    Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland
    Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals
    (28-FEB-08, GAO-08-458T).

    The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating
    countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining
    a visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law
    enforcement, and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007,
    Congress passed legislation that provides the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) with the authority to expand the program
    to additional countries whose nationals' applications for
    short-term business and tourism visas were refused between 3 and
    10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year. Countries must
    also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first complete and
    certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing the
    security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of
    these required actions--namely, that a system be in place that
    can verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who
    depart through U.S. airports (referred to as an air exit system).
    Our observations are based on our review of relevant legislation,
    regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO
    reports on the Visa Waiver Program and immigrant and visitor
    entry and exit tracking systems, as well as on discussions with
    federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft of this
    statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan for
    certifying the "97 percent" requirement, but that the department
    believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement.
    The Department of State also provided technical comments, which
    we incorporated, as appropriate.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-458T
        ACCNO:   A81151
      TITLE:     Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of
    Homeland Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals
         DATE:   02/28/2008
      SUBJECT:   Border security
    	     Data integrity
    	     Data transmission
    	     Foreign governments
    	     Homeland security
    	     Illegal aliens
    	     Immigrants
    	     Immigration
    	     International relations
    	     International travel
    	     Legislation
    	     Program evaluation
    	     Strategic planning
    	     Terrorism
    	     Visas
    	     Waivers
    	     Visa Waiver Program

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Product.                                                 **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-08-458T

    This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
    protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
    in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
    may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
    copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
    material separately.

    Testimony:

    Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland
    Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate:

    United States Government Accountability Office:

    GAO:

    For Release on Delivery:

    Expected at 2:30p.m.EST Thursday, February 28, 2008:

    Visa waiver program:

    Limitations with Department of Homeland Security's Plan to Verify
    Departure of Foreign Nationals:

    Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director:

    International Affairs and Trade:

    GAO-08-458T:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-458T, a testimony before the Chairman,
    Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Committee
    on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating
    countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a
    visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law enforcement,
    and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007, Congress passed
    legislation that provides the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    with the authority to expand the program to additional countries whose
    nationals� applications for short-term business and tourism visas were
    refused between 3 and 10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year.
    Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first
    complete and certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing
    the security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of these
    required actions�namely, that a system be in place that can verify the
    departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S.
    airports (referred to as an air exit system). Our observations are
    based on our review of relevant legislation, regulations and agency
    operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on the Visa Waiver Program
    and immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems, as well as
    on discussions with federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft
    of this statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan
    for certifying the �97 percent� requirement, but that the department
    believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement. The
    Department of State also provided technical comments, which we
    incorporated, as appropriate.

    What GAO Found:

    On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records of
    foreign nationals departing the country, as reported by airlines, to
    the department�s existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration
    status changes, or prior departures from the United States. Using this
    formula, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent,
    based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with the legislative
    air exit system requirement. DHS told us that it believes this
    methodology would meet the statutory requirement. On February 21, 2008,
    DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology
    the department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the
    department confirmed that the basic structure of its methodology would
    not change, and that it would use departure records as the starting
    point. There are several limitations with this methodology. For
    example, DHS�s methodology does not begin with arrival records and
    determine if these foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond
    their authorized periods of admission (referred to as overstays).
    Therefore, this methodology will not inform overall and country-
    specific overstay rates�key factors in determining illegal immigration
    risks of the Visa Waiver Program. Although most long-term overstays are
    likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have been
    identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity,
    including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In addition, DHS�s
    current methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines�
    transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are
    weaknesses in the departure data. For example, there may be some
    visitors who did not leave the country by air even though they were
    recorded on airlines� manifest data as having departed. The inability
    of the U.S. government to track the status of visitors in the country,
    to identify those who overstay their authorized period of visit, and to
    use this data to compute overstay rates have been longstanding
    weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. DHS�s plan to
    meet the �97 percent� requirement in the visa waiver expansion
    legislation will not address these weaknesses.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-458T]. For more information, contact Jess
    Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    February 28, 2008:

    Chairman Feinstein and Members of the Subcommittee:

    I am pleased to be here to discuss an important aspect of our ongoing
    work on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) oversight of the
    Visa Waiver Program[Footnote 1] and executive branch plans to expand
    the program--namely, a newly enacted legislative requirement that a
    system be in place that can verify the departure of 97 percent of
    foreign nationals who depart the United States through airports
    (referred to as an air exit system). The Visa Waiver Program enables
    citizens of 27 participating countries to travel to the United States
    for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a
    visa from U.S. embassies and consulates.[Footnote 2] The program has
    many benefits, including facilitating international travel for millions
    of foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States each year,
    creating substantial economic benefits to the United States, and
    allowing the Department of State (State) to allocate resources to visa-
    issuing posts in countries with higher-risk applicant pools.

    However, as we have reported,[Footnote 3] the program also poses
    inherent security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration risks to
    the United States. In particular, visa waiver travelers are not subject
    to the same degree of screening as those with visas because they are
    not interviewed by a consular officer before arriving at a U.S. port of
    entry. Therefore, the program could be exploited to gain illegal entry
    into the United States. In addition to these concerns, weaknesses in
    the U.S. government's system to track foreign visitors may hamper
    efforts to track foreign nationals who enter the country illegally, as
    well as those who enter legally yet overstay their authorized period of
    admission (referred to as overstays). Although most long-term overstays
    are likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have
    been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related
    activity, including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers.

    Until recently, U.S. law required that a country may be considered for
    admission into the Visa Waiver Program if the refusal rate for its
    nationals' business and tourism visas was less than 3 percent in the
    prior fiscal year. The executive branch has supported more flexible
    criteria for admission, and, in August 2007, Congress passed
    legislation that provides DHS with the authority to admit countries
    with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent, if the countries
    meet certain conditions.[Footnote 4] For example, countries must meet
    all mandated Visa Waiver Program security requirements and cooperate
    with the United States on counterterrorism initiatives. Before DHS can
    exercise this new authority, the legislation requires that the
    department complete certain actions aimed at enhancing security of the
    Visa Waiver Program.

    As requested, my testimony today will focus on one of these
    requirements placed on DHS--namely that an air exit system is in place
    that can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign
    nationals who depart through U.S. airports.[Footnote 5] Our
    observations are derived from our ongoing review of the Visa Waiver
    Program based on a request from this subcommittee.

    In the course of this work, we reviewed documentation, including the
    laws governing the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion, relevant
    regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on
    immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems. (A list of
    related GAO products appears at the end of this testimony.)
    Specifically, we collected and analyzed documentation and interviewed
    officials from several DHS components--including Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status and
    Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program Office[Footnote 6]--on the
    department's plans for the air exit system. We conducted this
    performance audit from September 2007 through January 2008, in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives. We will be reporting later
    this year on other aspects of the Visa Waiver Program, including the
    actions that DHS has taken to implement recommendations from our 2006
    report.[Footnote 7]

    Summary:

    On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records,
    reported by airlines,[Footnote 8] of visitors departing the country to
    the department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration
    status changes,[Footnote 9] or prior departures from the United States.
    Using this methodology, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate
    above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with
    the air exit system requirement in the legislation.[Footnote 10] On
    February 21, 2008, in commenting on a draft of this statement, DHS
    indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology the
    department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the
    department confirmed that it planned to use departure records as the
    starting point. There are several limitations with this approach.
    First, DHS's approach does not begin with arrival records to determine
    if those foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond their
    authorized periods of admission. Therefore, DHS's plan will not inform
    overall and country-specific overstay rates--key factors in determining
    illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 11] In
    addition, the methodology does not address weaknesses in data the
    airlines report on people who are departing the United States by air,
    and DHS acknowledges there are weaknesses in the departure data. For
    example, there may be some visitors who did not leave the country by
    air even though they were recorded on airlines' manifest data as having
    departed. The inability of the U.S. government to track the status of
    visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their
    authorized period of visit, and to use these data to compute overstay
    rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa
    Waiver Program.[Footnote 12] DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent"
    requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address
    these weaknesses.

    Background:

    In 2007, almost 13 million citizens from 27 countries entered the
    United States under the Visa Waiver Program. The program was created to
    promote the effective use of government resources and to facilitate
    international travel without jeopardizing U.S. national security. The
    United States last expanded the Visa Waiver Program's membership in
    1999 with the addition of Portugal, Singapore, and Uruguay;[Footnote
    13] since then, other countries have expressed a desire to become
    members. In recent years, Members of Congress have introduced bills
    calling for the expansion of the program. In February 2005, President
    Bush announced that DHS and State would develop a strategy, or "Road
    Map Initiative," to clarify the statutory requirements for designation
    as a participating country. According to DHS, some of the countries
    seeking admission to the program are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq
    and have high expectations that they will join the program due to their
    close economic, political, and military ties to the United States.

    In July 2006, we reported that DHS and State were consulting with 13
    "Road Map" countries seeking admission into the Visa Waiver Program--
    Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
    Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and South Korea.[Footnote
    14] In September 2007, State nominated Greece for admission into the
    program, and DHS is currently reviewing this nomination to assess the
    impact of Greece's participation on U.S. security, law enforcement, and
    illegal immigration interests. In fiscal year 2006, Greece was one of
    three countries (along with Cyprus and Malta) with a refusal rate below
    3 percent. Three other "Road Map" countries have refusal rates between
    3 and 10 percent, while seven others have rates above 10 percent:

    (see table 1)[Footnote 15].:

    Table 1: Visa Refusal Rates for Short-Term Tourist and Business
    Visitors of Countries Seeking to Join the Visa Waiver Program, Fiscal
    Year 2007:

    "Road Map" country: Greece;
    Refusal rate (%): 1.6.

    "Road Map" country: Cyprus;
    Refusal rate (%): 1.8.

    "Road Map" country: Malta;
    Refusal rate (%): 2.7.

    "Road Map" country: Estonia;
    Refusal rate (%): 4.0.

    "Road Map" country: South Korea;
    Refusal rate (%): 4.4.

    "Road Map" country: Czech Republic;
    Refusal rate (%): 6.7.

    "Road Map" country: Hungary;
    Refusal rate (%): 10.3.

    "Road Map" country: Latvia;
    Refusal rate (%): 11.8.

    "Road Map" country: Slovakia;
    Refusal rate (%): 12.0.

    "Road Map" country: Lithuania;
    Refusal rate (%): 12.9.

    "Road Map" country: Bulgaria;
    Refusal rate (%): 14.3.

    "Road Map" country: Poland;
    Refusal rate (%): 25.2.

    "Road Map" country: Romania;
    Refusal rate (%): 37.7.

    Source: Department of State.

    [End of table]

    We plan to report later this year on the other aspects of our ongoing
    work for the subcommittee, including the status of DHS's plans to
    expand the Visa Waiver Program to other "Road Map" countries and the
    extent to which DHS has implemented other provisions in the August 2007
    legislation, including an electronic travel authorization system. In
    addition, we plan to report this year on the cost and resource
    implications for State's consular operations of changes in the
    countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Program.

    DHS's Current Plan to Certify Air Exit System Requirement Will Not
    Address All Potential Risks of An Expanded Visa Waiver Program:

    In response to our inquiries, on December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us
    that it will match records of foreign nationals' departures that
    airlines reported to the department to records of any prior arrival,
    change of status action, or prior departure from the United States to
    certify the air exit system requirement (see fig. 1). Using this
    methodology, DHS stated that it can achieve a 97.10 percent match rate,
    based on data from August 2007. Although DHS acknowledged there are
    weaknesses with this methodology, the department told us that it had no
    intention of altering its plans for certifying the air exit system
    requirement. On January 23, 2008, the assistant secretary for policy
    development noted that DHS may use more current departure manifest data
    prior to certification. On February 21, 2008, in commenting on a draft
    of this testimony, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision
    on which methodology the department would use to certify compliance;
    however, the department confirmed that all methodologies under
    consideration would match foreign nationals' departure records against
    prior records "to determine that the person is a foreign national, and
    that the person did depart the country through a U.S. airport."

    Figure 1: DHS's Current Plan for Certifying "97 Percent" Requirement:

    This figure is a visual depiction of DHS's current plan for certifying
    "97 Percent" Requirement.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data; Map
    Resources (maps); Nova Development (clip art).

    [End of figure]

    There are several weaknesses with this approach. First, DHS's
    methodology does not begin with arrival records to determine if those
    foreign nationals departed or remained in the United States beyond
    their authorized periods of admission--more useful data for oversight
    of the Visa Waiver Program and consideration of its expansion.
    Furthermore, DHS's methodology will not inform overall or country-
    specific overstay rates, which are key factors in determining illegal
    immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. An alternate approach
    would be to track air arrivals from a given point in time and determine
    whether those foreign nationals have potentially overstayed.[Footnote
    16] Figure 2 compares DHS's plan to match visitor records using
    departure data as a starting point to a methodology that would track
    foreign nationals using arrival data as a starting point.

    Figure 2: DHS's Current Plan Omits Those Who Remain in the United
    States:

    This figure is a visual depiction of DHS's current plan which omits
    those who remain in the United States.

    [See PDF for image]

    Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data; Map
    Resources (maps); Nova Development and Ingram Publishing (clip art).

    [End of figure]

    Second, for the purposes of this provision, we do not see the value in
    verifying that a foreign national leaving the United States had also
    departed at a prior point in time--in other words, matching a new
    departure record back to a previous departure record from the
    country.[Footnote 17] If, however, DHS attempted to match records of
    air departures in August 2007 back to records of prior entries alone,
    US-VISIT data for that month show that DHS would only achieve a 92.8
    percent match rate. DHS's assistant secretary for policy development
    told us in January 2008 that the department chose to include previous
    departure and change of immigration status records in its methodology
    because this method allowed the department to achieve a match rate of
    97 percent or greater.

    Third, DHS's methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines'
    transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are
    weaknesses in the departure data. Foreign nationals who enter the
    United States by air are inspected by DHS officers--a process that
    provides information that can be used to verify arrival manifest data-
    -and, since 2004, DHS has implemented the US-VISIT program to collect
    biometric information on foreign nationals arriving in the United
    States.[Footnote 18] However, the department has not completed the exit
    portion of this tracking system; thus, there is no corresponding check
    on the accuracy and completeness of the departure manifest information
    supplied by the airlines. As a result, according to DHS, it cannot be
    certain that visitors listed on airlines' manifest data as departing
    the country did in fact physically depart. Furthermore, there may be
    some visitors who did leave the country by air, but were not recorded
    on airlines' manifest data as having departed. According to DHS, the
    department works with air carriers to try to improve both the
    timeliness and comprehensiveness of manifest records, and fines
    carriers that provide incomplete or inaccurate information. If DHS
    could evaluate these data, and validate the extent to which they are
    accurate and complete, the department would be able to identify
    problems and work with the airlines to further improve the data.

    DHS reported to us that it had used its methodology for meeting the "97
    percent" requirement to match records in the past; however, we were
    unable to identify an instance when DHS had used this particular
    methodology. We noted that DHS has used a similar methodology since
    2004 in its annual report to the Committees on the Judiciary in the
    U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on the matching of visitor
    arrival and departure records using biographic and biometric data
    gathered through US-VISIT.[Footnote 19] However, the methodology used
    in these annual reports is different from what DHS told us it intends
    to use to certify the "97 percent" provision. In these prior annual
    reports, DHS matched departure records to records of prior arrivals
    into the United States. For example, for the period of January 5, 2004,
    through September 30, 2004, DHS was able to match 71 percent of
    recorded departures from air and sea ports of entry to records of prior
    arrivals. In its May 2007 report on its integrated entry and exit data
    system, DHS was able to match 88.1 percent of recorded departures from
    air and sea ports of entry to records of prior arrivals. While these
    reports have shown that DHS's ability to match departure records has
    improved since US-VISIT was established in 2004, this methodology does
    not account for foreign nationals who have not left the United States.

    Moreover, DHS's plans to certify the "97 percent" requirement will not
    further its efforts in responding to Congress's longstanding calls for
    the development of an automated entry and exit control system to track
    visitors to the United States and identify those visitors who have
    remained in the country illegally.[Footnote 20] We testified in June
    2007 that the prospects for successfully delivering a biometric exit
    system were as uncertain then as they were when US-VISIT was first
    implemented in 2004.[Footnote 21] Without the capability to verify
    departures, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system
    by identifying visitors who have overstayed their original period of
    admission.

    In October 2007, DHS officials told us that data on overstay rates
    would be very useful for oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. As we
    have reported, overstays are a significant part of the larger problem
    of illegal immigration.[Footnote 22] For example, overstay rates would
    inform decision makers of illegal immigration risks associated with
    adding new countries to the program.[Footnote 23] However, according to
    the department, it cannot generate accurate overstay rates for visitors
    from visa waiver countries due to weaknesses in the data that indicate
    who has departed the United States, as previously mentioned. Moreover,
    the department has not designated an office with the responsibility of
    developing such data for the purposes of this program. Nevertheless, we
    identified an office within US-VISIT, the Data Integrity Group, which
    develops limited data on overstay rates that may be useful information
    for oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. This office provides
    information to DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement on visitors
    who have potentially overstayed the terms of their admission into the
    country. Immigration enforcement officials told us they use these data
    regularly during investigations of potential illegal immigrants. The
    Data Integrity Group also provides similar information to the
    department's Office of Immigration Statistics, as well as the Visa
    Waiver Program Office. While these are positive actions, DHS
    acknowledges that there are significant limitations in these data
    because of weaknesses in the multiple systems that the Data Integrity
    Group uses. For example, an unknown portion of reported overstays may
    be false because DHS could not match an arrival record to a departure
    or change of status record (for example, a visitor may have departed
    via a land border and not generated a departure record).

    Conclusion:

    An air exit system that facilitates the development of overstay rate
    data is important to managing potential risks in expanding the Visa
    Waiver Program. DHS's planned methodology for meeting the "97 percent
    provision" so it can move forward with program expansion will not
    demonstrate improvements in the air exit system or help the department
    identify overstays or develop overstay rates.

    Chairman Feinstein, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
    happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the
    Subcommittee may have at this time.

    Contact and Acknowledgments:

    For further information about this statement, please contact Jess Ford
    at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
    page of this statement. In addition, John Brummet, Assistant Director;
    Teresa Abruzzo; Kathryn Bernet; Joseph Carney; Etana Finkler; and Eric
    Larson made key contributions to this statement.

    [End of section]

    Related GAO Reports:

    Homeland Security: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program's Long-
    standing Lack of Strategic Direction and Management Controls Needs to
    Be Addressed. GAO-07-1065. August 31, 2007.

    Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability
    Remain Unclear. GAO-07-1044T. June 28, 2007.

    Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational, Technological,
    and Management Challenges. GAO-07-632T. March 20, 2007.

    Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and
    Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-
    07-499T. February 16, 2007.

    Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
    Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified. GAO-07-278.
    February 14, 2007.

    Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
    Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248.

    December 6, 2006.

    Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the
    United States. GAO-06-976T. August 2, 2006.

    Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks
    of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. July 28, 2006.

    Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver
    Program. GAO-06-835R. July 28, 2006.

    Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border
    Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296.

    February 14, 2006.

    Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on
    U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. GAO-05-
    202. February 23, 2005.

    Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered
    Defense. GAO-04-82. May 21, 2004.

    Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered
    Defense. GAO-04-170T. October 16, 2003.

    Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security
    Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. September 19, 2003.

    Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit
    System Expenditure Planning. GAO-03-563. June 9, 2003.

    Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need Improvement.
    PEMD-95-20. September 26, 1995.

    Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide
    Better Population Estimates. PEMD-93-25. August 5, 1993.

    Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology. GAO 03-
    546T. March 12, 2003.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, P.L. 99-603,
    created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot program. In 2000, the
    program became permanent under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act,
    P.L. 106-396.

    [2] The participating countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria,
    Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
    Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
    Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
    Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

    [3] See GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and
    Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington,
    D.C.: July 28, 2006).

    [4] Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
    P.L. 110-53.

    [5] Before DHS can expand the program to countries with refusal rates
    between 3 percent and 10 percent, it must also certify that an
    electronic travel authorization system is fully operational. This
    system would require nationals from visa waiver countries to provide
    the United States with biographical information before boarding a U.S.-
    bound flight to determine the eligibility of, and whether there exists
    a law enforcement or security risk in permitting, the foreign national
    to travel to the United States under the program. As of Feb. 21, 2008,
    DHS had not announced its plans for this authorization system. In
    addition, Congress also required the implementation of a biometric exit
    system at U.S. airports. If this is not in place by mid-2009, the
    flexibility DHS could have obtained to admit countries with refusal
    rates between 3 percent and 10 percent will be suspended until it is in
    place. A biometric air exit system utilizes biometric identifiers such
    as digital fingerprint scans rather than paper documents and biographic
    information to verify the departure of foreign nationals from the
    United States. As of Feb. 21, 2008, DHS had not announced plans for a
    biometric exit system.

    [6] The US-VISIT program is governmentwide program designed to
    integrate information on certain foreign nationals' arrival and
    departure from the United States. US-VISIT aims to enhance the security
    of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade,
    ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect
    visitors' privacy. In 2004, DHS's US-VISIT program began collecting
    information on foreign nationals arriving in the United States. The
    program is managed by the US-VISIT Program Office, which is headed by
    the US-VISIT Director, who reports to the DHS Undersecretary for
    National Protection and Programs. GAO has issued a series of reports on
    the US-VISIT program.

    [7] GAO-06-854.

    [8] Air carriers transmit visitor manifest information, which is
    obtained directly from government-issued passports, to CBP through the
    Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS includes arrival and
    departure manifest information such as name, date of birth, travel
    document issuing country, gender, U.S. destination address, entry date,
    and departure date. As of Feb. 19, 2008, commercial carriers are
    required to transmit manifest information to be vetted by DHS prior to
    departure of the aircraft.

    [9] This includes changes and extensions of the visits of lawfully
    admitted, nonimmigrant foreign nationals.

    [10] DHS officials indicated that they may update the air departure
    data prior to certification.

    [11] The overstay rate is the ratio of the total number of nationals of
    a country who were admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant
    visitors during the previous fiscal year and who violated the terms of
    such admission by remaining in the country beyond the authorized time
    period to the total number of nationals of that country who arrived at
    a U.S. port of entry and applied for admission into the United States
    as nonimmigrant visitors during the same period.

    [12] For more than 10 years, GAO has recommended the collection of
    departure information and the development of estimates of overstays by
    air. See GAO, Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods
    Provide Better Population Estimates, PEMD-93-25 (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
    5, 1993) and GAO, Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods
    Need Improvement, PEMD-95-20 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995). In
    November 2007, DHS told us that the department could not yet respond to
    open recommendations from these reports, in part because DHS has not
    identified which office will have responsibility for calculating
    overstay rate estimates.

    [13] In 2003, the Attorney General removed Uruguay from the Visa Waiver
    Program, stating that Uruguay's participation in the program was
    inconsistent with U.S. interests. According to a 2002 Federal Register
    notice on the subject, Uruguayan nationals were, on average, two to
    three times more likely than all nonimmigrants to have been denied
    admission at the border. Uruguayan air entries had an apparent overstay
    rate more than twice that of the average apparent overstay rate for all
    nonimmigrant air entries. In addition, Argentina was removed from the
    program in 2002, following an economic crisis in that country and an
    increase in the number of Argentinean nationals attempting to use the
    Visa Waiver Program to live and work illegally in the United States.

    [14] See GAO, Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa
    Waiver Program, GAO-06-835R (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).

    [15] Under the August 2007 visa waiver legislation, a country whose
    refusal rate is above 10 percent could also be considered for admission
    into the program if its overstay rate does not exceed a maximum
    overstay rate. According to the legislation, DHS and State must
    establish the maximum overstay rate, using information from the air
    exit system to do so. DHS has not indicated if or when it plans to
    establish this rate.

    [16] This could include foreign nationals who departed after their
    authorized period of admission expired, as well as those foreign
    nationals who may have remained in the country as overstays.

    [17] A DHS official told us that the system functions by matching the
    departure record to an alien's "account," which may contain numerous
    prior arrivals, departures, and immigration benefit transaction
    records. The official also stated that a specific departure record
    match may not fall chronologically in the alien's "account" after an
    arrival; it may fall, for example, after a record that an immigrant
    benefit was granted to extend the alien's stay for 6 additional months.

    [18] DHS's US-VISIT program collects, maintains, and shares data,
    including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, on selected
    foreign nationals entering the United States to verify their identities
    as they arrive at air, sea, and land ports of entry. DHS currently
    operates the entry portion of the US-VISIT program at more than 300
    air, sea, and land U.S. ports of entry. When fully implemented, US-
    VISIT is also intended to capture the same information from foreign
    nationals as they depart the country. The program aims to, among other
    things, identify foreign nationals who have overstayed or violated the
    terms of their visit.

    [19] See "United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
    Technology (US-VISIT) Annual Report on the Integrated Entry and Exit
    Data System" as required by the Data Management Improvement Act of
    2000, P.L. 106-215, and the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, P.L. 106-
    396.

    [20] In 1996, Congress called for such a system. See Illegal
    Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104-
    208. In 2000, Congress passed legislation requiring the establishment
    of an electronic system that would provide access to and integrate
    visitor arrival and departure data for all ports of entry by December
    31, 2005. See The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
    Management Improvement Act of 2000, P.L. 106-215.

    [21] We have reported on how DHS has managed US-VISIT's exit
    capability. In particular, we reported that, beyond a high-level
    schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what
    will be done by what entities and at what cost. See GAO, Homeland
    Security: Prospects for US-VISIT Biometric Exit Capability Remain
    Unclear, GAO-07-1044T (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007).

    [22] In 2000, the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated
    that about one-third of illegal aliens in the United States were
    overstays. In 2004, we reported that three alternative estimates of
    overstays that we analyzed did not represent the illegal population,
    but did provide some evidence that a substantial proportion of illegal
    immigrants are likely overstays. These data demonstrated that
    preventing additional visitors from becoming overstays is in the
    national interest. See GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of
    Homeland Security and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.:
    May, 21, 2004).

    [23] In addition, a country must be terminated from the Visa Waiver
    Program if that county's disqualification rate for the most recent
    fiscal year for which data are available was more than 3.5 percent. The
    disqualification rate is the total for a given fiscal year, of (1)
    those nationals of the country who were admitted as nonimmigrants and
    violated the terms of their admission--this would include overstays--
    and (2) the number of foreign nationals who were denied admission upon
    arrival in the United States, as it compares to the total number of
    nationals of that country who applied for admission as nonimmigrant
    visitors during the same time period. According to the legislation, the
    country must be terminated at the beginning of the second fiscal year
    following the fiscal year in which the determination of the
    disqualification rate was made. See 8 USC � 1187 (f). We will be
    reporting on this issue later in the year as part of our overall work
    on the Visa Waiver Program for this subcommittee.

    GAO's Mission:

    The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
    investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
    its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
    and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
    GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
    policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
    to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
    decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
    values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

    Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:

    The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
    cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
    weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
    correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
    posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
    and select "Subscribe to Updates."

    Order by Mail or Phone:

    The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
    each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
    of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
    more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
    Orders should be sent to:

    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street NW, Room LM:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    To order by Phone:
    Voice: (202) 512-6000:
    TDD: (202) 512-2537:
    Fax: (202) 512-6061:

    To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:

    Contact:

    Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
    E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
    Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:

    Congressional Relations:

    Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
    (202) 512-4400:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    Public Affairs:

    Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
    (202) 512-4800:
    U.S. Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    *** End of document. ***