-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-39		

TITLE:     Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to 
Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the 
Civilian Reserve Corps

DATE:   12/06/2007 
				                                                                         
----------------------------------------------------------------- 

This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-39 
entitled 'Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to 
Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the 
Civilian Reserve Corps' which was released on December 6, 2007.

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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:

November 2007:

Stabilization and Reconstruction:

Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and 
Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps:

GAO-08-39: 

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-08-39, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and 
implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In 
December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential 
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, 
planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the 
United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. 
GAO was asked to report on Stateï¿½s efforts to improve (1) interagency 
planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To 
address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and 
reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private 
research centers. 

What GAO Found:

The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
(S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. 
reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security 
Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the 
frameworkï¿½the Interagency Management System and procedures for 
initiating the frameworkï¿½s use. However, the third elementï¿½a guide for 
planning stabilization and reconstruction operationsï¿½is still in 
progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be 
because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and 
reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agenciesï¿½ roles and 
responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-
upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses 
an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency 
partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for 
the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning 
process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as 
cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. 
S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some 
interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. 
However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of 
civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective 
coordination.

State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly 
to international crises, but key details for establishing and 
maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the 
Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) 
comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to 
international crises and has worked with several agencies to create 
similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to Stateï¿½s 
difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of 
training available to SRC volunteers, other agenciesï¿½ inability to 
secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic 
missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such 
operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, 
State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be 
comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for 
stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, 
civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily 
available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would 
become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 
500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 
2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to 
reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does 
not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues 
related to volunteersï¿½ compensation and benefits that could affect CRC 
recruitment and management would require congressional action. 
Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for 
which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to 
establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs 
for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate 
roles and responsibilities within State for stabilization and 
reconstruction operations and complete development and apply all 
elements of the framework to an actual operation. GAO also recommends 
that when considering authorizing the Civilian Reserve Corps, Congress 
require State to report on its development, annual, and deployment 
costs; types of missions; and obstacles that could affect its 
operations. In comments on a draft of this report, State said it 
partially concurs with the recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-39]. For more information, contact Joseph 
A. Christoff at (202) 512-4128 or [email protected].

[End of section] 

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

State's Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear 
Guidance, and Interagency Support:

State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining 
Rapid Deployment Corps:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Matter for Congressional Consideration:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:

GAO Response to State's Comments:

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: State's Estimated Startup Costs for CRC for Fiscal Years 2007 
through 2009:

Table 2: Agencies and Research Centers Contacted for GAO Review:

Figures:

Figure 1: Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Operations:

Figure 2: Draft Planning Guide for Integrated U.S. Government 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:

Abbreviations:

ACT: Advance Civilian Team: 

ARC: Active Response Corps: 

CRC: Civilian Reserve Corps: 

CRSG: Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group: 

DFA: Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FACT: Field Advance Civilian Team: 

IMS: Interagency Management System: 

IPC: Integration Planning Cell: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive: 

S/CRS: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: 

SRC: Standby Response Corps: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548:

November 6, 2007:

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Vic Snyder: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable W. Todd Akin: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The United States has determined that weak and failing states pose 
significant threats to its national security and is committed to 
helping countries prevent or emerge from conflict. According to the 
Defense Science Board, since the end of the Cold War the United States 
has begun stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 
months, with each operation typically lasting 5 to 8 years.[Footnote 1] 
Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in 2003, an 
internal Department of State (State) report noted that the U.S. 
government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or 
manage stabilization and reconstruction operations. Stabilization and 
reconstruction operations include efforts to re-establish security, 
strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and 
economic well-being.

In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential 
Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which recognized that the United States has a 
significant stake in enhancing its capacity to stabilize and 
reconstruct countries or regions. NSPD-44 directed the Secretary of 
State to coordinate and lead U.S. government stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. The Secretary of State delegated the 
implementation of this directive to the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).[Footnote 2] In addition, the 
directive established a National Security Council (NSC) committee to 
lead interagency efforts to improve planning and coordination for 
reconstruction and stabilization operations and to develop a strong 
civilian response capability. The committee is co-chaired by the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and NSC.

In this report, we review S/CRS's efforts to improve (1) interagency 
planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, and (2) the deployment of civilians to these 
operations.[Footnote 3]

To complete our work, we reviewed the legislation that created S/CRS, 
National Security Presidential Directives, the National Security 
Strategy of the United States, the Foreign Affairs Manual, S/CRS 
planning guidance, plans for several ongoing stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, budget requests, and funding allocations. In 
addition, we interviewed officials from eight executive agencies, 
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense (DOD), 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID); former senior S/CRS 
officials; and experts from U.S. government and private research 
centers. We asked agency officials about their agencies' roles and 
responsibilities for planning and executing stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, the development of a proposed framework for 
planning and executing such operations, and the development of new 
capabilities for deploying U.S. federal government personnel to 
overseas crises. Finally, we reviewed related GAO reports.[Footnote 4] 
We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed 
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

S/CRS is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning 
and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations for 
countries at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The framework 
includes procedures and guidance to plan and coordinate reconstruction 
and stabilization operations under NSPD-44. NSC has adopted two of 
three elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System 
(IMS), and procedures for initiating the framework's use.[Footnote 5] 
However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and 
reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine 
how effective the framework will be since it has not been fully applied 
to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, 
guidance on the roles and responsibilities of State's bureaus and 
offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon 
definition for what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction 
operation poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, 
some interagency partners said senior officials have shown limited 
support for the framework and for S/CRS, and some described the 
proposed interagency planning process, as outlined in early versions of 
the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the 
results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the 
framework by addressing agencies' concerns and providing training to 
interagency participants. However, differences between the planning 
capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the 
military pose obstacles to effective coordination.

State has begun developing three civilian corps--another element of the 
framework--to deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details 
for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, 
State created two units--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the 
Standby Response Corps (SRC)--comprised of U.S. government employees to 
act as first responders to international crises. State also has 
collaborated with other U.S. government agencies involved in such 
operations to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited 
due to (1) State's difficulties in achieving planned staffing levels 
for ARC and providing training opportunities available to SRC 
volunteers, (2) other agencies' inability to secure resources for 
operations unrelated to their core missions, and (3) the possibility 
that deploying agency staff and SRC volunteers would result in staff 
shortages at their home units. Second, in 2004, State began developing 
the initial concept for the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would 
be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for 
stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, 
police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not 
readily available within the U.S. government. CRC personnel would 
become full-time term federal employees once they are deployed. S/CRS 
developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has 
approved a plan to expand the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In 
May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million 
to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to 
obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' 
compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and 
management would require congressional actions. Furthermore, State has 
not yet clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be 
deployed. Finally, State has estimated costs for establishing CRC and 
keeping it ready to deploy. However, these estimates do not include 
costs for deploying CRC personnel to other countries or sustaining them 
while there.

We recommend that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate roles 
and responsibilities within the Department of State for stabilization 
and reconstruction operations, and work with interagency partners to 
complete and test the framework by applying all of its elements to an 
actual operation. We also recommend that Congress, when considering 
whether to authorize the establishment of CRC, should consider 
requiring the Secretary to report on CRC's development, sustainment, 
deployment, and the types of operations for which it would be used, and 
potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and 
deployment of volunteers, to better understand the long-term fiscal and 
oversight commitments that would accompany its authorization.

The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State provided written 
comments on a draft of this report (see apps. II and III). State's 
comments included a joint response from State, DOD, and USAID. Commerce 
stated that the report provided a good overview of the new planning 
process but did not comment on the report's recommendations. State 
partially concurred with GAO's recommendations but noted that recent 
progress S/CRS made developing the planning and coordination framework 
and CRC was under reported. In the joint State, DOD, and USAID 
response, the agencies stated they are committed to the new framework 
and reiterated State's point that the draft report did not reflect the 
achievements made over recent months. The agencies did not comment on 
the report's recommendations or matter for congressional consideration. 
The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and State 
and USAID also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of Homeland Security 
and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft report but did not 
comment. We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not 
reflect changes that have occurred since the completion of our 
fieldwork. We completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and 
included in our draft report discussions and assessments on the 
framework elements NSC approved in March 2007 and on civilian response 
mechanisms. Our draft report did not include NSC-approved details for 
ARC, SRC, and CRC because those details were not provided until October 
2007. We incorporated this new information into our final report, as 
well as other information from written and technical comments from six 
agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the 
status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007.

Background:

Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the fall of 
2003, an internal State report concluded that the U.S. government had 
no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or manage 
stabilization and reconstruction operations; and the United States had 
relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts. 
State recommended the establishment of a new office to provide a 
centralized, permanent structure for planning and coordinating the 
civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Accordingly, in August 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced the 
creation of S/CRS to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and 
resource responses to complex emergencies, failing and failed states, 
and post-conflict environments. Such efforts could involve establishing 
security, building basic public services, and supporting economic 
development. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted 
statutory authorization for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of 
State.[Footnote 6]

In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the 
coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and 
stabilization operations. NSPD-44 assigned the Secretary of State 
responsibility for planning and coordinating U.S. government 
stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at 
risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The 
Secretary, in turn, delegated implementation of the directive to the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 identifies 
the specific roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements of 
U.S. government agencies that would likely participate in stabilization 
and reconstruction operations. It also requires State to lead the 
development of a civilian response capability, including the capacity 
to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to 
overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC Policy 
Coordination Committee[Footnote 7] for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
Operations, which is co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization and NSC, and is comprised of representatives from 
other executive agencies.

State's Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear 
Guidance, and Interagency Support:

S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning 
and coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations. NSC 
has adopted two of three elements of the framework--the Interagency 
Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element-- 
a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is 
still in progress. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully 
applied to any operation. In addition, guidance on roles and 
responsibilities for State's bureaus and offices is unclear and 
inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition of a 
stabilization and reconstruction operation poses an obstacle to 
interagency collaboration. In addition, some interagency partners have 
shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners 
described the proposed interagency planning process as cumbersome and 
time consuming. S/CRS is taking steps to strengthen the framework's 
effectiveness by addressing agencies' concerns and providing training 
to interagency partners, but differences between the planning 
capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the 
military pose obstacles to effective coordination.

S/CRS Has Led the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning 
and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:

S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for 
developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD- 
44. Sixteen U.S. agencies participated in NSC interagency working 
groups tasked with developing the framework,[Footnote 8] including DOD. 
The framework is intended to guide the development of U.S. planning for 
reconstruction and stabilization operations by facilitating 
coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the 
framework include:

* the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority 
and highly complex crises and operations; 

* a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization 
operations, and; 

* procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS 
and the planning guide.[Footnote 9]

IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high- 
priority and highly complex crises and operations. IMS is a system for 
guiding communication and coordination between Washington policymakers 
and Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. In March 
2007, NSC approved IMS and, with the Cabinet Secretaries and Deputy 
Secretaries, would determine whether IMS is required for a specific 
operation. If IMS is used, it would consist of three interagency 
groups: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), an 
Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) 
(see fig. 1).

CRSG would be responsible for developing and integrating U.S. 
government policies, integrating civilian and military plans, and 
mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. It would be comprised of the NSC policy coordination 
committee responsible for the country or region and would be supported 
by a secretariat comprised of staff from multiple agencies that develop 
the plans in conjunction with Chiefs of Mission and the U.S. military. 
CRSG also would mobilize resources, monitor and evaluate 
implementation, and coordinate with international partners.

IPC would be responsible for integrating U.S. civilian agencies' plans 
with military operations. IPC members would include civilian agency 
staff with country-specific, functional, or planning expertise. IPC 
would be located at the headquarters of the military combatant command 
responsible for planning military operations but would report to the 
CRSG rather than the combatant commander. IPC would not be formed when 
planning and implementing operations that do not require military 
actions.

ACT would be deployed to the U.S. embassy, if one exists, to set up, 
coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation 
planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and 
military field commanders. ACT could be supported by Field Advance 
Civilian Teams (FACT) to help implement reconstruction and 
stabilization programs at the provincial or local levels.

Figure 1: Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Operations: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the Interagency Management System for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The following 
relationships are depicted:

Headquarters, Civilian:
* National Security Council; 
- Principals Committee; 
- Deputies Committee; 
* Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group [A] (Policy 
Coordination Committee and Staff). 

Headquarters, Military: 
* Combatant Command. 

The Integration Planning Cell [A] overlaps both Civilian and Military, 
with a direct relationship between the National Security Council and 
the Combatant Command. 

Field: Civilian; 
Embassy or Ambassador (or existing U.S. government presence): 
* Advance Civilian Team [A]; 
- Field Advance Civilian Team (3 depicted).

Field, Military: 
* Joint Task Force or Theater Commander; 
- Field Commander. 

The illustration also depicts the following direct relationships:
Embassy or Ambassador (or existing U.S. government presence) with Joint 
Task Force or Theater Commander; 
Field Advance Civilian Team with Field Commander. 

Sources: GAO analysis of Interagency Management System for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization and S/CRS documents. 

[A] Bodies developed under NSPD-44.

Note: The U.S. military may or may not be involved in specific 
operations. The figure shows operations that include U.S. military 
efforts. NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S. 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts with foreign governments, 
multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Although 
important, these areas lie outside the scope of our review and are not 
included in the figure. 

[End of figure] 

The second element of the framework, the planning guide, has not been 
approved by NSC because State is rewriting the guide to address 
interagency concerns. Although NSC is not required to approve the 
planning guide, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would 
strengthen the framework's overall standing among interagency partners. 
Without NSC approval, the framework lacks the authority needed for 
interagency use. The planning guide divides planning for stabilization 
and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, 
strategy development, and implementation planning (see fig. 2). As 
currently envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at 
each level should be achievable; have well-defined measures for 
determining progress; and have goals, objectives, and planned 
activities that are clearly linked. At the first level of planning, 
policy formulation, Washington-based policymakers would articulate the 
overall goal or desired outcome the United States plans to 
achieve.[Footnote 10] At the second level, strategy development, the 
same Washington policymakers, in conjunction with the relevant Chiefs 
of Mission, would define the major objectives and essential tasks 
necessary to achieve the overarching policy goal, the resources 
necessary for completing each objective, and the implementing agency or 
bureau. At the third level, implementation planning, the agencies, 
bureaus, and overseas posts responsible for implementing the programs 
and tasks for achieving the objectives would develop work plans, 
resource requirements, and metrics for monitoring progress.

Figure 2: Draft Planning Guide for Integrated U.S. Government 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:

[See PDF for image] 

The figure is an illustration of the Draft Planning Guide for 
Integrated U.S. Government Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. 
The following data is depicted:

Planning level: Policy Formulation; 
* Assesses conflict; 
* Develops goals; 
Plan elements: Overarching policy or goal.

Planning level: Strategy Development; 
* Develops strategies, including identification of metrics and 
resources; 
* Identifies essential tasks; 
* Determines lead agency or bureau for each task; 
* Tracks other donor contributions; 
Plan elements: Major mission objectives.

Planning level: Implementation planning; 
* Develops and monitors task metrics; 
* Provides budget information; 
* Tracks program management; 
Plan elements: Tasks for each mission objective.

Sources: GAO analysis of draft planning guide for reconstruction and 
stabilization and S/CRS documents. 

[End of figure]

The third element, which the NSC approved in March 2007, establishes 
procedures for using the framework when agencies are responding to an 
actual or imminent crisis or engaging in long-term scenario-based 
planning. Factors that may trigger a U.S. response to a crisis include 
the potential for significant military action in the near-term; actual 
or imminent state failure; events with significant potential to 
undermine regional stability and development progress, such as coups, 
economic collapse, or severe environmental damage; large-scale 
displacement of people; and impending or actual genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, or massive and grave human-rights violations. Planning for 
crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC (including the Cabinet 
Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, or Policy Coordination Committees) or 
by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of 
Defense. Long-term scenario planning may be conducted for crises that 
may emerge within 2 to 3 years. NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional 
Assistant Secretaries of State may request the initiation of long-term 
scenario-based planning based on five criteria: (1) the potential 
impact on U.S. national security and foreign-policy objectives; (2) the 
regional impact or scale of humanitarian needs; (3) the potential for 
significant U.S. military involvement; (4) the probability of a crisis 
occurring, as indicated by U.S. government agencies, the United 
Nations, or other international organizations; and (5) the ability of 
the affected country or neighboring countries to respond to a crisis.

As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any 
stabilization and reconstruction operation. S/CRS and interagency 
partners have used draft versions of the planning guide to plan 
operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo, but implementation of the 
resulting plans has been limited. Only the plan for Haiti was 
implemented. The plan for Sudan was not implemented because it was 
completed just as the government of Sudan and opposition groups signed 
a peace accord. Interagency planning for potential operations in Kosovo 
is ongoing.

According to State officials, the administration is using interagency 
processes created in NSPD-1 National Security Council System for 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. NSPD-1 established the process for 
coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and 
implementation of national security policies, which includes the 
interagency Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and policy 
coordination committees.[Footnote 11] In May 2004, the President issued 
NSPD-36 to direct U.S. operations in Iraq following the transfer of 
sovereignty to the Iraqi government. This directive made State 
responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all 
U.S. government employees, policies, and activities in Iraq, except 
those under the command of an area military commander or seconded to an 
international organization. According to the directive, the Commander 
of the U.S. Central Command--under the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretary of Defense--continues to be responsible for 
U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq, 
including U.S. efforts in support of training and equipping Iraqi 
security forces. In April 2006, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and the 
U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq developed their first joint campaign 
plan for Iraq and issued a revision to their joint plan in July 2007.

Guidance Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and a Common 
Definition for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations:

We found that NSPD-44, related State and administration guidance, and 
the planning framework collectively do not provide clear direction in 
three key areas. First, S/CRS's roles and responsibilities conflict 
with those assigned to State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission 
in the Foreign Affairs Manual. Second, guidance is inconsistent 
regarding S/CRS's responsibilities for conflict prevention efforts, 
which could compromise the office's ability to fulfill its mandate. 
Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and 
stabilization operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration.

First, S/CRS's roles and responsibilities conflict with those of 
State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. In October 2005, we 
reported that collaborating agencies must agree on how to lead 
collaborative efforts.[Footnote 12] According to the Foreign Affairs 
Manual, each regional bureau is responsible for U.S. foreign relations 
with countries within a given region, including providing overall 
direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in the 
region.[Footnote 13] In addition, Chiefs of Mission have authority over 
all U.S. government staff and activities in their countries.[Footnote 
14] As S/CRS initially interpreted NSPD-44, S/CRS's roles and 
responsibilities included leading, planning, and coordinating 
stabilization and reconstruction operations; these responsibilities 
conflict with those of the regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. S/
CRS officials stated that they expected the next version of the Foreign 
Affairs Manual to include a clearly defined and substantive description 
of the office's roles.

Second, guidance varies regarding S/CRS's responsibility for preventing 
conflicts. NSPD-44 and the memo announcing S/CRS's creation include 
conflict prevention as one of the office's responsibilities. However, 
S/CRS's authorizing legislation and the State memo aligning S/CRS with 
the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) do not explicitly include 
conflict prevention as a responsibility. Ambiguity about S/CRS's 
prevention role could result in inadequate prevention efforts. A DOD 
official in the Global Strategic Partnerships office stated that 
responsibility for prevention is not currently assigned to anyone, and 
the work might not be done without such an assignment.

Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and 
stabilization operations poses an obstacle to effective collaboration 
under the framework. In our October 2005 report, we found that 
collaborative efforts require agency staff to define and articulate a 
common outcome or purpose.[Footnote 15] While the framework includes 
definitions for reconstruction and stabilization, it does not define 
what constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations or explain 
how these operations differ from other types of military and civilian 
foreign assistance operations, such as counterinsurgency operations, 
counterterrorism operations, and standard development assistance. In 
addition, while S/CRS has developed a list of basic terms related to 
reconstruction and stabilization, staff from other bureaus and agencies 
had different definitions of these terms. As a result, it is not clear 
when agencies and bureaus are expected to apply the framework. S/CRS 
staff said that it is difficult to clearly define reconstruction and 
stabilization and difficult to determine when a response to a crisis 
constitutes a reconstruction or stabilization operation. Prior GAO work 
shows that the lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to 
improved planning and coordination of reconstruction and stabilization 
operations. In our previous report on DOD's stability operations 
approach, GAO found that the lack of a clear and consistent definition 
of stability operations caused confusion among military planners and 
limited progress in strengthening stability-operations 
capability.[Footnote 16]

Civilian Interagency Partners Have Concerns about S/CRS and the 
Planning Framework:

State and other U.S. civilian agencies have concerns about the planning 
framework for three key reasons. First, some civilian interagency 
partners are concerned that S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles 
and responsibilities. Staff from one of State's regional bureaus 
believed that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with 
the Regional Assistant Secretary's responsibility for leading an 
operation and coordinating with interagency partners. USAID staff noted 
how their agency had planned and coordinated reconstruction operations 
in the past and questioned why S/CRS now had these roles. Although most 
agency staff and outside experts we interviewed agreed that interagency 
coordination should improve, some USAID and State employees questioned 
why NSC was not given the primary role for planning and coordinating 
stabilization and reconstruction operations or for implementing NSPD- 
44.

USAID and regional bureau staffs also said some aspects of the planning 
framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant since 
interagency teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing 
operations in accordance with NSPD-1. For example, planning for U.S. 
assistance to Sudan and Darfur before 2005 was led by State's Bureau of 
African Affairs. In 2005, S/CRS applied an early version of the 
planning guide to ongoing efforts in Sudan. USAID staff involved in 
both the regional bureau-led planning and S/CRS-led planning stated 
they were frustrated that S/CRS staff were not well-versed in Sudan 
policy and had to be educated before planning could occur. Other staff 
said S/CRS should focus more on filling the gaps in planning and 
operational mechanisms and focus less on policy development.

Concerns about roles and responsibilities have led to confusion and 
disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource 
allocation. As a result, some of State's regional bureaus have resisted 
applying the new interagency planning process to particular 
reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS staff said one 
regional bureau discouraged the office's involvement in a country that 
S/CRS identified as appropriate for the framework; another bureau is 
generally reluctant to allow S/CRS to participate in its efforts in the 
region. In addition, State and other agency staff said S/CRS had 
conflicts with DFA over which office controlled resource allocation for 
these operations. These disputes made it difficult for S/CRS to 
coordinate and plan reconstruction and stabilization operations using 
the framework.

Second, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have 
provided limited support for S/CRS and its planning framework. In our 
October 2005 report, we stated that committed leadership from all 
levels of an organization is needed to overcome the barriers that exist 
when working across agency boundaries.[Footnote 17] Staffs from various 
State offices said senior officials did not communicate strong support 
for S/CRS or the expectation that State and interagency partners should 
follow its framework for planning and coordinating reconstruction and 
stabilization operations. In addition, S/CRS was not selected to lead 
planning for recent high-priority operations. When the office was 
created in 2004, S/CRS and other State officials agreed that it would 
not focus efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq because these operations had 
existing processes, and policymakers feared that the scope of those 
operations would overwhelm S/CRS. However, S/CRS has not been given key 
roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as the 
ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and 
experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to 
address. These officials and experts stated that S/CRS has a large 
responsibility but little authority and no resources to achieve it.

Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined 
in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for 
the results it produces. Officials who participated in the planning for 
Haiti stated that the process provided more systematic planning, better 
identification of interagency goals and responsibilities, and better 
identification of sequencing and resource requirements. However, some 
officials involved in planning operations for Haiti and Sudan stated 
that using the framework was time consuming, involved long meetings and 
extra work hours for staff, and was cumbersome to use because it was 
overly focused on process details. Staff also said that, in some cases, 
the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources, 
particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer. Other officials 
were frustrated when S/CRS processes were applied to interagency 
planning efforts that they believed were already functioning. As a 
result of these concerns, officials from some offices and agencies 
expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future reconstruction and 
stabilization plans.

State Is Taking Steps to Revise and Strengthen the Framework:

State is taking steps to strengthen the framework by revising and 
updating its draft planning guide based on feedback from other agencies 
and participants. S/CRS said it would commit to ensuring that the S/
CRS-facilitated planning process is not duplicative or overly 
burdensome relative to its results and intends to provide assistance to 
State regional bureaus.[Footnote 18] S/CRS also said the revisions 
would provide more details about the framework's implementation at the 
field level and metrics to assess progress.

State officials also said S/CRS's realignment under DFA would 
strengthen S/CRS's control over reconstruction and stabilization 
resources. On March 12, 2007, the Secretary of State aligned S/CRS with 
DFA, while still maintaining a direct reporting relationship between S/
CRS and the Office of the Secretary. DFA is charged with reorganizing 
U.S. foreign assistance and has authority over all State and USAID 
foreign-assistance funding and programs. However, it is not clear how 
the change will affect S/CRS's role and the use of the framework. DFA 
has procedures and tools to guide the development of operational plans 
for foreign assistance, and its staff said some of those processes 
would likely be applied to S/CRS planning.

According to S/CRS officials, S/CRS and DFA have recently developed a 
more productive working relationship than they had in the past. For 
example, the two organizations recently settled a dispute over funds 
State could receive from DOD under section 1207 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. This act authorized the 
Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year in fiscal 
years 2006 and 2007 to State to be applied to stabilization and 
reconstruction operations.[Footnote 19] According to State and DOD 
staff, in 2006 only $10 million was transferred to State due to a 
dispute between S/CRS and DFA over which office controlled the money. 
However, according to the March 2007 memo aligning S/CRS with DFA, S/
CRS would be responsible for overseeing the transfer and use of these 
funds. S/CRS provided documents that indicated that State had obligated 
approximately $99.7 million of the $100 million available under section 
1207 for fiscal year 2007. This funding was applied to ongoing 
stabilization and reconstruction operations in Haiti, Nepal, Columbia, 
Yemen, and Somalia; to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership; 
and to infrastructure, economic development, rule of law programs, and 
counterterrorism activities in the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. In addition, S/CRS participated in DFA's review of U.S. 
assistance to some countries for fiscal year 2008 and, as S/CRS 
acquires new staff, it plans to assume responsibility for the budget 
process of countries in DFA's "rebuilding" category.[Footnote 20]

Although S/CRS has not finished updating the framework guide or 
determined its role under DFA, it has taken other steps to strengthen 
the use of the framework and prepare interagency partners to coordinate 
effectively. For example, S/CRS offers Foreign Service Institute 
courses to train interagency participants in planning stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, leading and managing interagency 
coordination for such operations, and applying tools for early warning 
and conflict assessment. S/CRS reported that 352 federal employees 
participated in its training courses in 2006 and 452 employees 
participated in 2007.[Footnote 21] The majority of participants were 
from State, DOD, and USAID, although S/CRS reported that staff from 
seven other agencies also attended classes. Course instructors said it 
was difficult to attract participants from other agencies and described 
advertising to those agencies as ad hoc, in part because the Foreign 
Service Institute does not have an up-to-date list of contacts. S/CRS 
staff said they were exploring other strategies for recruiting course 
participants, such as identifying key agency leaders who agree that 
their staffs should attend.[Footnote 22] S/CRS also has developed tools 
and information to strengthen reconstruction and stabilization 
operations, such as information on guiding concepts and terms and tools 
for early warning and prevention, assessing best practices, and 
applying lessons learned.

Differences between Military and Civilian Planning Pose Obstacles to 
Coordination:

Although S/CRS made efforts to strengthen both coordination and the 
commitment of key DOD officials to the goals of S/CRS, several 
differences in military and civilian planning capacities and procedures 
pose obstacles to effective coordination.[Footnote 23] First, 
differences in planning capacities and resources make coordination 
difficult. In our report on DOD's stability operations 
approach,[Footnote 24] we found that DOD and non-DOD organizations do 
not fully understand each other's planning processes, and non-DOD 
organizations have limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range 
of planning activities. State officials noted its planning differs from 
DOD's; State is more focused on current operations and less focused on 
the wide range of potential contingency operations for which DOD must 
plan. State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to 
DOD's combatant commands. DOD officials noted that their efforts to 
include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts were 
stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer. 
State officials indicated it does not have DOD's capacity to staff 
operations and planning; both DOD and State staff doubted that civilian 
capacity and resources would ever match the levels desired.

Second, State generally does not receive DOD military plans as they are 
being developed, which restricts its ability to harmonize 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts with military plans and 
operations as required by NSPD-44. DOD does not have a process in place 
to share, when appropriate, information with non-DOD agencies early in 
plan development without specific approval from the Secretary of 
Defense.[Footnote 25] DOD's hierarchical approach limits interagency 
participation while plans are being developed by the combatant commands 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. NSPD-44 working 
groups are developing a process for reviewing military plans, when 
appropriate, but are not yet ready to use it.

Third, agency staff and outside experts have found that differences in 
organizational structure, terminology, and information systems pose 
obstacles to effective coordination between military and civilian 
agencies. For example, S/CRS found that differences between civilian 
agencies' headquarters and field organization and the strategic, 
operational, and tactical organization of the military can make 
coordination more difficult.[Footnote 26] The Administration's July 
2007 report to Congress stated it was developing common standards and 
systems, including blogs and other technologies, to address 
inconsistencies in U.S. information management systems and to support 
interagency collaboration and communication.[Footnote 27]

In our stability operations report,[Footnote 28] we recommended that 
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, 
provide implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate 
and encourage interagency participation in the development of military 
plans; develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD 
agencies early in the planning process, as appropriate; and orient DOD 
and non-DOD personnel in each agency's planning processes and 
capabilities. In commenting on the report, DOD said it partially agreed 
with our recommendations but did not indicate the steps it would take 
to implement them.

State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining 
Rapid Deployment Corps:

State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to 
international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing 
and maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the 
department--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response 
Corps (SRC)--and has collaborated with several other U.S. government 
agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however, 
face challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties 
in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training 
opportunities for State's SRC volunteers, (2) agencies' inabilities to 
secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core 
missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying volunteers could 
result in their home units having insufficient staff. Second, in May 
2007, State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps 
(CRC), which would be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and 
experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, 
such as civil engineers, police officers, judges, and public 
administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S. 
government. If deployed, reservists would become federal employees. 
State, however, does not yet have congressional authority to establish 
the CRC or to provide the planned benefits package for CRC personnel. 
In addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for 
which CRC would be deployed. Further, State has estimated the costs for 
establishing and keeping CRC ready to deploy, including costs for 
recruiting, training, equipping CRC personnel, but these estimates do 
not include the costs of deploying CRC personnel to other countries or 
sustaining them once deployed.

State, USAID, and the Department of the Treasury Have Developed Some 
Internal Capacity to Deploy Staff Rapidly in Support of Stabilization 
and Reconstruction Operations:

To meet NSPD-44 requirements for developing a strong civilian response 
capability, State and other U.S. agencies developed internal mechanisms 
to reassign personnel in support of stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. S/CRS has taken the lead in expanding State's internal 
capacity to respond to conflict by creating ARC and SRC.[Footnote 29] 
S/CRS also collaborated with several other U.S. government agencies to 
initiate the development of ARC and SRC units within those agencies.

In 2006, State developed ARC within S/CRS to deploy during the initial 
stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS has 15 
temporary staff positions for ARC; ARC staff serve 1-year rotations. In 
October 2007, 10 of the 15 authorized positions were staffed. ARC staff 
deploy to unstable environments to assess countries' or regions' needs 
and help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. 
Since 2006, ARC staff have deployed to seven locations: (1) Sudan, to 
help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; (2) Eastern Chad, to monitor 
the displacement of civilians resulting from the conflict in Darfur; 
(3) Lebanon, to assist with the evacuation of American citizens and to 
coordinate assistance immediately following the Israeli-Hezbollah 
conflict; (4) Kosovo, to help plan for a follow-on to the United 
Nations Mission to Kosovo; (5) Liberia, to coordinate reforms of the 
security sector; (6) Iraq, to assist with integrating new Provincial 
Reconstruction Team members; and (7) Haiti, to plan the implementation 
and oversight of programs to improve security, local government 
capacity, and economic opportunity in Citï¿½ Soleil. According to S/CRS, 
regional bureau staff, and State's Office of the Inspector General, ARC 
involvement and performance in these operations has been positive. When 
not deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning 
exercises and work with other S/CRS offices and State bureaus on 
related issues to gain relevant expertise.

SRC would deploy during the second stage of a surge to stabilization 
and reconstruction operations. SRC works to support activities of ARC 
when additional staff or specialized skills are required. Unlike ARC, 
SRC does not have not dedicated staff positions. Rather, when not 
deployed, current employees on the SRC roster serve in other capacities 
throughout State. Currently, SRC is composed of about 90 State 
employees and 210 State retirees. In July 2007, NSC approved S/CRS 
plans to increase SRC to a roster of 500 volunteers government-wide by 
fiscal year 2008, and to a roster of 2,000 volunteers government-wide 
by fiscal year 2009. If called upon, SRC members would be available for 
deployment within 60 days and could be deployed for up to 6 months. 
According to S/CRS staff, the office aims to have up to one-quarter of 
this standby corps ready for deployment at any one time. However, to 
date, S/CRS has deployed SRC members to only two ongoing operations: 
one to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and one to Chad 
to support refugees from Eastern Darfur.

Although S/CRS has started working with other U.S. agencies to 
establish units similar to ARC and SRC, these efforts are in very early 
stages. Currently, only USAID and the Department of the Treasury have 
established mechanisms for responding rapidly to stability and 
reconstruction missions. USAID uses the Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives to respond to 
conflict situations.[Footnote 30] In addition, USAID has started 
developing its own internal surge capacity and has identified 15 staff 
available for immediate deployment to crises. USAID's Bureau of 
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance developed a proposal 
to create a civilian reserve office to respond to stabilization and 
reconstruction operations and requested funds to hire, train, equip, 
and deploy more than 50 staff specifically for this purpose. The 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance has ongoing 
programs around the world and intends to build the capacity to lead 
long-term stability operations.[Footnote 31] In addition, the Office of 
Technical Assistance developed the First Responder Initiative in 2004, 
which includes approximately 30 staff who are willing to deploy rapidly 
to conflict areas in support of stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.

State and Other Agencies Face Challenges That Limit Their Efforts to 
Establish and Deploy Rapid Response Units:

State and other agencies face challenges in establishing their rapid 
response capabilities. These challenges include (1) difficulties in 
achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training 
opportunities for State's SRC volunteers, (2) agencies' inability to 
secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core 
missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying agency staff and SRC 
volunteers would result in staff shortages in their home units.

S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting for ARC 
and training SRC members. S/CRS plans to increase the number of 
authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions to 33 
permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request. 
However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that State will 
receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Although S/CRS has not 
had difficulty recruiting SRC volunteers, it does not presently have 
the capacity to ensure they are properly trained for participating in 
stabilization and reconstruction operations. ARC staff and SRC 
volunteers would be required to complete five courses offered jointly 
by S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute. According to S/CRS staff, 
the Foreign Service Institute does not currently have the capacity to 
train the 1,500 new volunteers S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is 
studying ways to correct the situation.

Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and 
reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff 
available for rapid responses to overseas crises. Most agencies' 
missions are domestic in nature. Nonetheless, domestic policy agencies, 
including the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, operate 
overseas programs. However, officials from these agencies said 
international programs are viewed as extensions of their domestic 
missions.[Footnote 32] As a result, it is difficult for these agencies 
to secure funding for cadres of on-call first and second responders.

Finally, State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can 
leave home units without sufficient staff and, as a result, they must 
weigh the value of deploying volunteers against the needs of their 
units. For example, when not deployed to stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, current State SRC volunteers serve normal 
duty rotations at overseas posts or within State's various bureaus and 
offices within the United States. According to State's Office of the 
Inspector General, S/CRS has had difficulty getting State's other units 
to release the SRC volunteers it wants to deploy in support of 
stabilization and reconstruction operations.[Footnote 33] The home 
units of the volunteers do not want to become short of staff or lose 
high-performing staff to other operations. Other agencies reported a 
reluctance to deploy staff overseas or establish on-call units because 
doing so would leave fewer workers available to complete the offices' 
work requirements. Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify, 
train, and deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction 
operations provided that State fund the efforts. According to S/CRS 
staff, however, the training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC 
would not begin until fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 34]

S/CRS Has Made Efforts to Establish CRC:

In 2004, S/CRS developed an initial concept for CRC, which would be 
deployed in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. CRC 
would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences 
useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil 
engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are 
not readily available within the U.S. government. Reservists would 
serve 4-year terms of voluntary service and, if called upon, would 
deploy for rotations of up to 1 year. Reservists would remain in their 
daily jobs until called upon for service and would be ready for 
deployment within 30 to 60 days. Deployed CRC personnel would be 
classified as full-time term federal employees, with the authority to 
speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and 
employees. Volunteers would receive training upon joining CRC and would 
be required to complete annual training. In addition, they would 
receive training specific and relevant to an operation immediately 
before deployment.

According to S/CRS staff, NSC has approved plans to develop a roster of 
2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009; however, a BearingPoint study 
commissioned by S/CRS found that CRC would require at least 3,550 
volunteers to respond to CRC goals.[Footnote 35] The BearingPoint study 
also noted that decisions about CRC's roster size would likely evolve 
over time.[Footnote 36] In addition, a panel of experts convened by the 
Congressional Research Service concluded that the proposed roster may 
represent only a portion of what is likely required.[Footnote 37] The 
panel noted that simultaneously deploying CRC to two large and one 
small operation, as defined by BearingPoint, could require deploying 
the entire CRC roster.[Footnote 38] S/CRS staff said the office would 
assess whether to expand the roster in subsequent years.

CRC Lacks Congressional Authority in Key Areas and a Clearly Defined 
Mission:

State cannot spend any funds for the CRC until Congress has authorized 
the CRC's establishment. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority 
to reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to 
support and maintain CRC.[Footnote 39] However, the legislation 
specified that no money may be obligated without a subsequent act of 
Congress. Legislation that would authorize CRC is pending in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of October 2007, 
neither chamber had taken action on the bills.[Footnote 40]

In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key 
elements of the planned compensation package for deployed volunteers. 
Under current plans, deployed volunteers would become full-time term 
federal employees and would receive compensation and benefits similar 
to those received by Foreign Service employees. Such compensation and 
benefits would include:

* salary commensurate with experience;

* danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and 
allowances;

* recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions;

* overtime pay and compensatory time;

* leave accrual and payment for unused leave upon service completion;

* competitive hiring status;

* federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while 
deployed;

* dual compensation for retired federal workers; and; 

* the ability to count deployed time toward retirement benefits.

The pending legislation would address some of the compensation 
authorities needed by State to offer the full proposed benefits package 
to CRC personnel. Specifically, it would authorize State to provide the 
same compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to 
members of the Foreign Service. However, the proposed legislation does 
not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive 
hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time 
deployed would count toward government retirement benefits. In 
addition, deployed personnel would not have re-employment rights 
similar to those for military reservists. Currently, military 
reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called into service 
have the right to return to their previous place of employment upon 
completion of their military service requirements.[Footnote 41] 
However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does not include 
similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS staff said that the 
Civilian Reserve Task Force would assess whether re-employment rights 
are necessary based on the experience of recruiting the first 500 
personnel.

Further, S/CRS is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a 
defined set of potential missions in which CRC would participate. 
According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation in the House and 
Senate that would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to specific 
nonhumanitarian stabilization and reconstruction missions when called 
upon by the President. However, as with the planning guide and IMS, 
there is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes a stabilization 
and reconstruction mission. S/CRS staff said they are still working 
through the conceptual differences between these and other types of 
operations, such as for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, but 
that under its current approach, CRC could be deployed to almost any 
operation in a conflict zone.

State Has Estimated Some Costs for CRC:

Although State has estimated some costs for establishing and sustaining 
CRC at home, the estimates do not include the costs of deploying CRC 
personnel to other countries or sustaining them once deployed.

As shown in table 1, State has identified about $135 million in 
estimated costs for establishing and sustaining CRC at home during 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009.[Footnote 42] In comparison, Bearing Point's 
study estimated that a 3-year startup period would cost approximately 
$341 million. Under current State plans, these funds would come from 
the fiscal year 2007 reallocation authority and from State's fiscal 
year 2009 budget. The administration did not request any funds for CRC 
in fiscal year 2008.

Table 1: State's Estimated Startup Costs for CRC for Fiscal Years 2007 
through 2009, Dollars in millions: 

Funding Purpose: 
Marketing, recruiting, screening, and enrolling; 
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: $7.7; 
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: $17.2; 
Total: $24.9.

Funding Purpose: Training; 
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 5.1; 
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 13.1; 
Total: 18.2.

Funding Purpose: Equipment Purchases; 
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 2.3; 
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 45.4; 
Total: 47.7.

Funding Purpose: Administration; 
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 6.4; 
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 12.6; 
Total: 19.0.

Funding Purpose: Compensation; 
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 4.2; 
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 20.7; 
Total: 24.9.

Funding Purpose: Total; 
CRC Established with 500 Personnel: $25.7; 
CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: $109.0; 
Total: $134.7.

Source: Department of State documents and staff.

[End of table]

If Congress authorizes the CRC, State plans to obligate approximately 
$26 million of the $50 million authority in fiscal year 2007 
supplemental funds to market the program and recruit, screen, and 
enroll the first 500 CRC personnel, including 350 with expertise in 
rule of law issues ($7.7 million); train the first 500 personnel ($5.1 
million); purchase equipment such as armored vehicles, police weapons, 
electronics, cots, tents, and body armor ($2.3 million); administer 
CRC, such as establishing a home office and a U.S. Deployment Center, 
and hiring 37 new government staff and contractor positions to manage 
CRC's day-to-day administrative functions ($6.4 million); and 
compensate CRC personnel when they are being trained ($4.2 million).

State currently estimates that it will cost about $109 million to 
expand the CRC to 2,000 personnel in fiscal year 2009 (see table 1). In 
this phase, State would hire up to 26 additional administrative staff 
and provide training for the new CRC volunteers.[Footnote 43] As of 
October 2007, the Office of Management and Budget had not yet approved 
State's request for $109 million. The actual funding request for 2009 
may differ from these estimates.

S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000- 
volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million. According to S/CRS staff, 
these annual costs include the activities needed to ensure that CRC 
personnel are ready to deploy. However, they do not include costs for 
deploying CRC personnel outside the United States or sustaining them 
once overseas. Deployment and overseas sustainment costs could include 
security costs, which may be high in a conflict zone; salaries and 
allowances; operation and infrastructure costs, including for 
facilities; and life support, such as food, lodging, and medical 
support.

Conclusions:

Government personnel and outside experts in national security issues 
agree that the U.S. government must improve its capacity to plan for 
and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. To address 
these issues, S/CRS and its interagency partners have worked to develop 
a new interagency planning and coordination framework and rapid 
response corps of civilian government and nongovernment personnel. 
Since the framework has never been fully applied, an understanding of 
its benefits and drawbacks remains unknown. However, concerns about 
roles and responsibilities and the value of the framework have slowed 
its acceptance by interagency partners. Although there is no 
requirement that NSC approve all elements of the framework, without 
such approval it will be difficult to ensure that U.S. government 
agencies collaborate and contribute to interagency planning efforts to 
the fullest extent possible.

S/CRS has not completed developing plans to fully establish and 
maintain CRC, but is seeking authorization to begin recruitment of CRC 
volunteers. Although State received authority to reallocate up to $50 
million for CRC, a separate act of Congress is required to authorize 
CRC before State may obligate that or future funding. S/CRS has 
developed a plan for using this funding to train, equip, and keep ready 
to deploy up to 2,000 CRC personnel by fiscal year 2009. However, costs 
of deploying CRC personnel to operations outside of the United States 
or of sustaining them at their new posts are not included. In addition, 
S/CRS has not yet specified types of missions for which the CRC would 
be used. Moreover, failure to provide full benefits and re-employment 
rights could affect State's ability to recruit and retain personnel for 
CRC. These are critical elements for Congress to consider when debating 
the long-term commitment associated with authorizing CRC and the future 
oversight of CRC operations and effectiveness.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To strengthen interagency planning and coordination of stabilization 
and reconstruction operations, we recommend that the Secretary of State 
clarify and communicate specific roles and responsibilities within 
State for S/CRS and the regional bureaus, including updating the 
Foreign Affairs Manual.

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary, with the assistance of 
interagency partners, finish developing the framework and test its 
usefulness by fully applying it to a stabilization and reconstruction 
operation.

Matter for Congressional Consideration:

To better understand the long-term fiscal and oversight commitments 
that would accompany authorizing CRC, when considering whether to grant 
such authority, the Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with other relevant agencies, to report on the 
activities and costs required for its development; the administrative 
requirements and annual operating costs once it is established, 
including for sustainment at home, deployment, and sustainment once 
deployed; the types of operations for which it would be used; and 
potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and 
deployment of personnel.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the 
Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State (see appendixes II and 
III). In addition, State, DOD, and USAID submitted a joint statement to 
the draft report, which is included as part of State's comments. The 
Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense, Justice, and 
State and USAID also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of 
Homeland Security and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft 
report but did not comment.

Commerce stated the report was a good overview of the new process for 
planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations, 
but did not comment on the report's recommendations and matter for 
Congressional consideration.

State said it partially concurred with our recommendations. It said 
that while it had no objections to the recommendations, it believes the 
progress made toward developing a civilian R&S capability was 
underreported. State said that the data GAO presented preceded a 
tremendous period of growth and change for the interagency process. In 
a joint statement, State, DOD, and USAID reiterated the draft report 
did not reflect the achievements made over recent months, including the 
IMS, ARC, SRC, and CRC. The joint statement did not comment on the 
report's recommendations or matter for Congressional consideration.

When providing technical comments, USDA, Justice, USAID each stated 
strong support for the new planning and coordination framework, and 
that they would continue to work with S/CRS to improve civilian 
deployment capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations. USAID further stated that more work is needed to clarify 
roles and responsibilities, particularly in the relationships between 
S/CRS and DFA, and between S/CRS and USAID.

We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect 
changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We 
completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our 
draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC 
approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft 
report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC 
because those details were not provided until October 2007. We 
incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as 
other information from written and technical comments from six 
agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the 
status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, 
Justice, State, and the Treasury and to the Administrator for USAID. We 
will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-4128 or at [email protected]. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV.

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To address both of the objectives of our review, we examined U.S. 
government documents and research and conducted more than 50 interviews 
with staff from 31 offices and bureaus at eight U.S. agencies with 
roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations (see table 2). We 
also interviewed staff members and reviewed reports and documents from 
eight U.S. government and independent research organizations.

Table 2: Agencies and Research Centers Contacted for GAO Review:

Agency: Department of State; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Bureau of African Affairs; 
* Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 
* Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; 
* Bureau of International Organization Affairs; 
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; 
* Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; 
* Bureau of Political Affairs; 
* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; 
* Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs; 
* Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; 
* Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance; 
* Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; 
* Office of the Inspector General.

Agency: Department of Agriculture; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Foreign Agricultural Service.

Agency: Department of Commerce; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* International Trade Administration.

Agency: Department of Defense; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy; 
* Joint Staff, J5.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Office of International Affairs.

Agency: Department of Justice; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* National Security Division.

Agency: Department of the Treasury; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Office of Technical Assistance.

Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Africa Bureau; 
* Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance; 
* Food for Peace; 
* Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; 
* Office of Military Affairs; 
* Office of Transition Initiatives.

Agency: U.S. Government Research Centers; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Institute for Defense Analyses; 
* National Defense University; 
* U.S. Institute for Peace.

Agency: Independent Research Centers; 
Bureau or office contacted: 
* Brookings Institution; 
* Center for Global Development; 
* Center for Strategic and International Studies; 
* Project on National Security Reform; 
* RAND Corporation.

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

To determine the Department of State's (State) efforts to improve 
interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, we interviewed current and former staff from 
the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/
CRS) and reviewed documentation on its development, roles, and 
responsibilities. Documents reviewed include Presidential Decision 
Directive 56, National Security Presidential Directives 1 and 44, 
Section 408 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005,[Footnote 
44] the Foreign Affairs Manual, and internal State reports and memos. 
We also reviewed documentation from and held discussions with S/CRS, 
State's regional and program bureaus, other agencies, and public and 
private research institutions on the development of the new planning 
framework for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Topics 
reviewed and discussed included mechanisms for triggering the process, 
roles and responsibilities of various actors, the Interagency 
Management System, the new planning template, and monitoring and 
evaluation requirements. We also discussed planning efforts and, where 
possible, reviewed resultant plans for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo with S/CRS, staff from State's 
relevant regional bureaus, and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. Finally, we participated in five training courses on 
stabilization and reconstruction planning developed and taught by S/CRS 
staff in conjunction with the Foreign Service Institute.

To determine State's efforts to improve the deployment of civilians to 
these operations, we reviewed documents and interviewed State and other 
agencies' staffs about the existing internal capacity each has for 
supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations and the actions 
they are taking to develop rapid deployment units and capabilities. We 
reviewed the development of the Active Response Corps, Standby Response 
Corps, and Civilian Reserve Corps by interviewing State staff from S/
CRS, regional bureaus, select program bureaus, and the Office of the 
Inspector General. We reviewed BearingPoint's study for creating and 
maintaining the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) and S/CRS plans for 
implementing the study's recommendations, we examined proposals and 
assessments prepared by the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Institute for 
Defense Analyses, and the Congressional Research Service, and we 
reviewed pending legislation in the Senate and House of Representatives 
that would authorize CRC. Finally, we discussed S/CRS's civilian 
reserve concept with staffs from other agencies including the 
Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and the 
Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as 
with private research institutions, including the Brookings 
Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and 
the RAND Corporation.

We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce: 

United States Department Of Commerce: 
The Under Secretary for International Trade: 
Washington, D.C. 20230: 

October 23, 2007: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Walker: 

Thank you for sharing with us the draft United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, "Stabilization and 
Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a Planning and 
Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps," and 
for the opportunity to comment on the report. The report provides a 
good overview of the complexities associated with the development and 
implementation of a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning 
and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations for 
countries threatened by conflict. 

Technical comments and corrections have been attached in a separate 
document for your consideration. 

Thank you for your work in producing this report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Christopher A. Padilla, Acting: 

[End of letter] 

Department Of Commerce Comments: 

Government Accountability Office Report GAO-08-39: 
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a 
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve 
Corps: 

Department of Commerce Contact:
Merriam Mashatt, International Trade Administration: 
(202) 482-3499, [email protected]: 

1. Page 25: Delete the reference to "Commerce" in the third sentence of 
the first paragraph (below). This sentence does not reflect the 
official position of the Department of Commerce and is factually 
incorrect. International programs are a central part of the 
Department's core mission and the Department's appropriations reflect 
this fact. Already, the Department plays a significant role in 
stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition, insert the language as the last 2 sentences of the first 
paragraph. Commerce comments in bold text below:

"Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and 
reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff 
available to respond rapidly to overseas crises. Most agencies have 
primary missions that are domestic in nature although many agencies, 
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security 
and Justice operate overseas programs. However, according to (at this 
point the word "Commerce" has been struck through with a line) Homeland 
Security, and Justice officials, international programs are not viewed 
as central to their core missions, either by the agency or their 
appropriators. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to 
secure funding to deploy to active stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second 
responders or for longer-term assistance programs. Start Insert - The 
Department of Commerce is taking steps to develop a capability that 
could be deployed for reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Over 
the next year, the International Trade Administration intends to 
conduct analysis and execute a series of tabletop exercises to develop 
a reconstruction and stabilization response mechanism for relevant 
Department of Commerce agencies and bureaus. - End Insert."

2. Page 14 through 16 and in Summary Sections: 
In the section entitled "Civilian Interagency Partners Have Not 
Accepted the Framework Due to Concerns about Roles and 
Responsibilities, Limited Support for the S/CRS, and a Cumbersome 
Planning Process," the current use of the term "interagency" is 
misleading. The Department of Commerce does not claim to have these 
objections to the framework and it is inaccurate to include implicit or 
explicit references to the Department of Commerce in this section. 
Please redraft this section and any other summary sections referring to 
this section to make it clear that the Department of Commerce, as a 
civilian interagency partner, does not hold the assertions made in it.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

October 24, 2007: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a 
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve 
Corps," GAO Job Code 320438.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Sheila Gwaltney, Senior Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization at (202) 663-0842. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Sid Kaplan (Acting): 

cc: GAO ï¿½ Sam Bernet: 
S/CRS ï¿½ John Herbst: 
State/OIG ï¿½ Mark Duda: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State, Defense, and USAID Joint Response: 

Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a 
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve 
Corps (GAO-08-39, GAO Code 320438): 

On behalf of the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) thanks the Government 
Accountability Office for the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft 
report.

We welcome the GAO's review of the U.S. Government's efforts to develop 
the systems and procedures for whole-of-government planning and 
management of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) policy and 
operations. Our nation's security will be strengthened by improving the 
capacity of civilian agencies to prevent or mitigate conflicts that may 
threaten us, and stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from 
conflict by fostering stability, democracy, and economic development.

Our agencies share the view that the GAO report, which was over a year 
in preparation, does not reflect the achievements made over recent 
months in developing interagency mechanisms for effective management of 
R&S situations. Chief among those achievements was the formal approval 
by all agencies of the Interagency Management System (IMS), which 
provides the framework for comprehensive policy and program management 
for R&S operations, integrated within Washington agencies, as well as 
our embassies and regional combatant commands. We also have made 
significant strides in the planning for a Civilian Reserve Corps, 
which, if Congress funds it, will create a critically important 
capability benefiting the nation. We have determined the interagency 
composition of the Active Response Corps and the Standby Response 
Corps, and created additional interagency tools for R&S management. The 
results of these advances also can be seen in recent engagements in 
Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia, to name just three specific examples.

Our agencies have each commented separately on the GAO report, but we 
also wanted to take this opportunity to provide a joint response in 
recognition of the unprecedented degree of interagency cooperation and 
collaboration on these issues of national importance. 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a 
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve 
Corps (GAO-08-39, GAO Code 320438): 

Introduction: 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and 
comment on the GAO Draft Report, "Stabilization and Reconstruction: 
Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and 
Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. " The Office of the Coordinator 
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established formally 
in August 2004, and received its mandate, as delegated by the Secretary 
of State, from National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of 
December 2005. Its core mission is to enhance our nation's capacity to 
lead, coordinate, and institutionalize civilian capability to prevent 
or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and 
reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so 
they can reach a more sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a 
market economy. Over the three years since it was established, S/CRS 
has led the interagency effort in Washington to implement the 
President's vision to develop the systems and procedures to provide 
comprehensive, whole-of-government planning for and management of 
reconstruction and stabilization operations.

In her February 8, 2007 remarks on transformational diplomacy, 
Secretary Rice stated:

"When it comes to working comprehensively to help societies rebuild 
after conflict, one group of diplomats is truly at the forefront of our 
efforts; that is, our Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization. These individuals are not just helping our Department to 
plan for the next Bosnia or Liberia or Haiti. Some of them are actually 
deployed right now in the hottest spots overseas.... These men and 
women are part of our effort to create an expeditionary arm of the 
Department of State. It is a way of thinking and training and operating 
that is mostly new for us, but one that we must adopt." 

Over the last year, S/CRS has worked with fifteen agencies associated 
with reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) to develop integrated 
planning, operations, and civilian response systems. Based on S/CRS' 
demonstrated capacity for developing reconstruction and stabilization 
plans and operations, this office is prepared to take on the role for 
which it was created: to coordinate the interagency in managing the 
U.S. Government response to the next crisis with reconstruction and 
stabilization implications.

S/CRS and its interagency partners have made great progress over the 
last several months in creating the procedures and tools for managing 
R&S operations. These are ready for use. The Interagency Management 
System (IMS) and its components can be activated to plan for, manage, 
and staff a whole-of-government R&S response to a foreign crisis. The 
Washington-based, interagency component of the IMS, the Country 
Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), can provide policy 
options and overall management of the R&S response. The CRSG's 
secretariat, an interagency, working level team, can immediately begin 
planning with the relevant regional bureau and embassy involved. If 
significant U.S. military involvement is anticipated, S/CRS can 
assemble an interagency team of planners and experts to send to the 
relevant Combatant Command as an Integration Planning Cell (IPC). If 
requested by the Chief of Mission, members of the Active Response Corp 
(ARC) can deploy immediately to assist the Embassy as the core element 
of an Advance Civilian Team (ACT).

The S/CRS Interagency Process Has Just Begun: 

As noted above, S/CRS is a relatively new organization and is creating 
a fundamentally new approach to enable more timely, integrated, and 
effective management of U.S. Government efforts in reconstruction and 
stabilization. This new approach requires modification of long-standing 
bureaucratic practices and creation of new habitual relationships, 
lines of communication, and forms of cooperation. In the year since 
work on the GAO report was begun ï¿½ which represents a third of the 
lifespan thus far for S/CRS ï¿½ the office's engagement with interagency 
partners has expanded, deepened and been strengthened. [See comment 1]

For example, a series of working groups and other formal structures 
regularly bring together representatives of the Departments of State, 
Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Homeland Security, 
Health and Human Services, Transportation, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the intelligence community, and the 
National Security Council (NSC) to prepare for effective whole-of-
government planning for and management of reconstruction and 
stabilization efforts. Within the Department of State, regional bureaus 
and S/CRS have collaborated to develop and implement programs in Haiti, 
Nepal, Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Colombia, Liberia, Yemen, the 
trans-Sahara region, the tri-border region in Asia (Philippines, 
Indonesia and Malaysia) and in Somalia. The data presented in this GAO 
study, while perhaps accurate at the time of collection several months 
ago, preceded a period of tremendous growth and change for the 
interagency process and do not adequately reflect the current 
situation. [See comment 1] 

Areas of Significant Progress Not Adequately Recognized in the Report: 

The critical areas of progress listed below were not captured in the 
GAO report and are important developments that round out the report's 
findings.

Implementation of NSPD-44: The GAO report states that two of three 
elements of an interagency framework for planning and coordinating R&S 
operations have been approved. In fact, since January 2007, the NSC has 
approved three of four major components of the interagency management 
effort for R&S engagements. The three approved components are the 
Interagency Management System (IMS); procedures for initiating the IMS; 
and the civilian surge mechanism, a critical component of which is the 
Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). Work on the fourth element, the planning 
framework, is in progress. [See comment 2] 

The GAO report at one point incorrectly stated that NSPD-44 delegates 
authority to S/CRS for leading U.S. Government R&S efforts, while in 
other sections correctly notes that the Presidential directive tasks 
the Secretary of State with this responsibility. Specifically, NSPD-44 
delegates to the Secretary responsibility for "integrated U.S. 
Government efforts involving U.S. Departments and Agencies with 
relevant capabilities" to prepare for, plan, and conduct stabilization 
and reconstruction operations in the range of failing and post-conflict 
states (Emphasis added). The Secretary of State in turn can delegate to 
S/CRS responsibility for leading these efforts. S/CRS has worked with 
its partners from a variety of relevant agencies to establish the tasks 
and systems needed for R&S mobilization, management and field 
operations as well as the exercises and experimentation necessary to 
test and refine these systems. The interagency agreed on an 
implementation work plan and timeline that will produce the interagency 
tools and procedures to enable whole-of-government engagement in R&S 
situations. Greater detail on these tools and procedures is provided 
below. [See comment 3] 

Interagency Management System (IMS): Early in 2007, the NSC approved 
the IMS and the procedures for initiating its use. The IMS provides the 
framework to enable Washington policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and 
military commanders to manage complex R&S engagements jointly. It 
ensures coordination among all U.S. Government stakeholders, elaborates 
the roles and responsibilities for interagency teams, and facilitates 
and supports integrated strategic and implementation planning. [See 
comment 4] 

The GAO report states that there is lack of clarity on roles and 
responsibilities among regional bureaus and S/CRS and among agencies of
the U.S. Government. The Department notes that continuing work on the 
IMS by S/CRS, the Department's regional bureaus, and our interagency 
partners will refine and test the IMS through a number of events, 
experiments, and exercises with the goal of further identifying gaps 
and clarifying roles and responsibilities both within the Department of 
State and among executive branch agencies.

Over ten U.S. Government departments participated in a recent 
demonstration of the IMS and in the after-action review that provided 
very useful input to help the interagency fine tune IMS procedures and 
mechanisms. The Department also notes that S/CRS works to complement 
the existing roles of regional and functional bureaus at State, USAID, 
and other agencies working in R&S. S/CRS may, depending on the 
circumstance, assist with conflict assessment and planning processes 
for reconstruction and stabilization in conjunction with its 
interagency partners; in the field ï¿½ if asked by the Chief of Mission ï¿½ 
elements of the interagency Advance Civilian Team may function as an 
executive office or clearinghouse for information and action, or 
provide critical liaison among various field elements that are 
executing the tasks routinely associated with their agency's mandate.

Procedures for Initiation of Whole-of-Government Planning: Early in 
2007, the NSC also approved interagency-agreed criteria and processes 
for initiating or "triggering" whole-of-government planning for 
specific R&S engagements, including immediate crisis response as well 
as long-term scenario-based (or contingency) planning. Senior policy-
level bodies, Chiefs of Mission and State Department Regional Assistant 
Secretaries may request that the Reconstruction and Stabilization 
Policy Coordinating Committee consider initiating whole-of-government 
planning for long-term scenarios, while senior officials (such as the 
Secretary of State or Defense) can authorize planning for imminent 
crises. The criteria for triggering whole-of-government R&S planning 
and response include significant actual or potential U.S. military 
involvement; significant threats to regional security; and actual or 
imminent state failure, particularly where the host government is 
unwilling or unable to respond; excessive mortality rates; or large-
scale displacement of people. [See comment 5] 

Draft Planning Framework: Once planning is triggered by the above 
process, the interagency planning framework will be used to guide 
department and agency involvement in a whole-of-government planning 
effort at the levels of both strategy and implementation. The goal of 
the planning process is to translate a whole-of-government approach to 
policy and strategy development into operational effectiveness. The 
development of concepts and plans must ensure integration across major 
mission programs, as prioritized activities frequently have multiple 
effects, and when implemented and coordinated correctly can be 
synergistic and achieve multiple objectives. As a principle, the 
planning process should reflect the greatest amount of consultation in 
the field with local stakeholders that the environment allows. [See 
comment 6] 

Civilian Surge Capability: In the State of the Union address in January 
2007, President Bush called for the creation of an expeditionary or 
civilian reserve corps, noting that "such a corps would function much 
like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces 
by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on 
missions abroad when America needs them. And it would give people 
across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the 
defining struggle of our time." [See comment 7] 

In testimony on February 7, 2007, to the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Secretary also underscored the importance of 
establishing the Civilian Response Corps that the President proposed in 
the State of the Union. She noted: "... we don't have a counterpart to 
the military, national guard, or reserve corps of civilians who can be 
ready and trained to go out and perform these functions: engineers, 
lawyers, agricultural specialists. And so we are charged with 
developing the concept for a Civilian Response Corps. We will be coming 
to the Congress for support for that concept and for funding for that 
concept so that we can have a ready reserve of civilians to take 
exactly this kind of task."

Following the State of the Union address, and the inclusion of up to 
$50 million in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina 
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-
28), S/CRS formed an interagency Civilian Reserve Task Force, made up 
of representatives from the State Department, USAID, the Departments of 
Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland 
Security, and Treasury and with the Department of Defense (DOD). The 
Task Force has worked for the last eight months to develop the 
policies, procedures and infrastructure necessary to stand-up the U.S. 
Civilian Reserve Corps.

The critical step remaining to create the CRC is securing the 
authorizing legislation necessary to access the supplemental funding. 
The key legislation, "The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian 
Management Act of 2006," passed by unanimous consent in the Senate 
during the 109th Congress. That important legislation, with minor 
changes, has been reintroduced as S. 613, with a similar bill being 
introduced on the House side in the form of H.R. 1084. While there is 
bipartisan support for the legislation, the bills nonetheless are still 
pending. If this authorizing legislation is enacted, up to $50 million 
in the P.L. 110-28 would become available to support and maintain the 
CRC.

The GAO report does not fully convey the progress that has been 
achieved in preparing to stand up the CRC, pending authorization by 
Congress. These achievements include: [See comment 7]

* An NSC-approved CRC Mission Statement; 

* Determination of the skills sets that will be required by the CRC to 
respond to critical stabilization and reconstruction missions. A total 
of 121 separate positions have been identified for which fully 
developed position descriptions have been completed; 

* Development of the necessary interagency human resources policies, 
mechanisms, and procedures for recruiting, hiring and compensating CRC 
members; 

* Development of a detailed training plan for the CRC members that will 
leverage existing training capacity and also create new courses 
tailored to the needs of the CRC; 

* Candidate search culminating in a short-list for the Chief Operating 
Officer of the CRC. The position will be filled once funding becomes 
available upon enactment of the CRC authorizing legislation; 

* Development of a draft memorandum of understanding between State and 
other U.S. Government civilian agencies regarding the roles and 
responsibilities for recruiting, selecting, training, and managing the 
CRC when deployed; 

* Secured space and staffing plan for the CRC Administrative Office 
(Home Office); 

* Concept development of the CRC deployment center, to be established 
and operated by USAID; and; 

* Draft CRC Agreement outlining the terms and conditions of CRC 
service. 

The GAO report contains a number of technical errors related to the 
CRC. First, the GAO states that CRC members will be temporary U.S. 
Government employees. It is important to clarify that all CRC members 
will be full-time, term federal employees if and when they begin their 
pre-deployment training. As envisioned by S. 613, CRC members will 
enjoy important benefits and employment rights. Following the 
recruitment of the first five hundred members of the CRC, the 
Department will evaluate whether other employment terms need to be 
considered, including the question of reemployment rights. [See comment 
7] 

Second, the GAO report raises the issue of whether and what punitive 
actions could be taken for CRC members who refuse to deploy. The 
Department notes that all Civilian Reservists will be required to sign 
a Service Agreement that will outline acceptable reasons for service 
deferments and actions that will be taken if the Reservist refuses to 
deploy. S/CRS is in the process of preparing this agreement. [See 
comment 7] 

Third, the GAO report states that S/CRS is moving the CRC's development 
forward without a set of potential missions for which it could be 
deployed. This point is somewhat puzzling to the Department. Similar 
entities, such as the military reserves, do not maintain lists of 
possible deployments and are not limited to certain missions specified 
in advance. The CRC is intended to provide the civilian surge and 
backup capability for R&S crises. Reservists will train for deployment 
under a variety of circumstances and must have the flexibility to 
respond to different situations. [See comment 8] 

Finally, the GAO report states that the plan for expanding the CRC from 
500 to 2000 members has not been made public. The Department notes that 
the expansion plan has been drafted and is still undergoing internal 
review and will be shared with the Congress when the review is 
completed. 

Development of Surge Capability in the ARC: The GAO report states that 
the Department of State has been unable to achieve planned staffing 
levels for the one of the other components of civilian surge, the 
Active Response Corps (ARC). The Department notes that the ARC 
currently has ten officers. These ARC members represent a mix of 
Foreign Service and Civil Service employees assigned to the ARC, plus 
detailee employees from other offices within State. All have training 
necessary to deploy; most also have experience from previous 
deployments and exercising with the military. In late Fiscal Year 2007, 
S/CRS added three new Civil Service positions to regularize the 
positions filled by detailees. S/CRS also began to recruit additional 
detailees from other agencies, effectively making the ARC interagency, 
and is actively recruiting Foreign Service Officers in the current 
assignment cycle. We are awaiting the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2008 
Department budget request to determine future ARC personnel levels. 
[See comment 9] 

The Standby Response Corps (SRC) currently has in excess of 90 vetted 
members, from all areas of the State Department. A small but growing 
number of those members have received at least the minimum necessary 
training. Efforts are currently underway to increase the current roster 
of 90 and add USAID employees to it, and to get written commitments 
from the State Department and other agency personnel systems to allow 
SRC members to train and deploy as needed while still filling their 
"day" jobs. [See comment 9] 

Elements of the ARC and the SRC have deployed to Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, 
Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Two SRC and 
approximately one dozen ARC members have deployed for periods of 
between one and five months. 

S/CRS has a full-time development officer devoted to building up the 
SRC. Both that position and the positions of the Director of the Office 
of Civilian Readiness and Response, the ARC Director and her deputy 
have as their number one goal the expansion of the ARC and the SRC. 
That is also the primary goal of a two-person training unit that is 
developing and maintaining the necessary training regime for a fully 
capable ARC and SRC. 

Training: The GAO report states that there is a lack of training 
opportunities for one of the three civilian surge capabilities, the 
Standby Response Corps (SRC). The Department notes that R&S training 
opportunities are available and are increasing at a rapid pace among 
the interagency as training, education, exercises, and experiments are 
being designed and delivered to meet the needs of current and future 
engagements. SRC volunteers have the opportunity to access training 
provided by multiple agencies and the Department is working to ensure 
that SRC members are able to take time from their current assignments 
to pursue professional development. ARC members, on the other hand, are 
able to complete an extensive training regimen and engage in exercises 
due to the nature of their jobs. [See comment 9] 

Based on the interagency R&S training strategy of 2005, S/CRS is 
currently involved in the design and delivery of courses at the Foreign 
Service Institute (FSI) and National Defense University, as well as 
helping design distance learning courses at Joint Forces Command, the 
DOD, and the Department of Commerce. 

S/CRS courses with FSI are increasing from five in 2006 to ten in 2008. 
All courses focus on integrated and interagency R&S topics. The R&S 
courses reserve informally 80% of the tuition-free slots for agencies 
and offices that do or will contribute SRC members. Outreach to the 
interagency community to increase enrollment in S/CRS's FSI courses has 
been successful. The number trained increased from 352 to 432 in the 
past year with basic courses having reached capacity. A majority of the 
participants are from State, USAID, and DOD as these are the leading 
agencies in overseas operations; however, nine other agencies are 
consistently involved as their leadership recognizes the new 
requirements outline. [See comment 9] 

Of equal significance, S/CRS convened an interagency body to develop a 
training program tailored to meet current and future needs. This group 
established an interagency training implementation strategy and is 
systematically addressing each component necessary to prepare to train 
future personnel. 

Expansion of 1207-funded activities and coordination with the Office of 
the Director for Foreign Assistance: The Department appreciates GAO's 
recognition of the expansion of R&S activities funded under Section 
1207. The GAO report states that the Department obtained only $10 
million of the $100 million of funds authorized in Fiscal Year 2006 
under Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 
R&S projects, and that confusion between S/CRS and the Office of the 
Director for Foreign Assistance (F, which had just been created) 
complicated transfer of additional funding that year. Building on the 
FY06 experience, and in complete coordination with F, S/CRS worked 
closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense during Fiscal Year 
2007 to identify and obtain approval for seven interagency projects, 
totaling $99.745 million of the $100 million Congress authorized DOD to 
transfer. [See comment 10] 

Conflict Prevention: The GAO asserts that S/CRS 's authorizing 
legislation does not include conflict prevention. While "conflict 
prevention" is not explicitly mentioned in Public Law 108-447 that 
created S/CRS, the law does call upon the office to "address crises in 
countries and regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict 
or civil strife." (Emphasis added) Conflict prevention is an important 
mechanism to support societies in this transitional phase to ensure 
that conflict does not re-emerge during the stabilization and 
reconstruction periods through support for stabilizing influences and 
deterrence of the destabilizing influences. Conflict prevention is thus 
inherent in the basic work of S/CRS. [See comment 11] 

Other Comments: 

Inclusion of personal observations by U.S. Government officials: The 
GAO report contains personal comments voiced by U.S. Government 
employees that are in direct contradiction to the official positions of 
these individuals' agencies. In some cases, these personal views are 
taken out of context; in others, it is not clear when the statements 
were made or if the individuals' views have changed due to intervening 
developments. While the Department fully respects the rights of 
individuals to express their personal opinions, the GAO report would be 
more balanced and would benefit if these personal observations were 
identified as such. [See comment 12] 

The Department's Response to the Recommendations: 

Partially concur. While the Department poses no objections to GAO's 
recommendations, we believe the progress made toward achieving the 
goals articulated in the recommendations, as well as the overall 
progress achieved toward developing a civilian R&S capability, is under-
reported. [See comment 13] 

The Department stands ready to assist the GAO in the future to update 
this report's evaluation of the U.S. government's civilian interagency 
surge capabilities. The Department is confident that S/CRS will 
continue to develop this capability, fully implement a planning and 
coordination framework, and establish a Civilian Reserve Corps. 

[End of Department of State, Defense, and USAID Joint Response] 

GAO Response to State's Comments: 

We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect 
changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We 
completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our 
draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC 
approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft 
report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC 
because those details were not provided until October 2007. We 
incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as 
other information from written and technical comments from six 
agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the 
status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007. We also 
have specific comments to points raised by State (see below). 

1. While we are aware of the efforts S/CRS and regional bureaus have 
made in the countries cited, we note that S/CRS involvement in most of 
them includes the deployment of a small number of staff or the 
allocation of section 1207 funds, which we recognized in the report. We 
also note in the report that S/CRS applied its draft planning guide to 
operations in Haiti and Sudan, and we note the outcomes of those plans. 
We also report that interagency staff involved in those efforts had 
different points of view on the merits of the planning process, that 
the planning guide is still in development, and that S/CRS is revising 
the planning guide based on partners' concerns. 

2. We chose to discuss CRC separately because of the potential costs 
associated with its development and sustainment. However, we 
acknowledge within the report that State views civilian response 
mechanisms--ARC, CRC, and SRC--as the fourth major element of the 
framework. 

3. We have changed the text in our report to reflect State's comment. 

4. We reported on the basic structures of the IMS. We note that it is 
designed to ensure coordination between Washington and the field, and 
between the civilian and military sectors of government. However, since 
IMS has never been used, it is premature to state whether it is an 
effective tool. We found, however, that different documents outline 
different roles and responsibilities for S/CRS. While State and S/CRS 
have taken some steps to clarify S/CRS' role, some interagency partners 
stated more must be done. For example, when providing comments on a 
draft of our report, USAID stated it would like more definition on the 
relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and S/CRS and USAID. State would 
seem to agree with this assessment since it plans to use exercises to 
identify gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities. Although we are 
encouraged that State plans to take these actions, we believe the true 
test of IMS's effectiveness will come when it is applied to an actual 
operation. 

5. We reported on the procedures for triggering the use of IMS and, 
once finalized, the planning guide. As with IMS, the true test of the 
effectiveness of these procedures will come when it is used for an 
actual operation. 

6. We reported on the ongoing development of the draft planning guide, 
including its features; its use for planning operations in Haiti, Sudan 
and Kosovo; and revisions S/CRS is making based on partners' concerns. 
We also note that although NSC need not approve this element, such 
approval would add credibility to the guide and the framework, as a 
whole. 

7. Based on these comments and technical comments from State, we 
updated information on State's plans for establishing CRC, including 
startup costs, annual costs, and authorizing legislation. We 
acknowledge that NSC approved a plan to establish by 2009 a roster of 
2,000 CRC reservists who would deploy to stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. Although we constrain our discussion to 
higher-level considerations, we are encouraged by the list of 
achievements State says it recently made; however, we note that a 
number them are still in the draft or conceptual stage of development. 
In addition, we removed from the final report discussion on the 
punitive actions State could take against volunteers who refused to 
deploy. 

8. We did not state that lists of possible locations for deployment of 
CRC volunteers should be maintained. Our finding and conclusion pertain 
to the lack of clarity for the type of operations for which CRC would 
be used. As stated in the report, State has not clarified how 
stabilization and reconstruction operations differ from other 
operations, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, or 
traditional development assistance programs. Having a clear definition 
of the types of operations CRC volunteers could deploy to would enable 
State to better define the skill mix it needs for the CRC roster. It 
would also provide a basis for Congressional oversight and a valuable 
check against potential misuse. 

9. We updated our discussions or ARC and SRC based on information 
provided in these and other technical comments. We are encouraged that 
S/CRS has developed these courses--five of which GAO staff attended. 
However, based on our findings, we are concerned that S/CRS and the 
Foreign Service Institute may not have the capacity to provide full 
training to 3,000 SRC and CRC volunteers in fiscal year 2009. 

10. We adjusted the report to reflect this new information. We note 
that approximately $80 million of the $99.75 million was obligated in 
the final month of the fiscal year. 

11. We do not challenge States interpretation that the legislation 
implicitly authorizes S/CRS to engage in conflict prevention 
activities. Our point was to show that ambiguities between the sources 
of S/CRS authorities can lead to confusion among partners over S/CRS's 
true roles and responsibilities. 

12. Although agencies may have official positions that they support S/
CRS and the new framework, our fieldwork revealed that many individuals 
within State's regional and program bureaus and other agencies have not 
yet accepted it. 

13. We disagree with the assertion that our report does not reflect 
changes that occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We 
completed our initial audit work in August 2007, and in October 2007 we 
obtained and incorporated additional information from agencies written 
and technical comments on a draft of our report. Our report reflects 
the status of the framework and development of civilian response 
capabilities as of October 2007. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-4128 or [email protected]: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual contact named above, Judith McCloskey, 
Assistant Director; Sam Bernet; Lynn Cothern; Marissa Jones; and Sona 
Kalapura made key contributions to this report. Technical assistance 
was provided by Joseph Brown, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Mark 
Dowling, Holly Dye, Francisco Enriquez, Timothy Fairbanks, Etana 
Finkler, Bradley Hunt, Marisela Perez, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jeremy Sebest. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Defense Science Board defines stabilization and reconstruction 
as the period following the cessation of high-intensity conflict. See 
DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from 
Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: December 2004). 

[2] In August 2004, State created S/CRS under the Secretary of State's 
authority. Congress subsequently authorized the office in section 408 
of the Fiscal Year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 108- 
447, Div. B, Title IV, sec. 408). 

[3] We provided preliminary observations on our findings in testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed 
Services Committee. See GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions 
Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future 
Operations, GAO-08-228T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

[4] In May 2007, we reported on DOD's efforts to elevate stability, 
security, transition, and reconstruction operations to the same level 
as combat operations. GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to 
Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency 
Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007). See also GAO, 
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 21, 2006). 

[5] In this report, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key 
elements developed to plan and coordinate reconstruction and 
stabilization operations under NSPD-44. The first section of our report 
discusses three elements for planning these operations, while civilian 
response mechanisms, which S/CRS considers a fourth element, are 
discussed in the second section of this report. 

[6] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. 108-447, sec. 408). 

[7] NSC policy coordination committees manage the development and 
implementation of national security policies and serve as the main day- 
to-day mechanism for interagency coordination of national security 
policies. 

[8] The Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization Operations created interagency working groups to develop 
plans and processes for implementing NSPD-44 that focus on sectors of 
reconstruction and stabilization, such as transitional security and 
rule of law, humanitarian response and social well-being, and conflict 
prevention and mitigation. Among other responsibilities, each working 
group was tasked with identifying current reconstruction and 
stabilization capabilities and gaps in those capabilities; lessons 
learned; and issues for diplomatic outreach. 

[9] United States Joint Forces Command J7 and Department of State, 
Pamphlet Version 1.0, U.S., Government Draft Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December 
2005). 

[10] Washington policymakers would include NSC, Assistant Secretaries 
for State's regional bureaus and their counterparts at other civilian 
agencies, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and DOD. 

[11] NSPD-1 organized NSC and its committees for the current 
administration. NSPD-1 placed oversight of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations under the six regional Policy Coordination 
Committees, which are chaired by officials of Under Secretary or 
Assistant Secretary rank, designated by the Secretary of State. 

[12] GAO-06-15. 

[13] Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112 (a). 

[14] 22 U.S.C. 3927. 

[15] GAO-06-15. 

[16] GAO-07-549. 

[17] GAO-06-15. 

[18] State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington, 
D.C.: August 2006). When S/CRS and U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the 
first draft in December 2005, they distributed it to stakeholder 
agencies and requested their feedback. S/CRS is currently developing a 
revised framework based on stakeholders' comments. 

[19] Pub. L. 109-163, sec. 1207. 

[20] DFA developed the Foreign Assistance Framework to guide the budget 
process for foreign-assistance programs. The framework identifies five 
categories of countries receiving foreign assistance including 
rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partnership, and 
restricting. The rebuilding category includes countries "in or emerging 
from and rebuilding after internal or external strife." 

[21] This figure includes S/CRS staff who received the training. In 
addition, several GAO staff participated in courses in fiscal year 2007 
to obtain information about the S/CRS framework and the office's 
efforts to train interagency staff. 

[22] State currently pays tuition for non-State participants, and staff 
said other agencies do not have funds available for this purpose. 

[23] S/CRS has emphasized the importance of close coordination between 
military and civilian government, while acknowledging that not all 
reconstruction and stabilization operations require military 
participation. S/CRS has been involved in more than a dozen joint 
exercises to practice civilian and military coordination and strengthen 
interagency operations. For example, S/CRS partnered with the U.S. 
Joint Forces Command to support Multinational Experiment 4 in February 
and March 2006 to test crisis coordination among eight countries and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. S/CRS also is coordinating 
interagency input into the U.S. Joint Forces Command-led Multinational 
Experiment 5 series. 

[24] GAO-07-549. 

[25] Specifically, DOD officials stated that DOD's policy is not to 
share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside DOD unless 
directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines their 
need to know. However, these officials also noted DOD's planning 
policies and procedures state that a Combatant Commander, with 
Secretary of Defense's approval, may work in coordination with the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff 
to seek input on plan development from other U.S. government agencies. 

[26] State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for 
Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington, 
D.C.: August 2006). 

[27] DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Improving 
Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National Security 
Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, D.C., July 19, 
2007). Congress mandated this report in the John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Pub. L. 109-364, sec. 
1035). 

[28] GAO-07-549. 

[29] Before the creation of ARC and SRC, State had a program to provide 
operational capacity for stability operations through the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. However, according to the 
U.S. Institute for Peace, this capacity was limited to providing police 
for international police missions through a private contractor. U.S. 
Institute for Peace, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability 
Operations (Washington, D.C.:, April 2004). 

[30] The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance uses Disaster Area 
Response Teams and Response Alternatives for Technical Services, among 
other mechanisms, in support of humanitarian assistance in 
stabilization and reconstruction missions. The office also has standing 
agreements with disaster assistance teams around the world that are 
trained and equipped to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. The 
Office of Transition Initiatives has 16 staff available for deployment, 
but the staff take assignments by mutual consent. The staff also said 
that, depending on availability and needed skill sets, other employees 
may deploy to humanitarian missions. 

[31] These programs focus on economic governance for developing 
countries so that their governments can become legitimate sources of 
power. The Office of Technical Assistance focuses on countries in 
failed-state environments and has deployed staff to assist operations 
in such places as Iraq and Haiti. 

[32] Officials from the Department of Justice said the agency is not a 
foreign affairs agency and its base appropriations provide for its 
defined missions. Funding for Justice Department stabilization and 
reconstruction activities is achieved through interagency agreements, 
generally through agreements with State and USAID pursuant to section 
632 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2392). 

[33] State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector 
General, Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, ISP-l-07-26 (Washington, D.C., May 
2007). 

[34] State plans to request funds to deploy interagency response teams 
in the fiscal year 2009 budget. Training would occur only if this 
request was approved. 

[35] BearingPoint, Management Study for Establishing and Managing a 
Civilian Reserve (McLean, Virginia, 2006). 

[36] BearingPoint, pp. 11, 69, and 71. 

[37] Congressional Research Service, A Civilian Reserve for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. 
Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress 
(Washington, D.C., 2007). 

[38] BearingPoint's study said the reserve should be capable of 
deploying simultaneously to one large, one medium, and one small 
operation. BearingPoint defines these sizes in terms of deployment 
years. A large deployment year would see 900 to 1,200 volunteers 
deployed, a medium deployment year would see 600 to 900 volunteers 
deployed, and a small deployment year would see up to 600 volunteers 
deployed. 

[39] This authority was granted in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental 
appropriation to fund operations in Iraq and elsewhere. See U.S. Troop 
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. 110-28, sec. 3810). 

[40] See 110th Congress, S. 613 and H.R. 1084. 

[41] See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C. 
Secs. 4301-4333. 

[42] This plan was developed by the Civilian Reserve Task Force, which 
is led by S/CRS, and approved by NSC in July 2007. 

[43] S/CRS stated that it would establish up to 63 total permanent and 
contract administrative positions depending on the actual size of CRC. 
These staff would be responsible for such functions as recruiting, 
training, logistics and supply management, payroll, and benefits 
management, among other duties. 

[44] Pub. L. 108-447. 

[End of section] 

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