Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs	 
(31-MAR-08, GAO-08-467SP).					 
                                                                 
This report is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected weapon  
programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly
doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion  
to $1.6 trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of	 
cost and schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for 
major defense programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have	 
increased 26 percent from first estimates, compared with 6	 
percent in 2000. Programs have also often failed to deliver	 
capabilities when promised. DOD's acquisition outcomes appear	 
increasingly suboptimal, a condition that needs to be corrected  
given the pressures faced by the department from other military  
and major nondiscretionary government demands. This report	 
provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an		 
independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs,	 
identifying potential risks when a program's projected attainment
of knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs 	 
assessed--most of which are considered major acquisitions by	 
DOD--were selected using several factors: high dollar value,	 
acquisition stage, and congressional interest. This report also  
highlights overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes and issues 
raised by the cumulative experience of individual programs. GAO  
updates this report annually under the Comptroller General's	 
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. 	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-467SP					        
    ACCNO:   A81451						        
  TITLE:     Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon     
Programs							 
     DATE:   03/31/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Best practices					 
	     Best practices methodology 			 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense cost control				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Financial analysis 				 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Military technology				 
	     Missiles						 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Program management 				 
	     Risk management					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Technology 					 
	     Weapons						 
	     Weapons research and development			 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Air Force B-2 Radar Modernization			 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     Air Force Small Diameter Bomb			 
	     Army Advanced Threat Infrared			 
	     Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     Army Excalibur Precision Guided Extended		 
	     Range Artillery Projectile 			 
                                                                 
	     Army Future Combat Systems 			 
	     Army Light Helicopter Family Program		 
	     Army Warfighter Information Network		 
	     C-130 Avionics Modernization Program		 
	     C-5 Avionics Modernization Program 		 
	     C-5 Reliability Enhancement and			 
	     Reengining Program 				 
                                                                 
	     Combat Search and Rescue Replacement		 
	     Vehicle						 
                                                                 
	     DDG-1000 Destroyer 				 
	     DOD Advanced Extremely High Frequency		 
	     Satellite Program					 
                                                                 
	     DOD Distributed Common Ground-Surface		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     DOD Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     DOD Joint Tactical Radio System			 
	     DOD Multifunctional Information			 
	     Distribution System				 
                                                                 
	     DOD Space Radar Program				 
	     DOD Space Tracking and Surveillance		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     DOD Transformational Satellite			 
	     Communications System Program			 
                                                                 
	     E-2D Advanced Hawkeye				 
	     EA-18G Aircraft					 
	     F-22 Aircraft					 
	     Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle		 
	     H-1 Helicopter					 
	     Hercules Aircraft					 
	     Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile		 
	     Joint Strike Fighter				 
	     LHA Amphibious Assault Ship			 
	     Littoral Combat Ship				 
	     Longbow Apache Helicopter				 
	     Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting		 
	     Vehicle						 
                                                                 
	     Marine Corps Heavy Lift Replacement		 
	     System						 
                                                                 
	     Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program		 
	     MDA Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     MDA Airborne Laser Program 			 
	     MDA Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 		 
	     Program						 
                                                                 
	     MDA Kinetic Energy Interceptor System		 
	     National Polar-Orbiting Operational		 
	     Environmental Satellite System			 
                                                                 
	     NAVSTAR Global Positioning System			 
	     Navy Extended Range Guided Munition		 
	     Navy Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21		 
	     Navy Mobile User Objective System			 
	     Space Based Infrared System-High			 
	     SSN 774 Submarine					 
	     V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical		 
	     Lift Aircraft					 
                                                                 
	     VH-71A Helicopter					 
	     Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle			 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Product.                                                 **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-08-467SP

   

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to [email protected]. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2008: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs: 

GAO-08-467SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-467SP, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

This report is GAOï¿½s sixth annual assessment of selected weapon 
programs. Since 2000, the Department of Defense (DOD) has roughly 
doubled its planned investment in new systems from $790 billion to $1.6 
trillion in 2007, but acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and 
schedule have not improved. Total acquisition costs for major defense 
programs in the fiscal year 2007 portfolio have increased 26 percent 
from first estimates, compared with 6 percent in 2000. Programs have 
also often failed to deliver capabilities when promised. DODï¿½s 
acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal, a condition that 
needs to be corrected given the pressures faced by the department from 
other military and major nondiscretionary government demands. 

This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an 
independent, knowledge-based assessment of defense programs, 
identifying potential risks when a programï¿½s projected attainment of 
knowledge diverges from best practices. The programs assessedï¿½most of 
which are considered major acquisitions by DODï¿½were selected using 
several factors: high dollar value, acquisition stage, and 
congressional interest. This report also highlights overall trends in 
DOD acquisition outcomes and issues raised by the cumulative experience 
of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually under the 
Comptroller Generalï¿½s authority to conduct evaluations on his own 
initiative. 

What GAO Found: 

Of the 72 programs GAO assessed this year, none of them had proceeded 
through system development meeting the best practices standards for 
mature technologies, stable design, or mature production processes by 
critical junctures of the program, each of which are essential for 
achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The absence 
of wide-spread adoption of knowledge-based acquisition processes by DOD 
continues to be a major contributor to this lack of maturity. Aside 
from these knowledge-based issues, GAO this year gathered data on four 
additional factors that have the potential to influence DODï¿½s ability 
to manage programs and improve outcomesï¿½ performance requirements 
changes, program manager tenure, reliance on nongovernmental personnel 
to help perform program office roles, and software management. GAO 
found that 63 percent of the programs had changed requirements once 
system development began, and also experienced significant program cost 
increases. Average tenure to date for program managers has been less 
than half of that called for by DOD policy. About 48 percent of DOD 
program office staff for programs GAO collected data from is composed 
of personnel outside of the government. Finally, roughly half the 
programs that provided GAO data experienced more than a 25 percent 
increase in the expected lines of software code since starting their 
respective system development programs. 

In response to previous GAO recommendations and congressional 
direction, DOD has recently taken actions that could help move the 
department toward more sound, knowledge-based acquisition processes. 
For example, a new concept decision review initiative, guidance for 
determining acquisition approaches based on capability need dates, and 
the establishment of review boards to monitor weapon system 
configuration changes could enable department officials to make more 
informed decisions in the early stages of a program and better match 
program requirements and resources, a key first step. Improvements to 
individual program acquisition outcomes will likely hinge on the 
success of initiatives like these, paired with knowledge-based 
strategies. 

Table: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios 
(fiscal year [FY] 2008 dollars): 

Portfolio size: Number of programs: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 75; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 91; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 95. 

Portfolio size: Total planned commitments: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: $790 Billion; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: $1.5 Trillion; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: $1.6 Trillion. 

Portfolio size: Commitments outstanding: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: $380 Billion; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: $887 Billion; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: $858 Billion. 

Portfolio performance: Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 27 percent; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 33 percent; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 40 percent. 

Portfolio performance: Change in total acquisition cost from first 
estimate: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 6 percent; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 18 percent; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 26 percent. 
 
Portfolio performance: Estimated total acquisition cost growth: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: $42 Billion; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: $202 Billion; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: $295 Billion. 

Portfolio performance: Share of programs with 25 percent or more 
increase in program acquisition unit cost: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 37 percent; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 44 percent; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 44 percent. 

Portfolio performance: Average schedule delay in delivering initial 
capabilities; 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 16 months; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 17 months; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 21 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-467SP]. For more 
information, contact Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

Summary: 

Weapon Acquisition Outcomes Continue to Undermine DOD Investments: 

DOD Weapon System Programs Are Still Not Following a Knowledge-Based 
Approach: 

DOD Practices Continue to Contribute to Program Risk and Instability: 

Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Acquisition Outcomes: 

Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement: 

How to Read The Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) Increment 2: 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH): 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability: 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System: 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): 

C-130J Hercules: 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X): 

CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier: 

Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A): 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

EA-18G: 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)--Atlas V, Delta IV: 

Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS): 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Extended Range Munition (ERM): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

F-22A Modernization Program: 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

H-1 Upgrades: 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

Joint Cargo Aircraft: 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS 
AMF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR): 

JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS): 

KC-X Program: 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): 

Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM): 

Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW): 

LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program: 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): 

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS): 

Multiple Kill Vehicle: 

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program: 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform: 

Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle: 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control: 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft: 

PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): 

Space Radar (SR): 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program: 

Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774): 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 1: 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios: 

Table 2: Examples of Program Delays and Impacts: 

Table 3: Planned RDT&E and Procurement Funding for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs, as of December 2006: 

Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2008 Assessment: 

Table 5: Significant Changes to Contract Prices for DOD Development 
Contracts: 

Table 6: Program Office Staffing Composition for 52 DOD Programs: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems: 

Figure 2: Knowledge Achievement for Weapon System Programs in 2008 
Assessment at Key Junctures: 

Figure 3: Maturity Levels of Critical Technologies for DOD Programs: 

Figure 4: Percentage of Programs Achieving Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 5: Percentage of Programs Releasing 90 Percent of Engineering 
Drawings by Key Junctures: 

Figure 6: Best Practices Compared to DOD Practices for Programs in 2008 
Assessment: 

Figure 7: Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since Initial 
Estimates: 


Figure 8: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

AESR: Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction: 

AIRSS: Alternative Infrared Satellite System: 

AOA: Analysis of Alternatives: 

CASPER: Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded Resource 
Communication Controller: 

CAVES WAA: Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array: 

CBA: Capital Budget Account: 

CCD: Cockpit Control Display: 

CDR: critical design review: 

DACS: divert and attitude control system: 

DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency: 

DDR&E: Director for Defense Research and Engineering: 

DIB: DCGS Integration Backbone: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DRR: Design Readiness Review: 

EMALS: electromagnetic aircraft launch system: 

ER: Extended Range: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FPA: focal plane array: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

GBI: Ground-based interceptors: 

GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit: 

HEO: highly elliptical orbit: 

HMSD: helmet-mounted sight displays: 

IAMD: Integrated Air and Missile Defense: 

ICAP: Improved Capability: 

IMU: inertial measurement units: 

ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: 

JNN-N: Joint Network Node - Network: 

JPALS: Joint Precision Approach and Landing System: 

JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System: 

LRIP: low-rate initial production: 

KDP: Key Decision Point: 

KP: knowledge points: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Program: 

MLP: Mobile Landing Platform: 

NA: not applicable: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NLOS-C: Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

NSS AP: National Security Space Acquisition Policy: 

RDT&E: research, development, test and evaluation: 

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report: 

SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System: 

SDB: Small Diameter Bomb: 

SM-3: Standard Missile 3: 

TBD: to be determined: 

TIP: Technology Insertion Program: 

TRTF: Tanker Replacement Transfer Fund: 

TSRM: Third Stage Rocket Motor: 

UAS: unmanned aircraft system: 

UHF: Ultra High Frequency: 

ULA: United Launch Alliance: 

[End of section] 

Comptroller General of the United States: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

March 31, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

I am pleased to present GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected 
weapon programs. It comes at a time of large and growing national 
government fiscal imbalance and budget deficits that continue to strain 
all of our federal agencies' resources. Our nation faces a range of 
challenges that will require a more disciplined and balanced approach 
to discretionary and mandatory spending as we move into the 21ST 
century. In the coming decades, our ability to sustain even the 
constitutionally enumerated responsibilities of the federal government 
will come under increasing pressure. Budget experts now agree that 
growing entitlement costs for mandatory spending programs like Social 
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will, absent fundamental reforms, put 
intense and increasing pressure on discretionary spending programs or 
tax levels or both. 

DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the largest 
discretionary items in the budget. While overall discretionary funding 
is declining, DOD's budget continues to demand a larger portion of what 
is available, thereby leaving a smaller percentage for other 
activities. DOD's investment in weapon acquisition programs is now at 
its highest level in two decades. The department expects to invest 
about $900 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on 
development and procurement with more than $335 billion, or 37 percent, 
going specifically for new major weapon systems. Every dollar spent 
inefficiently in developing and procuring weapon systems is less money 
available for many other internal and external budget priorities--such 
as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs. These 
inefficiencies also often result in the delivery of less capability 
than initially planned, either in the form of fewer quantities or 
delayed delivery to the warfighter. 

Unfortunately, our review this year indicates that cost and schedule 
outcomes for major weapon programs are not improving over the 6 years 
we have been issuing this report. Although well-conceived acquisition 
policy changes occurred in 2003 that reflect many best practices we 
have reported on in the past, these significant policy changes have not 
yet translated into best practices on individual programs. Flagship 
acquisitions, as well as many other top priorities in each of the 
services, continue to cost significantly more, take longer to produce, 
and deliver less than was promised. This is likely to continue until 
the overall environment for weapon system acquisitions changes. For 
example, a balanced, well-prioritized portfolio of weapon system 
acquisitions that allows for the right mix of weapon systems would 
alleviate the pressure each program now faces in winning funding from 
others; a knowledge-based business case at the outset of each program 
would alleviate overpromising on cost, schedule, and performance and 
would empower program managers; and more immediate accountability in 
the execution of each program would alleviate untimely decision making 
when programs do get into trouble. 

The current DOD leadership has recently established initiatives 
designed to change the strategic environment at the weapon acquisition 
portfolio level. These initiatives reflect sound business concepts and 
could lead to better outcomes if implemented fully and correctly. 
However, policy without practice is not uncommon within the Department 
and the upcoming change in administration presents challenges in 
advancing progress through sustained implementation of best practices, 
as well as addressing new issues that may emerge. Significant changes 
will only be possible with greater, and continued, department level 
support, including strong and consistent vision, direction, and 
advocacy from DOD leadership, as well as sustained oversight by the 
Congress. Successful implementation will have significant implications 
for decisions made on individual programs, DOD's larger modernization 
goals, and the nation at large. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro: 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States: 

[End of letter] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

March 31, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

This is GAO's sixth annual assessment of selected Department of Defense 
(DOD) weapon programs. During the past 6 years, GAO has reported on 
individual programs as well as many crosscutting problems with the 
acquisition process and has offered numerous recommendations on how DOD 
could improve acquisition outcomes. DOD's planned investment for new 
weapon systems now reflects the highest funding levels in two decades, 
with no significant decline expected in the near term. These levels 
will be difficult to sustain as the nation begins to address other long-
term fiscal imbalances and as DOD encounters considerable pressure to 
reduce its investment in new weapons. DOD faces pressures within its 
own budget as new weapon system investments compete with funding needed 
to procure equipment and support military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 

This report provides information on 72 individual weapon programs and 
assesses overall trends in DOD acquisition outcomes for decision makers 
to use as they determine the best ways to invest limited resources in 
the face of competing demands. Programs were selected for individual 
assessment based on several factors, including (1) high dollar value, 
(2) stage in acquisition, and (3) congressional interest. The majority 
of the 72 programs covered in the report are considered major defense 
acquisition programs by DOD.[Footnote 1] We conducted this performance 
audit from June 2007 to March 2008 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Appendix I contains detailed information on our scope and 
methodology. 

Summary: 

Since fiscal year 2000, DOD has significantly increased the number of 
major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. 
Unfortunately, during this same time period, acquisition outcomes did 
not improve. Based on our analysis, total acquisition costs for the 
fiscal year 2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs 
increased 26 percent from first estimates, whereas the 2000 portfolio 
increased by 6 percent. Likewise, development costs for fiscal year 
2007 programs increased by 40 percent from first estimates, compared to 
27 percent for fiscal year 2000 programs. In most cases, programs also 
failed to deliver capabilities when promised--often forcing warfighters 
to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Our analysis 
shows that current programs are experiencing an average delay of 21- 
months in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter, a 5-month 
increase over fiscal year 2000 programs. 

Of the 72 weapon programs we assessed this year, no program had 
proceeded through system development meeting the best practices 
standards for mature technologies, stable design, and mature production 
processes--all prerequisites for achieving planned cost, schedule, and 
performance outcomes.[Footnote 2] Eighty-eight percent of the programs 
in this assessment began system development without fully maturing 
critical technologies according to best practices. Ninety-six percent 
of the programs had not met best practice standards for demonstrating 
mature technologies and design stability before entering the more 
costly system demonstration phase. Finally, no programs we assessed had 
all of their critical manufacturing processes in statistical control 
when they entered production, and most programs were not even 
collecting data to do so. Also, programs assessed this year did not 
improve on the level of knowledge attained at critical junctures from 
those assessed in 2005. This year, in an effort to further understand 
the cause of poor DOD outcomes, we gathered data to determine whether 
two key systems engineering tools--preliminary design reviews and 
prototypes--had been used by key junctures to ensure appropriate 
knowledge before moving forward. Our analysis showed that only a small 
percentage of programs used either key tool to demonstrate the maturity 
of the product's design by critical junctures. 

The results of our analysis indicate that DOD programs continue to be 
suboptimal and that the lack of knowledge at key junctures of system 
development continues to be a major cause of these outcomes. The final 
result is lost buying power and opportunities to recapitalize the 
force. About 60 percent of the programs we assessed had to reset their 
business case at least once because they lacked necessary knowledge to 
reasonably estimate the cost and time it would take to develop and 
produce the product. The continuing absence of knowledge-based 
acquisition processes steeped in disciplined systems engineering 
practices--aimed at analyzing requirements to determine their 
reasonableness before a program starts--contributed significantly to 
this. Our work has shown that systems engineering is a best practice 
used by commercial firms to ensure that requirements are well 
understood and achievable within given resources before system 
development starts. Our analysis of requirements changes occurring 
after system development began within DOD programs indicates that this 
practice is not always used. Likewise, increased risks to the 
government can occur when DOD enters into contracts to develop these 
complex systems before performing thorough requirements analysis to 
ensure specific needs can be met. Finally, long development cycle times 
invite additional instability for programs. 

In addition to gathering information on acquisition outcomes and the 
achievement of critical knowledge at key junctures, this year we also 
present new data as an indicator of other factors that could 
potentially influence DOD's ability to manage its programs and improve 
cost and schedule outcomes. These factors include changes in 
performance requirements, program manager tenure, composition of the 
government workforce, and because of its increasing importance to 
performance, software management. Our analysis of these factors can be 
summarized as follows: 

* Unsettled requirements in acquisition programs can create significant 
turbulence. Sixty-three percent of the programs we received data from 
had requirement changes after system development began. These programs 
encountered cost increases of 72 percent, while costs grew by 11 
percent among those programs that did not change requirements. 

* Frequent program manager turnover occurs during system development. 
For programs started since 2001, the average tenure to date for program 
managers has been 17 months--less than half of what is prescribed by 
DOD policy--challenging continuity and accountability. 

* DOD relies heavily on contractors to perform roles that have in the 
past been performed by government employees. For programs we assessed, 
about 48 percent of their staff was made up of individuals outside of 
the government; performing engineering, business, and supporting 
program management related roles. These data raise questions about 
whether DOD has the appropriate mix of staff and capabilities within 
its workforce to effectively manage programs. 

* Programs continue to have difficulty managing software development 
for weapon systems. Roughly half of the programs that provided us data 
had more than a 25 percent growth in their expected lines of code since 
starting system development. Changes to the amount of software needing 
to be developed for such programs often indicate the potential for cost 
and schedule problems. 

There is reason for optimism. Based in part on GAO recommendations and 
congressional direction, DOD has recently begun to develop several 
initiatives that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a 
foundation for establishing sound, knowledge-based business cases for 
individual acquisition programs and improving program outcomes. For 
example, a new concept decision review initiative, guidance for 
determining acquisition approaches based on capability need dates, and 
the establishment of review boards to monitor weapon system 
configuration changes are all designed to enable key department leaders 
to make informed decisions well ahead of a program's start. This should 
help DOD attain a closer match between each program's requirements and 
available resources. Improvements to individual acquisition program 
outcomes hinge on the success of these initiatives paired with rigorous 
knowledge-based acquisition strategies. 

Weapon Acquisition Outcomes Continue to Undermine DOD Investments: 

DOD is not receiving expected returns on its large investment in weapon 
systems. Our analysis does not show any improvements in acquisition 
outcomes as programs continue to experience increased costs and delays 
in delivering capabilities to the warfighter. In fact, when compared to 
the performance of the fiscal year 2000 portfolio of major defense 
acquisition programs, cost and schedule performance for current 
programs is actually worse. Without improved acquisition outcomes in 
the future, achieving DOD's transformational objectives in a 
constrained fiscal environment is highly unlikely. 

Trends in DOD's Weapon Acquisitions Investments and Outcomes since 
2000: 

While DOD is committing substantially more investment dollars to 
develop and procure new weapon systems, our analysis shows that the 
2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs is experiencing 
greater cost growth and schedule delays than programs in fiscal years 
2000 and 2005.[Footnote 3] For example, as shown in table 1, total 
acquisition costs for 2007 programs increased 26 percent from first 
estimates, whereas programs in fiscal year 2000 increased by 6 percent. 
Total RDT&E costs for programs in 2007 increased by 40 percent from 
first estimates, compared to 27 percent for programs in 2000. 

Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios 
(Fiscal year 2008 dollars): 

Portfolio size: Number of programs: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 75; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 91; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 95. 

Portfolio size: Total planned commitments: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: $790 Billion; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: $1.5 Trillion; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: $1.6 Trillion. 

Portfolio size: Commitments outstanding: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: $380 Billion; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: $887 Billion; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: $858 Billion. 

Portfolio performance: Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 27 percent; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 33 percent; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 40 percent. 

Portfolio performance: Change in total acquisition cost from first 
estimate: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 6 percent; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 18 percent; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 26 percent. 
 
Portfolio performance: Estimated total acquisition cost growth: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: $42 Billion; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: $202 Billion; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: $295 Billion. 

Portfolio performance: Share of programs with 25 percent or more 
increase in program acquisition unit cost: 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 37 percent; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 44 percent; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 44 percent. 
 
Portfolio performance: Average schedule delay in delivering initial 
capabilities; 
FY 2000 Portfolio: 16 months; 
FY 2005 Portfolio: 17 months; 
FY 2007 Portfolio: 21 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Data were obtained from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports (dated 
December 1999, 2004, and 2006) or, in a few cases, data were obtained 
directly from program offices. Number of programs reflects the programs 
with Selected Acquisition Reports. In our analysis we have broken a few 
Selected Acquisition Report programs (such as Missile Defense Agency 
systems) into smaller elements or programs. Not all programs had 
comparative cost and schedule data, and these programs were excluded 
from the analysis where appropriate. Also, data do not include full 
costs of developing Missile Defense Agency systems. 

[End of table] 

One way to measure Table: Program Performance is in examining the cost 
growth as expressed in changes to program acquisition unit cost. This 
represents the value DOD gets per unit for the acquisition dollars 
invested in a certain program and shows the net effect of cost growth 
and quantity changes. According to our analysis of the 2007 portfolio, 
44 percent of DOD's major defense acquisition programs are paying at 
least 25 percent more per unit than originally expected. The proportion 
of programs experiencing a 25 percent or more increase in program 
acquisition unit costs in fiscal year 2000 was 37 percent. 

The consequence of cost growth is reduced buying power and lost 
opportunity costs for DOD. Every dollar spent on inefficiencies in 
acquiring one weapon system is less money available for other 
opportunities. Total acquisition cost for the current portfolio of 
major programs under development or in production has grown by nearly 
$300 billion over initial estimates. As program costs increase, DOD 
must request more funding to cover the overruns, make trade-offs with 
existing programs, delay the start of new programs, or take funds from 
other accounts. 

Delivery of Operational Capabilities Continues to Be Late: 

As important as wasting investment dollars, DOD has already missed 
fielding dates for many programs and many others are behind schedule. 
The services' requirement for a new system is often based on replacing 
aging, legacy systems or filling an expected gap in capability, or 
both. The warfighter's urgent need for the new weapon system is often 
cited when the case is first made for developing and producing the 
system. However, on average, the current portfolio of programs has 
experienced a 21-month delay in delivering initial operational 
capability to the warfighter. As shown in figure 1, about two-thirds of 
the current programs have encountered some form of a delay. 

Figure 1: Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart, depicting the following data: 

Schedule Delays for Major Weapon Systems: Programs 1 to 24 months late: 
38%; Programs 25 to 48 months late: 15%; Programs more than 48 months 
late: 14%; Programs on time: 33%. 

Note: This reflects planned or actual delivery of initial capabilities 
for programs with comparable schedule data. 

[End of figure] 

Because of program delays, warfighters often have to operate costly 
legacy systems longer than expected, find alternatives to fill 
capability gaps, or go without the capability. Table 2 shows examples 
where program delays in delivering initial capabilities have affected 
the military services. 

Table 2: Examples of Program Delays and Impacts: 

Program delays: WIN-T; 
Impacts: The Army had to take extraordinary efforts to acquire an 
interim capability to fulfill a gap in communication capabilities for 
soldiers. The Army's optimistic acquisition approach for the Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) program created the impression 
that the capability gap was far smaller than it really was, and when 
the program experienced delays it forced the Army to work outside the 
normal processes and use supplemental funding to meet an urgent 
warfighter need. This effort later became the first increment of the 
WIN-T program. 

Program delays: F-22A and JSF; 
Impacts: Because of delayed deliveries and quantity reductions with the 
F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft, legacy systems (with 
less capability) will make up a larger proportion of the future fighter 
fleet for a longer period of time, and the services must now invest 
billions of dollars to modernize legacy aircraft to keep them available 
and capable to meet mission requirements. Despite this investment, 
several legacy F-15 aircraft were recently grounded because of 
structural safety concerns. Service officials have also raised concerns 
about whether the number of new aircraft will be sufficient to meet 
national security requirements with an acceptable level of risk. 

Program delays: Aerial Common Sensor;
Impacts: Significant delays in delivering the capabilities expected 
from the Aerial Common Sensor program are now requiring the Army and 
Navy to make unanticipated investments in already existing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems at the same time 
that they are developing the new replacement systems. 

Program delays: Global Hawk; 
Impacts: Delays in the Global Hawk program have contributed to the need 
to keep the U-2 in the inventory longer than anticipated. The Air Force 
is now developing a plan to fully retire the U-2s a year later in 2013 
and at a slower rate, which will increase the funds needed to operate 
and support these aircraft over this extended period. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Current U.S. Fiscal Challenges Will Affect DOD's Acquisition Funding: 

DOD is in a period of high investment that will be difficult to sustain 
given the many internal and external budgetary pressures faced by the 
department in today's fiscal environment. Over the next 5 years, DOD 
expects to expend approximately $900 billion in research, development, 
test, and evaluation and procurement funds (fiscal year 2008 dollars). 
About $335 billion, or 37 percent, is for the acquisition of its 
current portfolio of 95 major defense acquisition programs. To 
illustrate the significance of these investments, table 3 lists the top 
10 programs that will dominate DOD's budget over that time. If the 
trend DOD is experiencing today continues into the future years, one 
can easily see how these programs, now 58 percent of funding for all 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs, could encompass a much larger share 
of the funding. 

Table 3: Planned RDT&E and Procurement Funding for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs, as of December 2006 (Fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
billions): 

Program: Ballistic Missile Defense System; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $8.9; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $9.1; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $9.1; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $8.9; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $8.8; 
Total: $44.9. 

Program: Joint Strike Fighter; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $6.7; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $6.9; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $8.1; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $8.4; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $11.3; 
Total: $41.4. 

Program: Virginia Class Submarine; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $2.9; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $3.7; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $3.9; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $3.8; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $4.7; 
Total: $19.0. 

Program: Future Combat Systems; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.6; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $3.2; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $3.2; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $3.2; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $3.7; 
Total: $17.0. 

Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.0; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $3.1; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $3.1; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $2.8; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $3.0; 
Total: $15.0. 

Program: DDG 1000 Destroyer; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.5; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $2.8; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $2.9; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $2.7; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $2.6; 
Total: $14.4. 

Program: Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $3.1; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.6; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $1.7; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $0.6; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $3.4; 
Total: $13.4. 

Program: F-22A; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $4.4; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.3; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $0.5; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $0.4; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $0.5; 
Total: $10.1. 

Program: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $0.9; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $1.2; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $2.9; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $2.7; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $2.5; 
Total: $10.1. 

Program: F/A-18 EF; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $2.1; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $1.7; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $1.9; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $1.6; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $1.5; 
Total: $8.8. 

Program: Funding for Top 10 MDAP programs; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $39.1; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $40.6; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $37.3; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $35.2; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $42.0; 
Total: $194.2. 

Program: Funding for other 85 MDAP programs; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $33.2; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $31.5; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $26.9; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $25.4; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $24.1; 
Total: $141.1. 

Program: Total; 
Fiscal year: 2008: $72.3; 
Fiscal year: 2009: $72.1; 
Fiscal year: 2010: $64.2; 
Fiscal year: 2011: $60.6; 
Fiscal year: 2012: $66.1; 
Total: $335.3. 

Program: Top 10 MDAP programs (percentage of total); 
Fiscal year: 2008: 54; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 56; 
Fiscal year: 2010: 58; 
Fiscal year: 2011: 58; 
Fiscal year: 2012: 64; 
Total: 58. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. The Ballistic Missile 
Defense System is composed of several programs. We have assessed 
several of these programs later in this report. 

[End of table] 

In addition, other military needs can be expected to challenge the 
funding for these investments. Within DOD's internal budget, investment 
in new weapon systems competes with those funds necessary to replace 
equipment and sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 
September 2001 and May 2007, DOD has been provided $542.9 billion to 
support the global war on terror. War operations have identified the 
need for new, alternative systems and have resulted in greater wear on 
existing weapons that will need refurbishment or replacement sooner 
than expected. For example, DOD's urgent need for armored vehicles to 
protect personnel from mine blasts, are not included in the planned 
acquisition costs for the December 2006 major defense programs 
discussed above. These vehicles are estimated to cost about $13.5 
billion between 2006 and 2008.[Footnote 4] 

Other government spending priorities will place external pressure on 
DOD's planned investment in major weapon systems. As nondiscretionary 
programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid consume a growing 
percentage of the available budget, discretionary programs--including 
defense--face competition for increasingly scarce resources. As a 
result, sustaining real topline budget increases in any discretionary 
program will be difficult. DOD's investment in weapon systems 
represents one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. Since 
1978, discretionary funding has decreased from 52 percent of the 
federal budget to an estimated 37 percent in 2007. While the percentage 
of discretionary funding is declining, DOD's budget continues to demand 
a larger portion of what is available, thereby leaving a smaller 
percentage for other activities. 

DOD Weapon System Programs Are Still Not Following a Knowledge-Based 
Approach: 

We continue to find that a prime contributor to DOD's poor program 
outcomes is the lack of widespread adoption of a knowledge-based 
acquisition process within DOD despite polices that support such a 
process. Our assessment of 72 weapon systems shows that DOD programs 
continue to proceed through critical junctures with knowledge gaps that 
expose programs to significant, unnecessary technology, design, and 
production risks. Because of this, many programs in our assessment have 
experienced cost growth and schedule delays. Our analysis also shows 
that there has not been an increase in the share of programs achieving 
key elements of product knowledge at critical junctures over what we 
found in our 2005 assessment. As a result, DOD programs are likely to 
continue to experience a cascade of negative effects that affect both 
costs and schedules. 

A Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Can Lead to Better Program 
Outcomes: 

In order to have good outcomes, best commercial practices require the 
use of a knowledge-based approach to product development that 
demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant commitments 
are made. This type of strategy is essential for getting better 
outcomes for DOD programs. The achievement of the right knowledge at 
the right time enables leadership to make informed decisions about when 
and how best to move into various acquisition phases. In essence, 
knowledge supplants risk over time. This building of knowledge consists 
of information that should be gathered at three critical points over 
the course of a program: 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. Achieving a high level 
of technology maturity by the start of system development is an 
important indicator of whether this match has been made.[Footnote 5] 
This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended 
environment. In addition, the producer has completed a preliminary 
design of the product that shows the design is feasible. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a 
program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will 
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability 
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system- 
level critical design review, usually held midway through system 
development. Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings 
at the system design review provides tangible evidence that the design 
is stable, and a prototype demonstration shows that the design is 
capable of meeting performance requirements. 

* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature. This point is 
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the company can manufacture 
the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A best practice 
is to ensure that all key manufacturing processes are in statistical 
control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, and capable of 
consistently producing parts within the product's quality tolerances 
and standards--at the start of production. Demonstration of a fully 
integrated product in its intended environment shows that the product 
works as needed. 

Outcomes for the Programs We Assessed Mirror Outcomes for the Overall 
DOD Major Acquisition Program Portfolio: 

For this report, we assessed 72 individual programs and found that 
outcomes for a large portion of those programs are consistent with 
DOD's overall portfolio of major defense acquisition programs--they 
cost more and are taking longer to field than originally planned (see 
table 4).[Footnote 6] 

Table 4: Outcomes for Weapon Programs in 2008 Assessment: 

Performance indicators: Increase in RDT&E costs from first estimate; 
Outcomes to date: 38 percent. 

Performance indicators: Share of programs with more than 25 percent 
growth in program acquisition unit cost; 
Outcomes to date: 47 percent. 

Performance indicators: Average schedule delay in delivering initial 
capabilities; 
Outcomes to date: 23 months. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Not all programs in our assessment have entered system 
development or had comparable first and latest estimates to measure 
outcomes. These programs were not included in our analysis. Details of 
our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

[End of table] 

In assessing the 72 weapon programs, we found no evidence of widespread 
adoption of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy. The majority of 
programs in our assessment this year proceeded with lower levels of 
knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product 
knowledge later in development than expected under best practices. The 
building of knowledge over a product's development is cumulative, as 
one knowledge point builds on the next, and failure to capture key 
product knowledge can lead to problems that eventually cascade and 
become magnified throughout product development and production. 
Consequently, programs managed without the knowledge-based process are 
more likely to have surprises in the form of cost and schedule 
increases. Figure 2 compares the degree of cumulative product knowledge 
at critical decision points for DOD programs in our assessment versus 
best practices standards. 

Figure 2: Knowledge Achievement for Weapon System Programs in 2008 
Assessment at Key Junctures: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a table depicting the following information: 

Key junctures: Best practices; 
Development start: Knowledge point 1: Mature all critical technologies; 
Design review: Knowledge point 2: Achieve knowledge point 1 on time and 
complete 90 percent of engineering drawings; 
Production start: Knowledge point 3: Achieve knowledge points 1 and 2 
on time, and have all critical processes under statistical control. 

Key junctures: DOD outcomes[A]; 
Development start: 12% of programs; 
Design review: 4% of programs; 
Production start: 0% of programs[B]. 

[A] Not all programs provided information for each knowledge point or 
had passed through all three key junctures. 

[B] In our assessment, two programs--the Light Utility Helicopter and 
the Joint Cargo Aircraft--are depicted as meeting all three knowledge 
points when they began at production start. We excluded these two 
programs from our analysis because they were based on commercially 
available products and we did not assess their knowledge attainment 
with our best practices metrics. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Programs Enter System Development without Mature Technologies or Sound 
Preliminary Design: 

Very few programs start system development with evidence that the 
proposed solution is based on mature technologies and proven design 
features. Achieving knowledge point 1 at system development start makes 
it easier to reach the remaining two knowledge points at the right 
time. Only 12 percent of the programs in our assessment demonstrated 
all of their critical technologies as fully mature at the start of 
system development, meaning that 88 percent fell short of achieving 
knowledge point 1. Without mature technologies, it is difficult to know 
whether the product under design will meet customer requirements or if 
the design allows enough space for technology integration. As shown in 
figure 3, for the 356 critical technologies at system development start 
in the programs we assessed, only 31 percent were fully mature and only 
another 23 percent were approaching full maturity. This means that 
programs accepted 164 technologies, or 46 percent, into their product's 
design based on no more than a laboratory demonstration of basic 
performance, technical feasibility, and functionality, and not on a 
representative model or prototype demonstration close to form and fit 
(size, weight, and materials) in a relevant or realistic environment. 
In some cases, technologies were in very early technology development 
stages when weapon program managers accepted them as part of their 
system development programs. 

Figure 3: Maturity Levels of Critical Technologies for DOD Programs: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

Maturity Levels of Critical Technologies for DOD Programs: 
Technologies immature: 46%; 
Technologies approaching maturity: 23%; 
Technologies fully mature: 31%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Programs that are still working to mature technologies while they are 
also maturing the system design and preparing for production have 
higher cost growth than programs that start system development with 
mature technologies. For those programs in our assessment with immature 
technologies at system development start, the total RDT&E costs grew by 
44 percent more than for programs that began with mature technologies. 
More often than not, programs were still maturing technologies late 
into system development and even into production. This trend is 
troublesome, as we have found the share of programs with fully mature 
technologies prior to production has actually decreased from our 2005 
assessment (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: Percentage of Programs Achieving Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple bar graph depicting the following data: 

Development start: 
2005 assessment: 15%; 
2006 assessment: 10%; 
2007 assessment: 16%; 
2008 assessment: 12%. 

DOD design review: 
2005 assessment: 45%; 
2006 assessment: 43%; 
2007 assessment: 44%; 
2008 assessment: 41%. 

Production decision: 
2005 assessment: 86%; 
2006 assessment: 67%; 
2007 assessment: 67%; 
2008 assessment: 64%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to ensuring that technologies are mature by system 
development start, best product development practices suggest that the 
developer should have delivered a preliminary design of the proposed 
solution based on a robust systems engineering process before 
committing to system development. This process should allow the 
developer to analyze the customer's expectations for the product and 
identify gaps between resources and expectations, which then can be 
addressed through additional investments, alternate designs, and 
ultimately trade-offs. Only 10 percent of the programs in our 
assessment had completed their preliminary design review prior to 
committing to system development. For programs that had not completed 
the preliminary design review, it was an average of about 2 1/2 years 
into system development before the review was completed or was planned 
to be completed. GAO's work has shown that successfully completing this 
review and delivering a sound preliminary design based on mature 
technological solutions leads to better and more predictable program 
outcomes. DOD programs, like the Aerial Common Sensor and Joint Strike 
Fighter, that did not deliver sound preliminary designs at system 
development start and discovered problems early in their design 
activities required substantial resources be added to the programs or, 
in the case of Aerial Common Sensor, termination of the system 
development contract. 

Programs Continue to Move into System Demonstration and Production 
without Achieving Design Stability: 

As previously shown in figure 2, only a small portion of the programs 
in our assessment that have held a design review captured the necessary 
knowledge to ensure that they had mature technologies at system 
development start and a stable design before entering the more costly 
system demonstration phase of development. Over half of the programs in 
our assessment did not even have mature technologies at the design 
review (knowledge that actually should have been achieved before system 
development start). Also less than one-quarter of the programs that 
provided data on drawings released at the design review reached the 
best practices standard of 90 percent, which is a smaller share than 
programs in our 2005 assessment (see fig. 5). Knowing that a product's 
design is stable before system demonstration reduces the risk of costly 
design changes occurring during the manufacturing of production 
representative prototypes--when investments in acquisitions become more 
significant. Even by the beginning of production, more than a third of 
the programs that had entered this phase still had not released 90 
percent of their engineering drawings. 

Figure 5: Percentage of Programs Releasing 90 Percent of Engineering 
Drawings by Key Junctures: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple bar graph depicting the following data: 

Percentage of Programs Releasing 90 Percent of Engineering Drawings by 
Key Junctures: 

DOD design review: 
2005 assessment: 42%; 
2006 assessment: 35%; 
2007 assessment: 27%; 
2008 assessment: 26%. 

Production decision: 
2005 assessment: 75%; 
2006 assessment: 58%; 
2007 assessment: 67%; 
2008 assessment: 65%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

We have found that programs moving forward into system demonstration 
with low levels of design stability are more likely than other programs 
to encounter costly design changes and parts shortages that in turn 
cause labor inefficiencies, schedule delays, and quality problems. In 
addition, we found that over 80 percent of the programs providing data 
did not or did not plan to demonstrate the successful integration of 
the key subsystems and components needed for the product through an 
integration laboratory, or better yet through testing an early system 
prototype by the design review. Demonstrating that the system can be 
successfully integrated before the critical design review is a best 
practice that provides additional evidence of design stability before a 
program makes costly investments in materials, manufacturing equipment, 
and personnel to begin building production representative prototypes 
for the system demonstration phase. For example, the Navy's E-2D 
Advanced Hawkeye moved past the design review and entered systems 
demonstration without fully proving--through the use of an integration 
lab or prototype--that the design could be successfully integrated. The 
program did not have all the components operational in a systems 
integration lab until almost 2 years after the design review. While the 
program estimated it had released 90 percent of the drawings needed for 
the system by the design review, as it was conducting system 
integration activities, it discovered that it needed substantially more 
drawings. This increase means that the program really had completed 
only 53 percent of the drawings prior to the review, making it 
difficult to ensure the design was stable. 

Programs Enter Production without Demonstrating Acceptable 
Manufacturing and Test Performance: 

In addition to lacking mature technologies and design stability, most 
programs have not or do not plan to capture critical manufacturing and 
testing knowledge before entering production. This knowledge ensures 
that the product will work as intended and can be manufactured 
efficiently to meet cost, schedule, and quality targets. Of the 26 
programs in our assessment that have had production decisions, none of 
them provided data showing that they had all their critical processes 
in statistical control by the time they entered into the production 
phase.[Footnote 7] In fact, only three of these programs indicated that 
they had even identified the key product characteristics or associated 
critical manufacturing processes--key initial steps to ensuring 
critical production elements are stable and in control. Failing to 
capture key manufacturing knowledge before producing the product can 
lead to inefficiencies and quality problems. For example, the Wideband 
Global SATCOM program encountered cost and schedule delays because 
contractor personnel installed fasteners incorrectly. Discovery of the 
problem resulted in extensive inspection and rework to correct the 
deficiencies, contributing to a 15-month schedule delay. The Missile 
Defense Agency's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system continues to 
encounter quality issues with delivered interceptors. Officials believe 
inadequate controls may have allowed less reliable or inappropriate 
parts to be incorporated into the manufacturing processes of two key 
subsystems. 

In addition to demonstrating that the product can be built efficiently, 
GAO's work has shown that production and post-production costs are 
minimized when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated to 
show it will work as intended and in a reliable manner. We found that 
many programs are very susceptible to discovering costly problems late 
in development, when the more complex software and advanced 
capabilities are tested. Of the 33 programs that provided us data about 
the overlap between system development and production, almost three- 
quarters still had or planned to have system demonstration activities 
left to complete after production had begun. For nine programs, the 
amount of system development work remaining was estimated to be over 4 
years. This practice of beginning production before successfully 
demonstrating that the weapon system will work as intended increases 
the potential for discovering costly design changes that ripple through 
production into products already fielded, and usually require 
substantial modification costs at a later time. 

Forty programs we assessed provided us information on when they had or 
planned to have first tested a fully configured, integrated production 
representative article (i.e., prototype) in the intended environment. 
Of these, 38 percent reported that they had already conducted or 
planned to conduct a development test of a fully configured, integrated 
prototype before they make a production decision. In other cases, we 
found instances where it would be several years after production has 
begun before the fully integrated, capable product was first tested. We 
also found examples where product reliability is not being demonstrated 
in a timely fashion. Making design changes to achieve reliability 
requirements after production begins is inefficient and costly. For 
example, during flight tests in 2007, the Air Force's Joint Air-to- 
Surface Standoff Missile encountered four failures during four tests, 
resulting in an overall missile reliability rate of less than 60 
percent despite being more than 5 years past the production decision. 
The failures halted procurement of new missiles by the Air Force until 
the problems could be resolved. 

DOD's Practices Lead to Concurrent Development, Test, and Production: 

The absence of a knowledge-based acquisition process results in DOD 
continuing to develop new weapon systems in a highly concurrent 
environment, which forces acquisition programs to manage technology, 
design, and manufacturing risks at the same time and can lead to waste 
from costly rework. This environment has made it difficult for either 
DOD or congressional decision makers to make informed decisions because 
appropriate knowledge has not been available at key decision points. 
Rather than seeking to reduce risk early in programs, DOD's common 
practice for managing this environment has been to create aggressive 
risk mitigation plans in its programs after poor investment decisions 
have been made. Figure 6 shows a generalization of the overlapping, 
concurrent approach that DOD uses to develop its weapon systems. As 
discussed earlier, in a large percentage of cases, DOD programs were 
still maturing technologies, stabilizing designs, and bringing 
production processes into control long after the program had entered 
production. This means that these programs were not achieving all three 
knowledge points (KP) until after entering production, long after the 
programs passed through decision points when this knowledge should have 
been available--a high-risk approach. 

Figure 6: Best Practices Compared to DOD Practices for Programs in 2008 
Assessment: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a timeline comparison, as follows: 

Best practice: 
Begin: Concept refinement and technology development; 
KP1: System development and demonstration: System integration; 
KP 2: System development and demonstration: System demonstration; 
KP 3: Production and deployment. 

DOD practice for many programs in 2008 assessment: 
Begin: Concept refinement and technology development; 
At about 10% of Concept refinement and technology development: begin 
System development and demonstration; 
At about 50% of System development and demonstration: begin Production 
and deployment; 
KP1, KP2, KP3: occur at about 25% intervals during Production and 
deployment. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

More important, the problems created by this concurrent approach on 
individual programs can profoundly affect the pressure placed on DOD's 
budget. It is difficult to prioritize and allocate limited budgets 
among needed requirements when acquisition programs' costs and 
schedules are always in question. Programs that are managed without the 
knowledge-based process are more likely than other programs to have 
unpredictable cost and schedule implications that are accommodated by 
either reducing overall program quantities or disrupting the funding of 
other programs. Because of these disruptions, decision makers are not 
able to focus on a balanced investment strategy. 

DOD Practices Continue to Contribute to Program Risk and Instability: 

Our work has shown that knowledge-based acquisition processes for 
individual programs are often lacking because DOD acquisition practices 
necessary to ensure effective implementation are not always followed, 
despite policies and guidance to the contrary. We have frequently 
reported on the importance of having a solid, executable business case 
before committing resources to new product development. In its simplest 
form, a sound business case provides evidence that (1) the warfighter's 
needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the 
chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources-
-that is, proven technologies, along with adequate funding, design 
knowledge, and time to deliver the product when needed. Without the 
timely use of systems engineering activities, DOD does not effectively 
translate customer wants into specific product characteristics and 
functions, and ultimately into a preferred design. As a result, DOD 
weapon programs suffer from unexecutable business cases, resulting in 

unsettled requirements and funding instability, which can lead to 
unnecessary risks and long development cycle times. 

Absence of Disciplined Systems Engineering Practices Leads to 
Unexecutable Business Cases: 

The absence of a knowledge-based acquisition process steeped in 
disciplined systems engineering practices contributes greatly to DOD's 
poor acquisition outcomes. Systems engineering is a process that 
translates customer wants into specific product features for which 
requisite technological, software, engineering, and production 
capabilities can be identified. These activities include requirements 
analysis, design, and testing to ensure that the product's requirements 
are achievable and designable given available resources. However, it is 
not just the use of systems engineering in the development of a new 
product or weapon system, but also when it is used, that makes it a 
best practice. Early systems engineering provides knowledge that 
enables a developer to identify and resolve gaps before product 
development begins, such as overly optimistic requirements that cannot 
be expected to be met with current resources. Consequently, 
establishing a sound acquisition program with an executable business 
case depends on determining achievable requirements, based on systems 
engineering, that are agreed to by both the acquirer and the developer 
before a program's initiation. 

DOD programs often do not conduct systems engineering in a timely 
fashion to support critical investment junctures within programs or, in 
some cases, omit key systems engineering activities altogether. For 
example, the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program did not adequately 
analyze the product's requirements at the program's outset, a key 
systems engineering activity. As a result, when the program needed to 
integrate new avionics into the test aircraft, the amount of wiring and 
the number of harnesses and brackets needed for the installation had 
been underestimated by 400 percent. In another example, B-2 Radar 
Modernization Program officials also stated some key aspects of the 
systems engineering process were not completed. This caused schedule 
delays when technical problems with the antenna performance were 
discovered during flight testing. We have recently reported on the 
impact that poor systems engineering practices have had on several 
programs such as the Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System, F-22A, 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, 
and others.[Footnote 8] 

While these are anecdotal examples, they are indicative of the type of 
uncertainty that exists when DOD programs begin. Based on information 
obtained from 43 programs, our analysis shows that 58 percent of the 
programs had to reset their baseline at least once. Some programs have 
had a significant number of rebaselines, such as the V-22 program, 
which has had to reset its baseline 10 times. 

Program Uncertainties Lead to Unnecessary Risks: 

DOD often sets optimistic requirements for weapon programs that require 
new and unproven technologies. Unfortunately, when early analysis is 
not performed to ensure that specific DOD needs can be met and that 
requirements are firmly established and understood prior to starting 
system development, increased cost risk to the government can occur. 
During weapon system development, DOD often asks prime contractors to 
develop cutting-edge systems and awards cost reimbursement type 
contracts for which the government pays the allowable incurred costs to 
the extent provided by the contract.[Footnote 9] In these cases, the 
government reimburses the contractor for its best efforts in completing 
the contract requirements. However, because the government often does 
not perform the proper up-front analysis to determine whether its needs 
can be met, significant contract cost increases can occur as the scope 
of the requirements changes or becomes better understood by the 
government and contractor. As such, the consequences of poorly formed 
and analyzed requirements are manifested in these changes to contract 
costs over the course of the period of performance, with the government 
taking on the burden of the increases. For example, the Joint Strike 
Fighter and Future Combat Systems (FCS) are expected to be developed on 
a cost reimbursable basis for 12 years. As of fiscal year 2007, DOD 
anticipates having to reimburse the prime contractors on these two 
programs nearly $13 billion more for their work activities than 
initially expected. Table 5 illustrates eight development programs 
within the scope of our review that use cost reimbursement type 
contracts and have experienced or anticipate significant increases to 
initial contract prices. 

Table 5: Significant Changes to Contract Prices for DOD Development 
Contracts (Then year dollars in millions): 

Program: Joint Strike Fighter; 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $18,981.9; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $25,873.2; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $6,891.3; 
Percentage change: 36. 

Program: Future Combat Systems[B]; 
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $14,924.8; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $20,882.9; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $5,958.1; 
Percentage change: 40. 

Program: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System; 
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $2,942.7; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $5,106.0; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $2,163.3; 
Percentage change: 74. 

Program: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites; 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $2,839.0; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $4,149.3; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $1,310.3; 
Percentage change: 46. 

Program: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle; 
Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $712.1; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $1,283.9; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $571.8; 
Percentage change: 80. 

Program: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery 
Projectile; 
Prime contractor: Raytheon; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $51.2; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $518.0; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $466.8; 
Percentage change: 912. 

Program: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program; 
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $484.6; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $2,048.4; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $1,563.8; 
Percentage change: 323. 

Program: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio; 
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Initial contract target price [A]: $235.5; 
DOD's estimated price at completion: $966.3; 
Actual or anticipated price change: $730.8; 
Percentage change: 310. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports. 

[A] Price means cost plus any fee or profit applicable to the contract 
type. 

[B] Future Combat Systems began under an Other Transaction Authority 
agreement but was converted to a traditional contract subject to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation in 2005. Both the agreement and the 
contract provided for reimbursement of the vendors costs. The initial 
contract target price reflects the price under the Other Transaction 
Authority agreement and DOD's estimated price at completion reflects 
estimated costs of the contract. 

[End of table] 

We have found examples of programs extending the use of cost 
reimbursement contracts into the production phase instead of using 
fixed priced contracts, reflecting uncertainties as programs enter 
production. For example, the Joint Strike Fighter plans to use cost 
reimbursement contracts for as many as 7 years worth of low-rate 
initial production orders. According to program officials, it hopes to 
transition to a fixed price contract sometime before full-rate 
production, but by this time it could have procured over 275 aircraft 
at a cost of over $40 billion. 

Long DOD Development Cycle Times Contribute to Instability: 

A hallmark of an executable program with a sound business case is short 
development cycle times. Long cycle times promote instability, 
especially considering DOD's tendency to have changing requirements and 
program manager turnover. In fact, DOD itself suggests that system 
development should be limited to about 5 years. Time-defined 
constraints such as this are important because they serve to limit the 
initial product's requirements, allow for more frequent assimilation of 
new technologies into weapon systems, and speed new capabilities to the 
warfighter. Most programs we assessed were based on cycle times much 
longer than those prescribed through best practices. While there are 
isolated examples of programs with cycle times shorter than 5 years, 
the majority of programs included in our assessment were established 
with cycle times much longer than this. For 34 programs that have been 
started since 2001, only 11 programs (32 percent) even planned their 
development cycle times to be less than 5 years. 

Additional Factors Can Contribute to Poor Weapon Acquisition Outcomes: 

This year we also gathered new data focused on other factors we believe 
could have a significant influence on DOD's ability to improve cost and 
schedule outcomes. Foremost, several DOD programs in our assessment 
incurred requirements changes after the start of system development and 
also experienced cost increases. At the same time, DOD's practice of 
frequently changing program managers during a program's development 
makes it difficult to hold them accountable for the business cases that 
they are entrusted to manage and deliver. We also found that DOD is 
relying more on contractors to support the management and oversight of 
weapon system acquisitions and contracts, which could add risk to 
programs. Finally, as programs rely more heavily on software to perform 
critical functions for weapon systems, we found that a large number of 
programs are encountering difficulties in managing their software 
development. 

Stable Requirements Are Needed for Improved Outcomes: 

As stated previously, establishing a valid need and translating that 
into system requirements is essential for obtaining the right program 
outcome. Without these, DOD increases the risk that it will pay too 
much for the system or enter too quickly into a business case that 
exposes the department to unnecessary risks. However, once DOD system 
development programs are under way, and despite efforts to define 
needed capabilities, product requirements often do change--the problem 
or threat the program was seeking to address changes or the user and 
acquisition communities may simply change their minds about a program. 
Among the 46 programs we surveyed, 63 percent of them indicated that 
requirements had changed in some fashion (additions, reductions, or 
deferments) since system development start. Our analysis of program 
data shows that this instability can have a profound impact on a 
program's costs. Figure 7 illustrates how RDT&E costs increased by 11 
percent over initial estimates for programs that have not had 
requirements changes, while they increased 72 percent among those that 
had requirements changes.[Footnote 10] 

Figure 7: Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since Initial 
Estimates: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple bar graph depicting the following data: 

Average RDT&E Cost Growth for Programs since Initial Estimates: 
Programs without requirements changes: 11%; 
Programs with requirements changes: 72%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Frequent Changes to Program Management Reduce Accountability: 

DOD frequently changes program managers during a product's development 
program, making it difficult to hold one program manager accountable 
for the content of the program's business case when it is established 
and to ensure that a knowledge-based acquisition process is followed. 
According to DOD policy, the assignment period for program managers is 
required to be at least until completion of the major milestone that 
occurs closest in time to the date on which the manager has served in 
the position for 4 years. We recently reported that rather than lengthy 
assignment periods, as suggested by best practices and DOD's own 
policy, many of the programs we reviewed had multiple program managers 
within the same milestone.[Footnote 11] Our analysis indicates that for 
39 major acquisition programs started since March 2001, the average 
time in system development was about 37 months. The average tenure for 
program managers on those programs during that time was about 17 
months--less than half of what is required by DOD policy. This practice 
may promote shortsightedness, challenge continuity, and reduce 
accountability for poor outcomes. It might also discourage managers 
from raising issues and addressing problems early, keeping them from 
realistically estimating the resources needed to deliver the program. 
Consequently, program managers may have little incentive to pursue 
knowledge-based acquisition approaches, as program funding is not tied 
to successfully reaching knowledge points before a program can move 
forward. 

As part of a new strategy for program manager empowerment and 
accountability, DOD plans a variety of actions to enhance development 
opportunities, provide more incentives, and arrange knowledge-sharing 
opportunities. For example, DOD intends to increase "just-in-time" 
training, establish a formal mentoring program, and plans to explore 
the use of monetary awards. However, the new practices DOD is planning 
to implement will not be as effective as they could be until DOD 
ensures that program managers are given acquisition programs that are 
executable--that is, programs that are the result of an integrated, 
portfolio-based approach to investments and that have a sound business 
case. Only then will program managers be placed in a better position to 
carry out their programs in a manner suited for successful outcomes. 

DOD Relying Heavily on Contractors to Support Program Management 
Responsibilities: 

The federal government is increasingly reliant on the private sector in 
general and contractors in particular to deliver a whole range of 
products and services, provide hard to find skills, augment capacity on 
an emergency basis, and reduce the size of government.[Footnote 12] At 
a time when weapon acquisitions are becoming more complex and larger in 
size, DOD is likewise relying more on contractors and other non- 
government personnel to help manage and oversee weapon system programs 
and their contractors. On the basis of our work looking at various 
weapon systems, we have observed that DOD has given contractors 
increased program management responsibilities for activities such as 
developing requirements, designing products, and estimating costs--key 
aspects of setting and executing a program's business case. Table 6 
shows that the 52 DOD programs that provided information indicated that 
about 48 percent of the program office staff was composed of 
individuals outside of the government. 

Table 6: Program Office Staffing Composition for 52 DOD Programs 
(Percentage of staff): 

Government: 
Program management: 70%; 
Administrative support: 39%; 
Business functions: 64%; 
Engineering and technical: 48%; 
Other: 45%; 
Total: 52%. 

Support contractors: 
Program management: 22%; 
Administrative support: 60%; 
Business functions: 35%; 
Engineering and technical: 34%; 
Other: 55%; 
Total: 36%. 

Other non-government[A]: 
Program management: 8%; 
Administrative support: 1%; 
Business functions: 1%; 
Engineering and technical: 18%; 
Other: 1%; 
Total: 12%. 

Total non-government: 
Program management: 30%; 
Administrative support: 61%; 
Business functions: 36%; 
Engineering and technical: 52%; 
Other: 56%; 
Total: 48%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Table may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Other includes federally funded research and development centers, 
universities, and affiliates. 

[End of table] 

GAO has noted that the DOD workforce faces serious challenges and has 
expressed concerns about DOD's reliance on contractors to perform roles 
that have in the past been performed by government employees. Without 
the right-sized workforce, with the right skills, we believe this could 
place greater risk on the government for fraud, waste, and abuse. 
[Footnote 13] In part, this increased reliance has occurred because DOD 
is experiencing a critical shortage of certain acquisition 
professionals with technical skills as it has downsized its workforce 
over the last decade. For example, in a prior review of space 
acquisition programs, we found that 8 of 13 cost-estimating 
organizations and program offices believed the number of cost 
estimators was inadequate and we found that 10 of those offices had 
more contractor personnel preparing cost estimates than government 
personnel. We also found examples during this year's assessment where 
the program offices expressed concerns about having inadequate 
personnel to conduct their program office roles. 

Effective Software Management Necessary for Delivering Critical 
Capability: 

Modern weapon systems are increasingly more dependent on software than 
anytime before, and the development of complex software represents a 
potential leap forward in operational capability for any number of DOD 
defense acquisitions. Much of a system's functionality is controlled by 
software. Technological advancements have even made it possible for 
software to perform functions once handled by hardware. As this demand 
for complex software grows, the use of disciplined, structured 
development processes that measure, manage, and control software 
requirements is essential to delivering software-intensive systems on 
time and within budget. Our prior work has shown that one key metric 
used by leading software developers is to measure changes to the amount 
of software code developed for the program.[Footnote 14] Size metrics, 
such as lines of code, are used to compare the amount of software code 
produced with the amount originally estimated. Changes to the size 
needed can indicate potential cost and schedule problems. 

We have found cases where programs continue to have difficulties in 
managing software development for weapon systems. Roughly half of the 
programs that provided us software data had at least a 25 percent 
growth in their expected lines of code since system development 
started. For example, software requirements were not well understood on 
the FCS program when the program began, and as the program moves toward 
preliminary design activities, the number of lines of software code has 
nearly tripled. Also, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program 
experienced software growth during system development, and the Marine 
Corps testing agency identified software test failures as a factor 
affecting the system's reliability. 

Recent DOD Actions Provide Opportunities for Improvement: 

In February 2007, DOD, in response to congressional direction, issued a 
report on the department's acquisition transformation initiatives and 
the goals established to achieve change.[Footnote 15]Within that 
report, DOD noted that every aspect of how the department does business 
was being assessed and streamlined to deliver improved capabilities to 
the warfighter and visibility to executive leadership. The report also 
noted the need for continuous and evolutionary changes across the DOD 
acquisition system, especially with regard to determining which assets 
and investments to acquire in order to meet desired capabilities. 
Future reports on acquisition transformation are expected to build on 
the outcomes of initiatives described in that report. As such, DOD has 
set forth its intention to change the strategic environment at the 
portfolio level. DOD also plans to implement new practices mentioned 
earlier, similar to past GAO recommendations that are intended to 
provide program managers more incentives, support, and stability. The 
department acknowledges that any actions taken to improve 
accountability must be based on a foundation whereby program managers 
can launch and manage programs toward greater performance, rather than 
focusing on maintaining support and funding for individual programs. 
DOD acquisition leaders have told us that any improvements to program 
managers' performance hinge on the success of these departmental 
initiatives. 

We have reported that DOD should develop an overarching strategy and 
decision-making processes that prioritize programs based on a balanced 
match between customer needs and available department resources. Within 
its strategy and other reports, DOD has highlighted several initiatives 
that, if adopted and implemented properly, could provide a foundation 
for improved outcomes. For example, DOD is experimenting with a new 
concept decision review practice, selection of different acquisition 
approaches according to expected fielding times, and panels to review 
weapon system configuration changes that could adversely affect program 
cost and schedule. The DOD strategy emphasizes that initiatives 
designed to improve program manager performance can be successful only 
if the strategic objectives are accepted and implemented. In addition, 
in September 2007 the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a policy memorandum to 
ensure weapon acquisition programs are able to demonstrate key 
knowledge elements that could inform future development and budget 
decisions. This policy directed pending and future programs to include 
acquisition strategies and funding that provide for two or more 
competing contractors to develop technically mature prototypes through 
Milestone B (knowledge point 1), with the hope of reducing technical 
risk, validating designs and cost estimates, evaluating manufacturing 
processes, and refining requirements. Each of the initiatives is 
designed to enable more informed decisions by key department leaders 
well ahead of a program's start, decisions that provide a closer match 
between each program's requirements and the department's resources. Our 
work has shown that if this is to occur, all of the players involved 
with acquisitions--the requirements community, the comptroller, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
and perhaps most importantly, the military services--must be unified in 
implementing these new policies from top to bottom. 

How to Read The Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

We assess each program in two pages and depict the extent of knowledge 
in a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of 
the first page. As illustrated in figure 8, the knowledge graph is 
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the 
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), 
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted 
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment 
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The 
closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the 
more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and 
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by 
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice 
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces 
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks 
are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 8: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge 
as Compared with Best Practices. An interpretation of this depicting 
follows in the next paragraph. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system 
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing 
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design 
review, as some technologies were still not mature and only a small 
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for 
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve 
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that 
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases. 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Our assessments of the 72 weapon programs follow. 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

{See PDF for image] 

Figure: Photograph of Airborne Laser (ABL). 

Source: Airborne Laser Program Office. 

MDA's ABL element is being developed to destroy enemy missiles during 
the boost phase of their flight. Carried aboard a modified Boeing 747 
aircraft, ABL employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus 
the beam on a target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel 
tanks of enemy missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and 
execute engagements. We assessed the system's prototype design that is 
expected to lead to a lethality demonstration in 2009. 

Timeline: Technology/System development to Initial capability: 
Program start: 11/96; 
Transition to MDA: 10/01; 
Long duration laser test: 12/05; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Lethality demonstration: 2009; 
Demonstrated capability: 2016/2017. 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N.M.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $3,496.0 million; 
* Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,496.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $8,127.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $8,127.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Cost data include all known costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2013. 

[End of table] 

None of ABL's critical technologies are fully mature, yet MDA has 
released 100 percent of the prototype's engineering drawings. Program 
officials expected to demonstrate the prototype's critical technologies 
during a flight test planned for late 2008, but recent integration 
issues and technical challenges delayed that test until 2009. 
Additional drawings may be needed if problems encountered during future 
testing necessitate design changes. The work for ABL's prime contract 
was rebaselined in 2004 and refined again in 2005. However, the 
contractor continued to experience cost and schedule delays in 2006. In 
May 2007, the program replanned its contract work again, increasing 
costs and extending the length of the contract. Subsequent to the 
replan, the contractor continued to overrun its cost and schedule 
budgets through fiscal year 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

ABL Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office assessed all seven of its critical technologies--the 
six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric compensation, 
transmissive optics, optical coatings, jitter control, and managing the 
high-power beam--as nearly mature. According to program officials, all 
of these technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. 

Although the program office assessed jitter control as nearly mature, 
it considers this technology to be a high risk to the program. Jitter 
is a phenomenon pertaining to the technology of controlling and 
stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration unique to the 
aircraft does not degrade the laser's aimpoint. It is critical to 
imparting sufficient energy to the target to rupture its fuel tank. The 
program's assessment of this technology is based on models that have 
been anchored to measurements taken during recent ground and flight 
tests. On the basis of current jitter measurements, officials are 
confident that they can successfully execute a key flight test planned 
for 2009. 

The program plans to demonstrate all of its critical technologies 
during this flight test of the system prototype, referred to as a 
lethality demonstration, in which ABL will attempt to shoot down a 
short-range ballistic missile. Although the program had expected to 
complete the lethality demonstration in 2008, software integration 
issues and recent technical challenges associated with the system's 
beam control/fire control component delayed the demonstration until 
2009. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess ABL's design stability because the element's 
initial capability will not be fully developed until the second 
aircraft is well underway. While the program has released 100 percent 
of its engineering drawings for the prototype, it is unclear whether 
the design of the prototype aircraft can be relied upon as a good 
indicator of design stability for the second aircraft. More drawings 
may be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered 
during flight testing force design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity for the system's prototype 
because statistical process control data are not available due to the 
limited quantity of hardware being produced for the prototype aircraft. 

Other Program Issues: 

MDA estimates that it will have spent approximately $5.1 billion for 
its ABL element from its inception in 1996 through its lethality 
demonstration in 2009. For years, the program has faced significant 
cost and schedule growth. In 2004, the ABL program restructured its 
prime contract work to focus on executing near-term milestones within 
budget and on schedule. However, since that restructure, the program 
has continued to experience cost growth and schedule delays. During 
2005, the program further refined its work plan to ensure it could meet 
its cost and schedule objectives. However, a year later, the ABL 
program encountered new technical challenges that contributed to 
additional cost increases and schedule slippage. Consequently, program 
officials reevaluated the program and implemented a new baseline for 
all remaining work. In 2007, the ABL program once again modified its 
prime contract, increasing the cost ceiling by $253 million and 
extending the period of performance by approximately 1 year. The prime 
contract is currently valued at about $3.9 billion and is expected to 
end in February 2010. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the ABL Program Office 
concurred with our assessment. The program office also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

{See PDF for image] 

Figure: Photograph of Aegis BMD. 

Source: Aegis BMD Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being 
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed 
U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-to-medium range ballistic 
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, 
Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles, and command and control systems. It 
will also be used as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and 
tracking of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed the SM-3 
Block IA, to be delivered in Block 2006. 

Timeline: Technology/System development to Initial capability: 
Program/development start: 10/95; 
Transition to MDA: 1/02; 
Missile contract awarded: 8/03; 
Design review: 10/04; 
Block 2004 completion: 12/05; 
Block 2006 start: 1/06; 
GAO review: 1/08. 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon; 
Program office: Dahlgren, Va; 
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $6,196.9 million; 
* Procurement: NA; 
Total funding: $6,196.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 07/2007: $11,233.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $11,233.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include known costs from the programï¿½s inception through fiscal 
year 2013. 

[End of table] 

Program officials report all Block IA critical technologies are mature. 
Our data indicate that one of the technologies is less mature. The 
Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS) pulse one has been 
successfully flight tested since our last report. However, the zero 
pulse mode of the missile's third stage rocket motor has not been 
demonstrated in an operational environment. Officials also report the 
missile's design is stable with 100 percent of its drawings released to 
manufacturing and they do not anticipate any design changes. The Block 
IA missile is in production but officials state that the contractor's 
processes are not mature enough to collect statistical data. Instead, 
other means are being used to gauge production readiness. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

Aegis BMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We reported last year that two of the three technologies critical to 
the SM-3 Block IA missile, the Solid Divert and Attitude Control System 
(SDACS) and the Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM), were not mature. Since 
our last report, one of the SDACS's pulse modes, pulse one, which 
allows the kinetic warhead to divert in order to adjust its aim, has 
flown three times, in April, June, and November 2007. Pulse one was 
used to shift the warhead's aim just prior to intercept and all tests 
resulted in successful intercepts. The other pulse mode of the SDACS, 
pulse two, is identical in technology and functionality as pulse one 
but has not been flight tested. Program officials state that both pulse 
modes have been successfully tested in four consecutive ground tests 
but that it is difficult for the SDACS to use both pulse modes in a 
flight test because the first pulse has provided sufficient divert 
capability to make the intercept. Program officials state that an 
artificiality would have to be built into the flight test in order to 
guarantee the use of pulse two. Additionally, program officials 
consider pulse two to be a margin to the system since it is designed to 
provide additional energy, if needed, after employing pulse one, to 
make the necessary maneuvers to intercept the target in the desired 
spot for maximum destruction. Similarly, the zero pulse mode of the 
TSRM that increases the missile's capability against shorter-range 
threats has not been flight tested. Although the production design of 
the TRSM attitude control system passed qualification testing in 
February 2007 and has been integrated into the manufacturing line, the 
zero pulse mode is not scheduled for flight testing due to range safety 
limitations. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that the design for the SM-3 Block IA 
missiles being produced during Block 2006 is stable, with 100 percent 
of its drawings released to manufacturing. Program officials do not 
anticipate additional design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the SM-3 missiles being 
procured for Block 2006. Program officials stated that the contractor's 
processes are not yet mature enough to statistically track production 
processes. The Aegis BMD program continues to use other means to assess 
progress in production and manufacturing, such as tracking rework 
hours, cost of defects per unit, and other defect and test data. 

Other Program Issues: 

The original Aegis BMD program goals for Block 2006 included delivery 
of 19 SM-3 Block IA U.S. missiles. Last year, program officials reduced 
the goal to 15. Since that time, delivery goals have been reduced to 
12, because the contractor did not have the production capacity to 
deliver both foreign military sales missiles and U.S. missiles. 
Although Raytheon reported no cost or schedule growth, because much of 
the SM-3 Block IA contract work was being reported as a level of 
effort, it was difficult to assess true performance since it could not 
be practically measured by discrete earned value techniques. According 
to American National Standards Institute guidelines adopted by DOD, 
only work that does not result in a product should be reported as level 
of effort under earned value management. However, in August 2007, 
Raytheon reported 73 percent of the contract work as level of effort, 
some of which was identified as possibly unjustified and appearing 
excessive by a team composed of technical and functional experts during 
a 2007 review. Since that time, program officials report that they were 
able to implement earned value management reporting on future delivery 
contracts and stated in January 2008 that Raytheon had reduced the 
contract level of effort work to 18 percent. 

Agency Comments: 

Technical comments provided by the program office were incorporated as 
appropriate. In addition, program officials stated that they believe 
the TSRM is a mature technology and add that is has been successfully 
flown in multiple missions in increasingly realistic operational 
environments. Program officials consider the zero pulse mode of the 
third stage rocket motor to be marginal to the system and explain that 
the capability is difficult to demonstrate in an operational 
environment due to range safety limitations. Additionally, program 
officials state that all design verification tests for both the SDACS 
and the TSRM have been completed, all requirements have been exceeded, 
and qualification tests for the capabilities have been completed and 
verified by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the 
Indian Head Division, Naval Warfare Center. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control 
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are 
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: 4/99; 
Development start: 9/01; 
Design review: 4/04; 
Production decision: 6/04; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
First launch: 11/08; 
Initial capability: 6/10. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,078.9 million; 
* Procurement: $93.6 million; 
Total funding: $1,172.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $4,669.0; 
Latest, 12/2006: $6,098.9; 
Percent change: 30.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1380.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $718.9; 
Percent change: -47.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $6,050.0; 
Latest, 12/2006: $6,817.3; 
Percent change: 12.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $1,209.993; 
Latest, 12/2006: $2,272.443; 
Percent change: 87.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest, 12/2006: 3; 
Percent change: -40. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 111; 
Latest, 12/2006: 134; 
Percent change: 20.7. 

[End of table] 

The AEHF program's technologies are mature and the design is stable. We 
could not assess production maturity because the program office does 
not collect statistical process control data. In September 2007, the 
program announced a launch slip of over 6 months because technical 
problems with some hardware components delayed the start of system- 
level environmental testing. Because of concerns about the development 
of the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) and a 
possible gap in capabilities, the conference report accompanying the 
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 encouraged the Air 
Force to procure an additional AEHF satellite. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

AEHF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are 
mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment. All 
hardware has been integrated into the first satellite for system-level 
environmental testing. 

Design Stability: 

The AEHF's design is stable. All expected design drawings have been 
released and the program completed system-level critical design review 
in April 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity could not be assessed, as the program office does 
not collect statistical process control data. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since our assessment of the AEHF last year, subcontractors delivered 
all major subsystems, including the propulsion unit, antennas, and 
payload to the prime contractor for final integration into the first 
satellite. However, because of technical difficulties with some key 
hardware components, the payload was incomplete when delivered. 
Although the program began system integration and some functional 
testing, it could not proceed with system-level environmental testing 
until all satellite hardware was in place. Because of this delayed 
start, the launch of the first two satellites will also be delayed. In 
September 2007, the program office determined the launch of the first 
satellite will slip over 6 months, from April 2008 to November 2008. 
The second satellite will be delayed over 3 months, from April 2009 to 
August 2009. The program office estimated the cost of the slip to be 
between $230 million and $250 million. The program office expects to 
keep the same schedule of April 2010 for the third satellite. 

The original AEHF program included the acquisition of five satellites. 
In December 2002, satellites 4 and 5 were deleted from the program with 
the intention of using three AEHF satellites and the first TSAT 
satellite to achieve full operational capability. However, because of 
concerns that delays in developing and fielding TSAT could result in a 
gap in protected communications capability, the conference report 
accompanying the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
encouraged the Air Force to procure an additional AEHF satellite and 
provided funding for advanced procurement of the forth AEHF satellite. 
Program officials stated the primary challenges associated with 
procuring a fourth satellite are obsolescence of electronic components 
and a minimum 3-year production gap between the third and fourth 
satellites, making the fourth satellite much more costly than the third 
satellite. The officials stated if the fourth satellite is fully 
funded, the earliest possible launch would be in 2013. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) Increment 2: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS) 
Increment 2: 

Source: 30th Intelligence Squadron, U.S. Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

AF DCGS provides a global intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capability for the Air Force. AF DCGS provides all-
source intelligence information, including time critical targeting and 
direct threat warning information from various sensors to the joint 
task force commander and echelons below. AF DCGS is part of DOD's DCGS 
Enterprise, a cooperative effort among the military services and 
national agencies to provide interoperable ISR systems and data. We 
assessed AF DCGS Increment 2. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Development start: 4th quarter, FY 2009; 
Specific program event dates are in development as the acquisition 
strategy is being formulated. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass. 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $318.3 million:
* Procurement: $943.6 million:
Total funding: $1,278.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 1: 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $477.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,545.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,126.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,126.518; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

The current estimate is representative of the entire AF DCGS effort, 
which includes funding for Block 10.1, Block 10.2, and Increment 2. In 
addition, DCGS is considered a single system with multiple sites; 
therefore only one system will be procured. 

[End of table] 

AF DCGS is an operational system undergoing net-centric and technology 
transformation. The program is composed of three blocks or increments: 
(1) Block 10.1 is currently fielded and provides operational networked 
ISR; (2) Block 10.2, considered a technology refresh program, will 
provide a net-centric infrastructure and is scheduled for fielding in 
fiscal year 2008; and, (3) Increment 2, a future capability, will 
provide multi-intelligence net-centric operations, a layered service 
oriented architecture, and automated analysis and fusion, among other 
capabilities. The Increment 2 Capabilities Development Document is 
currently undergoing review by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, while Increment 2 is scheduled to enter system development in 
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. Specific program event dates 
are still in development as the acquisition strategy is being 
formulated. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] ] 

AF DCGS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

AF DCGS provides the Air Force with a ground-based "system of systems" 
capable of (1) tasking intelligence sensors, and (2) receiving, 
processing, exploiting, and disseminating data from airborne and 
national reconnaissance platforms and commercial sources. Increment 2 
will upgrade the net-centric baseline system, focusing on signal 
intelligence and data fusion. These upgrades will use commercial 
hardware and software for most of the fielded capabilities. No 
development or specially produced hardware will be utilized. Those 
items that are government-unique will be procured through other 
programs. 

The program has yet to define specific critical technologies for 
Increment 2, but has identified critical technology areas such as data 
fusion, imagery automated extraction, and knowledge management, among 
others. A technology readiness assessment is planned for the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2008. 

Design Stability: 

Design drawings are not available, as Increment 2 has yet to begin 
development. 

Other Program Issues: 

AF DCGS and other DCGS systems are highly dependent on the DCGS 
Integration Backbone (DIB). The DIB is a common set of enterprise 
services and standards that serves as the foundation for the 
interoperability and data sharing across the DCGS enterprise. The DIB 
program is pursuing an evolutionary acquisition strategy and has 
delivered early versions of the product. To date, the DIB has achieved 
successful connectivity and data sharing in a demonstration with Army, 
Air Force, and Navy laboratories. According to a DIB program official, 
the next major milestone for the DIB is the planned delivery of a new 
version that will focus on interoperability testing and certification. 
The delivery of the new DIB software is scheduled for the first quarter 
of fiscal year 2009 to support the DCGS-Army version 4. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH); 

Source: ARH Prototype #1 Flight Testing at Bell Helicopter, ï¿½2006 Bell 
Helicopter, A Textron Company. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's ARH is expected to provide reconnaissance and security 
capability for air and ground maneuver teams. The ARH was to combine a 
modified off-the-shelf airframe with a non-developmental item mission 
equipment package and is replacing the Kiowa Warrior helicopter fleet. 
A streamlined acquisition strategy was proposed for the ARH program in 
order to support current military operations. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: 7/05; 
Design review: 1/07; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Low-rate decision: 6/08; 
Full-rate decision: 12/10; 
Initial capability: 7/11. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell Helicopter Textron; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $386.5 million; 
* Procurement: $4,977.4 million; 
Total funding: $5,363.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 512; 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2005: $388.3; 
Latest, 08/2007: $750.9; 
Percent change: 93.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2005: $3,019.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $4,977.4; 
Percent change: 64.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2005: $3,407.7; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5,728.3; 
Percent change: 68.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2005: $9.260; 
Latest, 08/2007: $11.188; 
Percent change: 20.8. 

Total quantities; 
As of 07/2005: 368; 
Latest, 08/2007: 512; 
Percent change: 39.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2005: 47; 
Latest, 08/2007: 72; 
Percent change: 53.2 

[End of table] 

Since our assessment of the ARH program last year, the program has 
progressed through the critical design review, but has experienced 
multiple issues integrating and qualifying one of two critical 
technologies. Program officials currently project the sensor technology 
will not demonstrate maturity until at least the planned production 
decision in June 2008. While the current ARH design is stable, the ARH 
program issued a stop-work order in March 2007 and remains in flux 
until a future Defense Acquisition Board meeting. According to program 
officials, the board will consider the current acquisition program as 
well as the results from a Center for Naval Analyses study to help 
define the future plan for the program. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

ARH Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the program's two critical technologies, the engine, is mature. 
The sensor is not projected to be fully mature until at least the 
planned production decision in June 2008. The sensor selected for the 
ARH was designed and developed as a collaborative effort with the 
Marines and the Navy for combat helicopter operations. An earlier 
version of the sensor is currently fielded in the Iraqi theater on a 
Marine helicopter. An updated version of the currently fielded sensor 
was proposed by the lead contractor for integration onto the ARH 
platform. Although previous sensor technology has been used in the 
Marine helicopter, the updated sensor hardware and related software 
have not been integrated and tested at the component system level 
within the ARH sensor suite to determine their functionality and 
reliability. This is an important consideration since the lead 
contractor has proposed the Army use results from the original sensor 
configuration's testing to support its qualification on the ARH. 

According to program officials, the integration and qualification 
issues with the sensor have contributed heavily to the risks of the 
program. At the beginning of the program, the lead contractor proposed 
the Navy lead efforts to flight test and qualify the sensor. However, 
according to the Army Test and Evaluation Command, there were 
significant differences between sensor and airframe configurations that 
could result in additional test requirements that were not anticipated 
by the lead contractor's proposal. Program officials stated that after 
contract award, it became apparent that the Navy effort was behind 
schedule projections and that ARH would bear the burden of development. 
Subsequently, the lead contractor performed significant development and 
testing in order to mature the sensor, which resulted in placing the 
development, integration, and qualification risk on the ARH program. 

Design Stability: 

According to the program office, the basic design of the ARH is stable 
with 98 percent of drawings released to manufacturing at the design 
review in January 2007. Additionally, program office officials stated 
the ARH program is an assembly and integration effort with moderate 
design effort. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the 
program office, it does not plan to collect statistical process control 
data. However, to determine the maturity of the ARH production 
capability for the June 2008 decision, the Army will conduct a 
Production Readiness Review (including an assessment of the Engineering 
and Manufacturing Readiness Levels), review facility plans and limited 
tooling development, conduct an operations capacity analysis, and 
assess lean manufacturing initiatives. 

Other Program Issues: 

In March 2007, the ARH program office released a stop-work order to the 
contractor as a result of greater than 50 percent development cost 
growth and low-rate initial production pricing disagreements. The 
contractor requested and received permission to continue work at its 
own risk and submitted a plan to convince the Army that it can complete 
the contract as intended. According to program officials, the Army has 
met with the Army System Acquisition Review Council and the Army 
Acquisition Executive, to consider proposed alternative courses of 
action. Further, an independent study by the Center for Naval Analyses 
was completed as directed by the Army Acquisition Executive to 
determine the root cause of failures prior to continuing work on 
meeting the ARH requirement. According to program officials, the study 
made numerous recommendations to be considered at a future Defense 
Acquisition Board meeting. 

Prior to the stop-work order, an increase in acquisition quantities and 
delays in receiving low-rate initial procurement quantities required to 
support the initial operational test and evaluation led to cost 
increases and negative schedule variances during development. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the program office 
stated that leveraging off the Navy testing is a positive approach 
because the Navy shipboard standards are more stringent with regard to 
electro magnetic interference and emission-shielding requirements. 
Other technical comments were provided and incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile 
Warning System: 

[End of figure] 

The Army's and Special Operations Command's ATIRCM/CMWS is a component 
of the Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend 
U.S. aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will 
be employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS 
includes an active infrared jammer, missile warning system, and 
countermeasure dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, 
such as flares and chaff. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: 6/95; 
Design review: 2/97; 
Low-rate decision: 11/03; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Initial capability: To be determined; 
Full-rate decision: 6/10; 
Last procurement: 2023. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $155.1 million; 
* Procurement: $3,105.9 million; 
Total funding: $3,260.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1,347: 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/1996: $636.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $797.9; 
Percent change: 25.3 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/1996: $2,604.8; 
Latest, 12/2006: $4,515.3; 
Percent change: 73.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/1996: $3,241.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $5,313.2; 
Percent change: 63.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/1996: $1.048; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1.480; 
Percent change: 41.3 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/1996: 3,094; 
Latest, 12/2006: 3,589; 
Percent change: 15.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 03/1996: Classified; 
Latest, 12/2006: Classified; 
Percent change: Classified. 

[End of table] 

The ATIRCM portion of the program is in low-rate production and the 
CMWS portion is in full-rate production. The technologies for CMWS are 
mature and the design is stable. Currently, the program's production 
processes are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of the 
program entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent 
deployment requirements. However, full-rate production for both 
components was delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past 
several years, the program has had to overcome cost and schedule 
problems brought on by shortfalls in knowledge. Key technologies were 
demonstrated late in development, and only a small number of design 
drawings were completed by the design review. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

ATIRCM/CMWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five critical technologies are now considered mature. Four of the 
critical technologies did not mature until after the design review in 
February 1997. Although the infrared jam head is now considered mature, 
it still has reliability problems. A reliability test was to be 
conducted in November 2007 to determine if problems were resolved. 

Design Stability: 

The basic design of the system is complete, with 100 percent of the 
drawings released to manufacturing. However, the program office expects 
the number of drawings to change because the infrared jam laser and the 
infrared lamp will be replaced with a multi-band laser. The number of 
drawings or potential changes is not known because the technical data 
package has not been received. 

Production Maturity: 

According to program officials, the number of key manufacturing 
processes dropped from 26 to 17 in the past year because the program 
outsourced some of the electro-optic mission sensor's components. The 
processes are in various phases of control. The CMWS production portion 
of the system has stabilized and benefited from increased production 
rates. Also, processes supporting both ATIRCM and CMWS will continue to 
be enhanced as data are gathered, and lessons learned will be included 
in the processes. 

The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to meet an 
urgent need. Subsequently, full-rate production was delayed for both 
components due to reliability testing failures. The program implemented 
reliability fixes to six production representative subsystems for use 
in initial operational test and evaluation. These systems were 
delivered in March 2004. Due to ATIRCM performance issues, the full- 
rate production decision for the complete system was delayed until June 
2011. However, the program office has an objective of achieving full- 
rate production in June 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure 
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft. 
When the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each 
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of 
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as 
needed. The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the 
modification hardware, wiring harness, and cables necessary to install 
and interface the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. Previously, the 
approved program was for 1,710 ATIRCMs; however, in May 2007, the Army 
reduced the number of ATIRCMs to 1,076 after a comprehensive 
requirements review. The current approved program is for 1,076 ATIRCMs, 
1,710 CMWSs, and 3,571 kits to use for aircraft integration. However, 
the Army acquisition objective for planning purposes is for a quantity 
of 2,332 ATIRCMs, 2,752 CMWSs, and 4,393 kits. To determine the 
acquisition objective, the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center looked 
at each aircraft and determined aircraft survivability equipment suites 
based on aircraft missions. According to a program official, a new cost 
estimate for the additional systems has not been completed because the 
new quantity has not been approved. 

Agency Comments: 

The ATIRCM/CMWS program continues to focus efforts on Global War on 
Terrorism force protection requirements. In response to a November 2003 
memo from the Acting Secretary of the Army to equip all Army 
helicopters deployed to combat theaters with the most effective 
defensive systems, the program office accelerated the CMWS portion. 
These accelerated efforts provided the CMWS ahead of the planned 
schedule (February 2007). CMWS Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
and full-rate production decision events were successfully completed 
during this reporting period. 

Due to delays in receipt of reprogramming funding, funds intended for 
the ATIRCM program were utilized to maintain the CMWS acceleration. The 
rebaselined ATIRCM program efforts are now continuing, with Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation planned for November 2009. This 
rebaselined plan was presented and approved by the Army Acquisition 
Executive in December 2005. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM 
Capability. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force B-2 EHF SATCOM is a new satellite communication system 
designed to upgrade the current avionics infrastructure, replace the 
ultra high frequency (UHF) system, and ensure continued secure, 
survivable communication capability while maintaining the B-2 low- 
observable signature. The program has three increments: Increment 1 
includes upgraded flight management computer processors, Increment 2 
adds antennaes and radomes, and Increment 3 allows connectivity to the 
Global Information Grid. Increment 1 is the only increment currently in 
system development. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: 3/20; 
Development start: 2/07; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Design review: 6/08; 
Low-rate decision: 7/11; 
Full-rate decision: 4/12; 
Initial capability: 3/14; 
Last procurement: 2016. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $436.5 million; 
* Procurement: $117.6 million; 
Total funding: $554.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 21. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2007: $557.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $557.9; 
Percent change:NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2007: $117.6; 
Latest, 08/2007: $117.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2007: $675.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $675.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2007: $32.167; 
Latest, 08/2007: $32.167; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2007: 21; 
Latest, 08/2007: 21; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2007: 85; 
Latest, 08/2007: 85; 
Percent change: NA. 

The total quantity of 21 units includes 4 to be bought with R&D funds 
and 17 to be bought with procurement funds. All 21 units will 
eventually be placed on operational B-2 aircraft. Data reflects 
Increment 1 only. 

[End of table] 

All five of the B-2 EHF SATCOM critical technologies for Increment 1 
are approaching maturity, but are not expected to be fully mature until 
after the design review. The program office considers the design to be 
stable since it uses hardware that is currently in use in another 
aircraft. However, the uncertainty with technology maturity could 
affect system integration activities and design stability. While 
Increments 2 and 3 are not yet in development, areas of potential 
concern already exist. According to the program office, Increment 2 
will require physical changes--integration of large radomes and 
antenna--that present additional risk to the low-observable nature of 
the aircraft. Further, Increment 3 requirements are not yet defined or 
funded. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

B-2 EHF SATCOM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The B-2 EHF SATCOM program entered system development in February 2007 
with all five of its critical technologies approaching maturity. 
However, the program office does not expect the technologies to be 
demonstrated in a realistic environment, and therefore fully mature, 
until after the design review. This increases the risk that the program 
could encounter further technology issues as it integrates those 
technologies into the B-2 aircraft. For example, the program is still 
developing the disk drive unit--a high-risk item that is essential to 
Increment 1 modernization efforts. If unable to mature this technology 
as expected, the program could face schedule delays and increased 
costs. The program currently does not have back-up technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The program has released nearly 63 percent of its drawings, but plans 
all to be released by the Critical Design Review in June 2008. The 
program office considers the design to be stable since it incorporates 
hardware that is currently in use in another aircraft. However, the 
uncertainty with technology maturity could affect system integration 
and design stability. We have found some programs that underestimated 
the complexity of integrating hardware onto existing platforms and have 
experienced unanticipated cost growth and schedule delays. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office does not plan to collect statistical process control 
data because it believes the production quantities are too small. A 
production readiness review is scheduled for January 2011, followed by 
a low-rate initial production decision in July 2011 and a full-rate 
production decision in April 2012. 

Other Program Issues: 

Increments 1 and 2 of the B-2 EHF SATCOM program are estimated to cost 
nearly $1.9 billion. While Increments 2 and 3 are not yet in 
development, areas of potential concern already exist. The program 
office expects Increment 2 to represent a major modification to the 
system. Specifically, Increment 2 requires physical changes that 
present additional risk to the low-observable nature of the aircraft 
because of the integration of large radomes and antenna. Increment 2 
currently plans to incorporate six additional technologies, two of 
which are very immature. The program began a component advance 
development phase in November 2007 to define requirements and begin 
preliminary design activities. System development for Increment 2 is 
expected to begin in November 2010. Fielding the completed EHF 
capability in time to meet operational needs is currently at risk due 
to funding constraints and other program dependencies. For example, the 
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) is a 
supporting program that could negatively affect B-2 EHF SATCOM 
development efforts, since it has already experienced significant 
delays. In addition to the risks identified for Increment 2, Increment 
3 requirements are not yet defined or funded and its four critical 
technologies are immature. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force noted that 
it expects the risks associated with the disk drive unit to be fully 
mitigated when hardware testing is complete in May 2009. At that time 
it believes all critical technologies will be demonstrated to be low or 
moderate risk. System integration is expected to be demonstrated with 
lab testing complete by September 2009, flight testing beginning in 
November 2009, and completion of an operational assessment prior to the 
low-rate initial production decision in July 2011. The Air Force also 
noted that the current FAB-T program plans support the B-2 EHF SATCOM 
schedule. The Air Force provided additional technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP). 

Source: B-2 Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system 
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. Program 
officials told us that to comply with federal requirements, the 
frequency must be changed to a band where DOD has been designated as 
the primary user. The modified radar system is being designed to 
support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of stealth, range, 
payload, and near-precision weapons delivery capabilities. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: 3/02; 
Development start: 2/07; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Design review: 6/08; 
Low-rate decision: 7/11; 
Full-rate decision: 4/12; 
Initial capability: 3/14; 
Last procurement: 2016. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $81.9 million; 
* Procurement: $394.1 million; 
Total funding: $475.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 10; 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2004: $716.9; 
Latest, 07/2007: $579.9; 
Percent change: -19.1. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2004: $560.9; 
Latest, 07/2007: $552.9; 
Percent change: -1.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2004: $1,277.6; 
Latest, 07/2007: $1,132.5; 
Percent change: -11.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2004: $60.836; 
Latest, 07/2007: $53.928; 
Percent change: -11.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2004: 21; 
Latest, 07/2007: 21; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2004: 63; 
Latest, 07/2007: 65; 
Percent change: 3.2. 

The total quantity of 21 operational units includes 14 to be bought 
with procurement funds and 7 with R&D funds. Quantities and costs 
reflect the program of record but are expected to change after the 
program restructures its procurement profile. 

[End of table] 

The four B-2 RMP critical technologies were considered mature at the 
May 2005 design review. By 2006, the program had released 100 percent 
of its design drawings. However, in early 2007, the program experienced 
problems with the radar antenna. Due to an aggressive development 
schedule, some important systems engineering and systems integration 
tasks were not completed. As a consequence, antenna performance 
deficiencies forced a delay in the development program, including 
flight test, in January 2007. These issues caused a 1 year delay in the 
start of production. Consequently, the Air Force reprogrammed fiscal 
year 2007 production funds to other priorities. Flight testing resumed 
in June 2007 to verify the problems have been fixed. The program is 
currently planning to enter production in August 2008. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

B-2 RMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All 4 of B-2 RMP's critical technologies are currently mature. 

Design Stability: 

Eighty-five percent of the expected drawings were released to 
manufacturing at the program design readiness review. Since then, all 
drawings have been released. However, in early 2007, the program 
experienced technical problems with the radar antenna. During flight 
testing, the radar had difficulties staying powered on and 
characterizing weather conditions. These difficulties delayed testing 
and production by at least a year. 

Production Maturity: 

The program does not use manufacturing process control data because of 
the small number of production units. However, the program has 
identified one key process related to the assembly of the radar antenna 
array. The B-2 RMP is now approaching the point of conducting complete 
systems-level testing. This testing will establish whether or not the 
program is ready to enter production, which is currently scheduled for 
August 2008. Program officials noted that they are still monitoring and 
addressing test asset and equipment resource constraints. 

Other Program Issues: 

In late January 2007, the development program, including flight 
testing, was delayed and replanning efforts were initiated because of 
radar antenna performance problems. The Air Force subsequently 
reprogrammed fiscal year 2007 funds for the first four production radar 
units. This delayed the start of production by 1 year. Program 
officials noted that pursuing an aggressive schedule to change the 
radar frequency caused significant execution problems. Specifically, 
certain important tasks were not completed, such as some aspects of 
systems engineering, integration and testing. This led to difficulty in 
understanding the causes of the radar antenna's technical problems 
encountered during flight testing. 

After addressing the technical problems of the radar antenna, flight 
testing resumed in June 2007. The program is currently planning to 
enter production in August 2008. 

Although the Air Force intends to enter production in fiscal year 2008, 
important testing events, including the completion of development 
flight testing and operational testing, are not scheduled for 
completion until fiscal year 2009. Producing units before testing is 
able to demonstrate the design is mature and can work in its intended 
environment increases the risk of costly design changes in the future. 
The program office noted that it plans to mitigate concurrency between 
development and production by completing qualification tests, flight- 
testing for conventional combat capability, and an operational 
assessment prior to a production decision. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office concurred with this assessment and provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft 
System. 

Source: BAMS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 
(BAMS UAS) is to provide a persistent maritime intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Along with the Multi-
mission Maritime Aircraft and the future EP-X electronic surveillance 
aircraft, BAMS UAS will be part of a maritime patrol and reconnaissance 
force family of systems integral to the Navy's recapitalization of its 
airborne ISR. Australia is participating in pre-system development 
activities with the program. 

Timeline: Concept to system design to production: 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Program/development start: 2/08; 
Design review: 2/10; 
Low-rate decision: 8/11; 
Initial capability: 8/14; 
Last procurement: to be determined. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $2,139.5 million; 
* Procurement: $690.9 million; 
Total funding: $2,830.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: TBD. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,139.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $691.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,830.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The BAMS UAS program plans to begin system development during the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2008. The program is currently evaluating 
proposals for source selection and developing documents to meet formal 
design decision requirements. The program previously planned to start 
system development by October 2007, but according to a program 
official, additional time is needed to evaluate contractor proposals. 
Program officials indicated that the system development solicitation 
requires critical technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant 
environment prior to contract award. The program is conducting a 
technology readiness assessment in parallel with source selection. BAMS 
UAS initial operational capability has also been delayed from fiscal 
year 2013 to the last quarter of fiscal year 2014. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

BAMS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

BAMS UAS is working to evaluate technologies prior to the start of 
system development. As part of the previous Persistent Unmanned 
Maritime Airborne Surveillance effort, the program awarded contracts to 
develop mission performance metrics and determine capabilities 
necessary for optimal performance of the maritime intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance mission within a family of systems. 

Program officials are requiring contractors to identify critical 
technologies in their proposals as part of source selection. According 
to program officials, critical technologies must be approaching 
maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to the start 
of system development. 

Other Program Issues: 

BAMS UAS is intended to serve as an adjunct to the Multi-mission 
Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The Navy intends to position BAMS UAS mission 
crews with maritime patrol and reconnaissance forces personnel to allow 
operators to closely coordinate missions and utilize a common support 
infrastructure. If BAMS UAS does not develop as planned or continues to 
experience schedule delays, Navy officials state that additional MMA 
will be purchased as a fallback, increasing the overall cost of the MMA 
program. 

The Navy's future EP-X electronic surveillance aircraft is also 
intended to be a part of the maritime patrol and reconnaissance forces 
family of systems as a replacement for the Navy's current airborne 
intelligence platform, the EP-3. The EP-X program replaced development 
efforts previously being conducted through the Army's Aerial Common 
Sensor program, which was terminated due to a significant weight 
increase. According to BAMS UAS officials, the EP-X schedule will not 
affect the BAMS UAS program. 

DOD is continuing to exchange information and coordinate with allied 
and friendly nations that have common maritime surveillance goals and 
objectives. Program officials indicated that Australia is participating 
in BAMS UAS pre-system development activities and has provided specific 
requirements that were included in the BAMS UAS solicitation as an 
option. Australia has also expressed interest in participating in the 
system development and demonstration phase of the program. 

Program Office Comments: 

The BAMS UAS program office provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). 

Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program, System Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and 
avionics for three combat delivery configurations of the C-130 fleet, 
which provides increased reliability, maintainability, and 
sustainability. The program is intended to ensure C-130 global access 
and deployability by satisfying navigation and safety requirements, 
installing upgrades to the cockpit systems, and replacing many systems 
no longer supportable due to diminishing manufacturing sources. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: 7/01; 
Design review: 8/05; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Low-rate decision: 6/08; 
Full-rate decision: 1/12; 
Last procurement: 2017. 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $589.9 million; 
* Procurement: $3,324.3 million; 
Total funding: $3,914.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 219. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 07/2001: $736.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,977.0; 
Percent change: 168.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 07/2001: $3,188.1; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,371.4; 
Percent change: 5.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 07/2001: $3,924.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5,348.4; 
Percent change: 36.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 07/2001: $7.562; 
Latest, 08/2007: $24.092; 
Percent change: 218.6. 

Total quantities; 519; 
As of 07/2001: 519; 
Latest, 08/2007: 222; 
Percent change: -57.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 07/2001: TBD; 
Latest, 08/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

The C-130 AMP's technologies are currently mature and its design is 
stable. However, the program has had ongoing problems for more than 2 
years. The program is presently being restructured to provide a better 
balance between requirements and resources. In the past year, the 
program reduced the number of aircraft and variants to be modified and 
increased estimated costs, which resulted in a critical Nunn-McCurdy 
breach concerning unit cost increases. The program acquisition unit 
costs have increased to over three times what was expected at 
development start. The program now plans to enter production in June 
2008, over 3 years later than originally planned. However, production 
maturity will not be fully known at that time because the program does 
not plan to collect key manufacturing information. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-130 AMP critical technologies are fully mature. Removal of 11 of 
the 14 C-130 aircraft configurations previously included in the program 
is expected to stabilize the program through reduced requirements and 
led to the removal of three critical technologies during 2007. The 
three remaining critical technologies--global air traffic management, 
defensive systems, and combat delivery navigator removal--are specific 
to the combat delivery configurations of the C-130 fleet, which 
comprises the entire AMP following program restructuring in 2007. 

Design Stability: 

The C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable, with over 3,200 
expected drawings released. However, at the critical design review held 
in 2005, the program had not proven that all subsystems and components 
could be successfully integrated into the aircraft. According to the 
program office, the complexity of the engineering efforts needed to 
modify the different configurations of the C-130 was misjudged. 
Specifically, upon integration of the new avionics into the test 
aircraft, the amount of wiring and the number of harnesses and brackets 
needed for the installation had been underestimated by 400 percent. As 
a result, the design had to be reworked, delaying the delivery of the 
test aircraft and increasing costs. The program believes it has 
addressed these integration issues. 

Two of the three C-130 aircraft configurations included in the AMP have 
begun flight testing. However, several key development activities 
remain that may necessitate design changes if problems arise, including 
demonstration on the fully integrated test aircraft. Developmental 
flight testing is expected to conclude in June 2009. The first flight 
of a fully configured, integrated production representative prototype 
occurred for the initial C-130 aircraft configuration in September 
2006, while the first flight for the final C-130 configuration is 
scheduled for February 2009. 

Production Maturity: 

The program expects to begin production in June 2008 but will not have 
data that shows the total number of key product characteristics, the 
maturity of critical manufacturing processes, or capability indices. 
Program officials stated they will meet the approved exit criteria 
established by the milestone decision authority, which includes a 
Production Readiness Review scheduled for March 2008, before entering 
into low-rate initial production. Since the beginning of 2006, the low- 
rate initial production decision has been delayed 19 months due to 
program uncertainties related to program funding and changing customer 
requirements. However, changes in the program schedule should allow 
more testing before the program increases production rates. 

Other Program Issues: 

The C-130 AMP has experienced uncertainty and restructuring for more 
than 2 years. In February 2007, the program announced it encountered a 
critical Nunn-McCurdy breach concerning unit cost increases that led to 
DOD certification, resulting in a formal replan effort to revise 
requirements. At the time of our review, the program was still 
finalizing the details of the replan, which included reallocating 
resources within the program and reducing requirements (fewer aircraft 
quantities and fewer configurations for the program). The program 
manager expects that the replan will better position the program to 
deliver the C-130 AMP within cost and schedule targets. However, the 
program does not have an updated acquisition strategy, test and 
evaluation master plan, or service cost position. This information is 
expected by the production decision in June 2008. The Air Force also 
must develop an investment strategy, as stipulated in the DOD 
certification, for 166 C-130 aircraft that are no longer part of the 
program. 

Given the significant changes to the C-130 program, the Air Force is 
paying more to modernize the avionics for far fewer aircraft than 
originally planned. At the same time, the warfighter is waiting longer 
than originally planned for the new capability. 

Air Force Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated the C-
130 AMP is focused on restructuring the development effort and 
proceeding into low-rate initial production in June 2008. The program 
recently accomplished first flight without a serious software 
deficiency, incremental software was delivered on time, and flight 
testing is slightly ahead of schedule. The program has also addressed 
past issues and is committed to providing the warfighter a critically 
needed capability. 

[End of section] 

C-130J Hercules: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: C-130J Hercules. 

Source: C-130J Program Office (657th AESS), U.S. Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

The C-130J is a tactical airlift aircraft designed primarily for the 
transport of cargo and personnel within a theater of operation. It is 
the latest addition to DOD's fleet of C-130 aircraft, providing 
performance improvements over legacy aircraft in the series. Variants 
of the C-130J are being acquired by the Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard, and several foreign militaries to perform their respective 
missions. We reviewed the baseline configuration of the Air Force's C- 
130J aircraft and related modernization efforts. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/production start: 6/96; 
First delivery: 3/99; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Last procurement: FY 2008. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company - Marietta; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $327.7 million; 
* Procurement: $1,348.5 million; 
Total funding: $1,676.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 9. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1996: $10.9; 
Latest, 11/2007: $430.3; 
Percent change: 3,847.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1996: $890.2; 
Latest, 11/2007: $8,375.1; 
Percent change: 840.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1996: $901.2; 
Latest, 11/2007: $8,929.5; 
Percent change: 890.8. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1996: $81.928; 
Latest, 11/2007: $102.637; 
Percent change: 25.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1996: 11; 
Latest, 11/2007: 87; 
Percent change: 690.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1996: 16; 
Latest, 11/2007: 33; 
Percent change: 106.3. 

These figures reflect only the Air Force's procurement of the C-130J. 

[End of table] 

We did not assess technology, design, or production maturity for the 
baseline aircraft because the Air Force did not maintain visibility 
into this information as part of the C-130J's original commercial 
acquisition strategy. Program officials stated they evaluated these 
areas to their satisfaction in other ways. The Air Force is funding 
modernization efforts to correct deficiencies and provide improvements 
to fielded C-130Js. Program officials stated there are no issues with 
technology, design, or production maturity for the modernization 
efforts now under way. Both the modernization efforts and remaining 
procurement are being executed under noncommercial negotiated 
contracts, completing the move from the original commercial item 
acquisition strategy. This transition provided insight into the cost 
and pricing of the remaining aircraft buy and data rights for all 
modernization efforts. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

C-130J Hercules Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the critical technologies of the baseline aircraft, 
since the contractor initiated development of the C-130J at its own 
expense in the early 1990s and DOD took no responsibility for its 
technology maturity. Program officials also reported no issues with the 
technology maturity of modernization efforts currently under way. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the design of the baseline aircraft because the Air 
Force does not maintain visibility into design drawing information that 
GAO would normally utilize to measure design maturity. Because the C- 
130J was originally procured as a commercial item, rights to this 
information were not included as part of the acquisition. While program 
officials believed the initial C-130J design was stable, deficiencies 
were discovered that had to be corrected in order to meet minimum 
warfighter requirements, which resulted in the current baseline 
aircraft. Other design shortfalls to the baseline aircraft have 
recently been discovered that affect the C-130J's ability to complete 
certain airdrop operations. Program officials stated that options to 
address these shortfalls are being developed and should result in 
aircraft testing in the summer of 2008. Air navigation improvements 
must also be made so the C-130J can continue to successfully operate in 
international airspace. These improvements and others will be added to 
the aircraft through modernization efforts, resulting in a significant 
development cost increase. Program officials reported no issues with 
the design maturity of modernization efforts currently under way. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the baseline aircraft 
because the C-130J was originally procured as a commercial item and DOD 
has limited access to the full range of contractor manufacturing 
process and quality control information. Instead, the program relies on 
oversight by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) at the 
contractor's facility to ensure that the C-130J aircraft is 
manufactured in accordance with applicable quality standards. DCMA 
officials informed us that their oversight into the contractor's 
manufacturing processes has improved as a result of the recently 
completed transition from a commercial item acquisition to a 
noncommercial negotiated acquisition. Furthermore, production schedules 
were not affected by the transition and aircraft continue to be 
delivered on time. 

Other Program Issues: 

In April 2006, test officials deemed the C-130J to be effective in only 
a low to medium threat environment. The ongoing modernization efforts 
are expected to correct known deficiencies and address future needs 
such as communication, navigation, and safety improvements so that the 
aircraft can accomplish its intended missions. The first of four 
planned modernization efforts to upgrade the baseline aircraft were 
tested during 2007, and installation on fielded aircraft will begin in 
2008. The second modernization effort, a collaborative endeavor funded 
by both the Air Force and foreign military customers, is in the initial 
planning stages, with developmental testing scheduled to begin in 
fiscal year 2010. The other two modernization efforts are in a 
preliminary planning stage, with upgrade activities expected to 
continue through 2015. The Air Force has budgeted approximately $400 
million in development funding to pursue the four modernization efforts 
that does not include the additional costs to install these upgrades on 
fielded C-130Js in the future. 

In October 2006, the Air Force finalized the program's transition from 
a commercial item acquisition to a noncommercial negotiated acquisition 
for the remaining procurement. The Air Force now has data rights 
related to development efforts under the modernization program and full 
insight into cost and pricing of the C-130J, which resulted in a 
downward price adjustment of $364 million. However, according to the 
DOD Inspector General, DOD has assumed responsibility for costs related 
to shutting down production of the C-130J that were previously factored 
into the commercial item price for the aircraft. In the future, these 
potential cost increases may reduce the estimated savings of the 
transition. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP). 

Source: Edwards AFB, CA. Photo taken by Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 
to improve mission capability rate and transport capabilities and to 
reduce ownership costs. The AMP incorporates Global Air Traffic 
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, 
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the 
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the 
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We 
assessed the C-5 AMP. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: 1/99; 
Design review: 5/01; 
Production decision: 2/03; 
Initial capability: 2/07; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Last procurement: FY 2013. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $14.3 million; 
* Procurement: $519.9 million; 
Total funding: $534.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 52. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/1998: $381.0; 
Latest, 08/2007: $460.9; 
Percent change: 20.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/1998: $666.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $989.8; 
Percent change: 48.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/1998: $1,047.6; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,450.5; 
Percent change: 38.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/1998: $8.314; 
Latest, 08/2007: $12.951; 
Percent change: 55.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/1998: 126; 
Latest, 08/2007: 112; 
Percent change: -11.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/1998: 83; 
Latest, 08/2007: 97; 
Percent change: 16.9. 

[End of table] 

The C-5 AMP technologies and design are used in other aircraft and are 
considered mature. We did not assess production maturity as the 
components are commercial off-the-shelf items. While the program is 
currently in production, 250 deficiencies were identified by the end of 
Operational Test and Evaluation. These deficiencies are reviewed and 
prioritized by the Air Force annually, and the top priority 
deficiencies will be included in the software maintenance builds 
released in the fourth quarter of every year. Further, 14 operational 
requirements have been waived; four will be addressed by the C-5 RERP 
and others may be included in a possible block upgrade for fiscal year 
2010. At the time of our review, DOD was studying options to meet its 
airlift requirements, due to cost increases in the C-5 RERP. This could 
result in a smaller number of C-5 aircraft receiving the modernization 
upgrades. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

C-5 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the 
program uses commercial technologies that are considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

The program reports that the contractor has now released all of the 
drawings for the AMP. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are 
readily available as commercial off-the-shelf items. This equipment is 
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. To ensure 
production maturity, the contractor annually surveys its suppliers to 
assess future availability of AMP modification kits and works with the 
program office and end user to ensure that installations can be 
completed according to the installation schedule. 

According to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
program is not operationally suitable. According to program officials, 
250 deficiencies, including software issues related to autopilot 
disconnects, currently exist, and 14 operational requirements have been 
waived. Program officials expect that 44 of the deficiencies will be 
corrected as part of a sustainment contract software build in August 
2008. The corrections to 24 of these 44 deficiencies will also be 
included in the C-5 RERP. The C-5 RERP program is also expected to 
address 4 of the 14 previously waived operational requirements, such as 
the Auto Take Off and Go Around functionality and memory improvement 
for the Flight Management System database. Air Force officials are 
considering a block upgrade program beginning in 2010 to correct the 
remaining deficiencies and the 10 unmet operational requirements. 

Other Program Issues: 

Program unit costs have increased approximately 56 percent since the 
original estimate because of a reduction in the total number of 
aircraft scheduled to receive the AMP upgrade, as well as increases in 
development and procurement estimates related to software reliability 
problems. 

Last year we reported that the program did not have enough funding to 
implement an Air Force mobility study recommendation to modify all C-5 
aircraft. At that time, there was only funding for 59 aircraft. The Air 
Force requested funding in fiscal year 2008 to complete the AMP upgrade 
for all aircraft in the C-5 fleet. However, officials continue to study 
options to meet its airlift requirements because of cost increases 
associated with the C-5 RERP. This could result in a smaller number of 
C-5 aircraft receiving the modernization upgrade. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph of C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 
RERP). 

Source: Edwards AFB, CA. Photo taken by Air Force. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The 
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and 
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system and 
modifying the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear 
systems as well as other structural modifications. Together with the C- 
5 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), these upgrades are intended to 
improve the mission capability rates and reduce total ownership costs. 
We assessed the C-5 RERP. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: 2/99; 
Development start: 11/01; 
Design review: 4/04; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Low-rate decision: 3/08; 
Full-rate decision B-Model: 12/10; 
Full-rate decision A-Model: 10/13; 
Last procurement: FY 2019. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $403.6 million; 
* Procurement: $13,501.4 million; 
Total funding: $13,905.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 108. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2001: $1,664.4; 
Latest, 09/2007: $1,744.4; 
Percent change: 4.8. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2001: $8,688.6; 
Latest, 09/2007: $13,531.6; 
Percent change: 55.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2001: $10,356.7; 
Latest, 09/2007: $15,283.9; 
Percent change: 47.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2001: $82.196; 
Latest, 09/2007: $137.693; 
Percent change: 67.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2001: 126; 
Latest, 09/2007: 111; 
Percent change: -11.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2001: 100; 
Latest, 09/2007: 139; 
Percent change: 39.0. 

These numbers are expected to change after DOD completes its Nunn- 
McCurdy certification. 

[End of table] 

The C-5 RERP technologies are mature and the design is stable. We did 
not assess production maturity because the Air Force is buying 
commercially available items. Despite the high degree of product 
knowledge, the program has faced a series of development and production 
issues over the past year. The RERP experienced a 1-year delay in 
starting low-rate initial production because of rising production 
costs. The program resolved complications related to a requirement that 
certain specialty metals be bought only from American sources. The Air 
Force notified Congress that program unit costs have increased over 50 
percent, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase over the critical 
cost growth threshold. At the time of our review, DOD was examining 
options to meet its airlift requirements. There are also concerns about 
the contractor's ability to track costs and the funding needed to fix 
some C-5 AMP problems. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent 
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. 

Design Stability: 

The basic design of the C-5 RERP is now complete with over 90 percent 
of the drawings released. At the critical design review, program 
officials believed that about 80 percent of the drawings had been 
released. However, since then, a redesign of the pylon/thrust reverser 
was needed to address weight requirements and safety concerns for the 
engine mount area as well as control of asymmetric thrust reverser 
conditions in flight. According to program officials, the now completed 
redesign effort contributed to a 4-month modification program delay. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. 

The program awarded a long-lead contract for Lot 1, which comprises one 
aircraft, in April 2007, 14 months later than planned. The primary 
causes of the delay were increased costs in producing engines and 
pylons and estimate revisions associated with the automation of 
production processes and material installation touch labor. During this 
delay, the Air Force granted a permanent waiver from the specialty 
metal provisions of the Berry Amendment, permitting the use of non-U.S. 
sources for certain specialty materials. 

According to program officials, the program office and prime contractor 
have expended considerable effort in preparing the RERP for production. 
For example, a production readiness review has been conducted, three 
test aircraft were produced in the system development and demonstration 
phase, and the lessons learned are being applied to production plans. 
The program office is reviewing the contractor's proposal for low-rate 
initial production in preparation for award of Lot 1, with options for 
Lots 2 and 3, in April 2008. Final work to be accomplished includes 
about 30 percent of flight test verification points, flight test 
completion, a software verification review, and operational test and 
evaluation preparatory work. 

However, the production program continues to be a major issue for the 
RERP as the costs to fund first-unit production and related expenses 
have increased by about 108 percent since last year. According to 
program officials, the prime contractor did not maintain long-term 
contracts with key suppliers that could have kept costs down and 
significantly underestimated the amount of touch labor needed to 
complete each aircraft. In addition, the C-5 RERP program will pay up 
to an additional $16 million to the prime contractor to address 4 
deviation waivers and 24 deficiencies from the C-5 AMP. 

Flight testing has been extended to August 2008, an increase of 8 
months, to allow sufficient time for additional test points, reflights, 
weather, maintenance, and other factors. The low-rate initial 
production decision has now been scheduled for March 2008. Producing 
units before testing is able to demonstrate the design is mature and 
works in its intended environment increases the likelihood of future 
costly design changes during production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Air Force recently reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase over 
the critical cost growth threshold because program costs have increased 
more than 50 percent. Air Force leadership is currently working with 
DOD and Congress to determine the most prudent course for the U.S. 
strategic airlift fleet. Options could include reducing the number of C-
5 aircraft that will receive the RERP modification and procuring 
additional C-17 aircraft to fulfill the airlift mission. 

The Defense Contract Audit Agency has identified significant 
deficiencies with the prime contractors' earned value management system 
that affects the Air Force's ability to oversee the cost aspects of the 
program. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR). 

Source: Sikorsky Aircraft Company, ï¿½ 2003 Sikorsky Aircraft Company. 

[End of figure] 

The Marine Corps' CH-53K helicopter will perform the marine 
expeditionary heavy-lift assault transport of armored vehicles, 
equipment, and personnel to support distributed operations deep inland 
from a sea-based center of operations. The CH-53K program is expected 
to replace the current CH-53E helicopter with a new design to improve 
range and payload, survivability and force protection, reliability and 
maintainability, coordination with other assets, and overall cost of 
ownership. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: 11/03; 
Development start: 12/05; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Design review: 3/09; 
Low-rate decision: 12/12; 
Initial capability: 9/15; 
Full-rate decision: 12/15; 
Last procurement: 2021. 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,429.8 million; 
* Procurement: $11,664.2 million; 
Total funding: $15,094.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 152. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2005: $4,158.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $4,159.5; 
Percent change: 0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2005: $11,565.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $11,664.2; 
Percent change: 0.8. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2005: $15,724.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $15,823.8; 
Percent change: 0.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2005: $100.799; 
Latest, 12/2006: $101.434; 
Percent change: 0.6. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2005: 156; 
Latest, 12/2006: 156; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2005: 119; 
Latest, 12/2006: 117; 
Percent change: -1.3. 

[End of table] 

The CH-53K program entered system development in December 2005 without 
demonstrating that its three critical technologies had reached full 
maturity. The program has decided to use an alternative technology for 
one of these technologies and expects the remaining two technologies to 
be mature by 2012, three years after the program's design review. 
Elements of other technology areas are not considered critical, 
although they may still present challenges to the program as many of 
them are currently being developed or used by other programs and will 
be integrated later into the CH-53K. Due to attrition in the fleet of 
CH-53Es, the program has recognized the need for fielding the CH-53Ks 
as soon as possible. To address these challenges, it plans to 
manufacture a large portion of aircraft during low rate initial 
production and concurrent with operational testing. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

CH-53K Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Two critical technologies for the CH-53K program--the main rotor blade 
and the main gearbox--are not expected to be fully mature until 2012, 
three years after the program's design review. The main rotor blade 
will be the same diameter (79 feet) and 11 percent wider than that of 
the CH-53E design. The CH-53K main rotor blade has demonstrated 
improved performance to meet new vertical lift requirements. Program 
officials stated that smaller-scale models of the main rotor blade 
performed well in tests and the actual-sized rotor blade is expected to 
achieve full maturity by 2012. The main gearbox has not achieved full 
maturity, which is expected by fiscal year 2012. While other 
helicopters have utilized similar technology, their intended payload 
was less than that of the CH-53K. Program officials stated that through 
testing to date, the main gearbox has achieved greater than 100 percent 
of its torque requirement. 

The viscoelastic lag damper, which serves to control the lead-lag 
motion of the blade, was originally considered a critical technology 
and expected to be fully mature by 2009. However, program officials 
told us that the program has now decided to use a linear hydraulic 
damper as an alternative. While this may result in a reduction of 
planned CH-53K reliability, program officials stated that modifications 
have doubled the reliability of the current damper used on the CH-53E. 

An assessment conducted in September 2004 reduced 10 original critical 
technologies to the 3 above. Of the 7 technologies that were determined 
to not be critical, 2 are being developed by the CH-53K program, 
including the engine for which a supplier was selected in December 
2006. The other 5 are being developed by or used on other programs, and 
4 of them will be integrated onto the CH-53K platform. While the 
program does not anticipate problems with the 4 technologies, they are 
dependent on the development and maturity schedules of the other 
programs. 

Design Stability: 

CH-53K design stability is being assessed through reviews and approvals 
of relevant design baselines at the system engineering technical 
reviews. The program has completed a review and approved the systems 
requirements baseline and has also conducted a systems-level review and 
approved the system functional baseline. A critical design review is 
scheduled for March 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

Due to unexpected attrition of CH-53E aircraft, the need for the 
deployment of the CH-53K as a replacement has increased, resulting in 
the return of decommissioned CH-53E helicopters to operational status. 
According to program officials, all available aircraft have been 
reclaimed while the program continues to review the condition of other 
usable aircraft for potential spare parts. 

Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft have flown at three times the 
planned utilization rate. This operational pace is expected to result 
in higher airframe and component repair costs, including short-term 
fatigue repairs necessary to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until 
CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels. 

Program officials stated that to address the challenges that have led 
to this attrition, the requirements of the CH-53K have expanded the CH- 
53E's thresholds for heat, distance, and load capacity. The program 
also intends to manufacture 29 of the 156 total helicopters (19 
percent) during low-rate initial production and concurrent with initial 
operational testing. While concurrent production may help to field the 
systems sooner, it could also result in greater retrofit costs if 
unexpected design changes are required. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X). 

Source: 669 AESS/TH CSAR-X Program Office. 

Note: Photo is of the HH-60 Pavehawk, the aircraft the CSAR-X will 
replace. 

[End of figure] 

The Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) is planned to 
provide the United States Air Force with a vertical take-off and 
landing aircraft that is quickly deployable and capable of main base 
and austere location operations for worldwide CSAR and personnel 
recovery missions. The CSAR-X will be developed in two blocks and will 
replace the aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter fleet. We assessed CSAR- 
X Block 0, the first block to be developed. 

Timeline: concept to system development to production: 
Development start: 10/06; 
GAO review: 1/08; 
Production decision: 9/09; 
Full-rate decision: 6/12; 
Initial capability: 9/12. 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $491.9 million; 
* Procurement: $7,271.9 million; 
Total funding: $7,874.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 141. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $836.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $7,271.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $8,219.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $57.077; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 144; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 70; 
Percent change: NA. 

Cost and schedule data are based on estimates developed prior to legal 
rulings and are subject to change pending contract award in spring 
2008. 

[End of table] 

The CSAR-X program received approval to begin product development in 
October 2006, and program officials reported that all critical 
technologies were mature at that time. However, two related consecutive 
bid protests filed by competitors required the program to suspend 
development activities. GAO sustained both protests, and currently, the 
Air Force is amending the request for proposals to address GAO's 
recommendations. As a result, information regarding technology maturity 
is subject to change pending the contract award, which is not expected 
to occur before spring 2008. Design stability and production maturity 
information was not available at the time of this review. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

CSAR-X Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

CSAR-X program officials identified eight critical technologies for 
Block 0 and reported that all eight were mature based on a program 
office assessment of industry standards and market research. However, 
since that assessment was completed, two separate but related bid 
protests were filed by competing contractors and sustained by GAO. In 
response to GAO's concerns, the Air Force is currently amending the 
request for proposals and does not anticipate awarding a development 
contract before spring of 2008. As such, it is possible that the 
technology readiness information could change upon contract award. The 
Air Force also identified a number of other critical technologies 
expected to support the next segment of CSAR-X vehicles (Block 10), but 
did not provide related maturity information. These additional 
technologies will be assessed prior to the start of Block 10 
development. 

Program Issues: 

CSAR-X is being managed as an incremental development program. Block 0, 
the block assessed in this review, and Block 10 will be managed as 
separate programs, each with its own requirements, program baselines, 
and milestone reviews. 

The initiation of CSAR-X Block 0 development has been delayed several 
times, in part due to two bid protests. The Air Force awarded the CSAR- 
X Block 0 development contract to Boeing in November 2006, but a bid 
protest by competing contractors filed with GAO required the Air Force 
to suspend the beginning of product development activities. In February 
2007 GAO sustained the protest. In response, the Air Force amended its 
request for proposals. However, the competitors filed another bid 
protest in response to the Air Force's amended request. This second 
protest was also sustained by GAO in August 2007. As a result, the Air 
Force is again amending the request for proposals to respond to GAO's 
latest recommendations. 

These schedule delays in Block 0 development will likely affect the 
entire CSAR-X acquisition strategy including the development of Block 
10, which is currently scheduled to start in 2009. Program officials do 
not expect to award a Block 0 development contract before spring 2008. 
According to program officials, the Air Force still desires to have the 
first unit of CSAR-X helicopters in the field by 2012, but due to the 
delayed start of product development they acknowledge that initial 
operational capability could occur as late as 2014. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials provided 
technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: CVN 21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier. 

Source: CVN-21 Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's CVN 21 program is developing a new class of nuclear-powered 
aircraft carriers that will replace USS Enterprise and the Nimitz-class 
as the centerpiece of the carrier strike group. The new carriers are to 
include advanced technologies in propulsion, weapons handling, aircraft 
launch and recovery, and survivability designed to improve operational 
efficiency and enable higher sortie rates while reducing required 
manpower. The Navy expects to award a contract for construction of the 
lead ship, CVN 78, in June 2008. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (6/00); 
Development start: (4/04); 
Production decision-1st ship: (7/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Construction contract award-1st ship: (6/08); 
Construction contract award-2nd ship: (1/12); 
Initial capability: (9/16). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $1,450.9 million; 
* Procurement: $22,059.9 million; 
Total funding: $23,510.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2004: $4,561.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $4,083.2; 
Percent change: -10.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2004: $29,224.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $25,652.6; 
Percent change: -12.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2004: $33,786.0; 
Latest, 12/2006: $29,735.8; 
Percent change: -11.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2004: $11,261.997; 
Latest, 12/2006: $9,911.948; 
Percent change: -11.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2004: 3; 
Latest, 12/2006: 3; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2004: 137; 
Latest, 12/2006: 149; 
Percent change: 8.9. 

Program costs decreased due to changes in the estimated costs for the 
second and third ships and the application of new outyear inflation 
indices. 

[End of table] 

Five of 15 current critical technologies are fully mature, including 
the nuclear propulsion and electric plant. Six technologies are 
expected to approach maturity, while four others will remain at lower 
maturity by construction contract award. Since last year, the Navy has 
eliminated an armor protection system from CVN 78, but is evaluating 
use on follow-on ships, and the air conditioning plant and automated 
weapons information system are no longer considered developmental. Of 
CVN 21's technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system 
(EMALS), the advanced arresting gear, and the dual band radar (composed 
of the volume search and multifunction radars) present the greatest 
risk to the ship's cost and schedule. By January 2008, 76 percent of 
the design was complete. Challenges in technology development could 
lead to delays in maintaining the design schedule needed for 
construction. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

CVN 21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

EMALS will not be tested at sea, but a production model is now 
scheduled to begin land-based testing in 2009. Difficulties developing 
the generator and meeting detailed Navy requirements have already led 
to a 15-month schedule delay. Problems manufacturing the generator 
recently delayed testing scheduled to begin by February 2008. The Navy 
is considering authorizing production of the generators prior to 
completing initial testing in order to ensure delivery to support CVN 
78's construction schedule. As a consequence, production may begin 
prior to demonstrating that the generators work as intended. Timely 
delivery of EMALS remains at risk. Problems that occur in testing or 
production will likely prevent EMALS from being delivered to the 
shipyard to meet the construction schedule. 

The dual band radar is being developed as part of the DDG 1000 program. 
In 2007 DOD reassessed the multifunction radar's readiness. Since modes 
critical to CVN 21 have not yet been tested, including electronic 
protection and air traffic control, the radar could not be considered 
fully mature. While the multifunction radar has been tested at sea, 
considerable testing remains for the volume search radar. Due to 
problems with a critical circuit technology, the volume search radar 
will not demonstrate the power output needed to meet requirements 
during upcoming testing. Full power output will not be tested on a 
complete system until the first production unit in 2010, and the radar 
will not be fully demonstrated until operational testing on DDG 1000 in 
2013. Problems discovered during testing may affect installation on the 
carrier scheduled to begin in 2012. 

The advanced arresting gear completed early verification tests that 
proved the system's concept and tested components. Integrated testing 
with simulated and live aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2009. Delays 
have led the Navy to consolidate test events in order to maintain the 
shipyard delivery date, leaving little time to address any problems 
prior to production. Late delivery will require the shipbuilder to 
install this system after the flight deck has been laid, disrupting the 
optimal build sequence and increasing cost. 

Other technologies will not be fully matured by construction contract 
award, but present less risk to ship construction. The advanced weapons 
elevator cannot be tested at sea until ship delivery but will complete 
full-scale testing in 2008. A shipboard replenishment system is a 
modification of current technology and full-scale testing concluded 
this year. The shipboard weapons loader is critical for achieving 
manpower reductions, but will be stored on the flight deck and not 
required until ship delivery. A GPS-based landing system (JPALS) is 
still in development, but the carrier will use a backup to land 
aircraft that are not JPALS-capable. A missile uplink will not be 
operationally tested until 2013, but CVN 78 can achieve its key 
performance parameters without this improvement. 

Design Stability: 

By January 2008, 76 percent of the design was complete. Rather than 
conducting discrete design reviews, the Navy reviews each design zone 
(or separate units that make up the ship's design) as it completes an 
interim phase of the product model and measures design progress by the 
number of zones completed. According to the Navy, the design is on 
track to support construction. However, the program may face challenges 
in maintaining its design schedule due to delays in the receipt of 
technical information on some key technologies. In particular, late 
delivery of information on EMALS is driving inefficiencies in design 
development and must be resolved to prevent late delivery of design 
products needed for construction. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy generally concurred with our assessment that concurrent 
technology development, particularly regarding EMALS, the advanced 
arresting gear, and the dual-band radar system, presents the highest 
programmatic risk, but stated that all critical technologies are being 
managed through established processes to mitigate cost, schedule, and 
development risk. Additionally, a lengthy construction period allows 
technologies to mature and helps ensure technologies do not become 
obsolete by ship delivery. The Navy noted that the program has 
maintained key performance parameters through product modeling, which 
indicates design stability. Production risk is being mitigated by the 
advanced construction of structural units low in the ship. As of 
December 2007, 25 percent of the ship's units were under construction. 

[End of section] 

Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A). 

Source: PM DCGS-A, U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's DCGS-A is an automated information system providing 
commanders at various echelons with access to a variety of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data. DCGS-A 
allows commanders to visualize and understand threats, execute 
targeting, conduct ISR integration, and support information operations. 
The Army plans ongoing enhancement of DCGS-A by incrementally fielding 
more capable versions of the system over time. We assessed Version 4, 
which is intended to provide commanders with a mobile capability. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start; (4/06); 
Design review: (3/07);
GAO review: (1/08); 
Limited users test: (3/10); 
Production decision: (8/10). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J. 
Funding FY08-FY13: 
* R&D: $204.1 million; 
* Procurement: $1,012.3 million; 
Total funding: $1,216.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $637.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,206.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,844.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Northrop Grumman is the development contractor; the production 
contractor is to be determined. 

Funding needed to complete includes appropriations through fiscal year 
2013, future funding needed is to be determined. 

[End of table] 

DCGS-A Version 4 began system development in April 2006. Currently, all 
three Version 4 critical technologies are mature. DCGS-A is scheduled 
to undergo a limited users test in March 2010 to support a Version 4 
production decision in August 2010. We were unable to assess design 
stability because the program does not use drawings to assess design 
stability. Additionally, we did not assess production maturity because 
the production phase does not involve any critical manufacturing 
processes. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

DCGS-A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Currently, all critical technologies are mature and were demonstrated 
in the 2007 Empire Challenge ISR demonstration. A program official 
noted that all critical technologies will be tested through a series of 
Software Blocking Operational Evaluations culminating in a Limited 
Users Test in March 2010. 

Design Stability: 

We were unable to assess design stability because the program does not 
use drawings to assess design stability. A program official stated that 
design stability was demonstrated during the critical design review in 
March 2007 and through the delivery of the first test article in 
September 2007. 

Production Maturity: 

DCGS-A has no critical manufacturing processes, as it integrates 
existing ISR capabilities through the use of hardware and software. 
DCGS-A is an integration of commercial off-the-shelf and government off-
the-shelf hardware and software with additional software functionality 
being added to meet the requirements of the Army's capabilities 
development document. Program officials expect that the Version 4 
production decision to occur in August 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

DCGS-A is composed of multiple versions split into three capability 
development increments: Versions 2 and 3 are in Increment 1, Version 4 
is in Increment 2, and Version 5 is in Increment 3. Version 4 will meet 
about 85 percent of the DCGS-A operational requirements and be further 
modified to achieve the system's full objective capability in Version 
5. Version 4 upgrades current software, increases system mobility, and 
consolidates existing ISR capabilities, including the Common Ground 
Station, All Source Analysis System family of systems, Digital 
Topographic Support System, Integrated Meteorological System, Counter 
Intelligence and Interrogation Operations Workstation, and Prophet 
Control. Version 5 will consist primarily of software upgrades to the 
Version 4 configuration to provide advanced fusion capabilities and the 
ability to receive and process data from emerging and developing 
sensors. 

Each military service has a DCGS system and all are highly dependent on 
the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB); without this they cannot work 
together. The DIB is a common set of enterprise services and standards 
that serves as the foundation for interoperability and data sharing 
across the DCGS enterprise. The DIB program is pursuing an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy and has delivered early versions of the product. 
To date, the DIB has achieved successful connectivity and data sharing 
in a demonstration with Army, Air Force, and Navy laboratories. 
According to a DIB program official, the next major milestone for the 
DIB is the planned delivery of a new version that will focus on 
interoperability testing and certification. The delivery of the new DIB 
software is scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 to 
support the DCGS-A Version 4. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: DDG 1000 Destroyer. 

Source: PEO Ships (PMS 500). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer (formerly known as DD(X)) is a 
multimission surface ship designed to provide advanced land attack 
capability in support of forces ashore and contribute to U.S. military 
dominance in littoral operations. The program awarded contracts for 
detail design in August 2006 and negotiated contract modifications for 
construction of two lead ships in February 2008. The program will 
continue to mature its technologies and design as it approaches 
construction start, currently planned for July 2008. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: 1/98); 
Development start: (3/04); 
Design review: (9/05); 
Production decision-1st ships: (11/05); 
GAO review: (1/08);
Construction start: (7/08); 
Initial capability: (1/14). 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman 
Shipbuilding, Raytheon; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $2,336.4 million; 
* Procurement: $20,291.3 million; 
Total funding: $22,627.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 10. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of: 01/1998; $2,163.3; 
Latest, 12/2006: $9,342.4; 
Percent change: 331.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of: 01/1998; NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: $23,734.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of: 01/1998; NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: $33,076.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; NA.
As of: 01/1998; NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: $3,307.694; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of: 01/1998; 0; 
Latest, 12/2006: 10; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of: 01/1998; 128; 
Latest, 12/2006: 192; 
Percent change: 50. 

Quantity based on the approved program estimate, the Navy's 
shipbuilding plan estimates 7 ships. Costs increased due to changes in 
quantities, technology development, and program restructuring. 

[End of table] 

Three of 12 DDG 1000 critical technologies are fully mature, having 
been demonstrated in a sea environment. While 7 other technologies are 
approaching full maturity, 5 of them will not demonstrate full maturity 
until after installation on the ship. Two technologies remain at lower 
levels of maturity--the volume search radar and total ship computing 
environment. Land-based testing of a volume search radar prototype is 
expected to begin in May 2008--a delay of over 12 months since last 
year's assessment. Software development for the total ship computing 
environment has been replanned, shifting functionality to later 
software blocks. The Navy plans on completing 85 percent of the ship's 
detail design prior to the start of construction. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

DDG 1000 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The volume search and multifunction radars constitute the dual band 
radar system. While the multifunction radar has been tested at sea, the 
volume search radar continues to experience delays. Problems in 
developing the prototype and constructing the test facility have 
delayed land-based testing of the volume search radar by over a year. 
In order to support the ship construction schedule, the Navy has begun 
initial testing at an alternate test site. Because of issues with a 
critical circuit technology, the volume search radar will not 
demonstrate full power output until at least 2010--after production of 
the dual band radar is well under way. Problems or delays discovered 
during testing will likely affect radar production and installation. 

The total ship computing environment includes hardware and six blocks 
of software code. Current software development is focused on the fourth 
block. The Navy has reduced its software development efforts in order 
to accommodate available funding. As a consequence, some functionality 
has been deferred to blocks five and six. The Navy believes that cost 
and schedule parameters will still be achieved by leveraging non- 
development items and existing software code. However, full maturity 
will not occur until after the start of ship construction. 

Of the seven technologies approaching full maturity, the Navy expects 
to demonstrate full maturity of the integrated deckhouse and peripheral 
vertical launch system by the start of ship construction in July 2008. 
Production of a large-scale deckhouse test unit is under way and final 
validation of the vertical launching system will occur in spring 2008. 
Practical limitations prevent the Navy from fully demonstrating all 
critical technologies at sea prior to ship installation. Testing of 
other technologies continues through ship construction start. 

Due to scheduling issues for the lead ships, the Navy did not have time 
to fully test the integrated power system prior to shipyard delivery 
and instead requested funds in fiscal year 2008 to procure an 
additional unit. The Navy will conduct integrated power system testing 
in 2010 using this unit at a land-based test site. Considerable 
software development remains and land-based testing will mark the first 
integrated testing between the power generation and distribution system 
and the control system. If problems are discovered during testing, 
construction plans and costs could be at risk because the power systems 
needed for the first two ships will already have been delivered to the 
shipyards. 

The Navy continues to test prototypes of the ship's hull form to 
demonstrate stability in extreme sea conditions at higher speeds. 
According to Navy officials, existing computer simulation tools over- 
predicted the ship's tendency to capsize. The Navy is now relying on 
testing of scale models in tanks and on the Chesapeake Bay, and is 
updating its computer simulation tool. Ongoing testing is aimed at 
developing guidance for operating the ship safely under different sea 
conditions. 

Design Stability: 

The Navy estimates that it will complete 85 percent of the detail 
design prior to the start of lead ship construction. While design 
progress is being made, the program faced initial technical 
difficulties in sharing the design tool between shipbuilders. 
Processing changes between shipyards and contractors resulted in some 
delays. According to the Navy, the program is on track to reach its 
design targets. Successfully meeting its target requires that DDG 1000 
technologies develop according to plan. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy stated that DDG 1000 will have the most mature design of any 
surface combatant at the start of fabrication, resulting in a more 
affordable construction, with fewer changes. According to the Navy, 
successful completion of its design review in 2005 certifies that its 
critical technologies are capable of performing at planned levels and 
sufficiently mature to remain in the ship baseline, continuing into 
detail design and construction. Due to the long timeline required to 
design, develop, and deliver a Navy ship, the Navy stated that some 
concurrency is unavoidable to prevent the immediate obsolescence of 
technologies and preclude additional costs associated with stretching 
the timeline to allow all technologies to reach readiness levels 
meeting GAO best practice criteria prior to the start of ship 
construction. The Navy concluded that DDG 1000 strikes the best balance 
between management risk and delivering required capability within cost 
and schedule. 

[End of section] 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE). 

Source: Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft Programs (PEO(T)). 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based, 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It 
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2D AHE is 
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational 
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and 
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (6/03); 
Design review: (10/05); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (3/09); 
Initial capability: (4/11); 
Full-rate decision: (12/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop-Grumman; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $1,650.8 million; 
* Procurement: $11,414.7 million; 
Total funding: $13,065.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 70. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2003: $3647.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $3,902.9; 
Percent change: 6.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2003: $10,362.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $11,414.7; 
Percent change: 10.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2003: $14,009.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $15,317.7; 
Percent change: 9.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2003: $186.798; 
Latest, 12/2006: $204.236; 
Percent change: 9.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2003: 75; 
Latest, 12/2006: 75; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2003: 95; 
Latest, 12/2006: 94; 
Percent change: -1.0. 

[End of table] 

Since our assessment of the E-2D AHE last year, the program reported an 
increase in its baseline procurement cost due to, among other factors, 
the addition of one aircraft to the program's procurement budget and an 
increase in the program's material cost estimate. One of the E-2D AHE's 
four critical technologies is mature. Since our last assessment, two of 
these technologies have continued to mature as the program has 
completed high-fidelity laboratory testing. Although the design met 
best practice standards at the time of the October 2005 design review, 
continued increases in the number of required drawings indicated that 
the design may not be stable. The program office reports that the 
design is currently 93 percent complete, but system integration 
activities may result in additional design changes. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

E-2D AHE Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the E-2D AHE's four critical technologies--the space time 
adaptive processing algorithms--is mature. Since the last assessment, 
two additional technologies--the rotodome antenna and the power 
amplifier module UHF transistor--are currently approaching maturity as 
the program completed high-fidelity laboratory testing. The program 
office anticipates that all four critical technologies will be fully 
mature through mission system flight testing, which is scheduled to 
begin at the end of 2007. The program plans to complete a Technology 
Readiness Assessment in late fiscal year 2008 in support of the low- 
rate initial production decision. 

Design Stability: 

The program office reports that 93 percent of total drawings are 
complete. However, continued growth in the number of required drawings 
indicates that the design may not be stable. While the program had 
completed 90 percent of planned drawings at the time of its October 
2005 design review, the number of total drawings has continued to 
increase. Since the last assessment, the number of required drawings 
has increased by 39 percent. The program attributes the increase in 
drawings to, among other things, releases of wiring diagrams, wiring 
adjustments due to system maturation, and engineering changes that 
apply to multiple aircraft platforms including the E-2D AHE. This 
increase in drawings means that the program had completed only 53 
percent of planned drawings prior to the design review. The program 
office anticipates that 100 percent of the drawings will be complete by 
the planned start of production in March 2009. 

The program office reported that all components were operational in the 
system integration laboratory in September 2007, and that the first 
development test of a fully integrated prototype will take place in 
early 2008. Without the benefit of a systems integration laboratory or 
a fully integrated prototype prior to entering the systems 
demonstration phase, the program increases the likelihood of additional 
design changes and that problems may be discovered late in development 
when they are more costly to address. 

Production Maturity: 

The program expects a low-rate initial production decision in March 
2009, but does not require the contractor's major assembly site to use 
statistical process controls to ensure its critical processes are 
producing high-quality and reliable products. The program initiated a 
series of production assessment reviews in February 2008 and plans a 
production readiness review in August 2008 to assess the contractor's 
readiness for low-rate initial production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program reported a procurement cost increase in its December 2006 
Selected Acquisition Report. Reasons for the cost increase include the 
addition of one aircraft to the program's procurement budget and an 
increase in the program's material cost estimate. The program has 
initiated its developmental flight test program, but to date has 
completed fewer test points than planned due to weather delays and 
issues with the aircraft's hydraulic lines. The program is developing 
options to make up for the delays, but any additional testing delays 
may complicate the program's ability to complete its flight test 
program as planned. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy stated that the E-2D program is executing to the approved 
acquisition program baseline plan, has met all major program events on 
schedule, and is on track to meet future major program schedule events 
including the operational assessment in fiscal year 2008 and the low- 
rate initial production decision in fiscal year 2009. Regarding design 
stability, the growth for E-2D unique drawings is 13 percent. The 
additional 26 percent of drawing growth includes global engineering 
orders common to the E-2C and C-2A. The E-2D System Integration 
Laboratory was stood up between critical design review and aircraft 
test activities as per NAVAIR system engineering best practices and has 
been an invaluable resource to the program to date. The Navy has chosen 
not to fund integration of aircraft manufacturing statistical process 
controls due to the maturity of the 30-plus years of E-2 production 
history. 

[End of section] 

EA-18G: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: EA-18G. 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's EA-18G Growler will replace the carrier-based EA-6B and 
provide electronic warfare capability beginning in 2009. The EA-18G is 
designed to support friendly air, ground, and sea operations by 
suppressing enemy radar and communications. The aircraft is a 
combination of the new, more capable Improved Capability (ICAP) III 
electronic suite and the F/A-18F airframe. The Navy accepted the first 
production configuration EA-18G in September 2007 and expects to begin 
operational testing by September 2008. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (8/02); 
Development start: (12/03); 
Design review: (4/05); 
Low-rate decision: (4/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Full-rate decision: (4/09); 
Initial capability: (9/09); 
Last procurement: (2012). 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $567.9 million; 
* Procurement: $5,084.4 million; 
Total funding: $5,675.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 68. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2003: $1,815.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,952.7; 
Percent change: 7.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2003: $6,708.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $6,151.9; 
Percent change: -8.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2003: $8,524.4; 
Latest, 12/2006: $8,127.9; 
Percent change: -4.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2003: $94.716; 
Latest, 12/2006: $101.599; 
Percent change: 7.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2003: 90; 
Latest, 12/2006: 80; 
Percent change: -11.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2003: 70; 
Latest, 12/2006: 69; 
Percent change: -1.4. 

[End of table] 

The EA-18G began system development without demonstrating that its five 
critical technologies had reached full maturity, but all have since 
made progress. However, the software needed to demonstrate full 
functionality for three of these technologies, while having been 
delivered, has not yet demonstrated full functionality in a realistic 
environment. The design appears stable, with almost all drawings 
complete. However, until all technologies are demonstrated using fully 
matured software, the potential for redesign remains. The first 
production configuration aircraft has been delivered with 3 more in 
production. There are an additional 26 low-rate initial production 
aircraft planned. During development testing the Navy identified six 
deficiencies that needed correction prior to the start of operational 
testing. Fixes for some of these deficiencies have yet to be 
identified. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

EA-18G Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all five of the EA-18G's critical 
technologies are mature. While the 2.0 software build, needed to 
demonstrate full functionality for three of the technologies--the ALQ- 
218 Receiver System, the Communications Countermeasures Set, and the 
Multimission Advanced Tactical Terminal system--has been delivered, 
tests to demonstate full functionality in a multithreat environment 
will not start until late this summer. However, the program expects 
that ongoing development and operational tests will demonstrate full 
functionally of these technologies before then. 

The effect of noise and vibration on the aircraft is being done in two 
phases. Phase I, which investigates noise and vibration with no 
external stores except for the ALQ-218 receiver pod, has been completed 
on two aircraft. Phase II is conducted with external stores, 
specifically the ALQ-99 jamming pods on the aircraft. This test started 
in the fall of 2007 and was approximately 25 percent complete at that 
time. 

Design Stability: 

The design of the EA-18G appears stable, with 97 percent of drawings 
released. According to program officials, more of the ALQ-218 receiver 
software from the ICAP III on the EA-6B can be reused than was 
previously estimated--almost 80 percent versus 60 percent. However, the 
potential for redesign remains until all technologies are demonstrated 
with fully mature software. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the program does not 
collect statistical process control data. In April 2007, the Navy 
approved the program's low-rate initial production decision and by 
September 2007, the first production configuration EA-18G aircraft was 
delivered. The Navy has a total of 8 low-rate initial production 
aircraft on contract, plus the conference report accompanying the 2007 
Supplemental Appropriation indicates the conferee's intent to fund 1 
additional aircraft. Congress has not yet authorized or appropriated 
funds for an additional 18 aircraft planned for procurement in the 
second low-rate initial production lot. 

The F/A-18E/F and EA-18G share a production line. The two-seat Growler 
airframe has about 90 percent parts commonality with the F/A-18F 
airframe. 

The Navy is planning to buy about one-third of the total production 
quantity, 26 of 80 aircraft, during low-rate initial production prior 
to the completion of development and operational tests. Concurrency in 
testing and production could result in significant additional costs 
should later tests determine that changes are needed to already 
produced aircraft. 

Other Program Issues: 

Development tests of the EA-18G revealed 28 deficiencies, six of which 
need to be corrected before beginning operational testing. Operational 
testing is expected to begin in September 2008 and will not be 
completed until December 2008. According to the program office, it has 
fully addressed two of the six problems--a failure to detect a threat 
without operator indicator and the assignment of jammers to incorrect 
emitters--and is working to correct the remaining deficiencies. These 
additional deficiencies include airborne electronic attack system 
lockups, the lack of adequate threat warning information about pop-up 
weapon system emitters, and addressing the excessively time-consuming 
and cumbersome process to build the mission planning system and 
database. 

In addition, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 
identified operator workload of the two-man EA-18G crew in electronic 
attack and electronic support missions--currently performed by the four-
man EA-6B crew--as a program risk. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. 
Additionally, the Navy stated that the program continues to progress on 
schedule and within cost while meeting or exceeding all performance 
requirements. According to the Navy, there are currently no high-level 
risks associated with program completion, and identified deficiencies 
are being addressed to stay on schedule for the September 2008 Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation. 

[End of section] 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)--Atlas V, Delta IV: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)--Atlas V, Delta 
IV. 

Source: United Launch Alliance, ï¿½ 2007 United Launch Alliance, LLC. All 
Rights Reserved. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force EELV program acquires satellite launch services for 
military, intelligence, and civil missions from two families of launch 
vehicles---Atlas V and Delta IV. The program's goal is to preserve the 
space launch industrial base, sustain assured access to space, and 
reduce life cycle costs of space launches by at least 25 percent over 
previous systems. A number of vehicle configurations are available, 
depending on satellite vehicle weight and mission specifications. We 
assessed both the Atlas V and Delta IV. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (12/96); 
Development start and production decision: (6/98); 
First flight-Delta IV: (11/02); 
First flight-Atlas V: (8/02); 
Initial capability: (12/06); 
GAO review: (1/08). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Launch Services, Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $0.0 million; 
* Procurement: $25,155.1 million; 
Total funding: $25,155.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 109. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1998: $1,690.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,837.2; 
Percent change: 8.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1998: $14,810.2; 
Latest, 08/2007: $30,443.9; 
Percent change: 105.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1998: $16,500.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $32,281.2; 
Percent change: 95.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1998: $91.165; 
Latest, 08/2007: $233.922; 
Percent change: 156.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1998: 181; 
Latest, 08/2007: 138; 
Percent change: -23.5. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1998: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 120; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

We did not assess technology, design, and production maturity 
information. The EELV contracts do not include requirements for 
delivery of such data from the contractors. The EELV program completed 
production and transitioned into the sustainment phase in August 2007. 
However, only 9 of 15 possible configurations of launch vehicles have 
been launched. As of November 1, 2007, all 18 EELV launches (8 
government, 3 NASA, and 7 commercial) have been successful. Twelve 
additional launches are scheduled through the end of fiscal year 2008. 
The United Launch Alliance (ULA), a joint venture between Boeing Launch 
Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems, was established on December 
1, 2006. Over about a 4-year period from establishment, the joint 
venture is to combine production, engineering, test, and launch 
operations associated with U.S. government launches of Atlas and Delta 
vehicles. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

EELV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess technology maturity because, according to the program 
office, the EELV contracts do not require the delivery of information 
needed to conduct this assessment. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess design stability because the EELV contracts do not 
require the delivery of information needed to conduct this assessment. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the EELV contracts do not 
require the delivery of information needed to conduct this assessment. 

Other Program Issues: 

Efforts to complete the ULA merger are currently under way. The 
intention of the joint venture is to combine and centralize the 
production of launch vehicles into one plant location and all 
management and engineering activities into another facility. Nearly all 
transition efforts are expected to be completed by the end of 2010. The 
current challenge is the consolidation of Atlas and Delta facilities 
and personnel while maintaining mission success. 

As part of the revised acquisition strategy, the EELV program awarded 
cost-plus-award-fee contracts for launch capabilities to Lockheed 
Martin and Boeing in 2006. A firm fixed price contract for launch 
services was awarded to Lockheed Martin in February 2007 and to Boeing 
in January 2008. According to DOD officials, contract awards for launch 
services have been delayed because the EELV program is understaffed. 
Further, under the revised contracting strategy, the program office 
will assume greater responsibilities with regard to program oversight 
and financial execution and will continue to monitor every aspect of 
booster procurement and production. However, program officials are 
concerned about a shortage of skilled program office staff to 
effectively carry out its increased oversight responsibilities. 

In August 2007, a revised acquisition program baseline transitioned the 
EELV program to the sustainment phase. However, only 9 of 15 possible 
configurations of launch vehicles have been launched. Additionally, the 
program office has yet to revise the life cycle cost estimate to 
reflect this transition and is awaiting further guidance on changes to 
program reporting requirements. 

According to EELV officials, the program is close to resolving issues 
related to the RL-10 upper stage engine and the Russian-built RD-180 
Atlas V engine. Program officials explained that a technical review 
held in September 2007 approved a "return-to-flight" plan for the RL-10 
that includes improvements to the fuel inlet valve, the direct cause of 
an early shut off during a June 2007 Atlas V launch. During the same 
month, the Air Force also received approval to maintain a sufficient 
inventory of RD-180 engines in lieu of implementing a domestic RD-180 
co-production capability. Furthermore, the Air Force is investigating 
the costs and benefits of implementing a single RS-68 Delta IV upgrade. 
This upgrade is intended to support future launch needs of the Air 
Force, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft of this 
assessment, but did not have any comments. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS). 

Source: EFSS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Marine Corps' EFSS is an indirect fire support system used for the 
Marines' vertical assault operations and is designed for internal 
transport on the MV-22 and CH-53E aircraft. The EFSS consists of two 
vehicles: a rifled mortar that fires 120 millimeter shells and an 
ammunition trailer. The program conducted operational testing in July 
2007. In response to a letter from a member of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, the full-rate production decision was delayed; it 
is now scheduled for May 2008. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (11/04); 
Design review: (4/05); 
Low-rate decision: (6/05); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Full-rate decision: (5/08); 
Initial capability: (2008). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Quantico, Va.
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $24.8 million; 
* Procurement: $128.9 million; 
Total funding: $170.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 54. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/2004: $52.8; 
Latest, 01/2008: $78.5; 
Percent change: 48.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/2004: $600.0; 
Latest, 01/2008: $174.6; 
Percent change: -70.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/2004: $751.8; 
Latest, 01/2008: $272.7; 
Percent change: -63.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/2004: $10.895; 
Latest, 01/2008: $3.895; 
Percent change: -64.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/2004: 69; 
Latest, 01/2008: 70; 
Percent change: 1.4. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/2004: 52; 
Latest, 01/2008: 71; 
Percent change: 36.5. 

Latest estimate excludes ammunition procurement from 2014 through 2025, 
which was included in the 2004 estimate. 

[End of table] 

Since our assessment last year, the EFSS program has completed 
operational testing. However, the aggressive test schedule allowed no 
time to implement corrective actions for problems previously discovered 
during developmental testing. As a result, the EFSS was determined to 
be operationally effective and suitable with safety, reliability, and 
performance limitations. In response to congressional concerns, the 
program subsequently rescheduled the full-rate production decision 
until after an expanded follow-on test and evaluation effort assesses 
progress in fixing these limitations. The follow-on testing is expected 
to be conducted in early calendar year 2008. In the past year, the 
program has obtained its internal and external flight certification for 
use on the MV-22 and CH-53 aircraft. Naval concurrence regarding the 
ammunition's compliance with safety standards is pending. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

EFSS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

EFSS is approaching full-rate production. According to the program 
office, no critical technologies have been identified because EFSS is 
relying on existing technologies. 

Design Stability: 

At the program design review, less than 50 percent of the total system 
level drawings were complete. Now, the design appears stable because 
the program office set the EFSS baseline design, and ordered the first 
production vehicles. However, design changes to address safety, 
reliability, and performance issues discovered during testing have not 
yet been fully validated, so the potential for redesign remains. 

The EFSS program faces unique design challenges due, in part, to the 
internal MV-22 Osprey transportability key performance parameter 
requirement. The EFSS design must fit within the MV-22 cabin size and 
meet its weight restrictions. The program office initially planned to 
meet EFSS requirements by using a mostly commercial off-the-shelf 
system. However, EFSS needed more development than originally 
anticipated. Many changes were incorporated into the design due to the 
internal MV-22 transportability requirement and due to issues that 
arose with the vehicle's axle, hub assembly, driveshaft, chassis, and 
electrical system. The aggressive test schedule allowed no time to 
incorporate corrections identified during developmental testing into 
assets for use in operational testing. In addition, a design issue with 
the tail charge of the mortar round was recently discovered and must be 
fixed prior to starting cold weather testing, currently scheduled for 
early calendar year 2008. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity because the program office 
does not collect statistical control data. The design changes and 
aggressive test schedule led program officials to make a production 
decision in June 2005 before the development scope was fully 
recognized. This contributed to a year long delay between the 
production decision and the actual award of the low-rate initial 
production contract. In August 2007, the program office completed the 
production readiness review and accepted delivery of the first 
production vehicles in November 2007. 

Other Program Issues: 

Operational testing revealed several safety, reliability, and 
performance issues. For example, there were safety concerns regarding 
instability with the ammunition trailer (which could cause harm to 
personnel riding in the rear seat). In addition, the EFSS vehicle could 
not carry the recommended combat load; the radiator was unable to 
sufficiently cool the engine and transmission during operations; the 
compressor was not robust enough to support the air ride system and 
central tire inflation system; and the vehicle had problems starting at 
higher altitudes. These issues led the operational testers to determine 
that EFSS was operationally effective with limitations and suitable 
with limitations. The testers characterize the EFSS as a "niche 
capability," which must operate within a small performance envelope. 

The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee requested that the 
Marine Corps delay the EFSS full-rate production decision that had been 
scheduled for September 2007. This decision is now planned for May 2008 
and the program office is revising the test plan to support validation 
of the corrections required for the identified limitations. 

Finally, the program office recently authorized additional limited 
production before reaching agreement on the scope and price of the 
work. Under this undefinitized contract action, the contactor is 
authorized to begin work before reaching a final agreement on contract 
terms. We have previously reported that these types of arrangements 
provide little incentive to the contractor to control cost until the 
terms of the work are finalized. The program office expected to reach 
agreement on the terms of work between the end of 2007 and January 
2008. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photographs (4): Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). 

Source: EFV Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships 
offshore to inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer 
distances than the system it is designed to replace, the Assault 
Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). The EFV will have two variants---a 
troop carrier for 17 combat equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a 
command vehicle to manage combat operations in the field. We assessed 
both variants. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (3/95); 
Development start: (12/00); 
Design review: (1/01);
GAO review: (1/08); 
2nd design review: (9/08); 
Low-rate decision: (9/11); 
Initial capability: (8/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Woodbridge, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,279.5 million; 
* Procurement: $9,632.3 million; 
Total funding: $10,978.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 573. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2000: $1,569.1; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,565.0; 
Percent change: 127.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2000: $7,037.3; 
Latest, 08/2007: $9,846.9; 
Percent change: 39.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2000: $8,696.7; 
Latest, 08/2007: $13,504.4; 
Percent change: 55.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2000: $8.485; 
Latest, 08/2007: $22.773; 
Percent change: 168.4. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2000: 1025; 
Latest, 08/2007: 593; 
Percent change: -42.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2000: 138; 
Latest, 08/2007: 245; 
Percent change: 77.5. 

[End of table] 

The EFV's technologies are mature. However, the system design proved 
unstable following the original design review. After reliability 
shortfalls were discovered, the program was restructured to extend 
development, initiate a design-for-reliability process, and to enhance 
program oversight and monitoring. The EFV is scheduled to have a second 
design review in September 2008, and projected initial capability has 
been delayed by almost 5 years, to 2015. Program officials said that 
the redesign of key systems should enable the program to meet 
reliability metrics. The program has currently identified 12 critical 
manufacturing processes, but does not require the contractor to use 
statistical process controls. The Navy reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost increase over the critical cost threshold in part because of 
reliability issues and quantity reductions. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

EFV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All four of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have 
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype. According to program 
officials, the current redesign effort will not affect the maturity of 
any of the existing critical technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The EFV design was thought to be approaching stability at the time of 
the original design review. However, reliability shortfalls were 
discovered during an operational assessment in 2006 when the EFV 
achieved only a fraction of the required operational goal of 43.5 hours 
of operations before maintenance was required. Given the discovery of 
problems with reliability, the program was restructured to extend 
development efforts and build a second set of prototypes. The program 
is redesigning various systems, such as the drivetrain, and plans to 
monitor their predicted and demonstrated reliability. The program 
reports that 70 percent of its design drawings have been released to 
manufacturing and expects to release all drawings by the newly 
established design review in September 2008. This schedule may be 
ambitious given the design instability related to ongoing redesign and 
testing efforts to resolve reliability issues. 

The EFV design currently has a flat hull, which enables the vehicle to 
move very quickly over the water. Program officials said they recently 
completed a review of using a "v-shaped" hull, and found that such a 
hull would reduce the vehicle's vulnerability to ground-based explosive 
devices, but would make it impossible to meet its key performance 
parameters. In order to provide additional blast protection, officials 
said additional hull belly armor could be added to the vehicle for land 
operations. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office currently does not require the contractor to use 
statistical process controls to ensure critical processes will produce 
products within cost, schedule, performance, and quality targets. 
Instead, the program is using production representative processes for 
the manufacture of prototype vehicles during development. Twelve 
critical processes have been identified so far and will be used to 
manufacture the next seven prototype vehicles. The program expects to 
continue to evolve these processes. 

Other Program Issues: 

In February 2007, the Navy reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost increase 
over the critical cost growth threshold. Various factors contributed to 
cost increases, including reliability challenges, optimistic estimating 
assumptions, and reduced procurement quantities because of changes in 
the Marine Corps ground mobility strategy. After a comprehensive 
review, the program was restructured in June 2007 to extend system 
development. This will delay initial production to 2011 to allow for 
development of a second set of prototypes to resolve reliability 
issues. Furthermore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics has established a set of oversight, 
monitoring, and reporting mechanisms to ensure successful management of 
the program. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Extended Range Munition (ERM): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Extended Range Munition (ERM). 

Source: Naval Gunnery Project Office, PEO IWS3C/Raytheon, ï¿½2006 
Raytheon. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's ERM is a 5-inch, rocket-assisted projectile that will 
provide fire support to expeditionary forces operating near coastal 
waters. ERM is being designed to fire to an objective range of 63 
nautical miles using modified 5-inch guns onboard 32 Arleigh Burke- 
class destroyers. ERM represents a continuation of the Navy's Extended 
Range Guided Munition program, which entered system development and 
demonstration in 1996. The Navy is currently restructuring the program, 
and the planned initial fielding date of 2011 is under review. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (7/96); 
Design review: (5/03); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (9/10); 
Initial capability: (9/11); 
Full-rate decision: (5/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $108.6 million; 
* Procurement: $858.9 million; 
Total funding: $967.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 15,000. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1997: $86.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $500.1; 
Percent change: 475.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1997: $343.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $858.9; 
Percent change: 150.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1997: $430.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,359.1; 
Percent change: 215.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1997: $.050; 
Latest, 08/2007: $.090; 
Percent change: 79.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1997: 8,570; 
Latest, 08/2007: 15,100; 
Percent change: 76.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1997: 50; 
Latest, 08/2007: 182; 
Percent change: 264.0. 

[End of table] 

Of ERM's 17 critical technologies, 8 have reached maturity. 
Obsolescence issues facing ERM have prompted the Navy to replace 
components for a number of critical technologies. Testing of these new 
components inside gun-fired canisters has revealed a number of 
structural weaknesses. While analysis of recent test results continues, 
program officials have begun to question the validity of these tests 
and are focused on moving forward with flight testing. Also, while all 
of ERM's design drawings have been released, continuing component test 
failures may necessitate design changes. Further, program officials 
report that DOD continues to evaluate plans for completing development 
of ERM. Until these plans are approved and performance of new 
components is validated in testing, it is uncertain whether the Navy's 
goal to begin fielding ERM in 2011 is realistic. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

ERM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Currently, 8 of ERM's 17 critical technologies are mature. Another 8 
technologies are approaching maturity. Recent engineering changes to 
the munition prompted the Navy to reduce its assessment for ERM's 
rocket motor, rocket motor igniter, and height-of-burst fuze 
technologies from mature to approaching maturity. Engineering changes 
also affected the control actuation system, and the Navy now assesses 
this technology as immature. 

The Navy recently replaced components for a number of ERM technologies 
due to obsolescence and is testing these new components inside 8-inch 
canisters fired from guns. This canister testing is intended to help 
the Navy evaluate ERM reliability by exposing components to 
representative gun pressure and acceleration environments. Although the 
Navy initially outlined a robust plan for testing the new ERM 
components, hardware fabrication errors and delays as well as supplier 
cost growth have prompted the Navy to scale back these plans. Component 
testing completed to date has identified a number of structural 
weaknesses with ERM components. For instance, in a July 2007 canister 
test, ERM's radome separated from the guidance section, the canard 
covers buckled, and subassemblies of the control actuation system 
fractured and deformed. Program officials report that although they 
continue to analyze test results, they have begun to question the 
validity of canister testing for ERM. Specifically, there is concern 
that the gun pressure loads placed upon the canisters in testing far 
exceed those induced in a normal 5-inch gun. Alternatively, the program 
has begun testing the structural integrity of new components using 
centrifuge and air gun assets and is moving forward with engineering 
flight testing in advance of a 20-round reliability demonstration test 
phase planned for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008. 

Design Stability: 

The program has released 100 percent of ERM's anticipated 143 
production representative engineering drawings. None of these drawings 
were released in time for the munition's May 2003 design review. 
Instead, the Navy conducted this review with less mature drawings and 
used them to validate the design of the developmental test rounds. 
According to program officials, recent changes to ERM components to 
address obsolescence and reliability issues have required significant 
redesign of the munition. If the munition does not perform as expected 
in remaining component and flight tests or technologies do not mature 
as planned, additional design changes may be needed. Program officials 
stated they are concerned that ERM's development schedule may not allow 
sufficient time to fix technical problems should they occur during 
engineering flight testing planned for the second quarter of fiscal 
year 2008. 

Production Maturity: 

The Navy plans to collect statistical process control data for ERM once 
production begins. According to Navy officials, 100 ERM units will be 
built during system development using lessons learned and process 
control methods developed in the Excalibur program. The Navy 
anticipates that this strategy will result in mature production 
processes for ERM at the beginning of low-rate initial production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy has proposed a restructuring of the ERM program following cost 
growth that led to an elevation in oversight responsibility for the 
program. According to program officials, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has approved a new 
acquisition strategy for the program and is reviewing a new acquisition 
program baseline and systems engineering plan for ERM. In addition, 
program officials stated that a new test and evaluation master plan for 
ERM is under review and anticipate it will be completed in spring 2008. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery 
Projectile. 

Source: PM Excalibur. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155 mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended 
to provide improved range and accuracy. The Excalibur's near-vertical 
angle of fall is intended to reduce collateral damage around the 
intended target, making it more effective in urban environments than 
current projectiles. The Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight 
Cannon requires the Excalibur to meet its required range. Only the 
unitary variant is currently being developed. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (5/97); 
Design review/low-rate decision: (5/05); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Full-rate decision: (10/08); 
Initial capability: (1/09); 
Last procurement: (2020). 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Raytheon;
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. 
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $184.4 million; 
* Procurement: $1,119.9 million; 
Total funding: $1,303.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 29,301. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2003: $726.9; 
Latest, 07/2007: $954.8; 
Percent change: 31.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2003: $3,809.1; 
Latest, 07/2007: $1,364.0; 
Percent change: -64.1. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2003: $4,536.1; 
Latest, 07/2007: $2,358.7; 
Percent change: -48.0. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2003: $.059; 
Latest, 07/2007: $.078; 
Percent change: 31.2. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2003: 76,677; 
Latest, 07/2007: 30,388; 
Percent change: -60.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2003: 136; 
Latest, 07/2007: 140; 
Percent change: 2.9. 

[End of table] 

The Excalibur program has begun early production to support an urgent 
early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery that 
will reduce collateral damage. According to program officials, this 
early production run of the Excalibur's first increment has completed 
testing necessary to field the projectile for use in combat operations. 
They also noted that Excalibur's critical technologies reached full 
maturity in May 2005, and all of its 790 drawings were completed in 
July 2005. The Excalibur unitary variant will be developed in three 
incremental blocks, which will incorporate increased capabilities and 
accuracy over time. Since development began in 1997, the program has 
encountered a number of significant changes, including four major 
restructures, reduced initial production quantities, and increased unit 
costs. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

Excalibur Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All three of the unitary variant's critical technologies reached full 
technology maturity in May 2005 at the time of the Excalibur's design 
review. These technologies were the airframe, guidance system, and 
warhead. 

Design Stability: 

Excalibur's design appears to be stable. In May 2005, Excalibur held 
its design review and concurrently entered production to support an 
urgent fielding requirement in Iraq. At the time of the design review, 
750 of 790 design drawings were released. All 790 were complete for the 
first Excalibur block in July 2005. By August 2006, the number of 
drawings had increased by almost 20 percent to 943, all of which have 
been released. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. The program is 
taking steps to utilize statistical process control at subsystem and 
component levels, but the production processes remain inconsistent at 
this point. 

Other Program Issues: 

Excalibur started as a combination of three smaller artillery programs 
with the intent to extend the range of artillery projectiles with an 
integrated rocket motor. It is expected to enable three different Army 
howitzers and the Swedish Archer howitzer to fire farther away and 
defeat threats more quickly while lowering collateral damage and 
reducing the logistics support burden. The program has encountered a 
number of changes and issues since development began in 1997, including 
a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of the contractor's 
plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and changes in 
program requirements. Since 1997, it has been restructured four times. 
In 2002, the program was directed to include the development of the 
Excalibur for the Army's Future Combat System's Non-Line-of-Sight 
Cannon (NLOS-C). The net effect of these changes has been to lengthen 
the program's schedule, substantially decrease planned procurement 
quantities, and dramatically increase unit costs. 

The Excalibur acquisition plan currently focuses on developing its 
unitary version in three incremental blocks. In the first block, which 
has been made available for early fielding, the projectile would meet 
its requirements for lethality and accuracy in a non-jammed 
environment. In the second block, the projectile would be improved to 
meet its requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment, with 
extended range and increased reliability, and would be fielded with the 
NLOS-C when the cannon is available. Finally, in the third block, the 
projectile would be improved to further increase reliability, lower 
unit costs, and would be available for fielding to all systems in late 
fiscal year 2011. The other two Excalibur variant blocks--smart and 
discriminating--are expected to enter system development in fiscal year 
2010, although both variants are unfunded. 

In 2002, an early fielding plan for the unitary version was approved. 
According to the program office, a limited user test was completed in 
fiscal year 2007, almost 2 years after entering production, with 
results that exceeded the objective requirements for accuracy and 
reliability. Excalibur was fielded in Iraq with its first use in combat 
in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. The program office reported 
the munition performed well in combat operations. 

According to program officials, compatibility with NLOS-C has been 
identified as one of its top program risks because the muzzle brake on 
that platform is different than that on a standard howitzer. An 
engineering study was completed in May 2007 that identified 
modifications to both the Excalibur projectile and the NLOS-C. Testing 
of the new designs is scheduled to begin in December 2007, with firing 
of the projectile from the redesigned NLOS-C in the third quarter of 
fiscal year 2008. If the redesigned projectile is successfully fired 
from the NLOS-C, the projectile will then have to be retested in the 
Paladin and lightweight 155 mm howitzer platforms. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

F-22A Modernization Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: F-22A. 

Source: F-22A System Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority 
fighter, will now also have air-to-ground attack capability. It was 
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to 
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for 
long ranges. The Air Force established the F-22A modernization and 
improvement program in 2003 to add enhanced air-to-ground, information 
warfare, counter air, reconnaissance, and other capabilities and to 
improve the reliability and maintainability of the aircraft. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (3/03); 
Design review: (12/06); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Development complete: (FY 2012); 
Initial capability: (FY 2014). 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $3,064.8 million; 
* Procurement: $1,606.6 million; 
Total funding: $4,671.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/2003: $3,055.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $4,127.7; 
Percent change: 35.1. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/2003: $529.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,779.9; 
Percent change: 236.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/2003: $3,584.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5,907.6; 
Percent change: 64.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/2003: $13.131; 
Latest, 08/2007: $34.148; 
Percent change: 160.0. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/2003: 273; 
Latest, 08/2007: 173; 
Percent change: -36.6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/2003: 133; 
Latest, 08/2007: 133; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The Air Force originally planned to field the enhanced F-22A 
capabilities in three development increments to be completed in 2010. 
However, due to numerous funding decreases, schedule slips, and changes 
in requirements and work content in each increment, the last increment 
will not be integrated on the F-22A until 2013, 3 years later than 
planned. The program has achieved less than 30 percent design maturity 
for its first major increment. The Air Force also plans to integrate 
additional capabilities beyond the current three planned increments in 
a separate Acquisition Category I program. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

F-22A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of four critical technologies--processing memory--is mature and has 
been demonstrated in a realistic environment. The three remaining 
technologies--stores management system, cryptography, and radio 
frequency--are approaching maturity, having been tested in a relevant 
environment. According to program office officials the current F-22 
production and modernization plans do not commit to incorporating new 
technology into developmental increments until the underlying 
technologies have been tested in a relevant environment, and also do 
not commit to fielding these technologies until they have been proven 
in a developmental and operational environment. The number and mix of 
technologies identified by program officials has changed somewhat over 
the years, reflecting the changes in program direction, priorities, and 
work content. Two critical technologies associated with the program 
last year (larger bandwidth and low observables) were removed from the 
current funded modernization program to be addressed in future 
increments, which will be implemented as a separate Acquisition 
Category I program. 

Design Stability: 

The design for the first major increment of enhanced capabilities of 
the F-22A Modernization Program is not mature and, as of October 2007, 
less than one-third of the planned engineering drawings had been 
released. The program office had released no engineering drawings when 
critical design review (CDR) was held and approved in December 2006. 
According to program officials, they did not plan to release drawings 
at CDR because most of the design consisted of software changes or 
modifications of existing hardware to enable the aircraft to carry and 
deliver the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) on preplanned missions as well as 
to use an air-to-ground radar mode to permit attack of emerging targets 
using SDBs, and to save radar imagery for post-mission analysis. 
Program officials further mentioned final instrumentation that is 
planned for installation--such as radio frequency data links and other 
items--will not be installed in test aircraft until fiscal year 2011. 
Consequently, there are a significant number of engineering drawings 
that have to be released before the design is mature. 

Other Program Issues: 

The F-22A modernization program has experienced numerous budget 
decreases and program restructurings that have resulted in delaying the 
planned implementation of the development increments by 3 years. Since 
fiscal year 2002, the F-22A's modernization budget has been decreased 
by nearly $330 million. Some of these decreases were the result of 
congressional budget cuts. However, more than 50 percent of the 
decreases can be attributed to program restructuring by the Air Force 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In its fiscal year 2008 
budget submission to Congress, the Air Force requested $743 million in 
development funding for F-22A modernization. The conference reports 
accompanying the 2008 National Department of Defense Authorization Act, 
and Defense Appropriations Act both recommended providing the F-22A 
modernization program with $611 million, about $132 million less than 
requested. Program officials indicated that this decrease in funding 
required changes to minimize the impact on the planned modernization 
program. 

The Air Force also budgeted $132 million in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 
for reliability and maintainability upgrades, $28 million more than the 
amount budgeted for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Despite these efforts, 
the F-22A continues to operate below its expected reliability rates. A 
key reliability requirement for the F-22A is a 3-hour mean time between 
maintenance intervals, which is required by the time the program 
achieves 100,000 operational flying hours, now projected for fiscal 
year 2010. Mean time between maintenance is defined as the number of 
operating hours divided by the number of maintenance actions. 
Currently, the mean time between maintenance is less than 1 hour, or 
about half of what was expected by the end of system development in 
December 2005. There has been no significant change reported regarding 
the current mean time between maintenance since last year's review. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T). 

Source: Boeing Corp., Anaheim, CA. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's FAB-T will provide a family of satellite communications 
terminals for airborne and ground-based users. FAB-T will address 
current and future communications capabilities and technologies, 
replacing many program-unique terminals. FAB-T is being developed 
incrementally; the first increment will provide voice and data military 
satellite communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as 
airborne and ground command posts, including the B-2, B-52, RC-135, E- 
6, and E-4 aircraft. We assessed the first increment. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (9/02); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Design review: (12/08); 
Low-rate decision: (2/10); 
Full-rate decision: (12/11). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $668.9 million; 
* Procurement: $1,916.2 million; 
Total funding: $2,585.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 197. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2002: $1,459.9; 
Latest, 04/2007: $1,468.9; 
Percent change: 0.6. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2002: $1,568.3; 
Latest, 04/2007: $1,886.1; 
Percent change: 20.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2002: $3,028.1; 
Latest, 04/2007: $3,354.7; 
Percent change: 10.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2002: $14.019; 
Latest, 04/2007: $15.111; 
Percent change: 7.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2002: 216; 
Latest, 04/2007: 222; 
Percent change: 2.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2002: 129; 
Latest, 04/2007: 129; 
Percent change: 0. 

[End of table] 

Although FAB-T entered system development in 2002, its critical 
technologies were not assessed until January 2007, after being 
designated an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 program. Currently, the 
seven critical technologies are approaching maturity and the program 
office expects that all will reach full maturity by the low-rate 
initial production decision in February 2010. While the program reports 
that the FAB-T design is nearly stable, it expects further minor design 
changes, including those to address vibration issues in the modem 
processor group. In 2006, the program was restructured to address 
design changes caused by the concurrent development of the Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency satellite and cryptological devices, as well 
as issues with contractor performance. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

FAB-T Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All seven critical technologies are approaching maturity, and program 
officials expect they will be fully mature by the end of the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2010, well before the scheduled development and 
operational tests in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. According 
to program officials, when FAB-T began system development in 2002, a 
technology readiness assessment was not required. Critical technologies 
were not assessed until after it was designated an ACAT 1D program in 
August 2006. In January 2007, the program office initially identified 
and assessed 9 critical technologies. 

In June 2007, the milestone decision authority requested an independent 
technology readiness assessment for FAB-T. While the program office 
estimated that most critical technologies were mature, the independent 
panel determined that they were not, in part because some of them had 
not been flight tested in a realistic environment. The review team also 
added an additional critical technology that had not previously been 
identified by the program. In addition, four technologies identified by 
the program office as critical were removed because the review 
concluded that they were more appropriately categorized as engineering, 
integration and/or interoperability issues. The Deputy Under Secretary 
for Science and Technology did not agree with the removal of one of 
these technologies, redesignated it as critical, and assessed it as 
approaching maturity based on additional information provided by the 
program office. 

Because FAB-T is a software-defined radio, another risk facing the 
program is the large amount of new software code. Since the start of 
program development, the total lines of code expected in the final 
system has increased by 40 percent, with 69 percent of the total lines 
of code to be newly developed. Program officials noted that the 
software growth was necessary to accommodate the design and interface 
requirement changes with the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
satellite and cryptological devices. The software budget has increased 
significantly, and program officials explained that this was due to the 
additional lines of code and to lower than expected levels of 
productivity. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that 98 percent of design drawings have been 
released to manufacturing. Prior to system-critical design review, 
scheduled for early in fiscal year 2009, there have been a number of 
line replaceable unit critical design reviews. Each of the line 
replaceable unit critical design reviews was completed successfully, 
and there were no significant design issues identified. Testing to date 
has been conducted at the component, shop replaceable unit, and line 
replaceable unit levels. Program officials noted that testing revealed 
vibration issues with two cards within the modem processor group; these 
cards are being modified and will undergo retest. As of February 2008, 
over 70 percent of the software lines of code had been coded, tested 
and integrated. 

The program has allowed 4 months to execute initial operational 
testing. Program officials said that this is sufficient, but noted it 
will allow only minimal time for retesting any required design changes. 

Other Program Issues: 

Increment 1 of the program was restructured in 2006 because concurrent 
development of the terminal and the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
satellite and cryptologic devices resulted in a need to revise the 
terminal requirements. In addition, contractor design teams were 
restructured to improve performance and efficiency. Program officials 
said that costs for development have more than tripled since the 
contract was awarded due to design changes and contractor cost growth. 
Program officials also said the concurrent development and contractor 
performance issues resulted in a delay to the start of low-rate initial 
production from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the FAB-T program office 
provided additional background information and technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. As part of the background 
information, the program office noted that, as of 2006, FAB-T is being 
managed in accordance with National Security Space Acquisition Policy 
03-01. This includes program milestones that are different than those 
for a DOD 5000 program. The program office established a new program 
baseline under these guidelines in calendar year 2007. 

[End of section] 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Diagram: Future Combat Systems (FCS). 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

The FCS program consists of an integrated family of advanced, networked 
combat and sustainment systems; unmanned ground and air vehicles; and 
unattended sensors and munitions intended to equip the Army's new 
transformational modular combat brigades. Within a system-of-systems 
architecture, FCS features 14 major systems and other enabling systems 
along with an overarching network for information superiority and 
survivability. This assessment focuses on the full FCS program. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (5/00); 
Development start: (5/03); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Design review: (2/11); 
Low-rate decision: (2/13); 
Full-rate decision: (2/17); 
Initial capability: (6/15); 
Last procurement: (unknown). 

Program Essentials: 
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Hazelwood, Mo.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $16,651.9 million; 
* Procurement: $99,275.0 million; 
Total funding: $116,657.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 15. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2003: $20,537.8; 
Latest, 12/2006: $28,478.2; 
Percent change: 38.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2003: $67,060.0; 
Latest, 12/2006: $99,275.0; 
Percent change: 48.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2003: $88,278.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $128,483.8; 
Percent change: 45.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2003: $5,885.245; 
Latest, 12/2006: $8,565.589; 
Percent change: 45.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2003: 15; 
Latest, 12/2006: 15; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2003: 91; 
Latest, 12/2006: 145; 
Percent change: 59.3. 

[End of table] 

Since last year's assessment, the Army has made progress maturing six 
technologies, but three other critical technologies are now assessed as 
less mature. The Army continues to define the requirements for core FCS 
systems, and contractors continue to refine their initial designs. 
Testing of the initial FCS items to be delivered to current Army forces 
is expected to begin in fiscal year 2008. The Army also plans to begin 
initial production of both the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and a few other 
related systems in fiscal year 2009. The Army has eliminated four of 
the core FCS systems due to budget considerations. The Army's 
development cost estimate for FCS is much lower than two independent 
estimates and is based on less demonstrated knowledge than would 
normally be expected near the midpoint of development. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

FCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only 2 of the program's 44 technologies are fully mature and 30 are 
nearing full maturity. Based on the Army's assessment, 6 technologies 
have demonstrated higher maturity since last year, but 3 are now 
assessed as less mature. All critical technologies may not be fully 
mature until the Army's production decision in February 2013. The next 
independent verification of FCS critical technologies should be 
available in early 2009 for the preliminary design review. 

The Army is using a phased approach to "spin out" mature FCS equipment 
to current forces, provided the equipment demonstrates military utility 
during testing. Testing of the initial spinout items should begin in 
fiscal year 2008. Because technical issues have delayed development of 
new radios, the Army will be testing spinout hardware using surrogate 
radios. As currently scheduled, production-representative radios will 
not be available for testing until at least 2009, which is after the 
production decision for spinout items. 

Design Stability: 

The Army plans to conduct a preliminary design review in February 2009 
and a critical design review in February 2011. At the critical design 
review, the Army expects to have completed 90 percent of FCS design 
drawings. FCS contractors have released some design drawings for a 
small number of systems that are candidates for near-term spinout 
fielding including unattended sensors, the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch 
System, and various communications equipment. Contractors have also 
released some design drawings for an early production version of the 
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon. The vehicles are being built to satisfy a 
congressional mandate for the early fielding of cannon vehicles. 

Production Maturity: 

Since the low-rate production decision for the core FCS systems is not 
scheduled until February 2013, we did not assess production maturity. 
However, the Army plans to spend more than $5 billion to begin initial 
production of both the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon and a few spinout 
systems in 2009--4 years before the program's system-of-systems 
production decision and before any of the other manned ground vehicles 
are subject to any developmental, live fire, or operational testing. 
The Army intends to use a sole source contract with the current lead 
system integrator for all FCS low-rate production. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since last year's assessment, the Army deleted four systems and made 
several other adjustments to the FCS development program based largely 
on budgetary constraints. The Army also reduced the annual FCS 
production rate and stretched out the production phase by about 5 
years, also due to budgetary limitations. As a result, total cost 
estimates for the program were slightly reduced. 

The Army's FCS development cost estimate depends on a number of 
assumptions. Historically, programs using such assumptions tend to 
underestimate costs. Program officials stated they will not spend more 
in development than the current value of the FCS development contract. 
Any projected cost overruns would be eliminated by deleting 
requirements, forcing the user to forego certain capabilities. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System. 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high-altitude, long-endurance 
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. After a 
successful technology demonstration, the system entered development and 
limited production in March 2001. The acquisition program has been 
restructured several times. The current plan acquires 7 aircraft 
similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ-4A) and 47 of a larger 
and more capable model (the RQ-4B). 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Demonstration program start: (2/94); 
Development start/low-rate decision: (3/01); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Full-rate decision: (4/09); 
Last procurement: (2013). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,603.1 million; 
* Procurement: $3,894.9 million; 
Total funding: $5,500.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 30. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 03/2001: $989.3; 
Latest, 09/2007: $3,682.4; 
Percent change: 272.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 03/2001: $4,101.7; 
Latest, 09/2007: $5,773.9; 
Percent change: 40.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 03/2001: $5,121.0; 
Latest, 09/2007: $9,599.8; 
Percent change: 87.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 03/2001: $81.286; 
Latest, 09/2007: $177.773; 
Percent change: 118.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 03/2001: 63; 
Latest, 09/2007: 54; 
Percent change: -14.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 03/2001: 55; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

RQ-4A production is complete and RQ-4B aircraft are currently in 
production. Key technologies are mostly mature. The program is 
collecting manufacturing process control data and bringing them into 
control, but test delays constrain these efforts. The first RQ-4B had 
its first flight in March 2007 but encountered problems. Flight testing 
is ongoing but proceeding slowly. Representative prototypes of the two 
sensors driving the requirement for the larger aircraft are in flight 
test on surrogate platforms. However, critical imaging sensors are not 
yet fully mature. Airframe design appears stable, but differences 
between the two models were much more extensive and complex than 
anticipated; these differences resulted in extended development times, 
frequent engineering changes, and significant cost increases. The 
program was rebaselined for the third time since its 2001 inception. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

Global Hawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Critical technologies on the RQ-4B are mature or approaching maturity. 
This includes the advanced signals intelligence and improved radar 
sensors, two key capabilities that are critical for developing and 
acquiring the larger aircraft. Representative prototypes of both 
sensors are in flight tests on surrogate aircraft. However, critical 
imaging sensors are not yet fully mature. 

Design Stability: 

The RQ-4B basic airframe design is now stable with all its engineering 
drawings released. During the first year of production, however, 
frequent and substantive engineering changes increased development and 
airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing schedules. Differences 
between the two aircraft models were much more extensive and complex 
than anticipated. 

Production Maturity: 

The contractor has built all seven RQ-4A aircraft and production 
efforts are now focused on the larger, more advanced RQ-4B aircraft. 
The first block of RQ-4B's (six aircraft, which do not include the 
advanced radar or signal intelligence capabilities) have all been 
produced. The program office is collecting statistical process control 
data for several of its critical manufacturing processes, and many of 
these are in control. Other performance indicators, such as defects and 
rework rates, are also being used to monitor quality. 

The first RQ-4B aircraft completed production in August 2006 and had 
its first flight in March 2007. This aircraft is more than 1 year 
behind schedule. The first flight had been delayed, in part, due to 
problems identified during testing. Developmental testing is ongoing 
but has proceeded slowly. Continued test delays may affect efforts to 
further mature production processes. Performance and flight issues 
identified during tests could result in design changes, revised 
production processes, and rework. Operational tests to verify that the 
basic RQ-4B design works as intended are planned to be completed in 
February 2009, a delay of more than 2 years. By that time the Air Force 
expects to have bought about one-half of the total quantities. 
Schedules for integrating, testing, and fielding the new advanced 
sensors have had delays, raising risks that these capabilities may not 
meet the warfigther's requirements. 

An operational assessment was completed in March 2007 on the RQ-4A, 
over 2 years later than originally estimated. Performance problems were 
identified in communications, imagery processing, and engines. These 
issues have not yet been completely resolved. 

Other Program Issues: 

We have previously reported significant cost, schedule, and performance 
problems for the Global Hawk program. Soon after its March 2001 start, 
DOD restructured the program from a low-risk incremental approach to a 
high-risk, highly concurrent strategy. Specifically, the restructuring 
aimed to develop and acquire the larger RQ-4B aircraft with advanced 
but immature technologies on an accelerated production schedule. The 
program has been rebaselined three times, and aircraft unit costs have 
more than doubled since program start. Significant cost increases 
between 2002 and 2005 culminated in a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of 
the critical cost growth threshold, which led to certification to 
Congress. The program still faces risks, as the most advanced aircraft 
variant will not be fully tested until mid-fiscal year 2010. By this 
point, the program plans to have purchased over 60 percent of the total 
aircraft quantity. Also, software and subcontractor management continue 
to be risk areas for the program. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on an assessment draft, the Air Force stated that the 
Global Hawk program made progress in the last year and continues to 
execute what it calls a challenging acquisition program. Three deployed 
RQ-4A aircraft supported military operations, amassing 5,700 combat 
hours in 2007. Two advanced technology sensors, which were once a 
technology maturity concern, are being successfully tested on surrogate 
aircraft: a risk management initiative. The RQ-4B aircraft entered a 
rigorous development test phase. The methodical collection of test data 
paces this testing, not the test schedule. Integration of the two 
advanced technology sensors into the RQ-4B aircraft is beginning or in 
planning. Current program challenges include: software production, RQ- 
4B (Block 20) testing, and normalization of sustainment and operations. 

[End of section] 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD). 

Source: Department of Defense. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's GMD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to defend against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks 
during the midcourse phase of the missile's flight. GMD is an 
integrated system consisting of radars, an interceptor (a booster and 
an exoatmospheric kill vehicle) and a fire control system that 
formulates battle plans and directs components. We assessed the 
maturity of technologies critical to the Block 2006 GMD element, but we 
assessed design and production maturity for the interceptor only. 

Timeline: Technology/system development to Initial capability: 
Program start: (2/96); 
Directive to field initial capability: (12/02); 
Integrated design review: (3/03); 
Initial capability: (8/04); 
Block 2006 start: (1/06); 
1st end-to-end test: (9/06); 
Block 2006 completion: (12/07); 
GAO review: (1/08). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding FY08-FY13: 
* R&D: $10,422.4 million; 
* Procurement: NA; 
Total funding: $10,422.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: $37,334.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 


Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: $37,334.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception 
through fiscal year 2013. 

[End of table] 

Block 2006 enhances GMD's Block 2004 design by adding two new 
technologies that are expected to improve the performance of the 
interceptor. All Block 2004 technologies are mature, but the Block 2006 
technologies have not been demonstrated in an operational environment. 
MDA has released all drawings related to the Block 2004 interceptor to 
manufacturing and has emplaced 24 interceptors for operational use. 
However, technical problems with the 2004 design and efforts to mature 
new technologies may lead to design changes. Although MDA is producing 
hardware for operational use, it has not made a formal production 
decision, and we could not assess the stability of production processes 
because the program is not collecting statistical data. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

GMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All nine Block 2004 technologies are mature. Block 2006 adds two new 
technologies--an upgraded infrared seeker and onboard discrimination-- 
to the interceptor's exoatmospheric kill vehicle. These two 
technologies are approaching maturity but have not yet been 
demonstrated in an operational environment. The GMD program expects to 
integrate these technologies into the interceptor's design and field 
the enhanced interceptor in 2008. 

One critical technology was removed since last year's assessment. 
Lockheed Martin's Boost Vehicle Plus program, including its guidance 
navigation and control subsystem, was canceled in 2006 because of 
fiscal constraints and the program's success with the Orbital Booster 
Vehicle. 

Design Stability: 

The design of the Block 2004 ground-based interceptor appears stable, 
with 100 percent of its drawings released to manufacturing. However, 
the number of drawings may increase if ongoing tests of the Block 2004 
interceptor identify needed design changes. Additionally, the design of 
the Block 2006 configuration is incomplete, as the program is still 
maturing the kill vehicle's infrared seeker and onboard discrimination. 

Production Maturity: 

Officials do not plan to make an official production decision, and the 
program intends to keep production quantities low. Because production 
quantities are small, the program does not collect statistical control 
data, and we could not assess the maturity of the production processes. 
Instead, the GMD program measures production capability and maturity 
with a monthly evaluation process called a manufacturing capability 
assessment that evaluates critical manufacturing indicators for 
readiness and execution. 

Other Program Issues: 

GMD's flight test program continues to experience delays. GMD planned 
three flight tests in 2007, including two intercept attempts and one 
radar characterization test. The program successfully accomplished one 
intercept attempt and the radar characterization flight. The first 
intercept attempt was originally declared a "no test" when the target 
malfunctioned. To make-up for the no test, the program held another 
test with the same objectives. This test was successfully completed in 
September 2007. 

Quality control procedures have allowed less reliable or inappropriate 
parts to be incorporated into the manufacture of the booster and the 
kill vehicle. The program has corrected some reliability problems by 
incorporating new parts into the manufacturing line. However, numerous 
emplaced interceptors include unproven parts because they were 
manufactured before the improved parts were introduced into the 
production line. The program expects to remedy this problem by 
retrofitting the emplaced interceptors, but this is not scheduled to 
begin until fiscal year 2008. 

As reported in our last assessment, we estimate that at the contract's 
completion, the GMD prime contractor, Boeing, could experience a cost 
overrun between $1.0 billion and $1.4 billion. As of September 2007, 
the GMD program was overrunning its fiscal year 2007 cost budget by $22 
million. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

H-1 Upgrades: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: H-1: 

Source: Bell Helicopter, ï¿½ 2007 Bell Helicopter. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's H-1 Upgrades Program converts the AH-1W attack helicopter 
and the UH-1N utility helicopter to the AH-1Z and UH-1Y configurations, 
respectively. The mission of the AH-1Z attack helicopter is to provide 
rotary wing fire support and reconnaissance capabilities in day/night 
and adverse weather conditions. The mission of the UH-1Y utility 
helicopter is to provide command, control, and assault support under 
the same conditions. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (10/96); 
Design review: (9/98): 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Production decision: (7/08); 
Initial capability UH-1Y: (9/08); 
Initial capability AH-1Z: (3/11). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell Helicopter Textron; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $21.7 million; 
* Procurement: $5,282.1 million; 
Total funding: $5,303.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 246. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1996: $663.3; 
Latest, 09/2007: $1,521.7; 
Percent change: 129.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1996: $2,780.8; 
Latest, 09/2007: $6,734.9; 
Percent change: 142.2. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1996: $3,444.1; 
Latest, 09/2007: $8,256.7; 
Percent change: 139.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1996: $12.127; 
Latest, 09/2007: $29.073; 
Percent change: 139.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1996: 284; 
Latest, 09/2007: 284; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1996: 105; 
Latest, 09/2007: 143; 
Percent change: 36.2. 

[End of table] 

The H-1 Upgrades Program did not assess technology maturity at program 
start, but faces challenges with key technologies, including the target 
sight system and helmet-mounted sight display. The program office 
reported that it currently has 2,611 AH-1Z drawings and 3,169 UH-1Y 
drawings. The program does not track data for critical process control 
in manufacturing, but utilizes postproduction quality metrics. The H-1 
upgrades program was approved for Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 4 in 
July 2007 and currently has 34 aircraft on contract. The program 
reported that three AH-1Z and five UH-1Y have been delivered to date. 
The program is currently undergoing its fourth major restructuring, 
which has delayed the expected full-rate production decision by 18 
months, now expected for July 2008. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

H-1 Upgrades Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials reported that technologies and related maturity were 
not assessed at program start, but that all technologies are currently 
considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

The program reported there are currently 2,611 AH-1Z drawings, 475 of 
which are legacy, and 3,169 UH-1Y drawings, 765 of which are legacy. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials reported they do not collect critical process control 
data. However, postproduction quality metrics and engineering change 
metrics are used to assess product maturity. 

A recent operational test report identified performance issues with key 
technologies that will need to be resolved prior to initial operational 
capability. For example, the program's target sight system continues to 
experience a high failure rate, which could affect the AH-1Z's 
readiness for fielding. Further, flight restrictions are in effect for 
both the AH-1Z and UH-1Y during operational test and evaluation due to 
the poor performance of the helmet-mounted sight displays (HMSD), a key 
weapon system upgrade. The visual sharpness of the HMSD does not 
support shipboard landings at night, depth perception cues are 
misleading, and HMSD components are not reliable. The program reported 
designed improvements are currently being tested to address these 
challenges. Upon implementation of these improvements, the aircraft 
will go through a second phase of operational evaluation. However, if 
deficiencies in the HMSD are not corrected, or if the upgrade is not 
delivered on time, initial operational capability cannot be supported 
for the UH-1Y. 

The program was approved for Low-Rate Initial Production Lot 4 in July 
2007. To date, the program has 34 aircraft on contract, consisting of 
eight AH-1Z and 26 UH-1Y. Program officials reported that the third AH- 
1Z and fifth UH-1Y were delivered in October and November 2007, 
respectively. 

Other Program Issues: 

In an effort to minimize the time aircraft are out of service for 
remanufacturing, the UH-1Y acquisition strategy was adjusted to a new 
build airframe in fiscal year 2006. Additionally, the program office is 
using fiscal year 2007 funding for preliminary engineering for new AH- 
1Z airframes. The program has experienced significant delays and cost 
growth in the manufacturing of initial production aircraft, leading to 
140 percent cost growth and 36 percent schedule growth. The cost growth 
experienced by the program is due primarily to revised estimates for 
labor, material, and tooling based on manufacturing performance data 
from development and initial production aircraft. The program reported 
that requirements changes in previous years have also contributed to 
cost growth. 

In May 2006, the Navy initiated the program's fourth major 
restructuring effort, resulting in an approximate 18-month delay in the 
full-rate production decision (now expected for July 2008), a reduction 
in production quantities from 47 to 38 in fiscal years 2006 to 2008, 
and the extension of low-rate production. At the same time, the 
contractor has failed to meet the commitments of an increased 
production rate. Program officials stated that the prime contractor's 
delivery schedule is a key risk that could affect the UH-1Y initial 
operational capability. The prime contractor has experienced challenges 
with supply chain management, manufacturing standards, and built-in 
quality, affecting program schedule and resulting in aggressive 
training timelines with little margin. If the planned September 2008 
initial operational capability is not met, the program may face an 
acquisition program baseline breach and risk undergoing a fifth 
restructuring. Additionally, the contractor's earned value management 
system was decertified. The program expects recertification during 
spring 2008. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). 

Source: JASSM Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

JASSM is a long-range Air Force air-to-ground precision missile that is 
able to strike targets from a variety of aircraft, including the B-1, B-
2, and F-16. The Air Force plans for the JASSM Extended Range (ER) 
variant to add greater range capability to the baseline missile. 
According to the program office, the baseline JASSM and the ER variant 
share approximately 70 percent commonality in components. We assessed 
both variants. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (6/96); 
Development start: (11/98); 
Low-rate decision: (12/01); 
Initial capability: (9/03); 
Full-rate decision: (7/04); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Last procurement: (2020). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $138.1 million; 
* Procurement: $3,375.3 million; 
Total funding: $3,513.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3,958. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 11/1998: $970.1; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,407.3; 
Percent change: 45.1. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 11/1998: $1,207.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,998.5; 
Percent change: 231.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 11/1998: $2,200.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5,670.1; 
Percent change: 157.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 11/1998: $0.891; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1.133; 
Percent change: 27.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 11/1998: 2,469; 
Latest, 08/2007: 5,006; 
Percent change: 102.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 11/1998: 75; 
Latest, 08/2007: 87; 
Percent change: 16.0. 

[End of table] 

The baseline JASSM entered production in 2001. Both variants have the 
same three critical technologies, and the program office indicates that 
all three are mature. However, the JASSM design is still not stable. In 
test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four of 
four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of 
less than 60 percent. The program office has planned reliability 
improvements, and it expects to demonstrate those in ground and flight 
tests during the December 2007 through March 2008 time frame. No 
additional procurement will occur until the reliability improvements 
have been demonstrated. The program also experienced a Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold that may require 
a certification by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JASSM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JASSM program identified the same three critical technologies for 
both variants--composite materials, global positioning system anti- 
spoofing receiver module, and stealth/signature reduction--and 
indicated all three are mature. 

Design Stability: 

Test results show that the JASSM design is not stable. The program 
office is not acquiring drawings because the contractor has Total 
System Performance Responsibility wherein, according to program 
officials, the contractor guarantees the missile performance. 

In test flights during April and May 2007, the program experienced four 
of four test failures, producing an overall missile reliability rate of 
less than 60 percent. Of the four test failures, three were related to 
the global-positioning system and one was a repeat of a previously- 
experienced fuze failure. 

The program office has developed a plan to solve the reliability 
problems by: (1) implementing a software change to the GPS receiver, 
(2) correcting a design flaw by moving a cable associated with the 
weapon's anti-spoofing capability farther away from the engine, and (3) 
reworking the software code for a key data processor. 

The program office plans a minimum of nine ground tests in late 2007 
and early 2008 as well as a 16-shot test-flight program in the February 
through mid-March 2008 time frame. These tests are expected to verify 
the planned improvements to JASSM's reliability. The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will evaluate the 
test results. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity could not be assessed because the program does not 
collect production process control data. The program office stated that 
the contractor collects limited production process control data from 
its vendors, but it does not formally report the data to the Government 
under JASSM's contract terms. However, program office personnel review 
production control data during monthly program management reviews. 

Additionally, program officials believe that none of the manufacturing 
processes that affect critical system characteristics are a problem, 
although there are key production processes that have cost 
implications, such as the bonding for various subassemblies within the 
missile body. 

Other Program Issues: 

Following the test failures, the Air Force officially halted 
procurement of JASSM missiles in July 2007. Of the 942 missiles 
currently on contract (Lots 1-6) from the total planned buy of 4,900 
baseline and ER variants, 611 have been delivered. According to program 
officials, if the planned tests validate JASSM's reliability, the Air 
Force expects to restart procurement by renegotiating the Lot 7 buy. 

The program has also experienced a cost increase of over 60 percent. 
This cost increase resulted in a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the 
critical cost growth threshold. The primary drivers for the cost breach 
were the addition of 2,500 of the more expensive Extended Range variant 
(increasing total missile quantity from 2,400 to 4,900) and a 
reliability improvement program. As a result, even if JASSM performs 
successfully in its ground and flight tests, the program cannot 
continue unless the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics certifies that it is essential to national 
security, no feasible alternatives exist, cost estimates are 
reasonable, and the program's management structure is adequate. The 
Under Secretary has delayed certification pending the test results. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force reiterated 
that JASSM remains in the Nunn-McCurdy certification process. The Air 
Force added that previous independent reviews found reliability issues 
primarily driven by supplier quality control problems. It was further 
stated that significant progress has been made towards the resolution 
of the GPS issue and once corrective actions are validated and verified 
through continued testing they will be incorporated into additional 
JASSM test missiles. The Air Force also provided technical comments 
which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Cargo Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Joint Cargo Aircraft. 

Source: C-27J Spartan www.c-27j.com, ï¿½2006 C-27J Team. 

[End of figure] 

Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is a joint acquisition by the Army and the 
Air Force for a medium lift, fixed-wing aircraft which will move 
mission-critical and time-sensitive cargo to tactical units in remote 
and austere locations. The six JCA missions are (1) critical resupply, 
(2) casualty evacuation, (3) air drop (personnel/supplies), (4) aerial 
sustainment, (5) troop transport, and (6) homeland security. This is a 
fully-developed commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft that is currently 
being delivered to multiple military customers worldwide. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Low-rate decision: (5/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Initial capability: (2/10); 
Full-rate decision: (3/10). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: L-3 Communications; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $98.7 million; 
* Procurement: $3,590.7 million; 
Total funding: $3,689.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 76. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $113.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,669.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,783.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $48.502; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 78; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 32; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Costs reflect Army's and Air Force's dollars through fiscal year 2013. 
Total program cost beyond fiscal year 2013 is to be determined. 

The JCA is a commercial off-the-shelf procurement. No developmental 
efforts are planned, and the system's technology and design are mature. 
Production maturity is high since this aircraft is currently in use 
commercially. On June 13, 2007, the Army awarded a $2.04 billion 
contract with L-3 Communications for an initial quantity of 78 aircraft 
by 2013, along with training and support. The delivery date for the 
first aircraft is September 2008. The system is scheduled to undergo 
initial operational test and evaluation from September to November 2009 
and its initial operational capability is planned for February 2010. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JCA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JCA is an off-the-shelf procurement of a fully developed commercial 
aircraft that is currently produced and delivered to multiple military 
customers worldwide. As such, the JCA program office states that the 
system's technologies are mature. The Army submitted a technology 
readiness assessment for JCA in support of program entry at Milestone 
C. This assessment concluded that nondevelopmental capabilities 
presently embodied in both military and commercially available aircraft 
are sufficient to meet the JCA mission requirements without further 
technology development. The assessment also determined that there are 
no technology elements associated with the JCA's performance, 
manufacturing process, material, or tooling/manufacturing 
infrastructure that are new or novel or are being used in a new or 
novel way. The Office of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering concurred with this conclusion in a memorandum on May 30, 
2007, and noted that the aircraft has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. It was also noted that if any future technology insertions 
are included in the JCA program, a technology certification should be 
revisited for those technologies. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the JCA's design stability because program officials 
said that the design of the JCA is stable, since the aircraft is 
already a fully developed commercial aircraft. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials state that the production maturity is at a high level 
because the aircraft is commercially available, and production lines 
are already established. The delivery date for the first aircraft to 
the JCA program is September 2008. The system will undergo initial 
operational tests from September to November 2009 and be fielded 
shortly thereafter, in February 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army awarded a low-rate initial production contract for 13 aircraft 
on June 13, 2007, with full-rate production decision scheduled for 
March 2010. A bid protest that was filed shortly after the contract 
award was resolved, but program officials stated that this had a 3 
month impact on the JCA's schedule. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration of Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) logo. 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is a cooperative Army and Navy 
effort to acquire a high-speed, shallow-draft vessel capable of 
operating without existing ports for rapid intratheater transport of 
personnel and cargo. The program awarded three preliminary design 
contracts in January 2008 and intends to award a detailed design and 
construction contract in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008. The 
program expects to mature its design as it approaches construction, 
currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (4/06); 
Preliminary design contract award: (1/08); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Design review: (TBD); 
Production decision: (8/08); 
Detailed design start: (9/08); 
Construction start: (9/09); 
Last ship delivery: (2015). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $58.0 million; 
* Procurement: $1,421.0 million; 
Total funding: $1,479.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 8. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $112.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,421.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,533.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $191.625; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

In 2007, DOD and the Navy determined that the JHSV program had no 
critical technologies because all of the technologies have been 
previously demonstrated on ships leased by DOD. However, a number of 
existing designs and technologies, such as at-sea tension refueling, 
hull design, the fire suppression system, and the engines, may need to 
be modified to support additional performance requirements. These 
performance requirements may be amended if the associated technologies 
do not mature on time. The JHSV is designated as part of the Capital 
Budget Account (CBA), a DOD pilot program designed to keep shipbuilding 
programs on budget. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JHSV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JHSV program intends to modify existing commercial fast ferry 
technologies and designs in order to produce a ship that meets its key 
performance parameters. According to the program office, the three most 
important key performance parameters are payload, speed, and un- 
refueled range. The ship design will include a helicopter flight deck 
and a ramp capable of supporting an Abrams main battle tank. 

According to the program office, all of the ship's key performance 
parameters have been demonstrated on ships leased by the government and 
used in military operations. On the basis of the results of these 
operations, program officials estimate that there is only a low risk 
that a new high-speed vessel derived from commercial designs would fail 
to meet JHSV key performance parameters. 

In addition to the key performance parameters, other requirements have 
been established for the ship. These additional requirements may 
require the use of existing technologies that have not been proven on 
similar vessels and are in development in other programs. For example, 
one requirement is the installation of a fire suppression system that 
uses high-expansion foam. While high-expansion foam fire suppression 
systems are in use, they have never been used in an open cargo bay of a 
moving ship. There is also a requirement for at-sea tensioned 
refueling, a technology that has not been demonstrated on lightweight 
vessels that rely on waterjet propulsion. This technology is scheduled 
for testing on the Littoral Combat Ship. Another JHSV requirement 
includes engine reliability specifications that have not been 
demonstrated by existing commercial engines. JHSV may be able to 
leverage other shipbuilding programs, such as the Littoral Combat Ship, 
that are currently testing engines with similar requirements. According 
to program officials the additional requirements for JHSV can be 
amended or removed from the ship if associated technologies do not 
mature on time or fail to meet basic performance specifications. 

Design Stability: 

The program is pursuing a phased approach to designing the ship. In 
phase I the program office selected three contractors to develop 
competing preliminary designs based on JHSV requirements. The contracts 
for preliminary design were awarded in January 2008. In phase II the 
program office will select a single contractor and award a contract for 
detailed design and construction sometime in the summer of 2008. Follow-
on ships will be modified versions of this contractor's design. 

Modifications to existing commercial designs may be necessary to meet 
JHSV specifications. For example, existing high-speed structural 
designs may not be adequate to meet the required open ocean transit 
capability. The program office believes that all of the key performance 
parameters have been sufficiently demonstrated on the four leased ships 
and that any necessary modifications are not significant. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense designated the JHSV program for 
the CBA. CBA is a program that establishes metrics used to measure a 
program's progress against an established budget. According to 
officials, the metrics against which the JHSV program will be measured 
have not yet been established. Even when established, CBA metrics will 
not be applied to the program until after the program enters 
development-currently planned for August 2008-when the program's budget 
and requirements will be set. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted 
Sensor System (JLENS). 

Source: JLENS Product Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and 
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is 
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a 
test bed to demonstrate initial capability. Spiral 2 will utilize two 
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well 
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing 
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other 
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Design review: (2/09); 
Low-rate decision: (3/11); 
Full-rate decision: (6/13); 
Initial capability: (9/13); 
Development start: (8/05); 
Last procurement: (2019). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,586.5 million; 
* Procurement: $4,411.1 million; 
Total funding: $6,070.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 14. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2005: $1,904.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,932.9; 
Percent change: 1.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2005: $4,357.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $4,411.1; 
Percent change: 1.2 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2005: $6,330.5; 
Latest, 12/2006: $6,416.8; 
Percent change: 1.4. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2005: $395.655; 
Latest, 12/2006: $401.052; 
Percent change: 1.4. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2005: 16; 
Latest, 12/2006: 16; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2005: 97; 
Latest, 12/2006: 97; 
Percent change: 0. 

[End of table] 

The program began development in August 2005 with one of its five 
critical technologies mature. The program has reduced the number of 
technologies from five to four, and of those, one is approaching 
maturity, while three are not yet mature. All technologies are expected 
to be mature in late 2010. Although the program plans to release nearly 
90 percent of engineering drawings by the design review in February 
2009, risks for redesign remain until technologies demonstrate full 
maturity. The synchronization of JLENS development with the Army's 
effort to integrate its air and missile defense systems also poses a 
risk to the program's schedule. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JLENS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its 
five critical technologies mature. Since that time, the program has 
combined the communications payload and the processing station into the 
communications processing group. The communications processing group, 
which includes radios and fiber optic equipment and also serves as the 
JLENS operations center, is approaching full maturity. Both sensors-- 
the fire control radar and the surveillance radar--along with the 
platform, have not yet reached maturity. The program expects to 
demonstrate these technologies by late 2010. 

According to program officials, JLENS development predominately 
requires integration of existing technologies, and therefore all have 
been demonstrated as mature. However, components of the JLENS platform 
and the two sensors will require modification to their form and fit 
before demonstration in the JLENS operational environment. 

While many of the JLENS sensor technologies have legacy components, key 
hardware that proves functionality, such as the surveillance radar's 
element measurement system that provides data for signal processing, 
have yet to be demonstrated in the size and weight needed for 
integration on the aerostat. Tests to characterize and integrate fire 
control radar and surveillance radar components are currently being 
conducted in the program's system integration laboratory. Furthermore, 
sensor software items related to signal processing, timing, and 
control, as well as element measurement, are not yet mature. 

Design Stability: 

The program estimates that 88 percent of its 17,000 drawings will be 
released by the design review in February 2009. The program will hold a 
number of preliminary design reviews and subsystem design reviews over 
the next year in preparation for this event. However, until the 
maturity of the JLEN'S critical technologies has been demonstrated, the 
potential for design changes remains. 

The platform consists of the aerostat, mobile mooring station, power 
and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support equipment. 
The mobile mooring station--used to anchor the aerostat during 
operations--is the least defined component of the JLENS system and is 
based on a fixed mooring station design. The program has yet to 
demonstrate the mobility of the mooring station, as the design 
parameters associated with modifying it from a fixed to a mobile asset 
have not yet been identified. Consequently, the weight of the mobile 
mooring station may affect its ability to meet transportability 
requirements. 

Other Program Issues: 

JLENS will be a crucial part of the Army's Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense (IAMD) program expected to start development in fiscal year 
2009. IAMD will develop a standard set of interfaces between systems 
such as JLENS and other sensors, weapons, and the battle management, 
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 
components to provide a common air picture. According to program 
officials, the impact of synchronizing the IAMD schedule with JLENS 
development and test schedule is currently unknown. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with 
the information provided in this report. 

[End of section] 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 

Source: JSF Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy 
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. 
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier- 
suitable variant will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The 
conventional takeoff and landing variant will primarily be an air-to- 
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and 
will complement the F-22A. The short takeoff and vertical landing 
variant will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (11/96); 
Development start: (10/01); 
Design review: (6/07); 
Low-rate decision: (6/07); 
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capability, USMC: (3/12); 
Initial capability, USAF: (3/13); 
Initial capability, Navy: (3/15); 
Last procurement: (2034). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $13,976.3 million; 
* Procurement: $192,764.7 million; 
Total funding: $207,178.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,441. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/2001: $37,015.8; 
Latest, 12/2006: $45,826.0; 
Percent change: 23.8. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/2001: $164,221.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $193,652.1; 
Percent change: 17.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/2001: $202,956.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $239,974.3; 
Percent change: 18.2. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/2001: $70.815; 
Latest, 12/2006: $97.630; 
Percent change: 37.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/2001: 2,866; 
Latest, 12/2006: 2,458; 
Percent change: -14.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/2001: 175; 
Latest, 12/2006: 196; 
Percent change: 12.0. 

[End of table] 

Cycle time calculations are based on the Air Force's initial capability 
because they represent over 70 percent of the procurement quantities. 

Two of the eight JSF critical technologies are mature, three are 
nearing maturity, and three (mission systems integration, prognostics 
and health management, and manufacturing technologies) are still 
immature 6 years past the start of development. None of the variants 
demonstrated design stability at their design review, though two have 
now met the standard. The program collects data to manage manufacturing 
maturity, but currently unproven processes and a lack of flight testing 
could mean costly future changes to design and manufacturing processes. 
Program costs have continued to increase and the schedule has slipped 
since the 2004 rebaseline. Very little flight testing has occurred to 
date and the first fully integrated aircraft will not begin flight 
testing for at least 4 years. In 2007 DOD cut the number of test 
aircraft and flight test hours to maintain cost and schedule plans. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JSF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Two of the JSF's eight critical technologies are fully mature and three 
are approaching maturity, but three (mission systems integration, 
prognostics and health management, and manufacturing technologies) are 
immature despite being past the design review. Maturing critical 
technologies during development has led to cost growth, with the 
electric-hydraulic actuation and power thermal management systems costs 
increasing by 195 and 93 percent respectively since 2003. 

Design Stability: 

As of August 2007, the contractor said it had released 99 percent of 
planned engineering drawings for the short takeoff and vertical landing 
variant, 91 percent for the conventional takeoff and landing variant, 
and 46 percent for the carrier variant. All three variants fell 
significantly short of meeting the best practices standard of 90 
percent of drawings released by the critical design reviews--46 percent 
for the short takeoff and landing variant, 43 percent for the carrier 
variant, and 3 percent for the conventional takeoff and landing 
variant. The late release of drawings led to late parts deliveries, 
delaying the program schedule and forcing inefficient manufacturing 
processes. The program began production before delivering an aircraft 
representing the expected design. 

Production Maturity: 

The program is collecting information on production maturity and 
reports that about 10 percent of its critical manufacturing processes 
are in statistical control. While we credit the program for collecting 
this information, efforts to mature production are constrained because 
the designs are not fully proven and tested, and manufacturing 
processes are not demonstrated. The first test aircraft completed 
needed 35 percent more labor hours than planned, and follow-on aircraft 
are not meeting a revised schedule put in place in 2007. Because of 
parts shortages and schedule delays, the test aircraft are being built 
differently from the process expected for the production aircraft. 
Flight testing, began in late 2006, is still in its infancy, with only 
19 of some 5,500 planned flights completed as of November 2007. A fully 
integrated, capable aircraft is not expected to enter flight testing 
until 2012, increasing risks that problems found may require design and 
production changes, as well as retrofit expenses for aircraft already 
built. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since the program rebaseline in fiscal year 2004, estimated acquisition 
costs have increased by about $55 billion (then-year dollars). 
Estimated procurement costs rose due to greater material costs, labor 
costs, and labor hours, a 7-year extension of the procurement schedule 
from fiscal year 2027 to 2034, and a reduction in annual production 
rates. Development costs since the rebaseline have been stable largely 
because the program removed about $2.8 billion for risk reduction and 
an alternate engine program. The program recently restructured 
development efforts to meet schedule and budget requirements. DOD cut 
the number of flight test aircraft and flight test sorties, putting 
greater reliance on the remaining flight test aircraft as well as 
ground tests to free up funds to replace dwindling management reserves. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials 
challenged its balance, use of best practices, and depiction of program 
status. They noted the first aircraft is in flight test, includes all 
major subsystems, and along with other aircraft in work is showing 
unprecedented assembly fit and quality improvements with each aircraft. 
They stated the flying test bed is flying mission systems software and 
reducing risk prior to their first flight on a JSF in early 2009, and 
all mission systems are maturing as planned. The final software block 
enters testing in 2011, and later blocks mainly incorporate sensor and 
weapons updates after lab testing. Officials asserted that data on 
design maturity and drawing release at critical design reviews are not 
accurately presented, saying drawing changes are very low compared to 
legacy systems. They said their plan for spiral blocks of capability 
balances cost, schedule and risk, while GAO's approach would increase 
costs by billions and delay delivery of capability to warfighters. 

GAO Response: 

JSF cost increases and schedule delays are indicative of a program that 
consistently proceeds through critical junctures with knowledge gaps 
that expose the program to significant risks. The new plan to cut test 
assets and test activities is another example of adding risk. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station (JTRS 
AMF): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photographs: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-
Station (JTRS AMF). 

Source: JTRS JPEO. 

[End of figure] 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services. Program/product offices develop hardware and software for 
users with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop radios 
and associated equipment for integration into nearly 100 different 
types of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations for all the services. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Pre-SDD competitive contract award: (9/04); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Development start: (TBD); 
Design readiness: review: (3/09); 
Production decision: (9/11). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,478.0 million; 
* Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: TBD. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of: NA: NA; 
Latest, 12/2007: $1,850.71; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of: NA: NA; 
Latest, 12/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of: NA: NA; 
Latest, 12/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of: NA: NA; 
Latest, 12/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of: NA: NA; 
Latest, 12/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of: NA: NA; 
Latest, 12/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The JTRS AMF program has taken steps to mature technologies prior to 
the start of system development, scheduled for early 2008. A presystem 
development phase started in 2004 with the award of competitive system 
design contracts to two industry teams. During 2006 and 2007, an 
independent technology readiness assessment found that all critical 
technologies had been demonstrated in a relevant environment and were 
approaching full maturity. However, there are concerns about four 
critical technologies needed by JTRS AMF; the program is dependent on 
another JTRS domain for the development of those technologies. In 
addition, JTRS AMF may experience cost, schedule, or performance 
problems if other related program capabilities are delivered late. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS AMF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

To help mitigate technical risks and address key integration 
challenges, the JTRS AMF program awarded competitive predevelopment 
contracts to two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In 
early 2008, after a full and open competition, a contracting team is 
expected to be selected for the JTRS AMF system development. 

During 2006 and 2007, an independent technology readiness assessment 
was completed by the Army in support of the start of system 
development. This assessment found that all critical technologies have 
been demonstrated in a relevant environment. An independent review team 
representing the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and 
Technology concurred with that assessment. As a result, the JTRS AMF 
program is expected to enter system development with all critical 
technologies approaching full maturity. 

While noting the maturity of the JTRS AMF technologies, the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology also expressed 
concern about four critical technologies on which JTRS AMF is 
dependent, including waveforms and network management services. These 
technologies are being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain-
-a separate domain under the Joint Program Executive Office. To address 
the concern, the Deputy Under Secretary recommended that the Joint 
Program Executive Office conduct an independent technical assessment of 
the Network Enterprise Domain's waveforms, networking, and network 
management approaches. In addition, the Deputy Under Secretary 
recommended that a technology readiness assessment be conducted on the 
networking and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) waveforms, as well 
as network management software, to show that they are mature before 
being inserted into the JTRS AMF program. 

Other Program Issues: 

Differences among the program's estimated costs and approved budget 
were resolved at the November 2007 JTRS Board of Directors meeting. The 
effort to reach a joint consensus caused a delay in the program 
schedule but resulted in a full funding decision for system 
development. However, production funding and quantities have not yet 
been finalized. 

The disparity between the cost estimates and approved budget was 
attributable to a number of factors. For example, program office cost 
estimates were influenced by assumptions about the number of JTRS AMF 
variants and waveforms, the number of engineering development models, 
test costs, and contract costs for award fees and engineering change 
orders. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimate was derived, in 
part, from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter communication, navigation and 
identification friend or foe cost history and cost performance reports. 
The approved budget included the effects of prior congressional 
adjustments and reductions to the overall JTRS budget, the overall 
restructuring of the JTRS program, and transfers to the Multifunctional 
Information Distribution System part of the JTRS program. Exacerbating 
the concerns about the difference between cost and budget was that 
estimates of overall program risk for the JTRS AMF program ranged from 
moderate to high. 

The restructuring of the JTRS program has resulted in an Increment 1 
requirement for JTRS AMF to develop (1) a small radio variant for 
airborne platforms that will support the Wideband Networking Waveform, 
the Soldier Radio Waveform, the NATO Link 16/Tactical Digital 
Information Link J waveform, and the MUOS waveform and (2) a large 
radio variant for ships and fixed stations that will support MUOS and 
legacy UHF satellite communications. Currently, the JTRS AMF program 
office assesses the delivery of the MUOS waveform to the program as 
high risk. If the final development documentation and software for the 
MUOS waveform are delivered late, then the design and development of 
JTRS AMF will likely experience cost growth (estimated at $10 million 
to 25 million), schedule delays (estimated at 4-7 months), and 
performance problems (a significant loss of required functionality and/ 
or required operational performance). 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photographs: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS 
GMR). 

Source: JTRS JPEO. 

[End of figure] 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with select radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The JTRS Ground Mobile 
Radio (formerly Cluster 1) product office, within the JTRS Ground 
Domain program office, is developing radios for ground vehicles. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (6/02); 
Design review: (12/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (7/10); 
Full-rate decision: (12/11); 
Initial capability: (12/11). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $588.6 million; 
* Procurement: $13,895.6 million; 
Total funding: $14,484.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 104,285. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2002: $968.5; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,586.5; 
Percent change: 63.8. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2002: $15,576.6; 
Latest, 12/2006: $13,897.2; 
Percent change: -10.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2002: $16,545.0; 
Latest, 12/2006: $15,483.7; 
Percent change: -6.4. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2002: $.153; 
Latest, 12/2006: $.148; 
Percent change: -2.7. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2002: 108,388; 
Latest, 12/2006: 104,425; 
Percent change: -3.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2002: 55; 
Latest, 12/2006: 114; 
Percent change: 107.3. 

Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected 
to change as part of the program's restructuring. 

[End of table] 

Twelve of JTRS GMR's 20 critical technologies are mature. While 5 other 
technologies are approaching maturity, 3 are not expected to mature 
until the production qualification test in early 2009. This includes 2 
technologies--security architecture and the modem hardware and 
software--that were recently downgraded because early prototypes did 
not meet performance requirements. In addition, the program is still 
working to obtain security certification from the National Security 
Agency and has only demonstrated limited networking capabilities. The 
program reports a nearly stable design and expects to have fully 
functioning prototypes in early fiscal year 2009. The program's 
restructuring received final approval by the milestone decision 
authority in November 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS GMR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS GMR program started system development in 2002 with none of 
its 20 critical technologies mature by best practice standards or even 
DOD policy. Currently, 12 critical technologies are mature, 5 are 
approaching maturity, and 3 critical technologies--the bridging 
retransmission software, modem hardware and software, and the security 
architecture--are immature. The maturity of the modem hardware and 
software and the security architecture was downgraded because early 
prototypes did not meet performance requirements. The program expects 
to demonstrate the maturity of all critical technologies during a 
production qualification test scheduled for early 2009. 

Developing multiple levels of security and obtaining security 
certification from the National Security Agency continues to be a 
challenge for JTRS GMR. Security challenges persist, in part because 
waveform software is being developed while security requirements are 
still evolving. Nonetheless, the program office said that it is on 
track to obtain security certification in fiscal year 2010, as 
scheduled, in time for its low-rate production decision later that 
year. 

A central feature of JTRS GMR's networking capabilities is the Wideband 
Networking Waveform being developed under the JTRS Network Enterprise 
Domain, a separate domain under the JTRS Joint Program Executive 
Office. Progress has been made in developing the waveform but testing 
and demonstrations on the JTRS GMR have been limited. The radio's 
closing range and throughput performance have both exceeded 
requirements in field tests. However, the tests were completed using a 
network of only two to six nodes, and key networking functions have yet 
to be demonstrated. Program office officials expect to demonstrate 
progressively greater Wideband Networking Waveform functionality-- 
including mobile ad hoc networking, subnetting, and throughput tests-- 
in field experiments leading up to the Limited User Test scheduled to 
begin in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, when 35 nodes will be 
tested. More extensive functionality will be demonstrated in the Multi- 
Service Operational Test and Evaluation scheduled for early fiscal year 
2012. This test is expected to include 60 nodes and may be augmented 
with additional assets from the Future Combat Systems program. The 
program is also in discussion with the testing community regarding the 
possibility of using complex modeling to test up to 150 nodes. 

Design Stability: 

The program has released approximately 83 percent of its planned 1,575 
drawings. According to the program office, most size, weight, and power 
issues have been addressed, although the program is still working to 
integrate the radios onto legacy platforms. The program has delivered 
71 early prototypes to the Army's Future Combat Systems. While the 
program expects to have fully functioning prototypes available in early 
fiscal year 2009, the immature technologies related to the security 
requirements raise concerns about the program's design stability. 

Production Maturity: 

The program expects that approximately 77 percent of its key 
manufacturing processes will be in statistical control when the program 
makes its low rate production decision in 2010. By not having all 
processes in statistical control, there is a greater risk that the 
radio will not be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets. 

Other Program Issues: 

The JTRS program was restructured in 2006 due to significant cost and 
schedule problems. While significant technical issues remain, the 
restructuring appears to put the program in better position to succeed 
by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach to 
developing and fielding capabilities. The restructuring--including 
program costs--received final approval by the Milestone Decision 
Authority in late November 2007, and was completed with the report to 
Congress on the significant Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches in late 
January 2008. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS). 

Source: JTRS JPEO. 

[End of figure] 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with select radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. The JTRS HMS product office, within the JTRS 
Ground Domain program office, is developing handheld, manpack, and 
small form radios. The program includes two concurrent phases of 
development. Phase I includes select small form variants, while Phase 
II includes small form radios with enhanced security as well as 
handheld and manpack variants. This report assesses both phases. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (4/04); 
Design review: (3/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision, Phase I: (2/09); 
Low-rate decision, Phase II: (4/10); 
Full-rate decision, Phase I: (8/10); 
Full-rate decision, Phase II: (10/11); 
Initial capability, Phase II: (1/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $298.3 million; 
* Procurement: $9,015.5 million; 
Total funding: $9,313.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 328,514. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2004: $517.3; 
Latest, 08/2007: $688.2; 
Percent change: 33.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2004: $9,015.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $9,015.5; 
Percent change: 0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2004: $9,532.8; 
Latest, 08/2007: $9,703.6; 
Percent change: 1.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2004: $.029; 
Latest, 08/2007: $.029; 
Percent change: 1.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2004: 329,574; 
Latest, 08/2007: 329,574; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2004: 85; 
Latest, 08/2007: 93; 
Percent change: 9.4. 

Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected 
to change as part of the program's restructuring. 

[End of table] 

The critical technologies for JTRS HMS have undergone some changes as a 
result of the program's 2006 restructuring. Currently, Phase I includes 
two critical technologies, both of which are approaching maturity. 
Critical technologies for Phase II have yet to be defined. Developing 
multiple layers of communication security and obtaining National 
Security Agency certification continues to be a challenge. In addition, 
while the key networking waveform has been integrated onto JTRS HMS 
radios in a static laboratory environment, program officials report 
that it will take additional efforts to transition the waveform to a 
realistic operational platform. Furthermore, achieving size, weight, 
and heat dissipation requirements for the two-channel handheld radio 
remains a significant challenge. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS HMS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS HMS program started system development in 2004 with only one 
of its six critical technologies mature. However, changes were made to 
the program's acquisition approach and critical technologies as a 
result of the program's restructuring in 2006. The restructured program 
currently includes two concurrent phases of development. Phase I 
development intends to maximize the use of commercial off-the-shelf 
components and products. As such, the program currently reports only 
two critical technologies--logical partitioning and software power 
management--for Phase I products. Both technologies are approaching 
maturity and are expected to be fully mature to support the program's 
low rate production decision in 2009. 

Phase II development will encompass a customized design. Critical 
technologies and associated technology maturity levels for Phase II 
will be defined in a technology readiness assessment scheduled to begin 
12 months prior to the Phase II low-rate production decision in-process 
review currently scheduled for April 2010. The program expects that all 
critical technologies for Phase II will mature sufficiently to begin 
low-rate production deliveries by the second quarter of fiscal year 
2011. 

Developing multiple levels of communication security and obtaining 
security certification from the National Security Agency is a challenge 
for JTRS HMS. The security challenges persist, in part, because 
waveform software is being developed while security requirements are 
still evolving. 

Developing the Operating Environment software and integrating it with 
waveform software also remains a significant challenge. JTRS HMS radios 
will operate the Soldier Radio Waveform, which is a low-power, short- 
range networking waveform optimized for radios with severe size, 
weight, and power constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and 
small form radios. The waveform is being developed by the JTRS Network 
Enterprise Domain, which is a separate domain under the JTRS Joint 
Program Executive Office. The initial version of the Soldier Radio 
Waveform has been successfully integrated into early prototypes. While 
the waveform has demonstrated some functionality in a static laboratory 
environment, program officials noted that it will take some effort to 
transition the waveform to a realistic operational platform. In 
particular, program officials are concerned about the waveform's 
security architecture and how this may affect integrating it into a 
JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the waveform's development schedule 
may be ambitious. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials stated that there will be 527 drawings associated 
with the program. Of that total, 121 are associated with Phase I and 
406 with Phase II. To date, only 55 percent of the Phase I drawings 
have been released to the manufacturer. The program expects the 
remaining drawings to be released in the second quarter of fiscal year 
2008. None of the Phase II drawings are expected to be released until 
after the Phase II critical design review scheduled for the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2008. Achieving size, weight, and heat 
dissipation requirements are still significant challenges on the two- 
channel handheld radio, in part because of security requirements. The 
program expects early prototypes of the 2-channel hand-held to be 
available in early fiscal year 2008. 

Other Program Issues: 

The JTRS program was restructured in 2006 due to a number of high-risk 
elements of the JTRS program. Despite the significant challenges that 
remain, the restructuring appears to put the program in better position 
to succeed by emphasizing an incremental, more moderate risk approach 
to developing and fielding capabilities. The restructuring received 
final approval by the milestone decision authority in late November 
2007. 

Agency Comments: 

The JTRS Joint Program Executive Office provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

KC-X Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: KC-X. 

Source: ASC/PAM. 

Note: Photo is of the KC-135 Stratotanker, the aircraft the KC-X will 
replace. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force KC-X program is the first of three phases in the 
recapitalization of the current KC-135 aerial refueling tanker fleet. 
It is planned to provide sustained aerial refueling capability to 
facilitate global attack, air-bridge, deployment, sustainment, homeland 
defense, theater support, specialized national defense missions, as 
well as airlift capabilities for passenger and palletized cargo 
deployment. The current KC-X acquisition strategy is to procure 179 
commercial aircraft and modify them for military use. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Development start: (1/08-3/08); 
Low-rate decision: (1/10-3/11); 
Initial capability: (7/12-3/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,834.3 million; 
* Procurement: $10,631.2 million; 
Total funding: $12,465.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 48. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,941.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $10,631.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $12,572.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $241.787; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 52; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 69; 
Percent change: NA. 

Cost and quantity data are budgeted amounts for fiscal year 2005 
through fiscal year 2013. An additional $89.8 million remains available 
in the Tanker Replacement Transfer Fund (TRTF). 

[End of table] 

Program officials state the KC-X program will enter system development 
in fiscal year 2008 with mature or near-mature technologies. While the 
candidate commercial airframes and engines are in wide use, with mature 
manufacturing processes and established logistic chains, program 
officials believe the systems integration effort required to meet 
military requirements will be complex and technically challenging. The 
program is the Air Force's highest acquisition priority, yet a 
comprehensive business case analysis that fully considered life cycle 
costs was not conducted in deciding its acquisition strategy. The 
primary decision factor was budgetary--limited funds for system 
development and a $3 billion ceiling on future annual procurements. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

KC-X Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials state that the KC-X program will enter system 
development sometime in fiscal year 2008 with mature technologies or 
technologies approaching maturity. However, actual maturity levels will 
be dependent upon the aircraft design and source selected. Program 
officials assess technical risks as medium, as they anticipate that 
critical technologies will be at least in prototype form and 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. 

Design Stability: 

Because the program has not begun system development, it has not yet 
scheduled a critical design review. While the candidate commercial 
airframes and engines are in wide use with mature manufacturing 
processes and established logistic chains, program officials believe 
that systems integration required to meet military requirements will be 
very complex and technically challenging. The program acknowledges that 
experiences from other programs, particularly avionics modernization 
programs, confirm that systems integration and software developments 
are inherently risky from cost, schedule, and performance standpoints. 
We have also found this to be the case in our review of other programs. 
Although new immature technologies are not likely to be applied to KC- 
X solutions, it is envisioned that the technical integration of 
existing avionics systems will drive significant software development 
as part of the total development effort. While physical integration of 
the KC-X hardware is not particularly challenging, it is the 
electrical, antenna, and software integration that will require 
significant effort. 

Other Program Issues: 

The KC-135 recapitalization is in the first of three expected phases-- 
KC-X, KC-Y, and KC-Z--which may involve the procurement of a total of 
about 600 aircraft over about 40 years. The Air Force considers this 
its highest acquisition priority, and the entire cost for 
recapitalization could exceed $100 billion. 

A March 2006 analysis of alternatives (AOA) formed the foundation for 
much of the cost, schedule, and budgeting assumptions. An internal Air 
Force estimate indicates the potential for higher development and 
production costs for the KC-X program than estimated in the AOA. 
Specifically, development costs could range from $2 billion to $4 
billion. It is expected that final costs for the program will be 
determined by both the program office and an Office of the Secretary of 
Defense independent estimate prior to the beginning of system 
development later this year. 

For the KC-X program, the Air Force is using a competitive approach 
that will select a single source for development and procurement. While 
other options were considered, the Air Force did not conduct a 
comprehensive business case analysis that fully considered life cycle 
costs in deciding its approach. Instead, the acquisition strategy was 
based primarily on budgetary constraints--including limited available 
near-term funding for system development and a $3 billion ceiling on 
future annual procurements. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on this draft, the Air Force stated that program costs 
and program dates are dependent upon the outcome of source selection 
and Milestone B, and currently vary by offeror. 

A full analysis of alternatives was performed for the purpose of 
developing the KC-X acquisition strategy. Additionally, a detailed 
analysis of a dual source contract award was completed, and the results 
were presented to senior leadership. The KC-X acquisition strategy 
emphasizes competition and the first 80 KC-X aircraft will be 
competitively priced. Furthermore, the follow-on KC-Y and KC-Z programs 
will be competitively priced. 

[End of section] 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI). 

Source: ATK. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy 
medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during 
the boost and midcourse phases of flight. The objective system will 
include a fire control and communications unit, hit-to-kill 
interceptors, and launchers. MDA plans to launch the KEI interceptor 
from a variety of platforms, including land-based, and sea-based 
platforms. We assessed the land-based, mobile KEI program. 

Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capacity: 
Program start: (10/02); 
Prime contractor selection: (12/03); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Booster flight test: (3rd Q/FY 2009); 
Design review: (8/11); 
MKV characterization flight: (1st Q/FY 2014). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $2,911.7 million; 
* Procurement: NA; 
Total funding: $2,911.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: $4,038.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: $4,038.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 09/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception 
through fiscal year 2013. 

[End of table] 

According to program officials, in April 2007 MDA directed the KEI 
program to focus on development of technologies critical to the 
interceptor's booster and defer work on the fire control and 
communications unit and the launcher. The program is developing four 
critical booster technologies and none are expected to reach full 
maturity until after system design review in fiscal year 2011. 
Additionally, MDA transferred development responsibility for the 
interceptor kill vehicle critical technologies to other programs. 
Although the program responsible for developing 16 of the 17 kill 
vehicle technologies reports that most are nearly mature, we disagree 
because the technologies have not been demonstrated in the smaller form 
or with the fit required for the KEI interceptor. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

KEI Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

This year, the KEI program increased the total number of critical 
technologies from 7 to 21, recognizing that technologies being 
developed by other programs will be essential to the KEI interceptor's 
kill vehicle. The KEI program office is responsible for 4 technologies, 
while the other 17 are the responsibility of the Multiple Kill Vehicle 
(MKV) and Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) program 
offices. In some cases, these technologies were originally being 
developed by the KEI program. 

The KEI program's current focus is on developing 4 booster 
technologies. These include the attitude control system, booster 
motors, third stage rocket motor, and trapped ball thrust vector 
control. These technologies are at relatively low levels of maturity 
and are not projected to be nearing maturity until the fourth quarter 
of fiscal year 2011, 2 years after the 2009 booster flight test could 
lead to a commitment to fully develop KEI. Backup technologies exist 
for the 4 booster technologies, but they are at the same low level of 
maturity. 

During fiscal year 2007, program officials conducted several static 
fire tests of the first and second stage rocket motors and wind tunnel 
tests of the boost vehicle. The static fire tests collect data on 
rocket motor performance in induced environments, while the wind tunnel 
tests, which were completed in April 2007, helped to validate 
aerodynamic models for the boost vehicle. 

Of the 17 technologies, the MKV program is responsible for maturing 16, 
and the STSS program is responsible for 1. According to the MKV 
program, 14 of the 16 technologies are nearing maturity, while the 
other 2 are at relatively low levels of maturity. However, only the 
carrier vehicle's divert and attitude control system which allows the 
vehicle to alter its course to its target, has demonstrated that it is 
nearing maturity. The other 15 technologies have been used in other 
weapon programs, but the hardware has not been tested in the smaller 
form and with the fit required for the KEI interceptor. Program 
officials agree that these technologies may need to be repackaged to 
properly fit the KEI and further testing may be needed at that time to 
ensure the technology is ready to be incorporated into KEI's design. 
The STSS Program Office is developing the algorithms that enable the 
kill vehicle to discriminate between the exhaust plume and the missile 
body itself. This technology is at a relatively low level of maturity 
and will not reach full maturity until after KEI holds its system 
design review in 2011. 

Design Stability: 

Last year, KEI officials estimated the KEI element would incorporate 
about 7,500 drawings and that 5,000 of these drawings would be complete 
when the program holds a critical design review in the fourth quarter 
of fiscal year 2011. However, program officials recently noted that the 
number of drawings was based on the fire control and communications 
component, the mobile launcher, and the booster. The number of drawings 
is expected to increase when MDA begins developing all the components 
because more interfaces with the Ballistic Missile Defense System's 
(BMDS) Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications 
component will be required as it matures, as more sensors with which 
KEI must connect are fielded, and as the BMDS as a whole becomes more 
complex. The number of drawings will also be adjusted to remove kill 
vehicle drawings and software that will be reported by other programs, 
such as the MKV program. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, prior to the replan in April 2007, KEI 
was focused on developing a three-stage interceptor capable of engaging 
ballistic missiles in the boost phase of their flight. The first two 
rocket motor stages are being developed and flight tested under the 
first booster flight program. The original baseline third stage was a 
shrouded Standard Missile-3 third stage rocket motor. Program officials 
stated that because MDA also wants KEI to engage ballistic missiles 

during the midcourse of their flight, the interceptor will eventually 
develop a third stage rocket motor to accommodate this wider flight 
envelope. The third stage will not be tested prior to or as part of the 
first booster flight test. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures, anti- 
submarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. It consists of the 
ship itself--referred to as a seaframe--and the mission package it 
carries and deploys. The Navy plans to construct the first eight LCS 
seaframes--known as Flight 0--in two unique designs. Two seaframes--one 
of each design--are under construction and expected to deliver in 
August and October 2008. We assessed only the Flight 0 seaframes. See 
pages 119 to 124 for analyses of mission packages. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (9/02); 
Development start: (6/04); 
Production decisionï¿½first design: (12/04); 
Production decisionï¿½second design: (10/05); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
First ship delivery: (8/08); 
Initial capability: (7/09). 
Second ship delivery: (10/08); 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $267.4 million; 
* Procurement: $2,701.7 million; 
Total funding: $2,969.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 9. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2004: $1,304.6; 
Latest, 10/2007: $1,516.9; 
Percent change: 16.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2004: $0.0; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,716.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2004: $1,304.6; 
Latest, 10/2007: $5,233.2; 
Percent change: 301.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2004: $652.297; 
Latest, 10/2007: $348.880; 
Percent change: -46.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2004: 2; 
Latest, 10/2007: 15; 
Percent change: 650.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2004: 41; 
Latest, 10/2007: 62; 
Percent change: 51.2. 

Research and development funding includes detail design and 
construction of two ships. 

[End of table] 

Fifteen of 19 critical technologies for the two LCS seaframe designs 
are fully mature, and another 2 technologies are approaching maturity. 
The overhead launch and retrieval system in the Lockheed Martin design 
and the aluminum structure in the General Dynamics design are immature. 
In addition, the Navy identified watercraft launch and recovery as a 
major risk affecting both seaframe designs, and the aviation landing/ 
retrieval system planned for the Lockheed Martin design may not be 
qualified for use. Further, weight increases experienced in 
construction degraded the hydrodynamic performance of each seaframe, 
prompting the Navy to reduce range at transit speed requirements for 
LCS. Cost growth led the Navy to cancel construction of the third and 
fourth LCS and defer construction of additional ships. The Navy 
continues to modify its acquisition strategy for LCS. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

LCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Navy identifies a total of 19 critical technologies across both LCS 
seaframe designs. Fifteen of these technologies are fully mature, and 
another 2 technologies are approaching maturity. Two other 
technologies--the overhead launch and retrieval system in the Lockheed 
Martin design and the aluminum structure in the General Dynamics 
design--remain immature. 

The Navy has identified the watercraft launch and recovery concept as a 
major risk to both LCS seaframe designs. This capability is essential 
to complete anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions 
planned for LCS. According to the Navy, industry watercraft launch and 
recovery designs are untested and unproven. To mitigate this risk, the 
Navy is conducting launch and recovery modeling and simulation, model 
basin testing, and experimentation. The Navy is encouraging the LCS 
seaframe industry teams to adopt similar approaches. Final integration 
of watercraft to each LCS seaframe design is not expected until the 
third quarter of fiscal year 2009--after the Navy has accepted delivery 
of the first two LCS seaframes. 

In addition, while the Navy has identified the aviation landing/ 
retrieval system as a mature technology, it is concerned that this 
system may not be qualified for use on the Lockheed Martin seaframe and 
may, in fact, result in damage to aircraft. The Navy has developed a 
system qualification and certification plan to mitigate this risk and 
intends to conduct pierside testing and training of the aviation 
landing/retrieval system in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

The Navy assesses LCS seaframe design stability by monitoring changes 
to the requirements documents, execution of engineering change 
proposals, and the completion of contract deliverables related to 
drawings, ship specifications, and independent certification of the 
design. Seaframe construction is monitored through use of earned value 
management to measure cost and schedule performance as well as 
evaluation of manufacturing hours spent on rework, deficiencies 
detected and corrected, and the number of test procedures performed. 

The Navy adopted a concurrent design-build strategy for the first two 
LCS seaframes, which has since proven unsuccessful. Contributing 
challenges included implementation of new design guidelines (referred 
to as Naval Vessel Rules), delays to major equipment deliveries, and an 
unwavering focus on achieving schedule and performance goals. 
Subsequently, these events drove low levels of outfitting, out-of- 
sequence work, and rework on the lead ships--all of which increased 
construction costs. 

In addition, the lack of a complete and integrated design prior to ship 
construction led to weight increases for both seaframe designs. This 
weight growth degraded the hydrodynamic performance of each seaframe 
and shortened endurance ranges below threshold requirements. To 
compensate, the Navy has revised the LCS capability development 
document to reduce the speeds associated with threshold and objective 
endurance range requirements. The Navy now expects both seaframe 
designs to meet endurance range requirements. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy expects the first two LCS to exceed their combined budget of 
$472 million by over 100 percent and anticipates lead ship delivery 
will occur nearly 18 months later than initially planned. As a result 
of these challenges, the Navy canceled construction of the third and 
fourth LCS and deferred construction of additional seaframes. The Navy 
plans to use funds previously appropriated for construction of the 
fifth and sixth LCS seaframes to pay for cost growth on the remaining 
two ships under contract. The Navy continues to modify its acquisition 
strategy for LCS. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The ASW mission package is one of three mission packages for the Navy's 
Littoral Combat Ship. ASW is designed to counter threats from 
submarines in waters close to shore, called littorals, using manned and 
unmanned mission systems. The mission package is being developed and 
delivered in increments of capability, with the first package-- 
consisting primarily of prototypes--to be delivered in 2008. For 
discussions on the other mission packages, as well as LCS itself, see 
pages 117, 121, and 123. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (5/04); 
Design review: (12/06); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
First package delivery: (2/08); 
Procurement start: (4/09). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $13.1 million; 
* Procurement: $703.6 million; 
Total funding: $716.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 14. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $191.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $721.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $912.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $57.046; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 16; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

The cost to procure the MH-60R and the Vertical Take-off Autonomous 
Aerial Vehicle are not reflected in the mission package program costs, 
as they are not procured directly by the program. 

[End of table] 

As the delivery of the first anti-submarine warfare mission package 
approaches, the critical technologies and design both continue to 
mature. The program office identified 12 technologies as critical for 
this package, 5 of which remain immature. A production representative, 
deployable package will not be delivered until fiscal year 2011. The 
program tracks design drawings for only those portions of mission 
systems that require alteration to deploy from LCS, as well as those 
for the containers in which mission systems are stored and transported. 
The design was not complete at critical design review. Neither the 
critical technologies nor the design of this package are expected to be 
fully mature until after they have been demonstrated as prototypes 
aboard the second LCS ship. The program office does not currently track 
critical process control data or use other production metrics. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

LCS ASW Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Delivery of the first anti-submarine warfare mission package for LCS is 
expected to occur in February 2008. Of the 12 critical technologies 
identified, seven are fully mature, two are approaching full maturity, 
and three are immature. The technologies currently requiring further 
development include sensors for submarine detection intended for use on 
unmanned platforms. If they fail to develop as expected, it could 
increase reliance on the manned MH-60R helicopter, which has reached 
full maturity, or the unmanned surface vehicle and its towed array 
sensor, both of which are nearing full maturity. 

Design Stability: 

The Navy's warfare center in Newport, Rhode Island and systems center 
in San Diego, California are responsible for the ASW mission package 
design. This mission package contains a number of systems that have 
been developed and designed by other programs for other purposes, such 
as the MH-60R and the Vertical Take-off Autonomous Aerial Vehicle. The 
LCS mission module program office tracks design stability for only 
those portions of mission systems that require alterations to deploy 
from LCS and the containers in which they are transported and stored. 
Seventy-four percent of the drawings needed for these alterations are 
currently complete. For example, while the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle 
was developed as a mine countermeasures system for use on destroyers, 
the program office is working to integrate it with sensors to detect 
submarines and to enable its launch and recovery from the LCS. These 
design changes will be integrated into production through the 
submission of engineering change proposals to the affected system's 
original program office. Quantities with designs specific to LCS will 
then be ordered as extensions to existing contracts where available. 

Production Maturity: 

The LCS ASW mission package containers--which include the connections 
necessary for the utilities needs of mission systems--are designed by 
the Navy and will be produced by Northrop Grumman Corporation, 
Integrated Systems Division. Northrop Grumman will be responsible for 
collecting the mission systems and integrating them with the containers 
beginning with the package delivered in 2011. 

The first two ASW mission modules will be assembled by the Navy's 
warfare center in Newport, which does not track critical process 
control data or other production metrics. The program relies on others 
for the production of mission systems when possible, and on its 
contractor for production of the mission package containers. The 
exception is the unmanned surface vehicle, where no current production 
contractor exists. According to the program office, these systems are 
being produced by U.S. Naval laboratories. 

Other Program Issues: 

The first two ASW mission packages, expected to deliver in fiscal year 
2008, will consist largely of prototypes or low-rate initial production 
items. According to the program office, these mission packages are not 
considered deployable and will be used only to demonstrate performance 
and concepts of operation from LCS seaframes. The mission systems 
delivered in these packages will eventually be upgraded to production 
representative, deployable systems. The first mission packages may also 
deliver without some of the software needed for full functionality. The 
third mission package, expected for delivery in 2011, should consist of 
fully mature, deployable, and production representative mission 
systems. According to program officials, the final number of anti- 
submarine warfare mission packages to be procured and the concepts of 
operation that guide their use are currently under review. 

Agency Comments: 

LCS mission modules program officials noted they define production of a 
mission package as the support container procurement, assembly, 
checkout, and verification of readiness for issue of the mission module 
components that constitute an integrated package. They contend 
traditional manufacturing processes and metrics may not be applicable 
to the production of a mission package. 

These officials also stated that the the first two ASW unmanned surface 
vehicles were designed and built under a contract to build a total of 
four. They plan to transition production responsibility to a program of 
record in fiscal year 2009 for future mission packages. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM). 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Mine Countermeasures (MCM) for the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship 
include mine hunting, neutralization, and sweep systems deployed from 
the MH-60S helicopter and other unmanned underwater, aerial, and 
surface vehicles. Packages represent increments of capability, the 
first of which was delivered in September 2007 and included six of 11 
planned systems. The third delivery, scheduled for fiscal year 2011, 
will contain the full capability needed for the MCM mission. Pages 117, 
119 and 123 describe LCS and its other mission packages. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (5/04); 
Design review: (9/06); 
First package delivery: (9/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Production start: (6/08); 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $4.2 million; 
* Procurement: $1,841.4 million; 
Total funding: $1,854.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 22. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $119.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $847.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $976.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $40.665; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 24; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Quantities are subject to change pending finalization of concepts of 
operation and alignment with LCS seaframe characteristics. 

[End of table] 

Technologies used in the MCM package are all mature or approaching 
maturity. However, delays in testing some airborne systems from the MH- 
60S helicopter--due to both integration challenges and competing fleet 
demands for the MH-60S--may delay the fielding of some MCM systems to 
later packages. Some systems in the MCM package were initially 
developed for fielding on other ships, and the Navy is redesigning them 
to accommodate launch and recovery systems planned for LCS. The MCM 
package design is not yet stable; at the design readiness review, only 
47 percent of design drawings were releasable. The program does not 
track production metrics and is relying on test results using ships 
other than LCS to inform full-rate production decisions. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

LCS MCM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office identified 11 technologies for use in the fully 
capable MCM package: four vehicles, five sensors for hunting and 
sweeping, and two weapons for neutralization. All technologies are 
mature or approaching maturity. We evaluated five of these systems last 
year in our review of Airborne Mine Countermeasures--a capability 
dependent on successful integration of new systems with the MH-60S 
helicopter. Difficulty scheduling and conducting some system tests with 
the helicopter may affect plans to field MCM systems with the package. 
Recent tests identified technical challenges with a cable the 
helicopter uses to tow MCM systems. If the cable continues to 
malfunction in testing, fielding of airborne MCM systems may be 
delayed. 

Design Stability: 

The MCM package design is not yet stable. The Navy only tracks the 
design of mission system elements that require modification for use on 
LCS, along with drawings for system storage, support, and transport 
containers. At the design readiness review, 47 percent of expected 
drawings were releasable; subsequently the expected number of drawings 
increased by about 12 percent due to changes driven by weight, cost, 
and producibility issues. 

Although the MCM package has yet to be fully demonstrated aboard LCS, 
the Navy plans to make full-rate production decisions on several MCM 
systems. These systems are scheduled for tests that assess their 
suitability and effectiveness, but the Navy plans to conduct these 
tests aboard other ships, not LCS. LCS features a new automated launch, 
recovery, and handling system that is fully integrated with the 
seaframe; however, the Navy will not be able to test MCM systems with 
it until a seaframe is delivered in fiscal year 2009. As a result, the 
Navy may not fully understand the suitability of new MCM systems to 
operate from LCS. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office is not tracking critical process control or other 
production data. Although the Navy will deliver packages in fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010, they will continue to be configured with 
prototypes and low-rate initial production articles as they become 
available. The package will not be configured in production- 
representative form until the third package, expected for delivery in 
fiscal year 2011, the same time the design is to be stable. The LCS 
program has primary responsibility for integrating mission systems into 
modules for use on LCS, but relies on other program offices and 
contractors for production of mission systems when possible. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy continues to refine concepts of operation for LCS and its 
mission packages. While initial packages meet the Navy's weight 
requirement, they lack some systems required for full mission 
capability. Currently, the fully configured package is expected to 
exceed its weight requirement by about 10 percent. The Navy is 
exploring ways to reduce weight while maintaining capability. If 
desired weight reductions are not achieved, the Navy may be forced to 
reduce MCM capability or accept a reduction in the ship's speed and 
endurance. This would affect earlier packages the Navy plans to backfit 
to be fully capable. Also, the crew members needed to operate the MCM 
package may exceed seaframe capacity. Navy mission planners and 
operators estimated 19 mission package and 23 aviation detachment crew 
would be needed per ship to complete planned missions--seven more than 
capacity. 

Agency Comments: 

Program officials state they define production as support container 
procurement, assembly, checkout and verification of readiness for issue 
of mission module components constituting an integrated package. They 
note design stability will be achieved at completion of the Technical 
Data Package for the first production package planned for delivery in 
fiscal year 2011. Traditional manufacturing processes and metrics may 
not be applicable to mission package production, and the LCS seaframe 
construction schedule allows limited access for package testing prior 
to delivery. Mission modules and systems are undergoing extensive 
testing in ways that do not require the ship. Surrogate platforms are 
being used to test some systems. Crew workload has been reassessed; the 
original estimate of 19 has been reduced to 15 mission package crew 
members, and the aviation detachment will increase from 20 to 23 to 
meet the mission requirement. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW). 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The SuW mission package is one of three mission packages for the Navy's 
Littoral Combat Ship. SuW is designed to detect, track, and engage 
small boat threats to maximize striking power and successfully move 
through waters close to shore, called littorals. The mission package is 
being developed and delivered in increments of capability, with the 
first SuW package--consisting primarily of prototypes--scheduled for 
delivery in June 2008. For discussions on the other mission packages, 
as well as LCS itself, see pages 117, 119, and 121. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (5/04); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
First package delivery: (6/08); 
Design reviewï¿½30mm gun: (10/08); 
Design reviewï¿½missile system: (6/09); 
Procurement start: (8/09). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Washington, D.C:
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $33.7 million; 
* Procurement: $493.2 million; 
Total funding: $526.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 22. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $156.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $493.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $649.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $27.047; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 24; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

The cost to procure the MH-60R and the Vertical Take-off Autonomous 
Aerial Vehicle are not reflected in the mission package costs as they 
are not procured directly by the program. 

[End of table] 

The program office identified four critical technologies for the SuW 
mission package, three of which are mature. A production 
representative, deployable package will not be delivered until fiscal 
year 2011. The non-line-of-sight missile system is not mature and the 
program relies on the Army to develop that system. Design of the SuW 
mission package is tracked in a unique manner, as many of the 
technologies are complete systems in themselves. The program office 
tracks only the changes to those systems needed to interface and deploy 
with LCS. Design completion of the SuW mission package has been delayed 
due to the immaturity of the missile system and funding issues for the 
30 mm gun. The program office does not currently track critical process 
control data or other production metrics. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

LCS SuW Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office identified four technologies for use in the SuW 
mission package. Of these the manned MH-60R helicopter, unmanned 
Vertical Take-off Autonomous Aerial Vehicle, and 30 mm gun system are 
considered fully mature, while the non-line-of-sight missile system 
remains immature. While the program office considers the 30 mm gun 
itself to be mature, its integration with LCS is not complete. 

The Navy relies on the Army's Future Combat System for development of 
the missile system and will work with FCS to integrate it with LCS. As 
a result, the first SuW package, currently scheduled for delivery in 
June 2008, will not include the missile system. The first missile 
launcher will be delivered as a prototype without missiles in the 
second mission package in 2009, and missiles will deliver with the 
fourth mission package in fiscal year 2011. Should this technology fail 
to develop as anticipated, LCS will become more reliant on its guns for 
self-defense and upon the MH-60R for striking targets at greater 
distances. 

Design Stability: 

Design of the SuW mission package is tracked in a unique manner. To 
ensure the technologies used will be compatible with LCS, the program 
has established interface specifications that each system must meet. 
The program office tracks design drawings, which are at 34 percent, for 
those parts of the systems it adapts to ensure the correct interface 
with LCS. According to program officials, the SuW mission package 
differs from other mission packages in that it will not be placed in 
containers for deployment on LCS. Instead, the 30 mm gun and missile 
system will be placed directly on the ship. 

Due to a lack of technical maturity, completion of the missile system 
design for LCS has been delayed and is scheduled to complete in fiscal 
year 2011, after the missile system is demonstrated aboard LCS. 
According to the program office, the main challenge in the design is 
passing Navy munitions and safety requirements. 

The Navy delayed design of the 30 mm gun module for budgetary reasons 
and will not complete the design until fiscal year 2009. In addition, 
the program has been discussing adding a capability for manned firing 
of the 30 mm gun as well as the planned remote firing capability. 
Introduction of this requirement could lead to further design changes. 
According to the program office, developmental testing of the gun will 
begin in 2009. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the program office, the first three mission packages will 
be assembled and delivered by the Navy warfare center in Dahlgren, 
Virginia, which does not track critical process control data or other 
production metrics. Beginning in 2011, production-representative 
mission packages will be produced and delivered by Northrop Grumman. 
The LCS program relies on other program offices and their contractors 
for the production of mission systems when possible. 

Other Program Issues: 

The first two mission packages are scheduled for delivery in fiscal 
years 2008 and 2009. However, neither of these is complete or 
deployable. For example, the first package will contain only a 
prototype of the 30 mm gun system. The first mission package delivery 
with all key systems present in production representative variants does 
not occur until the fourth mission package in fiscal year 2011. 
According to program officials, the quantities and concept of 
operations for the mission package are not yet finalized. 

Agency Comments: 

The LCS mission modules program office defines production of a mission 
package as the support container procurement, assembly, checkout and 
the verification of readiness for issue of the mission module 
components that constitute an integrated mission package. Traditional 
manufacturing processes and metrics may not be applicable to the 
production of a mission package. 

The delivery strategy for the SuW mission package includes an 
incremental capability approach that delivers mature mission modules 
first, such as the 30mm gun module, followed by the delivery of the 
missile capability, after its technology maturity has been achieved. 
The Army is leading the development of the missile system and the Navy 
continues to work closely with the Army on its integration into LCS. 

[End of section] 

LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship. 

Source: Amphibious Warfare Program Office, LHA 6 Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's LHA 6 will replace aging Tarawa-class amphibious assault 
ships and is designed to embark, land, and support expeditionary 
forces. The LHA 6 is a modified variant of the LHD 8 amphibious assault 
ship currently under construction. The LHA 6 design will feature 
enhanced aviation capabilities and is optimized to support new aircraft 
such as the V-22 Osprey and Joint Strike Fighter. The LHA 6 is 
scheduled to start fabrication in April 2008 and is expected for 
delivery in 2012. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (7/01); 
Development start: (5/05); 
Design review: (10/05); 
Production decision: (1/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Construction start: (4/08); 
Ship delivery: (8/12); 
Initial capability: (2/14). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Ship Systems; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $31.9 million; 
* Procurement: $1,378.1 million; 
Total funding: $1,409.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 01/2006: $209.8; 
Latest, 08/2007: $211.3; 
Percent change: 0.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 01/2006: $2,810.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,980.9; 
Percent change: 6.1. 

Total program cost; 
As of 01/2006: $3,020.3; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,192.1; 
Percent change: 5.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 01/2006: $3,020.258; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,192.086; 
Percent change: 5.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 01/2006: 1; 
Latest, 08/2007: 1; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 01/2006: 146; 
Latest, 08/2007: 151; 
Percent change: 3.4. 

Another LHA ship--LHA 7--is being acquired separately through the 
Maritime Prepositioning Force Future program and is not reflected here. 

[End of table] 

In 2005, DOD and the Navy determined that the LHA 6 program had no 
critical technologies because all of the ship's critical systems and 
equipment utilize technologies from existing Navy programs. Almost 45 
percent of LHA 6 design is based on LHD 8, currently under 
construction. The program office identified six key subsystems needed 
to achieve the system's full capability, one of which is not fully 
mature. In addition, there are two subsystems that may pose some risk-
-the air conditioning plant and the machinery control system. The ship 
design is about 30 percent complete. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

LHA 6 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In 2005, DOD and the Navy concluded that all LHA 6 components and 
technologies were fully mature, technology requirements were sufficient 
to enter system development, and the program could proceed without a 
formal technology readiness assessment. The program did identify six 
key subsystems needed to achieve full LHA 6 capability. Five of these 
subsystems are mature technologies used on numerous Navy ships. 
According to program officials, these technologies will not be modified 
for LHA 6 and further development will not be required for ship 
integration. The sixth key subsystem, the Joint Precision Approach and 
Landing System (JPALS)--a Global Positioning System (GPS)-based 
aircraft landing system--is not mature. JPALS will be used to support 
the all-weather landings of next-generation Navy aircraft, including 
the Joint Strike Fighter. JPALS is still in development and is expected 
to be fielded on other ships prior to its integration on LHA 6. 
According to the program office, JPALS is not needed to achieve the LHA 
6 operational requirements, and the ship's construction schedule is not 
dependent on JPALS availability. Although JPALS is already planned as a 
post-delivery item, officials state that the LHA 6 design has 
incorporated space for JPALS based on initial estimates of its 
specifications and that legacy aviation control will serve as the 
backup technology in the event that JPALS development is delayed. 

Though they are not considered critical technologies, the program 
office has identified two subsystems that may pose some risk--the air 
conditioning plant and the machinery control system. The 500-ton air 
conditioning plant for the LHA 6 is the only machinery/auxiliary system 
that differs from the LHD 8 ship and, according to program officials, 
is a minor adaptation of plants used aboard Virginia-class submarines. 
Program officials state that the LHA 6 air conditioning plants are 
undergoing shock and vibration testing and have begun production. 

According to program officials, the machinery control system on LHA 6-
-which controls the ship's propulsion and electric plants, damage 
control, and auxiliary systems--is an area of risk. LHA 6 will reuse 75 
percent of the machinery control system software from LHD 8, and while 
the LHA 6 machinery control system is to be a less complex version of 
the system on LHD 8, program officials have stated it is the biggest 
technology risk on LHD 8. Due to increasing quantity and automation of 
machinery control systems on ship classes in coming years, the Navy 
conducted an internal review to determine capacity and availability of 
technical resources to oversee the implementation and introduction of 
these systems into the fleet. Although the program office previously 
stated that the reuse of LHD 8 machinery control system software is a 
deliberate strategy to mitigate cost, schedule, and technical risk, 
officials are now concerned about difficulty and delays in the LHD 8 
machinery control system; this may affect the schedule for LHA 6. 

Design Stability: 

The Navy conducted a design review of LHA 6 in October 2005, and 
determined that its preliminary design was stable. According to program 
officials almost 45 percent of the design effort is expected to be 
based on LHD 8, while more than half of the ship will require newly 
created designs or modifications from LHD 8. Major adjustments from the 
LHD 8 design will include expansion of the aviation hanger deck to 
create more space for future aircraft, removal of the well deck to 
accommodate increased hanger space and additional aviation fuel 
capacity, and updated warfare systems. 

The Navy finalized a fixed-price incentive contract for detail design 
and construction with Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in June 2007. 
According to the program office, design of the ship is about 30 percent 
complete. 

Navy officials noted that a production readiness review that will 
assess design progress is scheduled for March 2008. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Longbow Apache Block III. 

Source: U.S. Air Force, Apache PMO. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's AH-64D Longbow Apache can be employed day or night, in 
adverse weather and obscurants, and is capable of engaging and 
destroying advanced threat weapon systems. The primary targets of the 
aircraft are mobile armor and air defense units, with secondary targets 
being threat helicopters. Block III enhancements are intended to ensure 
the Longbow Apache is compatible with the Future Combat System 
architecture, is a viable member of the future force, and is 
supportable through 2030. We assessed all phases of the program. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (7/06); 
Design review: (1/08); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (4/10); 
Initial capability: (1/13); 
Last procurement: (2024). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $793.2 million; 
* Procurement: $6,388.3 million; 
Total funding: $7,181.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 634. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2006: $1,097.5; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,082.9; 
Percent change: -1.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2006: $5,780.8; 
Latest, 12/2006: $6,388.3; 
Percent change: 10.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2006: $6,878.3; 
Latest, 12/2006: $7,471.2; 
Percent change: 8.6. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2006: $11.426; 
Latest, 12/2006: $11.692; 
Percent change: 2.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2006: 602; 
Latest, 12/2006: 639; 
Percent change: 6.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2006: 79; 
Latest, 12/2006: 78; 
Percent change: -1.2. 

[End of table] 

The Apache Block III entered system development and demonstration in 
July 2006 with one critical technology--an improved drive system--which 
is approaching full maturity. The program plans to complete three 
phases of development and meet requirements through a series of 
technology insertions, each requiring integration, test, and 
qualification. The Army reports that these technology insertions were 
fully mature at development start. Only the first phase of insertions 
will need to be installed at the factory; the others can be installed 
in the field. A production decision for the first phase is scheduled in 
fiscal year 2010. Since development start, an increase in production 
quantities and a subsequent delivery restructure have led to an 
increase of total procurement costs. Weight is closely monitored to 
avoid affecting performance while not exceeding required limits. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

Longbow Apache BLIII Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The system entered development in July 2006 with one critical 
technology, an improved drive system, which is approaching full 
maturity. This technology will be used in a helicopter transmission for 
the first time and is expected to improve the available power and 
reliability over the existing transmission. The drive system has been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment, and the Army has plans for 
flight testing in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to evaluate its full 
maturity. 

To upgrade and modernize the Apache system, a time-phased series of 
technical insertions is planned for development. The Apache Block III 
funding profile does not allow all of the required system improvements 
to be fielded with the first aircraft lot. The insertion plan was based 
on (1) program funding availability, (2) aircraft going to the factory 
one time for modification, and (3) a single final Block III 
configuration. The technology insertion approach leverages other 
development programs with mature, production ready technologies that 
will require integration, test, and qualification on the Apache Block 
III platform. 

System development occurs in three phases. The first phase will 
complete integration qualification of all required hardware changes 
applied to Apache Block III helicopters. Two limited development phases 
with follow-on improvements requiring further technical insertions will 
be necessary. With the exception of the common data link hardware, the 
follow-on development phases will consist of software improvements that 
although limited in scope, still require planning, test, and 
evaluation. These insertions will be applied in the field, and aircraft 
will not be required to return to the factory to achieve the later 
configuration upgrades. A low-rate production decision for the first 
phase of development is scheduled for April 2010, with a full-rate 
decision scheduled for April 2012. Subsequent configuration upgrades 
for the remaining development phases will be dependent on successful 
interim design reviews scheduled for fiscal years 2014 and 2016. 

Design Stability: 

According to program officials, 92 percent of design drawings were 
released at the design review in January 2008. Criteria established in 
the development contract requires 85-90 percent of the total drawings 
be complete for a successful design review. If they are not releasable, 
the program office will assess the criticality of the drawing shortage 
and require the contractor to provide a plan for completion. Until the 
maturity of the critical technology and technology insertions have been 
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains. 

The weight of the Apache Block III aircraft is considered a moderate 
cost risk. The current design weight margin is approximately 100 pounds 
below specification empty weight. Historical data from other new 
helicopter development programs indicate a 5-percent typical weight 
growth. As a result, subsystem integrated product teams monitor weight 
allocations weekly and are trying to minimize weight increases to the 
aircraft. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since the start of program development, the Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army approved a program change increasing the Apache Block III 
production quantity from 597 to 634. Further, deliveries were 
restructured from 60 to 48 a year, thereby stretching the program 
schedule by 4 years. The costs associated with both the remanufacture 
of the additional 37 aircraft and the stretched delivery schedule led 
to an increase in total procurement costs, as reported in the December 
2006 Selected Acquisition Report. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 


[End of section] 

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Light Utility Helicopter (LUH). 

Source: LUH Product Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Army's Light Utility Helicopter is a new aircraft acquisition that 
will conduct exclusively noncombat missions in support of specific Army 
tasks, to include homeland security support operations, disaster 
relief, search and rescue, general support, medical evacuation, and 
support for Army training and test centers. The Army is purchasing a 
commercially available helicopter for this mission rather than enter 
into a new development program. The commercial system has been in use 
as a medical evacuation helicopter. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start/production review: (6/06); 
Initial operational test and evaluation: (3/07); 
Initial capability: (5/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Last procurement: (2016). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: EADS North America Defense Co.
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete: 
* R&D: $0.0 million; 
* Procurement: $1,555.9 million; 
Total funding: $1,555.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 280. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/2006: $0.0; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3.4; 
Percent change: 100.0. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/2006: $1,617.0; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1789.5; 
Percent change: 10.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/2006: $1,617.0; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,792.8; 
Percent change: 10.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/2006: $5.022; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5.568; 
Percent change: 10.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 06/2006: 322; 
Latest, 08/2007: 322; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/2006: 10; 
Latest, 08/2007: 11; 
Percent change: 10.0. 

The system is a commercial system with no developmental efforts or 
design review. Acquisition cycle time measurement is not applicable. 

[End of table] 

The LUH is a commercial off-the-shelf procurement. No further 
developmental efforts are planned, and the system's technology and 
design are mature. Production maturity is high since the selected 
system--the Eurocopter-145--is a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
certified aircraft and currently in use commercially. The contract for 
the system was awarded on June 30, 2006. Limited operational test and 
evaluation was conducted in March 2007. The system is currently in low- 
rate production and 16 aircraft were delivered as of November 2007. 
Full-rate production was approved in August 2007. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

LUH Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The LUH is an off-the-shelf procurement of a fully developed, FAA- 
certified commercial aircraft. The LUH program office considers the 
system's five critical technologies as mature. These critical 
technologies are (1) network-ready communications, (2) cabin size 
sufficient for 2 crew and 6 passenger seats, (3) force protection-- 
defined as the capability of the crew to operate all flight controls 
while wearing standard protection suits, (4) survivability--defined as 
meeting FAA standards for crashworthy seats and fuel tanks, and (5) 
performance--defined as the ability to carry 2 patients on litters with 
a medical attendant and equipment. Four modifications were approved to 
be added to the aircraft: a secure military radio, a cabin temperature 
ventilation system to mitigate a temperature elevation observed during 
limited operation test and evaluation, an engine inlet barrier filter, 
and a modification to the medical evacuation mission support kit. 
Program officials state that no development efforts are necessary for 
the aircraft or the modifications. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the status of the LUH design because program 
officials said that the aircraft was based on a fully developed 
commercial aircraft and therefore stable. Also, since the LUH aircraft 
is already flying, the program office is not requiring the contractor 
to provide technical drawings for the system. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials state that production maturity is at a high level 
because the aircraft is a commercially available helicopter and 
production lines are already established. For this reason, they will 
not require statistical process control data on the system as it is 
produced. 

The Army awarded a low-rate initial production contract for up to 42 
aircraft in June 2006 and full-rate production was approved in August 
2007. Sixteen aircraft have been delivered as of November 2007. The 
Army plans to acquire a total of 322 aircraft. 

Other Program Issues: 

The helicopter will not fly combat missions or be deployed into combat 
areas and the contractor will provide total logistics support. Due to a 
reprogramming of funding in fiscal year 2007, some of the aircraft buys 
have been moved to later in the program. This action and the four 
modifications discussed earlier have resulted in an increase in total 
procurement costs. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS). 

Source: MIDS JTRS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The MIDS program is transforming the existing MIDS Low Volume Terminal-
-a jam-resistant, secure voice and data information distribution 
system--into a 4-channel, JTRS-compliant radio that will be used in 
different types of aircraft, ships, and ground stations for the 
military services. We assessed the development of the MIDS-JTRS core 
terminal. We also reviewed the status of the planned JTRS platform 
capability package, which includes an airborne networking waveform, 
being developed by the JTRS Network Enterprise Domain. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development startï¿½core terminal: (12/04); 
Design reviewï¿½core terminal: (5/06); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decisionï¿½core terminal: (3/08); 
Initial capabilityï¿½core terminal: (3/09). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Data Link Solutions, ViaSat; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $95.9 million:
* Procurement: $194.4 million; 
Total funding: $290.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 371. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2004: $295.1; 
Latest, 08/2007: $417.1; 
Percent change: 41.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2004: $0.0; 
Latest, 08/2007: $205.5; 
Percent change: 100.0. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2004: $295.1; 
Latest, 08/2007: $622.6; 
Percent change: 110.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2004: $9.223; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1.438; 
Percent change: -84.4. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2004: 32; 
Latest, 08/2007: 433; 
Percent change: 1253.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2004: 50; 
Latest, 08/2007: 50; 
Percent change: 0. 

Procurement costs and quantity relate only to core terminal. 

[End of table] 

All four of the core terminal critical technologies are approaching 
maturity. In addition, core terminal engineering development models 
have been integrated into F/A-18 aircraft and are now undergoing 
testing in an operational environment. Test results will be used to 
support a planned low-rate initial production decision. The design of 
the core terminal is considered stable and production processes are 
considered mature. However, in September 2007, the JTRS Board of 
Directors suspended the design, development, fabrication, and testing 
of the JTRS platform capability package pending a determination of 
whether there were enough potential users among the military services 
to support this effort. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MIDS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The core terminal's four critical technologies--(1) Link-16 waveform 
software, (2) Link-16 architectural design, (3) operating environment, 
and (4) programmable crypto module--are approaching maturity. Several 
technical issues emerged during development, but they have largely been 
resolved. In 2006, cryptographic subsystem component stability and 
power issues caused a delay in software and firmware development, 
leading to delays in radio integration, test, and qualification 
efforts. Also, since the core terminal will be the first JTRS radio to 
undergo National Security Agency certification, it has faced challenges 
in meeting security requirements. Presently, it has received National 
Security Agency design concurrence and over-the-air approval in a F/A- 
18 aircraft. In addition, a delay in requirements approval has resulted 
in a 12-month delay of the program's low-rate initial production 
decision. To mitigate the impact of this delay, program officials have 
modified and accelerated the delivery plan for air worthiness and 
production transition terminals. According to program officials, the 
accelerated delivery of these terminals will support the developmental 
and operational testing schedule and allow the program to meet the 
planned initial operational capability date scheduled for fiscal year 
2009. They further noted that the program office began demonstrating 
the terminal's capabilities in an operational environment during the 
first quarter of fiscal year 2008 and thus far have not disclosed any 
significant technical issues. Program officials stated that these test 
results will be used to support the core terminal program's low-rate 
initial production decision, scheduled for March 2008. 

Design Stability: 

According to program officials, the core terminal's design is stable, 
as the program has released 100 percent of its design drawings to the 
manufacturer. However, until the maturity of the core terminal's 
critical technologies has been demonstrated in an operational 
environment, the potential for design changes remain. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials stated that production maturity is high because the 
core terminal is a form, fit, and function replacement for the MIDS Low 
Volume Terminal. They further noted that the MIDS-JTRS program type 
manufacturing processes are the same as those employed in the MIDS Low 
Volume Terminal program. 

Other Program Issues: 

In March 2006, the program office began preliminary studies and 
specification work on the JTRS platform capability package. This 
package will allow the MIDS-JTRS radio to operate a wideband networking 
waveform specifically designed for low latency airborne missions. In 
September 2007, the JTRS Board of Directors suspended the design, 
development, fabrication, and testing of the JTRS platform capability 
package, pending a determination of whether there were enough potential 
users among the military services to support this effort. Furthermore, 
the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has been advised by the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology to conduct an 
independent technical assessment of waveforms, networking, and network 
management approaches. As a result, the award of the development 
contract has been delayed. Program officials stated that continuance of 
this delay may affect the terminal's system detail design schedule, 
funding, and its ability to meet the initial operational capability 
scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 for the Air Force. 

Program officials also noted that platform integration costs for the 
core terminal will be minimal due to the terminal's form, fit, and 
function replacement of the MIDS Low Volume Terminal. However, like 
other JTRS waveforms, integration costs for the JTRS platform 
capability package will be significant and are not currently funded as 
part of the JTRS program. According to Navy officials, the cost to 
integrate the full networking functionality of the JTRS platform 
capability package into four variants of airborne platforms is 
estimated to be $868 million. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the MIDS-JTRS program 
office provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Multiple Kill Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Multiple Kill Vehicle. 

Source: MDA/MK. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's MKV is being designed to provide multiple kill capability to all 
midcourse defense system interceptors. The payload in its current 
concept is expected to engage midcourse threat clusters by deploying 
multiple kill vehicles from a larger carrier vehicle. Key components of 
the carrier and kill vehicles include the seekers and the divert and 
attitude control systems. An initial capability is expected in 2017. We 
assessed the carrier and kill vehicle concept currently being developed 
for the Ground-based and Kinetic Energy interceptors. 

Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capacity: 
Program start: (2/06); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
System requirements review: (12/08); 
Preliminary design review: (12/09); 
Critical design review: (9/11); 
Initial capability: (2017). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon; 
Program office: Arlington, Va.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $2,957.8 million; 
* Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $2,957.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,197.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,197.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Costs include all known costs from program inception through fiscal 
year 2013. 

[End of table] 

The MKV program was started in 2006, and the program remains in the 
technology development phase. We assessed only one technology--the 
divert and attitude control system on the carrier vehicle--as mature. 
Conversely, the MKV program assessed 14 of the 16 technologies critical 
to the MKV concept as approaching maturity because they have been 
tested in other programs. However, despite being used on other 
programs, most of these technologies must be repackaged if they are to 
fit onto the Ground-based (GBI) and Kinetic Energy (KEI) interceptors. 
The program continues to mitigate its highest risk, engagement 
management algorithms, and expects to demonstrate the system's ability 
to manage multiple kill vehicles in 2010. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MKV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to our analysis, only 1 of the 16 MKV critical technologies 
is mature. The technologies for the carrier vehicle include the divert 
and attitude control system (DACS), cooler, inertial measurement units 
(IMU), focal plane array (FPA), optics, power, processor, and carrier 
vehicle-ground datalink. The technologies critical to the kill vehicle 
include the DACS, seeker FPA, cooler, optics, IMUs, power, processors, 
and carrier vehicle-to-kill vehicle datalink. According to the program, 
all 16 assessed MKV technologies are mature, with the exception of 2-- 
the carrier vehicle's optics and FPA. We disagree with the program's 
evaluation and consider only 1 of the 16 technologies, the carrier 
vehicle DACS, as nearing maturity. Although all of the critical 
technologies have been used in other programs, most need to be 
repackaged to have the correct form and fit for the GBI and KEI. To 
date, only the carrier vehicle DACS hardware has been repackaged and 
successfully tested. 

The program continues to mitigate its top risk, the engagement 
management algorithms, which are necessary to ensure the multiple kill 
vehicles can engage targets successfully. According to program 
officials, in 2010 the program plans to perform hardware testing using 
a digital simulation test bed intended to demonstrate this engagement 
functionality. 

Design Stability: 

We were unable to assess the design maturity of the MKV program because 
the program has not yet estimated the number of drawings that will be 
required. According to program officials, the program will not have a 
good estimate until it holds a preliminary design review in 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

MDA plans to employ a parallel path to develop the MKV for the GBI, 
KEI, and Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIB missile. 
Currently, Lockheed Martin is developing MKV concepts for the GBI and 
KEI, and it is also expected to develop a design for the Aegis BMD SM- 
3. In 2007, the MKV program added a contractor--Raytheon--to design a 
second concept in parallel with Lockheed Martin's concept. Raytheon has 
been contracted to develop MKV solutions for Aegis BMD SM-3 as well as 
for the GBI and KEI, although, according to program officials, they 
have just begun work and have not yet developed a firm concept. 
Raytheon's work, funded under the KEI program through 2007, was 
expected to become a part of the Aegis BMD SM-3 contract in 2008. 
However, in the conference report accompanying the 2008 Defense 
Appropriation Act, the conferees indicated their intent to remove all 
funds from the MKV program designated for the SM-3 effort, citing 
concerns that MDA does not have the resources to adequately fund both 
this work and its current work on an MKV for the GBI and KEI. 
Furthermore, the conferees also agreed that no funding under the Aegis 
BMD SM-3 program be used for the MKV program. Although MDA's parallel 
path approach emphasizes common standards, architecture, and interfaces 
that allow flexibility to increase the likelihood of delivery to the 
weapon system integrators, its development has caused at least a year 
delay in key milestone reviews. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program. 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP- 
RTIP) is designing a modular, scalable, two-dimensional active 
electronically scanned array radar for integration into the Global Hawk 
unmanned aerial vehicle platform. The radar will provide improved 
ground moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar imaging. 
The MP-RTIP program funds research, development, and test and 
evaluation activities only; the Global Hawk program will fund 
production of the radars. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (10/03); 
Design review: (9/06); 
Global Hawk flight test: (9/06); 
GAO review: (1/08). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $80.0 million; 
* Procurement: NA; 
Total funding: $80.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2003: $1,706.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,325.4; 
Percent change: -22.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2003: $1,706.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,325.4; 
Percent change: -22.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 12/2006: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Seven of MP-RTIP's eight critical technologies for the Global Hawk 
radar are mature, and the design is stable. In 2006, the MP-RTIP 
program completed three Global Hawk MP-RTIP development units and 
several software builds, and also commenced system-level testing. A 
Global Hawk MP-RTIP radar unit was installed on a surrogate testbed 
aircraft (Proteus) and flight testing began in September 2006. Expected 
completion of Proteus flight testing has been delayed from September 
2007 to summer of 2008 because software necessary for this testing has 
taken longer to develop than planned. However, program officials stated 
that the revised testing time-frame will not affect Global Hawk's 
ability to integrate the radar in fiscal year 2009 for developmental 
and operational testing. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MP-RTIP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Of the eight critical technologies MP-RTIP is developing for the Global 
Hawk radar, seven are fully mature, while the remaining technology-- 
software modes necessary to operate the radar--is approaching maturity. 
According to program officials, this technology is being matured during 
ongoing flight testing and is expected to be fully mature by summer 
2008. 

Design Stability: 

The program had completed 100 percent of its planned drawings as of 
August 2007. The total number of drawings has decreased by about 8 
percent since design review because some of the previously completed 
drawings were not part of the current MP-RTIP Global Hawk radar 
configuration. Going forward, the potential for design changes remains 
until the maturity of the remaining critical technology is demonstrated 
in an operational environment. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess MP-RTIP's production maturity because the program 
only consists of research, development, and test and evaluation 
activities; the Global Hawk program is responsible for radar 
production. 

Other Program Issues: 

Originally, the MP-RTIP program also included the development of the 
Wide Area Surveillance radar for integration into a wide-body aircraft, 
specifically the E-10A aircraft. However, the fiscal year 2008 
President's budget eliminated funding for the Wide Area Surveillance 
radar, and the E-10A Technology Development Program was terminated by 
the Air Force in February 2007. The Senate Committee on Armed Services 
noted that the MP-RTIP radar should be on platforms larger than the 
Global Hawk in its report on the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2008. The committee recommended an increase in funding of 
about $275 million so that MP-RTIP radar technology can be retrofitted 
into the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint 
STARS) aircraft. In Conference Report number 110-477 accompanying the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the conferees 
authorized approximately $178 million in supplemental funding for the E-
10A program. This funding was requested primarily to further the 
development of MP-RTIP, including possibly investigating the use of MP- 
RTIP radar technology on platforms other than the Global Hawk. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred 
with our findings. Program officials also provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing 
Platform logo. 

Source: MPF(F)/MLP Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is a vessel in the planned 
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)--MFP(F)--squadron that would 
facilitate at-sea vehicle and cargo transfer and serve as a staging 
area for supplies that support activities on shore. The Navy plans to 
procure a total of three MLP ships. The MLP program--a new ship design 
for the Navy--is currently in the technology development phase. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (12/02); 
Development start: (8/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Production decisionï¿½first ship: (TBD); 
Construction start: (TBD); 
Initial capability: (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $36.7 million; 
* Procurement: $2,629.4 million; 
Total funding: $2,666.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: $58.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: $2,628.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: $2,687.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: $895.700; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: 3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2003: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

In 2006, the Navy identified two critical technologies that will be 
used on the MLP--skin-to-skin replenishment and landing platform 
technologies. After completing a series of at-sea tests on the skin-to- 
skin replenishment system between fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the Navy 
focused its attention on a component of landing platform technologies 
that it believed would be more efficient. Landing platform 
technologies--now reported as the only critical technology--is not 
currently mature, but the MLP program office expects it to be mature by 
early 2008. Design and production maturity could not be assessed 
because these activities have not begun. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MPF(F)/MLP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In 2006, the program office identified two critical technologies--skin- 
to-skin replenishment and landing platform technologies--with skin-to- 
skin replenishment reported as mature and landing platform technologies 
as approaching maturity. The Navy conducted a series of at-sea tests to 
assess the skin-to-skin replenishment system's ability to transfer 
vehicles between an MLP surrogate ship and another ship at very close 
proximity. The tests were conducted using commercial-based technology 
similar to the technology desired by the Navy. While the program office 
concluded that skin-to-skin replenishment had been successfully 
demonstrated, it decided to instead use a component of landing platform 
technologies--dynamic positioning--which it believed would offer more 
efficient vehicle and cargo transfer. 

In 2007, the program office identified only one critical technology for 
MLP--landing platform technologies--and listed it at a lower level of 
maturity than in 2006. According to the program office, this technology 
has three components: (1) dynamic positioning, which aligns the MLP 
with other ships using position sensors and the ship's propulsion 
system to adjust its relative position; (2) test article vehicle 
transfer system ramp for transferring vehicles and cargo between ships; 
and (3) surface craft interfaces that allow the MLP to partially 
submerge in water, which facilitates at-sea boarding by Landing Craft 
Air Cushion and Army amphibious vehicles. The landing platform 
technologies enable the MLP to serve as a staging area for vehicles and 
equipment in support of on-shore military activities. 

The program office has tested the functionality of the surface craft 
interface component and plans to develop a test article of the ramp in 
2008. The program office conducted an at-sea test of the dynamic 
positioning component using a commercially available system on a leased 
barge. The test was conducted in sea conditions less challenging than 
those during the skin-to-skin replenishment tests. 

The MLP program office reported that landing platform technologies was 
not mature and that no formal technology readiness assessment on the 
technology had been conducted, but it expected to fully mature the 
technology by early 2008. The program office also stated that the use 
of a backup technology for landing platform technologies would cause 
substantially degraded performance by the MLP. The Navy identified 
other relevant systems expected on board the MLP, including cargo 
handling systems, cranes, and forklifts to maneuver cargo and 
munitions, but did not believe these additional systems required new 
development. 

Design Stability: 

There is no existing MLP design that could be assessed. According to 
the Navy, the MLP design will be similar to that of existing commercial 
heavy lift ships. The MLP will be used to transport, embark, and 
disembark various amphibious military vehicles. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to the program office, because the ship is linked to the 
overall acquisition of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), the 
MLP acquisition cannot move forward until these future force 
requirements are approved by DOD. Until the MPF(F) requirements are 
determined, any technology development and testing activities for the 
MLP are considered concept demonstration. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft. 

Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper (formerly Predator B) is a multirole, 
medium-to-high altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system 
capable of flying at higher speeds and higher altitudes than its 
predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. The Reaper is designed to provide a 
ground attack capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and 
assess small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each system will consist 
of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a satellite 
communications suite. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (1/02);
Development start: (2/04); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (2/08); 
Design review: (6/08); 
Initial capability: (9/08); 
Last procurement: (2013). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems; 
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $225.9 million; 
* Procurement: $993.3 million; 
Total funding: $1,367.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 50. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost;
As of 08/2004: $192.1; 
Latest, 08/2007: $353.2; 
Percent change: 83.9. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2004: $500.2; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,733.0; 
Percent change: 246.5. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2004: $692.3; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,234.6; 
Percent change: 222.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2004: $20.978; 
Latest, 08/2007: $27.587; 
Percent change: 31.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2004: 63; 
Latest, 08/2007: 81; 
Percent change: 28.6. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2004: 70; 
Latest, 08/2007: 56; 
Percent change: -20.0. 

Latest cost and quantity data are through fiscal year 2013; earlier 
cost and quantity data only go through fiscal year 2009. The Air Force 
could not provide comparable cost information. 

[End of table] 

The Reaper entered system development in February 2004 with three of 
its four critical technologies mature. The fourth technology--stores 
management system--experienced several delays, but is now considered 
mature. The Reaper's critical design review has been delayed until June 
2008, nearly 3 years later than originally planned. By that point, the 
program office estimates that 94 percent of the design drawings will be 
complete. Despite the design review delay, the program continues to 
produce and field aircraft. The lack of demonstrated design and 
production maturity represents a significant risk to the program. In 
addition, initial operational testing is not scheduled to be completed 
until the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, when about 45 percent of 
the aircraft quantity will have already been placed on contract. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MQ-9 (Reaper) Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All four of the Reaper's critical technologies--the synthetic aperture 
radar, the multispectral targeting system, the air vehicle, and the 
stores management subsystem--are now mature. Development of the stores 
management subsystem was initially expected to be mature in 2004, but 
it encountered several delays. In December 2006, it began weapons 
release testing and is now considered mature. Subsequent increments may 
require other new technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The program office currently reports that over 80 percent of the 
drawings for the first increment aircraft are complete and expects that 
94 percent of the drawings will be complete by the critical design 
review. The design review was initially planned for September 2005, but 
has slipped repeatedly since the program began development, and is now 
scheduled for June 2008, 4 months after the production decision. 
According to program officials, the delays were caused by the user's 
requirement for early fielding of the aircraft. Program officials 
acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for subsequent 
aircraft increments. 

Production Maturity: 

The program does not use statistical process controls to ensure product 
quality. Instead, it uses other quality control measures such as scrap, 
rework, and repair to track product quality. Although the contractor 
has met the MQ-9 production requirements to date, the concurrent 
production of the Predator, Reaper, and Warrior has greatly increased 
the contractor's business base and workforce requirements. The Air 
Force is in the process of completing a manufacturing readiness 
assessment for the program. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since inception, the Reaper program has followed a nontraditional 
acquisition path highlighted by changing requirements. Within the past 
year, total program quantities have increased from 63 to 81 aircraft 
and the fiscal year 2007 purchase quantity increased from 2 to 12 
aircraft. Since development started, program unit costs have increased 
by over 30 percent--primarily due to a user requirement for an early 
operational capability that included the Hellfire missile and a digital 
electronic engine control. These changes also increased the weight of 
the aircraft, requiring stronger landing gear, fuselage, and control 
surfaces. Further requirements changes resulted in an even more robust 
early fielding configuration. Subsequent aircraft will have upgrades to 
the radar and weapons as well as further software developments. The 
production of these aircraft before the critical design review and 
operational testing adds significant risk to the program. To date, the 
Air Force has taken delivery of 14 aircraft and plans to make a 
production decision prior to the system critical design review. By the 
time the program completes initial operational testing, the Air Force 
will have already contracted for about 45 percent of the total 
production aircraft quantity. Changes stemming from the test program 
would further disrupt the aircraft's cost, schedule, and manufacturing 
plan. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
it was forced into a nontraditional acquisition path to rapidly meet 
the demands of the Global War on Terrorism. While this path has 
introduced some inefficiencies, the Air Force stated that it has 
delivered effective combat capability well ahead of what would have 
been achievable using a traditional acquisition path. It also noted 
that the majority of the production to date has been the result of 
congressional direction and funding provided in excess of DOD requests. 
Program officials maintain there is manageable and accepted risk with 
production taking place before critical design review and operational 
testing. The Reaper underwent an integrated system exercise in 
September 2007 to operationally assess its readiness for early 
deployment. A second exercise will assess its readiness for initial 
operational testing. 

GAO Response: 

Our reviews of DOD weapon systems confirm that producing the system 
before the completion of the design review and operational testing adds 
significant cost risk to the program. Further, the first integrated 
system exercise was a limited developmental test and not a replacement 
for rigorous operational testing. 

[End of section] 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle. 

Source: Joint MRAP Family of Vehicles Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The MRAP is a joint program led by the Navy and Marine Corps to procure 
a family of armored vehicles to protect personnel from mine blasts, and 
fragmentary and direct-fire weapons. DOD will acquire three categories 
of vehicles: Category I for urban combat missions; Category II for 
convoy escort, troop transport, explosive ordinance disposal, and 
ambulance missions; and Category III for clearing mines and improvised 
explosive devices. The Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special 
Operations Command are acquiring vehicles. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Production decision: (1/07); 
Contract awards: (1/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Full-rate decision: (2/08). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Various; 
Program office: Quantico, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: TBD; 
* Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: TBD; 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $177.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $12,552.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $13,501.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $1.430; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: 9439; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Latest cost and quantity estimate is based on the President's budgets 
and supplemental requests for fiscal years 2006 through 2008 but does 
not include recent orders for more vehicles. 

[End of table] 

The MRAP program is DOD's highest-priority acquisition program. To meet 
an urgent, joint-service operational need, DOD is buying MRAP as 
nondevelopmental items. The greatest challenge for vendors will be 
obtaining sufficient quantities of ballistic-grade steel. Another 
significant challenge will be producing enough tires to equip the fleet 
and provide for replacements. Finally, integration of government- 
furnished equipment is taking three times longer than desired. DOD is 
pursuing a very aggressive schedule while at the same time grappling 
with a significant number of unknowns that could delay fielding or 
increase costs. The program is trying to concurrently produce the 
baseline MRAP, develop and produce various upgrades, and develop an 
MRAP II vehicle. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MRAP Program: 

Production Maturity: 

DOD is buying MRAP vehicles as nondevelopmental items, so we did not 
assess whether production processes were mature. We did assess the 
ability of vendors to manufacture the required number of vehicles in 
the time frames needed to achieve accelerated production and fielding 
requirements. 

The greatest challenge for vendors is obtaining sufficient quantities 
of ballistic-grade steel. A DOD assessment found there is sufficient 
steel available to produce the 11,891 contracted vehicles. However, as 
the total number of vehicles procured increases and the amount of armor 
per vehicle grows to meet the threat, there may not be enough steel. A 
second challenge is producing enough tires to equip the fleet and 
provide replacements. Tire production was expected to reach 9,500 per 
month by February 2008, but 20,000 per month could be needed to support 
production and replacement in the field. Replacement rates are not yet 
known. 

DOD has taken steps to ensure availability of key materials. For 
example, DOD has given MRAP contracts a higher priority (DX rating) 
that requires these contracts to be accepted and performed before all 
other nonpriority government and commercial contracts. DOD has also 
allocated funds to procure an advance reserve of steel and to increase 
tire production capacity. In addition, some of the vendors and 
suppliers have made corporate investments to maximize capacity. 

All vehicles come from the vendor without mission equipment, which must 
be integrated onto vehicles before fielding. This equipment is 20 
percent of the total program cost and includes items such as a tracking 
system that identifies friendly forces and a system to jam improvised 
explosive devices. A large challenge is integrating the entire suite of 
mission equipment onto the vehicles in a timely manner. It currently 
takes an average of 21 days to install the equipment on a vehicle, but 
the goal is to reduce that to 7 days. The plan is to process 50 
vehicles per day for a total of 1,000 vehicles per month. 

Other Program Issues: 

Due to urgent fielding requirements, the MRAP program is pursuing a 
very aggressive schedule while at the same time grappling with a 
significant number of unknowns, such as the total quantity required and 
the long-term sustainment strategy. DOD has taken steps to reduce these 
risks, including implementing a contracting strategy that only 
committed the government to purchase initial test assets. Additional 
purchases are based on demonstrated performance and production 
capability. Further, the focus of the effort is on crew protection, 
with reliability given less priority. 

In order to rapidly field the vehicles, DOD substantially reduced the 
normal scope of test and evaluation. For example, there is no minimum 
requirement for vehicle reliability, and durability testing covered 
only 300 hard surface miles and 200 off-road miles in the first test 
phase. By the time the first phase of developmental testing had been 
completed, over 3,700 vehicles were already on order--a commitment of 
nearly $2 billion. The current plan places 11,891 vehicles on contract 
before operational effectiveness and operational suitability are 
determined. As a result, test results could lead to costly retrofits or 
replacements. 

The program is concurrently pursuing the original baseline MRAP, 
various upgrades, and an MRAP II variant. In order to avoid a break in 
production, orders for additional vehicles may be necessary before test 
results are available for the upgrade efforts or the MRAP II. 

DOD acknowledges that a long-term sustainability strategy and full life 
cycle support cost estimate has yet to be established. This is an area 
of risk that could have a large impact on DOD. 

Agency Comments: 

Joint Program Office officials provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated. In commenting, officials characterized the test program 
as phased to support key decisions in order to field the most 
survivable vehicles as quickly as possible while addressing upgrades or 
modifications in future testing. As developmental and operational tests 
continue, vehicles will undergo additional reliability and durability 
testing. Changes resulting from these tests will be incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). 

Source: Lockheed Martin, ï¿½ 2007 Lockheed Martin. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide a worldwide, multi-service population of mobile and fixed-site 
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity 
and improved availability for small terminals. It is to replace the 
Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite system currently in operation 
and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS consists of a 
network of satellites and an integrated ground network. We assessed 
both the space and ground segments. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (9/02); 
Development start: (9/04); 
Design review: (3/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Production decision: (2/08); 
On-orbit capability: (3/10); 
Full capability: (3/14). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,808.3 million; 
* Procurement: $2,353.3 million; 
Total funding: $4,184.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 09/2004: $3,464.2; 
Latest, 08/2007: $3,574.1; 
Percent change: 3.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 09/2004: $2,882.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,353.3; 
Percent change: -18.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 09/2004: $6,383.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5,991.7; 
Percent change: -6.1. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 09/2004: $1,063.893; 
Latest, 08/2007: $998.609; 
Percent change: -6.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 09/2004: 6; 
Latest, 08/2007: 6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 09/2004: 91; 
Latest, 08/2007: 91; 
Percent change: -27.4. 

[End of table] 

In September 2004, the MUOS program was authorized to begin 
development. All of the program's critical technologies are mature, and 
about 95 percent of design drawings had been completed at the critical 
design review in March 2007. Production maturity could not be 
determined because the program does not collect statistical process 
control data. The delivery of MUOS capabilities has become time- 
critical due to the operational failure of two UHF Follow-On 
satellites. The program is at risk of cost and schedule growth, and 
problems encountered under the Joint Tactical Radio System program may 
result in underutilization of MUOS capabilities. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

MUOS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all critical technologies are mature. 

Design Stability: 

At critical design review, about 95 percent of the expected number of 
design drawings had been completed. According to the program office, 
the size of the spacecraft at critical design review was much larger 
than at development start. The program considers satellite mass growth 
to be of moderate risk to the program. If the mass of the spacecraft 
grows to exceed the capability of the planned launch vehicle, design 
changes to the spacecraft would be made which could reduce mission 
performance. The program stated that this risk can be eliminated in 
2008 if more than 50 percent of the predicted spacecraft mass has been 
validated with actual values and launch vehicle mass margins are not 
exceeded. According to the program office, as of November 2007, 
satellite mass had remained stable since the completion of critical 
design review. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office does not collect statistical process control data. 
However, it is collecting and tracking data on defects in manufacturing 
processes to assess the maturity of MUOS production. The program began 
production activities in May 2007 after the contractor successfully 
completed a production readiness review. 

Other Program Issues: 

The importance of the first MUOS launch has increased due to the 
unexpected failures of two UHF Follow-On satellites, one in June 2005 
and another in September 2006. As a result, UHF communication 
capabilities are predicted to degrade below the required level of 
availability in February 2009, 14 months before the first MUOS 
satellite is to become operational. DOD is examining options for 
addressing this capability gap, including developing an integrated 
waveform to increase communications capacity provided by existing 
satellites and continuing to lease additional satellite communications 
capacity. Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command has tasked the 
Operationally Responsive Space office to review and identify other 
potential near-term options to augment UHF satellite communications. 

While the MUOS space segment is only slightly behind schedule, 
contractor costs have increased over budget. Through October 2007, 
space segment costs were about $149 million, or about 32 percent, over 
the contractor's initial estimate due primarily to subcontract cost 
increases, piece part material cost increases, the addition of 
personnel to resolve design issues and test anomalies, and higher costs 
for increases in satellite structure size. The program office does not 
expect the trend in cost increases to breach the program office's cost 
estimate. 

According to the program office, development of MUOS ground software 
represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size and 
complexity of the contractor's design. As of September 2007, software 
development was nearly on schedule, with about 70 percent of the total 
effort complete. However, the program office projects the effort to 
cost $251 million, 54 percent over the initial contractor estimate of 
about $163 million. Additionally, a May 2007 independent software 
review concluded the development is at high risk for cost increases and 
schedule delays due, in part, to an optimistic assumption of software 
development productivity and code growth. 

Full utilization of MUOS capabilities is dependent on the fielding of 
terminals developed by the Joint Tactical Radio System program. 
However, development problems encountered under the JTRS program have 
resulted in deferrals of requirements and have increased risk that MUOS 
capabilities will be underutilized until MUOS-compliant terminals are 
fielded. According to the program office, MUOS satellites can be 
launched and their legacy payload capability can be used to support 
warfighter requirements if problems are encountered with MUOS ground 
software and/or JTRS synchronization. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control. 

Source: Global Positioning Systems Wing. 

[End of figure] 

GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department 
of Transportation, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, United 
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system 
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation 
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000, 
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF 
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system 
and receiver units. We focused our review on Block IIF. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (1/99); 
Development start: (2/00); 
Production decision: (7/02); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
First satellite launch: (1/09); 
Initial capability: (NA). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $362.9 million; 
* Procurement: $641.9 million; 
Total funding: $1,004.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2002: $2,090.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $2,597.4; 
Percent change: 24.2. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2002: $3,813.3; 
Latest, 12/2006: $4,459.3; 
Percent change: 16.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2002: $5,904.2; 
Latest, 12/2006: $7,056.7; 
Percent change: 19.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2002: $178.915; 
Latest, 12/2006: $213.841; 
Percent change: 19.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 02/2002: 33; 
Latest, 12/2006: 33; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2002: TBD; 
Latest, 12/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

The program office estimates that the launch of the first Block IIF 
satellite will be delayed to January 2009, over two years from its 
original launch estimate. This delay is due to risks and challenges in 
working through development and production concerns, such as technical 
issues with signal capabilities. The program also continues to 
experience development and production cost overruns. In addition, 
problems with control system software development have resulted in the 
deferral of requirements and commensurate capabilities. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

NAVSTAR GPS-Space & Control Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Block IIF critical technology--space--qualified atomic frequency 
standards-is mature. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract 
does not require that design drawings be delivered to the program. 
According to the program office, it assesses design maturity through 
reviews of contractor testing, technical interchange meetings, periodic 
program reviews, and participation in the contractor development 
process. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the contractor is not 
required to collect statistical process control data on the Block IIF 
satellite development and production contract. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program estimates that the launch of the first Block IIF satellite 
will be delayed over 2 years from its original launch date (December 
2006 to January 2009), due in part to (1) late hardware deliveries, (2) 
technical challenges with signal transponders, and (3) the addition of 
mission assurance activities. Recently, the program successfully 
completed the integration of new software for the control segment that 
will replace the legacy mainframe system and provide command and 
control capability. However, additional critical tests such as thermal 
vacuum testing are still needed to confirm the satellite's ability to 
operate in the harsh space environment. 

The program continues to experience cost increases due to technical 
problems resulting in production cost overruns. In fiscal year 2006, 
the Air Force reprogrammed an additional $148 million into the Block 
IIF program to cover the contractor's estimate for production of the 
first three satellites. At the same time, the Air Force requested an 
addition $66 million in fiscal year 2008 and $46 million in fiscal year 
2009 to cover the government's independent estimate for production of 
these satellites. 

Ongoing delays with software development for the Block IIF control 
system have resulted in the deferral of requirements to the future 
control segment of the next generation of GPS satellites. The program 
expects this deferral to reduce control system costs to the Block IIF 
segment by $101 million, which could then be used to offset the 
contractor cost overruns. 

A DOD report recently found that the development of GPS user equipment-
-under separately funded and managed programs--has not been 
synchronized with the development of the satellites and control system, 
increasing the risk of substantial delays in realistic operational 
testing and fielding of capabilities. 

GPS III, the next generation of satellites, recently experienced a 
budget cut of $100 million. In addition, the current launch date for 
the first GPS III satellite has slipped from 2013 to 2014. According to 
program officials, the potential gap in capabilities will occur between 
the time the last GPS IIF satellite is launched (currently scheduled 
for around 2012) and the first GPS III satellite is launched. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force concurred with this assessment and provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 
Satellite System (NPOESS). 

Source: NPOESS Integrated Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

NPOESS is a tri-agency--National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration-- 
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the 
year 2026. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single 
national system. NOAA and DOD each provide 50 percent of the funding 
for NPOESS. The program consists of four segments: space; command, 
control, and communications; interface data processing; and the launch 
segment. We assessed the space segment. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (3/97); 
Development start/production decision: (8/02); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
First satellite launch: (1/13); 
Initial capability: (10/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Program office: Silver Spring, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,798.1 million; 
* Procurement: $2,816.6 million; 
Total funding: $6,614.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2002: $5,044.4; 
Latest, 08/2007: $7,892.5; 
Percent change: 56.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2002: $1,302.2; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,816.6; 
Percent change: 116.3. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2002: $6,346.6; 
Latest, 08/2007: $10,709.1; 
Percent change: 68.7. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2002: $1,057.758; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,677.286; 
Percent change: 153.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2002: 6; 
Latest, 08/2007: 4; 
Percent change: -33.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2002: 172; 
Latest, 08/2007: 200; 
Percent change: 16.3. 

[End of table] 

In July 2007, the NPOESS program restructure was finalized in response 
to a Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition unit cost breach of the critical 
cost growth threshold. As part of the restructure, seven of the 
original 14 critical technologies were removed from the program. Of the 
remaining technologies, three are immature but are expected to be 
mature by the design review in April 2009. While the program 
restructure lowered risk for future cost and schedule problems, it 
increased the risk of a satellite coverage gap and significantly 
reduced climate data collection capabilities. As of November 2007, 
about 75 percent of the design drawings had been released. Production 
maturity could not be assessed because the program is not collecting 
statistical process control data. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

NPOESS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only one of the program's 14 original critical technologies was mature 
at the development and production decision in August 2002. As part of 
the program's restructure, seven of the critical technologies were 
removed from the program. Of the remaining seven technologies, four are 
mature, and the program projects that all will be mature by the design 
review in April 2009. 

The primary purpose of the NPOESS Preparatory Project, an effort funded 
by NASA to develop and operate a demonstration satellite, is to reduce 
development risk by providing processing centers with an early 
opportunity to work with sensors, ground control, and data-processing 
systems and allow for incorporating lessons learned into the four 
NPOESS satellites. Under the restructured NPOESS program, the satellite 
is expected to demonstrate the performance of three of four sensors 
deemed critical (because they are to provide data for key weather 
products) and one noncritical sensor in an operational environment. The 
launch of this satellite has been delayed about 40 months to September 
2009. 

Design Stability: 

In August 2002, the program began development and production before 
achieving design stability or production maturity. The program office 
revised the estimated number of design drawings to accommodate the 
deletion of a major sensor and estimates a total of 6,648 drawings. As 
of November 2007, about 75 percent of the drawings had been released. 
The design review date has been delayed 36 months to April 2009. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office does not collect statistical process control data 
due to the small number of satellites to be built. However, program 
officials stated that the contractors track and use various metrics for 
subcomponent production, such as rework percentages, defect 
containment, and schedule and cost performance. 

Other Program Issues: 

In response to a Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition unit cost breach of 
the critical cost growth threshold, the program office, in conjunction 
with the prime contractor, completed a program restructuring of NPOESS 
in July 2007. The restructure included acquiring fewer satellites, an 
overall increase in program costs, delays in satellite launches, and 
deletions or replacements of satellite sensors. 

At an estimated life cycle cost of about $12.5 billion through 2026 for 
four satellites, the cost of the restructured NPOESS program is about 
$4.1 billion over the previous cost estimate of $8.4 billion for six 
satellites. The launch of the first satellite has been delayed from 
November 2009 to January 2013. The launch of the second satellite has 
been delayed from June 2011 to January 2016. As we recently reported, 
the delayed launches of fewer satellites will result in reduced 
satellite data collection coverage, requiring dependence on a European 
satellite for coverage during midmorning hours. Additionally, the 
launch delays increase the risk of a coverage gap for the existing 
constellation of satellites should there be premature satellite 
failures or unsuccessful launches of legacy satellites. 

The restructured program also deleted four of 13 original instruments 
and reduced the functionality of four sensors. As a result, the revised 
NPOESS system will have significantly less capability for providing 
global climate measures than was originally planned. According to the 
program office, key performance parameters, or critical user 
requirements, have not changed as a result of the revised program. 
Consequently, the reduced capability of the system will not meet all 
critical requirements. 

As we recently reported, the program office has made progress in the 
acquisition since the restructure. However, significant risks remain. 
For example, two critical sensors have experienced major developmental 
problems, adding risk to the Preparatory Project schedule, which could 
have associated impacts on schedule and costs of the overall program. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the NPOESS Integrated 
Program Office noted that while the NPOESS system will not meet all 
critical science requirements, it is expected to meet all critical 
operational weather requirements and provide considerable science 
benefit. 

[End of section] 

P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft. 

Source: The Boeing Company. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A), a militarized 
version of the Boeing 737, is the replacement for the P-3C. Its primary 
roles are persistent antisubmarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; and 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The P-8A shares an 
integrated maritime patrol mission with the Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System and the EPX (formerly the Navy 
Aerial Common Sensor). These systems are intended to sustain and 
improve the Navy's maritime warfighting capability. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (3/00); 
Development start: (5/04); 
Design review: (6/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (5/10); 
Full-rate decision: (4/13); 
Initial capability: (7/13); 
Last procurement: (2017). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $3,886.9 million; 
* Procurement: $21,969.1 million; 
Total funding: $25,968.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 108. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 05/2004: $7,152.7; 
Latest, 08/2007: $6,669.9; 
Percent change: -6.7. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 05/2004: $22,190.3; 
Latest, 08/2007: $21,969.1; 
Percent change: -0.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 05/2004: $29,473.8; 
Latest, 08/2007: $28,773.6; 
Percent change: -2.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 05/2004: $256.294; 
Latest, 08/2007: $252.400; 
Percent change: -1.5. 

Total quantities; 
As of 05/2004: 115; 
Latest, 08/2007: 114; 
Percent change: -0.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 05/2004: 160; 
Latest, 08/2007: 160; 
Percent change: 0. 

Figures shown are based on the December 2006 Selected Acquisition 
Report and do not reflect the total cost increase discussed below and 
in the Other Program Issues section. 

[End of table] 

The P-8A program entered development with four critical technologies. 
Since then, the program has removed one critical technology, replaced 
two with backups, and added a new critical technology. Of the current 
critical technologies, only one is mature. The program office completed 
critical design review (CDR) in June 2007 and design readiness review 
(DRR) in August 2007. However, only 70 percent of the design drawings 
were complete at CDR. The P-8A has experienced a $1.2 billion contract 
cost increase due to inefficiencies in the release of design drawings, 
software development risks, and subcontractor cost and scope increases. 
Further, the program office is currently assessing how its production 
aircraft will meet the specialty metals provision of the Berry 
Amendment. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

P-8A MMA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the P-8A's initial four critical technologies were mature when 
it entered development in May 2004. The program identified mature 
backup technologies for each of the four, which, according to program 
officials, would still allow the P-8A to meet minimum requirements. 
Last year, we reported that the acoustic bellringer algorithm 
technology was replaced with a less capable but more mature backup. 
More recently, during a technology readiness assessment in November 
2006, the program made significant changes to the critical technologies 
list. First, the integrated rotary sonobuoy launcher was removed from 
the critical technologies list. While the program still plans to 
utilize this technology, it was recategorized as a developmental risk. 
As such, it may not be fully mature prior to production and could lead 
to delays should design changes or a backup technology be necessary. 
Second, the program replaced the data fusion technology with its 
backup. Program officials stated that alternative algorithms can be 
utilized in place of the data fusion technology, which will provide 
less capable data fusion, but will still meet minimum P-8A 
requirements. Third, the Magnetic Anomaly Detector Control Surface 
Compensation Algorithms were added as a critical technology. These 
compensation algorithms, needed to reduce noise interference, pose an 
additional technical risk because they have not been tested on an 
aircraft. The program currently estimates that this technology will 
reach maturity by low rate decision in 2010, which is 6 years later 
than recommended best practices. Finally, the ESM digital receiver, 
which is being leveraged from the EA-18G program, is currently the only 
critical technology for the program that has been demonstrated in a 
realistic environment, and is considered mature. 

Design Stability: 

The P-8A program released only 70 percent of its design drawings to the 
manufacturer by CDR in June 2007. According to P-8A officials, the 
program experienced schedule delays and cost increases associated with 
the completion and release of design drawings because of contractor 
coordination problems. The Navy endorsed funding for four operational 
flight test aircraft in September 2007. 

Production Maturity: 

The contractor has estimated that the cost of producing an aircraft 
that is compliant with the specialty metals provision of the Berry 
Amendment would be significantly greater than current program cost 
estimates. The program office is currently assessing how its production 
aircraft will comply with these restrictions. 

The P-8A will undergo structural modifications while on the production 
line. This effort to reduce production time and cost represents the 
first time that DOD will attempt to militarize an aircraft on a 
commercial production line and has added risk to the program. 

Other Program Issues: 

As of June 2007, the System Development and Demonstration contract 
costs had risen from $3.8 billion to $5.0 billion as a result of 
contract modifications to address software development risks as well as 
delays in releasing system design drawings. This will delay the build 
and delivery dates for the seven aircraft test articles by 7 to 14 
months. The cost increase was also driven by subcontractor/supplier 
issues, according to the program office. For example, at the 
subcontractor level, some development costs have exceeded estimates and 
schedules have slipped. Despite the cost increase and delays, the 
program is still attempting to meet its milestones and cost targets by 
combining the developmental and operational test programs. 

Because the P-8A mission overlaps with that of the BAMS UAS, changes or 
delays in the development of that program may result in the need to 
procure additional P-8A aircraft. See page 51 for more information on 
BAMS UAS. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office states that the maturation of critical technologies 
is on schedule to support the System Development and Demonstration 
phase. The airplane remains about 60-65 percent common with the 
commercial 737. Although contract costs have grown, they remain below 
the program objective value for development cost parameters and below 
the system development cost estimates. The program continues to meet or 
exceed the cost, schedule, and performance parameters defined in the P- 
8A Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement. 

[End of section] 

PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit. 

Source: Lower Tier Project Office, Combined Aggregate Program (LTPO-
CAP). 

[End of figure] 

The Army's Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) transitions 
the Patriot missile system to MEADS. MEADS's mission is to provide low 
to medium altitude air and missile defense with the capability to 
counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles, or other air-breathing threats. MEADS is a codevelopment 
program among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the 
MEADS fire unit portion of the program that includes the launchers, 
radars, Battle Management component, and launcher reloaders. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (8/04); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Design review: (10/09); 
Initial production decision: (11/12); 
Last production decision: (3/17); 
Initial capability: (9/17). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $4,023.3 million; 
* Procurement: $12,851.5 million; 
Total funding: $16,874.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 48. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 08/2004: $5,041.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $4,746.8; 
Percent change: -5.8. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 08/2004: $13,348.6; 
Latest, 12/2006: $12,851.5; 
Percent change: -3.7. 

Total program cost; 
As of 08/2004: $18,389.7; 
Latest, 12/2006: $17,598.3; 
Percent change: -4.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 08/2004: $383.119; 
Latest, 12/2006: $366.631; 
Percent change: -4.3. 

Total quantities; 
As of 08/2004: 48; 
Latest, 12/2006: 48; 
Percent change: 0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 08/2004: 158; 
Latest, 12/2006: 157; 
Percent change: -0.6. 

[End of table] 

MEADS fire unit began development in 2004 with two mature critical 
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one 
immature critical technology. The technologies remain at these levels. 
Program plans call for a system design review in 2009, but officials 
estimate that only one of the six fire unit technologies will be more 
mature at that time than at development start. The program office 
anticipates that all critical technologies will be mature by the start 
of production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

Current plans call for insertion of MEADS components into Patriot Fire 
Units beginning with acquisition decisions in 2008 and continuing in 
2010 and 2013. However, MEADS will need to rebaseline its program cost 
and schedule because development of the Battle Management component is 
being transferred to the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Project 
Office. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only two of the six critical technologies--the launcher electronics and 
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile integration--are mature. 
Three other critical technologies--the low noise exciter that manages 
the radars' frequencies, the cooling system for the radars, and a slip 
ring that carries power and coolants to the radars--are nearing 
maturity. The remaining critical technology--the fire control radar 
transmit/receive module--is immature. 

The program office estimates that the maturity level of the low noise 
exciter, the radar cooling system, and the slip ring will remain 
unchanged when product development begins and that the transmit receive 
module will be nearing full maturity. The office expects all critical 
technologies to be fully mature by the start of production in the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2013. There are no backup technologies for any 
of the MEADS critical technologies. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of 
releasable drawings and total drawings expected was not available. The 
program office expects to identify the total number of releasable 
drawings at a design review scheduled in 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

MEADS is being developed to employ the PAC-3 Missile Segment 
Enhancement variant. The Missile Segment Enhancement is funded by the 
U.S. to improve on the current PAC-3 missile capability. Program 
estimates indicate that the Army plans to develop and procure missiles 
at a cost of approximately $6.1 billion. We did not assess the Missile 
Segment Enhancement variant of the PAC-3, and the associated costs are 
not included in our funding information. 

The MEADS program adopted an acquisition approach wherein MEADS major 
items are incrementally inserted into the current Patriot force. The 
three insertions will be based on acquisition decisions in 2008, 2010, 
and 2013 and each increment is expected to physically introduce new or 
upgraded capability into the program in 2009, 2011, and 2015. 

A 2006 Army initiative, to provide a common Battle Management system 
for MEADS and other Army air and missile defense systems has in part, 
resulted in the establishment of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
Project Office that will lead the Battle Management component 
development effort. According to the MEADS program office, because 
MEADS CAP is dependent on the Battle Management Command component, it 
cannot execute its schedule as planned and will need to rebaseline the 
program cost and schedule after the Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
system development demonstration decision in March 2009. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High. 

Source: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, Sunnyvale, Calif,
ï¿½ 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is intended to meet 
requirements for missile warning, missile defense, technical 
intelligence, and battlespace awareness missions. A planned replacement 
for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High is a constellation of four 
satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two sensors on host 
satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed and mobile 
ground stations. Last year, two additional HEO sensors were authorized 
for procurement. We assessed the space segment. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (2/95); 
Development start: (10/96); 
Design review/production decision: (8/01); 
First sensor delivery: (8/04); 
Second sensor delivery: (9/05); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
First satellite delivery: (11/09); 
Second satellite delivery: (11/10). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,697.8 million; 
* Procurement: $1,572.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,329.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 10/1996: $4,156.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $8,542.7; 
Percent change: 105.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 10/1996: 0; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,682.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 10/1996: $4,365.2; 
Latest, 12/2006: $10,470.4; 
Percent change: 139.9. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 10/1996: $873.041; 
Latest, 12/2006: $3,490.125; 
Percent change: 299.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 10/1996: 5; 
Latest, 12/2006: 3; 
Percent change: -40.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 10/1996: TBD; 
Latest, 12/2006: TBD; 
Percent change: TBD. 

[End of table] 

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies are mature. Based on the 
number of design drawings released and the total number expected, the 
design is considered mature. Production maturity could not be 
determined because the contractor does not collect production 
statistical process control data. After delays of 18 and 21 months, two 
HEO sensors have been delivered. According to program officials, the 
first sensor's on-orbit performance is exceeding expectations. The 
first GEO satellite launch is estimated for December 2009, representing 
a schedule slip of about a year, and program office confidence in this 
estimate is moderate. Further, design problems have recently emerged 
and additional schedule slippage of the GEO launches is possible. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

SBIRS High Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies are mature. 

Design Stability: 

The program's design is considered stable since almost all drawings 
have been released, but design-related problems could still emerge. 
Design problems delayed the delivery of the first two HEO sensors and 
increased program costs. A design flaw recently identified on the GEO 
satellites will likely delay the launch of the first satellite and 
increase costs. Specifically, the flight software that controls the 
health and status of the space vehicle was found to be inadequate. 
Correcting the problem may necessitate hardware and software changes 
that could, according to the Air Force, cause a minimum delay of 1 year 
and cost increases of up to $1 billion. The complexity of the GEO 
satellites is greater than that of the HEO sensors, and as of September 
2007, only 20 percent of planned integration testing on the first 
satellite was complete. As such, there is high probability that further 
design flaws may be discovered, leading to more cost and schedule 
increases. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the contractor does not 
collect statistical process control data. The program tracks and 
assesses production maturity by reviewing monthly test data and 
updates. 

Other Program Issues: 

Recent program assessments by the Defense Contract Management Agency 
indicate cost and schedule variances are high risk, and worsening. The 
cost variance at completion is over $133 million, more than five times 
what we noted in our September 2007 report. Cost and schedule variances 
are expected to increase due to spacecraft rework, software redesign, 
and delays in integration and test activities. Software overall is 
considered high risk, due in part to the need for redesign. 

The program continues to have problems with its flight software system 
and the pointing and control assembly software. DCMA reported that the 
flight software system is more than 50 percent behind schedule due to 
replanning and testing delays, and delivery of the pointing and control 
assembly software is about 45 percent behind schedule due in part to 
poor planning and execution, slips in rehearsal activities, and 
problems with the ground system. Software problems have already delayed 
the first GEO satellite launch by about a year. 

While program officials are expected to implement the program within 
the existing funding profile, they acknowledge that management reserves 
set aside to fix unexpected problems will likely be depleted in early 
2009. Subsequent problems may further affect cost and schedule. 

In December 2005, the Air Force was directed to begin efforts to 
develop a viable competing capability in parallel with the SBIRS 
program, previously known as the Alternative Infrared Satellite System 
(AIRSS). We reported in September 2007 that the Air Force had not 
positioned the AIRSS effort for success, because knowledge that could 
inform technology development and design was not fully leveraged. DOD 
agreed, revised the effort's development strategy, and gave it a new 
name--the Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS). Sensor 
development under 3GIRS--now a follow-on to the SBIRS High program-- 
continues, and sensor prototypes are slated for delivery around March 
2008. 

Agency Comments: 

According to the program office, the first GEO space vehicle and 
payload have completed thermal vacuum testing, and the satellite is 
completing the first phase of a test to verify system interfaces and 
demonstrate connectivity. The principal SBIRS activity is completing 
first-time integration of a complex satellite, and is designed to 
discover issues. While the recent flight software issues are 
disappointing, the recovery plan presented in November 2007 to the 
Secretary of the Air Force and the Defense Acquisition Executive is 
expected to succeed. The Air Force further expects that correcting the 
problem will cost well below the original estimate of $1 billion 
dollars. 

[End of section] 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II. 

Source: SDB II Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb Increment II will provide the 
capability to attack mobile targets from standoff range in adverse 
weather. The program builds on a previous increment that provided 
capability against fixed targets. SDB II will add capability for 
multiple kills per pass, multiple ordnance carriage, near-precision 
munitions, and reduced munitions footprint. SDB II will be installed on 
the Air Force F-15E and the Navy and Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighter, 
and is designed to work with other aircraft, such as the F-22A. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Competitive risk reduction start: (5/06); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Competitive down selection: (9/09); 
Development start: (12/09); 
Low-rate decision: (12/12); 
Initial capability: (9/14); 
Last procurement: (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing, Raytheon; 
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $627.8 million; 
* Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: $627.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 12,000. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $765.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 12,046; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 57; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Two of the five critical technologies for SDB II are currently in use 
on legacy Air Force and Navy systems. All technologies are expected to 
be nearing full maturity by development start in December 2009. In May 
2006, the Air Force awarded competitive risk-reduction contracts to 
Boeing and Raytheon. The 42-month risk reduction phase is expected to 
allow the contractors to further develop the immature technologies. The 
contractors will compete for the system development and demonstration 
contract, which the program plans to award in December 2009. Each 
competing contractor is attempting to reach critical design review- 
level maturity. If achieved, this will allow the program to focus 
development efforts on qualification, validation, and testing. The 
first SDB II delivery is expected in fiscal year 2014. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

SDB II Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

While the program office reports that two of the technologies are 
mature, that assessment refers to their use on legacy Air Force and 
Navy systems. The technologies' application to SDB II-specific 
requirements still requires additional development work. Three other 
technologies, the multimode seeker, net-ready data link, and payload 
(warhead and fuze), also need further development. According to program 
officials, the seeker will be the most challenging technology to 
demonstrate due to the complexity of the algorithms it will require and 
the need to package the multi-mode seeker into a small volume. The 
program's technology levels were assessed prior to beginning the risk 
reduction phase, and their status will not be updated until the program 
selects a single contractor design in December 2009. The program 
expects that each critical technology will be mature or approaching 
full maturity when the program begins system development and 
demonstration, regardless of the winning contractor. 

Program officials plan to mature these technologies through extensive 
early testing using modeling and simulation techniques, and relying on 
other programs that have used the same or similar technologies. Each 
contractor will conduct these activities separately. In order to select 
a winning design, the program plans to evaluate the level of technology 
maturity achieved by each contractor during the risk reduction phase. 

Design Stability: 

The two SDB II contractors are competing under separate risk reduction 
contracts. One contractor will be selected at the end of the risk 
reduction phase for the system development and production efforts. 
Specific details pertaining to each contractor's current design are 
competition sensitive and contractor proprietary. The program office 
utilizes a variety of program milestones and technical reviews to 
assess each contractor's design stability. The program office will 
further assess the contractors' progress through interim feedback 
sessions. Additionally, the program office participates in contractor 
risk reviews on a recurring basis to maintain insight into the system's 
current design maturity. In order to maximize their chance of being 
selected for the design and production contracts, the competing 
contractors are attempting to reach critical design review level 
maturity. If achieved, this will reduce system design risk carried 
forward into the system development and demonstration phase. 

Other Program Issues: 

The government plans to procure the SDB II based on contractor- 
developed and government-approved system performance specifications. 
The requirements in the risk reduction contracts are performance-based, 
whereby each contractor must meet a set of objectives stated in the 
contract. As such, the contractors will control their own activities, 
with the government maintaining insight and leveraging the competitive 
environment to mitigate risk. Each contractor will submit system 
performance specifications as part of its offer to the government for 
system development. These specifications become contractually binding 
once a single contractor is selected in fiscal year 2009. At that time, 
the contractor will be accountable for system performance. Accordingly, 
the contractor is responsible not only for the design of the weapon 
system, but also for planning the developmental test and evaluation 
program to verify the system performance. The government will assess 
the contractor's verification efforts for adequacy before three major 
decision points: award of the low-rate production contract, declaration 
that the system is ready for dedicated operational test, and award of 
the full-rate production contract after the beyond-low-rate production 
assessment. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred 
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). 

Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. 

[End of figure] 

The Army expects its Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft 
System, Sky Warrior, to fill a capability gap for an unmanned aircraft 
system at the division level. The system will include 12 aircraft, 
ground control stations, ground and air data terminals, automatic 
takeoff and landing systems, and ground support equipment. The Army 
plans for Sky Warrior to operate alone or with other platforms such as 
the Apache helicopter and perform missions including reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and target acquisition and attack. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (4/05); 
Design review: (10/06); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Low-rate decision: (7/08); 
Full-rate decision: (2/10); 
Initial capability: (3/10); 
Last procurement: (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $111.3 million; 
* Procurement: $1,463.1 million; 
Total funding: $1,649.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 11. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/2005: $327.5; 
Latest, 08/2007: $375.0; 
Percent change: 14.5. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/2005: $636.9; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,161.6; 
Percent change: 82.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/2005: $964.2; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,536.7; 
Percent change: 59.4. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/2005: $192.836; 
Latest, 08/2007: $128.055; 
Percent change: -33.1. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/2005: 5; 
Latest, 08/2007: 12; 
Percent change: 140.0 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/2005: 50; 
Latest, 08/2007: 59; 
Percent change: 18.0. 

Development and procurement costs and quantities shown are from program 
inception through fiscal year 2015. 

[End of table] 

The maturity of Sky Warrior's four critical technologies remains the 
same as reported last year, with two mature critical technologies and 
two nearing maturity. The program office anticipates all technologies 
will be mature by the time of production start, currently scheduled for 
August 2008. There are backup technologies in place should the 
technologies not mature as planned, but their use would result in a 
less capable system. Program officials stated that 96 percent of 
drawings have been released to manufacturing. However, the total number 
of drawings increased by over 37 percent from the program office's 
original projection at design review in October 2006. Program officials 
indicated that the increase largely resulted from requirements changes 
and redesign. DOD recently directed the Sky Warrior and Predator 
programs be combined into a single program. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

Sky Warrior UAS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Two of Sky Warrior's four critical technologies--the heavy fuel engine 
and the automatic takeoff and landing system--are mature. The other two 
critical technologies--the Ethernet and the tactical common data link-
-are nearing maturity. The Sky Warrior program office expects they will 
be fully mature by the production start planned for August 2008. 

The Ethernet is expected to provide communications between Sky Warrior 
aircraft and ground control stations as well as interoperability with 
other Army aviation platforms. Although the program office considers 
the Ethernet a proven technology, there are no unmanned systems to date 
that have employed it in the same way it will be used on the Sky 
Warrior. The data link has been demonstrated on the Air Force's 
Predator A unmanned aircraft system, but it has not yet been fielded on 
any unmanned aerial vehicle. 

The program office has technologies in place as backups for the 
Ethernet and data link, but it does not anticipate their use. If it 
became necessary to use the backups, they would result in a less 
capable system. Backups for the data link are not mature or have slower 
data transmission rates. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials stated that they have released 96 percent of drawings 
to manufacturing. However, the Sky Warrior's design has proven more 
difficult to mature than anticipated. The program office now 
anticipates a total of 4,428 drawings, over 37 percent more than the 
total expected at the time of the design review in October 2006. 

According to program officials, several factors contributed to the 
increased number of drawings. These include reliability and redundancy 
improvements to the aircraft, requirement changes due to the Sky 
Warrior's migration from a military intelligence asset to an aviation 
asset, and redesign of the system's ground control station. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess Sky Warrior's production maturity because the 
contractor does not use statistical process control as its metric. 
Instead, the contractor employs global technology standards per the 
International Standards Organization as its method for monitoring, 
controlling, and improving processes. The Sky Warrior program office 
stated that this approach is acceptable because Sky Warrior production 
is relatively low volume, and the contractor generally employs nearly 
100 percent testing of all critical items. 

Other Program Issues: 

In September 2007, DOD issued a memorandum directing that the Predator 
and Sky Warrior programs be combined into a single acquisition program 
in order to achieve common development, procurement, sustainment, and 
training activities. The memo indicated that the two programs would 
migrate to a single contract by October 2008. According to Sky Warrior 
program officials, the impact of this direction on the program is not 
yet known because all aspects of the merger are still being determined. 

Agency Comments: 

The Sky Warrior program office stated that the majority of the increase 
in drawing numbers resulted from requirements changes as well as 
technology improvements for enhancing system performance. The office 
indicated that it believes Sky Warrior was designed in a reasonable 
amount of time once final requirements were decided, and that it does 
not feel the system design was more difficult to mature than 
anticipated. Additionally, the office noted that although the Sky 
Warrior contractor does not use statistical process control to assess 
production maturity, the office itself employs measurements for that 
purpose. Those measurements include design stability, infrastructure 
tooling, test equipment, facilities, materials and personnel training, 
and process capability. 

[End of section] 

Space Radar (SR): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Space Radar (SR). 

Source: Space Radar Integrated Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

DOD and the intelligence community are collaborating to develop a 
single common radar system to provide global, persistent, all-weather, 
day and night, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities, particularly in denied areas. As envisioned by the 
program office, SR is to consist of a constellation of low-earth- 
orbiting satellites, ground systems, and communications network, and 
would generate large volumes of radar data for transmission to ground- 
, air-, ship-, and space-based platforms. We assessed the space 
segment. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Development start: (6/09); 
Design review: (4/12); 
Production decision: (6/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Chantilly, Va.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: TBD; 
* Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: 8. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $12,219.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $5,290.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $19,400.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $1,940.041; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 10; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The SR program is supported by five critical technologies that remain 
immature. The program office is focusing its efforts on technology risk 
reduction and concept development activities. The Integrated Program 
Office has made several changes to the acquisition approach, including 
those related to cost and schedule, to address continuing concerns 
about the affordability of SR. The program also revised its development 
start date from the last quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2009, 
an 8-month extension. Launch of the first SR satellite is scheduled for 
fiscal year 2016. Design and production maturity could not be assessed 
because SR has not begun product development. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

SR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The five critical technologies that we reported in our last assessment 
of SR have not changed and remain immature. The technologies are the 
advanced analog/digital converter, integrated radio frequency assembly, 
low earth orbit laser communication terminals, surface moving target 
indication processing algorithms, and open ocean surveillance 
processing algorithms. According to program office officials, these 
technologies will continue to evolve and reflect an initial attempt to 
define what is critical to the program. Two prime contractors were 
awarded risk reduction contracts to help mature SR's critical 
technologies. These contractors are competing for SR's system 
development contract and may have different approaches in how they plan 
to provide a space radar capability, which could result in a different 
set of critical technologies than currently defined by the program 
office. The program office expects all critical technologies to be 
mature when the product development phase begins in the third quarter 
of 2009. However, as we reported in August 2007, the program office 
will need to gain significant knowledge on these technologies to be 
well positioned for success by program start. 

Other Program Issues: 

In January 2005, DOD and the intelligence community committed to pursue 
a single space radar capability and have worked to establish a key 
funding agreement that addresses short-term cost sharing 
responsibilities. However, as we reported in August 2007, SR lacks a 
long-term funding agreement beyond fiscal year 2013, adding uncertainty 
to the ability of DOD and the intelligence community to afford 
expensive programs such as SR. Additionally, recent changes have 
occurred in the location of the SR budget--shifting from unclassified 
Air Force accounts to a DOD classified program account. Specifically, 
from the inception of the SR program, its budget and funding resided in 
unclassified Air Force accounts. However, starting in fiscal year 2008, 
the SR budget and funding were moved to the Defense Reconnaissance 
Support Activities budget, and are now classified. The SR program 
office estimates the cost of developing, producing, and operating the 
system through 2027 to range from $20 billion to $25 billion, although 
the cost is subject to change based on evolving program requirements. 

While the program office continues to remain focused on developing a 
single space radar system to meet user needs, other challenges remain. 
The program office told us that it is adjusting its acquisition 
approach to better balance capability, affordability, and risk through 
incrementally evolving the SR capability. For fiscal year 2008, the 
program office will focus on risk reduction and technology maturity 
activities as well as continuing with requirements definition, modeling 
and simulation, and joint systems engineering to ensure affordability 
and achievability of the first SR satellites. The program office is 
continuing its progress toward fully defining program requirements by 
June 2009. However, the program has experienced some schedule delays, 
and as we reported in August 2007, the SR program may not have planned 
enough time for design, integration, and production activities, which 
could result in further schedule delays. Our analysis showed that the 
planned acquisition time frame from program start to initial launch 
capability is shorter than what DOD has achieved or estimated for other 
complex satellite systems. 

At the time of this printing, we obtained an official statement from 
the National Reconnaissance Office of Strategic Communications/Office 
of Corporate Communication that DOD and the Intelligence Community have 
decided not to pursue the Space Radar Program of Record, citing that 
this program is not affordable and will be restructured immediately. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force stated that the 
SR Integrated Program Office is currently adjusting SR's acquisition 
approach and is moving toward a progressive capabilities acquisition 
strategy that better balances affordability with incremental capability 
evolution. This new approach is expected to affect the current fiscal 
year 2008 and beyond program plan. The 2008 Defense Appropriations 
Conference report anticipates a revised plan in early calendar year 
2008, and the SR Integrated Program Office is working toward that goal. 
The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The 
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built 
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch 
these satellites in 2008 to assess how well they work within the 
context of the missile defense system. The agency is also studying 
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next 
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites. 

Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capability: 
SBIRS-low program start: (1995); 
Transition to MDA: (10/00); 
STSS program start: (2002); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Demonstrator satellite launch: (8/08-10/08); 
Software upgrades: (2008). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $3,002.7 million; 
* Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,002.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: $6,591.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: $6,591.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: 2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 02/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception 
through fiscal year 2013. 

[End of table] 

All of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature. The 
STSS design appears otherwise stable, with all drawings released to 
manufacturing. However, a thermal vacuum test on the first space 
vehicle to assess the ability of the satellite to operate in the cold 
vacuum of space took twice as long as scheduled, problems with STSS 
integration caused the contractor to overrun its fiscal 2007 budget, 
and higher priorities at the United Launch Alliance site moved the 
program down on the launch priority list. These factors have delayed 
the STSS launch until possibly as late as October 2008. However, this 
date is dependent upon the successful integration of the sensor 
payloads with the satellite platforms, sufficient fiscal year 2008 
funding to support the new launch date, and launch site availability. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

STSS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five critical technologies--satellite communication cross-links, 
onboard processor, acquisition sensor, track sensor, and the single- 
stage cryocooler--are mature. The last two technologies--track sensor 
and the single-stage cryocooler--reached maturity when the thermal 
vacuum testing on the first satellite's payload was completed in 
February 2006. 

Design Stability: 

The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to 
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings 
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from 
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to 
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in 
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design 
drawings. 

Other Program Issues: 

The launch of the demonstration satellites was delayed from 2007 to 
2008 for several reasons. Since the satellites are legacy hardware 
built under the former Space Based Infrared System Low program, there 
are no spares available for testing, and the need to handle parts 
carefully to avoid damage caused schedule delays. In addition, a number 
of interface issues arose during thermal vacuum testing, causing the 
test to take twice as long as scheduled. Further delays occurred when 
problems with component hardware were recognized and when the launch 
site encountered schedule conflicts. 

The STSS contractor overran its fiscal year 2007 budget, and as such, 
fiscal year 2007 funds were not available to launch the satellites. The 
program office subsequently planned to launch the satellites during the 
early part of fiscal year 2008, but the launch pad was already 
occupied. Program officials did not want to commit to a new launch date 
until the thermal vacuum testing for the second space vehicle was 
completed. The program office is planning to have the satellites ready 
to launch in July 2008, in time for a launch window in August 2008, but 
a GPS satellite launch is scheduled for that time and the United Launch 
Alliance site has announced it cannot support two simultaneous Delta II 
missions. If the low STSS launch priority status is not upgraded, the 
new launch date may be as late as October 2008. However, as currently 
programmed, the fiscal year 2008 budget does not have sufficient funds 
to support the launch. 

Despite delays in hardware and software testing and integration, other 
parts of the STSS program have proceeded according to schedule. Lessons 
learned from the thermal vacuum test for the first satellite in these 
areas facilitated the completion of the second satellite's thermal 
vacuum test, which was complete in November 2007. In addition, 
procedures for ground, flight, maintenance, and contingency, testing 
have been developed and certified. The operations crew is moving toward 
Final Readiness Certification and plans a March 2008 mission "dress 
rehearsal" that will certify that the crew is ready to operate STSS. 
Finally, the second part of the acceptance test for the STSS ground 
component was completed in September 2007, and the command and control 
capabilities of the ground segment will be demonstrated in a system 
operability demonstration. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA concurred with the 
information provided in this report. 

[End of section] 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). 

Source: THAAD Project Office. 

[End of figure] 

MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend 
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will 
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and 
communications system. We assessed the design for the Block 2008 
initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to deliver to the 
Army in fiscal year 2009 for limited operational use. 

Timeline: Technology/system development to initial capacity: 
Program start: (1/92); 
Transition to MDA: (10/01); 
Block 2006 start: (1/06); 
1st successful intercept: (7/06); 
Contract award for fire units #1 and #2: (12/06); 
Integrated BMDS test: (4/07); 
Block 2006 completion: (12/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Partial capability date: (3rd Q/2009). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala.
Funding FY08-FY13:
* R&D: $4,136.7 million; 
* Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $4,136.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0; 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $15,561.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $15,561.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include known costs and quantities from the program's inception 
through fiscal year 2013. 

[End of table] 

THAAD's technologies are mature and its design is generally stable, 
with 94 percent of its design drawings released. During Block 2006, the 
program continued to mature THAAD's design and expects to deliver a 
limited operational capability during Block 2008. In fiscal year 2007, 
the program successfully conducted three of four scheduled tests. Two 
tests resulted in intercepts of unitary targets at different levels of 
the atmosphere. A third test verified the interceptor's components 
inside the atmosphere. According to program officials, the fourth test 
was delayed until fiscal year 2008 due to quality assurance issues, 
along with target and range availability. Additionally, the THAAD 
program is overrunning its fiscal year 2007 cost budget by $91.1 
million dollars. Rework and design complexities are the primary reasons 
for the cost increase. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

THAAD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as 
mature. All of these technologies are included in four major 
components: the fire control and communications component, the 
interceptor, the launcher, and the radar. 

Design Stability: 

Approximately 94 percent of THAAD's 12,282 drawings have been released, 
indicating that THAAD's design is stable. The number of drawings 
increased from a 2003 design review because previously excluded 
drawings were added for radar components, as well as for the missile 
component. 

The THAAD program rebaselined flight plans in fiscal year 2007 when MDA 
directed the program to eliminate three flight tests from the test plan 
because of budget pressures and limited target and range availability. 
According to program officials, key objectives from the deleted flight 
tests will be incorporated into other flight tests. 

THAAD officials originally expected to complete four flight tests prior 
to the end of fiscal year 2007 but instead were only able to conduct 
three. Two tests resulted in successful intercepts of "Scud"-type 
targets at different levels of the atmosphere, while the third test 
successfully demonstrated component capability in a high-pressure 
environment. The third test was the lowest altitude fly-out of a THAAD 
interceptor to date. The fourth flight test has been delayed due to a 
quality control issue with the interceptor and range and target 
availability. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because the program is 
only delivering test units until fiscal year 2009. MDA has purchased 
two fire units while simultaneously conducting developmental 
activities. The first will be delivered in fiscal year 2009, with the 
second expected to become available during fiscal year 2010. Prior to a 
production decision, the program office plans to assess production 
maturity using risk assessments and verification reviews to ensure that 
the contractor's processes are repeatable and of high quality. 

Other Program Issues: 

In fiscal year 2007, THAAD completed the transition of its test 
facilities from the White Sands Missile Range to the Pacific Missile 
Range Facility. This allows tests of the THAAD interceptor that were 
previously constrained by space limitations at the White Sands Range. 
Additionally, the transition enables other MDA elements to participate 
in flight tests. For example, one test in fiscal year 2007 utilized 
communications with the Aegis system as well as the communication link 
with the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications system. 

Hardware issues and technical problems are causing the program's prime 
contractor to experience negative cost variances. The variances can 
primarily be attributed to the missile, launcher, and system test 
components associated with the design and fabrication of the launch and 
test support equipment. As of September 2007, the THAAD program was 
overrunning its fiscal year 2007 cost budget by $91.1 million. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) 
logo. 

Source: TSAT Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Air Force's TSAT system will provide high-data-rate military 
satellite communications services to DOD users worldwide, including 
mobile tactical warfighting elements. The system will provide 
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio 
frequency and laser cross-links with other air and space systems. The 
TSAT system will consist of a constellation of five satellites, plus a 
spare, a network management architecture, and a ground control system. 
We assessed the satellites and the ground system. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Development start: (2nd Q/FY 2008); 
Design review/production decision: (1st Q/FY 2012); 
First satellite launch: (12/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems Solutions (TMOS); 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: TBD; 
* Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $11,778.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $194.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $12,035.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: $2,005.888; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 08/2007: 99; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include costs and quantities budgeted as of fiscal year 2008. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, all seven critical technologies are 
mature. In April 2007, the TSAT program completed the systems design 
review. Also, the maturity of the critical technologies was validated 
by an independent technology readiness assessment in June 2007. A 
Defense Space Acquisition Board is scheduled to convene in the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2008 to determine if the overall TSAT program is 
ready to enter the development phase. The first satellite launch has 
been delayed by over 12 months due to a DOD decision that includes a 
budget reduction to the TSAT program over concerns about an optimistic 
schedule and synchronization with other programs in the Global 
Information Grid. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

TSAT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

On the basis of subsystem-level tests conducted in 2007 by the 
contractors competing for the space segment contract, and verified by 
an independent contractor, the Air Force determined that all of the 
TSAT program's seven critical technologies are mature. Since our last 
assessment, dynamic bandwidth and resource allocation, protected 
bandwidth efficient modulation waveforms, and single-access laser 
communication have reached maturity. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, the TSAT program had invested over $2 
billion by the end of fiscal year 2007 for research, development, and 
risk reduction activities. However, information on cost, design 
stability, production maturity, or satellite software development 
metrics will not be available until the TSAT program formally enters 
the development phase and awards the space segment contract. At that 
time, the program should also have an approved Acquisition Program 
Baseline that includes validated requirements, total cost estimates for 
the first block of satellites, and key milestone dates. 

In December 2006, DOD issued a program decision memorandum that reduced 
the TSAT program budget by $232 million for fiscal year 2008. According 
to DOD officials, the budget reduction was due to concerns about an 
overly optimistic TMOS (TSAT Mission Operations System--the ground 
control system that will provide network management and the overall 
network architecture), software development schedule, and the long-term 
synchronization of TSAT with the terrestrial portion of the Global 
Information Grid, including terminals and teleports. As a result, all 
TSAT satellite launches were delayed by at least one year. The first 
launch was delayed from October 2014 to late 2015. 

The Air Force's fiscal year 2008 TSAT budget request included $481.9 
million to award a contract to begin satellite development in the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2008. According to DOD officials, the program is 
scheduled to undergo a program review approximately 8 months after 
space segment contract award to synchronize the space segment with TMOS 
and systems engineering and integration efforts in order to establish a 
TSAT-wide baseline. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
since the last assessment, the TSAT program Key Decision Point B (KDP- 
B) Defense Space Acquisition Board has been postponed into the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2008. The postponement will result in the delay 
to the space segment contract award to no earlier than the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2008. 

According to Air Force officials, during the past year, TSAT has 
successfully matured the key technologies and completed the TSAT system 
design review. In accordance with National Security Space Acquisition 
Policy 03-01, the independent technology readiness assessment, 
Independent Program Assessment, and Independent Cost Estimate required 
prior to KDP-B were completed in mid-2007. 

[End of section] 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft. 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The V-22 is a tilt rotor aircraft developed for Marine Corps, Air 
Force, and Navy use. The MV-22 will replace Marine Corps CH-46E 
helicopters. The MV-22 Block B variant addresses reliability and 
maintenance concerns of earlier variants. The Block B variant was 
deployed to Iraq in September 2007. The Special Operations CV-22 
variant is undergoing its first operational tests and is scheduled for 
fielding in 2009. Our assessment focuses on the MV-22 Block B but 
relates to the CV-22 due to common design and manufacturing processes. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program start: (12/82);
Development start: (4/86); 
Development restart: (9/94); 
Full-rate decision: (9/05); 
Initial capability: (6/07); 
GAO review: (1/08);
Last procurement: (2018). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $546.9 million; 
* Procurement: $27,593.4 million; 
Total funding: $28,203.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 345. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 04/1986: $4,033.2; 
Latest, 12/2006: $12,473.9; 
Percent change: 209.3. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 04/1986: $33,822.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $42,087.5; 
Percent change: 24.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 04/1986: $38,080.5; 
Latest, 12/2006: $54,767.3; 
Percent change: 43.8. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 04/1986: $41.709; 
Latest, 12/2006: $119.579; 
Percent change: 186.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 04/1986: 913; 
Latest, 12/2006: 458; 
Percent change: -49.8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 04/1986: 117; 
Latest, 12/2006: 295; 
Percent change: 152.1. 

[End of table] 

A number of design changes to the MV-22 Block B are under review, 
including a fix for hydraulic fluid leaks that have contributed to 
engine fires; a new troop seat design; reliability improvements for 
desert or icy environment operations; and cost reduction initiatives. 
The program office believes these design changes will address safety, 
reliability, and performance concerns. The proposed multiyear 
production contract would increase annual production rates but include 
fewer aircraft than expected. Aircraft continue to be accepted with 
deviations and waivers, and the contractor's ability to produce 
aircraft at the higher rates is a concern, but it is being managed 
closely by the program office. Earlier Block A aircraft continue to be 
upgraded to the Block B design at a cost of $15 million to $20 million 
per aircraft, according to program officials. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

V-22 Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The V-22 is being produced in blocks. Program officials state that, 
based on DOD criteria, Block A technologies are considered mature. Some 
Block A variants are being upgraded to the Block B configuration, which 
is the deployable configuration There are a number of design changes 
under review that could address safety, reliability, performance, and 
cost issues with the Block B design. For example, a newly designed 
crashworthy troop seat addresses deficiencies identified during testing 
in 2000. The new troop seats, which will be installed on new production 
aircraft, provide higher G-force load capabilities consistent with 
current G-force load requirements. Program officials state, however, 
that the aircraft structure was not designed to meet these new 
increased G-force load requirements and it is possible that the 
airframe's structural capability could be exceeded in certain crash 
scenarios. The exact difference between the seat loading and the 
airframe capability is being assessed to determine ways to strengthen 
the airframe to better match the higher G-force load capabilities of 
the troop seats now being installed. 

Fires have recently occurred in the engine compartment due to leaking 
hydraulic fluid coming into contact with hot engine parts, forcing the 
program office to make design changes to components and couplings in 
that area. Program officials are investigating whether the contractor 
could make changes to the engine compartment drainage system or if all 
hydraulic lines could be removed completely from the engine 
compartments to keep this from occurring. In the near term, frequent 
inspections are being conducted to check for hydraulic leaks. 

Program officials are also concerned that aircraft reliability and 
mission capability rates could be reduced when operating in desert 
environments such as Iraq, where it is now deployed, and in icy 
environments, such as Afghanistan. The effects of sand and dust on the 
aircraft systems and ice protection system maturity may affect mission 
capability rates. The program office states that both of these issues 
are being tracked and could result in design changes, especially as 
more maintenance experience is gained from deployment of the aircraft. 

A number of engineering change proposals have been made that would 
lower unit recurring flyaway cost to a level the contractor believes is 
needed to generate foreign military sales. The program continues to 
investigate ways to reduce the procurement cost of the aircraft. 

Production Maturity: 

In the Defense Appropriations and Authorization Acts for fiscal year 
2007, Congress authorized and appropriated funds for the Navy to enter 
into a multiyear contract for the V-22, beginning with the fiscal year 
2008 program year. Negotiations for a multiyear procurement contract 
are still under way. Original plans called for quickly increasing 
annual production to 42 aircraft per year--a rate that is substantially 
higher than the 11 aircraft per year the program was held to through 
fiscal year 2006. The highest annual production rate planned for the 
multiyear contract has since been decreased to 36 aircraft, and the 
total quantities were reduced from 185 to 167 aircraft. The V-22 
program recognizes the challenges with increasing the annual production 
rate under the multiyear procurement contract, specifically the 
inherent challenge of producing the fuselage and wing at separate 
locations and then assembling them at a third site. 

As reported in our last assessment, production aircraft continue to be 
conditionally accepted with deviation and waiver issues. These included 
erratic behavior of multifunction displays and anomalies during engine 
start. The multifunction display behavior was addressed with a mission 
computer software update that provided an alternative solution, but did 
not determine the root cause, as it could not be replicated in the lab. 
The engine start anomaly was addressed by design corrections. Also, new 
government-furnished troops seats, which meet current G-force load 
requirements, were not available for installation on all recently 
delivered aircraft. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the V-22 program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter. 

Source: Presidential Helicopters Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy's VH-71 will be a dual-piloted, multi-engine helicopter 
employed by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable, 
and timely transportation for the President and Vice President of the 
United States, heads of state, and others. When the President is 
aboard, it will serve as the Commander in Chief's primary command and 
control platform. The VH-71 will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N, and will 
be developed in two increments. We assessed Increment I and made 
observations on Increment II. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start/production decision: (1/05); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Initial capability: (3/10). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,069.3 million; 
* Procurement: $2,342.1 million; 
Total funding: $3,411.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 20. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 02/2006: $3,825.4; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 02/2006: $2,409.3; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of 02/2006: $6,415.1; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 02/2006: $278.916; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 23; 
As of 02/2006: 23; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 02/2006: 57; 
Latest, 09/2007: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Increment I and II development and Increment I production are funded 
with R&D funding. The program is being restructured and cost and cycle 
time are expected to grow. 

[End of table] 

The VH-71 program began system development and committed to production 
without fully maturing technologies, achieving design stability, or 
demonstrating production maturity due to a high-risk schedule driven by 
White House needs. The program is approaching full technology maturity 
and design stability for Increment I. However, concurrency in design, 
testing, and production continues to put the program at risk for cost 
growth and schedule delays. Some Increment I performance requirements 
have been deferred to Increment II, and weight issues continue to drive 
performance risks. In 2006, the program office determined that the 
Increment II program was not executable. It is reassessing this 
increment and will be making cost, schedule, and performance trade- 
offs; further cost growth and schedule delays are expected. This graph 
depicts product knowledge for Increment I. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

VH-71 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The VH-71 program's two Increment I critical technologies, the 
Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded Resource Communication 
Controller (CASPER) and Cockpit Control Display (CCD), were approaching 
maturity when the program began development and committed to production 
in January 2005. The program office now states the designation of these 
technologies as critical was erroneous because these systems presented 
integration, not maturity, risks. The CCD is now mature. However, the 
CASPER has not been demonstrated in a realistic environment. According 
to a program official, the CASPER has only been tested in a lab and has 
not been subjected to the movements and vibrations it will experience 
during flight. Our assessment does not include classified portions of 
this program. 

The VH-71 program does not expect to identify any critical technologies 
for Increment II. However, the program office is tracking three items-
-an advanced blade design, voice-over Internet protocol security, and 
the automatic flight computer system--because of potential technology 
maturity concerns. According to the program office, these items are 
still in the early stages of development but are based on existing 
technologies or systems. For example, the basic technology of the 
advanced blade design is fielded on another helicopter, but the rotor 
disc is being increased in size from 45 feet to 64 feet, a change that 
could pose potential technology issues. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

In January 2005, the VH-71 program committed to the production of five 
aircraft without a final design or fully defined production processes. 
The program's August 2006 design review was held 10 months later than 
planned and did not meet the Navy's criteria for a successful system- 
level review. An additional design review took place in February 2007. 
Currently, 86 percent of the Increment I drawings are releasable to 
manufacturing. However, according to Defense Contract Management Agency 
officials, there are still changes being made to the design that affect 
the basic aircraft. There are approximately 30 to 40 new specification 
change notices per month, and that trend is not abating. While DCMA 
does not see this as a high number, it does point to continuing design 
changes, which may result in retrofitting of the five pilot production 
aircraft. Weight growth has negatively affected the projected 
performance of the Increment I aircraft and could affect the program's 
ability to meet the range requirement for Increment II. Concurrency in 
design, testing, and production, also continues to drive the risk of 
cost growth and schedule delays on the program. 

Other Program Issues: 

The VH-71 program is currently in the midst of restructuring Increment 
II. Changes to this portion of the program could entail significant 
cost and schedule increases. Even before these changes, the cost of the 
VH-71 prime contract was projected to increase by over $1 billion. 
Earned value data from July 2007 showed that the estimated price of the 
contract increased almost $741 million dollars. According to the 
program office, there is an additional $300 million in out-of-scope 
work that has not yet been put on contract. The effect of these 
contract cost increases on the overall cost of the program will likely 
not be known until after the program has a new acquisition strategy. 
DOD officials have also stated that a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach is 
imminent for this program. However, a stop work order has been issued 
for Increment II development efforts, leaving future program direction 
and costs unknown at this time. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
VH-71 Increment I program is executing an accelerated schedule driven 
by an urgent White House need to replace existing aging assets. 
Concurrency in development, design, and production to meet the 
accelerated schedule is acknowledged as high risk and is part of the 
program's approved acquisition strategy. As noted in our assessment, 
the Navy said that program mitigation plans include conducting 
performance trade-offs by deferring Increment I requirements to 
Increment II with customer agreement. Performance trade-offs have been 
made, and an assessment of these trades along with program impacts on 
Increment II cost and schedule is ongoing. According to the Navy, the 
concurrency described in our assessment of Increment I design, testing, 
and production will be significantly reduced and/or removed in the 
revised Increment II program, which will follow a more typical 
acquisition approach. 

[End of section] 

Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774): 

[See PDF for image] 

Photograph: Virginia-Class Submarine (SSN 774). 

Source: General Dynamics Electric Boat. 

[End of figure] 

The Virginia-class attack submarine is designed to combat enemy 
submarines and surface ships, fire cruise missiles, and provide 
improved surveillance and special operation support to enhance littoral 
warfare. The Navy is working to reduce construction costs by about $400 
million per ship by fiscal year 2012. The Technology Insertion Program 
(TIP) consists of three technologies designed to improve performance 
and lower construction costs of these ships. We assessed the status of 
the Navy's cost reduction efforts and progress of the TIP. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start: (6/95); 
Development startï¿½cost reduction: (12/05); 
Development startï¿½TIP technology: (10/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Production decisionï¿½AESR: (5/10); 
Cost reduction target: (2012); 
Production decisionï¿½CAVES WAA: (10/14). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Electric Boat; 
Program office: Washington, D.C.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $1,228.2 million; 
* Procurement: $49,611.9 million; 
Total funding: $50,840.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 21. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 06/1995: $4,283.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $6,119.1; 
Percent change: 42.8. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 06/1995: $53,123.9; 
Latest, 12/2006: $75,132.2; 
Percent change: 41.4. 

Total program cost; 
As of 06/1995: $57,407.3; 
Latest, 12/2006: $81,251.4; 
Percent change: 41.5. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 06/1995: $1,913.578; 
Latest, 12/2006: $2,708.378; 
Percent change: 41.5. 

Total quantities; 30; 
As of 06/1995: 30; 
Latest, 12/2006: 30; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 06/1995: 134; 
Latest, 12/2006: 148; 
Percent change: 10.4. 

[End of table] 

The program's near term efforts are focused on cost reduction, with a 
goal of ordering and building two submarines per year at a cost of $2 
billion each (in 2005 dollars) in 2012. The Navy seeks to reduce 
construction costs by introducing more efficient production processes, 
developing cost effective design changes, and leveraging economies of 
scale. According to the Navy, about 79 percent of the necessary savings 
for construction and design have been achieved. However, a recent cost 
analysis indicated that the Navy may have difficulty achieving its cost 
target. The Technology Insertion Program was delayed to reduce cost and 
schedule risk, and further evaluate technologies. The TIP consists of 
three systems: Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction, Advanced 
Sail, and Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array, the 
first of which is scheduled for insertion in 2010. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

Virginia Class Submarine Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction (AESR) is a software 
package that uses improved algorithms to continuously monitor and 
recalibrate the submarine's signature. Similar software has been 
demonstrated in British submarines, but the technology is considered 
immature because modifications to the software will require additional 
testing. Software modification is expected to begin in October 2008, 
and insertion is scheduled for fiscal year 2010. Once development is 
complete, AESR will be retrofitted on all Virginia-class submarines. 

The Advanced Sail is a redesign of the structure that sits atop the 
main body of the submarine. The new design provides expanded space to 
carry weapons, anti-submarine systems, and communications systems 
external to the hull. Development began in June 2006, and the composite 
material used to construct the sail has been demonstrated under a 
separate program. However, insertion of the Advanced Sail has been 
delayed because related costs may exceed budget limits. A new bow 
design that also adds payload space for weapons and systems will be 
used on submarines starting in fiscal year 2009. The Navy will await 
testing of the new bow before completing a new sail design. 

The Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array (CAVES WAA) 
is intended to be a more cost-effective sensor array. CAVES WAA 
consists of two developmental technologies--fiber optic sensors and 
integrated panels that house them and manage their signature--that will 
be integrated together. Both technologies are still immature. To save 
costs, the insertion schedule has been deferred 2 years, to fiscal year 
2014. In fiscal year 2009, the Navy will conduct at-sea testing of a 
CAVES WAA integrated panel being used as part of another application, 
but not in the form necessary for the Virginia-class submarine. 

Design Stability: 

The Navy is attempting to lower the cost of each submarine by $100 
million through design changes without affecting ship capabilities. 
Eleven changes will be introduced on SSN 783, which begins construction 
in fiscal year 2008. Most changes consist of simplifying the design of 
minor systems such as the direct feed and brine overboard discharge 
system. Some major systems, such as the large aperture bow array, are 
also being redesigned. The new bow design, incorporating payload tubes 
and a large aperture bow array, is at an early stage and is scheduled 
for introduction on SSN 784 in fiscal year 2009. The design is less 
complex to build, has fewer components, and can be tested during 
earlier phases of construction. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy is attempting to save another $100 million per submarine 
through capital improvements at the shipyards and implementing a more 
efficient construction sequence. According to the Navy, about $61 
million has been invested in capital expenditures. For example, the 
shipyards upgraded their facilities to be able to reduce the number of 
sections used to build submarines from 13 to 4. Using fewer and larger 
sections lowers cost and allows for increased work during module 
outfitting. 

The Navy hopes to reduce construction time from more than 80 months to 
just 60 months. While SSN 778 and SSN 779 are expected to be delivered 
in 72 and 68 months, respectively, construction time must be reduced by 
another 17 and 12 percent, respectively, in order to meet the 60 month 
target. Historically, construction efficiencies tend to be captured in 
the early part of a production run, but SSN 778 and SSN 779 are the 
fifth and sixth ships being built. Additionally, a recent Navy estimate 
indicates that construction for the SSN 784 may take 6 months longer 
than target. 

The Navy expects to save $200 million per submarine by using a 
multiyear procurement contract to increase the production rate, improve 
construction efficiency, and lower overhead and support costs. Bulk 
purchases of materials could also lower costs. Past programs have 
benefited from such contracts. 

According to program officials, about 79 percent of the program's 
target savings for construction and design has already been achieved 
(approximately $158 million). However, a recent cost analysis of the 
program indicated that the Navy may have difficulty achieving target 
costs in fiscal year 2012. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS): 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). 

Source: WGS Program Office. 

[End of figure] 

WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential 
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition 
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the 
next-generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite 
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal 
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and 
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Development start/production decision: (11/00); 
First satellite launch: (10/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Initial capability: (1/09); 
Full capability: (6/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Development Center; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $0.0 million; 
* Procurement: $468.5 million; 
Total funding: $468.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of 12/2000: $203.1; 
Latest, 12/2006: $331.9; 
Percent change: 63.4. 

Procurement cost; 
As of 12/2000: $929.4; 
Latest, 12/2006: $1,698.9; 
Percent change: 82.9. 

Total program cost; 
As of 12/2000: $1,132.5; 
Latest, 12/2006: $2,030.7; 
Percent change: 79.3. 

Program unit cost; 
As of 12/2000: $377.498; 
Latest, 12/2006: $406.145; 
Percent change: 7.9. 

Total quantities; 
As of 12/2000: 3; 
Latest, 12/2006: 5; 
Percent change: 66.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of 12/2000: 50; 
Latest, 12/2006: 94; 
Percent change: 88.0. 

[End of table] 

The WGS program's technology and design are mature. We did not review 
production maturity data because of the commercial nature of the WGS 
Block 1 acquisition, but unit-level manufacturing for WGS is complete. 
The Air Force is considering acquiring WGS in a three-block approach. 
Block 1 includes the first three satellites, the first of which was 
launched in October 2007. The second and third satellites are scheduled 
to launch in August 2008 and December 2008 respectively. Block 2 
includes two satellites and an option for a third. The United States 
and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2007 
allowing Australia to join the WGS program and provide funding to 
expand the WGS program to six satellites. The Air Force is continuing 
to study the possibility of a Block 3. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

WGS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WGS has two critical technologies: the digital channelizer and the 
phased array antenna. According to program officials, both technologies 
were mature when the program made a production decision in November 
2000. 

Design Stability: 

The design for WGS is mature and the program office has released all 
the expected drawings to manufacturing. The first satellite has been 
launched and the second and third are in testing. According to the 
program office, the satellite design and configuration will not change 
for Block 2 except for an upgrade that will allow ground controllers to 
direct two antennas to bypass the onboard channelizer for added 
airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. 
Bypassing the channelizer will double the data transfer rate for those 
two channels. The WGS acquisition strategy indicates that the upgrade 
is low risk because the design and modification are within existing 
technology and contractor capabilities. 

Production Maturity: 

The commercial nature of the WGS Block 1 acquisition precludes the 
program office from having access to production control data. 
Manufacturing processes for these satellites are complete, and the Air 
Force does not anticipate any new manufacturing processes will be 
necessary for Block 2. The majority of the 1.5 million satellite parts 
are expected to remain the same for Block 2, but due to a 3-year break 
in production between Blocks 1 and 2, some parts are now obsolete. 
However, according to the program office, all of the new parts can be 
incorporated into satellite assembly without changing design or 
manufacturing processes. 

WGS Block 1 consists of three satellites. The first satellite was 
originally scheduled for launch in June 2007, but due to delays with 
both the satellite and the launch vehicle, the satellite was launched 
in October 2007. Specifically, a test failure on the second WGS 
satellite and performance issues with other Boeing satellites prompted 
the WGS program to reevaluate the first satellite. After further 
analysis, the satellite was cleared to launch. Additionally, readiness 
of the launch vehicle was delayed to identify and address a fuel valve 
problem during a recent launch. The second and third satellites are in 
testing and were scheduled to launch in March 2008 and July 2008 
respectively. However, due to issues identified during testing, which 
have to date been resolved, the program delayed the launch dates for 
these two satellites until August 2008 and December 2008 respectively. 
Furthermore, the program has pushed back the expected initial 
operational capability date to January 2009 due to the delay in 
launching the first satellite. Since achieving initial operational 
capability only requires one satellite, the program office does not 
expect further delays due to schedule changes on the second and third 
satellites. 

Other Program Issues: 

Following commercial item acquisition procedures, the Air Force awarded 
a firm-fixed price contract for the Block 1 satellites. However, the 
satellite's two critical technologies--the X-band phased array antenna 
system and digital channelizer--are no longer considered commercial 
items even though their design and configuration will not change for 
Block 2. Therefore, in February 2006, the Air Force did not use 
commercial item procedures when it negotiated and awarded a $1.07 
billion fixed price incentive fee contract for the Block 2 satellites 
that includes more reporting requirements such as earned value 
management data. The program office did not have access to this type of 
information under the Block 1 contract. 


Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 1: 

[See PDF for image] 

Photographs: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 
1. 

Source: PM, WIN-T. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels of 
command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global 
Information Grid. WIN-T is being restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breach, and will be fielded in four increments. The first 
increment absorbs the former Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N) program 
and provides the Army an initial battlefield networking capability down 
to the Army's battalion level. We assessed the first increment. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (2/04); 
Design review: (3/04); 
Low-rate decision: (6/07); 
GAO review: (1/08);
Initial capabilityï¿½increment 1a: (1/09); 
Full-rate decision: (6/09); 
Operational test increment 1b completed: (8/10). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems; 
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $16.2 million; 
* Procurement: $1,789.3 million; 
Total funding: $1,805.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 607. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $23.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,865.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,889.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $2.319; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: 1,677; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: 19; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Because its precursor, the JNN-N program, was based on mature 
commercial networking and satellite communications technologies, the 
Army had not initially identified any critical technologies for WIN-T 
Increment 1. Therefore we did not assess its technology maturity. The 
Army completed a technology readiness assessment for WIN-T Increment 1 
in early 2008. While design stability is evaluated during design 
reviews, it cannot be assessed using our methodology because the 
program office does not produce releasable drawings for the design, 
which is based upon mature commercial hardware and software products. 
In October 2007, DOD approved an acquisition program baseline for 
Increment 1. The WIN-T overarching acquisition strategy was approved in 
early January; the Increment 1 annex to this strategy is in final 
processing. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Incr. I Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Technology maturity for WIN-T Increment 1 could not be assessed because 
the Army had not identified any critical technologies for JNN-N, the 
precursor to WIN-T Increment 1. However, the June 2007 acquisition 
decision memorandum that approved the restructuring of the WIN-T 
program requires the Army to conduct a technology readiness assessment 
of the winning proposal for WIN-T Increment 1 within 120 days of 
contract award, and to submit this assessment to the department's 
Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) for approval. As 
contract award took place in late September 2007, this technology 
readiness assessment was due to DDR&E by late January 2008. In February 
2008, a DDR&E representative confirmed that her office had received the 
Army's assessment and was reviewing it. If the Army decides to insert 
technologies from future WIN-T increments into Increment 1, DDR&E must 
agree that those technologies are mature prior to insertion. 

Design Stability: 

Design stability for WIN-T Increment 1 could not be assessed using our 
methodology because, according to a program office representative, the 
development program integrates mature hardware and software products 
and does not produce drawings for these commercial products. Rather, 
according to this representative, design stability is assessed during 
design reviews and subsequent testing of those designs. The program 
office also noted that it does not redesign the system from one 
production lot to another; rather, newer, more capable commercial 
components replace outdated components as they become available. 

Other Program Issues: 

Previously, the Army fielded JNN-N as a separate beyond-line-of-sight 
communications network to units deployed in Iraq. JNN-N began the 
transitioning of the Army's communications systems to Internet protocol-
based systems, and provided an interface to DOD communications 
services, such as the Defense Information Systems Network, with 
multiple levels of security. However, JNN-N was only established as a 
formal program when it was designated as the first increment of the 
restructured WIN-T program in June 2007. Prior to WIN-T restructuring, 
the Army had already procured 759 JNN-N nodes and proposed moving 
forward with the acquisition of low-rate initial production (LRIP) 
quantities of JNN-N equipment needed to conduct initial operational 
testing, and to equip deploying units. As of March 2007, shortly before 
the WIN-T restructuring, the Army had planned to acquire additional 
quantities of JNN-N to field to the rest of the Army once initial 
operational testing had been completed, a beyond-LRIP report had been 
submitted to Congress, and a full-rate production decision had been 
made. As a result of the WIN-T restructuring, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics approved the Army 
moving forward with the acquisition of the full complement of needed 
JNN-N capabilities as the first increment of WIN-T. Initial operational 
tests will still be conducted in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009. 
Army representatives stated that recent statutory changes made by 
Section 231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007 grant the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
flexibility to deliver the beyond-LRIP report "as soon as practicable," 
and allow the Army to acquire Increment 1 assets in lots sized to meet 
its operational needs. The Army interprets this new statutory language 
to permit it to contract for quantities of WIN-T Increment 1 nodes in 
fiscal year 2008 to support operational needs, even if prior to the 
completion of initial operational testing required for a beyond-LRIP 
report. In September 2007, the Army contracted for 336 more Increment 1 
nodes, 25 more than the 311 nodes identified as the LRIP quantities in 
the September 2007 WIN-T Increment 1 Selected Acquisition Report, which 
was submitted to Congress on November 14, 2007. This will be clarified 
in future SAR submissions. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2: 

[See PDF for image] 

Illustration: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), 
Increment 2. 

Source: PM, WIN-T. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels of 
command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global 
Information Grid. WIN-T is being restructured following a Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breach, and will be fielded in four increments. The second 
increment will provide the Army with an initial networking on-the-move 
capability, while the third will provide a full networking on-the-move 
capability and fully support the Army's Future Combat Systems. 

Timeline: Concept to system development to production: 
Program/development start: (6/07); 
GAO review: (1/08); 
Design review: (2/08); 
Low-rate decision: (4/09); 
Full-rate decision: (11/10); 
Initial capability: (8/11). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems; 
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J.
Funding needed to complete:
* R&D: $218.8 million; 
* Procurement: $3,301.4 million; 
Total funding: $3,520.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1,837. 

Table: Program Performance (fiscal year 2008 dollars in 
millions): 

Research and development cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $227.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,301.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $3,528.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: $1.864; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities; 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: 1,893; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months); 
As of NA: NA; 
Latest, 10/2007: 50; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The original WIN-T program entered system development in August 2003 
with 3 of its 12 critical technologies nearing maturity. Insufficient 
technical readiness was cited as one of the key factors leading to the 
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach. Subsequently, DOD decided to field WIN- 
T incrementally using only mature technologies. However, on the basis 
of what was determined to be an insufficient body of evidence for 
assessing technology readiness, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and the Army have agreed that additional information will be provided 
in order to prove the critical technologies. While design stability 
will be evaluated during WIN-T design reviews, it cannot be assessed 
using our methodology because the program office does not track the 
number of releasable drawings. 

Figure: Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the attainment of product knowledge 
at three levels: technical maturity; design and technical maturity; and 
production, design and technical maturity. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Incr. 2 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Technology maturity for WIN-T Increment 2 could not be assessed because 
it was only recently separated from the original WIN-T system 
development effort, and the required technology readiness assessment 
for this increment has not yet been approved by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense's Director of Defense Research and Engineering. In 
June 2007, the WIN-T program was restructured to field in four 
increments using technologies for each increment that DDR&E assesses as 
approaching maturity prior to establishment of the increment's baseline 
and fully mature prior to the start of production for the increment. 
Increment 2 will provide the Army with initial networking on-the-move 
capabilities, while future increments will provide full networking on- 
the-move capabilities, will fully support FCS, and will provide the 
Army protected satellite communication on-the-move. 

The original WIN-T program entered system development with only 3 of 
its original 12 critical technologies approaching full maturity. 
Insufficient technical readiness was cited as one of the key factors 
leading to the March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the original 
WIN-T program. Moreover, while the Army had prepared a revised 
technology readiness assessment for the original WIN-T program in 2006, 
DDR&E did not concur with the Army's assessment for two of the five 
critical technology areas identified in this revised assessment-- 
network operations and high-mobility networking. The Army was required 
to submit a new technology readiness assessment for WIN-T Increment 2 
to DDR&E by early November 2007. DDR&E must agree that each critical 
technology assessed is approaching maturity--a prototype tested in a 
relevant environment--to be considered part of the system development 
baseline for this increment. While the Army and DDR&E were unable to 
reach consensus in 2006 on the maturity of the WIN-T's critical 
technologies, an agreement in principle has now been reached regarding 
how to measure such maturity. As agreed, the Army submitted an initial 
Increment 2 technology readiness assessment in November 2007; this 
assessment was updated with results from tests of Increment 2 
capabilities that were held in October and November 2007. In February 
2008, a DDR&E representative confirmed that her office had received the 
Army's updated assessment and is reviewing it. 

Other Program Issues: 

In March 2007, the WIN-T program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 
breach to the congressional defense committees. In June 2007, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics provided 
formal certification of the restructured WIN-T program to Congress. The 
restructured program now consists of four increments, each governed by 
an overarching acquisition strategy for providing networking and 
communications capability to operational and tactical ground forces. 
Acquisition program baselines for Increments 1 and 2 were approved in 
October 2007. Establishment of an acquisition program baseline for WIN- 
T Increment 3, intended to field full networking on-the-move 
capabilities and to fully support the needs of the Army's Future Combat 
System, will take place once FCS requirements for WIN-T have been 
firmly established. A formal agreement between the WIN-T and FCS 
program managers was expected to be completed later this year, in time 
for the Increment 3 preliminary design review currently scheduled for 
August 2008. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Agency Comments: 

DOD was provided a draft of this report and had no comments on the 
overall report, but did provide technical comments on the individual 
assessments. These comments, along with the agency comments received on 
the individual assessments, are included as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Air 
Force, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We 
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any question on this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology: 

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from 
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our 
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system 
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the 
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took 
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the 
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some 
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these 
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly. 
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable 
for our engagement purposes after reviewing DOD's management controls 
for assessing data reliability. 

Macro Analysis: 

We analyzed data from the National Defense Budget Estimates for 2008 to 
determine the trends in research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) and procurement actual and planned obligation authority for the 
period 1978 to 2012. All dollar amounts in this report are fiscal year 
2008 dollars except where noted. We also analyzed budget information 
from the Office of Management and Budget to determine trends in 
discretionary spending, including defense spending, and 
nondiscretionary funding since 1978. 

To determine the planned RDT&E and procurement funding for major 
defense acquisition programs from 2008 to 2012, we obtained information 
from the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval system, 
referred to as DAMIRs. We retrieved data that showed annual funding 
requirements for RDT&E and procurement for all major defense 
acquisition programs with DOD Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) dated 
December 2006. We converted the data into fiscal year 2008 dollars. 
This information was summarized and then sorted by the top 10 programs 
with the highest funding requirements during the period fiscal year 
2008 to 2012. We also used the Selected Acquisition Report Summary 
tables to identify the number of major defense acquisition programs 
submitting SARs as of December 1999, December 2004, and December 2006. 

Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition 
programs was obtained from funding stream data included in the SARs or, 
in a few cases, directly from program offices and then aggregated 
across all program in fiscal year 2008 dollars for each selected 
portfolio (fiscal years 2000, 2005, and 2007). We refer to programs 
with SARs dated December 1999 as the fiscal year 2000 portfolio, 
programs with SARs dated December 2004 as the fiscal year 2005 
portfolio, and programs with SARs dated December 2006 as the 2007 
portfolio. The commitments outstanding represent the difference between 
the total planned commitment and what has been expended through the 
fiscal year the SARs were issued. Also, the data do not include the 
full costs of acquiring Missile Defense Agency programs. To assess the 
cost and schedule performance of selected portfolios, we obtained data 
primarily from the SARs or, in a few cases, directly from program 
offices. In our analysis we have broken some SAR programs (such as 
Missile Defense Agency systems) into smaller elements or programs. We 
compared cost and schedule data from the first full estimate, generally 
system development start, with the current estimate. For the few 
programs that did not have development or a full estimate, we compared 
the current estimate to the planning estimate to measure changes in 
development costs and schedule delays but excluded these programs from 
our analysis of total acquisition costs and program acquisition unit 
costs. Where comparative cost and schedule data were not available for 
programs, these programs were excluded from the analysis when 
appropriate. We did not adjust the cost data to reflect changes in 
quantities that may have occurred over the life of the programs. Also, 
data do not include full costs of developing Missile Defense Agency 
programs, and in most cases these programs were left out of the 
comparative analysis. 

To assess the performance and outcomes of the 72 weapon system programs 
in our assessment, we collected information contained in program SARs 
or data provided by program offices as of January 15, 2008. To assess 
the overall outcomes to date for the 72 programs, it was necessary to 
identify those programs with the requisite cost, schedule, and quantity 
data at the first full estimate, generally Milestone B, and the latest 
estimate. Of the 72 programs in our assessment, 47 programs had 
relevant data on RDT&E costs, 45 had data on program acquisition unit 
cost,[Footnote 16] and 41 had data on schedules for delivering initial 
capabilities. The remaining programs not included in this analysis had 
not yet entered system development and/or did not have comparative 
data. We summed the first full estimate and latest estimate of RDT&E 
costs for the programs with relevant data and calculated the percentage 
change between the two estimates. The unit cost growth assessment 
reflects the share of the 45 programs with relevant data that have 
experienced program acquisition unit cost growth greater than 25 
percent. The schedule assessment is the simple average of the change in 
months of the planned or actual delivery of initial operational 
capability between first and latest estimates. 

To assess the knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision 
points, we identified programs that had actually proceeded through each 
juncture (system development start, DOD design review, and production 
start) and obtained their assessed knowledge levels at those points. 
The knowledge level information was drawn from data provided by the 
program offices as of January 15, 2008. (For more information, see the 
product knowledge assessment section in this appendix.) Programs in our 
assessment were in various stages of the acquisition life cycle, and 
not all programs provided all knowledge information for each point. 
Programs were not included in our analysis if relevant decision and/or 
knowledge point data were not available. For each decision point, we 
then summarize knowledge attainment of the programs as the percentage 
of programs with data that achieved the relevant knowledge point. The 
technology maturity for programs at various decision points includes 41 
programs at system development start, 37 programs at design review, and 
22 programs at production. Design maturity data for various decision 
points include 31 programs at design review and 17 programs at 
production. We then compared the results of this year's analysis with 
our 2005, 2006, and 2007 assessments. We also assessed the cumulative 
knowledge attainment at program decision points of programs that we had 
information on. For system development start, that is the percentage of 
programs that had mature technologies. At design review, we assessed 
what percentage of programs had stable designs and mature technologies 
at development start. And, at the production decision, we assessed what 
percentage of programs had their processes in statistical control and a 
stable design at the design review, and mature technologies at system 
development start. 

The maturity levels of the 356 critical technologies at system 
development start was collected from program officials as described in 
further detail in the product knowledge data section in this appendix. 
We included only programs, and their technologies, that have actually 
entered system development. To compare differences in RDT&E cost growth 
between programs with mature technologies at system development start 
and programs with immature technologies, we examined 33 programs that 
have actually passed through development start with relevant first and 
latest cost estimates. We then calculated the total RDT&E cost growth 
of all programs with mature technologies and compared it to total RDT&E 
cost growth of all programs with immature technologies. 

We collected data from program offices on the date each program has or 
plans to conduct key development tests of (1) an early system prototype 
and (2) a production representative prototype, and then compared these 
dates to scheduled or actual system design review and production 
decision dates. These comparisons are based on information from 35 
programs for early system prototypes and 40 programs for production 
representative prototypes--both actual and future scheduled dates are 
included. We also collected information from program offices on 
software size, usually expressed in terms of lines of code. We compared 
software size over time for 28 programs to determine software growth 
for these programs. 

We submitted an additional data collection instrument this year and 
collected programmatic data from 53 of the programs in our assessment, 
largely those that have entered system development.[Footnote 17] We did 
not validate the data provided by the program offices but reviewed the 
data and performed various checks, which revealed some discrepancies in 
the data. We clarified the data accordingly. The information included 
key schedule dates, program office staffing, program baselines, and 
requirements changes. We analyzed the data to determine the frequency 
of program rebaselines and requirements changes and to assess the 
timing of key technical events such as the preliminary design review. 
Where relevant, this information was compared to respective program 
outcome and schedule data. The assessment of programs having completed 
preliminary design review prior to system development start is based on 
responses from 39 programs. The assessment of the average time between 
development start and scheduled or actual preliminary design review is 
based on responses from 35 programs. 

We summarized information provided by 52 programs on staffing by 
function (program management, administrative support, business 
functions, engineering and technical, other, and overall total) and 
type (i.e., military, civilian, support contractor, federally funded 
research development center, or university and affiliates). Data from 
the 52 programs were summed together to obtain total staffing levels by 
function and by type. We then summarized the data to present the 
distribution of total staff in each function by type of staff. We also 
analyzed information provided by 43 programs on the number of program 
baselines. We did not include in our analysis baselines resulting from 
passing through development or production milestones. Finally, we 
summarized information provided by 46 programs regarding the number of 
programs experiencing requirements changes after system development 
start. We did not attempt to understand the degree or complexity of the 
requirement changes. We then compared the development cost outcomes for 
programs that have experienced requirement changes to development 
outcomes to date for programs that had not. 

Finally, we relied on GAO's body of work over the past years that has 
examined DOD acquisition issues. In recent years, we have issued 
reports that have identified systemic problems and made recommendations 
to DOD for improvements in how it acquires its major weapon systems. 
These reports cover topics such as contracting, program management, 
acquisition policy, and cost estimating. We have also issued many 
detailed reports that have evaluated specific weapon systems such as 
aircraft programs, ships, communication systems, satellites, missile 
defense system, and future combat systems. Finally, we used information 
from numerous GAO products that examine how commercial best practices 
can improve outcomes for various DOD programs. During the past 10 
years, we have gathered information based on discussions with more than 
25 major commercial companies. Our work has shown that valuable lessons 
can be learned from the commercial sector and can be applied to the 
development of weapon systems. 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Over the past several years, DOD has revised its policies governing 
weapon system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major 
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more 
consistent across the 72 program assessments, we standardized the 
terminology for key program events. For most individual programs in our 
assessment, "development start" refers to the initiation of an 
acquisition program as well as the start of system development. This 
coincides with DOD's Milestone B. For a few programs in our assessment 
(mostly programs that began before 2001), they have a separate "program 
start" date which begins a pre-system development phase for program 
definition and risk reduction activities, this "program start" date 
generally coincides with DOD's old milestone terminology for Milestone 
I, followed by a "development start" date, either DOD's old Milestone 
II or new Milestone B, depending on when the program began system 
development. The "production decision" generally refers to the decision 
to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate 
initial production. The "initial capability" refers to the initial 
operational capability--sometimes also called first unit equipped or 
required asset availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of 
key program events in relation to milestones varies for each individual 
program. Our assessments of shipbuilding programs report key program 
events as determined by each program's individual strategy. For the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) programs that do not follow the standard 
Department of Defense acquisition model, but instead develop systems in 
incremental capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology 
development efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block 
assessed. 

The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal 
year 2008 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on 
information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some 
instances the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the 
term "to be determined" (TBD), or "not applicable," annotated (NA). The 
quantities listed refer only to procurement quantities. Satellite 
programs, in particular, produce a large percentage of their total 
operational units as development quantities, which are not included in 
the quantity figure. 

To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we 
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices. 
In general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a 
baseline for each program. For programs that have started product 
development--those that are beyond Milestone II or B--we compared the 
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first SAR 
issued after the program was approved to enter development. For systems 
that have not yet started system development, we compared the latest 
available data to the planning estimate issued after Milestone I or A. 
For systems not included in SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable 
baseline and current data from the individual program offices. For MDA 
systems for which a baseline was not available, we compared the latest 
available cost information to the amount reported last year. 

All cost information is presented in fiscal year 2008 dollars using 
Office of the Secretary of Defense-approved deflators to eliminate the 
effects of inflation. We have depicted only the programs' main elements 
of acquisition cost--research and development and procurement. However, 
the total program costs also include military construction and 
acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and 
these additional costs, in some situations the total cost may not match 
the exact sum of the research and development and procurement costs. 
The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program 
cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to 
as program acquisition unit costs. In some instances, the data were not 
applicable, and we annotate this by using the term "NA." In other 
instances, the current absence of data on procurement funding and 
quantities precludes calculation of a meaningful program acquisition 
unit cost, and we annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities 
listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement and 
development quantities. 

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as 
the number of months between the program start and the achievement of 
initial operational capability or an equivalent fielding date. In some 
instances, the data were not yet available, and we annotate this by 
using the term "TBD," or saying that they are classified. 

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall 
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum 
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those 
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with 
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such 
detailed distinctions. 

Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key 
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to 
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each two- 
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such 
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program 
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels (TRL), for our 
analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally 
developed technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force 
science and technology research organizations use them to determine 
when technologies are ready to be handed off from science and 
technology managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels 
are measured on a scale of 1 to 9, beginning with paper studies of a 
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully 
integrated into a completed product. (See app. II for the definitions 
of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work has shown that 
a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a 
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that 
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In 
our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness 
level 7, a prototype demonstrated in a realistic environment, are 
referred to as mature or fully mature and those that have reached 
technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant 
environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are 
assessed as attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge. 
Satellite technologies that have achieved technology readiness level 6 
are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating 
maturity in an operational environment--space. 

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of 
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those 
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to 
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies 
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years. 

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our 
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the 
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We 
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases 
where information that raised concerns existed. Completed engineering 
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed 
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build-to" 
drawings. 

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to 
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this 
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of 
statistical process control where information existed that raised 
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which 
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a 
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be 
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it 
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework 
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were 
unavailable. Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators 
of potential risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of 
risk that a program encounters during development, such as funding 
instability. Our detailed reviews on individual systems normally 
provide for a fuller treatment of risk elements. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware/software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" 
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware/software: Low-fidelity breadboard; Integration of nonscale 
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or 
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach 
suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components; 
Hardware/software: High-fidelity breadboard; Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc). 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form 
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/ 
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. Integration 
of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a 
test bed aircraft; 
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate 
full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator aircraft; 
Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications; 
Hardware/software: Flight-qualified hardware; 
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug 
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware/software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Michael J. Sullivan (202) 512-4841: 

Acknowledgments: 

Principal contributors to this report were Brian Mullins, Assistant 
Director; Ridge C. Bowman; Quindi C. Franco; and Matthew B. Lea. Other 
key contributors included David B. Best, Thomas J. Denomme, Bruce 
Fairbairn, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, Barbara H. Haynes, 
Michael J. Hesse, Richard Horiuchi, J. Kristopher Keener, John E. 
Oppenheim, Kenneth E. Patton, Charles W. Perdue, Robert S. Swierczek, 
Wendy P. Smythe, Alyssa B. Weir, Paul G. Williams, and Karen S. 
Zuckerstein. 

The following staff were responsible for individual programs: 

System: Airborne Laser (ABL); 
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); 
Primary Staff: Michele R. Williamson. 

System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF); 
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry. 

System: Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF DCGS); 
Primary Staff: Guisseli Reyes-Turnell/Paul G. Williams. 

System: Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement Program (LHA 6); 
Primary Staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine. 

System: Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH); 
Primary Staff: Michael J. Hesse/Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System (ATIRCM/CMWS); 
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens. 

System: B-2 Spirit Advanced Extremely High Frequency SatCom Capability 
(B-2 EHF SATCOM); 
Primary Staff: Elizabeth DeVan/Andrew H. Redd. 

System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP); 
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Sean C. Seales. 

System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 
(BAMS); 
Primary Staff: W. William Russell IV. 

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Sean D. Merrill /Erin L. Stockdale. 

System: C-130J Hercules; 
Primary Staff: Matthew T. Drerup. 

System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Brian T. Smith/Cheryl K. Andrew. 

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Primary Staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Brian T. Smith. 

System: CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR); 
Primary Staff: Kevin J. Heinz. 

System: Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X); 
Primary Staff: Travis J. Masters/Julie C. Hadley. 

System: CVN-21 Nuclear Aircraft Class Carrier; 
Primary Staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Erin E. Carson. 

System: Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A); 
Primary Staff: Justin M. Jaynes/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell. 

System: DDG 1000 Destroyer; 
Primary Staff: Diana L. Moldafsky/Raj C. Chitikila. 

System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE); 
Primary Staff: Lauren M. Heft. 

System: EA-18G; 
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden. 

System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle-Atlas V, Delta IV (EELV); 
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant. 

System: Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS); 
Primary Staff: Bonita P. Oden/Laura T. Holliday. 

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Primary Staff: Quindi C. Franco/Alan R. Frazier. 

System: Extended Range Munition (ERM); 
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Primary Staff: Richard A. Cederholm. 

System: F-22A Modernization; 
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Robert K. Miller. 

System: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T); 
Primary Staff: Alexandra K. Dew/Winnie Tsen. 

System: Future Combat Systems (FCS); 
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/John M. Ortiz. 

System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System; 
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers. 

System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 
Primary Staff: Steven B. Stern. 

System: H-1 Upgrades; 
Primary Staff: Ian N. Jefferies. 

System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); 
Primary Staff: William C. Allbritton/Carrie R. Wilson. 

System: Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA); 
Primary Staff: Letisha T. Watson/Beverly A. Breen. 

System: Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV); 
Primary Staff: Moshe Schwartz. 

System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
System (JLENS); 
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF); 
Primary Staff: Simon J. Hirschfeld/Matthew B. Lea. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Station 
(JTRS AMF); 
Primary Staff: Paul G. Williams/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR); 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams. 

System: JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS); 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell. 

System: KC-X Program (KC-X); 
Primary Staff: Mary Jo Lewnard/Wendell K. Hudson. 

System: Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI); 
Primary Staff: Michael J. Hesse. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Primary Staff: Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW); 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Daniel Chen. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship: Mine Countermeasures (MCM); 
Primary Staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship: Surface Warfare (SuW); 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Daniel Chen. 

System: Light Utility Helicopter (LUH); 
Primary Staff: Beverly A. Breen. 

System: Longbow Apache Block III; 
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS); 
Primary Staff: Jeffrey V. Rose/Paul G. Williams. 

System: Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV); 
Primary Staff: Meredith M. Kimmett. 

System: Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP); 
Primary Staff: Anne McDonough-Hughes/Kathryn I. O'Dea. 

System: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform 
(MPF(F)/MLP); 
Primary Staff: Raj C. Chitikila/Lisa L. Berardi. 

System: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System (MQ-9); 
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp/Charlie Shivers. 

System: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle; 
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/J. Kristopher Keener/Michael W. 
Aiken/Charlie Shivers/Erin L. Stockdale. 

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control; 
Primary Staff: Josie H. Sigl. 

System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS); 
Primary Staff: Suzanne Sterling. 

System: P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (P-8A MMA); 
Primary Staff: Heather L. Barker Miller/Kathryn M. Edelman. 

System: PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit; 
Primary Staff: Ronald N. Dains/Tana M. Davis. 

System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High); 
Primary Staff: Claire A. Cyrnak. 

System: Small Diameter Bomb, Increment II (SDB II); 
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson. 

System: Sky Warrior UAS (UAS); 
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis. 

System: Space Radar (SR); 
Primary Staff: Lisa P. Gardner. 

System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); 
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty/Angela Pleasants. 

System: Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Primary Staff: Steven B. Stern/LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT); 
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr. 

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft; 
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden. 

System: VH-71 Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program; 
Primary Staff: Ronald E. Schwenn/David Schilling. 

System: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774); 
Primary Staff: Moshe Schwartz. 

System: Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS); 
Primary Staff: E. Brandon Booth. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical-Increment 1 (WIN-T 
Incr. 1); 
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical-Increment 2 (WIN-T 
Incr. 2); 
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Guisseli Reyes-Turnell. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to 
Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-294]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 1, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-406SP]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. 

Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology 
Transition Processes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
06-883]. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006. 

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed 
to Improve Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost 
and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-368]. Washington, D.C.: April 
13, 2006. 

DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-257T]. Washington, D.C.: 
November 15, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-393]. Washington, D.C.: March 
1, 2004. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-52]. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 
Practices. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-469T]. 
Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon 
System Decisions. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-
NSIAD-00-137]. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs 
Implement Best Practices. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-206]. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve 
Weapon System Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 
Outcomes. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-99-
116]. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1998. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 
Improvements for DOD. [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-162]. Washington, D.C.: August 26, 1996. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) are those identified by 
DOD that require eventual total research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures of more than $365 million or $2.19 
billion for procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

[2] Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point or 
had proceeded through system development. Details of our scope and 
methodology can be found in appendix I. 

[3] Our analysis in this area reflects comparisons of performance for 
programs meeting DOD's criteria for being major defense acquisition 
programs in fiscal year 2007 and programs meeting the same criteria in 
fiscal years 2005 and 2000. The analysis does not include all the same 
systems in all 3 years. 

[4] These figures represent cost and quantity estimates based on 
Presidents' budgets and supplemental requests for fiscal years 2006 
through 2008 but do not include recent orders for more vehicles. 

[5] The start of system development as used here indicates the point at 
which significant financial commitment is made to design, integrate, 
and demonstrate that the product will meet the user's requirements and 
can be manufactured on time, with high quality, and at a cost that 
provides an acceptable return on investment. System development follows 
concept refinement and technology development which is intended to 
mature technologies and deliver a preliminary design of the proposed 
solution. 

[6] While the programs we assessed were not chosen to be representative 
of the broader defense acquisition portfolio, the outcomes of the 
programs in our assessment closely mirror those of the 2007 portfolio 
of major defense acquisition programs discussed earlier in this report. 

[7] We have excluded two programs from this calculation, Light Utility 
Helicopter and Joint Cargo Aircraft. While we have assessed these 
programs as having mature manufacturing processes, this is because they 
are commercial acquisitions, not because processes were demonstrated to 
be in statistical control. Also, the Multifunctional Information 
Distribution System (MIDS) program indicates that its two critical 
processes are in statistical control but it has not formally entered 
the production phase. 

[8] GAO, Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight 
Needed to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System 
Quality, GAO-08-294 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 1, 2008). 

[9] In contrast, a firm-fixed price contract provides for a pre- 
established price, and places more risk and responsibility for costs 
and resulting profit or loss on the contractor and provides more 
incentive for efficient and economical performance. With either a cost 
reimbursement or a firm-fixed price type contract, if the government 
changes the requirements after performance has begun, which then causes 
a price or cost increase to the contractor, the government must pay for 
these changes. 

[10] This average does not include the C-130 J program because of its 
extreme RDT&E cost growth. The average including C-130 J is 210 
percent. 

[11] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Actions on 
Program Manager Empowerment and Accountability, GAO-08-62R (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 9, 2007). 

[12] Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress (January 2007). 

[13] GAO, DOD Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities, GAO-08- 
323CG (Washington D.C.: Nov. 29, 2007). 

[14] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices are 
Needed to Improve DOD's Software-intensive Weapon Acquisitions, GAO-04- 
393 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004). 

[15] Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, Defense Acquisition 
Transformation: Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: February 2007). 

[16] We excluded programs that had planning estimates as their first 
full estimate for the unit cost analysis. 

[17] We requested data from 4 additional programs but did not receive 
requested information in time from the H-1 Upgrades, DDG 1000 
Destroyer, CVN 21, and Wideband Global SATCOM programs. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: [email protected]: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected]: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

*** End of document. ***