Access-5." Access-5 incorporated the efforts of the UAV National
    Industry Team, known as UNITE, formed by six private-sector aerospace
    firms, as well as FAA, DOD, and other industry participants. The Access-
    5 partnership sought to achieve routine operations for high-level, long-
    endurance UASs in the national airspace system. NASA contributed about
    75 percent of the funding for this effort and the partnership had laid
    out plans through 2010. Although the partnership ended in fiscal year
    2006 when NASA canceled its funding, the project claimed a number of
    accomplishments, including creating productive and cohesive working
    relationships among key stakeholders and recommendations to advance the
    introduction of UASs into the national airspace system.

    Other agencies and organizations have roles or interests relating to
    UASs. For example, DHS's TSA has authority to regulate security of all
    transportation modes, including non-military UASs, to ensure that
    appropriate security safeguards are in place. GSA has the
    responsibility for maintaining an inventory of all federally-owned or -
    leased aircraft, as reported by federal agencies. Additionally, a
    number of associations, representing private-sector aviation
    industries, such as airframe and components manufacturers, and users of
    the national airspace system, have interest in UASs progressing toward
    routine access to the system. We refer to officials of these
    associations as stakeholders in this report.

    Federal Agencies Have Used UASs in Many Ways and Expanded Government
    and Commercial Use Is Possible in the Future:

    Several federal agencies are using UASs of varying sizes for missions
    ranging from forest fire monitoring to border security. These agencies
    are interested in expanded use of UASs and state and local governments
    would also like to begin using UASs for law enforcement or
    firefighting. UASs also could eventually have commercial applications.

    Federal Agencies Are Benefiting from Using UASs:

    Federal agencies use UASs for many purposes. NASA, for example, uses
    UASs as platforms for gathering scientific research data and has
    partnered with other government agencies to demonstrate and use UASs'
    unique capabilities. At its Wallops Island, Virginia, Flight Facility,
    NASA operates a small fleet of Aerosonde® UASs on a lease-to-fly basis
    for researchers. NASA also operates a modified Predator B UAS from its
    Dryden Flight Research Center, in California, and used it to aid
    firefighting efforts in southern California in 2007. During 2005, the
    Department of Commerce's National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
    Administration (NOAA) partnered with NASA and industry to use a UAS to
    fill data gaps in several areas, including climate research, weather
    and water resources forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management,
    and coastal mapping. During 2007, NOAA partnered with NASA to use an
    Aerosonde® UAS to gather data from Hurricane Noel and reported
    receiving valuable low-altitude data that could aid future weather
    forecasts and potentially reduce property damage and save lives.

    Several other federal agencies have benefited from using UASs. DHS's
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses Predator B UASs to help
    conduct surveillance along portions of the U.S. border with Mexico.
    (See fig. 3.) CBP credits its UAS operations as helping its agents make
    over 4,000 arrests and seize nearly 20,000 pounds of illegal drugs
    between September 2005 and March 2008. In the aftermath of Hurricane
    Katrina, UASs searched for survivors in an otherwise inaccessible area
    of Mississippi. Additionally, in 2004, the U.S. Geological Survey and
    the U.S. Forest Service used a UAS to study renewed volcanic activity
    at Mount St. Helens, Washington. The UAS proved useful in this study
    because it could operate above the extreme heat and toxic gases and
    solids emitted by the volcano.

    Figure 3: CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007:

    [See PDF for image]

    Photograph of CBP's Predator B UAS Inventory as of December 2007.

    Source: DHS.

    [End of figure]

    Interest Exists in Expanding UAS Operations to Obtain More Benefits:

    Recent events have contributed to increasing interest in expanding UAS
    operations. The nation's industrial base has expanded to support
    current overseas conflicts. Moreover, personnel returning from duty in
    war theaters provide a growing number of trained UAS operators.
    Advances in computer technology, software development, light weight
    materials, global navigation, advanced data links, sophisticated
    sensors, and component miniaturization also contribute to the
    heightened interest in using UASs in civilian roles.

    In addition, the military's use of UASs has raised the visibility of
    the possible benefits of using UASs in non-military applications. For
    example, the military recently demonstrated how operators can use UASs
    as communications platforms to bridge rugged terrain as shown in figure
    4. Disaster recovery officials could use UASs in a similar manner to
    help establish and maintain communications when the infrastructure is
    disabled or overloaded. The latter was an issue in the hours
    immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

    Figure 4: UASs Used as Communications Relays:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is an illustration of how UASs are used as communications
    relays. The following information is depicted:

    Ground station 1:
    Link of sight link to UAS 1.

    UAS 1:
    Line of sight link to UAS 2 (above rugged terrain).

    UAS 2:
    Line of sight link to Ground station 2.

    Source: GAO and DOD.

    [End of figure]

    An industry forecast anticipates that federal agencies will continue to
    be the main users of large UASs for much of the coming decade. CBP is
    expanding its fleet of Predator B UASs. The agency received its fourth
    aircraft in February 2008 and expects to acquire two more during fiscal
    year 2008. CBP also plans to expand its UAS operations along the
    southern U.S. border, and in the spring of 2008, begin operations along
    the northern U.S. border, and then eventually expand operations to the
    Great Lakes and Caribbean. CBP's Air and Marine Operations Center in
    Riverside, California, will eventually control most of the agency's
    UASs via satellite link. DHS's Coast Guard is evaluating various UAS
    designs for future use in maritime border protection, law and treaty
    enforcement, and search and rescue.

    Expanded UAS use for scientific applications is also possible.
    According to NOAA, UASs have the potential to continue to fill critical
    observation gaps in climate change research, weather and water
    resources forecasting, ecosystem monitoring and management, and coastal
    mapping. NOAA also anticipates further use of UASs for hurricane
    observation. Figure 5 illustrates how a high-altitude UAS might obtain
    hurricane data. The National Academies recently recommended that NASA
    should increasingly factor UAS technology into the nation's strategic
    plan for Earth science. In 2007, NASA acquired two Global Hawk UASs
    from the Air Force for potential use in long endurance missions
    monitoring polar ice melt or for gathering data on hurricane
    development 2,500 miles off the U.S. Atlantic coast.

    Figure 5: Illustration of UAS Use for Hurricane Data Collection:

    [See PDF for image]

    The figure is an illustration of UAS use for hurricane data collection.

    The following is illustrated:

    * Base of operations link to satellite which links to UAS;
    * UAS climbs to an altitude of 60,000 feet;
    * UAS flies 1,500 nautical miles in transit to hurricane (12-24 hours);
    * UAS flies above hurricane collecting real-time data;
    - Expendable sensors collect air and ocean data;
    * UAS returns to base of operations.

    Sources: GAO and AeroVironment.

    [End of figure]

    State and local agencies and commercial users envision using smaller
    UAS models. To facilitate more rapid resolution of emergency
    situations, an official with the International Association of Chiefs of
    Police envisions police and firefighting units having small, hand-
    deployed UASs available to assist at crime scenes and wildfire
    locations. According to FAA, as of January 2008, about a dozen law
    enforcement agencies had contacted the agency to discuss potential use
    of UASs. An industry forecast of UAS growth from 2008 to 2017 predicts
    that interest among local law enforcement agencies in operating UASs
    could increase late in the forecast period.[Footnote 5]

    In the private sector, some entrepreneurs have become interested in
    obtaining authorization to use small UASs to provide real estate
    photography services. Small UASs could also help companies survey
    pipeline or transportation infrastructure. However, an industry
    forecast noted that, for commercial applications, manned aircraft
    continue to be less costly than UASs. Consequently, demand for
    commercial applications will be limited in the near term. While the
    forecast indicates that civil and commercial UAS markets will
    eventually emerge, the forecast notes that, for the next several years,
    a more likely scenario would be for a UAS leasing industry to emerge to
    serve the needs of businesses that do not want to invest in UAS
    ownership.

    UASs also could provide benefits to manned aviation. Efforts to move
    toward routine access for UASs could produce technological improvements
    in areas such as materials, fuel cells, antennae, and laser
    communications, which could also benefit manned aviation, according to
    one study of UAS impact.[Footnote 6] Some experts we surveyed had
    similar observations, noting that advancements in see and avoid
    technology could lead to reduced aircraft separation requirements and,
    in turn, to increased airspace capacity. Five experts indicated that
    technological improvements could benefit the airspace, and four
    indicated that such improvements could benefit airports.[Footnote 7]
    Additionally, five experts predicted that UASs could provide a variety
    of benefits by assuming some of the missions currently performed by
    manned aircraft or surface vehicles. These experts predicted that UASs
    might perform these missions in less congested airspace or with engines
    that burn less fuel or produce less air pollution.

    Some experts view the routine use of UASs in the national airspace
    system as a revolutionary change in aviation. According to one study,
    the state of UASs today resembles the early days of manned aviation
    where innovation and entrepreneurial spirit spawned a new market and
    permanently changed the transportation landscape. The UAS industry is
    poised to meet the potential demand for UASs. A 2004 study, prepared
    for JPDO, reported that 49 UAS manufacturers operated in the United
    States.[Footnote 8] According to a 2007 industry estimate, UAS
    development and components manufacturing involved over 400 companies in
    the United States.[Footnote 9] An industry forecast for UASs indicates
    that, over the coming decade, the United States will account for 73
    percent of the world's research and development investment for UAS
    technology.[Footnote 10] The aforementioned 2004 JPDO report notes that
    the emergence of a civil UAS industry could provide a number of
    economic, social, and national security benefits, such as extending
    U.S. aerospace leadership in the global UAS market; sustaining, and
    perhaps increasing, employment in the U.S. aerospace industry;
    contributing to expanding the U.S. economy by increasing domestic
    productivity and aerospace exports; and creating the potential for a
    UAS civil reserve fleet for use in major national and international
    emergencies.[Footnote 11]

    Routine Access to the National Airspace System Poses Technological,
    Regulatory, Workload, and Coordination Challenges:

    Routine UAS access to the national airspace system poses a variety of
    technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges.
    Technological challenges include developing a capability for UASs to
    detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft; addressing communications and
    physical security vulnerabilities; improving UAS reliability; and
    improving human factors considerations in UAS design. A lack of
    regulations for UASs limits their operations and leads to a lack of
    airspace for UAS testing and evaluation and a lack of data that would
    aid in setting standards. Increased workload would stem from FAA's
    expectation of increased demand for UAS operations in the national
    airspace system without a regulatory framework in place. In addition,
    coordination of efforts is lacking among diverse federal agencies as
    well as academia and the private sector in moving UASs toward meeting
    the safety requirements of the national airspace system.

    Several Technological Issues Must Be Addressed before UASs Can
    Routinely Access the National Airspace System:

    FAA requires UASs to meet the national airspace system's safety
    requirements before they routinely access the system. However, UASs do
    not currently have the capability to detect, sense, and avoid other
    aircraft and airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft.
    UASs also have communications and physical security vulnerabilities.
    Moreover, some UASs have demonstrated reliability problems and lack
    human-machine interface considerations in their design.

    UASs Cannot Detect, Sense, and Avoid Other Aircraft in a Manner Similar
    to Manned Aircraft:

    Although research, development, and testing of sense and avoid
    technologies has been ongoing for several years, no suitable technology
    has been identified that would provide UASs with the capability to meet
    the detect, sense, and avoid requirements of the national airspace
    system. These requirements call for a person operating an aircraft to
    maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft. Without a
    pilot on board to scan the sky, UASs do not have an on-board capability
    to directly "see" other aircraft. Consequently, the UAS must possess
    the capability to sense and avoid the object using on-board equipment,
    or do so with assistance of a human on the ground or in a chase
    aircraft, or by using other means, such as radar. Many UASs,
    particularly smaller models, will likely operate at altitudes below
    18,000 feet, sharing airspace with other objects, such as gliders.
    Sensing and avoiding these other objects represents a particular
    challenge for UASs, since the other objects normally do not transmit an
    electronic signal to identify themselves and FAA cannot mandate that
    all aircraft or objects possess this capability so that UASs can
    operate safely. Many small UAS models do not have equipment to detect
    such signals and, in some cases, are too small to carry such equipment.
    The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association,[Footnote 12] in a 2006
    survey of its membership, found that UASs' inability to see and avoid
    manned aircraft is a priority concern. Additionally, the experts we
    surveyed suggested, more frequently than any other alternative,
    conducting further work on detect, sense, and avoid technology as an
    interim step to facilitate UAS integration into the national airspace
    system while FAA develops a regulatory structure for routine UAS
    operations.

    The effort to develop the Traffic Alert and Collision and Avoidance
    System (TCAS), used widely in manned aircraft to help prevent
    collisions, demonstrates the challenge of developing a detect, sense,
    and avoid capability for UASs. Although FAA, airlines, and several
    private-sector companies developed TCAS over a 13-year period, at a
    cost of more than $500 million, FAA officials point out that the
    designers did not intend for TCAS to act as the sole means of avoiding
    collisions and that the on board pilot still has the responsibility for
    seeing and avoiding other aircraft. FAA officials also point out that
    TCAS computes collision avoidance solutions based on characteristics of
    manned aircraft, and does not incorporate UASs' slower turn and climb
    rates in developing conflict solutions. Consequently, FAA officials and
    stakeholders we interviewed believe that developing the detect, sense,
    and avoid technology that UASs would need to operate routinely in the
    national airspace system poses an even greater challenge than TCAS did.
    FAA officials believe that an acceptable detect, sense, and avoid
    system for UASs could cost up to $2 billion to complete and is still
    many years away.

    UASs Have Communications, Command, Control, and Physical Security
    Vulnerabilities:

    Ensuring uninterrupted command and control for a UAS is important
    because without it, the UAS could collide with another aircraft or, if
    it crashes to the earth, cause injury or property damage. The lack of
    protected radio frequency spectrum for UAS operations heightens the
    possibility that an operator could lose command and control of the UAS.
    Unlike manned aircraft, which use dedicated, protected radio
    frequencies, UASs currently use unprotected radio spectrum and, like
    any other wireless technology, remain vulnerable to unintentional or
    intentional interference. This remains a key security vulnerability for
    UASs, because in contrast to a manned aircraft where the pilot has
    direct, physical control of the aircraft, interruption of radio
    frequency, such as by jamming, can sever the UASs' only means of
    control. One of the experts we surveyed listed providing security and
    protected spectrum among the critical UAS integration technologies.

    To address the potential interruption of command and control, UASs
    generally have pre-programmed maneuvers to follow if the command and
    control link becomes interrupted (called a "lost-link scenario") and a
    means for safe return to the ground if operators cannot reestablish the
    communications link before the UAS runs out of fuel. However, these
    procedures are not standardized across all types of UASs and,
    therefore, remain unpredictable to air traffic controllers.
    Predictability of UAS performance under a lost link scenario is
    particularly important for air traffic controllers who have
    responsibility for ensuring safe separation of aircraft in their
    airspace.

    Ensuring continuity of UAS command and control also depends on the
    physical security provided to UASs. Presently, UAS operations in the
    national airspace are limited and take place under closely controlled
    conditions. However, this could change if UASs have routine access to
    the national airspace. One study identifies security as a significant
    issue that could be exacerbated with the proliferation of UASs. TSA
    notes that in 2004, terrorists flew a UAS over northern Israel.
    [Footnote 13] One stakeholder questioned how we could prevent this from
    happening in the United States. UASs have the capability to deliver
    nuclear, biological, or chemical payloads, and can be launched
    undetected from virtually any site. In response to the events of
    September 11, 2001, entry doors to passenger airplane cockpits were
    hardened to prevent unauthorized entry. However, no similar security
    requirements exist to prevent unauthorized access to UAS ground control
    stations--the UAS equivalent of the cockpit. Security is a latent issue
    that could impede UAS developments even after all the other challenges
    have been addressed, according to one study.

    UASs Have Shown a Lack of Reliability:

    Although DOD has obtained benefits from its UAS operations overseas,
    the agency notes in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap[Footnote 14] that UAS
    reliability is a key factor in integrating UASs into the national
    airspace system.[Footnote 15] Our analysis of information that DOD
    provided on 199 military UAS accidents, of varying degrees of severity,
    that occurred over 4½ years during operations Enduring Freedom and
    Iraqi Freedom, indicates that reliability continues to be a challenge.
    About 65 percent of the accidents resulted from materiel issues, such
    as failures of UAS components.[Footnote 16]

    Studies indicate that a number of factors could contribute to UAS
    reliability problems. Many UASs have been designed primarily as
    expendable or experimental vehicles, where factors such as cost,
    weight, function, and performance outweigh reliability concerns,
    according to a 2004 study.[Footnote 17] The Congressional Research
    Service reported in 2006 that the lack of reliability stems from the
    fact that UAS technology is still evolving, and, consequently, less
    redundancy is built into the operating system of UASs than of manned
    aircraft, and until redundant systems are perfected, accident rates are
    expected to remain high.[Footnote 18] Reliability issues also stem from
    the nature of the components used in some UASs. A DOD report notes that
    there has been a tendency to design UASs at low cost using readily
    available materials that were not intended for use in an aviation
    environment. For example, one UAS used by DOD was equipped with a
    wooden propeller that could disintegrate in the rain.[Footnote 19] A
    composite or metal propeller could cost two to three times more than a
    wooden propeller.

    Human Factors Deficiencies in UAS Design Have Caused Accidents:

    UAS developers have not yet fully incorporated human factors
    engineering in their products. Such engineering incorporates what is
    known about people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations
    in the design of the equipment they use, the environments in which they
    function, and the jobs they perform. According to researchers and
    agency officials we interviewed, technology in its early developmental
    stages typically lacks human factors considerations. Researchers noted
    that UASs, similar to any new technology, have been designed by
    engineers who focused on getting the technology to work, without
    considering human factors, such as ease of use by non-engineers. FAA
    officials noted that UASs today are at a similar stage as personal
    computers in their early years before newer, more user-friendly
    operating systems became standard. Studies indicate that human factors
    issues have contributed to military UAS accidents and DOD has indicated
    the need for further work in this area.[Footnote 20] Our analysis of
    DOD's data on UAS accidents during Operation Enduring Freedom and
    Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that 17 percent were due to human
    factors issues.

    Several human factors issues have yet to be resolved. For example, the
    number of UASs that a single ground-based pilot can safely operate
    remains undetermined, as some future scenarios envision a single pilot
    operating several UASs simultaneously. Other unresolved issues include
    how pilots or air traffic controllers respond to the lag in
    communication of information from the UAS, the skill set and medical
    qualifications required for UAS pilots,[Footnote 21] and UAS pilot
    training requirements.[Footnote 22]

    The variety of ground control station designs across UASs is another
    human factors concern. For example, pilots of the Predator B UAS
    control the aircraft by using a stick and pedals, similar to the
    actions of pilots of manned aircraft. In contrast, pilots of the Global
    Hawk UAS use a keyboard and mouse to control the aircraft. Differences
    in UAS missions could require some variation among control station
    designs, but the extent to which regulations should require
    commonalities across all ground control stations awaits further
    research.

    The transition from one crew to another while UASs are airborne serves
    as another human factors issue needing resolution. Because UASs have
    the capability of extended flight, one crew can hand off control to
    another during a mission. Several military UAS accidents have occurred
    during these handoffs, according to a 2005 research study.[Footnote 23]
    The National Transportation Safety Board cited a similar issue in its
    report on the April 26, 2006, crash of CBP's Predator B UAS. According
    to the report, the pilot inadvertently cut off the UAS's fuel supply
    when he switched from a malfunctioning console to a functioning
    one.[Footnote 24] When the switch was made, a lever on the second
    console remained in a position that would cut off the fuel supply if an
    operator used the console to control the aircraft. Although procedures
    required that the controls on the two consoles be matched prior to
    making such a switch, this procedure was not followed. CBP reports that
    it has taken action to address this issue and has also addressed nearly
    all of the board's other recommendations stemming from this accident.

    A remote pilot's lack of situational awareness serves as another human
    factors-related challenge for the safe operation of UASs. For example,
    FAA officials have noted that situational awareness remains a key
    factor for operators to detect and appropriately respond to turbulence.
    A pilot on board an aircraft can physically sense and assess the
    severity of turbulence being encountered, whereas a remote pilot
    cannot. A UAS could break apart and become a hazard to other aircraft
    or to persons or property on the ground if the pilot has no indication
    of turbulence or its severity. Even if a remote pilot had an awareness
    of the turbulence, the level of risk that the pilot might accept needs
    further study. Because a pilot does not risk his own safety when
    operating a UAS, the pilot may operate the UAS in situations unsuitable
    for the aircraft, such as flying through turbulence strong enough to
    destroy the UAS's airframe.

    Although many experts and aviation stakeholders believe that the
    technical issues discussed above represent difficult challenges for UAS
    integration into the national airspace system, others do not. For
    example, DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap asserts that the technology for
    detecting and maneuvering to avoid objects does not present a major
    obstacle. Some experts responding to our survey expressed similar
    opinions. For example, one noted that technology needed to safely
    integrate UASs into the national airspace system exists today and that
    implementation should be the focus. Another said that FAA is too slow
    in adopting new technology and that sense and avoid techniques are
    available today that, when used in combination with a qualified pilot
    at the ground station's controls, would be sufficient to allow free
    access for larger UASs. However, FAA expects to continue its current
    practice of allowing UAS access to the national airspace system on a
    case-by-case basis, after a safety review, until technology, research,
    and regulations mature.

    A Lack of Regulations Limits UAS Operations:

    The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations[Footnote 25] prescribes rules
    governing the operation of most aircraft in the national airspace
    system. However, these regulations were developed for manned aircraft.
    Minimum performance standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and
    communications, command, and control capabilities, as well as
    regulations that incorporate these minimum standards, do not exist.
    Moreover, existing regulations may need changes or additions to address
    the unique characteristics of UASs. For example, because UASs do not
    need to be large or powerful enough to carry a pilot, they can be much
    smaller than any aircraft that today routinely operates in the national
    airspace system. Existing regulations were developed for aircraft large
    enough to carry a human.

    The lack of a regulatory framework has limited the amount of UAS
    operations in the national airspace system, which has, in turn,
    contributed to a lack of operational data on UASs and a lack of
    airspace in which developers can test and evaluate their products. An
    industry forecast indicates that growth in a civil UAS market is not
    likely until regulations exist that allow UASs to operate routinely.
    The forecast assumes that such regulations would be in place by 2012,
    but notes that few civil-use UASs would be produced in the near term,
    with numbers increasing towards 2017. (See fig. 6.)

    Figure 6: Forecast of Civil UASs Produced, 2008 through 2017:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:

    Year: 2008;
    Civil UASs produced: 7.

    Year: 2009;
    Civil UASs produced: 7.

    Year: 2010;
    Civil UASs produced: 7.

    Year: 2011;
    Civil UASs produced: 7.

    Year: 2012;
    Civil UASs produced: 35.

    Year: 2013;
    Civil UASs produced: 67.

    Year: 2014;
    Civil UASs produced: 69.

    Year: 2015;
    Civil UASs produced: 84.

    Year: 2016;
    Civil UASs produced: 111.

    Year: 2017;
    Civil UASs produced: 161.

    Source: Teal Group Corporation, 2008.

    [End of figure]

    Studies indicate that the lack of regulations can affect liability risk
    of UAS operations, which can increase insurance costs. For example,
    without airworthiness standards, insurers would be even more concerned
    about the liability hazard of UASs crashing in a dense urban
    environment. The lack of regulations to govern access to airspace has
    also posed challenges for developers of civil UASs. Officials of
    associations representing UAS developers told us of difficulties in
    finding airspace in which to test and evaluate UASs. One of these
    officials noted that some manufacturers have their own test ranges, and
    some have access to restricted military airspace, but other UAS
    developers have not had this access. Additionally, because UAS
    operations in the national airspace have been limited, operational data
    is scarce. Having data on UAS operations is an important element in
    developing regulations.

    Because UASs have never routinely operated in the national airspace
    system, the level of public acceptance is unknown. One researcher
    observed that as UASs expand into the non-defense sector, there will
    inevitably be public debate over the need for and motives behind such
    proliferation. One expert we surveyed commented that some individuals
    may raise privacy concerns about a small aircraft that is "spying" on
    them, whether operated by law enforcement officials or by private
    organizations, and raised the question of what federal agency would
    have the responsibility for addressing these privacy concerns. On the
    other hand, a study for JPDO noted that if UASs were increasingly used
    to produce public benefits in large-scale emergency response efforts,
    public acceptance could grow as the public notes the benefits that UASs
    can provide.[Footnote 26]

    Coordinating with Other Countries' Efforts to Integrate UASs Is a Key
    Task:

    As other countries work toward integrating UASs in their respective
    airspaces, FAA faces a challenge to work with the international
    community in developing harmonized standards and operational procedures
    so that UASs can seamlessly cross international borders and U.S.
    manufacturers can sell their products in the global marketplace.
    International bodies such as the European Organization for Civil
    Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE), and the European Organization for the
    Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), as well as individual countries
    face challenges similar to those that the United States faces in
    integrating UASs into their respective airspaces.

    EUROCAE formed a working group--WG-73--in 2006 to focus on UAS issues.
    The working group completed its first product in January 2007--a
    preliminary inventory of airworthiness certification and operational
    approval items that need to be addressed. The working group also plans
    to develop a work plan that lays out work packages and timelines; a
    concept for UAS airworthiness certification and operational approval
    that will provide recommendations and a framework for safe UAS
    operations in non-segregated airspace[Footnote 27]; requirements for
    command, control, and communications, as well as for sense and avoid
    systems; and a catalog of UAS-air traffic management incompatibility
    issues that need to be addressed.

    EUROCONTROL has established a UAS Air Traffic Management Activity and
    is hosting workshops to seek feedback, suggestions, and advice from a
    broad range of aviation stakeholders on its approach to UAS integration
    into European airspace. The second workshop is scheduled for May 2008
    and is open to all interested civil and military stakeholders,
    including air navigation service providers, UAS operators and
    manufacturers, regulators, as well as associations and professional
    bodies. EURCONTROL has also established an Operational Air Traffic Task
    Force that has developed high-level specifications for military UASs
    operating outside segregated airspace in a form suitable for European
    states to incorporate into their national regulations. The
    specifications state that UAS operations should not increase the risk
    to other airspace users, that air traffic management procedures should
    mirror those applicable to manned aircraft, and that the provision of
    air traffic services to UASs should be transparent to air traffic
    controllers.

    Table 1 illustrates the variety of individual country efforts to
    integrate UASs into their respective airspaces. With the variety of
    ongoing efforts around the world, FAA and other countries face a
    challenge in harmonizing UAS standards and procedures.

    Table 1: Examples of UAS Integration Efforts in Other Countries:

    Country: United Kingdom;
    UAS integration efforts: "The Autonomous Systems Technology Related
    Airborne Evaluation and Assessment" project is focusing on the
    technologies, systems, facilities, and procedures that will allow UASs
    to operate safely and routinely in United Kingdom airspace. The project
    has received funding from the British government, industries, and
    universities and work has commenced to address topics such as
    communications, collision avoidance, operating rules and procedures,
    and integration with the operating environment.

    Country: Australia/New Zealand;
    UAS integration efforts: An Australian aerospace firm has commissioned
    a program, Unmanned Aircraft Technology Applications Research, to
    organize efforts to address UAS issues. The program has, in turn,
    established an Australian/New Zealand working group to use
    demonstration programs to solve the critical issues currently
    inhibiting commercial UAS operations. The working group includes
    global, regional, and Australian UAS manufacturers and operators,
    researchers, military aviation, and an international insurance
    underwriter.

    Country: Japan;
    UAS integration efforts: In 2004, a consortium of Japanese
    manufacturers and a government ministry completed formulation of safety
    guidelines for using unmanned helicopters for commercial purposes over
    unpopulated areas. This consortium became an association that includes
    additional manufacturers and individuals from universities and research
    agencies and plans to develop safety guidelines for UASs. Japan
    currently uses unmanned helicopters for pesticide spraying.

    Country: Canada;
    UAS integration efforts: In 2007, Transport Canada issued the Final
    Report of its Unmanned Air Vehicle Working Group. The working group
    developed a plan to safely integrate unmanned air vehicles into the
    Canadian airspace system. The working group included representation
    from government, defense, and private-sector entities.

    Country: Germany;
    UAS integration efforts: Germany has established a working group called
    "UAS-Deutschland" to facilitate the operation of UASs in German
    airspace. The working group is tasked with developing a national
    opinion concerning enabling the integration of UAS operations in non-
    segregated airspace and preparing for and fostering international
    harmonization. Another working group called "UAV DACH" has been
    established for German-speaking countries--Austria, Germany, the
    Netherlands, and Switzerland--to develop standards for national and
    international regulations for civil and military UAS flights. The group
    is also charged with finding solutions for UAS technical challenges
    such as sensing and avoiding other aircraft.

    Source: FAA documents, Internet Web pages, a press release, and a UAS
    expert.

    [End of table]

    FAA Faces Increased Workload to Process COA and Special Airworthiness
    Certificate Applications for UAS Operations:

    FAA could face a workload challenge in conducting an increasing number
    of case-by-case safety reviews for proposed UAS operations in the
    national airspace system. FAA is already having difficulty in meeting
    its 60-calendar day goal for processing COAs, used for government
    requests to operate UASs. From December 2006 through January 2008,
    FAA's COA processing time averaged 66 calendar days[Footnote 28]. FAA
    anticipates a substantial increase in requests for COAs, as well as for
    special airworthiness certificates, used by private-sector entities
    proposing UAS operations in the national airspace system, by 2010. (See
    figs. 7 and 8.) Increased demand could result in even longer processing
    times for COAs.

    Figure 7: Applications for Certificates of Waiver or Authorization,
    Received in Calendar Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:

    Year: 2005;
    Applications received: 24.

    Year: 2005;
    Applications received: 64.

    Year: 2006;
    Applications received: 102.

    Year: 2007;
    Applications received: 109.

    Year: 2008;
    Applications received: 153.

    Year: 2009;
    Applications received: 229.

    Year: 2010;
    Applications received: 343.

    Source: FAA.

    [End of figure]

    Figure 8: Applications for Special Airworthiness Certificates, Received
    in Fiscal Years 2004-2007, and Projected through 2010:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:

    Year: 2005;
    Applications received: 0.

    Year: 2005;
    Applications received: 1.

    Year: 2006;
    Applications received: 3.

    Year: 2007;
    Applications received: 15.

    Year: 2008;
    Applications received: 17.

    Year: 2009;
    Applications received: 24.

    Year: 2010;
    Applications received: 32.

    Source: FAA.

    [End of figure]

    A lack of knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs
    adds uncertainty to FAA's expected future workload. The number of COAs
    does not provide a count of federally-owned or -leased UASs because
    each COA reflects an authorization to operate a UAS, not the number of
    UASs owned or leased by an agency. According to FAA, an agency could
    have multiple copies of the same type of UAS whose operation is
    approved in a COA. Moreover, having multiple UASs of the same type
    could drive additional workload for FAA if the agency requests
    authorization to operate its UASs under different operating scenarios,
    each of which would require a separate COA. An agency could also have
    only one UAS, but more than one COA, if the agency required and
    received approval for the UAS to operate under different sets of
    conditions. GSA has responsibility for maintaining the inventory of
    federally-owned and -leased aircraft, but its regulations on reporting
    these aircraft have not been updated to require federal agencies to
    report UASs.

    Coordination among Federal Agencies and Others Is Lacking:

    Coordinating the efforts of numerous federal agencies, academic
    institutions, and private-sector entities that have UAS expertise or a
    stake in routine access to the national airspace system is a challenge.
    As discussed above, several federal agencies are involved to varying
    degrees in UAS issues. Additionally, academic institutions have UAS
    expertise to contribute and UAS manufacturers have a stake in supplying
    the demand for UASs that routine access could create. FAA and experts
    referenced the Access-5 program that, in the past, served as an
    overarching coordinating body and provided a useful community forum.
    While some experts believe that Access-5's focus on high-altitude, long-
    endurance UASs is no longer appropriate, the program's institutional
    arrangements demonstrated how federal government and the private-sector
    resources could be combined to focus on a common goal.

    Stakeholders and experts we surveyed believe that coordination and
    focus are lacking among the diverse entities working on UAS issues, and
    expressed concerns that the potential public and economic benefits of
    UASs could be delayed while FAA develops the safety regulations
    required to enable routine UASs operations in the national airspace
    system. They noted the numerous potential uses in public safety, law
    enforcement, weather forecasting, and national security, discussed
    previously, stating that these benefits will be delayed until standards
    are developed. Some also noted that economic benefits realized through
    industry growth and productivity gains in the commercial sector would
    also be delayed. Additionally, some experts believe that, at the
    current pace of progress, the United States would lose its leadership
    position and manufacturers would move to other countries where the
    regulatory climate is more receptive. However, as previously noted, an
    industry forecast indicates that the United States will account for
    about two-thirds of the worldwide UAS research and development in the
    coming decade.

    Fully Addressing UAS Challenges Involves Several Agencies and Could
    Take a Decade or Longer:

    FAA and other agencies have roles in addressing technological,
    regulatory, and workload challenges, but no entity is in charge of
    coordinating these efforts. FAA and DOD are addressing some
    technological challenges, but TSA has not addressed the security
    implications of routine UAS operations. FAA is establishing a
    regulatory framework, but routine UAS access to the national airspace
    may not occur for over a decade. FAA is mitigating its expected
    increased workload by automating some of its COA processing steps. GSA
    is updating its federal aircraft reporting requirements to include
    UASs. Experts and stakeholders believe that an overarching entity could
    add focus to these diverse efforts and facilitate routine UAS access to
    the national airspace system.

    Federal Agencies Are Addressing Some Technological Issues:

    FAA is addressing technological issues by sponsoring research and
    taking steps to address UAS vulnerabilities in communications, command,
    and control. DOD is taking steps toward improving UAS reliability and
    the extent of human factors consideration in UAS design. An FAA-
    sponsored federal advisory committee is developing technical standards
    for FAA to use in developing UAS regulations. Although TSA issued an
    advisory circular in 2004 on UAS security concerns, it has not
    addressed the security implications of routine UAS access in the
    national airspace system.

    FAA Is Sponsoring Research on Detect, Sense, and Avoid Technologies and
    Other Topics:

    FAA has budgeted $4.7 million for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 for
    further UAS research on topics such as detect, sense, and avoid;
    command and control; and system safety management. NASA, FAA, and
    others have conducted tests to determine the capabilities of and
    potential improvements to detect, sense, and avoid technology. For
    example, in 2003, NASA installed radar on a manned aircraft that was
    equipped for optional control from the ground. The tests indicated that
    the radar detected intruding aircraft earlier than the onboard pilot,
    but also revealed the need for further work on the onboard sensing
    equipment to ensure adequate response time for the remote pilot. In
    another example, FAA and the Air Force Research Laboratory collaborated
    to execute flight tests for sense and avoid technology between October
    2006 and January 2007. According to a summary of the lessons learned
    from these tests, the results showed some promise, but indicated that
    much work and technology maturation would need to occur before the
    tested system could be deemed ready for operational use.

    FAA Has Begun to Address Radio Frequency Spectrum Allocation for UASs
    to Ensure Uninterrupted Communications, Command, and Control:

    Addressing the challenge of radio frequency allocation for UAS
    operations is moving forward, but may not be completed for several
    years. The International Telecommunication Union allocates radio
    frequency spectrum and deliberates such issues at periodic World
    Radiocommunication Conferences, the most recent of which was held in
    the fall of 2007. To obtain spectrum allocation for UASs, FAA has
    participated with the Department of Commerce in a national preparation
    process to place spectrum allocation decisions on the conference's
    future agenda. At the 2007 conference, delegates agreed to discuss at
    the next conference, in 2011, the spectrum requirements and possible
    regulatory actions, including spectrum allocations, needed to support
    the safe operation of UASs. The Department of Commerce and the Federal
    Communications Commission would jointly implement and manage the
    spectrum allocation decisions made at the 2011 conference, as these
    agencies manage, respectively, federal and non-federal use of frequency
    spectrum.[Footnote 29]

    DOD Is Working to Improve UAS Reliability and Incorporate Human Factors
    in UAS Design:

    DOD is urging manufacturers to increase UAS reliability while keeping
    costs low by using such practices as standard systems engineering,
    ensuring that replacement parts are readily available, and using
    redundant, fail-safe designs. DOD also notes in its Unmanned Systems
    Roadmap that, although UASs suffer accidents at one to two orders of
    magnitude greater than the rate incurred by manned military aircraft,
    accident rates have declined as operational experience increased. For
    some UASs, the accident rates have become similar to or lower than that
    of the manned F-16 fighter jet, according to the roadmap. According to
    a study by The MITRE Corporation, General Atomics designed the Predator
    B UAS with reliability in mind, and the Altair UAS, which is a modified
    version of the Predator, has, among other things, triple redundant
    avionics to increase reliability.

    The Army has made some progress in limiting the variety of ground
    control station designs for unmanned aircraft--a human factors concern-
    -by developing its "One System®," which involves a single ground
    control station capable of operating a variety of UASs. Further
    increasing standardization and interoperability across all unmanned
    systems is a continuing DOD goal.

    A Federal Advisory Body Is Developing Technical Standards:

    The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), a federal
    advisory committee sponsored by FAA,[Footnote 30] is establishing
    minimum performance standards for FAA to use in developing UAS
    regulations. RTCA established Special Committee 203 in October 2004 to
    develop such standards for UAS detect, sense, and avoid and for UAS
    communications, command, and control. Individuals from academia and the
    private sector serve on the committee without government compensation
    along with FAA, NASA, and DOD officials.

    Special Committee 203 has begun assessing the technological and
    regulatory landscape as it pertains to UASs to determine the scope of
    its task. The committee published guidance materials to provide a
    framework for its standards development effort and to help UAS
    designers, manufacturers, installers, service providers, and users
    understand the breadth of operational concepts and systems being
    considered for integration into the national airspace system.[Footnote
    31] The committee anticipates that the guidance will be further refined
    and validated as the standards development process moves along.

    According to a committee co-chair, the committee did not realize, at
    the outset, that developing technical standards for UASs would be a
    project of unprecedented complexity and scope for RTCA. RTCA's projects
    have been narrower in scope in the past, he said. Although the
    committee officials had previously estimated that the standards would
    be completed by 2011 or 2012, the completion date is now between 2017
    and 2019. The additional time has been added to apply a data-driven,
    systems engineering approach that will require the collaborative
    efforts of FAA, DOD, and MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System
    Development.[Footnote 32]

    RTCA anticipates that reliability and human factors requirements will
    be integrated into its minimum performance standards. The guidance
    materials note that UASs must meet the same reliability as manned
    aircraft, and that reliability is an important component of safety;
    flight control systems; certification requirements for detect, sense,
    and avoid avionics; and for command and control systems such as the
    UAS's autopilot. According to RTCA officials, human factors will be an
    overarching consideration in standards development.

    Security Implications of Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace
    System Have Not Been Addressed:

    Although UASs remain vulnerable to many of the same security risks as
    manned aircraft, little attention has been afforded to UAS security. In
    2004, TSA issued an advisory that described possible terrorist interest
    in using UASs as weapons. The advisory noted the potential for UASs to
    carry explosives or disperse chemical or biological weapons. However,
    the advisory noted that there was no credible evidence to suggest that
    terrorist organizations plan to use UASs in the United States and
    advised operators to stay alert for UASs with unusual or unauthorized
    modifications or persons observed loitering in the vicinity of UAS
    operations, loading unusual cargo into a UAS, appearing to be under
    stress, showing identification that appeared to be altered, or asking
    detailed questions about UAS capabilities. In 2007, the agency advised
    model aircraft clubs to fly their aircraft only at chartered club
    facilities or at administered sites and to notify local authorities of
    scheduled flying events.

    TSA considers these actions appropriate to address the security threat
    posed by UASs. According to TSA, the agency uses a threat based, risk
    management approach to prioritize risk, threats, and vulnerabilities in
    order to appropriately apply resources and implement security
    enhancements. TSA informed us that the agency continues to monitor
    threat information regarding UASs and has processes in place to act
    quickly to mitigate and respond to any identified vulnerabilities.
    While these actions may be appropriate for the low tempo of today's UAS
    operations, growth forecasts indicate that UASs could proliferate in
    the national airspace in the future. Such a proliferation could
    increase the risk of UASs being used by terrorists for attacks in the
    United States. A lack of analysis of security issues, while FAA
    develops the regulatory framework, could lead to further delays in
    allowing UASs routine access to the national airspace system.

    FAA Is Establishing a Regulatory Framework, but Routine UAS Access to
    the National Airspace May Not Occur for a Decade or More:

    FAA has established a UAS program office and is reviewing the body of
    manned aviation regulations to determine the modifications needed to
    address UASs, but these modifications may not be completed until 2020.
    As an interim step, FAA has begun an effort to provide increased access
    to the national airspace system for small UASs. FAA is taking steps to
    develop data to use in developing standards, but has been slow to
    analyze the data that it has already collected. FAA is also
    coordinating with other countries to harmonize regulations.

    FAA Has Created an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office to Ensure That UASs
    Operate Safely:

    In February 2006, FAA created the Unmanned Aircraft Program Office
    (UAPO) to develop policies and regulations to ensure that UASs operate
    safely in the national airspace system. With 19 staff, UAPO serves as
    FAA's focal point to coordinate efforts to address UAS technical and
    regulatory challenges and for outreach to other government agencies,
    the private sector, and other countries and international bodies
    working on UASs integration challenges. UAPO is developing a program
    plan to inform the aviation community of FAA's perspective on all that
    needs to be accomplished and the time frames required to create a
    regulatory framework that will ensure UAS safety and allow UASs to have
    routine access to the national airspace system. Although officials
    informed us that this plan was in progress in December 2006, as of
    March 2008 the plan was awaiting final approval for release. Issuing
    the program plan could provide industry and potential UAS users with a
    framework that describes FAA's vision and plans for integrating UASs
    into the national airspace system.

    While RTCA is developing minimum performance standards for UASs, FAA
    has begun to review the existing body of regulations for manned
    aviation to determine what regulations need to be modified or whether
    new regulations are needed to address the unique characteristics of
    UASs. Some of the rules for manned aircraft may not apply to UASs. For
    example, the rule requiring that oxygen be on board for passenger use
    on all aircraft operating above 14,000 feet would not apply to a UAS.
    On the other hand, new standards may be needed. For example, while FAA
    has developed standards for manned airframe stress, no similar standard
    exists for UASs. UASs may require unique standards because, as
    mentioned previously in this report, a remote pilot cannot physically
    experience and judge the severity of turbulence that could potentially
    harm the airframe and cause an accident.

    However, UASs may not receive routine access to the national airspace
    system until 2020. FAA's final step in developing UAS regulations must
    wait until the 2017 to 2019 time frame, after RTCA's Special Committee
    203 develops minimum technical standards for UASs. FAA would then
    conduct a rulemaking to adopt the committee's standards, which would
    require an additional year, according to an FAA official.

    As an interim effort to increase UAS access to the national airspace
    system, FAA began an effort in 2007 to establish regulations to
    incrementally allow small UASs to operate in the national airspace
    system, under low-risk conditions without undergoing the case-by-case
    approval process that is currently required. FAA has established a plan
    to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking by July 2009 and a final
    rule by 2010 or 2011. Although FAA has not reached any final decisions,
    FAA may limit these regulations to UASs weighing less than 30 pounds,
    operating within line of sight, and traveling at speeds less than 40
    knots, according to an FAA official.[Footnote 33] FAA is considering
    using a nontraditional certification approach that would allow
    applicants to register small UASs using a Web-based tool. FAA
    anticipates that, following the rulemaking, it will obtain data and
    experience with UAS operations that could lead to further gradual
    expansion of small UAS access to the national airspace system.

    Allowing incremental access of certain UASs that pose low risks is
    consistent with pending legislation[Footnote 34] and local government
    agencies and potential commercial operators have expressed much
    interest in operating small UASs. However, FAA recognizes that some
    small UASs may never have routine access to the national airspace
    system because their small size limits their ability to carry detect,
    sense, and avoid equipment. Additionally, FAA notes that, like all
    UASs, small UASs will require secure radio frequency spectrum for
    command and control, and this issue has not yet been resolved.

    FAA Seeks Data on UAS Operations, but Progress Is Slow:

    The absence of a comprehensive database on UAS safety and reliability
    that could inform the standards and regulations development process
    hinders FAA's efforts to establish a regulatory framework for UASs. FAA
    has been working to leverage DOD's decades of experience with UASs.
    Collaboration between FAA and DOD could provide mutual benefits. DOD
    plans to spend over $7 billion in research, development, test, and
    evaluation funds for UASs between fiscal years 2007 and 2013. Data from
    these efforts could facilitate FAA's development of a regulatory
    framework to allow UASs to have routine access to the national airspace
    system. DOD would benefit from this access by being able to operate its
    UASs in the national airspace, without first obtaining a COA, as UASs
    transit from home bases to training areas or to overseas deployment. To
    this end, FAA and DOD finalized a memorandum of agreement in September
    2007 that provides a formal mechanism for FAA to request, and DOD to
    provide, data on UAS operations to support safety studies. Through the
    memorandum, FAA will share the results of its studies with DOD and vice
    versa. FAA also participates with DOD on a joint integrated product
    team that is focusing on obtaining military UAS access to the national
    airspace system. According to DOD's Unmanned Systems Roadmap, the
    team's activities include modeling and simulation, technology
    development, acquisition, demonstrations, and flight tests.

    While DOD's extensive experience with UAS operations and its
    accumulated data represent potentially rich sources of information on
    UAS operations, regulators should use such information with the
    understanding that it comes from a wartime operating environment. FAA
    and DOD officials acknowledge that military experience and operational
    data on UASs are not always directly transferable to operations in the
    national airspace system. The military's use of UASs is focused on
    mitigating the danger to troops. Safety and reliability risks that may
    be appropriate in a war zone to protect troops may not be acceptable in
    the national airspace system.

    FAA's efforts to develop and analyze UAS operations data are a good
    start, but FAA has not yet analyzed the data that it has already
    collected. The COA requires the applicant to provide FAA with a variety
    of operational data, such as the number of flights conducted, the pilot
    duty time per flight, equipment malfunctions, and information on any
    accidents. FAA has been archiving this information as it is received,
    but has not analyzed it because of resource constraints, according to a
    UAPO official. Analyzing this data could add to the information
    available for developing standards.

    As a vehicle for collecting data on UAS operations and to address the
    challenge that UAS developers have had in finding airspace for testing
    and evaluating their products, FAA has established a UAS test center at
    New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, New Mexico. FAA expects that
    UAS operations at the test center, which opened in the spring of 2008,
    will provide FAA with some of the data needed to develop standards and
    regulations for allowing routine UAS access to the national airspace
    system. The university will operate the 12,000 square mile test center,
    where UASs can operate at altitudes up to 18,000 feet. (See fig. 9.)
    The university has several years of experience in demonstrating,
    testing, and evaluating UAS technologies. The New Mexico environment
    has the advantage of a very low population density and a low volume of
    air traffic, and the test center is located over mostly undeveloped
    government-owned land. FAA will provide oversight of the test center
    operation by way of announced and unannounced visits, according to an
    FAA official.

    Figure 9: UAS Test Center at New Mexico State University:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is a map of New Mexico with an area of detail shown
    indicating the UAS test center at New Mexico State University.

    Source: GAO and FAA.

    [End of figure]

    FAA Is Coordinating with Other Countries to Harmonize Regulations:

    To address the challenge of coordinating U.S. efforts with those of
    other countries, FAA is working with international aviation bodies and
    maintaining contact with other countries as they also work to overcome
    the challenges of integrating UASs into their respective airspaces. For
    example, the manager of FAA's UAPO serves as a vice chairman of
    EUROCAE's WG-73,[Footnote 35] and FAA has established a collaborative
    effort with EUROCONTROL to leverage mutual expertise and resources. FAA
    told us that the International Civil Aviation Organization
    (ICAO)[Footnote 36] has formed a study group to identify changes needed
    in global standards and practices to address UAS issues. FAA has also
    established a memorandum of cooperation with the Netherlands' Civil
    Aviation Authority to work on UAS technology, hazards, and risks. FAA
    plans to contribute, subject to appropriations, $1 million during
    fiscal years 2007 through 2011, to provide the Netherlands with data
    and expertise, while the Netherlands plans to contribute €160,000
    ($251,279).[Footnote 37] FAA has received briefings on Japan's use of
    UASs for pesticide spraying and has collaborated with several countries
    to address UAS issues with ICAO.

    FAA's efforts to work with the international community could facilitate
    mutual sharing of experiences and substantially increase the amount of
    information available to all countries. One stakeholder suggested
    Israel as a potential source of data, as that country has had extensive
    experience with UAS operations. An Israel Space Agency official, noting
    the growing importance of UASs in that country, stated that the numbers
    of unmanned aircraft in the Israel Air Force will outnumber manned
    aircraft within 20 years. The official also stated that in a recent
    conflict, Israel's UASs compiled more flying hours than manned
    aircraft.

    FAA Is Mitigating Anticipated Workload Increase by Automating Some COA
    Processing Steps, and GSA Is Working to Develop an Inventory of Federal
    UASs:

    FAA has taken some actions to mitigate the workload challenge stemming
    from an anticipated increase in requests for COAs to operate UASs in
    the national airspace system. During the spring of 2007, FAA began to
    introduce more automation into its COA review process for UASs and has
    plans for increasing automation. For example, FAA established a Web-
    based COA application, which became mandatory for applicants' use on
    July 1, 2007. FAA officials believe that the Web-based process allows
    applicants to more easily determine the application's requirements,
    thereby eliminating rework and repeated reviews before FAA accepts the
    application. FAA also expects that the September 2007 memorandum of
    agreement with DOD will reduce the number of COA applications because
    it allows DOD to conduct certain operations with UASs weighing 20
    pounds or less over military installations and in other specified
    airspace without obtaining a COA.[Footnote 38] Additionally, FAA is
    working to identify characteristics of routine COA applications, which
    FAA estimates constitute up to 80 percent of total COA applications,
    enabling agency staff to focus limited resources on non routine cases.
    Focusing less attention on routine cases is consistent with comments
    from three of our experts who noted the need for an expedited process
    for obtaining COAs and special airworthiness certificates. FAA
    officials also stated that because applicants are becoming more
    familiar with COA requirements, a higher percentage of applications do
    not need additional work and review.

    Knowledge of the number of federally-owned or -leased UASs could help
    FAA to plan for future workload. Forecasters indicate that UASs
    operated by federal agencies could be a major component of UAS growth
    in the immediate future. Although the current number of federally-owned
    or federally-leased UASs is unknown, GSA is taking steps to obtain this
    information. In response to our requests for data on the number of
    federally-owned or federally-leased UASs, GSA sent letters to federal
    agencies in February 2008, clarifying that FAA defines a UAS as an
    aircraft and requesting agencies to report their UASs by March 31,
    2008. GSA is also in the process of revising regulations to require
    federal agencies to include owned or leased UASs in their aircraft
    inventory reports. GSA expects to have its regulation updated by
    February 2009. GSA anticipates that the first public reporting of UASs
    will be in the fiscal year 2008 Federal Aviation Report, due by March
    31, 2009. This report could add a degree of certainty to FAA's future
    workload requirements.

    Experts and Stakeholders Believe an Overarching Entity Could Facilitate
    Efforts to Achieve Routine UAS Access to the National Airspace System:

    In addition to FAA, DOD, TSA, and GSA, other federal agencies,
    academia, and the private sector also have UAS expertise or a stake in
    obtaining routine UAS access to the national airspace system. For
    example, RTCA notes that developing standards will require
    collaboration with DOD's joint integrated product team and technical
    expertise from staff in MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System
    Development. DOD seeks expanded access to the national airspace and, as
    previously discussed, has extensive experience with operating its own
    UASs. Beyond DOD and FAA, other entities also have UAS expertise or a
    stake in achieving routine UAS access to the national airspace system.
    For example, DHS's CBP and Coast Guard need UAS access to the national
    airspace system to perform their missions. Several academic
    institutions have been involved in developing UAS technology in areas
    such as vehicle design and detect, sense, and avoid capability.
    Additionally, the private sector has a stake in being ready to respond
    to the anticipated market that could emerge when FAA makes routine
    access available to most UASs. Although FAA's UAPO serves as a focal
    point within FAA, the office has no authority over other agencies'
    efforts.

    Experts and stakeholders suggested that an overarching body might
    facilitate progress toward integrating UASs into the national airspace
    system. DOD, as the major user of UASs, is taking such an approach. DOD
    has recognized the need for coordination of UAS activities within its
    own sphere of influence, as each service has recognized the value of
    UASs for its respective missions. Consequently, DOD established an
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force to coordinate critical issues
    related to UAS acquisition and management within DOD. According to DOD,
    the task force will establish new teams or lead or coordinate existing
    Army, Navy, and Air Force teams to enhance operations, enable
    interdependencies, and streamline acquisitions. FAA is participating in
    a joint integrated product team that is part of this task force, and
    DOD has invited DHS to join the task force.

    The European Defense Agency has also recognized the challenge of
    channeling diverse entities, as well as multiple nation-states, toward
    the common goal of UAS access to non-segregated airspace. In January
    2008, the agency announced that it had awarded a contract to a
    consortium of defense and aerospace companies to develop a detailed
    roadmap for integrating, by 2015, UASs into European airspace. The
    project is intended to help European stakeholders such as airworthiness
    authorities, air traffic management bodies, procurement agencies,
    industry, and research institutes to develop a joint agenda for common
    European UAS activities. The consortium held its first workshop in
    February 2008 and has since prepared a roadmap outline based on the
    needs and requirements expressed by the stakeholders. The consortium
    has also identified as a baseline, key actions to be undertaken and key
    topics for further investigation. The consortium has invited
    stakeholders to discuss this common baseline at a second workshop,
    scheduled for May 2008.

    Congress addressed a similar coordination challenge in 2003 when it
    passed legislation to create JPDO to plan for and coordinate a
    transformation of the nation's current air traffic control system to
    the next generation air transportation system (NextGen) by 2025.
    NextGen involves a complex mix of precision satellite navigation;
    digital, networked communications; an integrated weather system;
    layered, adaptive security; and more.

    NextGen's coordination and planning challenges are similar to those
    posed by UASs. For example, as required for UAS integration, the
    expertise and technology required for NextGen resides in several
    federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. DOD has expertise
    in "network centric" systems, originally developed for the battlefield,
    which are being considered as a framework to provide all users of the
    national airspace system with a common view of that system. JPDO's
    responsibilities include coordinating goals, priorities, and research
    activities of several partner agencies, including DOD, FAA, the
    Department of Commerce, DHS, and NASA with aviation and aeronautical
    firms. Congress directed JPDO to prepare an integrated plan that would
    include, among other things, a national vision statement and a
    multiagency research and development roadmap for creating NextGen. The
    legislation called for the roadmap to identify obstacles, the research
    and development necessary to overcome them, and the roles of each
    agency, corporations, and universities.

    Impact of Routine UAS Operations Is Unknown:

    The impact of routine UAS operations on the national airspace system
    and the environment depends on a number of factors and remains
    generally speculative. UAS impact will depend on factors such as the
    number of UASs purchased for civil uses and the altitudes and
    geographic locations where they are used. Stakeholders whom we
    interviewed provided a variety of perspectives on UASs' potential
    impact. One official told us that UASs that use airports will impact
    air traffic control, while the impact of small UASs that do not need to
    use airports is less clear. Officials also noted that the level of risk
    depends on factors such as the UAS's weight and horsepower. For
    example, a small, 2-or 3-pound UAS would pose little risk to aircraft
    or people on the ground, but UASs weighing more than 20 pounds could do
    significant damage to an aircraft. Officials also noted that a UAS used
    over a sparsely populated area would have less impact than UAS
    operations over densely populated areas.

    Predictions of the impact of UASs on the national airspace system are
    speculative because there are few data upon which to base predictions.
    Predictions become even more speculative in view of RTCA's recent
    estimate that minimum standards for UASs--a prerequisite for routine
    UAS access to the national airspace system--will require about another
    10 years to complete. One study notes that more needs to be known about
    the needs and capabilities of future UASs as well as the potential
    market, but concluded that their operations could have a significant
    and potentially disruptive impact on aviation by affecting capacity and
    introducing more complexity. In 2007, RTCA's Special Committee 203
    reported similar concerns, indicating that UASs will create some unique
    challenges because they operate differently from typical manned
    aircraft. While manned aircraft generally go from one location to
    another, UASs may hover or circle in one location for a significant
    time. Additionally, UAS speed, maneuverability, climb rate and other
    performance characteristics may differ substantially from those of
    conventional aircraft. The committee believes that these
    characteristics could affect air traffic flow, air traffic controller
    workload, and departure and arrival procedures, among other things.
    Similarly, FAA officials noted that UASs pose airport safety and
    capacity questions that require further analysis.

    Most of the experts stated that the impact of UAS's would be at least
    as significant as that of additional manned aircraft on airspace,
    airports, and air traffic control. For example, they predicted that, as
    with manned aircraft, UASs would add to the number of aircraft and,
    therefore, affect airspace and airport capacity and add to the workload
    of air traffic controllers. However, the experts also predicted that
    UASs could have a beneficial impact on the environment. The experts
    predicted that UASs could assume some missions currently performed by
    manned aircraft, but could perform these missions using engines that
    burn less fuel or produce less air pollution.

    Conclusion:

    Although ensuring that UASs operate safely in the national airspace
    system is a new and complex challenge for FAA, the national airspace
    system should be prepared to accommodate them. Understanding the
    issues, trends, and influences of UASs will be critical in
    strategically planning for the future airspace system. FAA is making
    progress in addressing the challenges. Establishing a UAS test center
    to provide UAS developers with airspace in which to test, evaluate, and
    refine their aircraft designs, and initiating efforts to increase
    airspace access for small UASs are significant steps. Moving forward,
    issuing FAA's long-awaited program plan should benefit the aviation
    community by communicating FAA's strategy of how it plans to address
    the interactive complexities and unique properties of UASs and how it
    plans to leverage the resources of multiple entities that have
    expertise and experience in this area. FAA's efforts to accumulate and
    analyze data will be important to facilitate the regulatory development
    process. However, analyzing the data that it already has collected from
    recent UAS operations would further support decisions on the new
    regulations. FAA's new estimate that the regulatory framework is not
    likely to be completed until sometime near 2020--about 8 years later
    than the date assumed by the industry forecast cited in this report--
    could further delay the time frame when civil-use UAS production begins
    to increase. While TSA's risk assessment of UASs may be appropriate for
    today's UAS environment, a national airspace system that allows routine
    UAS access for all government and private UASs will require increased
    safeguards to protect against security vulnerabilities like those
    exposed in the events of September 11, 2001. Proactively assessing and
    addressing these issues will help ensure that the benefits of UASs are
    not further delayed pending resolution of security challenges.
    Additionally, it will be important for GSA to follow through and ensure
    that federal agencies report all of their owned or leased UASs, so that
    FAA has a more accurate basis for workload planning. It remains to be
    seen whether Europe will be successful in integrating UASs into its
    airspace by 2015, which is considerably sooner than the 2020 time frame
    expected in the United States. An overarching entity, modeled after
    JPDO and set up to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector
    entities, could facilitate progress in moving toward UASs having
    routine access to our national airspace system.

    Matter for Congressional Consideration:

    To coordinate and focus the efforts of federal agencies and harness the
    capabilities of the private sector so that the nation may obtain
    further benefits from UASs as soon as possible, Congress should
    consider creating an overarching body within FAA, as it did when it
    established JPDO, to coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector
    efforts in meeting the safety challenges of allowing routine UAS access
    to the national airspace system.

    Recommendations for Executive Action:

    To obtain further benefits from UASs, we are recommending that the
    Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to expedite
    efforts to ensure that UASs have routine access to the national
    airspace system by taking the following two actions:

    1. Finalize and issue a UAS program plan to address the future of UASs.

    2. Analyze the data FAA collects on UAS operations under its COAs and
    establish a process to analyze DOD data on its UAS research,
    development, and operations.

    To ensure that appropriate UAS security controls are in place when
    civil-use UASs have routine access to the national airspace system, we
    are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the TSA
    Administrator to examine the security implications of future, non-
    military UAS operations in the national airspace system and take any
    actions deemed appropriate.

    Agency Comments:

    We provided a draft of this report to DOT, DHS, DOD, GSA, NASA, and the
    Department of Commerce. DOT agreed to consider our recommendations as
    it moves forward in addressing UASs and DHS agreed with our
    recommendation to it. GSA commented that, although our report contained
    no recommendations to the agency, it will continue to work with federal
    agencies to ensure that FAA has accurate information on the number of
    federally-owned or -leased UASs. DOT commented that the report would
    benefit from additional information on the impact of UASs on airports.
    We revised the report to include DOT's concern that the impact of UASs
    on safety and capacity at airports requires further study. DOT, DOD,
    and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
    appropriate. NASA and the Department of Commerce had no comments.

    We are sending electronic copies of this report to FAA, DHS, DOD, GSA,
    NASA, the Department of Commerce, and interested congressional
    committees. We also will make electronic copies available to others
    upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
    the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

    If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact points for
    our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
    on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
    to this report are listed in appendix IV.

    Signed by:

    Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
    Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Scope and Methods:

    Our objective was to assess the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
    efforts to ensure that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are safely
    integrated into the national airspace system and the potential impact
    of UASs on the national airspace system and the environment after
    integration occurs. To meet this objective, we developed the following
    research questions: (1) What are the current and potential uses and
    benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely
    and routinely in the national airspace system? (3) What is the federal
    government's response to these challenges? and (4) Assuming that UASs
    have routine access to the national airspace system, how might they
    impact the system and the environment?

    To address these questions, we surveyed the literature and also
    obtained and reviewed documents and interviewed officials of
    government, academic, and private-sector entities involved with UAS
    issues. We discussed current and future use of UASs with officials at
    FAA, Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We
    interviewed leaders of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics'
    (RTCA) Special Committee 203, which is developing UAS standards, and
    met with officials from a federally-funded research and development
    center. We discussed potential use of UASs for cargo transport with the
    United Parcel Service and Federal Express. We also discussed our
    questions with officials of associations of UAS manufacturers and users
    of the national airspace system, specifically, the Air Transport
    Association; Aerospace Industries Association; Association for Unmanned
    Vehicle Systems International; Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association;
    Air Line Pilots Association, International; American Institute of
    Aeronautics and Astronautics; ASTM International, originally known as
    the American Society for Testing and Materials; Palm Bay Police
    Department; and Los Angeles Sheriff Department. We discussed UAS
    operations with officials and observed UAS operations at Fort Huachuca,
    Arizona, and met with DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
    officials in Arizona to discuss UAS use in border protection.
    Additionally, we obtained industry forecasts of UAS growth and
    interviewed a senior analyst involved in preparing Teal Group
    Corporation's UAS market profile and forecast. We also observed a
    demonstration of unmanned systems at Webster Field, St. Inigoes,
    Maryland.

    To obtain additional information on the challenges that must be
    overcome before UASs can safely and routinely operate in the national
    airspace system, we leveraged information that was originally obtained
    and analyzed for a related GAO engagement.[Footnote 39] For that
    engagement, we contacted the Army Combat Readiness Center, Naval Safety
    Center, and Air Force Safety Center to obtain data on each service's
    UAS accidents from October 2001 to April or May 2006, depending on when
    the services queried their databases. The services provided data on
    class A, B, C, and D accidents.[Footnote 40] Using the descriptive
    information that the services provided for each accident, we determined
    whether human, materiel, environmental, or undetermined factors caused
    the accident and categorized each accordingly. We used the definitions
    of human, materiel, and environmental factors provided in Army
    Regulation 385-40, Accident Reporting and Records. We classified
    accidents as "undetermined" when descriptive information did not fall
    within one of the first three categories of factors. We discussed the
    results of our analysis with DOD officials and incorporated their
    comments as appropriate.

    To obtain additional information on the federal response to the
    challenge of integrating UASs into the national airspace system and the
    impact that UASs might have on the system after they have routine
    access, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials of the
    General Services Administration and the Department of Commerce's
    National Telecommunications and Information Administration. We also
    obtained information from DHS's Transportation Security Administration.
    Additionally, we surveyed 23 UAS experts, whose names were identified
    with the assistance of the National Academies. We asked the experts to
    provide, in narrative format, their views on the interim regulatory,
    technological, research, or other efforts that could be undertaken for
    UASs to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible
    in the national airspace system while FAA develops the regulatory
    structure to enable all UASs to have routine access to the system. We
    also asked the experts to provide their predictions on how small and
    large UASs might impact the national airspace, airports, air traffic
    control, noise, and air quality, using a 7-point scale from large
    adverse impact to large beneficial impact, and asked that they explain
    their answers. Appendix II discusses how we developed and conducted the
    survey. The complete survey instrument appears as appendix III.

    We conducted this performance audit from October 2006 to May 2008, in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.

    [End of section]

    Appendix II: Survey Methods:

    We administered a Web-based survey to gather the professional views of
    experts on the impact of UASs on the national airspace system and the
    actions needed to move toward safe and routine UAS operations. The
    structured survey questions ensured that all individuals had the
    opportunity to provide information in response to the same questions
    and enabled us to quantify the results.

    We contracted with the National Academies to identify experts to
    participate in our survey. Using criteria to ensure adequate
    representation across the criteria that we had specified, the National
    Academies identified 26 experts. The criteria ensured that we achieved:

    * balance in terms of the type of expertise (i.e., aircraft and
    avionics manufacturing officials, association representatives,
    engineers, academics, foreign civil aviation authorities, and
    researchers involved in aviation safety);

    * balance of knowledge across relevant content areas (i.e., aviation
    regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air
    transportation system planning, airport operations, human factors, and
    international issues); and:

    * balance in representation of relevant organizations (i.e., academia,
    business, government, and professional organizations).

    The survey responses represent the professional views of the experts.
    Their expertise can be derived from formal education, professional
    experience, or both. The experts were identified by the National
    Academies as individuals who are recognized by others who work in the
    same subject matter area as having knowledge that is greater in scope
    or depth than that of most people working in the area. The experts
    included researchers, consultants, vice presidents, directors, and
    professors who were associated with private sector firms, associations,
    or academic institutions involved with UASs. Some of the experts were
    retired federal officials.

    We recognize that it is likely that no one individual possessed
    complete knowledge in each of the content areas addressed in the
    survey. However, through our selection criteria, we attempted to
    identify a set of individuals who, when their responses were considered
    in the aggregate, could be viewed as representing the breadth of
    knowledge in each of the areas addressed in the survey.

    We identified the information to collect in our surveys based on our
    congressional request, Internet and literature searches, professional
    conferences we attended, background interviews, and through discussions
    with external expert advisors. A social science survey specialist
    collaborated with staff with subject matter expertise on the
    development of the surveys.

    We pretested the survey to ensure that the questions appropriately
    addressed the topics, were clearly stated, easy to comprehend,
    unbiased, and did not place undue burden on respondents. We also
    evaluated the usability of the Web-based survey. Based on the pretest
    results, we made necessary changes to the survey prior to
    implementation.

    We administered the Web-based survey during August and September 2007.
    We used email to inform the respondents of the survey administration,
    and provided them with the Web link for the survey and their log-in
    name and password. In the email message, we informed respondents that
    our report will not contain individual survey responses; instead, it
    may present the aggregated results of all participants. To maximize the
    response rate, we sent follow up email reminders and followed up by
    telephone as necessary to encourage survey participation.

    The survey was sent to 26 experts; three did not respond, giving the
    survey a response rate of 89 percent.

    The narrative responses in question 1 and the explanations for the
    closed-ended items in questions 2 and 3 were analyzed and coded into
    categories. A reviewer checked the resulting categories and coded
    responses and, where interpretations differed, agreement was reached
    between the initial coder and the reviewer. The coded results were
    tallied and provide the basis for our survey findings for these items.
    Because we did not report on aggregate responses to question 4, we did
    not perform content analysis on this question.

    The number of responses reported for the closed-ended questions may
    vary by question because a number of experts responded "Don't know" or
    "No basis to judge," or did not answer specific questions.

    The survey was administered via the Web and is reproduced as a graphic
    image in appendix III.

    [End of section]

    Appendix III: Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:

    Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:

    Welcome to the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Survey of
    Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). GAO is conducting this
    survey as a part of our study on the future of UASs in the national
    airspace system which was requested by the Aviation Subcommittee of the
    House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. The purpose of
    the survey is to collect information on the impact of UASs on the
    national airspace system and the actions needed to move toward safe and
    routine UAS operations.

    To begin, you will need the user name and password from the e-mail
    message we sent you. In addition, please click here to download
    important information that will help you complete the questionnaire.
    The questionnaire will be available on the web for one week. During
    this time, you may log into the questionnaire to enter and edit
    information as often as you like. It will take between 30 and 45
    minutes to complete the questionnaire.

    You may bookmark this page to make it easier to start the questionnaire
    again.

    If you want to print a blank questionnaire for reference, you will need
    the Adobe Acrobat Reader software to do this. If you do not already
    have this software, click on the Adobe icon to download the software.
    If you want to print a blank questionnaire for reference, click here to
    download a copy. You will not be able to enter responses into this PDF
    file.

    If you have questions, please contact: Ed Menoche (menochee@gao.gov) at
    202-512-3420 or Teresa Spisak (spisakt@gao.gov) at 202-512-3952.

    Click on the button below [Start log in] to start this questionnaire.

    Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:	Page 1 of 12

    Survey of Experts on Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:

    Click here to learn more about navigating, saving, and exiting the
    survey, copying and pasting text responses, and printing all your
    survey responses at one time.

    Please be aware that you can print your responses to all the questions
    at one time using the link at the end of the survey.

    Interim Efforts Until UAS Operations are Safe and Routine:

    1. Our review of the literature and discussions with knowledgeable
    individuals indicates that it could be at least four years before a
    technological and regulatory framework exists to permit UASs to operate
    safely and routinely in the national airspace system. By safe, we mean
    that UASs operate at a level of safety equivalent to manned aircraft.
    By routine, we mean that they operate within existing regulations
    without the case-by-case review that exists today.

    In your opinion, between now and when UASs can operate safely and
    routinely in the national airspace system, what regulatory,
    technological, research, or other efforts could be undertaken for UASs
    to operate, if not routinely, then to the maximum extent possible in
    the national airspace system?

    Impact of Smaller UASs Once They Are Safely and Routinely Operating in
    the National Airspace System:

    2. In the future, when smaller UASs are safely and routinely operating,
    how do you think they will impact the following areas? (Choose one
    answer for each row.)

    2a. Airspace:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    2b. Airports:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    2c. Air traffic control:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    2d. Environmental noise:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    2e. Air quality:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    If there are other areas that would be impacted by smaller UASs, list
    them in the space below and explain their expected impact:

    Impact of Larger UASs Once They Are Safely and Routinely Operating in
    the National Airspace System:

    3. In the future, when larger UASs are safely and routinely operating,
    how do you think they will impact the following areas? (Choose one
    answer for each row.)

    3a. Airspace:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    3b. Airports:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    3c. Air traffic control:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    3d. Environmental noise:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    3e. Air quality:
    Large adverse impact:
    Moderate adverse impact:
    Limited adverse impact:
    Neither adverse	nor beneficial impact:
    Limited beneficial impact:
    Moderate beneficial impact:
    Large beneficial impact:
    Don't know/No basis to judge:

    Please explain your answer:

    If there are other areas that would be impacted by larger UASs, list
    them in the space below and explain their expected impact:

    Other Countries' UAS Efforts:

    4. To your knowledge, what regulatory, technological, research, or
    other approaches to integrating UASs that are used by other countries
    are potentially transferable to the United States?

    Additional Observations or Comments:

    5. Please provide any additional observations or comments you may have
    on the safe and routine operation of UASs in the national airspace
    system:

    Submit Your Completed Questionnaire:

    6. Are you ready to submit your completed questionnaire for the first
    phase of the survey to GAO now? (Check one.)

    1. Yes, I have completed the questionnaire.

    2. No, the questionnaire is not yet complete.

    7. Would you like to print all of your answers? (Check one.)

    1. Yes. Click here to get a copy of your responses.

    2. No (Click on the "Save responses and close" button below to send
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    Get a Copy of Your Responses:

    Click here to get a copy of your responses. Once you open the copy of
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    Click on "Save responses and close" below to send your answers to GAO.

    Thank you for your participation in the first survey on unmanned
    aircraft systems. We will recontact you soon to complete the second
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    [End of survey]

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    Definition of smaller unmanned aircraft systems:

    For purposes of this survey, we are defining smaller UASs as those
    similar to model aircraft, which have traditionally been covered under
    FAA's Advisory Circular for Model Aircraft Operation (AC 91-57). We are
    focusing on the size dimension because, to a great extent, size is
    associated with the UAS capabilities, such as range and type of
    operations, that may have varied impacts on the national airspace
    system.

    Click here to close this page:

    Definition of safe and routine:

    By safe, we mean that UASs operate at a level of safety equivalent to
    manned aircraft. By routine, we mean that they operate within existing
    regulations without the case-by-case review that exists today.

    Click here to close this page:

    Definition of larger unmanned aircraft systems:

    For purposes of this survey, larger UASs include all UASs not covered
    by our small UAS definition. We define smaller UASs as those similar to
    model aircraft, which have traditionally been covered under FAA's
    Advisory Circular for Model Aircraft Operation (AC 91-57) We are
    focusing on the size dimension because, to a great extent, size is
    associated with the UAS capabilities, such as range and type of
    operations, that may have varied impacts on the national airspace
    system.

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    [End of section]

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov:

    Staff Acknowledgements:

    In addition to the contact named above, Teresa Spisak, Assistant
    Director; Edmond Menoche, Senior Analyst; Colin Fallon; Jim Geibel;
    Evan Gilman; David Hooper; Jamie Khanna; Patty Lentini; Josh Ormond;
    Manhav Panwar; and Larry Thomas made significant contributions to this
    report.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] At our request, the National Academies provided names of 26 experts
    in aviation regulations and safety, UAS technology, next generation air
    transportation system planning, airport operations, human factors, and
    international issues. Three experts did not respond to the survey.

    [2] Although DOD often uses the term "mishap" to refer to UAS
    accidents, we use accidents throughout this report.

    [3] DOD has more than 5,000 UASs, ranging in size from the Raven, a
    hand-launched UAS, to large UASs such as the Global Hawk and Predator.
    Most of DOD's UASs are currently deployed overseas.

    [4] Part 61 addresses certification requirements for pilots, flight
    instructors, and ground instructors. Part 91 addresses general
    operating and flight rules.

    [5] Teal Group Corporation, World Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems
    (Fairfax, Va: 2008).

    [6] Matthew T. DeGarmo, Issues Concerning Integration of Unmanned
    Aerial Vehicles in Civil Airspace (McLean, Va: The MITRE Corporation,
    Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, November 2004).

    [7] Three of these experts indicated that technology improvements could
    be applied to both airspace and airports.

    [8] In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office
    to plan for and coordinate, with federal and nonfederal stakeholders, a
    transformation from the current air traffic control system to the next
    generation air transportation system by 2025.

    [9] Testimony of Steven M. Silwa, Chief Executive Officer and President
    of Insitu Inc., before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure (Mar. 22, 2007).

    [10] Teal Group Corporation, 2008.

    [11] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle National Task Force, The Impact of
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on the Next Generation Air Transportation
    System: Preliminary Assessment (Oct. 22, 2004).

    [12] The Airline Owners and Pilots Association is a not-for-profit
    organization representing the interests of general aviation.

    [13] Transportation Security Administration, Advisory - Security
    Information Regarding Remote Controlled Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicles (Arlington, Va: Nov. 22, 2004).

    [14] Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007 - 2032,
    (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007). We did not evaluate the validity of
    information contained in the roadmap.

    [15] DOD defines reliability as (1) the probability that an item will
    perform its intended function for a specified time under stated
    conditions or (2) the ability of a system and its parts to perform its
    mission without failure, degradation, or demand on the support system.

    [16] DOD classifies accidents according to severity. The accident data
    that DOD provided included accidents in class A, B, C, and D. See
    appendix I for accident class definitions and further details on our
    methodology. We also determined that 17 percent of the accidents were
    due to human factors (i.e., issues associated with how humans interact
    with machines); 6 percent of the accidents were caused by environmental
    issues; and 12 percent of the accidents' causes were undetermined. We
    did not evaluate the validity of the accident information that DOD
    provided.

    [17] The MITRE Corporation, 2004.

    [18] Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicles and Border Surveillance (Washington, D.C.: 2006).

    [19] A DOD official commented that wooden propeller damage is managed
    by adding treatments to the wood and by regular maintenance and
    inspection.

    [20] Human factors, such as pilot error, have also been significant
    contributors to manned aircraft accidents.

    [21] FAA currently requires that UAS pilots and observers have in their
    possession a current second class or higher airman medical certificate
    issued under chapter 14, Code of Federal Regulations part 67.

    [22] Jason S. McCarley and Christopher D. Wickens, Human Factors
    Implications of UAVs in the National Airspace (Institute of Aviation,
    Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana-
    Champaign, 2005).

    [23] McCarley and Wickens, 2005.

    [24] The second console can be used to operate the Predator's camera or
    to control the aircraft.

    [25] Part 91 of title 14.

    [26] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle National Task Force, 2004.

    [27] Non-segregated airspace is airspace that is available for all
    aircraft.

    [28] FAA does not start calculating the processing time until officials
    have determined that the application is administratively correct and
    that the proposed UAS operation is feasible.

    [29] The National Telecommunications and Information Administration of
    the Department of Commerce manages federal use of spectrum.

    [30] RTCA is a private, not-for-profit corporation that develops
    consensus-based performance standards regarding communications,
    navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management system issues.
    RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee, and its recommendations
    are the basis for a number of FAA's policy, program, and regulatory
    decisions.

    [31] RTCA Special Committee 203, Guidance Material and Considerations
    for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Washington, D.C.: 2007).

    [32] MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development is a
    federally-funded research and development center that performs systems
    research and development work for FAA and other civil aviation
    authorities.

    [33] DOD defines a small UAS as one that weighs less than 55 pounds,
    flies slower than 100 knots, and operates at altitudes below 1,000
    feet.

    [34] H.R. 2881, § 322.

    [35] EUROCAE formed WG-73 in 2006 to focus on UAS issues.

    [36] ICAO is the global forum for civil aviation. ICAO works to achieve
    its vision of safe, secure, and sustainable development of civil
    aviation through the cooperation of its member States.

    [37] Based on conversion rate as of April 9, 2008.

    [38] Previously, UAS operations could occur without a COA only within
    DOD's restricted airspace or warning areas.

    [39] See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and
    Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink,
    http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July
    11, 2007). The data, although not used in this report, was obtained and
    analyzed using generally accepted government auditing standards.

    [40] DOD classifies accidents in categories A, B, and C, based on the
    severity of resulting injury, occupational illness, or property damage.
    Property damage severity is generally expressed in terms of cost and is
    calculated as the sum of the costs associated with DOD property and non-
    DOD property that is damaged in a DOD accident. Class A accidents
    result in damages of $1 million or more, total loss of a DOD aircraft,
    or a fatality or permanent total disability. Class B accidents result
    in damages of $200,000 or more, but less than $1 million, a permanent
    partial disability, or hospitalization of three or more personnel.
    Class C accidents result in damages of $20,000 or more, but less than
    $200,000, a nonfatal injury that causes any loss of time from work
    beyond the day or shift on which it occurred, or a nonfatal
    occupational illness or disability that causes loss of time from work
    or disability at any time. Additionally, the services have varying
    classifications of less severe accidents. Only the Army provided
    accident data for Class D accidents, which the Army defines as those
    which result in property damage of $2,000 or more but less than
    $20,000, or a nonfatal injury that does not meet the criteria of a
    Class C accident.

    [End of section]

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