Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would	 
Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance,		 
Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing	 
(29-MAY-08, GAO-08-418).					 
                                                                 
The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high	 
pace of operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The	 
Navy has used multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships
and has shown it to increase a ship's operational availability.  
GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which the Navy, for ship 
rotational crewing, has (1) employed a comprehensive management  
approach, (2) developed and implemented guidance, (3)		 
systematically collected, analyzed data, and reported findings,  
and (4) systematically collected and used lessons learned. To	 
conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) and  
Navy documentation and best practices for transformation,	 
conducted focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials.  
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-418 					        
    ACCNO:   A82208						        
  TITLE:     Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives     
Would Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance,	 
Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing	 
     DATE:   05/29/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Comparative analysis				 
	     Concept of operations				 
	     Cost analysis					 
	     Cost effectiveness analysis			 
	     Data collection					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Facility management				 
	     Federal agency reorganization			 
	     Force structure					 
	     Lessons learned					 
	     Life cycle costs					 
	     Military forces					 
	     Military vessels					 
	     Naval personnel					 
	     Naval procurement					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Ships						 
	     Systems analysis					 
	     Systems evaluation 				 
	     Systems integration				 
	     Systems management 				 
	     Cost estimates					 
	     Navy Lessons Learned System			 

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GAO-08-418

This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-418 
entitled 'Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would 
Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive 
Analysis, and Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing' which was released on 
May 30, 2008. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2008: 

Force Structure: 

Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit from Top-Level 
Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and Improved 
Lessons-Learned Sharing: 

Force Structure: 

GAO-08-418: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-418, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high pace of 
operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The Navy has used 
multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships and has shown it to 
increase a shipï¿½s operational availability. GAO was asked to evaluate 
the extent to which the Navy, for ship rotational crewing, has (1) 
employed a comprehensive management approach, (2) developed and 
implemented guidance, (3) systematically collected, analyzed data, and 
reported findings, and (4) systematically collected and used lessons 
learned. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) 
and Navy documentation and best practices for transformation, conducted 
focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials. 


What GAO Found: 

Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for 
the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational 
crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive 
management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing 
efforts across the department and among various types of ships. GAOï¿½s 
prior work showed that sound management practices for implementing 
transformational programs include ensuring top leadership drives the 
change and dedicating an implementation team. The Navy has not assigned 
clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or 
designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing 
receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a 
comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a 
successful transformation of its crewing culture. 

The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of 
ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased 
accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching 
instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing 
initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in 
individual ship-class concepts of operations. Defense best practices 
hold that key aspects of a concept of operations include how a set of 
capabilities may be employed to achieve objectives and identifies by 
whom, where, and how it is to be accomplished. 

The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it 
has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and 
reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current 
and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and 
analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, 
the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that 
would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-
cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. 
The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options 
for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance 
requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses 
generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and 
estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, 
the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In 
the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are 
incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number 
of ships it needs to acquire. 

The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some 
rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have 
relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a 
systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship 
communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy 
Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing 
lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks 
repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively 
implement crew rotations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take several actions, including assigning 
leadership; establishing an implementation team; promulgating guidance; 
developing a systematic data-collection and analysis plan; assessing 
crewing options in analyses of alternatives; and developing guidance 
for rotational crewing lessons learned. DOD partially agreed with three 
recommendations but disagreed with five others. To facilitate 
transformation of the Navyï¿½s ship crewing culture, GAO included a 
matter for congressional consideration that would require DOD to 
establish clear leadership; an implementation team; and overarching 
guidance. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-418]. For more information, 
contact Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach 
to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts: 

Navy's Development, Dissemination, and Implementation of Rotational 
Crewing Guidance Has Been Inconsistent: 

The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing 
Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships: 

Some Actions Have Been Taken to Collect and Use Lessons Learned from 
Rotational Crewing Experiences: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Navy's Rotational Crewing Alternatives and Initiatives: 

Table 2: Examples of Actions Taken, outside of the Navy Lessons Learned 
System, to Collect and Leverage Lessons Learned between Ship 
Communities: 

Table 3: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System's 
Development: 

Figure 2: The Defense Acquisition Management Framework: 

Figure 3: The Littoral Combat Ship Community Implementation Team: 

Figure 4: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine: 

Figure 5: U.S.S. Ohio, an Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine, with a 
Drydeck Shelter, Arrives at Naval Station Pearl Harbor before 
Continuing on Its Maiden Deployment to the Western Pacific: 

Figure 6: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile 
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground: 

Figure 7: The Cyclone-class Coastal Patrol Craft U.S.S. Whirlwind (PC 
11) Protects Iraq's Oil Terminals in the Northern Persian Gulf: 

Figure 8: The U.S.S. Pioneer, a Mine Countermeasure Ship: 

Figure 9: The HSV-2 Swift: 

Figure 10: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship: 

Figure 11: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation Destroyer, 
DDG-1000: 

Abbreviations: 

CG(X)guided missile cruiser, new design or class: 
DDG: guided missile destroyer: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
HSV: high speed vessel: 
LCS: littoral combat ship: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

May 29, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

At a time when the federal government is facing a large and growing 
fiscal imbalance, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress will be 
asked to make important program and investment decisions on Navy 
surface ships. At costs ranging from $500 million to $5 billion 
each,[Footnote 1] the Navy's surface combatants represent a significant 
capital investment. The Navy consistently faces affordability 
challenges as it attempts to provide necessary forward presence while 
supporting a high pace of operations, rising personnel costs, and cost 
growth in new ship classes. The Navy has traditionally maintained 
overseas presence by using standard deployments whereby individual 
ships and their permanently assigned crews are deployed for 
approximately 6 months out of a 27-month cycle that includes time for 
training and ship maintenance. To maximize its return on investment 
while maintaining forward presence, the Navy is examining different 
means for employing its surface ships. Rotational crewing is one of 
many alternatives the Navy is pursuing to increase the utilization and 
operational availability of Navy ships. Recently, the Chief of Naval 
Operations cited rotational crewing as a cost-effective means of 
increasing forward presence while maintaining current force structure 
levels.[Footnote 2] 

Rotational crewing has been and is a part of today's Navy; however, 
this practice is not widespread and is still evolving. Since the 1960s, 
the Navy has used "Blue-Gold" rotational crewing on its ballistic 
missile submarines, whereby two complete crews are assigned to a single 
ship, and they rotate deployments. The Navy also uses this "Blue-Gold" 
rotational crewing alternative on its high speed vessel (HSV) 
experimental ship, the HSV-2 Swift, and plans on using this crewing 
alternative for its four newly converted guided missile submarines. In 
recent years, the United States Pacific and Atlantic Fleets have both 
completed "Sea Swap" efforts that demonstrated the ability to rotate 
the crews of destroyers. The "Sea Swap" crewing alternative uses one 
deploying ship but multiple sequentially deploying crews. Newly 
deploying crews swap ships with the crew on the forward-deployed ship 
and nondeployed crews train and perform maintenance on a ship in the 
home port. Currently, the Navy uses similar rotational crews to employ 
mine warfare and patrol coastal ships in the Persian Gulf. The Navy 
also plans to rotationally crew its new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
class, implementing a "Blue-Gold" alternative on the first two ships 
and additional approaches in the future. Appendix I provides a 
description of all the ships included in our evaluation. 

In a November 2004 report, we examined the Navy's implementation of 
rotational crewing in the U.S. Pacific Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap effort, 
as well as the Navy's other ongoing rotational crewing 
programs.[Footnote 3] Our report found that the Navy had not (1) 
established an analytical framework for evaluating rotational crewing 
efforts, (2) provided effective guidance, (3) systematically leveraged 
lessons learned to support rotational crewing implementation, and (4) 
fully assessed the effect on ship maintenance on ships with extended 
deployments with rotating crews. Recognizing the Navy's need to explore 
ways to improve the use of its surface ships and its plan to employ 
rotational crews on several types of surface ships in the current and 
planned force, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007[Footnote 4] directed us to report on the Navy's 
Atlantic guided missile destroyer (DDG) Sea Swap initiative as well as 
lessons learned from recent ship rotational crew experiments and the 
extent to which these lessons are systematically collected and shared. 
The mandate refers specifically to the Atlantic Fleet Sea Swap 
demonstrations, but at times collectively refers to other rotational 
crewing efforts, current or planned. We provided a briefing to the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives to meet the mandate on March 
4, 2008. In this report we assess the extent to which the Navy has: (1) 
employed a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and 
integrate rotational crewing efforts; (2) developed and implemented 
guidance and concepts of operations for rotational crewing; (3) 
systematically collected and analyzed data on rotational crewing 
efforts for current and future ships; and (4) collected and used 
lessons learned. 

To assess the extent to which the Navy employed a comprehensive 
management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing 
efforts, we compared the Navy's approach with our prior work on best 
practices for organizational transformations; reviewed relevant Navy 
practices; and interviewed DOD, Navy, and fleet headquarters officials. 
To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed, disseminated, and 
implemented guidance and concepts of operations for rotational crewing 
on surface ships, we obtained and analyzed relevant documentation 
including, but not limited to, concepts of operations,[Footnote 5] 
directives, instructions, and procedures from the Navy, and we 
interviewed fleet and Navy headquarters officials. To assess the extent 
to which the Navy has analyzed, evaluated, and assessed potential 
rotational crewing efforts for current and future ships, we reviewed 
and analyzed the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap data-collection and 
analysis plan and final report;[Footnote 6] collected and analyzed 
recent ship-class acquisition documents, including analyses of 
alternatives; interviewed fleet and Navy headquarters officials; and 
conducted 19 focus groups with rotational crews. To assess the extent 
to which the Navy has systematically collected, disseminated, and 
capitalized on lessons learned from past and current rotational crewing 
experiences, we obtained and reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System 
instructions, queried the Navy Lessons Learned System, and interviewed 
Navy officials. We assessed the Navy Lessons Learned System data and 
determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We 
conducted this performance audit from February 2007 to May 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology 
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix II. 

Results in Brief: 

While the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in some specific 
rotational crewing programs, it has not fully established a 
comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate 
rotational crewing efforts--from ship concept design through 
employment--throughout the department. We have identified several key 
management practices at the center of implementing transformational 
programs. These key management practices include ensuring that top 
leadership drives the change and dedicating an implementation team that 
will be responsible for the day-to-day management and coordination of 
the transformation.[Footnote 7] The Navy has provided leadership in 
some specific rotational crewing efforts. For example, Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces, has provided effective leadership to the LCS community 
by setting the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation of the 
ship-crewing culture, while institutionalizing accountability. However, 
there is not a designated leader to manage all rotational crewing 
efforts in the Department of the Navy. Additionally, the Navy has not 
designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing 
efforts throughout the department receive the focused attention 
necessary to be sustained and effective by keeping efforts coordinated, 
and integrating and applying their results to the fleet. As a result, 
numerous separate rotational crewing efforts continue with little, if 
any, top-down leadership and coordination, and no team or steering 
group exists within the Navy to manage the transformation of the Navy's 
ship-crewing culture. Without a comprehensive management approach, the 
Navy may not be able to effectively coordinate and integrate rotational 
crewing efforts or develop rotational crewing in an efficient manner. 
As a result, the Navy can not be assured that it will lead a successful 
transformation of its crewing culture. 

Although the Navy has developed guidance for some rotational crewing 
efforts, the development, dissemination, and implementation of 
rotational crewing guidance has been inconsistent, which could hinder 
rotational crewing efforts. The Navy has developed and promulgated crew 
exchange instructions that have provided some specific guidance and 
increased accountability; however, the Navy has not developed 
overarching guidance that provides high-level policy and guidance for 
rotational crewing initiatives and has been inconsistent in addressing 
rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations. 
According to defense best practices, key aspects of a concept of 
operations include a description of how a set of capabilities may be 
employed to achieve desired objectives or a particular end state and 
identifies who, where, and--most importantly--how it is to be 
accomplished, employed, and executed. Some existing instructions and 
concepts of operations have improved management of and accountability 
for ship operations during crew rotations and provided a plan for 
implementing rotational crewing on some existing and future surface 
ship classes. However, ship squadron commands have not consistently 
addressed rotational crewing initiatives in individual ship-class 
concepts of operations because no one has taken the lead in 
coordinating rotational crewing efforts and no guidance requires such 
efforts. Without overarching guidance and consistent treatment of 
rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations to 
ensure effective management, execution, and evaluation of rotational 
crewing efforts, the Navy may not efficiently and effectively implement 
current and future surface-ship rotational crewing initiatives. 

The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its 
surface ships; however, it has not developed a systematic method for 
data collection and analysis of rotational crewing on current surface 
ships, including the cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing options. 
Additionally, the Navy has not fully analyzed or systematically 
assessed rotational crewing options in the analysis of alternatives for 
surface ships in development, including life-cycle costs. The Navy's 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative included a data-collection and 
analysis plan that identified much of the information needed to assess 
a rotational crewing initiative. However, the plan did not include a 
comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that included an evaluation 
of life-cycle costs. In addition, the Navy has collected some data from 
its other rotational crewing efforts but has not established a 
standardized data-collection and analysis plan to guide data collection 
and analysis, assessment, and reporting of findings for each of the 
different types of rotational crewing efforts. Furthermore, the Navy 
has not fully and systematically evaluated rotational crewing options 
for future ship classes. DOD and Navy guidance requires an analysis of 
alternatives during the acquisition process of weapon systems, and 
these analyses generally contain an evaluation of the performance, 
operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and estimated costs 
of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs. However, the 
guidance does not specifically require consideration of rotational 
crewing alternatives as part of this analysis even though the use of 
rotational crewing may affect the life-cycle cost or mission 
effectiveness of the various alternatives. Without a systematic 
approach for collecting relevant rotational crewing-related data and 
analyzing, evaluating, and assessing rotational crewing for current and 
future ships, Navy decisionmakers will not have the ability to compare 
rotational crewing concepts with the traditional crewing concept of one 
crew for one ship. Consequently, the Navy may not be able to determine 
if particular rotational crewing alternatives have the potential for 
fulfilling operational needs and maximizing return on investment. In 
the absence of this knowledge the Navy's force structure assessments 
may be incomplete and the Navy may not have a complete picture of the 
number of ships it needs to acquire. 

The Navy has made progress in systematically collecting and 
disseminating lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences. 
However, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to 
capture lessons learned and enter them into Navy Lessons Learned 
System. Other ship communities, such as the LCS, have also taken 
actions to collect and leverage lessons learned from rotational crewing 
experiences, both within and across individual commands. However, most 
ship communities did not submit or use the Navy Lessons Learned System 
to enhance knowledge sharing or learn from others' experiences. The 
Navy lacks overarching systematic processes and requirements for the 
collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically 
to rotational crewing. By not systematically collecting, recording, and 
disseminating lessons learned from all rotational crewing experiences, 
the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes and could miss 
opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations. 

To facilitate increased ship utilization in an effective and efficient 
manner, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Navy to take the following actions with respect to ship 
rotational crewing: assign clear leadership and establish an 
overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day management 
oversight; develop and promulgate overarching rotational crewing 
guidance; develop a systematic data-collection and analysis plan with 
assessments and reporting of findings, including life-cycle costs; 
assess rotational crewing options in analysis of alternatives; develop 
and implement concepts of operations for all rotational crewing 
initiatives; and institutionalize lessons learned collection and 
dissemination. 

DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with 
our three recommendations regarding concepts of operations, data 
collection and analysis, and rotational crewing assessments during 
surface-ship analysis of alternatives. DOD disagreed with our five 
other recommendations that would assign clear leadership and 
accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts; establish an 
overarching implementation team; develop and promulgate overarching 
guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to 
consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all 
rotational crewing efforts; ensure the systematic collection and 
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational 
crewing; and incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach 
outlined in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations. In 
its comments, DOD stated that measures are already in place that 
address the issues raised by the report. We disagree that the actions 
taken by the Navy to date fulfill the intent of our recommendations and 
are complete. While the Navy has taken some positive actions on these 
issues, we do not believe that the Navy's actions go far enough in 
providing leadership, management, and guidance in transforming the 
Navy's surface-ship-crewing culture; in collecting and analyzing data, 
including cost-effectiveness and full life-cycle cost; nor in 
documenting and acting on lessons it has learned during implementation 
of different rotational crewing alternatives. For example, the Navy 
does not have a designated leader to manage all rotational crewing 
efforts or a Navy-wide implementation team to ensure that rotational 
crewing efforts throughout the department receive the focused attention 
necessary to be sustained and effective by keeping efforts coordinated, 
and integrating and applying their results to the fleet. Additionally, 
although some ship communities involved in rotational crewing have 
developed policies and procedures specific to their communities, the 
Navy does not have an overarching directive that would designate a 
clear leader and an implementation team; assign responsibilities; 
establish procedures, guides, functions, and reporting requirements, 
such as concepts of operations and data collection, analysis and 
reporting; and develop guidance on collecting and using lessons 
learned. As such, the Navy may be missing opportunities to improve its 
transformational capabilities and cost-effectively increase surface- 
ship operational availability. Therefore, we are suggesting that 
Congress consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to direct the 
Secretary of the Navy to implement our recommendations and report to 
Congress on its progress when the President's budget for fiscal year 
2010 is submitted to Congress. The department's comments and our 
evaluation of them are discussed on pages 45-50. DOD's comments are 
reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. 

Background: 

Rotational Crewing Proven to Provide Greater Forward Presence: 

Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter 
threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national 
military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military 
Strategy notes that an overseas presence supports the ability of the 
United States to project power against threats and support 
establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster 
extremist ideologies. By being forward-deployed, maritime forces can 
enable familiarity with the environment and behavior patterns of 
regional actors. The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas 
presence by using standard deployments whereby individual ships and 
their permanently assigned crews are deployed for approximately 6 
months out of a 27-month cycle. However, the amount of time a ship 
ultimately spends forward-deployed in a theater of operations is 
affected by several factors in its employment cycle. These factors 
include length of deployment, transit speeds to and from operating 
areas, port calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance 
requirements, and maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces 
during nondeployed periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the 
United States and deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will 
normally spend less than 20 percent of its 27 month cycle in-theater 
and that the Navy would need about six ships to maintain a continuous 
presence in the region over a 2-year period. 

Rotational crewing has been proven to provide greater forward presence 
for Navy ships by eliminating ship transits and maintaining more on- 
station time in distant operating areas. Specifically, the 2004 Pacific 
Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap initiative demonstrated that rotational 
crewing provides more forward presence with fewer ships. For example, 
one Pacific Fleet destroyer, rotationally crewed with three 
sequentially-deployed crews, produced an additional 16 days of forward 
presence compared with a standard four-ship/four-crew deployment. The 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative produced similar results. For 
example, one Atlantic Fleet destroyer, rotationally crewed with three 
crews, produced 25 days more of forward presence than a standard four- 
ship/four-crew deployment. Assessments completed by the Center for 
Naval Analyses and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
confirmed the results of the Pacific and Atlantic Sea Swap initiatives. 
Using the Blue-Gold alternative, the HSV-2 Swift has achieved an 
operations tempo of more than 80 percent and the four newly converted 
guided missile submarines expect to spend two-thirds of their 
operational cycles forward-deployed in the operations area. 

Pressure on Shipbuilding Procurement: 

At costs ranging from $500 million to $5 billion each, the Navy's 
surface combatants represent a significant capital investment. Facing 
cost growth in new ship classes[Footnote 8] and federal fiscal 
challenges,[Footnote 9] rotational crewing may be one alternative the 
Navy could utilize to meet mission requirements and mitigate the 
effects of cost growth on ship requirements as embodied in the Navy's 
long-range shipbuilding plan and maritime strategy. The Congressional 
Budget Office and Center for Naval Analysis have also noted the 
procurement savings achieved as a result of using rotational crewing on 
ships.[Footnote 10] In 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized 
the challenge of accomplishing the Navy's missions within its budget. 
The Chief of Naval Operations explained that there is extraordinary 
pressure to balance the Navy's personnel, operations, and procurement 
accounts in today's fiscal environment. Meanwhile, the Navy has faced 
increased criticism for rising shipbuilding costs. The increasing cost 
of surface ships has led the Navy to reduce procurements, and the 
resulting loss of economies of scale has driven costs of individual 
surface ships even higher. We have reported that significant cost 
growth and long schedule delays are persistent problems in both new and 
follow-on ships.[Footnote 11] We also reported that the Navy has 
developed and implemented several initiatives to increase the 
operational availability of Navy and Marine Corps fleet forces, 
including the Fleet Response Plan and rotational crewing.[Footnote 12] 
Navy officials have cited these initiatives as ways to increase 
readiness and reduce the numbers of ships needed in the Navy's force 
structure, thereby freeing funding for other priorities. 

Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System's Development: 

Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship's 
development have enormous effect on the cost of the system over its 
life.[Footnote 13] Life-cycle costs include the costs to research, 
develop, acquire, own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and 
support systems. These costs include the facilities and training 
equipment, such as simulators, unique to the system. Navy analyses show 
that by the second acquisition milestone (which assesses whether a 
system is ready to advance to the system development and demonstration 
phase), roughly 85 percent of a ship's life-cycle cost has been "locked 
in" by design, production quantity, and schedule decisions while less 
than 10 percent of its total costs has actually been expended. (See 
fig. 1.) 

Figure 1: Life-Cycle Costs Are Determined Early in a System's 
Development: 

This figure is an illustration showing that life-cycle costs are 
determined early in a system's development. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 1 depicts the relative apportionment of research and 
development, procurement, and operating and support costs over the 
typical life cycle of a ship program (the complete life cycle of a 
ship, from concept development through disposal, typically ranges from 
40 to 60 years). Research and development funds are spent at program 
initiation and generally constitute only a small fraction of a new 
ship's costs. Then, in the next acquisition phase, procurement funds 
are spent to acquire the new ship. The vast majority of the life-cycle 
costs is comprised of operating and support costs and is incurred over 
the life of the ship. 

Defense Acquisition Policy Requires Setting Goals to Optimize 
Performance and Minimize Cost: 

Recognizing that fiscal constraints pose a long-term challenge, DOD 
policy states that life-cycle costs of new military systems should be 
identified and that all participants shall plan programs based on 
realistic projections of the dollars and manpower likely to be 
available in future years.[Footnote 14] This approach, referred to as 
treating cost as an independent variable, requires program managers to 
consider cost-performance trade-offs in setting program goals. During 
the acquisition process, program managers are held accountable for 
making progress toward meeting established goals and requirements at 
checkpoints, or milestones, over a program's life cycle. These goals 
and requirements are contained in several key documents, including the 
initial capabilities document and the analysis of alternatives. An 
initial capabilities document describes an operational gap or 
deficiency, or opportunity to provide new capabilities, in operational 
terms and identifies possible material and nonmaterial solutions, 
including approaches involving, among other things, personnel and 
training, that may be used to satisfy the need. These capabilities and 
constraints are examined during a study called the analysis of 
alternatives. 

The DOD instruction outlining the process on how to acquire major 
weapons systems establishes the requirement for developing an analysis 
of alternatives to support major acquisition milestones and decision 
reviews.[Footnote 15] An analysis of alternatives is a documented 
analytical evaluation of the performance, operational effectiveness, 
operational suitability, and estimated costs (including full life-cycle 
costs) of alternative systems to meet a mission capability that has 
been identified through the department's capabilities and requirements 
process.[Footnote 16] Preparation of an analysis of alternatives is 
generally required during the Concept Refinement Phase, which is early 
in the defense acquisition process--even prior to formal initiation of 
a program--as shown in figure 2. An analysis of alternatives is 
required at an early stage to ensure that all potential alternative 
means of satisfying the stated capability are considered. The analysis 
of alternatives assesses the advantages and disadvantages of various 
alternatives being considered to satisfy the needed capability, 
including the sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes to 
key assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., performance 
capabilities). The analysis is intended to aid decision makers in 
judging whether or not any of the proposed alternatives to an existing 
system offer sufficient military or economic benefit, or both, to be 
worth the cost. In preparation for subsequent milestones, the analysis 
is updated, or a new one conducted, depending on then-existing 
circumstances. Additionally, the Department of the Navy has issued 
guidance containing mandatory procedures for implementation of DOD's 
acquisition instruction and process.[Footnote 17] The Navy's guidance 
requires an analysis of alternatives to include an analysis of 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, management, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities as well as joint implications. 

Figure 2: The Defense Acquisition Management Framework: 

This figure is a flowchart showing Defense acquisition management 
framework. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Ship-Crewing Alternatives: 

In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range 
of Navy crewing alternatives falls into three major categories: (1) Sea 
Swap, (2) Horizon, and (3) Blue-Gold. Each of these alternatives can be 
implemented in varying ways and may have different advantages and 
disadvantages and effects on life-cycle costs, but the Navy's actual 
experience with nonstandard crewing alternatives on surface ships is 
limited. Sea Swap is the only crewing alternative that has been used on 
ships as large as surface combatants. 

Standard Crew: 

Standard crews use one crew per ship. Most of the crewmembers are 
assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for crewmembers to 
deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Ships deploy to 
forward operating areas for periods of 6 or more months on average. On 
a 6 month deployment to the Arabian Gulf ships spend 3 to 4 months of 
that deployment actually on station depending on whether the ship 
deploys from the east or west coast of the United States.[Footnote 18] 
When not deployed, the ships fulfill surge deployment requirements, 
undergo maintenance availabilities and conduct training and 
certifications to maintain mission capability. Most Navy ships and 
their crews employ the standard crew deployment option. 

Sea Swap: 

The Sea Swap option uses one deploying ship but multiple sequentially 
deploying crews. Newly deploying crews swap ships with the crew on the 
forward-deployed ship. Nondeployed crews train and perform maintenance 
on a ship in the home port. Sea Swap normally operates in a multiple of 
two, three, or four ships and crews. The crews rotate through the ships 
in the assigned group. Notionally under this option, one of the ships 
deploys two, three, or four times longer than the standard time by 
rotating crews every 6 months at an overseas location. Ideally, all of 
the Sea Swap ships share an identical configuration, so crew 
performance and capability are not degraded because of ship 
differences.[Footnote 19] Because crews do not return to the ships on 
which they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap option, some crews could 
serve on three different ships in just over 6 months and be expected to 
demonstrate combat proficiency on each one. A limited number of 
destroyers have employed the Sea Swap option in recent years. 

Horizon: 

The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than ships, such as 
four crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve 
for no more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or 
more. Under a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least 
two ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat 
proficiency on each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship 
for a period of time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training, 
center. This crewing option was employed on mine countermeasure and 
patrol coastal ships in recent years. 

Blue-Gold: 

The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated "Blue" and 
"Gold," to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a 
ship for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on 
the same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 6 
months and are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this 
option includes the crews' familiarity with the ship. However, a 
disadvantage is that the proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes 
do not have a ship on which to train when not deployed and must rely on 
mock-ups and simulators at a training facility. The strategic and 
guided missile submarine forces and the HSV-2 Swift have employed the 
Blue-Gold alternative. 

History of Rotational Crewing Initiatives: 

Rotational crewing has been a part of the Navy for over 40 years, but 
the Navy's experience with this crewing concept on its surface fleet 
has been more recent and limited to a small number of ships and ship 
types. The Navy has used the Blue-Gold crewing approach on its 
ballistic missile submarines since the 1960s; however, until the mid- 
1990s, rotational crewing was not practiced on surface ships. In the 
mid-1990s, the Navy was in search of a new operational approach that 
allowed the Navy to meet forward-presence requirements and surge 
capability. The Navy developed the Horizon approach that sustained 
readiness by maintaining people and platforms in a continually ready 
state. This concept was originally used on Mine Countermeasure ships in 
the mid-1990s, and was later adopted by coastal minehunter and patrol 
coastal ships in 2003. In the same year, the Navy employed the Blue- 
Gold rotational crewing approach on the HSV-2 Swift. Beginning in 2007 
with the U.S.S. Ohio's deployment as a guided missile submarine, the 
Navy has implemented the Blue-Gold rotational crewing alternative on 
the four Ohio-class strategic missile submarines converted to guided 
missile submarines. Rotational crewing experiments have also been 
conducted on Navy destroyers in the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. 
Beginning in 2002, seven Pacific Fleet destroyers and their crews 
participated in the Sea Swap rotational crewing demonstration. This 
rotational crewing approach was tested again in 2005, this time using 
three of its 22 Atlantic Fleet destroyers in what is known as the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. Rotational crewing has not been 
used on the Navy's cruisers, amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, or 
support ships (other than the HSV-2 Swift). Table 1 shows the 
rotational crewing alternatives employed by the Navy during the 1990s 
and through the present. 

Table 1: Navy's Rotational Crewing Alternatives and Initiatives: 

Rotational crewing alternative and ratio of crews to ships: Sea Swap 
(2:2, 3:3, 4:4); 
Navy rotational crewing initiatives: * 2002-2004 Pacific Sea Swap: 
Spruance-class destroyers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers; 
* 2005-2007 Atlantic Sea Swap: Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. 

Rotational crewing alternative and ratio of crews to ships: Horizon 
(3:2, 4:3, 5:3 or a similar ratio); 
Navy rotational crewing initiatives: * 1990s: Mine countermeasure ships 
in Japan and Persian Gulf; 
* 2003-2006: Mine countermeasure ships and coastal minehunter ships in 
North Arabian and Persian Gulfs; 
* 2003-Present: Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships in North Arabian and 
Persian Gulfs; 
* Future: Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) plan to transition from Blue-Gold 
to Horizon. 

Rotational crewing alternative and ratio of crews to ships: Blue-Gold 
(2:1); 
Navy rotational crewing initiatives: * 1960s-Present: Ballistic missile 
submarines (multiple classes); 
* 2003-Present: HSV-2 Swift; 
* 2007-Present: Ohio-class guided missile submarines; 
* 2006-Present: Mine countermeasure ships in North Arabian and Persian 
Gulfs[A]; 
* Future: Crews are in place for the first two LCSs. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[A] The mine countermeasure ships are using a variation of "Blue-Gold" 
that includes a "Silver" crew that acts as the training crew for the 
ships homeported in Texas. 

[End of table] 

The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach 
to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts: 

Although the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in specific 
rotational crewing programs and transform its ship-crewing culture, the 
Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to 
coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts throughout the 
department. Specifically, the Navy has not fully incorporated key 
management practices to manage the transformation of the Navy's ship- 
crewing culture--such as providing top-down leadership and dedicating 
an overarching implementation team--that our prior work has shown 
critical to successful transformations.[Footnote 20] 

Rotational Crewing Is a Transformational Cultural Change: 

Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for 
the Navy. An organization's culture encompasses the values and 
behaviors that characterize its work environment. The Navy has a long 
history devoted to the one crew, one ship model whereby individual 
ships and their permanently assigned crews are deployed approximately 6 
months out of a 27-month cycle. Rotational crewing on surface ships is 
a relatively new concept for the Navy, with only one use before 2002. 
Sailors in several focus groups told us that rotational crewing stands 
in stark contrast to the normal deployment cycle of the Navy. They 
added that, in order to be successful, the Navy's crewing culture would 
have to be transformed. Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern 
Clark echoed this message in 2005, stating that rotational crewing has 
changed the face of the Navy, and that in any organizational 
transformation, people are almost always not in favor of change. If 
rotational crewing efforts are not properly managed, rotational crewing 
can have a negative effect on mission performance and retention. For 
example, we reported in 2004 that the Pacific Sea Swap experiments 
lacked proper management, including effective guidance and oversight. 
Focus groups with Pacific Sea Swap sailors reported training 
deficiencies, increased maintenance tasks, and a degraded quality of 
life. Further, lower reenlistments rates were found for sailors with 
less than 6 years of service. Successful rotational crewing efforts 
require management practices that lead a transformation of the Navy's 
ship-crewing culture. 

Navy Has Not Assigned Responsibility for Overall Management of 
Rotational Crewing: 

While the Navy has provided leadership in some specific rotational 
crewing programs, the Navy has not provided top-down leadership to 
manage and integrate all rotational crewing efforts throughout the 
Department of the Navy. We reported in 2003 that key practices and 
implementation steps for successful transformations include ensuring 
top leadership drives the transformation.[Footnote 21] The Commander, 
Naval Surface Forces, has been clearly and personally involved in 
leading the transformation of the Navy's ship-crewing culture in the 
implementation of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) rotational crewing. The 
Commander has set the direction, pace, and tone for the transformation, 
while institutionalizing accountability. For example, the Commander has 
instituted a set of cardinal rules that emphasize seizing the 
opportunity and embracing change as part of the transformation. One of 
these cardinal rules is not to compare the LCS to legacy platforms 
because the LCS cannot be manned, trained, equipped, maintained, or 
tactically employed in the same way. Further, the Commander has 
presented a clear and compelling picture of what the LCS community 
needs to achieve, helping to build morale and commitment to the 
rotational crewing concept. For example, the Commander has articulated 
a succinct and compelling reason for adopting rotational crewing, 
demonstrating conviction to making the change. Command officials 
explained that this has helped sailors and personnel throughout the LCS 
and Surface Forces command understand and share the Commander's 
expectations, engendering both their cooperation and ownership of these 
outcomes. In addition, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations provided top- 
down leadership in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, 
recognizing shortcomings in the Pacific Sea Swap initiative. Citing 
recommended actions in our 2004 report on the Pacific Sea 
Swap,[Footnote 22] the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed Naval 
Surface Forces Atlantic to develop goals, standardized guidance, 
metrics, and a comprehensive strategy for future rotational crewing 
initiatives. 

This transformational leadership, however, has been limited to the 
implementation of the LCS and Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap rotational 
crewing efforts. The Navy has not provided top-down, sustained 
leadership to manage and integrate all rotational crewing efforts. The 
Chief of Naval Operations has noted the success of rotational crewing 
programs and their potential to increase forward presence without 
buying more ships. However, with six rotational crewing efforts 
currently underway, Navy leadership has not assigned clear leadership 
and accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts, including 
designating responsibility for integrating and applying program results 
to the fleet, an action necessary to guide the transformation of the 
Navy's ship-crewing culture. For example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea 
Swap initiative successfully increased forward presence and generated 
total operational cost savings of nearly $10 million. However, Fleet 
Forces Command,[Footnote 23] in its final report on the Atlantic Fleet 
DDG Sea Swap initiative, stated that no future Sea Swaps are planned. 
The report states that only if an expansion of missions and roles for 
the destroyer class (such as the addition of a missile defense 
capability) decreased the total number of destroyers available, would 
rotational crewing be considered. According to Navy sailors and 
officials, Navy leadership also has not identified incentives for 
rotational crewing necessary to lead the transformation. Several 
sailors in focus groups with rotational crews reported that port calls 
and defined employment periods were critical to successful rotational 
crewing programs. To date, Navy leadership has not consistently managed 
these incentives and implemented them in each rotational crewing 
program. For example, mine warfare ship sailors in focus groups 
reported that their deployment schedules were unpredictable, resulting 
in poor quality of life. The Navy does not have top-down leadership 
because the Navy does not have overarching guidance for rotational 
crewing that assigns leadership within the Chief of Naval Operations. 
Without top-down, sustained Navy leadership, including assigning 
responsibility for managing rotational crewing efforts, the Navy cannot 
be assured that rotational crewing is developed in an efficient or 
sustainable manner. 

Navy Has Not Established an Implementation Team for Rotational Crewing: 

Although the Navy has established implementation teams for selected 
rotational crewing initiatives, it has not established an 
implementation team for managing all rotational crewing programs. We 
reported in 2003 that key practices for successful transformations 
include that an implementation team should be responsible for the day- 
to-day management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are 
integrated.[Footnote 24] Such a team would ensure that rotational 
crewing receives the focused, full-time attention necessary to be 
sustained and effective by keeping efforts coordinated, and integrating 
and applying implementation results to the fleet. The LCS community 
demonstrates the structure of an implementation team. The LCS team is 
led by an Oversight Board, chaired by the Commander, Naval Surface 
Forces, with executive-level representatives from program executive 
offices, program sponsors, and other major stakeholders. Two cross- 
functional teams report directly to the Oversight Board: one addresses 
manning and training issues, and the other addresses logistics and 
maintenance issues. Additional LCS team members include representatives 
from the LCS community, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, other appropriate 
functional disciplines, and a senior level executive working group, the 
Council of Captains (see fig. 3). 

Figure 3: The Littoral Combat Ship Community Implementation Team: 

This figure is a circular flow chart showing Littoral combat ship 
community implementation team. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Naval Surface Forces officials explained that, together, the 
implementation team groups review issues and barriers associated with 
the LCS program and jointly develop solutions. The process is 
documented in detailed Plans of Action and Milestones[Footnote 25] that 
list barriers, solutions, and planning goals. 

Other rotational crewing initiatives have benefited from implementation 
teams. For example, Naval Surface Forces established an implementation 
team to coordinate all involved activities and organizations in the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. The team included Naval Surface 
Forces Atlantic staff from multiple directorates, regional support 
organization representatives, ship commanding and executive officers, 
Board of Inspection and Survey[Footnote 26] members, a public affairs 
officer, and others. The team ensured that the execution of the 
initiative ran smoothly and provided a communications structure to 
facilitate coordination among all participants and support 
organizations. Submarine Group Trident[Footnote 27] command officials 
also benefited from implementation teams in preparing for swapping Blue 
and Gold crews overseas to support newly converted guided missile 
submarines. Submarine Group Trident command officials explained that 
they conducted multiple tabletop exercises to address maintenance 
support teams, overseas repairs, and travel logistics. Command 
officials further noted that working groups were formed to address 
specific challenges associated with forward-deployed crew swaps, such 
as selecting the type of aircraft to move the crews and procedures for 
storing spare parts, and to develop a preexercise plan. Drawing on the 
tabletop exercises, working group preparation, and the preexercise 
plan, the guided missile submarine U.S.S. Ohio completed the first 
forward-deployed submarine crew swap in over 15 years, successfully 
transporting supplies, paperwork, and the crew. 

Implementation teams, however, have not been utilized in all rotational 
crewing initiatives.[Footnote 28] Navy officials explained that no 
implementation team exists to manage the patrol coastal or mine warfare 
ship rotational crewing efforts. In focus groups, patrol coastal and 
mine warfare ship sailors reported poor quality of life, insufficient 
training and professional development time, inconsistent accountability 
during ship turnovers, and little, if any, support for the crewing 
transformation. Without an implementation team to devote focused 
attention, provide a communication structure, and apply lessons from 
other rotational crewing efforts, the Navy may not effectively resolve 
these issues on patrol coastal and mine warfare ships. 

There are several groups within the Navy with key roles in rotational 
crewing programs; however, none of these groups has the overall 
authority, responsibility, and accountability to coordinate and 
integrate all rotational crewing efforts. For example, Fleet Forces 
Command serves as the single voice for fleet requirements and 
coordinates standardized policy for manning, training, and maintaining 
fleet operating forces. A key strategic priority for Fleet Forces 
Command is delivering optimal readiness and operational availability of 
forces at best cost, managed through best practices and shared 
information supporting informed decisions by Commanders. The Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and 
Resources directorate, is responsible for optimizing Navy investments 
through centralized coordination of Navy warfighting and warfighting 
support analysis and assessments, Navy capability development and 
integration, joint and Navy requirements development, and resource 
programming. Naval Sea Systems Command builds, buys, and maintains the 
Navy's ships and submarines and their combat systems, as well as 
directs resources from program sponsors into the proper mix of manpower 
and resources to properly equip the fleet. Recently established Class 
Squadrons are functional command organizations specific to particular 
ship classes (e.g., Patrol Coastal, LCS) and are responsible for the 
manning, training, equipping and maintaining processes. Class Squadrons 
use metric-based analysis to assess readiness, examine class trends, 
establish lessons learned, and provide recommendations and solutions. 
Other groups with critical involvement in the implementation of 
rotational crewing efforts include Naval Surface Forces, Naval 
Submarine Forces, and many others. However, none of these groups has 
the overall authority, responsibility, and accountability to coordinate 
and integrate all rotational crewing efforts because the Navy has not 
specified how this will be accomplished in an overarching guidance 
document for rotational crewing. Without formally designating an 
overarching implementation team with diverse representation to provide 
day-to-day management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, the Navy 
can not be assured that rotational crewing programs will be coordinated 
and integrated, and their results applied to the rest of the fleet. As 
a result, the Navy may fail to lead a successful transformation of its 
ship-crewing culture. 

Navy's Development, Dissemination, and Implementation of Rotational 
Crewing Guidance Has Been Inconsistent: 

The Navy's development, dissemination, and implementation of rotational 
crewing guidance has been inconsistent, which could hinder rotational 
crewing efforts. The Navy has not developed an overarching directive 
that provides high-level vision and guidance for rotational crewing 
initiatives and has been inconsistent in addressing rotational crewing 
in individual ship-class concepts of operations. However, the Navy has 
developed and promulgated crew-exchange instructions that have provided 
some specific guidance for crew turnovers and increased accountability. 

The Navy Lacks an Overarching Directive to Guide All Rotational Crewing 
Efforts: 

The Navy has not developed and promulgated an overarching directive 
that provides the high-level vision and guidance needed to ensure that 
all rotational crewing efforts are effectively managed, thoroughly 
evaluated, and successfully implemented. Some communities involved in 
rotational crewing efforts have developed policies and procedures 
specific to their community; whereas others have implemented rotational 
crewing without the benefit of these instructions. For example, the 
Navy established specific policies and procedures for the execution of 
the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative. However, as discussed 
throughout this report, there is no Navy-wide vision or policy on when 
and why to consider rotational crewing as an alternative; how to 
develop implementation plans; and how to share and use lessons learned. 
As a result, rotational crewing has been inconsistently implemented and 
assessed across the Navy. According to DOD guidance on 
directives,[Footnote 29] an overarching directive for rotational 
crewing should provide essential policy and guidance to achieve the 
desired outcome and should delegate authority and assign 
responsibilities. According to Navy guidance,[Footnote 30] a directive 
could be used to do a number of things including: assign a mission, 
function, or task; initiate or govern a course of action or conduct; 
establish a procedure, technique, standard, guide, or method of 
performing a duty, function, or operation; and establish a reporting 
requirement. Without this overarching directive, the Navy may not have 
the high-level guidance to effectively manage, implement, and evaluate 
rotational crewing as a means of increasing capabilities and reducing 
costs. 

Inconsistent Development and Implementation of Concept of Operations 
Could Hinder Rotational Crewing Efforts: 

The Navy has inconsistently addressed rotational crewing in concepts of 
operations for ship classes employing rotational crewing. A concept of 
operations is an important leadership and management tool because it 
provides critical high-level information that describes how a set of 
capabilities may be employed to achieve desired objectives or a 
particular end state for a specific scenario and identifies with whom, 
where, and most importantly, how an activity or function should be 
accomplished, employed, and executed. In addition, determination of 
these details enables the development of metrics that support rigorous 
assessment of the real or proposed capabilities.[Footnote 31] While the 
guided missile submarine, LCS, and DDG communities relied on a concept 
of operations,[Footnote 32] other commands supporting operations 
conducted by rotationally crewed surface ships have not developed or 
used a concept of operations. The guided missile submarine community 
relied on a concept of operations that addressed the platform's 
operational capabilities and challenges while indicating the importance 
of leveraging the existing maintenance and training infrastructure. 
This concept of operations also described how operational availability 
would be increased by using two alternating crews and the special 
factors that need to be considered in a ship's employment. The Atlantic 
Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations provided stakeholders[Footnote 
33] with a high-level description of the rotational crewing alternative 
it employed, the principles that drove its execution, the rationale 
behind key decisions, and the roles and responsibilities of individual 
decision makers, managers, and leaders involved in its execution. 

Although the guided missile submarine, LCS, and DDG communities 
utilized concept of operations, the Patrol Coastal and Mine 
Countermeasures ship communities lacked the benefit of a concept of 
operations. While these communities relied on existing policies and 
procedures to address some aspects of rotational crewing, such as the 
exchange of command guidance, they did not have a concept of operations 
that articulated the vision, purpose, and plan for rotationally crewed 
surface ships and their crews. They also did not benefit from access to 
the high-level information and guidance needed specifically for 
rotational crewing to address critical personnel, supply, maintenance, 
and training issues. During focus group discussions with crewmembers 
representing both surface-ship communities, discontent was voiced about 
the lack of training, particularly the lack of advanced schools needed 
to increase technical proficiency; personnel shortages that affected 
crew cohesiveness; minimal maintenance support provided by teams 
overseas; and inadequate supply support that was to deliver critical 
equipment when it was needed. 

These inconsistencies in developing concepts of operations that address 
rotational crewing have occurred because the Navy does not have 
overarching guidance for rotational crewing and because it has not 
developed concepts of operations to guide individual rotational crewing 
initiatives. Without Navy-wide overarching guidance on rotational 
crewing and individual ship-class concepts of operations to ensure 
effective management, execution, and evaluation of rotational crewing 
efforts, current and potential surface ship rotational crewing 
initiatives may not be efficiently and effectively implemented. As a 
result, the Navy increases the risk that it will be unable to 
effectively communicate its vision of this transformational effort, and 
will be unable to effectively implement, manage, and institutionalize 
rotational crewing. 

Crew Exchange Instructions Promulgated for Increased Guidance and 
Accountability: 

In February 2005, the Commander of Naval Surface Forces promulgated 
specific guidance detailing how the crew exchange process should be 
conducted to ensure accountability during crew exchanges and for 
individual ship communities to use as a model for developing 
instructions tailored to their specific needs.[Footnote 34] By 
developing, disseminating, and implementing an exchange of command 
instruction, the Navy recognized that effective guidance is a key 
management tool needed to overcome challenges associated with change 
such as rotational crewing on surface ships and to facilitate efficient 
operations while establishing and maintaining oversight and 
accountability. The guidance stipulated that (1) the crew exchange 
process should nominally take 4 days; (2) the crews involved in the 
transition process should familiarize themselves with turnover guidance 
well in advance of the actual transition; and (3) when possible, an 
advance team should complete as much of the turnover process as 
possible before the crew exchange begins. Additionally, to promote 
accountability and to ensure that individuals assuming duties on a new 
ship are properly prepared to discharge their responsibilities, the 
guidance requires the commanding officer transitioning off the ship to 
initiate an exchange of command letter that addresses specific issues, 
including the material condition of the ship; equipment issues and 
deficiencies noted in casualty reports; inspection results; logistical 
issues, including the status of shipboard equipment identified in the 
ship's consolidated shipboard allowance list; classified material 
inventories; and supply and budgetary issues affecting the ship's 
financial posture. 

Furthermore, individual commands involved in or preparing to engage in 
rotational crewing on surface ships also have developed or are in the 
process of developing guidance, similar in format and content to the 
Naval Surface Forces crew exchange guidance, but tailored to their 
specific needs (for example, their unique missions, operations, or 
equipment). For example, the Mine Warfare Command issued an instruction 
addressing crew swap checklists to be used during crew rotations 
conducted aboard HSV-2 Swift.[Footnote 35] Likewise, Mine 
Countermeasures Squadron Two issued detailed guidance to address crew 
rotations occurring aboard Mine Countermeasures Ships,[Footnote 36] and 
the Patrol Coastal Class Squadron issued guidance to provide procedures 
covering crew rotations.[Footnote 37] These instructions addressed the 
unique requirements associated with rotationally crewed surface ships 
by discussing multicrew training, advance correspondence between crews, 
and training exercises needed to prepare crews to effectively conduct 
operations within a specific operational area. In addition, LCS 
squadron officials are overseeing the creation of a combined directives 
manual[Footnote 38] containing directives, procedures, and policies 
that address issues such as the rotational crewing turnover process, 
training, maintenance, and logistical requirements. The LCS guidance 
intends to divide responsibilities for those stationed ashore and 
afloat, define daily operations, promote teamwork, and support 
continuity of command. These crew exchange instructions have addressed 
some of the unique requirements associated with rotational crewing, but 
without overarching guidance and individual ship-class concepts of 
operations to ensure effective management, execution, and evaluation of 
rotational crewing efforts, the Navy increases the risk that it will 
not effectively implement current and future surface-ship rotational 
crewing initiatives. 

The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing 
Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships: 

The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its 
surface ships; however, unlike the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap 
initiative, the Navy has not developed a systematic method for data 
collection and analysis, assessment, and reporting of rotational 
crewing on current surface ships, including the cost-effectiveness of 
rotational crewing options. Additionally, the Navy has not fully 
analyzed or systematically assessed rotational crewing options in the 
analysis of alternatives for surface ships in development, including 
life-cycle costs. 

The Navy Has Not Developed a Systematic Method for Data Collection, 
Analysis, and Reporting of Rotational Crewing on Current Surface Ships: 

The Atlantic DDG Sea Swap initiative used a comprehensive data- 
collection and analysis plan for collecting, analyzing, and evaluating 
data and for reporting results. However, other Navy rotational crewing 
initiatives have not developed data-collection and analysis plans, 
collected and analyzed that data, and reported their findings. 
According to military best practices, developing a data-collection and 
analysis plan is essential to any experimental initiative by 
determining what needs to measured, what data will be necessary to 
collect, and how the data are to be analyzed. A data-collection and 
analysis plan consists of all data to be collected, the content of the 
data (type, periodicity, and format), the collection mechanism 
(automated or nonautomated processes, time frame, location, and 
method), the data handling procedures, and relationships of the data to 
the initiative itself. Additionally, data-collection and analysis plans 
are important to transformational initiatives because they ensure valid 
and reliable data are captured and understood, and that the analysis 
undertaken addresses the key issues in the initiative. If properly 
prepared and implemented, the data-collection and analysis plan aids 
subsequent analysis efforts and helps analysts maintain the focus 
needed to transform data collected into information that supports 
future decisions. In accordance with military best practices, the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan[Footnote 39] 
identified areas that needed to be measured (for example, morale and 
retention, training proficiency, operational performance, operational 
performance for supporting the Fleet Response Plan, long-term effect on 
ships' material condition, cost of implementation, and cost-performance 
trade offs), specific areas from which to collect the data (Navy 
reports, messages, and survey data), and how the data were to be 
analyzed (issues and subissues). Additionally, the Atlantic Fleet DDG 
Sea Swap plan identified overarching goals and key analysis issues; 
developed an experimental design; and defined measures and metrics. As 
a result, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap final report[Footnote 40] was 
well organized, thoughtfully designed, and provided the reader relevant 
information based on the original data-collection and analysis plan. By 
clearly identifying the areas needed for measurement, determining 
specific issues and subissues to be analyzed for each area, and 
systematically collecting data in accordance with the original analysis 
approach, the plan provided analysts and decision makers most of the 
data needed to conduct comparative analyses and support future 
decisions. 

Although the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan was 
nearly comprehensive it did not include a thorough cost-effectiveness 
analysis of the Sea Swap alternative, or any forms of rotational 
crewing. The plan included a marginal-cost analysis that examined 
shorter-term trade-offs between the Sea Swap concept and more 
traditional crewing concepts; however, it did not specify a 
comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that would determine the 
least costly crewing method to satisfy Navy requirements. According to 
best practices, cost-effectiveness is a method used by organizations 
seeking to gain the best value for their money and to achieve 
operational requirements while balancing costs, schedules, performance, 
and risks. The best value is often not readily apparent and requires an 
analysis to maximize value. A cost-effectiveness analysis is used where 
benefits cannot be expressed in monetary terms but, rather, in "units 
of benefit," for example, days of forward presence. According to Office 
of Management and Budget guidance,[Footnote 41] a comprehensive cost-
effectiveness analysis would include a comparison of alternatives, in 
this case, crewing options, based on a life-cycle cost analysis of each 
alternative. The plan called for a cost analysis using categories based 
on the major issues it identified in the plan; however, the plan 
acknowledges that these costs are limited, and a more detailed cost 
model is needed so costs that differ between crewing options can be 
identified and broken out for comparison. Additionally, the plan did 
not call for an analysis of full life-cycle cost data, although it 
stated that future rotational crewing concept analyses should consider 
life-cycle or total ownership costs as a part of examining future force 
structure options. 

While the Navy is collecting and compiling some data for the current 
surface ships involved in rotational crewing initiatives (patrol 
coastal ships, mine countermeasure ships, and HSV-2 Swift), there are 
no systematic metrics or methods for collecting and evaluating 
rotational crewing specific data similar to the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea 
Swap Experiment Analysis Plan. According to Navy officials, the Navy 
routinely collects retention, morale, material condition, training, 
cost, operational performance, and Fleet Response Plan-related data for 
all surface ships. Data collection and analysis for surface ships falls 
under the direction of the Surface Warfare Enterprise,[Footnote 42] an 
arm of the Commander, Naval Surface Forces. One of the major tenets of 
the Surface Warfare Enterprise and its cross-functional teams is to 
help recapitalize the future Navy by managing with metrics, and 
reducing the total cost of doing business. To that end, high-ranking 
Navy officials led by the Commander, Naval Surface Forces, meet monthly 
to review and discuss the effectiveness of various manning, training, 
equipping, and maintaining processes. Although much of these data are 
similar to those collected in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap plan, the 
data are not as comprehensive and are not consistent from initiative to 
initiative. Additionally, the Surface Warfare Enterprise data 
collection and analyses did not link to the effectiveness of different 
crewing alternatives. Currently, there are no standard metrics or 
systematic methods for collecting rotational crewing-related data from 
surface ships because the Navy has not developed and promulgated 
overarching guidance that requires a systematic data-collection, 
analysis, and reporting methodology. Consequently, the potential value 
of rotational crewing is unknown and the Navy is hindering its ability 
to determine optimal crewing concepts for ship classes. 

The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed or Systematically Assessed Rotational 
Crewing Options in the Analysis of Alternatives for Surface Ships in 
Development, Including Life-Cycle Costs: 

Navy surface-ship classes currently under development, the LCS, Joint 
High Speed Vessel, and the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class guided missile 
destroyer,[Footnote 43] have not fully analyzed or systematically 
assessed rotational crewing in their analysis of alternatives.[Footnote 
44] Early in the development of a new weapons system, DOD and the Navy 
require that an analysis of alternatives be completed that identifies 
the most promising alternatives. The analysis of alternatives process 
is intended to refine the initial weapon systems concept and requires 
an evaluation of the performance, operational effectiveness, 
operational suitability, and estimated costs, including full life-cycle 
costs, of alternatives that satisfy established capability needs. The 
analysis of alternatives assesses the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternatives being considered to satisfy capabilities, including the 
sensitivity of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions 
or variables. In at least three recent surface-ship acquisitions, the 
Navy has not consistently applied these principles because it did not 
thoroughly analyze and evaluate rotational crewing options and because 
the Navy's acquisition instruction does not explicitly require 
evaluating rotational crewing in the Navy's ship analysis of 
alternatives.[Footnote 45] However, according to the Navy's acquisition 
instruction, all analysis of alternatives should include analysis of 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, management, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities as well as joint implications. An evaluation 
of rotational crewing alternatives could affect all of these things, 
including force-structure requirements. A comprehensive evaluation 
could also show whether rotational crewing meets forward presence 
requirements with fewer ships and lower life-cycle costs. Additionally, 
the Navy did not have specific overarching rotational crewing guidance 
that would require such analysis and assessments. As a result, Navy 
officials will not have sufficient information to make informed 
investment decisions affecting future obligations of billions of 
dollars. 

The Navy identified rotational crewing as a crewing option for the LCS 
early in the acquisition process; however, the Navy did not complete 
any comprehensive analyses of rotational crewing alternatives in the 
ship's analysis of alternatives.[Footnote 46] The LCS analysis of 
alternatives included assumptions that rotational crewing would be used 
on the ship; however, the analysis did not identify and assess a range 
of rotational crewing alternatives. Because the analysis did not 
identify a range of alternative crewing options the Navy was not in 
position to assess the relative operational effectiveness, suitability, 
and life-cycle costs of the rotational crewing alternatives. For 
example, the Navy did not evaluate and compare the relative forward 
presence and warfighting capabilities for standard and rotational 
crewing alternatives and the potential effects on manpower, training, 
and facilities. Without adequately analyzing and systematically 
assessing different rotational crewing alternatives in the analysis of 
alternatives, the Navy was not able to determine the optimal crewing 
alternative for fulfilling its operational needs and maximizing returns 
on investment. Additionally, without considering rotational crewing 
options as part of the analysis of alternatives, cost-effective force 
structure assessments are incomplete. 

The Joint High Speed Vessel, a ship based on the operational successes 
of other high-speed surface ships, including the HSV-2 Swift, did not 
include rotational crewing in its analysis of alternatives despite 
highly successful experiences with rotational crews on the Swift, an 
explicit need for forward presence, and its classification as a high- 
demand, low-density asset. The Swift has employed Blue-Gold rotational 
crewing while conducting a range of missions, including 
experimentation, humanitarian operations, and Global Fleet Station 
deployments.[Footnote 47] According to focus groups, HSV-2 Swift 
sailors praised the predictability of the operating cycle and Blue-Gold 
rotational crewing. Additionally, Fleet Commanders and the commanding 
officers of the HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold crews provided positive 
feedback on the Swift mission performance. High demand for the ship and 
its capabilities has been met because rotational crewing enabled the 
ship to maintain a high operational availability and a sustained 
forward presence. The Joint High Speed Vessel analysis of alternatives 
considered some data and specifications from the Swift design and 
operational experiences. However, the Joint High Speed Vessel analysis 
of alternatives does not include any discussion of the Swift's 
rotational crewing experiences, despite their successes with 
maintaining a very high operational availability. In the analysis of 
alternatives, the Joint High Speed Vessel force structure requirements 
and basing options are driven by forward presence and the need for 
critical response time, but rotational crewing was not included as an 
option that may increase Joint High Speed Vessel forward presence. 

During the analysis of alternatives for the DDG-1000 guided missile 
destroyer, rotational crewing was not thoroughly analyzed despite 
statements by Navy officials early in the acquisition process and in 
the original operational requirements document[Footnote 48] that linked 
rotational crewing to the ship. The analysis of alternatives for the 
DDG-1000 compared the effects of rotational crewing and traditional 
crewing on the number of ships required to generate forward presence 
requirements. The evaluation showed that using rotational crewing 
alternatives, in place of the traditional single crew approach, 
produces a higher forward presence with fewer ships. Although the 
analysis of alternatives acknowledged that rotational crewing met 
forward presence requirements, while requiring fewer ships, the 
analysis of alternatives omitted further analyses of rotational crewing 
for DDG-1000. Furthermore, the analysis of alternatives addressed the 
rotational crewing concept, but did not analyze the effect of different 
rotational crewing schemes on force structure, training, materiel, and 
other aspects that would affect overall life-cycle costs. With a total 
of seven planned ships, the DDG-1000 destroyer meets the high-demand, 
low-density benchmark for rotational crewing recommended by Naval 
Surface Forces in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap report.[Footnote 49] 
According to Navy officials, the Navy has no plans to utilize 
rotational crewing on the DDG-1000, despite a lack of thorough analyses 
and the acknowledgement that rotational crewing meets operational 
requirements with the use of fewer ships. Without analyzing the costs 
and benefits of rotational crewing alternatives, as compared to the 
traditional single crewing approach, the Navy will not be able to make 
informed decisions about DDG-1000 procurements and future force 
structure. 

Lastly, the analysis of alternatives for the next generation guided 
missile cruiser, CG(X), is currently in the review process and had not 
been released as of April 2008.[Footnote 50] Navy officials have 
identified the CG(X) ship as a good candidate to be rotationally 
crewed. According to DOD documentation, the analysis of alternatives 
for the CG(X) ship will analyze and document major sustainment 
alternatives including variations in service life, reliability, 
operating profiles, maintenance concepts, manpower and crewing concepts 
(including crew rotation and Sea Swap), and other relevant sustainment 
factors to fully characterize the range of sustainment options. 
Although it is planned that the analysis of alternatives for CG(X) will 
analyze different crewing options, a Naval Sea Systems Command official 
could not provide us any information as to the content of the study 
until it is completed. 

Some Actions Have Been Taken to Collect and Use Lessons Learned from 
Rotational Crewing Experiences: 

The Navy has taken some actions to collect and use lessons-learned from 
rotational crewing experiences. For example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea 
Swap initiative developed and implemented a robust lessons-learned 
plan. Despite some progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned 
within individual ship communities, the Navy's efforts in many cases 
were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. 
Additionally, the Navy has not developed overarching processes for the 
systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned pertaining 
specifically to rotational crewing. 

The Navy Has Taken Actions to Collect, Disseminate, and Capitalize on 
Lessons Learned from Rotational Crewing Experiences: 

The Navy has taken actions to collect, disseminate, and capitalize on 
lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing within individual 
commands, using methods both formal and informal. For example, as part 
of the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, the Navy implemented a 
robust lessons learned plan to actively collect feedback from destroyer 
crews. The plan outlined a formal lessons learned process and 
established a team to collect, review, and analyze lessons learned and 
ensure that they were incorporated into policies and procedures. The 
team systematically collected lessons learned from destroyer rotational 
crews by, among other things, conducting interviews with crew members, 
reviewing ship message traffic, and examining turnover observation 
reports. According to the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative 
report, draft lessons-learned submissions underwent a well-defined 
review process to ensure quality, completeness, and consistency. 
Lessons learned that were of immediate utility were disseminated to Sea 
Swap initiative crews. Those relating to management and oversight were 
vetted with the goal of supporting future rotational crewing decision 
making and policy development. In addition, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea 
Swap initiative leveraged lessons learned from the 2002-2004 Pacific 
Fleet Destroyer Sea Swap effort, incorporating them into the 
development of operational plans. 

Other ship communities, using less systematic processes, have also 
captured and shared lessons learned within their communities. For 
example, the mine warfare community compiled lessons learned following 
a crew turnover in February 2007, when this community began using a 
"Blue-Gold" rotational crewing alternative. The guided missile 
submarine community, in planning for its implementation of rotational 
crewing, developed lessons learned from a crew rotation exercise in 
Hawaii. These lessons learned were disseminated to command officials 
and other ships within this community and also can be accessed from an 
internal submarine forces Web site's lessons-learned page. In addition, 
LCS officials stated that the LCS community shares lessons learned 
within the command through direct feedback from crew members and in 
class squadron, cross-functional team, and Oversight Board meetings. 
These meetings provide a forum to identify potential barriers and 
propose actions to resolve them, resulting in the development of 
lessons learned. The LCS community also has conducted a series of crew 
swap exercises to collect lessons learned regarding logistical support 
requirements in forward-deployed locations. Officials stated that the 
lessons learned would be incorporated into LCS standard operating 
procedures. 

Lessons learned were shared between individual ship communities through 
direct interaction and, on a more limited basis, the Navy Lessons 
Learned System. Individual ship communities collected and shared 
lessons learned primarily through direct interaction, such as meetings 
and site visits. Table 2 highlights examples of direct actions taken to 
collect and leverage lessons learned from rotational crewing 
experiences between ship communities. In addition, lessons learned were 
collected and disseminated through the Navy Lessons Learned System, 
which is a central repository for the collection and dissemination of 
lessons learned and a means to correct problems identified from fleet 
operations.[Footnote 51] The Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative 
lessons-learned plan explicitly incorporated into its goals the 
submission of lessons learned into this system. Twenty-six lessons 
learned were recorded in the system, which can be accessed by Navy 
personnel ashore and at sea through a classified Internet site. 

Table 2: Examples of Actions Taken, outside of the Navy Lessons Learned 
System, to Collect and Leverage Lessons Learned between Ship 
Communities: 

Ship community: Patrol Coastal; 
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: Patrol coastal 
community officials visited the mine warfare community to discuss 
lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences. 

Ship community: Mine Warfare; 
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: Mine warfare 
community officials stated that the decision to implement a "Blue-Gold" 
alternative with a Silver training ship was based on lessons learned 
from the rotational crewing experiences of the HSV-2 Swift and Trident 
submarines, which demonstrated the advantages--such as an increased 
sense of ownership and greater training opportunities--of the 
alternative. According to officials, the training ship maintained by 
the Silver crew is intended to be the mine warfare community's lower-
cost version of the Trident Training Facility. 

Ship community: Guided Missile Submarine; 
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: The guided 
missile submarine community, according to officials, based its 
implementation of the "Blue-Gold" alternative on the best practices of 
the ballistic missile submarine community, thereby capitalizing upon 
lessons learned from over 40 years of rotational crewing. For instance, 
this community is heavily leveraging off existing ballistic missile 
submarine shore infrastructure and, according to officials, will adopt 
applicable rotational crewing policies and procedures from the 
Ballistic Missile Submarine Combined Directives Manual. 

Ship community: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Actions taken to collect and leverage lessons learned: LCS community 
officials collected lessons learned in rotational crewing across ship 
communities by visiting the submarine and mine warfare communities and 
observing a crew turnover on the HSV-2 Swift; 
* According to LCS officials, the Trident submarine base site visit 
highlighted the importance of configuration control and the need for 
shore infrastructure and training simulators for the on- shore crew; 
* One of the primary purposes of the HSV-2 Swift was to validate and 
develop lessons learned for the LCS program. Although the focus was 
primarily on testing mission module operations, lessons learned on 
rotational crewing were captured by LCS crewmembers when they observed 
a crew turnover. According to the LCS Concept of Operations, the HSV-2 
Swift validated elements of the LCS rotational crewing model, such as 
the use of small crews and a 4-month rotation policy; 
Lessons learned, according to LCS officials, are also shared through 
the LCS Council of Captains meetings. The council is comprised of 
officers from numerous ship communities, including representatives from 
the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class. Officials stated that the council provides 
a forum to share lessons learned on rotational crewing and other LCS 
issues. The LCS command also obtained lessons learned from the Atlantic 
Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative; 
Lessons learned from other ship communities were explicitly 
incorporated into the LCS Concept of Operations and, according to 
officials, should be incorporated into a combined directives manual, 
modeled after the one used by the submarine community. In addition, 
officials stated that LCS standard operating procedures, which are 
currently in development, would be based on patrol coastal, mine 
warfare, and HSV-2 Swift crew instructions. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. 

[End of table] 

Despite Progress in Collecting and Sharing Lessons Learned, the Navy's 
Efforts in Many Cases Were Not Systematic and Did Not Use the Navy 
Lessons Learned System: 

Despite the Navy's progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned 
within ship communities, its efforts in many cases were not systematic 
and did not use the Navy's Lessons Learned System. Instead, the 
development and sharing of lessons learned relied on informal processes 
that are left to individual ship commands, and thus were not done 
consistently across all ship communities that use rotational crewing. 
For example, the mine warfare and patrol coastal communities lack 
formal written processes to collect lessons learned related 
specifically to rotational crewing, according to command officials. 
Focus group responses from both these communities indicate that efforts 
to gather lessons learned from crewmembers and communicate them up the 
chain of command have been inconsistent. A mine warfare community 
official stated that the collection of lessons learned is largely 
dependent on the commanding officer and is typically shared by word of 
mouth or e-mail. Furthermore, while the LCS and guided missile 
submarine communities have taken steps to collect and capitalize upon 
lessons learned before they operationally deploy, officials stated that 
these communities have yet to develop formal processes--such as written 
procedures or data-collection plans--to gather and share lessons 
learned specifically related to rotational crewing within their ship 
communities. LCS officials stated that their community is small at 
present, allowing lessons learned to be effectively shared informally, 
but acknowledged the need for formal processes in the future. Without 
formal processes, the LCS and guided missile submarine communities may 
be less likely to systematically collect lessons learned--similar to 
the mine warfare and patrol coastal communities--and therefore, miss 
opportunities to improve rotational crewing implementation. 

While ship communities have collected lessons learned among individual 
commands through direct interaction, such as meetings and site visits, 
they have not fully used the Navy Lessons Learned System to enhance 
knowledge sharing. As of October 30, 2007, lessons learned directly 
related to rotational crewing have yet to be recorded in the Navy 
Lessons Learned System by the mine warfare, patrol coastal, HSV-2 
Swift, guided missile submarine, and LCS communities. In addition, ship 
command officials from the mine warfare, patrol coastal, and LCS 
commands have indicated that they have not used the Navy Lessons 
Learned System to access lessons learned pertaining to rotational 
crewing. The following are examples where difficulties experienced by 
current rotational crewing efforts may have been addressed in previous 
lessons learned: 

* Issues such as personnel gaps and training deficiencies, lack of 
accountable inventory control measures during the crew turnovers, 
mitigating ship configuration differences, and the effect of limited 
port visits on crew morale were identified as problem areas in focus 
group discussions with mine warfare, patrol coastal, and guided missile 
submarine rotational crews. However, lessons learned recorded by the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative in the Navy Lessons Learned 
System had already addressed these issues. 

* As previously mentioned in this report, rotational crewing efforts 
have been implemented in separate, disjointed efforts across ship 
communities without top-down leadership because the Navy has not 
established a management team to oversee and integrate rotational 
crewing efforts. However, lessons learned from the Atlantic Fleet DDG 
Sea Swap initiative recommended the creation of a management team to, 
among other things, help define performance measures for rotational 
crewing efforts and ensure that lessons learned are documented and 
incorporated into existing policies and procedures. 

* The LCS community is trying to resolve barriers in transportation 
logistics that are addressed by lessons learned from the guided missile 
submarine community's exercise to help solve transportation logistics 
issues for forward-deployed crew turnovers. However, guided missile 
submarine community officials stated that they have not entered lessons 
learned from their rotational crewing experiences into the Navy Lessons 
Learned System. Consequently, the LCS community has not been able to 
capitalize on these lessons learned in its efforts to address 
transportation logistics issues. Officials from both the guided missile 
submarine and LCS communities stated that their experiences are likely 
to be pertinent to current and future ship classes and recognized the 
importance of recording lessons learned in the system to benefit the 
rest of the Navy. 

As the above examples demonstrate, by not fully utilizing the Navy 
Lessons Learned System, the Navy may continue to experience 
difficulties similar to those that previously recorded lessons learned 
sought to correct. Until the system is used to leverage past lessons 
learned, ship communities may miss opportunities to more effectively 
plan and conduct crew rotations, and may be unable to potentially 
prevent problems that were addressed in past rotational crewing 
experiences. 

The Navy Has Not Developed Overarching Processes for the Systematic 
Collection and Dissemination of Lessons Learned Pertaining Specifically 
to Rotational Crewing: 

Lessons learned are not developed and shared consistently across all 
ship communities that use rotational crewing because the Navy has not 
developed overarching processes to help ensure that ship commands 
systematically collect and disseminate lessons learned from their 
rotational crewing experiences. While the Chief of Naval Operations 
instruction for the Navy Lessons Learned System[Footnote 52] 
establishes a process for the collection, validation, and distribution 
of unit feedback, Navy Lessons Learned Program officials stated that 
the collection and sharing of lessons learned is not required and, 
instead, is left to the discretion of individual ship commands. 
Nonetheless, the Navy Warfare Development Command, which is responsible 
for administering the Navy's system, has launched an initiative to 
actively collect lessons learned for major exercise and events, using, 
for example, a lessons learned team and data-collection plan to collect 
information. Navy Warfare Development Command officials stated that, 
with the proper resources, it would be possible to employ similar 
active collection methods specifically for rotational crewing efforts. 
However, aside from the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative, the 
Navy has not developed processes to guide the active and systematic 
collection of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational 
crewing. The initiative's concept of operations stressed the importance 
of high-quality lessons learned in implementing new crewing concepts. 
It also expressly incorporated the Navy Lessons Learned System into 
lessons learned processes. However, these processes applied only to the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative and were not used in other ship 
communities. According to the concept of operations, the risks of not 
taking a proactive approach to lessons learned include failing to 
document policy changes and preserve process improvements, which is 
important given the high turnover of personnel during the time frame of 
the initiative. Similar turnover issues may apply to other ship 
communities that employ rotational crewing. Without overarching 
guidance to promote the systematic collection and dissemination of 
lessons learned across all ship communities, knowledge about rotational 
crewing may be lost and crews will be unable to benefit from the Navy's 
collective experiences. 

Conclusions: 

Given the fiscal environment facing the Navy and the rest of the 
federal government, decision makers must make investment decisions that 
maximize return on investment at the best value for the taxpayer. 
Rotational crewing can be a viable alternative to mitigate 
affordability challenges in the Navy while supporting a high pace of 
operations and an array of mission requirements. As a result, the Navy 
must be in a better position to make informed decisions about the 
potential for applying rotational crewing to current and future ships. 
As new ships become increasingly expensive it is imperative that 
rotational crewing alternatives are fully considered early in the 
acquisition process when the department conducts analysis of 
alternatives. Without comprehensive analysis of alternatives, cost- 
effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does 
not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. 

While the Navy has made progress in refining rotational crewing 
concepts, the Navy has not taken all of the steps that would be helpful 
to effectively manage rotational crewing efforts and assess crewing 
options for current and future ships. The Navy has made significant 
progress since our November 2004 report on rotational crewing. For 
example, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap benefited from an 
implementation team that developed and implemented a nearly 
comprehensive experiment analysis plan, promulgated a detailed concept 
of operations, and recorded and disseminated lessons learned. Further, 
several ship commands have promulgated their own crew-exchange 
instructions and concepts of operations. 

Progress has been limited, however, to specific rotational crewing 
efforts and has not been systematically integrated across the Navy. 
Without a comprehensive management approach that includes top-level 
leadership and an implementation team to guide and assess rotational 
crewing, the Navy can not be assured that rotational crewing efforts 
are coordinated and integrated as it attempts to lead a successful 
transformation of its ship-crewing culture. Further, without an 
overarching instruction to guide rotational crewing initiatives, the 
Navy may limit the potential for successfully managing, implementing, 
and evaluating rotational crewing as a transformational means of 
increasing capabilities in a cost-effective manner. 

The Navy has also not developed a systematic approach to analyzing 
rotational crewing alternatives or collecting and sharing related 
lessons learned. Without a systematic approach to analyzing rotational 
crewing alternatives on current and future ships, the Navy may not be 
able to determine if particular alternatives are successful in, or have 
the potential for, fulfilling operational needs and maximizing return 
on investment. As a result, the Navy may not develop and procure the 
most cost-effective mix of ships to meet operational needs. 
Additionally, by not systematically collecting and using lessons 
learned from rotational crewing experiences, the Navy risks repeating 
mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively plan and 
conduct crew rotations. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To facilitate the successful transformation of the Navy's ship-crewing 
culture, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Navy to take the following three actions: 

* assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational 
crewing efforts; 

* establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day 
management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and 
integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet; and: 

* develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level 
vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage, 
implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts. 

To ensure effective management, implementation, and evaluation of 
rotational crewing efforts, we recommend that the Commander, U.S. Fleet 
Forces, direct the development and promulgation of concepts of 
operations by all ship communities using or planning to use rotational 
crewing, that include a description of how rotational crewing may be 
employed and the details of by whom, where, and how it is to be 
accomplished, employed, and executed. 

To ensure that the Navy assesses the potential of different rotational 
crewing alternatives for improving performance and reducing costs for 
ship classes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to 
take the following two actions: 

* develop a standardized, systematic method for data collection and 
analysis, assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational 
crewing efforts, including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis 
that includes life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts; 
and: 

* require, as part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the 
concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition process, 
assessments of potential rotational crewing options for each class of 
surface ship in development, including full life-cycle costs of each 
crewing option. 

To ensure that the Navy effectively leverages lessons learned, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Navy to take the following two actions: 

* develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and 
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational 
crewing; and: 

* incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in 
the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among 
other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data- 
collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Because DOD disagreed with our recommendations dealing with assigning 
clear leadership, establishing an implementation team, developing and 
promulgating overarching guidance, and improving the use of lessons 
learned, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the 
Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to: 

* assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational 
crewing efforts; 

* establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day 
management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and 
integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet; 

* develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level 
vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage, 
implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts; 

* develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and 
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational 
crewing; and: 

* incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in 
the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among 
other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data- 
collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System. 

Congress should also consider requiring Secretary of Defense to direct 
the Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress on its progress when 
the President's budget for fiscal year 2010 is submitted to Congress. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD, in its comments on a draft of this report, partially agreed with 
our three recommendations regarding concepts of operations, data 
collection and analysis, and rotational crewing assessments during 
surface-ship analysis of alternatives. DOD disagreed with our five 
other recommendations that would assign clear leadership and 
accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts; establish an 
overarching implementation team; develop and promulgate overarching 
guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to 
consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all 
rotational crewing efforts; ensure the systematic collection and 
dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational 
crewing; and incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach 
outlined in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations. DOD 
stated that measures are already in place to manage ship and submarine 
manning, training, and equipping. However, as discussed below, we do 
not believe that the Navy's actions go far enough in providing 
leadership, management, and guidance in transforming the Navy's surface-
ship-crewing culture; collecting data, analyzing, reporting, and 
integrating the results of different rotational crewing efforts; and in 
documenting and acting on lessons it has learned during implementation 
of different rotational crewing alternatives. As such, the Navy may be 
missing opportunities to improve its transformational capabilities and 
cost-effectively increase surface-ship operational availability. 
Therefore, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the 
Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to implement 
our recommendations and report to Congress on its progress when the 
President's budget for fiscal year 2010 is submitted to Congress. The 
department also provided technical comments which were incorporated as 
appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix 
III. Our specific comments follow. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy facilitate the 
successful transformation of its ship-crewing culture by assigning 
clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational crewing 
efforts. DOD stated that the Department of the Navy has existing clear 
leadership and accountability for the manning of ships and submarines 
and that this management structure includes oversight and leadership 
within both operational and administrative chains of command. It 
further noted that additional organizational structure dedicated to 
rotational crewing is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. We 
have identified several key management practices at the center of 
implementing transformational programs, which include ensuring that top 
leadership drives the transformation. While the Navy has administrative 
and operational management structures, there is not a designated leader 
to manage all rotational crewing efforts in the Department of the Navy. 
As a result, numerous separate rotational crewing efforts continue with 
little, if any, top-down leadership and coordination, and no team or 
steering group exists within the Navy to manage the transformation of 
the Navy's ship-crewing culture. We continue to believe that our 
recommendation merits further action and have included this issue in a 
matter for congressional consideration. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy should establish an 
overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day management 
oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate 
efforts, and apply their results to the Fleet. DOD stated that the Navy 
already exercises day-to-day management to support ship and submarine 
manning and training and that an implementation team dedicated to 
rotational crewing is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. We 
reported in 2003 that key practices for successful transformations 
include that an implementation team should be responsible for the day- 
to-day management of transformation to ensure various initiatives are 
integrated. Although the Navy has established implementation teams for 
selected rotational crewing initiatives and has other existing 
management structures, it has not established an implementation team 
for managing all rotational crewing programs to ensure successful 
transformation of the Navy's ship-crewing culture. As a result, the 
Navy does not have a dedicated team or steering group that can devote 
focused attention, provide a communication structure, apply lessons 
learned, and execute other key practices that would build on its 
successful efforts and ensure consistent management of rotational 
crewing across the fleet. We continue to believe that our 
recommendation merits further action and have included this issue in a 
matter for congressional consideration. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy should develop and 
promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level vision and 
guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage, implement, and 
evaluate all rotational crewing efforts. DOD stated that the Navy has 
sufficient guidance in place to provide the high-level vision necessary 
to manage ship and submarine manning. As discussed in the report, the 
Navy has developed guidance for some rotational crewing efforts. 
However, the development, dissemination, and implementation of 
rotational crewing guidance has been inconsistent and fragmented. As 
noted in this report, an overarching directive for rotational crewing 
would provide essential and consistent Navy-wide policy and guidance on 
rotational crewing efforts; establish leadership, delegate authority, 
and assign responsibilities; assign missions, functions, or tasks; and 
establish a reporting requirement. DOD also stated that, although 
rotational crewing includes some unique crew considerations and support 
requirements, the training and support of sailors involved in 
rotational crewing are little different than those for sailors in the 
standard crewing process. We agree that the goals and objectives of 
ship and crew training and support are little different between 
rotational and standard crews. However, as shown in some of the 
concepts of operations and in the Navy Lessons Learned System, crew 
exchange guidance for rotational crewing and the execution of training 
and support for rotational crewing efforts can provide many unique 
challenges for sailors, in addition to the challenge of adapting 
sailors to a change in ship-crewing culture. We continue to believe 
that our recommendation merits further action and have included this 
issue in a matter for congressional consideration. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Commander, U.S. 
Fleet Forces, direct the development and promulgation of concepts of 
operations by all ship communities using or planning to use rotational 
crewing. DOD stated that the Navy already uses appropriate concepts for 
fleet operations and, when or if additional rotational crewing is 
warranted, the Navy will issue specific guidance, instructions, and 
concepts of operations. While we strongly support the Navy's efforts to 
develop concepts of operations that guide fleet rotational crewing 
efforts, its efforts have been inconsistent. For example, ship 
communities, such as patrol coastal and mine warfare, have experienced 
implementation challenges because they lacked key information such as 
the roles and responsibilities of individual decision makers, managers, 
and leaders involved in rotational crewing execution. For these 
reasons, we continue to believe that our recommendation merits further 
action and that the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces, should direct the 
development and promulgation of concepts of operations by all ship 
communities using or planning to use rotational crewing, using the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations as a model for other 
rotational crewing initiatives. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop a 
standardized, systematic method for data collection and analysis, 
assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational crewing efforts, 
including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes 
life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts. DOD stated that 
the Navy has no plans for broad general application of rotational 
crewing to all ship classes, and a standing implementation team and 
data collection is unnecessary. DOD also stated that the Navy will 
conduct appropriate studies to determine if and when additional 
rotational crewing is appropriate based on cost effectiveness. While we 
support DOD's efforts to proactively conduct studies, based on cost 
effectiveness, to determine if and when rotational crewing is 
appropriate to use on surface ships, we urge the Navy to take steps to 
develop a standardized, systematic method for collecting data and 
analyzing, assessing, and reporting results, including cost- 
effectiveness analysis, on all rotational crewing efforts, including 
those currently underway. As discussed in the report, the Surface 
Warfare Enterprise is collecting data from surface ships, including 
those participating in rotational crewing initiatives; however, the 
data they collect is not consistent from initiative to initiative, and 
none of the data are tied to the effectiveness of different crewing 
schemes or rotational versus traditional crewing schemes. DOD also 
stated that the LCS is the only new ship class that currently plans on 
implementing rotational crewing. While we agree that the LCS is the 
only new ship class with definitive plans to rotationally crew its 
ships, several other future ship classes, including the Joint High 
Speed Vessel, DDG-1000, and CG(X), still fit the requirements of 
potential rotationally crewed ships, as described by Fleet Forces 
Command. Therefore, we continue to believe, as we have recommended, 
that DOD should direct the Navy to develop a standardized, systematic 
method for data collection and analysis, assessment, and reporting on 
the results of rotational crewing efforts, including a comprehensive 
cost-effectiveness analysis that includes life-cycle costs, so that the 
potential value of rotational crewing will be known and the Navy will 
be able to determine optimal crewing concepts for current and future 
ship classes. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Navy require, as 
part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept 
refinement phase of the defense acquisition process, assessments of 
potential rotational crewing options for each class of surface ship in 
development, including full life-cycle costs of each crewing option. 
DOD agreed that all feasible crewing options should be considered 
during the concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition process. 
Ships determined to have a potential advantageous rotational crewing 
application will assess and include this option among the various 
crewing alternatives reported by the analysis of alternatives. We 
support DOD's assessment that all feasible rotational crewing options 
should be considered during the concept refinement phase in the 
analysis of alternatives. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy develop overarching 
guidance to ensure the systematic collection and dissemination of 
lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational crewing. DOD 
stated that the Navy already uses "lessons learned" tools as part of 
the rotational crewing and that further guidance to use these tools is 
not needed. We support the progress the Navy has made in collecting 
lessons learned and documenting these lessons in the Navy Lessons 
Learned System. However, as discussed in the report, most ship 
communities did not submit or draw on lessons in the Navy Lessons 
Learned System to enhance knowledge sharing or learn from others' 
experiences. For example, the mine warfare, patrol coastal, LCS, and 
guided missile submarine communities lack formal written processes to 
collect lessons learned related specifically to rotational crewing. 
Without guidance to ensure collection and dissemination of lessons 
learned, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes and could 
miss opportunities to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations. 
Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation merits 
further action and have included this issue in a matter for 
congressional consideration. 

DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Navy incorporate 
components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the Atlantic 
Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among other 
things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data- 
collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System. 
DOD stated that the Navy already relies on data collection and analysis 
from ships and that requiring already implemented rotational crewing 
efforts to adopt experimental data collection procedures is 
unnecessary. DOD further stated that procedures are already in place 
for crews, rotational or standard, to provide data to the chain of 
command to identify improvements. As discussed in the report, the Navy 
has taken some actions to collect, disseminate, and capitalize on 
lessons learned from its crew rotation experiences. However, despite 
some progress in collecting and sharing lessons learned within 
individual ship communities, the Navy's efforts in many cases were not 
systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. Instead, 
the development and sharing of lessons learned relied on informal 
processes that are left to individual ship commands, and thus were not 
done consistently across all ship communities that use rotational 
crewing. The initiative ensured documentation of lessons learned by 
outlining a requirement and a process in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea 
Swap Concept of Operations. The concept of operations also noted that 
the risks of not taking a proactive approach to lessons learned include 
failing to document policy changes and preserve process improvements, 
which is important given the high turnover of personnel during the time 
frame of the initiative. We believe that our recommendation merits 
further action and have included this issue in a matter for 
congressional consideration. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretary of the Navy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 
available to other congressional committees and interested parties on 
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Janet St. Laurent: 

Managing Director: 

Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Ships Included in Our Evaluation: 

Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine: 

Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, also known as 
Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of the triad of U.S. 
strategic deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike 
capability. The ballistic missile submarine force consists of 14 
submarines--6 homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and 8 in Bangor, 
Washington. Each submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted 
personnel. 

To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing 
concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a "Blue" Crew 
and a "Gold" Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship 
deploys with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2-to 3-day 
crew turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a 
Blue Crew deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat following 
a 3-day turnover process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in 
conducting maintenance repairs. During the Gold Crew's patrol, the Blue 
Crew stands down and enters a training cycle in its homeport. 

Figure 4: U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-class Ballistic Missile Submarine: 

This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Nevada, an Ohio-class 
ballistic missile submarine. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine: 

The first four of the Ohio-class Trident fleet ballistic missile 
submarines are being converted to nuclear-powered guided missile and 
special-operations submarines. Two submarines will be homeported in 
Kings Bay, Georgia, and two will be homeported in Bangor, Washington. 
Each submarine has about 15 officers and 144 enlisted personnel and can 
carry up to 66 Special Operations Forces personnel. 

According to Navy officials, in order to provide greater operational 
availability, Blue-Gold rotational crewing is employed on these 
submarines. Each submarine has a "Blue" crew and a "Gold" crew and each 
crew has its own respective command. The operating cycle consists of 
four alternating Blue and Gold crew deployments averaging about 73 days 
followed by a homeport maintenance period of 100 days. Two-to 3-day 
crew turnovers will take place overseas at sites such as Guam and Diego 
Garcia and coincide with a 23-day voyage-repair period. 

Figure 5: U.S.S. Ohio, an Ohio-class Guided Missile Submarine, with a 
Drydeck Shelter, Arrives at Naval Station Pearl Harbor before 
Continuing on Its Maiden Deployment to the Western Pacific: 

This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Ohio, an Ohio-class guided 
missile submarine, with a drydeck shelter, arriving at Naval station 
Pearl Harbor before continuing on its maiden deployment to the Western 
Pacific. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyer: 

The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers provide multimission 
offensive and defensive capabilities, operating independently or as 
part of other naval formations. The guided missile destroyer force 
consists of 52 ships--with primary homeports in San Diego, California, 
and Norfolk, Virginia. Each destroyer has about 24 officers and 250 
enlisted personnel. 

The Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, conducted a 
Sea Swap initiative during 2005-2007, as a follow-on to the 2002-2004 
proof-of-concept demonstration conducted by the Commander, Naval 
Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both Sea Swap experiments involved 
three guided missile destroyers and three crews, with crews rotating 
every 6 months to the forward-deployed ship. 

Figure 6: The U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile 
Destroyer, with a Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Passing in the Foreground: 

This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Benfold, an Arleigh Burke-
class guided missile destroyer, with a rigid hull inflatable boat 
passing in the foreground. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Cyclone-class Patrol Coastal: 

The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to 
conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in 
support of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of 
foreign shores. The patrol coastal force consists of eight ships--five 
homeported in Bahrain and three in Little Creek, Virginia. Five 
additional ships will be returned from loan to the U.S. Coast Guard 
over the next 3 years. Each patrol coastal has about 4 officers and 26 
enlisted personnel. 

According to Navy officials, the Navy is using a Horizon rotational 
crewing model on patrol coastal ships in which 13 crews rotate among 
the eight ships in order to increase operation days in the Arabian 
Gulf. Each crew spends 6 months deployed to Bahrain and then 10 months 
training in homeport in Virginia. 

Figure 7: The Cyclone-class Coastal Patrol Craft U.S.S. Whirlwind (PC 
11) Protects Iraq's Oil Terminals in the Northern Persian Gulf: 

This figure is a photograph of the Cyclone-class Coast Patrol Craft 
U.S.S. Whirlwind (PC 11) protecting Iraq's oil terminals in the 
Northern Persian Gulf. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Avenger-class Mine Countermeasure: 

The Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships are mine hunter-killers 
capable of finding, classifying, and destroying moored and bottom 
mines. The mine countermeasure ship force consists of 14 ships--8 
homeported in Ingleside, Texas, 4 homeported in Bahrain, and 2 
homeported in Sasebo, Japan. Each mine countermeasure ship has about 8 
officers and 76 enlisted personnel. 

According to Navy officials, in order to increase operation days in the 
Arabian Gulf, the Navy utilizes a Blue-Gold-Silver rotational crewing 
model on mine countermeasure ships. A "Blue" crew and a "Gold" crew are 
assigned to each of the four ships in Bahrain and four of the eight 
ships in Texas. The "Blue" and "Gold" crews rotate by spending 4 months 
deployed in Bahrain and then 4 months back in Texas. Four remaining 
crews in Texas make up "Silver" crews assigned to the other four ships 
in Texas. 

Figure 8: The U.S.S. Pioneer, a Mine Countermeasure Ship: 

This figure is a photograph of the U.S.S. Pioneer, a mine 
countermeasure ship. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

High Speed Vessel (HSV) 2 Swift: 

The HSV-2 Swift is a high-speed wave-piercing aluminum-hulled catamaran 
that was acquired as an interim mine warfare command and support ship 
and a platform for conducting joint experimentation, including Littoral 
Combat Ship program development. The Swift has about 45 crew members 
(officer and enlisted). The Navy leased and accepted delivery of the 
Swift from the builder, Bollinger/Incat, in August 2003. 

The Swift utilizes Blue-Gold crewing to maximize operational 
availability. The "Blue" crew is based in Ingleside, Texas, and the 
"Gold" crew in Little Creek, Virginia. Each crew operates the ship for 
about 117 days, with 3-4 day crew exchanges occurring wherever the ship 
happens to be at the end of that period whether homeport or at overseas 
locations. 

Figure 9: The HSV-2 Swift: 

This figure is a photograph of the HSV-2 Swift. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Littoral Combat Ship: 

The Littoral Combat Ship is a new class of Navy surface combatants that 
is intended to be fast, agile, and tailorable to the specific missions 
of antisurface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and mine warfare in 
heavily contested littoral and near-shore waters. Interchangeable 
mission packages will be used to assure access to the littorals for 
Navy forces in the face of threats from surface craft, submarines, and 
mines. The Navy plans to build 55 of these ships over the life of the 
program, as well as 24 mine-warfare mission packages, 24 surface- 
warfare mission packages, and 16 anti-submarine-warfare mission 
packages. The Littoral Combat Ship core crew, which will man the 
seaframe, will have 40 crewmembers while each mission package will have 
a maximum of 15 personnel onboard, and the aviation detachment will 
have 23. 

In order to increase operational availability, the Navy is exploring 
various rotational crewing options. The first two ships now under 
construction will utilize the Blue-Gold rotational crewing model. As 
more ships are commissioned, the Navy plans to use a rotational crewing 
concept similar to the one employed on mine warfare ships. 
Specifically, the Navy envisions using four crews to operate three 
ships based in the continental United States, of which one ship would 
be forward-deployed at any given time. 

Figure 10: Design Depictions of the Littoral Combat Ship: 

This figure is a combination of design depictions of the Littoral 
Combat ship. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class Multimission Destroyer: 

Developed under the DD(X) destroyer program, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt is 
the lead ship of a class of next-generation multimission destroyers 
tailored for land attack and littoral dominance. The Zumwalt-class will 
provide forward presence and deterrence, and operate as an integral 
part of joint and combined expeditionary forces. The ship has not been 
built, but the first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 2013. 
The planned procurement of the DDG-1000 will be completed by fiscal 
year 2013 with a total of seven ships. Current DDG-1000 plans 
anticipate a crew size of 148 people including a 28 person aviation 
detachment. 

The Navy currently plans to utilize the standard one-ship, one-crew 
model on the DDG-1000. However, in the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap 
report, Fleet Forces Command notes that rotational crewing models are 
being considered for the DDG-1000, likely due to their role as a high- 
demand, low-density asset. 

Figure 11: Design Depiction of the Navy's Next Generation Destroyer, 
DDG-1000: 

This figure is a design depiction of the Navy's next generation 
destroyer, DDG-1000. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Joint High Speed Vessel: 

The Joint High Speed Vessel will provide combatant commanders high- 
speed intratheater sealift mobility with inherent cargo handling and 
the capability of transporting personnel, equipment, and supplies over 
operational distances in support of maneuver and sustainment 
operations. The ship has not been built, but the first ship is planned 
for delivery to the Navy in 2011. According to Navy officials, there 
are eight ships in the current program of record--3 Navy and 5 Army. 
Current Navy plans anticipate a crew size of about 40 persons. Naval 
Sea Systems Command officials explained that crewing alternatives for 
the Joint High Speed Vessel are still under development. Officials also 
explained that the Navy has not selected a material solution for the 
Joint High Speed Vessel and is in source selection for multiple concept 
designs. 

CG(X)-class Cruiser: 

The Navy is currently developing technologies and studying design 
options for a planned new air-and missile-defense surface combatant, 
the CG(X) cruiser. The Navy is currently reviewing an analysis of 
alternatives to determine what capabilities and design the CG(X) will 
have, including nuclear power options. The Navy intends to begin buying 
the CG(X) cruiser in 2011 and amass a total ship force of 19 ships. 
Crew size has not been determined. Naval Sea Systems Command officials 
explained that crewing alternatives for the CG(X) are still under 
development. Officials also explained that the Navy has not selected a 
material solution for CG(X), as it is premilestone A and the Analysis 
of Alternatives is in review within the Navy. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the extent to which the Navy employed a comprehensive 
management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing 
efforts and transform its ship-crewing culture, we interviewed 
officials from the Department of the Navy, Fleet headquarters, and the 
private sector; reviewed relevant Navy practices and speeches by Navy 
leadership; received briefings from relevant officials; and compared 
the Navy's approach with our prior work on best practices for managing 
and implementing organizational transformations. To identify these best 
practices, we reviewed our prior work including GAO, Results-Oriented 
Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations. We reviewed key documents including the Littoral 
Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations and the U.S. Fleet 
Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative Final Report. We also conducted focus 
groups with crews participating in rotational crewing initiatives to 
obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine and ship 
officers and enlisted personnel, as well as to determine the extent to 
which the Navy had transformed its ship-crewing culture. In addition, 
we examined key documents from the Navy's Fleet Training area to 
demonstrate the architecture of an overarching implementation team. 

To assess the extent to which the Navy has developed, disseminated, and 
implemented guidance for rotational crewing on surface ships, we 
interviewed officials from the U.S. Fleet Forces Command; Commander, 
Naval Surface Forces; and Commander, Naval Submarine Forces. We also 
interviewed officials from the Patrol Coastal Class Squadron; Mine 
Countermeasures Squadrons One, Two, and Three; Submarine Group Trident; 
HSV-2 Swift; and the Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron. In addition, 
we obtained and reviewed exchange of command guidance issued by 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and its subordinate commands, 
including the Commander, Mine Warfare Command, Commander Mine 
Countermeasures Squadron Two, Patrol Coastal Class Squadron, and 
Regional Support Organization Norfolk that provided oversight of the 
Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap ships and crews. We also obtained and 
reviewed concept of operations for the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap, the 
Littoral Combat Ship, and guided missile submarine program. To assess 
the potential usefulness and application of concepts of operations we 
reviewed best practices guidance in the Navy, Department of Defense, 
and the Department of Transportation.[Footnote 53] 

To assess the extent to which the Navy has analyzed, evaluated, and 
assessed potential rotational crewing efforts for current and future 
ships, we interviewed officials from the Department of the Navy, Fleet 
headquarters, and the private sector; and received briefings from 
relevant officials. We reviewed and analyzed the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea 
Swap Experiment Analysis Plan and the U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap 
Initiative Final Report. We also reviewed the analysis of alternatives 
guidance contained in DOD and Navy acquisition instructions[Footnote 
54] and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.[Footnote 55] We also 
obtained and analyzed the analysis of alternatives for several ships in 
development, including the DDG-1000, Littoral Combat Ship, and Joint 
High Speed Vessel. To determine military best practices for data 
collection and evaluation, we reviewed several key documents including 
the Guide for Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation 
and the Navy Warfare Development Command's Analysis in Sea Trial 
Experimentation, and prior GAO reports.[Footnote 56] In addition, we 
conducted focus groups with crews participating in rotational crewing 
initiatives to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine 
and surface-ship officers and enlisted personnel, as well as to 
determine the extent to which the Navy collects, analyzes, and 
evaluates rotational crewing data. 

To assess the extent to which the Navy has systematically collected, 
disseminated, and capitalized on lessons learned from past and current 
rotational crewing experiences, we interviewed officials from the 
following Navy commands: Navy Warfare Development Command, Naval 
Surface Forces Command, Mine Countermeasure Class Squadron, Patrol 
Coastal Class Squadron; from the guided missile submarine, HSV-2 Swift, 
and LCS communities; and we conducted 19 focus group meetings with 
rotational crews. We also obtained and reviewed the Atlantic Fleet DDG 
Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan, the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap 
Concept of Operations, the U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative 
Final Report, the Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of 
Operations, and documentation of lessons learned from the guided 
missile destroyer (DDG), mine warfare, and guided missile submarine 
communities. In addition, we queried the Navy Lessons Learned System 
for lessons learned pertaining directly to rotational crewing and 
reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System guidance. We assessed the Navy 
Lessons Learned System by interviewing program officials, requesting 
data queries by these officials and comparing the results of these 
queries with our own data queries, and determined the data were 
sufficiently reliable for our analysis. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 to May 2008, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We conducted our review at 
the following locations: 

Washington, D.C. 

* Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (Integration of Capabilities & Resources): 

- Director, Assessments: 

- Director, Expeditionary Warfare: 

- Director, Surface Warfare: 

- Director, Submarine Warfare: 

* Naval Sea Systems Command: 

- PEO Ships-Combatants: 

- PEO Ships-Amphibious, Auxiliary and Sealift: 

* Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard: 

* Center for Naval Analyses: 

Norfolk, Virginia: 

* U.S. Fleet Forces Command: 

* Commander, Naval Submarine Forces: 

* Deputy Commander, Naval Surface Forces: 

* Navy Warfare Development Command: 

- Navy Lessons Learned System Program Office: 

* U.S.S. Bainbridge (DDG-96): 

* U.S. Coast Guard, Atlantic Area Command, Portsmouth, Virginia: 

* Board of Inspection and Survey: 

Little Creek, Virginia: 

* Patrol Coastal Class Squadron: 

* U.S.S. Squall (PC-7): 

* HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold: 

San Diego, California: 

* Commander, Naval Surface Forces, San Diego, California: 

- Offices of the Naval Surface Forces Command: 

- Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron: 

- Littoral Combat Support Facility: 

- Littoral Combat Ship Training Facility: 

* Commander, U.S. Third Fleet: 

* Naval Base San Diego: 

* Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command: 

Ingleside, Texas: 

* Commander, Mine Countermeasure Class Squadron: 

- Squadron One, Squadron Two, and Squadron Three: 

- U.S.S. Chief (MCM-14): 

Bangor, Washington: 

* Commander, Submarine Group Trident: 

- Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pacific Northwest (formerly 
Trident Refit Facility): 

- Trident Training Facility: 

- U.S.S. Ohio (SSGN-726): 

We held group discussions with selected personnel such as commanding 
officers, executive officers, department heads, and crew members from 
the following units, in the locations noted above: 

* Patrol Coastal Crew Kilo: 

* Patrol Coastal Crew Lima: 

* Mine Countermeasure officers and crews from Constant, Conflict, 
Impervious, and Implicit crews: 

* Ballistic Missile Submarine officers and crews from multiple crews: 

* Guided Missile Submarine officers and crews from Ohio and Michigan 
crews: 

* HSV-2 Swift Blue and Gold Crew commanding officers and executive 
officers and Gold Crew officers and enlisted crews: 

Focus Groups with Crews on Rotational Crewing Ships: 

We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers 
and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus 
groups involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more 
in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be 
obtained from single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group 
methodologies, our design included multiple groups with varying group 
characteristics but some homogeneity--such as rank and responsibility-
-within groups. Most groups involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions 
were held in a structured manner, guided by a moderator who used a 
standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their 
thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus group 
approach was to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine 
and ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations. 

Scope of Our Focus Groups: 

To gain broad perspectives, we conducted 19 separate focus group 
sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted 
personnel involved in crew rotations on a broad range of ship types, 
from small focused mission ships such as patrol coastals to larger, 
more complex ships such as nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed strategic 
missile submarines. Table 3 identifies the composition of the focus 
groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups, participants were 
selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers, enlisted personnel, 
seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts traveled to three naval 
stations to conduct the focus groups. 

Table 3: Number of Focus Groups by Personnel Group and Platform: 

Personnel groups: Junior enlisted personnel; 
Strategic submarines: 1; 
Guided missile submarines: 1; 
Patrol coastal ships: 2; 
HSV-2 Swift: 1; 
Mine countermeasure ships: 3; 
Total groups: 8. 

Personnel groups: Chief petty officers/lead petty officers; 
Strategic submarines: 1; 
Guided missile submarines: 2; 
Patrol coastal ships: 1[A]; 
HSV-2 Swift: -; 
Mine countermeasure ships: 1; 
Total groups: 5. 

Personnel groups: Senior enlisted personnel; 
Strategic submarines: -; 
Guided missile submarines: -; 
Patrol coastal ships: 1; 
HSV-2 Swift: 1; 
Mine countermeasure ships: 1; 
Total groups: 3. 

Personnel groups: Officers; 
Strategic submarines: 2; 
Guided missile submarines: 1; 
Patrol coastal ships: 1[A]; 
HSV-2 Swift: -; 
Mine countermeasure ships: -; 
Total groups: 3. 

Personnel groups: Total; 
Strategic submarines: 4; 
Guided missile submarines: 4; 
Patrol coastal ships: 4; 
HSV-2 Swift: 2; 
Mine countermeasure ships: 5; 
Total groups: 19. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] One Patrol Coastal focus group contained both chief petty officers 
and officers. 

[End of table] 

Methodology for Our Focus Groups: 

We conducted focus groups with all ship communities currently 
participating in rotational crewing. The number of focus groups we 
conducted varied by ship community depending upon ship crew sizes, the 
types of crew member responsibilities (e.g., command, engineering, and 
maintenance) and the experience level of the crew members. We developed 
a guide to assist the moderator in leading the discussions. The guide 
helped the moderator address several topics related to crew rotations: 
training, maintenance, infrastructure and operations, management and 
oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, quality of life, lessons 
learned, and overall satisfaction with the rotational crewing 
experience. We assured participants anonymity of their responses, in 
that names would not be directly linked to their responses. 

Limitations of Focus Groups: 

Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the 
extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, 
(2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make 
decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically 
representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, 
they are intended to generate in-depth information about the focus 
group participants' reasons for the attitudes held toward specific 
topics and to offer insights into the range of concerns and support for 
an issue. 

The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is 
limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of 
Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel from the 19 selected groups. 
Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to assure a 
distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship 
departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third, participants 
were asked questions about their specific experiences with crew 
rotations. The experiences of other Navy ship officers and personnel 
involved in crew rotations, who did not participate in our focus group, 
may have varied. 

Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups, 
but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and 
support our conclusions. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
4000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington. DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. St. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-08-418. "Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing 
Initiatives Would Benefit From Top Level Leadership, Navywide Guidance, 
Comprehensive Analysis and Improved Lessons Learned Sharing," dated 
April 8, 2008 (GAO Code 350966). 

DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. 
Detailed comments on the GAO recommendations are enclosed. 
Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Joseph J. Angello: 

Acting: 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness): 

Enclosure: 
As Stated: 

GAO Draft Report ï¿½ Dated April 8, 2008 GAO Code 350966/GAO-08-418: 

"Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would Benefit 
From Top Level Leadership, Navywide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis 
and Improved Lessons Learned Sharing" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to assign clear leadership and 
accountability for managing rotational crewing efforts. 

DOD Response: Non-concur. The Department of the Navy has clear 
leadership and accountability for the manning of ships and submarines. 
This management structure includes oversight and leadership within both 
operational and administrative chains of command. These organizational 
structures provide for manning, training and equipping all Navy ships 
and submarines regardless of crewing concept. Additional organizational 
structure dedicated to rotational crewing is unnecessary and 
potentially counterproductive. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to establish an overarching 
implementation team to provide day-to-day management oversight of 
rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and integrate efforts, and apply 
their results to the Fleet. 

DOD Response: Non-concur. The Navy already exercises day-to-day 
management to support ship and submarine manning and training. An 
implementation team dedicated to rotational crewing is unnecessary and 
potentially counterproductive. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop and promulgate overarching 
guidance to provide the high-level vision and guidance needed to 
consistently and effectively manage, implement, and evaluate all 
rotational crewing efforts. 

DoD Response: Non-concur. The Navy has sufficient guidance in place to 
provide the high-level vision necessary to manage ship and submarine 
manning. Although rotational crewing includes some unique crew 
considerations and support requirements, the training and support of 
Sailors involved in rotational crewing are little different than those 
for Sailors in the standard crewing process. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Commander, U.S. Fleet 
Forces direct the development and promulgation of concepts of 
operations by all ship communities, using or planning to use rotational 
crewing, that include a description of how rotational crewing may be 
employed and the details of by whom, where, and how it is to be 
accomplished, employed, and executed. 

DoD Response: Partial concur. The Navy already uses appropriate 
concepts for Fleet operations. When or if additional rotational crewing 
is warranted, the Navy will issue specific guidance, instructions, 
and/or concepts of operations. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the 
implementation team, to develop a standardized, systematic method for 
data collection and analysis, assessment and reporting on the results 
of rotational crewing efforts, including a comprehensive cost- 
effectiveness analysis that includes life cycle costs, for all 
rotational crewing efforts. 

DoD Response: Partial concur. The Littoral Combat Ship is the only new 
ship class that currently plans on implementing rotational crewing. The 
Navy has no plans for broad general application of rotational crewing 
to all ship classes, and a standing implementation team and data 
collection is unnecessary. The Navy will conduct appropriate studies to 
determine if and when additional rotational crewing is appropriate 
based on cost effectiveness. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the 
implementation team, to require as part of the mandatory analysis of 
alternatives in the concept refinement phase of the defense acquisition 
process, assessments of potential rotational crewing options for each 
class of surface ship in development, including full life cycle costs 
of each crewing option. 

DoD Response: Partial concur. The Department of Defense agrees that all 
feasible crewing options should be considered during the concept 
refinement phase of the defense acquisition process. Ships determined 
to have a potential advantageous rotational crewing application will 
assess and include this option among the various crewing alternatives 
reported by the Analysis of Alternatives. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to develop overarching guidance to 
ensure the systematic collection and dissemination of lessons learned 
pertaining specifically to rotational crewing. 

DoD Response: Non-concur. The Navy already uses ï¿½lessons learnedï¿½ tools 
as part of the rotational crewing. Further guidance to use these tools 
is not needed. 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Navy to incorporate components of the 
lessons learned approach outlined in the Atlantic Fleet [guided missile 
destroyer] DDG Sea Swap initiative concept of operations, including, 
among other things, establishing a lessons learned team, developing a 
data collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned 
System. 

DoD Response: Non-concur. The Department of the Navy already relies on 
data collection and analysis from ships. Requiring already implemented 
rotational crewing efforts to adopt experimental data collection 
procedures is unnecessary. Procedures are already in place for crews, 
rotational or standard, to provide data to the chain of command to 
identify improvements.

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Patricia Lentini, Assistant 
Director; James R. Bancroft; Renee S. Brown; Karen (Nicole) Harms; 
Jeffrey R. Hubbard; Roderick W. Rodgers; Rebecca Shea; Christopher T. 
Watson; and Johanna Wong made significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See Congressional Budget Office Testimony, The Navy's 2008 
Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs (Washington, D.C., July 24, 
2007) and Congressional Budget Office Testimony, Current and Projected 
Navy Shipbuilding Programs (Washington, D.C., Mar. 14, 2008). 

[2] Testimony of Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval 
Operations, during a Hearing of the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services on Navy Force Structure Requirements, May 
3, 2007. 

[3] See GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and 
Provide Standard Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational 
Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 109-364, ï¿½ 342 (2006). 

[5] A concept of operations provides an overview of the vision, 
purpose, and plan required to develop and implement a specific 
initiative such as rotational crewing on surface ships. By design, the 
concept of operations provides the information and high-level guidance 
needed to enable managers and decision makers to perform their duties 
consistent with and in support of the initiative being implemented. 

[6] Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Atlantic Fleet 
DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan (Norfolk, Va., Mar. 3, 2005) and 
U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap Initiative 
Final Report (Norfolk, Va., June 21, 2007). 

[7] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

[8] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to 
Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July 
24, 2007). 

[9] See GAO, A Call For Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's 
Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges, GAO-08-
93SP (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007); GAO, Fiscal Stewardship: A 
Critical Challenge Facing Our Nation, GAO-07-362SP (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007); and Steven M. Kosiak, Analysis of the FY 2009 Defense 
Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2008). 

[10] See Congressional Budget Office, Crew Rotation in the Navy: The 
Long-Term Effect on Forward Presence (Washington, D.C., October 2007) 
and Center for Naval Analyses, Cost Implications of Sea Swap 
(Alexandria, Va., November 2005). 

[11] GAO-07-943T. 

[12] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the 
Navy's Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan, GAO-06-587T (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 30, 2006). 

[13] In another report we recommended that DOD treat total ownership 
costs as a performance requirement equal in priority to any other 
performance requirement prior to beginning the acquisition program. See 
GAO, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce 
Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 11, 2003). 

[14] Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition 
System (May 12, 2003, and certified current as of Nov. 20, 2007). 

[15] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). Additionally, the Department of the 
Navy issues mandatory procedures to implement DOD's acquisition 
instruction and process including requirements for completing an 
analysis of alternatives in the Secretary of the Navy Instruction 
5000.2C, Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System 
and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Nov. 19, 
2004). 

[16] This process is called the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System. This formal DOD process defines acquisition 
requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs. 

[17] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C. 

[18] A ship based on the west coast of the United States would spend a 
greater portion of its deployment in transit to the Persian Gulf 
operating area than a ship based on the east coast, because of the 
distance. For example, a ship based on the west coast uses about 90 
days of its deployment in transit to and from the Persian Gulf area 
compared to a ship based on the east coast that would spend about 56 
days in-transit. 

[19] Surface ships are continuously having their combat and other 
systems upgraded or replaced so maintaining "identical" configurations 
can be a challenge if not managed and documented through a careful 
configuration control and change order process. Also, despite surface 
ships with the same "design" being built within a few years of each 
other, no two ships are exactly alike and even more differences are 
likely when these ships are built in different shipyards. 

[20] See GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

[21] GAO-03-669. 

[22] GAO-05-10. 

[23] U.S. Fleet Forces Command was established in 2001 to serve as the 
single voice for Fleet requirements and to coordinate standardized 
policy for manning, training, and maintaining Atlantic and Pacific 
Fleet operating forces. 

[24] GAO-03-669. 

[25] Both cross-functional teams in the LCS Community have a Plan of 
Action and Milestones. There is a Manning and Training Plan of Action 
and Milestones and a Maintenance and Logistics Plan of Action and 
Milestones. 

[26] The Board of Inspection and Survey's mission is to develop and 
establish Chief of Naval Operations policy and procedures for trials, 
material inspections, and surveys of ships and service craft, examine 
Naval vessels periodically by a board of Naval officers to determine 
fitness for further service, conduct material inspections and surveys 
of ships and service craft and provide assessment of the material 
readiness of these vessels, provide independent verification of a newly 
constructed ship's readiness for acceptance/delivery, conduct 
environmental protection and Navy Safety and Occupational Health 
oversight and inspection of Naval ships to include equipment, program 
compliance, and training, and compile statistical information and 
analyses on material deficiencies. 

[27] The Commander, Submarine Group Trident, provides policy and 
guidance input on all matters pertaining to strategic missile and 
guided missile submarine operations and readiness. 

[28] The Blue-Gold rotational crewing alternative implemented in the 
ballistic missile submarine community has been successful without an 
implementation team. This underscores a number of factors that 
influence the management of rotational crewing efforts including shared 
experience, the type of rotational crewing, the number of crews, and 
leadership. 

[29] DOD Instruction 5025.01, DOD Directives Program (Oct. 28, 2007). 

[30] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5215.17, Navy Directives 
Issuance System (Jun. 13, 2005). 

[31] Best practices for developing a concept of operations were derived 
from a number of sources, including: Commander U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command Instruction 5401.1, Fleet Concept of Operations Development 
(Sept. 4, 2007); Naval Warfare Development Command concepts of 
operations briefings and fact sheets; Sholom Cohen, Guidelines for 
Developing a Product Line Concept of Operations, Software Engineering 
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pa., August 1999), 
under a contract sponsored by DOD; Department of Transportation, 
Systems Engineering Guidebook for ITS, Version 2.0, (Jan. 2, 2007), and 
others. 

[32] U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile 
Submarine (SSGN) Concept of Operations (February 2006); Commander, 
Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap 
Concept of Operations (Oct. 19, 2005); and U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 
Littoral Combat Ship Platform Wholeness Concept of Operations (Revision 
B) (Mar. 8, 2007). 

[33] The stakeholders included, but were not limited to, the Fleet 
Forces Command, Second Fleet, Fifth Fleet, and Navy Surface Forces 
commanders and staff officials; ship squadrons; fleet training group; 
and Sea Swap ship commanders and crews. 

[34] Commander Naval Surface Forces Instruction 5440.1, Exchange of 
Command Guidance (Feb. 14, 2005). This instruction addressed several 
concerns identified in the 2004 reports by GAO and the Center for Naval 
Analyses. See GAO-05-10 and Center for Naval Analyses, Sea Swap 
Assessment (Alexandria, Va., September 2004). 

[35] Commander Mine Warfare Command Instruction 5400.2, Crew Swap 
Checklist (July 23, 2004). 

[36] Commander Mine Countermeasures Squadron Two Instruction 5400.3, 
Exchange of Command Guidance (Apr. 9, 2007). 

[37] Patrol Coastal Class Squadron (PCRON) Instruction 5440.1A, Patrol 
Coastal (PC) Employment Guide Manual (Aug. 28, 2007). 

[38] Littoral Combat Ship Class Squadron Combined Directives Manual 
(Draft) (February 2008). 

[39] Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Atlantic Fleet 
DDG Sea Swap Experiment Analysis Plan. 

[40] U.S. Fleet Forces Command. U.S. Fleet Forces DDG Sea Swap 
Initiative Final Report. 

[41] Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94, Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29, 
1992). 

[42] The Surface Warfare Enterprise integrates all surface warfare 
stakeholders together in order to provide one voice for policy, 
waterfront execution, and requirements. The Surface Warfare Enterprise 
consists of a board of high-ranking Navy officials led by the 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and three cross-functional teams: 
Sustainment and Modernization, Personnel Readiness, and Strategic 
Financial Management. 

[43] The origin of the DDG-1000 ship dates back to January 1995 when 
the Navy developed a strategy for acquiring a next-generation destroyer 
called DD-21. In May 2001, the Under Secretary of the Navy suspended 
the DD-21 program; however, in November of that same year, the program 
was restructured and renamed the DD(X) program. The ship program 
remained under the name DD(X) until April 2006 when the Navy announced 
that the class and lead ship of the destroyer would carry the 
designation and ship number DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class. 

[44] We were unable to determine to what extent the Navy assessed 
rotational crewing for a fourth ship class in development, the next 
generation guided missile cruiser, because the analysis of alternatives 
had not been completed. 

[45] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C, Implementation and 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (Nov. 19, 2004). The instruction 
states that an analysis of alternatives shall be conducted to assess 
how alternative approaches to a proposed Navy or Marine Corps system 
contribute to the total mission capability of a system of systems or 
family of systems. 

[46] The Navy performed an analysis of multiple concepts between June 
2002 and January 2004 to satisfy the DOD acquisition instruction 
requirement to conduct an analysis of alternatives prior to Milestone A 
decision. The study name, analysis of multiple concepts, reflected an 
earlier interim policy. The Navy also commissioned and completed as 
part of the analysis of multiple concepts a functional solutions 
analysis. The functional solutions analysis study addressed a broad 
range of potential solutions and the results are consistent with the 
study. 

[47] The global fleet station is envisioned to be a persistent sea base 
of operations from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force 
packages within a regional area of interest. Focusing primarily on 
theater security cooperation, global maritime awareness, and tasks 
associated specifically with the War on Terror, the concept offers a 
means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative 
efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners, as well as 
nongovernmental organizations. The Swift has participated in two of 
these missions, the Global Fleet Station Pilot 2007 in the U.S. 
Southern Command area of operations and the Africa Partnership Station 
initiative along the western coast of Africa. 

[48] The DD(X) Operational Requirements Document provided descriptions 
of the ship's multimission capabilities to effectively support the 
national strategy and global military operations. 

[49] Since the program's origin the program requirement has changed 
from 16-24 ships to 8-12 ships, and finally to 7 ships. The DDG-1000 
program is essentially a restructured continuation of the earlier DD-21 
program, and the DDG-1000 will resemble the DD-21 in terms of mission 
orientation and ship design. The DDG-1000 is to be a multimission ship 
with an emphasis on land-attack operations, reflecting a Navy desire to 
replace the large-caliber naval gunfire support capability that the 
Navy lost in 1990-1992, when it removed its four reactivated Iowa-class 
battleships from service. 

[50] The Navy had expected to complete the analysis in 2007. However, 
in response to a question about the timing of the analysis during a 
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 28, 2008, the 
Secretary of the Navy stated "we're still in the process of going 
through that right now. I will say that based on the preliminary 
reviews I've had, we still have a ways to go and I would be hard- 
pressed to give you a definitive date at this point in time." 

[51] Ship communities submit proposed lessons learned to their 
respective fleet commands, which process and validate the proposed 
lessons learned. Approved lessons learned are then forwarded to be 
officially entered into the system. Those identified as deficiencies 
requiring corrective measures are tracked and closed out when resolved. 

[52] Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.37C, Navy Lessons 
Learned System (Mar. 19, 2001). 

[53] Best practices for developing a concept of operations were derived 
from a number of sources, including: Commander U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command Instruction 5401.1, Fleet Concept of Operations Development 
(Sept. 4, 2007); Naval Warfare Development Command concepts of 
operations briefings and fact sheets; Sholom Cohen, Guidelines for 
Developing a Product Line Concept of Operations, Software Engineering 
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pa., August 1999), 
under a contract sponsored by DOD; Department of Transportation, 
Systems Engineering Guidebook for ITS, Version 2.0 (Jan. 2, 2007); and 
others. 

[54] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, (May 12, 2003) and Secretary of the Navy 
Instruction 5000.2C, Implementation and Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (Nov. 19, 2004). 

[55] The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is an Internet-based resource 
maintained by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Knowledge Sharing System program 
office at the Defense Acquisition University. 

[56] See GAO, Military Readiness: Navy's Fleet Response Plan Would 
Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, 
GAO-06-84 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005) and Force Structure: Joint 
Seabasing Would Benefit from a Comprehensive Management Approach and 
Rigorous Experimentation before Services Spend Billions on New 
Capabilities, GAO-07-211 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

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