Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to 
Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near 
Guam when Needed (12-MAY-08, GAO-08-427).			 
                                                                 
Unscheduled ship maintenance, known as voyage repairs, is a high 
priority for the U.S. Navy. Such repairs are sometimes beyond the
capability of the ship's crew to perform; cannot be deferred; and
must be made at a remote location. After the 1995 Base		 
Realignment and Closure Commission recommended closing the former
Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, the Navy leased the property at
that facility to the Guam Economic Development and Commerce	 
Authority, which sub-leased the property to a private shipyard.  
DOD has since begun planning for a military buildup on Guam. In  
January 2007 the Navy recommended allowing the private shipyard's
lease on Navy land to expire in 2012. Consequently, the House	 
Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine the extent to	 
which the Navy has (1) identified future ship repair requirements
at Guam, and (2) identified and assessed options to address those
requirements. GAO reviewed documents related to ship maintenance 
and interviewed officials affiliated with private contractors,	 
the Guam government, the Marine Corps, Military Sealift Command, 
and the Navy in conducting this review. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-427 					        
    ACCNO:   A82096						        
  TITLE:     Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a 
Plan to Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships	 
Operating near Guam when Needed 				 
     DATE:   05/12/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Data collection					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Equipment maintenance				 
	     Equipment repairs					 
	     Facility repairs					 
	     Force structure					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Naval bases					 
	     Naval facilities					 
	     Naval operations					 
	     Naval procurement					 
	     Performance appraisal				 
	     Repairs						 
	     Requirements definition				 
	     Risk assessment					 
	     Risk management					 
	     Ships						 
	     Shipyards						 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Guam						 

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GAO-08-427

   

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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2008: 

Defense Logistics: 

Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to Ensure That Voyage 
Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near Guam when Needed: 

Defense Logistics: 

GAO-08-427: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-427, a report to the Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Unscheduled ship maintenance, known as voyage repairs, is a high 
priority for the U.S. Navy. Such repairs are sometimes beyond the 
capability of the shipï¿½s crew to perform; cannot be deferred; and must 
be made at a remote location. After the 1995 Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission recommended closing the former Naval Ship Repair 
Facility, Guam, the Navy leased the property at that facility to the 
Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority, which sub-leased the 
property to a private shipyard. DOD has since begun planning for a 
military buildup on Guam. In January 2007 the Navy recommended allowing 
the private shipyardï¿½s lease on Navy land to expire in 2012. 
Consequently, the House Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine 
the extent to which the Navy has (1) identified future ship repair 
requirements at Guam, and (2) identified and assessed options to 
address those requirements. GAO reviewed documents related to ship 
maintenance and interviewed officials affiliated with private 
contractors, the Guam government, the Marine Corps, Military Sealift 
Command, and the Navy in conducting this review. 

What GAO Found: 

The Navy has not identified voyage surface ship repair requirements for 
2012 and beyond for vessels operating near Guam, although some 
information is available on which to base estimated requirements for 
planning. Navy officials stated that they cannot estimate such 
requirements because the Navy expects to change its force structure, 
the Marine Corps has not finalized its plans for any additional vessels 
associated with the buildup, and Military Sealift Command expects 
changes to its force structure at Guam. Although the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Military Sealift Command have not made final force structure 
decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, 
information is available to support an estimation of ship repair 
requirements as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. 
Specifically, the Navy (1) knows the history of voyage repairs 
conducted on Guam; (2) can identify vessels likely to operate near Guam 
based on planned force structure realignments in the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review; and (3) can identify ship repair capabilities available 
at other strategic locations in the Pacific area, including Yokosuka, 
Japan. Developing requirements is a prerequisite for planning, and 
without developing estimated repair requirements the Navy cannot 
adequately evaluate options for meeting them. 

Navy officials identified potential options for providing repairs in 
Guam, but have not fully assessed their viability or identified time-
critical planning tasks. According to Navy officials, once the Navy 
identifies voyage ship repair requirements for the Guam area, they will 
choose from four options or a combination of options for providing 
voyage repairs. First, the Navy could try to expand existing organic 
repair capabilities to conduct voyage repairs. However, the existing 
ship maintenance capabilities and facilities have little excess 
capacity without augmentation, limiting their ability to perform 
additional work. Second, the Navy could rely on repair teams flown in 
from naval shipyards in the United States. Third, the Navy could build 
a new Navy ship repair facility, though that could require years of 
planning and new funding. Fourth, the Navy could contract out work to 
either or both of the private ship repair providers now operating in 
Guam, or to any other private ship repair facility that might choose to 
locate in Guam. Three of these options might require building new 
facilities or expanding existing facilities. Officials said they would 
not begin planning until preparations begin for submissions to the 
Presidentï¿½s budget for fiscal year 2012. However, lead time is required 
to perform planning tasks necessary to provide repair capabilities from 
the Navyï¿½s suggested options. Without assessing the viability of each 
option for voyage repairs in a timely manner, the Navy increases the 
risk that voyage repair capabilities for ships operating in the Pacific 
may not be available when needed, potentially undermining shipsï¿½ 
ability to accomplish their missions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD estimate future voyage repair requirements for 
vessels at Guam; assess the options for providing repairs; and select 
the best option or combination of options. DOD concurred with comments 
to these recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-427]. For more 
information, contact Brian J Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 
[email protected] 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Navy Has Not Identified Future Voyage Ship Repair Requirements at Guam 
although Some information is Available for Use in Planning: 

The Navy Has Not Evaluated Options for Meeting Voyage Repair 
Requirements in Guam beyond 2012, and Risks Not Having a Repair 
Capability in Place when Needed: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Voyage Repair Man-Days and Costs for 2002-2007: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Physical Locations of Private Ship Repair Facilities: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

MSC: Military Sealift Command: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

May 12, 2008: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Guam is a territory of the United States with strategic value to the 
Department of Defense (DOD). It is the westernmost U.S. territory with 
Navy repair facilities, and DOD projects it will become increasingly 
important in supporting emerging U.S. strategic and political interests 
in the Pacific. U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships 
operate at or near Guam.[Footnote 1] Between fiscal years 1987 and 1995 
the Navy downsized its fleet from 594 to 392 ships and the Secretary of 
Defense proposed to close the Naval Ship Repair Facility, 
Guam,[Footnote 2] as part of the 1995 Base Closure and Realignment 
process, based on the excess capacity in Navy depot maintenance 
capabilities. The 1995 Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
generally agreed with the Secretary and recommended that the facility 
be closed. At that time, the Naval Ship Repair Facility, Guam, 
performed intermediate-and depot-level repairs[Footnote 3] that 
included (1) major maintenance and overhaul, and (2) emergent and 
voyage repairs (hereinafter referred to as voyage repairs) on Navy and 
MSC ships.[Footnote 4] The commission also found that the Navy repair 
facility should be replaced by a private-sector repair capability if 
MSC ships were to remain at Guam. Because MSC ships did remain, the 
Navy leased the property on which the former Naval Ship Repair 
Facility, Guam resided to the government of Guam, which in turn leased 
it to a contractor doing business as Guam Shipyard. The Navy pointed to 
the strategic value of having a private ship repair capability in Guam 
as the rationale for noncompetitively awarding contracts to Guam 
Shipyard from 1998 to 2007 to overhaul MSC ships and conduct other Navy 
ship repair work, including voyage repairs. Guam Shipyard continues to 
operate on the leased property. Guam Shipyard's lease was to expire by 
October 1, 2007, although Guam Shipyard exercised an option to extend 
its sub-lease with the Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority 
by 5 years, and they in turn exercised the option to extend the lease 
by 5 years with the Navy. The lease terms gave the Navy the power to 
terminate the lease at any time for cause, if cause existed. 

DOD's planning effort for a military buildup on Guam, which could have 
an impact on ship repair requirements in Guam, has begun.[Footnote 5] 
DOD plans to (1) relocate about 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from 
Okinawa to Guam, (2) construct a new Navy pier to support visiting 
aircraft carriers, (3) improve piers to support visiting amphibious 
vessels, (4) increase the submarine presence on Guam and in the Pacific 
region generally, and (5) locate an Army ballistic missile defense 
capability on Guam. Historically, U.S. naval ships whose home port was 
Guam were permitted by U.S. law to undergo overhaul, repair, or 
maintenance in shipyards outside the United States or Guam. The John 
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (the 
Act) amended section 7310 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code to prohibit U.S. 
naval vessels home-ported in Guam from undergoing such work in 
shipyards outside the United States or Guam, other than in the case of 
voyage repairs. The Act also required the Navy to evaluate options for 
Guam Shipyard's lease and any anticipated future ship repair workloads 
in Guam, and to report its findings to Congress. In January 2007, the 
Navy issued its report and concluded that it would prefer that future 
ship repair contracts on Guam be awarded competitively, and that it 
would be premature to extend the lease with Guam Shipyard as a result 
of the planned military build-up on Guam. Specifically, the Navy 
recommended that the lease with the government of Guam and with Guam 
Shipyard be allowed to expire on October 1, 2007, and that negotiations 
be opened to terminate Guam Shipyard's option to extend the lease by 5 
years or to allow the lease to run to the 2012 expiration on a smaller 
acreage, if negotiations to terminate the extension option 
failed.[Footnote 6] The Navy has not initiated negotiations since 
issuing its recommendations, and has taken no action to terminate its 
lease with the government of Guam for cause. Guam Shipyard exercised 
its option to extend its lease with the government of Guam until 2012 
without reducing its acreage, and the government of Guam completed its 
lease extension with the Navy for that time period. 

The Act also required GAO to evaluate the Navy report. On June 22, 
2007, we briefed your staff on our evaluation and concluded that the 
Navy's recommendation to allow Guam Shipyard's lease to expire was 
logically supported, and we could not disagree with the Navy's 
conclusion based on the information available at that time.[Footnote 7] 
At that briefing, your staff asked that we also determine the extent to 
which the Navy has (1) identified future ship repair requirements for 
the Guam area, and (2) identified and assessed options to address those 
requirements. This report responds to that request. 

To determine the extent to which the Navy has identified future repair 
requirements for ships operating in the Guam area and identified and 
assessed options to address those requirements, we reviewed documents 
related to past ship repair requirements in Guam, contracts associated 
with ship repairs, and Navy records related to ship repair facilities 
and activities. In addition, we interviewed officials at Guam Shipyard 
and another private ship repair provider, Gulf Copper, Inc; Guam 
government officials; Navy officials in Washington, D.C., Hawaii, and 
Guam; and MSC officials in Washington, D.C., Norfolk, Virginia, San 
Diego, California, and Guam. We conducted this performance audit from 
July 2007 to March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. See appendix I for a more detailed scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

The Navy has not identified voyage ship repair requirements for surface 
vessels operating near Guam for 2012 and beyond, although some 
information is available for developing estimated requirements for use 
in planning. Navy officials stated that they do not have enough 
information on which to base such an assessment. Nonetheless, while the 
Navy has plans for an increased ship presence in the Pacific and can 
generally predict the number and types of vessels likely to operate 
near Guam for the next 2 years, the Navy has not determined precisely 
how changes to its force structure for 2012 and beyond will impact ship 
repair requirements in Guam. Furthermore, the Marine Corps has not 
finalized its plans for additional vessels at Guam, or for the 
potential frequency and duration of visits to Guam anticipated for 
amphibious vessels which are currently home-ported in Japan, but that 
may be moved to Guam by 2014 to support Marine Corps units being moved 
there. In addition, MSC expects changes to its force structure 
operating at or near Guam. Officials stated that the timeline is 
uncertain for these changes, and thus the timing of future voyage 
repair requirements remains uncertain. While the Navy, Marine Corps, 
and Military Sealift Command have not made final force structure 
decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, 
information is available to support estimations of ship repair 
requirements as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. 
Moreover, DOD guidance requires that maintenance programs be clearly 
linked to strategic and contingency planning. Previous ship repair 
records and certain other information exists that could support 
development of at least estimated requirements. Specifically, the Navy 
(1) has historical data regarding voyage repairs conducted at Guam, (2) 
can identify vessels likely to operate near Guam based on planned force 
structure realignments in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 
developing operational plans, and (3) can identify ship repair 
capabilities available at other strategic locations in the Pacific 
area. Estimation of requirements is a prerequisite for performing an 
assessment of the viability of each option available for addressing 
those requirements in a cost-effective and timely fashion. Without 
developing estimated repair requirements, the Navy cannot determine the 
best alternative among various potential sources of repair or support 
planning to provide needed maintenance capabilities. 

Navy officials have identified potential options to meet voyage repair 
requirements on Guam for 2012 and beyond, but have not assessed their 
viability or identified the critical planning tasks. By not performing 
timely planning the Navy risks not having a repair capability in place 
when needed and, as time passes, limits the options that are available 
to it. Navy officials told us that once the Navy identifies voyage 
repair requirements for surface ships operating at or near Guam, they 
will select one or more of four options for providing those repairs. 
The options are to (1) expand existing Navy repair capabilities on 
Guam, (2) utilize repair teams flown in to Guam from U.S. Naval 
shipyards, (3) establish a new Navy repair capability on Guam, or (4) 
contract with one or more private ship repair providers. However, 
existing Navy-owned repair sources will face limitations in their 
ability to provide additional voyage repair capabilities for surface 
ships because they do not have excess capacity to accept additional 
workload, and the Navy has not determined the extent to which it will 
rely on U.S. Naval shipyards for voyage repair capabilities on Guam. 
Additionally, building a new Navy repair facility would require years 
of planning and additional resources, and such planning has not begun. 
Finally, the Navy has not determined the extent to which it would rely 
on private-sector ship repair providers beyond 2012, the year that the 
lease with Guam Shipyard will expire based on its exercise of the 
extension option. Military construction may be required depending on 
the option selected. Navy officials stated they will not begin planning 
to address voyage repair requirements on Guam until preparations begin 
for submissions to be included in the President's budget for fiscal 
year 2012. Without performing an assessment of the viability of each of 
the options for voyage repairs in a timely manner to support planning 
and budgeting of critical tasks, the Navy risks not having adequate 
voyage repair capabilities in place when needed to support operations 
in the Pacific Ocean. Further, as time passes, the Navy limits the 
options that are available to it because of the lead time that would be 
required to support some of the options. 

To ensure that adequate repair capabilities are available when needed, 
we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Navy to (1) estimate requirements for repairs for surface 
vessels operating on or near Guam based on data determined to be most 
appropriate by the Secretary of the Navy; (2) assess the benefits and 
limitations that exist in each of the options selected for providing 
repairs to ships operating near Guam in the future, and perform an 
assessment of anticipated costs and risks associated with each option; 
and (3) select the best option or combination of options for providing 
repair capabilities to support surface ships operating near Guam, and 
develop a plan and schedule for implementing a course of action to 
ensure that the required ship repair capability will be available by 
October 2012. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred, with comment, 
with each of our three recommendations. The department also provided 
technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate. DOD's 
comments and our evaluation are provided in the "Agency Comments and 
Our Evaluation" section of this report. 

Background: 

Ships' crews are often able to complete voyage repairs while the ship 
or battle group is underway. According to Navy officials, because ships 
often include redundant systems, repairs can usually be undertaken 
without interrupting the ship's mission or be postponed until the ship 
reaches a repair facility or its home port. However, voyage repairs are 
occasionally beyond the capability of ships' crews to complete, and 
must be performed by an intermediate or depot-level ship repair 
activity. Historically, Navy ships home-ported in Guam were permitted 
by U.S. law to be overhauled, repaired, or maintained in shipyards 
outside the United States or Guam. However, the John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 amended section 7310 of 
Title 10 of the U.S. Code to prohibit U.S. naval ships home-ported in 
Guam from being repaired in shipyards outside the United States or 
Guam, other than in the case of voyage repairs. 

Since the closure of the Navy Ship Repair Facility, Guam, the Navy and 
MSC have relied on four different sources to provide voyage repairs in 
Guam. First, the Navy submarine tender USS Frank Cable, which is a ship 
home-ported in Guam, has provided voyage repair capabilities for 
submarines when needed. Second, the Navy has relied on its Emergent 
Repair Facility to repair submarines by using a repair crew left behind 
from the USS Frank Cable when that ship is deployed. Third, fly-away 
teams from U.S. Naval shipyards have been sent to Guam to conduct 
voyage repairs when needed.[Footnote 8] Finally, the Navy has used its 
contract with Guam Shipyard for voyage repairs of both submarines and 
surface ships. 

Guam Shipyard has repaired most MSC ships operating around Guam and has 
assisted the Navy in completing voyage repairs on other ships and 
submarines. For example, Guam Shipyard assisted U.S. Naval shipyards 
with extensive voyage repairs on the USS San Francisco, a submarine 
that struck an undersea mountain, by providing dry-dock services and 
selected support services. Voyage repairs have averaged about 17 
percent of the total annual workload performed at Guam Shipyard. While 
Guam Shipyard officials told us that the voyage repair work would not 
be sufficient to support its current infrastructure and personnel, in 
2007 it won a competition for the overhaul of the USNS Bridge, an MSC 
Pacific fleet support vessel. Competitions for overhaul of other MSC 
ships operating near Guam are scheduled beyond 2008. 

While Guam Shipyard has been the only commercial shipyard capable of 
supporting Navy ship repair and overhaul requirements on Guam since 
1998, a private ship repair provider new to Guam, Gulf Copper, has 
initiated ship repair operations there. Although the Navy had indicated 
in its 2007 report to Congress that additional voyage repairs could be 
addressed by the submarine tender USS Frank Cable's repair department, 
MSC has awarded contracts to both Guam Shipyard and Gulf Copper for 
voyage repairs that may be needed during fiscal year 2008. MSC awarded 
single-year contracts without renewal options, but MSC officials said 
that they plan similar contracts for 2009 that will include option 
years. Voyage repairs are unscheduled, and the capabilities required to 
address them cannot be precisely predicted. 

Navy Has Not Identified Future Voyage Ship Repair Requirements at Guam 
although Some information is Available for Use in Planning: 

The Navy has not identified voyage ship repair requirements for 2012 
and beyond for surface vessels operating at or near Guam, although some 
information is available on which to base estimated requirements to 
support planning efforts. Navy officials stated that requirements have 
not been developed for the following three reasons. First, the Navy has 
not fully identified its future Pacific force structure or finalized 
operational plans. Second, the Marine Corps' plans for additional 
vessels, if any, and operations at Guam are still evolving. Third, MSC 
projects making changes to its force structure for ships operating near 
Guam. However, some information is available that could enable the Navy 
to develop estimates of ship repair requirements. Estimation of 
requirements is a prerequisite for assessing each option's ability to 
address those requirements in a cost-effective and timely fashion. 
Without developing estimated repair requirements, the Navy cannot 
determine the best alternative among various potential sources of 
repair or support planning to provide needed maintenance capabilities. 

Officials State That Requirements Cannot be Estimated until Force 
Structure Plans Are Final: 

Navy officials stated that voyage ship repair requirements at Guam 
cannot be identified until its future force structure plans are 
finalized. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review indicated that the Navy 
plans to operate six aircraft carrier strike groups and 60 percent of 
its submarine force in the Pacific. Moreover, the service has plans for 
a 313-ship Navy, but it has not yet identified the specific ships that 
will comprise the force structure in the Pacific beyond 2012. Officials 
stated that operational plans will dictate the number and type of 
vessels that will visit Guam, but those plans are periodically adjusted 
due to changes in the global security environment. As a result, Navy 
officials stated that they cannot yet develop requirements for voyage 
ship repairs at Guam for 2012 and beyond. 

Similarly, the Marine Corps' plans for additional vessels in Guam have 
not been finalized, but conceptual plans for relocating Marines from 
Okinawa to Guam may include the home-porting of four new High-Speed 
Vessels[Footnote 9] and two new Littoral Combat Ships[Footnote 10] at 
Guam. In addition to the possibility of adding vessels, the Marine 
Corps' force relocation from Okinawa to Guam is expected to result in 
visits by amphibious vessels home-ported in Japan. These vessels are to 
deploy to Guam to support training exercises for the Marines stationed 
on Guam, and they may generate demands for voyage repairs during these 
operations. 

MSC also expects changes to its force structure operating near Guam, 
but the timeline for these changes is uncertain. Current MSC vessels, 
such as ammunition ships[Footnote 11] and combat stores ships,[Footnote 
12] are expected to be replaced by new dry cargo/ammunition 
ships[Footnote 13] on a one-for-one basis. MSC officials believe that 
these new vessels will require less maintenance than the vessels they 
replace, thus potentially reducing repair requirements. For example, 
these vessels use new technology, including propulsion and electrical 
systems that are thought to require less frequent maintenance and 
different repair capabilities. Guam's first new dry cargo/ammunition 
ship is to arrive on station sometime in 2008, but acquisition 
schedules for additional such ships indicate deployment delays. 
Delaying the arrival of the new ships will delay decommissioning of the 
older ships, thus raising questions about the need to continue existing 
levels of repair capabilities in the near term, as MSC believes the 
older ships may require more intensive maintenance. 

Some Information Is Available to Develop Estimated Requirements for 
Repair Capabilities: 

While the precise force structure requirements associated with the 
military buildup around Guam remain uncertain, the Navy has some 
information that can be used to identify estimated ship repair 
requirements. Specifically, the Navy knows the history of voyage 
repairs conducted on Guam; it can identify vessels likely to operate 
near Guam, based on planned force structure realignments in the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review; and it can identify ship repair 
capabilities available at other strategic locations in the area, 
including Pearl Harbor, and Yokosuka, Japan. 

Historical data are available showing voyage repairs that have been 
performed on surface vessels and submarines in Guam for at least the 
past 6 years, and could be used to estimate likely future repair 
requirements based on past experience. MSC recently used these data to 
formulate contracts awarded for providing voyage repairs on vessels 
operating at or near Guam for fiscal year 2008. Table 1 shows the 
average number of man-days and the cost to complete voyage repairs from 
private sources on Guam for fiscal years 2002-2007. 

Table 1: Voyage Repair Man-Days and Costs for 2002-2007: 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Man-days utilized: 5,919; 
Dollar value: $4,198,962. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Man-days utilized: 6,564; 
Dollar value: 4,120,036. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Man-days utilized: 4,315; 
Dollar value: 3,252,163. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Man-days utilized: 12,137; 
Dollar value: 8,507,291. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Man-days utilized: 9,274; 
Dollar value: 5,506,583. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Man-days utilized: 3,582; 
Dollar value: 5,390,946. 

Fiscal year: Average; 
Man-days utilized: 6,965; 
Dollar value: $5,162,663. 

Source: Military Sealift Command. 

[End of table] 

The Navy has identified some vessel assignments associated with the 
force structure changes identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review. Specifically, the Navy plans to replace the USS Kitty Hawk at 
its home port in Japan with the USS George Washington--a new, nuclear- 
powered aircraft carrier. Navy officials stated that operational plans 
for that carrier's strike group will include visits to Guam for periods 
of 2 to 3 weeks. Although the Navy has not identified the specific 
vessels that will make up the strike group, Navy officials know the 
types of vessels that are normally part of a strike group. Moreover, 
Navy vessels have operated in the Pacific for decades, and voyage 
repair experiences are readily available to the Navy through repair 
records, shipyard billing, or similar documents. Nonetheless, the Navy 
has not used these records to forecast estimated surface ship repair 
requirements for Guam beyond 2012. 

Further, extensive ship repair capabilities exist in other locations in 
the Pacific, such as Pearl Harbor. Given that future ship repair 
capabilities on Guam may need to support a larger number and different 
mix of ships, the Navy could use ship repair data from Pearl Harbor and 
other strategic forward-deployed locations--such as the Navy Ship 
Repair Facility, Yokosuka, Japan, and the facility that repairs the 
Navy amphibious ships that support the Marine Corps at Sasebo, Japan-- 
to help it develop estimated voyage repair forecasts for Guam. 

DOD guidance requires that maintenance programs be clearly linked to 
strategic and contingency planning, and that a determination be made as 
to whether a specific industrial capability is required to meet DOD 
needs. This guidance calls for the Navy to follow industrial-based 
planning to ensure that required ship repair capabilities will be 
available when needed. Specifically, DOD Directive 5000.60, "Defense 
Industrial Capabilities Assessments," requires that planning occur when 
a known or projected problem exists, or when there is a substantial 
risk that an essential capability may be lost. Such problems can 
consist of inadequate industrial capacity operated by a DOD entity or 
similar inadequate capabilities in the private sector. Estimation of 
requirements is a prerequisite for performing an assessment of the 
viability of each option available for addressing those requirements in 
a cost-effective and timely fashion. Although some information is 
available for developing estimated requirements, the Navy has not 
identified voyage surface ship repair requirements for 2012 and beyond 
for vessels operating near Guam. Without developing estimated repair 
requirements the Navy cannot determine the best alternative among 
various potential sources of repair or support planning to provide 
needed maintenance capabilities. 

The Navy Has Not Evaluated Options for Meeting Voyage Repair 
Requirements in Guam beyond 2012, and Risks Not Having a Repair 
Capability in Place when Needed: 

While the Navy has not planned for meeting voyage repair requirements 
on Guam for 2012 and beyond, it has identified options for providing 
repairs, although some require long lead times to implement. However, 
by not performing timely planning the Navy risks not having a repair 
capability in place when needed, and as time passes, limits the options 
that may be available to it. Navy officials have stated that they do 
not intend to develop plans for a voyage ship repair capability on Guam 
until preparations for the 2012 budget cycle begin. However, in 
response to our inquiries, the Navy identified four potential options 
for meeting future voyage ship repair requirements on Guam and 
acknowledged that it cannot avoid doing some voyage repairs there. 
First, the Navy could use existing Navy-owned voyage repair 
capabilities in Guam, though these face certain limitations in their 
ability to take on additional voyage repairs. Second, fly-away teams 
could be brought in from Navy-owned shipyards in the United States, and 
these teams would rely on facilities and infrastructure in place on 
Guam. Third, the Navy could develop a new repair facility, which would 
entail significant planning, repair of existing infrastructure, and 
possibly new military construction. Fourth, the Navy could contract out 
the work to either or both of the existing private ship repair 
providers or to any other contractor that might choose to locate at 
Guam. DOD guidance requires that a determination be made as to whether 
a specific industrial capability is required to meet DOD needs and that 
a selection be made for meeting those needs. Moreover, Navy officials 
acknowledge that if the option to expand existing Navy repair 
capabilities on Guam or establish new Navy repair capabilities were 
chosen, early identification of mission requirements would be needed to 
facilitate planning and budgeting of new or expanded Navy construction 
to ensure that a fully functioning Navy-owned ship repair facility 
would be operational in 2012. 

A Navy-Operated Ship Repair Capability Presents One Option, but 
Existing Navy-Owned Capabilities on Guam Are Inadequate to Accept 
Additional Voyage Repairs: 

Existing Navy-owned capabilities in Guam are inadequate to address 
current voyage repair requirements for surface vessels and are unable 
to address additional voyage repair requirements without increased 
capabilities and capacity. First, the primary mission for the USS Frank 
Cable is to provide maintenance and support for the three fast attack 
submarines home-ported on Guam, and to address the needs of visiting 
submarines. At the time of our review, the submarine tender's repair 
crew was operating at full capacity in meeting its primary mission. As 
a result, the Navy contracted with Guam Shipyard to complete $1.2 
million in voyage repairs on submarines between fiscal years 2002 and 
2007, mostly to provide additional manpower to augment the submarine 
tender's repair crew. Although the Navy has not developed voyage repair 
plans for surface ships, it has developed some plans for the provision 
of voyage and other repairs for submarines. For example, current plans 
will require the USS Frank Cable to provide support for the new guided 
missile submarine that will visit Guam for rotational crewing. 
Additionally, the Navy plans to use part of the repair crew from the 
USS Frank Cable to perform repair services for the submarine tender USS 
Emory S. Land, which will be stationed at Diego Garcia in the British 
Indian Ocean Territories.[Footnote 14] The repair crew on the USS Frank 
Cable will be increased by about 170 personnel to enable about 160 to 
rotate for workload assignments on the USS Emory S. Land, leaving no 
more than 10 repair personnel to take on additional work. As a result, 
according to Navy officials, it is unlikely that the USS Frank Cable 
could provide voyage repairs for surface vessels in Guam in the future 
without adding capability and capacity beyond the 170 additional 
personnel already planned. 

Second, the Emergent Repair Facility on Guam that supports submarines 
when the USS Frank Cable is away from port[Footnote 15] lacks the 
capability to meet surface voyage repair requirements. This facility is 
used by a stay-behind repair crew from the USS Frank Cable when that 
ship is away from its home port. According to Navy officials, the 
Emergent Repair Facility is not adequate even for its current role. 
Officials estimated that the Navy would need about $21 million to 
expand and equip the facility just to meet its current submarine 
mission requirements, without taking on additional voyage repairs for 
surface ships. For example, the facility has no communications 
capabilities; repair personnel must use personal cellular telephones 
for any necessary communications. Navy officials acknowledge that it 
would have to be expanded to meet any future surface voyage repair 
requirements. Moreover, larger vessels may be unable to approach the 
Emergent Repair Facility without conducting dredging operations and 
completing pier improvements. As a result the Emergent Repair Facility 
cannot be used to provide voyage repairs for surface vessels without 
considerable planning and capital investment. 

Effective Use of Fly-Away Teams from U.S. Naval Shipyards Is a Second 
Option, but Depends upon Ability of Naval Shipyards to Deploy Personnel 
to Guam and the Infrastructure and Facilities Available There: 

The effective use of fly-away teams from Navy-owned shipyards in the 
continental United States to perform voyage repairs at Guam depends on 
the ability of U.S. Naval shipyards to provide personnel to perform 
repairs without negatively impacting their own ongoing work, as well as 
on the adequacy of infrastructure and facilities available for their 
use in Guam. Further, U.S. Naval shipyards have not been provided with 
voyage repair estimates to conduct workload planning and determine 
their capacity to provide fly-away teams to Guam. The use of fly-away 
teams may not be practicable or cost-effective for performing large 
amounts of voyage repair work, because Navy-owned shipyards in the 
United States that provide fly-away teams are currently operating 
beyond their target capacities, although they anticipate having excess 
capacity in the coming years. However, deploying fly-away teams to Guam 
to meet large amounts of voyage repair requirements without advance 
planning could undermine scheduled maintenance at the U.S. Naval 
shipyards. Fly-away teams also need sufficient infrastructure and 
equipment at the location at which they will conduct voyage repairs. 
Because the USS Frank Cable and the Emergent Repair Facility both face 
limitations, fly-away teams that deploy to Guam cannot be assured that 
these facilities would be available to provide needed infrastructure or 
equipment. Without more clearly defined repair requirements and further 
examination of equipment and personnel necessary to meet those 
requirements, the viability of using fly-away teams to provide future 
voyage repairs is uncertain. 

Establishment of a New Navy Depot Capability on Guam Is a Third Option, 
but Would Require Infrastructure, Equipment, Personnel, and Funding: 

Building a new Navy depot-level repair capability would require years 
of planning and additional infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and 
funding. If the lease on the property at the former Naval Ship Repair 
Facility, Guam, is allowed to expire, establishing a new Navy-owned 
ship repair capability at that location would require the Navy to 
address infrastructure, equipment, and personnel requirements to create 
the capability needed to meet surface voyage repair requirements on 
Guam. The Navy would have to determine what capability is needed and 
then take action to acquire the equipment to provide that capability. 
Furthermore, infrastructure repairs may be needed to support work on 
Navy vessels. For example, according to Navy officials the typhoon 
moorings at Guam Shipyard may require repair. A new Navy depot-level 
ship repair capability in Guam would also require staffing by military 
and civilian personnel. Without a determination of equipment, 
infrastructure, personnel, and funding requirements for providing new 
surface ship repair capabilities, the Navy cannot know whether 
establishing a new ship repair capability in Guam is a viable option. 
Additionally, implementing this option would also require significant 
lead time. 

Private-Sector Ship Repair Providers Offer a Fourth Option, but the 
Navy Has Not Determined the Extent to Which It Will Rely on Them beyond 
2012: 

The Navy has not determined the extent to which it will rely on private-
sector ship repair providers beyond 2012, when the lease on Navy 
property occupied by Guam Shipyard expires. While it is unclear what 
kind of private sector capability will be available beyond 2012, both 
private ship repair providers operating in Guam have been awarded 1-
year contracts by MSC to provide selected voyage repairs to surface 
vessels operating at or near Guam for fiscal year 2008. According to 
MSC officials, new contracts are to be executed by the end of fiscal 
year 2008, and this contracting arrangement will include option years 
that address voyage repair requirements for MSC ships through 2012. 
Guam Shipyard operates on Navy property located within Naval Base, 
Guam. Gulf Copper operates from approximately 700 feet of pier space at 
the commercial port opposite Navy property on Apra Harbor. It is 
possible that additional private ship repair providers may express 
interest in performing voyage repairs at Guam in the future, and that 
Guam Shipyard may continue operations at another location in Guam 
beyond 2012 when its lease on U.S. Navy property expires. Figure 1 
depicts the physical locations of Guam Shipyard and Gulf Copper. 

Figure 1: Physical Locations of Private Ship Repair Facilities: 

This figure is a map of physical locations of private ship repair 
facilities. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO, U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

The Joint Depot Maintenance Program provides guidance on selecting 
sources of maintenance and repair, and a DOD Handbook entitled 
Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities provides a framework for 
coordinating analysis and determining the most cost-and time-effective 
options for meeting DOD needs. If the option selected by the Navy for 
providing ship repairs in Guam requires military construction, as may 
be the case if the Navy chooses to expand existing Navy-owned 
capabilities or to establish new Navy-owned capabilities, the military 
construction requirements would have to be included in the budgeting 
process for fiscal year 2010 in order for new facilities to be ready by 
October 2012. However, Navy officials have stated that they do not 
intend to develop plans for a voyage ship repair capability on Guam 
until preparations for the 2012 budget cycle begin. Without performing 
an assessment of the viability of each of the options for voyage 
repairs in a timely manner to support planning and budgeting of 
critical tasks, the Navy risks not having adequate voyage repair 
capabilities in place when needed to support operations in the Pacific 
Ocean, and as time passes, limits the options that could be available 
to it by 2012. 

Conclusions: 

The Navy has not effectively identified voyage repair requirements that 
are a prerequisite for selecting among the options to provide such 
capabilities on Guam. While the Navy does not fully know its voyage 
surface ship repair requirements near Guam for 2012 and beyond, it does 
possess data that could be used to estimate requirements. Namely, it 
could use existing ship repair experiences, projected requirements 
identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and information 
about repair capabilities maintained at other strategic locations to 
identify its ship repair requirements for Guam in the near term and to 
aid in developing a baseline forecast of repair capabilities it will 
need for 2012 and beyond. Moreover, the requirements determination 
process is a precursor to planning for the provision of ship repair 
capabilities and selecting an option to provide those capabilities, 
since a certain amount of lead time would be required to implement some 
of the options. Additionally, a decision about future industrial repair 
requirements should be an integral part of ongoing Guam infrastructure 
planning to support the transfer of Marines to Guam from Japan. 
However, the Navy has not developed such plans, nor has it assessed the 
challenges associated with the options identified, or selected an 
option to provide ship repair capabilities on Guam. Without identifying 
requirements, performing a risk-based assessment of the viability and 
costs of each of the options, selecting the best option or combination 
of options available, and then developing and implementing an action 
plan to address any challenges associated with the option or options 
selected, the Navy lacks reasonable assurance that it will have 
sufficient time to prepare the best option or combination of options 
for meeting future surface ship repair requirements on Guam beyond 
2012. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that adequate voyage repair capabilities are available for 
ships operating near Guam, and recognizing the lead time required to 
implement options, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Secretary of the Navy to: 

* estimate requirements for repairs for surface vessels operating at or 
near Guam based on data determined to be most appropriate by the 
Secretary of the Navy; 

* assess the benefits and limitations of each of the options for 
providing repairs to ships operating near Guam, and perform an 
assessment of anticipated costs and risks associated with each option; 
and: 

* select the best option or combination of options for providing repair 
capabilities to support surface ships operating near Guam, and develop 
a plan and schedule for implementing a course of action to ensure that 
the required ship repair capability will be available by October 2012. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In a written response to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all 
of our recommendations with comments. The department's comments are 
reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The department also 
provided several technical comments that have been incorporated as 
appropriate. 

With regard to our first recommendation for an assessment of 
requirements for repairs for surface vessels operating at or near Guam, 
the Navy responded that it has a methodology to determine annual 
emergent repair requirements by ship class and fleet--which includes 
voyage repair execution history as a subset--and that this requirement 
will be included in the future years defense plan, and that no further 
direction is necessary. While we acknowledge that the Navy looks at 
overall maintenance requirements as a part of the annual budget 
process, this process does not provide a detailed listing of specific 
capabilities required for voyage repairs at strategic locations, such 
as Guam beyond 2012. Given its unique location and the changing 
circumstances that will impact voyage repair requirements in and around 
that location, we continue to believe that a specific assessment of 
requirements for providing surface vessel voyage repairs in Guam 
represents a necessary baseline for planning for the provision of ship 
repair capabilities beyond 2012 and for the selection of an option or 
combination of options to provide those capabilities. 

In concurring with our second recommendation regarding the need for an 
assessment of the benefits and limitations of each of the options for 
providing repairs to ships operating near Guam, the department's 
response was that the Navy has already identified a plan for providing 
repair capabilities for ships operating near Guam and that the Navy has 
determined that establishing a new repair facility on Guam is not 
viable since the expenditure of funds to do this is not necessary. The 
department's response also noted that the Navy is already developing a 
military construction project to expand the existing repair 
capabilities on Guam in fiscal year 2010, that the Navy intends to 
continue the practice of utilizing repair teams from U.S. Naval 
shipyards and private shipyards as needed, and that the Navy intends to 
continue the practice of contracting voyage repair work to one or more 
private ship repair providers. The Navy may have determined that a new 
repair capability on Guam is not necessary, but much of the existing 
repair equipment currently used to support voyage repair on surface 
vessels--including floating dry dock, floating crane, and industrial 
equipment--are owned by Guam Shipyard and could potentially be removed 
at the conclusion of the existing lease, if a new lease were not 
negotiated. We continue to believe that it is essential that the 
department determine whether it will have continued need for expensive 
capital equipment such as the floating dry dock and crane, and whether 
the capability provided by such equipment will be available from the 
private sector. Finally, it is commendable that the Navy has a plan for 
providing ship repair capabilities on Guam and is moving forward to 
implement it. However, at the time of our exit briefing with the Navy 
in January, the Navy did not inform us of this plan. Moreover, Navy 
officials have told us that this plan was developed in February, 
subsequent to our exit briefing and in response to our recommendations. 

In concurring with our third recommendation regarding selection of the 
best option or combination of options for providing repair capabilities 
to support surface ships operating near Guam, the department stated 
again that the Navy's plan for providing repair capabilities to support 
surface ships operating near Guam has already been determined, and that 
direction from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy is 
not needed. The response also stated that committing the Navy to a 
lease agreement in 2008 for a capability in 2012 is premature. While we 
agree that committing the Navy to a lease in 2008 for a capability 
required in 2012 is premature, it is not premature to decide whether or 
not there will be an industrial activity--either owned and operated by 
the government or leased by a private contractor--within the Navy 
installation. The department stated in its response that the Navy 
intends to use private-sector capability, but it did not state whether 
that would be on the Navy installation on Guam. Given the detailed 
planning that is required to support the planned buildup of military 
personnel expected over the next few years in Guam, we believe it is 
essential that the Navy determine whether or not it expects to continue 
to have an industrial activity operating as a part of the Guam Master 
Plan, and that it determine what acreage this activity would occupy. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-4523 or at [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Additional contacts and staff 
acknowledgments are provided in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore, Director: 

Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Navy has identified future ship 
repair requirements for ships operating in the Guam area and assessed 
options to address those requirements, we reviewed documents related to 
ship maintenance. In addition, we interviewed officials responsible for 
force structure planning, contracting for repairs on vessels belonging 
to the U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command, and performing repairs 
on vessels belonging to the Navy and Military Sealift Command on Guam 
as well as related organizations in Hawaii, and on the west coast of 
the United States. Specifically, we interviewed officials and analyzed 
documents related to ship repair requirements and the options proposed 
to meet them at the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations; the 
Commander, Pacific Fleet; the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific; the 
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command; the Commander, Naval Forces 
Marianas; the Chief of Naval Installations; the Commander, Military 
Sealift Command; the Commander, Naval Facilities Pacific; and the Guam 
Economic Development and Commerce Authority. We also performed work at 
the offices of several private ship repair providers to determine the 
extent to which private-sector repair capabilities may be available on 
Guam in the future. We also examined Department of Defense (DOD) policy 
and Joint Guidance for providing maintenance and repair of DOD assets 
afloat. We performed our review from July 2007 to January 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense For Logistics And Materiel Readiness: 
3500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301 -3500: 

April 17 2018: 

Mr. Brian Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Lepore: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-08-427, "Defense LOGISTICS: Navy Needs to Develop and 
Implement a Plan to Ensure that Voyage Repairs are Available to Ships 
Operating Near Guam When Needed," dated March 17, 2008 (GAO Code 
351068). 

The Department concurs with comment with each recommendation. An 
explanation of the DoD position is enclosed. Technical corrections were 
provided under separate cover. The Department appreciates the 
opportunity to comment on the draft report. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Jack Bell: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated March 17, 2008 GAO CODE 351068/GAO-08-427:  

"Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to 
Ensure that Voyage Repairs are Available to Ships Operating Near Guam 
When Needed" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:  

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to estimate requirements for repairs 
for surface vessels operating at or near Guam based on data determined 
to be most appropriate by the Secretary of the Navy. 

DOD Response: Concur with comment. The Navy has a methodology to 
determine annual emergent repair requirements by ship class and fleet, 
which includes voyage repair execution history as a subset, and has 
included that requirement in each year's Presidential Budget. All ship 
repair requirements, to include vessels operating near Guam, are 
identified in the Navy's POM build and ultimately are included in the 
FYDP. Further direction regarding emergent repair requirements is not 
necessary. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to assess the benefits and limitations 
of each of the options for providing repairs to ships operating near 
Guam, and perform an assessment of anticipated costs and risks 
associated with each option. 

DOD Response: Concur with comment. The Navy's plan for providing repair 
capabilities to support surface ships operating near Guam has already 
been selected and is described below. The Navy has determined that 
establishing a new repair facility on Guam, option 3 of the report, is 
not viable since the expenditures of funds to do this are not necessary 
for the following reasons: 1. Navy is already developing a MILCON 
project to expand the existing Navy repair capabilities on Guam in 
FY10. (Option 1 of the report) 2. Utilizing repair teams flown into 
Guam from Naval Shipyards and private shipyards in the United States is 
already a practice in Guam and elsewhere, and Navy plans to continue 
this practice in the future in order to efficiently utilize existing 
ship repair expertise as needed. (Option 2 of the report) 3. Navy 
intends to continue the practice of contracting voyage repair work to 
one or more private ship repair providers. (Option 4 of the report). 
The Navy will use combinations of options 1, 2, and 4 to ensure 
adequate resources are available to meet voyage repair requirements for 
surface vessels operating at or near Guam. Additional direction is not 
necessary. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to select the best option or 
combination of options for providing repair capabilities to support 
surface ships operating near Guam, and develop a plan and schedule for 
implementing a course of action to ensure that the required ship repair 
capability will be available by October 2012. 

DOD Response: Concur with comment. As mentioned in response to 
Recommendation 2 above, the Navy's plan for providing repair 
capabilities to support surface ships operating near Guam has already 
been determined. Accordingly, direction from the Secretary of Defense 
to Secretary of the Navy to develop such a plan is not needed. Navy 
recognizes this plan is contingent upon Navy, OSD and Congressional 
approval of the MILCON project to expand the existing Navy repair 
capabilities on Guam in FY10. Also, committing Navy to a lease 
agreement in 2008 for a capability in 2012 is premature. In the 
interim, Navy plans to utilize existing Navy facilities on Guam, fly 
away teams from U.S. shipyards and the private sector ship repair 
capability on Guam to execute voyage repairs on ships operating near 
Guam. To date this combination has successfully provided needed voyage 
repair capabilities.

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Julia Denman, Assistant 
Director; Jeffrey Kans; Julia C. Matta; John E.Trubey; and Cheryl 
Weissman made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] MSC operates logistics support vessels and stations them at 
strategic points such as Guam, and typically has several vessels at or 
near Guam. 

[2] Ship repair facilities differ from shipyards in that shipyards are 
generally found near fleet homeport concentrations while ship repair 
facilities are generally found near more remote deployment or operating 
areas. 

[3] Navy maintenance is performed at three different levels of 
increasing complexity: shipboard, intermediate, and depot. Depot-level 
maintenance is generally performed by civilian depot artisans or 
contractors. 

[4] Emergent and voyage repairs generally consist of maintenance to 
repair any problems that emerge during deployment, or emergency work 
needed to enable a ship to continue its mission and which can usually 
be accomplished without a significant change to a ship's operating 
schedule. 

[5] In 2004 the United States and Japan began a series of sustained 
security consultations aimed at, among other things, repositioning U.S. 
forces from Japan to other areas, including Guam. GAO's September 2007 
report on DOD's Overseas Master Plan (GAO-07-1015) stated that DOD's 
planning effort for the buildup of military forces and infrastructure 
on Guam was in its initial stages, with many key decisions and 
challenges yet to be addressed. 

[6] Guam Shipyards operates on 100 acres at the former Naval Ship 
Repair Facility, Guam, but Guam Shipyard and Navy officials indicate 
that it may be possible for them to continue operations from a smaller 
acreage of about 23 acres. 

[7] The Navy had concluded that, although there would be increased ship 
presence in the Pacific, there would be no additional home-porting on 
Guam and that additional voyage repairs resulting from the increased 
presence were expected to be within the capability and capacity of the 
home-ported submarine tender repair department. 

[8] Fly-away teams consist of personnel with needed skill sets from 
U.S. Naval shipyards to provide voyage repairs on an as-needed basis at 
significant distances from U.S. Naval shipyards. 

[9] High-Speed Vessels can operate in shallow waters and reach speeds 
of 35-45 knots to allow for rapid deployment of Marine Corps company- 
sized units with their vehicles, or be reconfigured to become a troop 
transport for an infantry battalion. 

[10] Littoral Combat Ships are being built to operate in shallow waters 
close to shore. The ship uses interchangeable mission packages so that 
it can be rapidly reconfigured for different missions. 

[11] T-AE ammunition ships provide logistic support to U.S. Navy ships 
at sea for all types of ammunition and assist with the transfer of 
ammunition between weapons storage and maintenance facilities 
worldwide. 

[12] T-AFS Combat Stores Ships provide supplies to U.S. Navy ships at 
sea using tensioned cargo rigs and CH-46 Sea Knight (or commercial 
equivalent) helicopters. 

[13] T-AKE Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships are new vessels for transferring 
cargo at sea to station ships and other naval warfare forces. The T-AKE 
may also operate in concert with T-AO oilers as a substitute on-station 
ship, providing direct logistic support to ships within a single 
carrier strike group. 

[14] Diego Garcia is an island military reservation located off the tip 
of India with multiple resident commands including Afloat Pre- 
Positioning Ships Squadron 4, Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships Squadron 
2, and a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Detachment. 

[15] Navy officials estimate that the submarine tender is deployed 
elsewhere for 8 to 20 weeks per year. 

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