Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland	 
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals	 
(28-FEB-08, GAO-08-458T).					 
                                                                 
The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating 
countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining 
a visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law	 
enforcement, and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007,	 
Congress passed legislation that provides the Department of	 
Homeland Security (DHS) with the authority to expand the program 
to additional countries whose nationals' applications for	 
short-term business and tourism visas were refused between 3 and 
10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year. Countries must  
also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first complete and	 
certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing the	 
security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of	 
these required actions--namely, that a system be in place that	 
can verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who  
depart through U.S. airports (referred to as an air exit system).
Our observations are based on our review of relevant legislation,
regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO	 
reports on the Visa Waiver Program and immigrant and visitor	 
entry and exit tracking systems, as well as on discussions with  
federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft of this	 
statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan for 
certifying the "97 percent" requirement, but that the department 
believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement.
The Department of State also provided technical comments, which  
we incorporated, as appropriate.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-458T					        
    ACCNO:   A81151						        
  TITLE:     Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of      
Homeland Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals
     DATE:   02/28/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Border security					 
	     Data integrity					 
	     Data transmission					 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Illegal aliens					 
	     Immigrants 					 
	     Immigration					 
	     International relations				 
	     International travel				 
	     Legislation					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Visas						 
	     Waivers						 
	     Visa Waiver Program				 

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GAO-08-458T

   

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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 
Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 

Expected at 2:30p.m.EST Thursday, February 28, 2008: 

Visa waiver program: 

Limitations with Department of Homeland Security's Plan to Verify 
Departure of Foreign Nationals: 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director: 

International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-08-458T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-458T, a testimony before the Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Committee 
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating 
countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a 
visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law enforcement, 
and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007, Congress passed 
legislation that provides the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
with the authority to expand the program to additional countries whose 
nationalsï¿½ applications for short-term business and tourism visas were 
refused between 3 and 10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year. 
Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first 
complete and certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing 
the security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of these 
required actionsï¿½namely, that a system be in place that can verify the 
departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. 
airports (referred to as an air exit system). Our observations are 
based on our review of relevant legislation, regulations and agency 
operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on the Visa Waiver Program 
and immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems, as well as 
on discussions with federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft 
of this statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan 
for certifying the ï¿½97 percentï¿½ requirement, but that the department 
believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement. The 
Department of State also provided technical comments, which we 
incorporated, as appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records of 
foreign nationals departing the country, as reported by airlines, to 
the departmentï¿½s existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration 
status changes, or prior departures from the United States. Using this 
formula, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent, 
based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with the legislative 
air exit system requirement. DHS told us that it believes this 
methodology would meet the statutory requirement. On February 21, 2008, 
DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology 
the department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the 
department confirmed that the basic structure of its methodology would 
not change, and that it would use departure records as the starting 
point. There are several limitations with this methodology. For 
example, DHSï¿½s methodology does not begin with arrival records and 
determine if these foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond 
their authorized periods of admission (referred to as overstays). 
Therefore, this methodology will not inform overall and country-
specific overstay ratesï¿½key factors in determining illegal immigration 
risks of the Visa Waiver Program. Although most long-term overstays are 
likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have been 
identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity, 
including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In addition, DHSï¿½s 
current methodology does not address the accuracy of airlinesï¿½ 
transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are 
weaknesses in the departure data. For example, there may be some 
visitors who did not leave the country by air even though they were 
recorded on airlinesï¿½ manifest data as having departed. The inability 
of the U.S. government to track the status of visitors in the country, 
to identify those who overstay their authorized period of visit, and to 
use this data to compute overstay rates have been longstanding 
weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. DHSï¿½s plan to 
meet the ï¿½97 percentï¿½ requirement in the visa waiver expansion 
legislation will not address these weaknesses. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-458T]. For more information, contact Jess 
Ford at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

February 28, 2008: 

Chairman Feinstein and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss an important aspect of our ongoing 
work on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) oversight of the 
Visa Waiver Program[Footnote 1] and executive branch plans to expand 
the program--namely, a newly enacted legislative requirement that a 
system be in place that can verify the departure of 97 percent of 
foreign nationals who depart the United States through airports 
(referred to as an air exit system). The Visa Waiver Program enables 
citizens of 27 participating countries to travel to the United States 
for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a 
visa from U.S. embassies and consulates.[Footnote 2] The program has 
many benefits, including facilitating international travel for millions 
of foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States each year, 
creating substantial economic benefits to the United States, and 
allowing the Department of State (State) to allocate resources to visa- 
issuing posts in countries with higher-risk applicant pools. 

However, as we have reported,[Footnote 3] the program also poses 
inherent security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration risks to 
the United States. In particular, visa waiver travelers are not subject 
to the same degree of screening as those with visas because they are 
not interviewed by a consular officer before arriving at a U.S. port of 
entry. Therefore, the program could be exploited to gain illegal entry 
into the United States. In addition to these concerns, weaknesses in 
the U.S. government's system to track foreign visitors may hamper 
efforts to track foreign nationals who enter the country illegally, as 
well as those who enter legally yet overstay their authorized period of 
admission (referred to as overstays). Although most long-term overstays 
are likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have 
been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related 
activity, including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. 

Until recently, U.S. law required that a country may be considered for 
admission into the Visa Waiver Program if the refusal rate for its 
nationals' business and tourism visas was less than 3 percent in the 
prior fiscal year. The executive branch has supported more flexible 
criteria for admission, and, in August 2007, Congress passed 
legislation that provides DHS with the authority to admit countries 
with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent, if the countries 
meet certain conditions.[Footnote 4] For example, countries must meet 
all mandated Visa Waiver Program security requirements and cooperate 
with the United States on counterterrorism initiatives. Before DHS can 
exercise this new authority, the legislation requires that the 
department complete certain actions aimed at enhancing security of the 
Visa Waiver Program. 

As requested, my testimony today will focus on one of these 
requirements placed on DHS--namely that an air exit system is in place 
that can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign 
nationals who depart through U.S. airports.[Footnote 5] Our 
observations are derived from our ongoing review of the Visa Waiver 
Program based on a request from this subcommittee. 

In the course of this work, we reviewed documentation, including the 
laws governing the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion, relevant 
regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on 
immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems. (A list of 
related GAO products appears at the end of this testimony.) 
Specifically, we collected and analyzed documentation and interviewed 
officials from several DHS components--including Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status and 
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program Office[Footnote 6]--on the 
department's plans for the air exit system. We conducted this 
performance audit from September 2007 through January 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We will be reporting later 
this year on other aspects of the Visa Waiver Program, including the 
actions that DHS has taken to implement recommendations from our 2006 
report.[Footnote 7] 

Summary: 

On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records, 
reported by airlines,[Footnote 8] of visitors departing the country to 
the department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration 
status changes,[Footnote 9] or prior departures from the United States. 
Using this methodology, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate 
above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with 
the air exit system requirement in the legislation.[Footnote 10] On 
February 21, 2008, in commenting on a draft of this statement, DHS 
indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology the 
department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the 
department confirmed that it planned to use departure records as the 
starting point. There are several limitations with this approach. 
First, DHS's approach does not begin with arrival records to determine 
if those foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond their 
authorized periods of admission. Therefore, DHS's plan will not inform 
overall and country-specific overstay rates--key factors in determining 
illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 11] In 
addition, the methodology does not address weaknesses in data the 
airlines report on people who are departing the United States by air, 
and DHS acknowledges there are weaknesses in the departure data. For 
example, there may be some visitors who did not leave the country by 
air even though they were recorded on airlines' manifest data as having 
departed. The inability of the U.S. government to track the status of 
visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their 
authorized period of visit, and to use these data to compute overstay 
rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa 
Waiver Program.[Footnote 12] DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent" 
requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address 
these weaknesses. 

Background: 

In 2007, almost 13 million citizens from 27 countries entered the 
United States under the Visa Waiver Program. The program was created to 
promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate 
international travel without jeopardizing U.S. national security. The 
United States last expanded the Visa Waiver Program's membership in 
1999 with the addition of Portugal, Singapore, and Uruguay;[Footnote 
13] since then, other countries have expressed a desire to become 
members. In recent years, Members of Congress have introduced bills 
calling for the expansion of the program. In February 2005, President 
Bush announced that DHS and State would develop a strategy, or "Road 
Map Initiative," to clarify the statutory requirements for designation 
as a participating country. According to DHS, some of the countries 
seeking admission to the program are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq 
and have high expectations that they will join the program due to their 
close economic, political, and military ties to the United States. 

In July 2006, we reported that DHS and State were consulting with 13 
"Road Map" countries seeking admission into the Visa Waiver Program-- 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and South Korea.[Footnote 
14] In September 2007, State nominated Greece for admission into the 
program, and DHS is currently reviewing this nomination to assess the 
impact of Greece's participation on U.S. security, law enforcement, and 
illegal immigration interests. In fiscal year 2006, Greece was one of 
three countries (along with Cyprus and Malta) with a refusal rate below 
3 percent. Three other "Road Map" countries have refusal rates between 
3 and 10 percent, while seven others have rates above 10 percent: 

(see table 1)[Footnote 15].: 

Table 1: Visa Refusal Rates for Short-Term Tourist and Business 
Visitors of Countries Seeking to Join the Visa Waiver Program, Fiscal 
Year 2007: 

"Road Map" country: Greece; 
Refusal rate (%): 1.6. 

"Road Map" country: Cyprus; 
Refusal rate (%): 1.8. 

"Road Map" country: Malta; 
Refusal rate (%): 2.7. 

"Road Map" country: Estonia; 
Refusal rate (%): 4.0. 

"Road Map" country: South Korea; 
Refusal rate (%): 4.4. 

"Road Map" country: Czech Republic; 
Refusal rate (%): 6.7. 

"Road Map" country: Hungary; 
Refusal rate (%): 10.3. 

"Road Map" country: Latvia; 
Refusal rate (%): 11.8. 

"Road Map" country: Slovakia; 
Refusal rate (%): 12.0. 

"Road Map" country: Lithuania; 
Refusal rate (%): 12.9. 

"Road Map" country: Bulgaria; 
Refusal rate (%): 14.3. 

"Road Map" country: Poland; 
Refusal rate (%): 25.2. 

"Road Map" country: Romania; 
Refusal rate (%): 37.7. 

Source: Department of State. 

[End of table] 

We plan to report later this year on the other aspects of our ongoing 
work for the subcommittee, including the status of DHS's plans to 
expand the Visa Waiver Program to other "Road Map" countries and the 
extent to which DHS has implemented other provisions in the August 2007 
legislation, including an electronic travel authorization system. In 
addition, we plan to report this year on the cost and resource 
implications for State's consular operations of changes in the 
countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Program. 

DHS's Current Plan to Certify Air Exit System Requirement Will Not 
Address All Potential Risks of An Expanded Visa Waiver Program: 

In response to our inquiries, on December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us 
that it will match records of foreign nationals' departures that 
airlines reported to the department to records of any prior arrival, 
change of status action, or prior departure from the United States to 
certify the air exit system requirement (see fig. 1). Using this 
methodology, DHS stated that it can achieve a 97.10 percent match rate, 
based on data from August 2007. Although DHS acknowledged there are 
weaknesses with this methodology, the department told us that it had no 
intention of altering its plans for certifying the air exit system 
requirement. On January 23, 2008, the assistant secretary for policy 
development noted that DHS may use more current departure manifest data 
prior to certification. On February 21, 2008, in commenting on a draft 
of this testimony, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision 
on which methodology the department would use to certify compliance; 
however, the department confirmed that all methodologies under 
consideration would match foreign nationals' departure records against 
prior records "to determine that the person is a foreign national, and 
that the person did depart the country through a U.S. airport." 

Figure 1: DHS's Current Plan for Certifying "97 Percent" Requirement: 

This figure is a visual depiction of DHS's current plan for certifying 
"97 Percent" Requirement. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data; Map 
Resources (maps); Nova Development (clip art). 

[End of figure] 

There are several weaknesses with this approach. First, DHS's 
methodology does not begin with arrival records to determine if those 
foreign nationals departed or remained in the United States beyond 
their authorized periods of admission--more useful data for oversight 
of the Visa Waiver Program and consideration of its expansion. 
Furthermore, DHS's methodology will not inform overall or country- 
specific overstay rates, which are key factors in determining illegal 
immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. An alternate approach 
would be to track air arrivals from a given point in time and determine 
whether those foreign nationals have potentially overstayed.[Footnote 
16] Figure 2 compares DHS's plan to match visitor records using 
departure data as a starting point to a methodology that would track 
foreign nationals using arrival data as a starting point. 

Figure 2: DHS's Current Plan Omits Those Who Remain in the United 
States: 

This figure is a visual depiction of DHS's current plan which omits 
those who remain in the United States. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data; Map 
Resources (maps); Nova Development and Ingram Publishing (clip art). 

[End of figure] 

Second, for the purposes of this provision, we do not see the value in 
verifying that a foreign national leaving the United States had also 
departed at a prior point in time--in other words, matching a new 
departure record back to a previous departure record from the 
country.[Footnote 17] If, however, DHS attempted to match records of 
air departures in August 2007 back to records of prior entries alone, 
US-VISIT data for that month show that DHS would only achieve a 92.8 
percent match rate. DHS's assistant secretary for policy development 
told us in January 2008 that the department chose to include previous 
departure and change of immigration status records in its methodology 
because this method allowed the department to achieve a match rate of 
97 percent or greater. 

Third, DHS's methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines' 
transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are 
weaknesses in the departure data. Foreign nationals who enter the 
United States by air are inspected by DHS officers--a process that 
provides information that can be used to verify arrival manifest data-
-and, since 2004, DHS has implemented the US-VISIT program to collect 
biometric information on foreign nationals arriving in the United 
States.[Footnote 18] However, the department has not completed the exit 
portion of this tracking system; thus, there is no corresponding check 
on the accuracy and completeness of the departure manifest information 
supplied by the airlines. As a result, according to DHS, it cannot be 
certain that visitors listed on airlines' manifest data as departing 
the country did in fact physically depart. Furthermore, there may be 
some visitors who did leave the country by air, but were not recorded 
on airlines' manifest data as having departed. According to DHS, the 
department works with air carriers to try to improve both the 
timeliness and comprehensiveness of manifest records, and fines 
carriers that provide incomplete or inaccurate information. If DHS 
could evaluate these data, and validate the extent to which they are 
accurate and complete, the department would be able to identify 
problems and work with the airlines to further improve the data. 

DHS reported to us that it had used its methodology for meeting the "97 
percent" requirement to match records in the past; however, we were 
unable to identify an instance when DHS had used this particular 
methodology. We noted that DHS has used a similar methodology since 
2004 in its annual report to the Committees on the Judiciary in the 
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on the matching of visitor 
arrival and departure records using biographic and biometric data 
gathered through US-VISIT.[Footnote 19] However, the methodology used 
in these annual reports is different from what DHS told us it intends 
to use to certify the "97 percent" provision. In these prior annual 
reports, DHS matched departure records to records of prior arrivals 
into the United States. For example, for the period of January 5, 2004, 
through September 30, 2004, DHS was able to match 71 percent of 
recorded departures from air and sea ports of entry to records of prior 
arrivals. In its May 2007 report on its integrated entry and exit data 
system, DHS was able to match 88.1 percent of recorded departures from 
air and sea ports of entry to records of prior arrivals. While these 
reports have shown that DHS's ability to match departure records has 
improved since US-VISIT was established in 2004, this methodology does 
not account for foreign nationals who have not left the United States. 

Moreover, DHS's plans to certify the "97 percent" requirement will not 
further its efforts in responding to Congress's longstanding calls for 
the development of an automated entry and exit control system to track 
visitors to the United States and identify those visitors who have 
remained in the country illegally.[Footnote 20] We testified in June 
2007 that the prospects for successfully delivering a biometric exit 
system were as uncertain then as they were when US-VISIT was first 
implemented in 2004.[Footnote 21] Without the capability to verify 
departures, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system 
by identifying visitors who have overstayed their original period of 
admission. 

In October 2007, DHS officials told us that data on overstay rates 
would be very useful for oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. As we 
have reported, overstays are a significant part of the larger problem 
of illegal immigration.[Footnote 22] For example, overstay rates would 
inform decision makers of illegal immigration risks associated with 
adding new countries to the program.[Footnote 23] However, according to 
the department, it cannot generate accurate overstay rates for visitors 
from visa waiver countries due to weaknesses in the data that indicate 
who has departed the United States, as previously mentioned. Moreover, 
the department has not designated an office with the responsibility of 
developing such data for the purposes of this program. Nevertheless, we 
identified an office within US-VISIT, the Data Integrity Group, which 
develops limited data on overstay rates that may be useful information 
for oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. This office provides 
information to DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement on visitors 
who have potentially overstayed the terms of their admission into the 
country. Immigration enforcement officials told us they use these data 
regularly during investigations of potential illegal immigrants. The 
Data Integrity Group also provides similar information to the 
department's Office of Immigration Statistics, as well as the Visa 
Waiver Program Office. While these are positive actions, DHS 
acknowledges that there are significant limitations in these data 
because of weaknesses in the multiple systems that the Data Integrity 
Group uses. For example, an unknown portion of reported overstays may 
be false because DHS could not match an arrival record to a departure 
or change of status record (for example, a visitor may have departed 
via a land border and not generated a departure record). 

Conclusion: 

An air exit system that facilitates the development of overstay rate 
data is important to managing potential risks in expanding the Visa 
Waiver Program. DHS's planned methodology for meeting the "97 percent 
provision" so it can move forward with program expansion will not 
demonstrate improvements in the air exit system or help the department 
identify overstays or develop overstay rates. 

Chairman Feinstein, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 
happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the 
Subcommittee may have at this time. 

Contact and Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this statement, please contact Jess Ford 
at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this statement. In addition, John Brummet, Assistant Director; 
Teresa Abruzzo; Kathryn Bernet; Joseph Carney; Etana Finkler; and Eric 
Larson made key contributions to this statement. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Reports: 

Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program's Long- 
standing Lack of Strategic Direction and Management Controls Needs to 
Be Addressed. GAO-07-1065. August 31, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability 
Remain Unclear. GAO-07-1044T. June 28, 2007. 

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational, Technological, 
and Management Challenges. GAO-07-632T. March 20, 2007. 

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and 
Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO- 
07-499T. February 16, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant 
Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified. GAO-07-278. 
February 14, 2007. 

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248. 

December 6, 2006. 

Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the 
United States. GAO-06-976T. August 2, 2006. 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 
of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. July 28, 2006. 

Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver 
Program. GAO-06-835R. July 28, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border 
Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296. 

February 14, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on 
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. GAO-05- 
202. February 23, 2005. 

Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered 
Defense. GAO-04-82. May 21, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered 
Defense. GAO-04-170T. October 16, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security 
Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. September 19, 2003. 

Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit 
System Expenditure Planning. GAO-03-563. June 9, 2003. 

Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement. 
PEMD-95-20. September 26, 1995. 

Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide 
Better Population Estimates. PEMD-93-25. August 5, 1993. 

Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology. GAO 03- 
546T. March 12, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99-603, 
created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot program. In 2000, the 
program became permanent under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, 
P.L. 106-396. 

[2] The participating countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 

[3] See GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and 
Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

[4] Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 
P.L. 110-53. 

[5] Before DHS can expand the program to countries with refusal rates 
between 3 percent and 10 percent, it must also certify that an 
electronic travel authorization system is fully operational. This 
system would require nationals from visa waiver countries to provide 
the United States with biographical information before boarding a U.S.- 
bound flight to determine the eligibility of, and whether there exists 
a law enforcement or security risk in permitting, the foreign national 
to travel to the United States under the program. As of Feb. 21, 2008, 
DHS had not announced its plans for this authorization system. In 
addition, Congress also required the implementation of a biometric exit 
system at U.S. airports. If this is not in place by mid-2009, the 
flexibility DHS could have obtained to admit countries with refusal 
rates between 3 percent and 10 percent will be suspended until it is in 
place. A biometric air exit system utilizes biometric identifiers such 
as digital fingerprint scans rather than paper documents and biographic 
information to verify the departure of foreign nationals from the 
United States. As of Feb. 21, 2008, DHS had not announced plans for a 
biometric exit system. 

[6] The US-VISIT program is governmentwide program designed to 
integrate information on certain foreign nationals' arrival and 
departure from the United States. US-VISIT aims to enhance the security 
of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, 
ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect 
visitors' privacy. In 2004, DHS's US-VISIT program began collecting 
information on foreign nationals arriving in the United States. The 
program is managed by the US-VISIT Program Office, which is headed by 
the US-VISIT Director, who reports to the DHS Undersecretary for 
National Protection and Programs. GAO has issued a series of reports on 
the US-VISIT program. 

[7] GAO-06-854. 

[8] Air carriers transmit visitor manifest information, which is 
obtained directly from government-issued passports, to CBP through the 
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS includes arrival and 
departure manifest information such as name, date of birth, travel 
document issuing country, gender, U.S. destination address, entry date, 
and departure date. As of Feb. 19, 2008, commercial carriers are 
required to transmit manifest information to be vetted by DHS prior to 
departure of the aircraft. 

[9] This includes changes and extensions of the visits of lawfully 
admitted, nonimmigrant foreign nationals. 

[10] DHS officials indicated that they may update the air departure 
data prior to certification. 

[11] The overstay rate is the ratio of the total number of nationals of 
a country who were admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant 
visitors during the previous fiscal year and who violated the terms of 
such admission by remaining in the country beyond the authorized time 
period to the total number of nationals of that country who arrived at 
a U.S. port of entry and applied for admission into the United States 
as nonimmigrant visitors during the same period. 

[12] For more than 10 years, GAO has recommended the collection of 
departure information and the development of estimates of overstays by 
air. See GAO, Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods 
Provide Better Population Estimates, PEMD-93-25 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
5, 1993) and GAO, Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods 
Need Improvement, PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995). In 
November 2007, DHS told us that the department could not yet respond to 
open recommendations from these reports, in part because DHS has not 
identified which office will have responsibility for calculating 
overstay rate estimates. 

[13] In 2003, the Attorney General removed Uruguay from the Visa Waiver 
Program, stating that Uruguay's participation in the program was 
inconsistent with U.S. interests. According to a 2002 Federal Register 
notice on the subject, Uruguayan nationals were, on average, two to 
three times more likely than all nonimmigrants to have been denied 
admission at the border. Uruguayan air entries had an apparent overstay 
rate more than twice that of the average apparent overstay rate for all 
nonimmigrant air entries. In addition, Argentina was removed from the 
program in 2002, following an economic crisis in that country and an 
increase in the number of Argentinean nationals attempting to use the 
Visa Waiver Program to live and work illegally in the United States. 

[14] See GAO, Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa 
Waiver Program, GAO-06-835R (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

[15] Under the August 2007 visa waiver legislation, a country whose 
refusal rate is above 10 percent could also be considered for admission 
into the program if its overstay rate does not exceed a maximum 
overstay rate. According to the legislation, DHS and State must 
establish the maximum overstay rate, using information from the air 
exit system to do so. DHS has not indicated if or when it plans to 
establish this rate. 

[16] This could include foreign nationals who departed after their 
authorized period of admission expired, as well as those foreign 
nationals who may have remained in the country as overstays. 

[17] A DHS official told us that the system functions by matching the 
departure record to an alien's "account," which may contain numerous 
prior arrivals, departures, and immigration benefit transaction 
records. The official also stated that a specific departure record 
match may not fall chronologically in the alien's "account" after an 
arrival; it may fall, for example, after a record that an immigrant 
benefit was granted to extend the alien's stay for 6 additional months. 

[18] DHS's US-VISIT program collects, maintains, and shares data, 
including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, on selected 
foreign nationals entering the United States to verify their identities 
as they arrive at air, sea, and land ports of entry. DHS currently 
operates the entry portion of the US-VISIT program at more than 300 
air, sea, and land U.S. ports of entry. When fully implemented, US- 
VISIT is also intended to capture the same information from foreign 
nationals as they depart the country. The program aims to, among other 
things, identify foreign nationals who have overstayed or violated the 
terms of their visit. 

[19] See "United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (US-VISIT) Annual Report on the Integrated Entry and Exit 
Data System" as required by the Data Management Improvement Act of 
2000, P.L. 106-215, and the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, P.L. 106-
396. 

[20] In 1996, Congress called for such a system. See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104- 
208. In 2000, Congress passed legislation requiring the establishment 
of an electronic system that would provide access to and integrate 
visitor arrival and departure data for all ports of entry by December 
31, 2005. See The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data 
Management Improvement Act of 2000, P.L. 106-215. 

[21] We have reported on how DHS has managed US-VISIT's exit 
capability. In particular, we reported that, beyond a high-level 
schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what 
will be done by what entities and at what cost. See GAO, Homeland 
Security: Prospects for US-VISIT Biometric Exit Capability Remain 
Unclear, GAO-07-1044T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007). 

[22] In 2000, the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated 
that about one-third of illegal aliens in the United States were 
overstays. In 2004, we reported that three alternative estimates of 
overstays that we analyzed did not represent the illegal population, 
but did provide some evidence that a substantial proportion of illegal 
immigrants are likely overstays. These data demonstrated that 
preventing additional visitors from becoming overstays is in the 
national interest. See GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of 
Homeland Security and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: 
May, 21, 2004). 

[23] In addition, a country must be terminated from the Visa Waiver 
Program if that county's disqualification rate for the most recent 
fiscal year for which data are available was more than 3.5 percent. The 
disqualification rate is the total for a given fiscal year, of (1) 
those nationals of the country who were admitted as nonimmigrants and 
violated the terms of their admission--this would include overstays-- 
and (2) the number of foreign nationals who were denied admission upon 
arrival in the United States, as it compares to the total number of 
nationals of that country who applied for admission as nonimmigrant 
visitors during the same time period. According to the legislation, the 
country must be terminated at the beginning of the second fiscal year 
following the fiscal year in which the determination of the 
disqualification rate was made. See 8 USC ï¿½ 1187 (f). We will be 
reporting on this issue later in the year as part of our overall work 
on the Visa Waiver Program for this subcommittee. 

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