    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-39

    TITLE:     Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to
    Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the
    Civilian Reserve Corps

    DATE:   12/06/2007

    -----------------------------------------------------------------

    This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-39
    entitled 'Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to
    Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the
    Civilian Reserve Corps' which was released on December 6, 2007.

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    Report to Congressional Requesters:

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    GAO:

    November 2007:

    Stabilization and Reconstruction:

    Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and
    Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps:

    GAO-08-39:

    GAO Highlights:

    Highlights of GAO-08-39, a report to congressional requesters.

    Why GAO Did This Study:

    In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator
    for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and
    implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In
    December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential
    Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination,
    planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the
    United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises.
    GAO was asked to report on State�s efforts to improve (1) interagency
    planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction
    operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To
    address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and
    reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private
    research centers.

    What GAO Found:

    The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
    (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S.
    reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security
    Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the
    framework�the Interagency Management System and procedures for
    initiating the framework�s use. However, the third element�a guide for
    planning stabilization and reconstruction operations�is still in
    progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be
    because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and
    reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies� roles and
    responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-
    upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses
    an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency
    partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for
    the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning
    process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as
    cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced.
    S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some
    interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners.
    However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of
    civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective
    coordination.

    State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly
    to international crises, but key details for establishing and
    maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the
    Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC)
    comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to
    international crises and has worked with several agencies to create
    similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State�s
    difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of
    training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies� inability to
    secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic
    missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such
    operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004,
    State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be
    comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for
    stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers,
    civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily
    available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would
    become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first
    500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to
    2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to
    reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does
    not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues
    related to volunteers� compensation and benefits that could affect CRC
    recruitment and management would require congressional action.
    Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for
    which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to
    establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs
    for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas.

    What GAO Recommends:

    GAO recommends that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate
    roles and responsibilities within State for stabilization and
    reconstruction operations and complete development and apply all
    elements of the framework to an actual operation. GAO also recommends
    that when considering authorizing the Civilian Reserve Corps, Congress
    require State to report on its development, annual, and deployment
    costs; types of missions; and obstacles that could affect its
    operations. In comments on a draft of this report, State said it
    partially concurs with the recommendations.

    To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
    [hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-39]. For more information, contact Joseph
    A. Christoff at (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov.

    [End of section]

    Contents:

    Letter:

    Results in Brief:

    Background:

    State's Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear
    Guidance, and Interagency Support:

    State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining
    Rapid Deployment Corps:

    Conclusions:

    Recommendations for Executive Action:

    Matter for Congressional Consideration:

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:

    GAO Response to State's Comments:

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    Tables:

    Table 1: State's Estimated Startup Costs for CRC for Fiscal Years 2007
    through 2009:

    Table 2: Agencies and Research Centers Contacted for GAO Review:

    Figures:

    Figure 1: Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization Operations:

    Figure 2: Draft Planning Guide for Integrated U.S. Government
    Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:

    Abbreviations:

    ACT: Advance Civilian Team:

    ARC: Active Response Corps:

    CRC: Civilian Reserve Corps:

    CRSG: Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group:

    DFA: Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance:

    DOD: Department of Defense:

    FACT: Field Advance Civilian Team:

    IMS: Interagency Management System:

    IPC: Integration Planning Cell:

    NSC: National Security Council:

    NSPD: National Security Presidential Directive:

    S/CRS: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization:

    SRC: Standby Response Corps:

    USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:

    USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:

    [End of section]

    United States Government Accountability Office:
    Washington, DC 20548:

    November 6, 2007:

    The Honorable Christopher Shays:
    Ranking Member:
    Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
    Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable Vic Snyder:
    Chairman:
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
    Committee on Armed Services:
    House of Representatives:

    The Honorable W. Todd Akin:
    Ranking Member:
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
    Committee on Armed Services:
    House of Representatives:

    The United States has determined that weak and failing states pose
    significant threats to its national security and is committed to
    helping countries prevent or emerge from conflict. According to the
    Defense Science Board, since the end of the Cold War the United States
    has begun stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24
    months, with each operation typically lasting 5 to 8 years.[Footnote 1]
    Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in 2003, an
    internal Department of State (State) report noted that the U.S.
    government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or
    manage stabilization and reconstruction operations. Stabilization and
    reconstruction operations include efforts to re-establish security,
    strengthen governance, rebuild infrastructure, and improve social and
    economic well-being.

    In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential
    Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which recognized that the United States has a
    significant stake in enhancing its capacity to stabilize and
    reconstruct countries or regions. NSPD-44 directed the Secretary of
    State to coordinate and lead U.S. government stabilization and
    reconstruction operations. The Secretary of State delegated the
    implementation of this directive to the Office of the Coordinator for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).[Footnote 2] In addition, the
    directive established a National Security Council (NSC) committee to
    lead interagency efforts to improve planning and coordination for
    reconstruction and stabilization operations and to develop a strong
    civilian response capability. The committee is co-chaired by the
    Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and NSC.

    In this report, we review S/CRS's efforts to improve (1) interagency
    planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction
    operations, and (2) the deployment of civilians to these
    operations.[Footnote 3]

    To complete our work, we reviewed the legislation that created S/CRS,
    National Security Presidential Directives, the National Security
    Strategy of the United States, the Foreign Affairs Manual, S/CRS
    planning guidance, plans for several ongoing stabilization and
    reconstruction operations, budget requests, and funding allocations. In
    addition, we interviewed officials from eight executive agencies,
    including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense (DOD),
    Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury, and the U.S.
    Agency for International Development (USAID); former senior S/CRS
    officials; and experts from U.S. government and private research
    centers. We asked agency officials about their agencies' roles and
    responsibilities for planning and executing stabilization and
    reconstruction operations, the development of a proposed framework for
    planning and executing such operations, and the development of new
    capabilities for deploying U.S. federal government personnel to
    overseas crises. Finally, we reviewed related GAO reports.[Footnote 4]
    We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed
    description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

    Results in Brief:

    S/CRS is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning
    and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations for
    countries at risk of, in, or emerging from conflict. The framework
    includes procedures and guidance to plan and coordinate reconstruction
    and stabilization operations under NSPD-44. NSC has adopted two of
    three elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System
    (IMS), and procedures for initiating the framework's use.[Footnote 5]
    However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and
    reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine
    how effective the framework will be since it has not been fully applied
    to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition,
    guidance on the roles and responsibilities of State's bureaus and
    offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon
    definition for what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction
    operation poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover,
    some interagency partners said senior officials have shown limited
    support for the framework and for S/CRS, and some described the
    proposed interagency planning process, as outlined in early versions of
    the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the
    results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the
    framework by addressing agencies' concerns and providing training to
    interagency participants. However, differences between the planning
    capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the
    military pose obstacles to effective coordination.

    State has begun developing three civilian corps--another element of the
    framework--to deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details
    for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First,
    State created two units--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the
    Standby Response Corps (SRC)--comprised of U.S. government employees to
    act as first responders to international crises. State also has
    collaborated with other U.S. government agencies involved in such
    operations to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited
    due to (1) State's difficulties in achieving planned staffing levels
    for ARC and providing training opportunities available to SRC
    volunteers, (2) other agencies' inability to secure resources for
    operations unrelated to their core missions, and (3) the possibility
    that deploying agency staff and SRC volunteers would result in staff
    shortages at their home units. Second, in 2004, State began developing
    the initial concept for the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would
    be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for
    stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers,
    police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not
    readily available within the U.S. government. CRC personnel would
    become full-time term federal employees once they are deployed. S/CRS
    developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has
    approved a plan to expand the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In
    May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million
    to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to
    obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers'
    compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and
    management would require congressional actions. Furthermore, State has
    not yet clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be
    deployed. Finally, State has estimated costs for establishing CRC and
    keeping it ready to deploy. However, these estimates do not include
    costs for deploying CRC personnel to other countries or sustaining them
    while there.

    We recommend that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate roles
    and responsibilities within the Department of State for stabilization
    and reconstruction operations, and work with interagency partners to
    complete and test the framework by applying all of its elements to an
    actual operation. We also recommend that Congress, when considering
    whether to authorize the establishment of CRC, should consider
    requiring the Secretary to report on CRC's development, sustainment,
    deployment, and the types of operations for which it would be used, and
    potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and
    deployment of volunteers, to better understand the long-term fiscal and
    oversight commitments that would accompany its authorization.

    The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State provided written
    comments on a draft of this report (see apps. II and III). State's
    comments included a joint response from State, DOD, and USAID. Commerce
    stated that the report provided a good overview of the new planning
    process but did not comment on the report's recommendations. State
    partially concurred with GAO's recommendations but noted that recent
    progress S/CRS made developing the planning and coordination framework
    and CRC was under reported. In the joint State, DOD, and USAID
    response, the agencies stated they are committed to the new framework
    and reiterated State's point that the draft report did not reflect the
    achievements made over recent months. The agencies did not comment on
    the report's recommendations or matter for congressional consideration.
    The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and State
    and USAID also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
    into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of Homeland Security
    and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft report but did not
    comment. We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not
    reflect changes that have occurred since the completion of our
    fieldwork. We completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and
    included in our draft report discussions and assessments on the
    framework elements NSC approved in March 2007 and on civilian response
    mechanisms. Our draft report did not include NSC-approved details for
    ARC, SRC, and CRC because those details were not provided until October
    2007. We incorporated this new information into our final report, as
    well as other information from written and technical comments from six
    agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the
    status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007.

    Background:

    Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the fall of
    2003, an internal State report concluded that the U.S. government had
    no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or manage
    stabilization and reconstruction operations; and the United States had
    relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts.
    State recommended the establishment of a new office to provide a
    centralized, permanent structure for planning and coordinating the
    civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction operations.

    Accordingly, in August 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced the
    creation of S/CRS to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and
    resource responses to complex emergencies, failing and failed states,
    and post-conflict environments. Such efforts could involve establishing
    security, building basic public services, and supporting economic
    development. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted
    statutory authorization for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of
    State.[Footnote 6]

    In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the
    coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and
    stabilization operations. NSPD-44 assigned the Secretary of State
    responsibility for planning and coordinating U.S. government
    stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at
    risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The
    Secretary, in turn, delegated implementation of the directive to the
    Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 identifies
    the specific roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements of
    U.S. government agencies that would likely participate in stabilization
    and reconstruction operations. It also requires State to lead the
    development of a civilian response capability, including the capacity
    to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to
    overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC Policy
    Coordination Committee[Footnote 7] for Reconstruction and Stabilization
    Operations, which is co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction
    and Stabilization and NSC, and is comprised of representatives from
    other executive agencies.

    State's Interagency Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clear
    Guidance, and Interagency Support:

    S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning
    and coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations. NSC
    has adopted two of three elements of the framework--the Interagency
    Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element--
    a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is
    still in progress. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully
    applied to any operation. In addition, guidance on roles and
    responsibilities for State's bureaus and offices is unclear and
    inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition of a
    stabilization and reconstruction operation poses an obstacle to
    interagency collaboration. In addition, some interagency partners have
    shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners
    described the proposed interagency planning process as cumbersome and
    time consuming. S/CRS is taking steps to strengthen the framework's
    effectiveness by addressing agencies' concerns and providing training
    to interagency partners, but differences between the planning
    capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the
    military pose obstacles to effective coordination.

    S/CRS Has Led the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning
    and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:

    S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for
    developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD-
    44. Sixteen U.S. agencies participated in NSC interagency working
    groups tasked with developing the framework,[Footnote 8] including DOD.
    The framework is intended to guide the development of U.S. planning for
    reconstruction and stabilization operations by facilitating
    coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts
    at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the
    framework include:

    * the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority
    and highly complex crises and operations;

    * a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization
    operations, and;

    * procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS
    and the planning guide.[Footnote 9]

    IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high-
    priority and highly complex crises and operations. IMS is a system for
    guiding communication and coordination between Washington policymakers
    and Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. In March
    2007, NSC approved IMS and, with the Cabinet Secretaries and Deputy
    Secretaries, would determine whether IMS is required for a specific
    operation. If IMS is used, it would consist of three interagency
    groups: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), an
    Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT)
    (see fig. 1).

    CRSG would be responsible for developing and integrating U.S.
    government policies, integrating civilian and military plans, and
    mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction
    operations. It would be comprised of the NSC policy coordination
    committee responsible for the country or region and would be supported
    by a secretariat comprised of staff from multiple agencies that develop
    the plans in conjunction with Chiefs of Mission and the U.S. military.
    CRSG also would mobilize resources, monitor and evaluate
    implementation, and coordinate with international partners.

    IPC would be responsible for integrating U.S. civilian agencies' plans
    with military operations. IPC members would include civilian agency
    staff with country-specific, functional, or planning expertise. IPC
    would be located at the headquarters of the military combatant command
    responsible for planning military operations but would report to the
    CRSG rather than the combatant commander. IPC would not be formed when
    planning and implementing operations that do not require military
    actions.

    ACT would be deployed to the U.S. embassy, if one exists, to set up,
    coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation
    planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and
    military field commanders. ACT could be supported by Field Advance
    Civilian Teams (FACT) to help implement reconstruction and
    stabilization programs at the provincial or local levels.

    Figure 1: Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization Operations:

    [See PDF for image]

    This figure is an illustration of the Interagency Management System for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The following
    relationships are depicted:

    Headquarters, Civilian:
    * National Security Council;
    - Principals Committee;
    - Deputies Committee;
    * Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group [A] (Policy
    Coordination Committee and Staff).

    Headquarters, Military:
    * Combatant Command.

    The Integration Planning Cell [A] overlaps both Civilian and Military,
    with a direct relationship between the National Security Council and
    the Combatant Command.

    Field: Civilian;
    Embassy or Ambassador (or existing U.S. government presence):
    * Advance Civilian Team [A];
    - Field Advance Civilian Team (3 depicted).

    Field, Military:
    * Joint Task Force or Theater Commander;
    - Field Commander.

    The illustration also depicts the following direct relationships:
    Embassy or Ambassador (or existing U.S. government presence) with Joint
    Task Force or Theater Commander;
    Field Advance Civilian Team with Field Commander.

    Sources: GAO analysis of Interagency Management System for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization and S/CRS documents.

    [A] Bodies developed under NSPD-44.

    Note: The U.S. military may or may not be involved in specific
    operations. The figure shows operations that include U.S. military
    efforts. NSPD-44 also charges State with coordinating U.S.
    reconstruction and stabilization efforts with foreign governments,
    multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Although
    important, these areas lie outside the scope of our review and are not
    included in the figure.

    [End of figure]

    The second element of the framework, the planning guide, has not been
    approved by NSC because State is rewriting the guide to address
    interagency concerns. Although NSC is not required to approve the
    planning guide, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would
    strengthen the framework's overall standing among interagency partners.
    Without NSC approval, the framework lacks the authority needed for
    interagency use. The planning guide divides planning for stabilization
    and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation,
    strategy development, and implementation planning (see fig. 2). As
    currently envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at
    each level should be achievable; have well-defined measures for
    determining progress; and have goals, objectives, and planned
    activities that are clearly linked. At the first level of planning,
    policy formulation, Washington-based policymakers would articulate the
    overall goal or desired outcome the United States plans to
    achieve.[Footnote 10] At the second level, strategy development, the
    same Washington policymakers, in conjunction with the relevant Chiefs
    of Mission, would define the major objectives and essential tasks
    necessary to achieve the overarching policy goal, the resources
    necessary for completing each objective, and the implementing agency or
    bureau. At the third level, implementation planning, the agencies,
    bureaus, and overseas posts responsible for implementing the programs
    and tasks for achieving the objectives would develop work plans,
    resource requirements, and metrics for monitoring progress.

    Figure 2: Draft Planning Guide for Integrated U.S. Government
    Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations:

    [See PDF for image]

    The figure is an illustration of the Draft Planning Guide for
    Integrated U.S. Government Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.
    The following data is depicted:

    Planning level: Policy Formulation;
    * Assesses conflict;
    * Develops goals;
    Plan elements: Overarching policy or goal.

    Planning level: Strategy Development;
    * Develops strategies, including identification of metrics and
    resources;
    * Identifies essential tasks;
    * Determines lead agency or bureau for each task;
    * Tracks other donor contributions;
    Plan elements: Major mission objectives.

    Planning level: Implementation planning;
    * Develops and monitors task metrics;
    * Provides budget information;
    * Tracks program management;
    Plan elements: Tasks for each mission objective.

    Sources: GAO analysis of draft planning guide for reconstruction and
    stabilization and S/CRS documents.

    [End of figure]

    The third element, which the NSC approved in March 2007, establishes
    procedures for using the framework when agencies are responding to an
    actual or imminent crisis or engaging in long-term scenario-based
    planning. Factors that may trigger a U.S. response to a crisis include
    the potential for significant military action in the near-term; actual
    or imminent state failure; events with significant potential to
    undermine regional stability and development progress, such as coups,
    economic collapse, or severe environmental damage; large-scale
    displacement of people; and impending or actual genocide, ethnic
    cleansing, or massive and grave human-rights violations. Planning for
    crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC (including the Cabinet
    Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, or Policy Coordination Committees) or
    by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of
    Defense. Long-term scenario planning may be conducted for crises that
    may emerge within 2 to 3 years. NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional
    Assistant Secretaries of State may request the initiation of long-term
    scenario-based planning based on five criteria: (1) the potential
    impact on U.S. national security and foreign-policy objectives; (2) the
    regional impact or scale of humanitarian needs; (3) the potential for
    significant U.S. military involvement; (4) the probability of a crisis
    occurring, as indicated by U.S. government agencies, the United
    Nations, or other international organizations; and (5) the ability of
    the affected country or neighboring countries to respond to a crisis.

    As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any
    stabilization and reconstruction operation. S/CRS and interagency
    partners have used draft versions of the planning guide to plan
    operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo, but implementation of the
    resulting plans has been limited. Only the plan for Haiti was
    implemented. The plan for Sudan was not implemented because it was
    completed just as the government of Sudan and opposition groups signed
    a peace accord. Interagency planning for potential operations in Kosovo
    is ongoing.

    According to State officials, the administration is using interagency
    processes created in NSPD-1 National Security Council System for
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. NSPD-1 established the process for
    coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and
    implementation of national security policies, which includes the
    interagency Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and policy
    coordination committees.[Footnote 11] In May 2004, the President issued
    NSPD-36 to direct U.S. operations in Iraq following the transfer of
    sovereignty to the Iraqi government. This directive made State
    responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
    U.S. government employees, policies, and activities in Iraq, except
    those under the command of an area military commander or seconded to an
    international organization. According to the directive, the Commander
    of the U.S. Central Command--under the authority, direction, and
    control of the Secretary of Defense--continues to be responsible for
    U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq,
    including U.S. efforts in support of training and equipping Iraqi
    security forces. In April 2006, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and the
    U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq developed their first joint campaign
    plan for Iraq and issued a revision to their joint plan in July 2007.

    Guidance Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and a Common
    Definition for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations:

    We found that NSPD-44, related State and administration guidance, and
    the planning framework collectively do not provide clear direction in
    three key areas. First, S/CRS's roles and responsibilities conflict
    with those assigned to State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission
    in the Foreign Affairs Manual. Second, guidance is inconsistent
    regarding S/CRS's responsibilities for conflict prevention efforts,
    which could compromise the office's ability to fulfill its mandate.
    Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and
    stabilization operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration.

    First, S/CRS's roles and responsibilities conflict with those of
    State's regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. In October 2005, we
    reported that collaborating agencies must agree on how to lead
    collaborative efforts.[Footnote 12] According to the Foreign Affairs
    Manual, each regional bureau is responsible for U.S. foreign relations
    with countries within a given region, including providing overall
    direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in the
    region.[Footnote 13] In addition, Chiefs of Mission have authority over
    all U.S. government staff and activities in their countries.[Footnote
    14] As S/CRS initially interpreted NSPD-44, S/CRS's roles and
    responsibilities included leading, planning, and coordinating
    stabilization and reconstruction operations; these responsibilities
    conflict with those of the regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. S/
    CRS officials stated that they expected the next version of the Foreign
    Affairs Manual to include a clearly defined and substantive description
    of the office's roles.

    Second, guidance varies regarding S/CRS's responsibility for preventing
    conflicts. NSPD-44 and the memo announcing S/CRS's creation include
    conflict prevention as one of the office's responsibilities. However,
    S/CRS's authorizing legislation and the State memo aligning S/CRS with
    the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) do not explicitly include
    conflict prevention as a responsibility. Ambiguity about S/CRS's
    prevention role could result in inadequate prevention efforts. A DOD
    official in the Global Strategic Partnerships office stated that
    responsibility for prevention is not currently assigned to anyone, and
    the work might not be done without such an assignment.

    Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and
    stabilization operations poses an obstacle to effective collaboration
    under the framework. In our October 2005 report, we found that
    collaborative efforts require agency staff to define and articulate a
    common outcome or purpose.[Footnote 15] While the framework includes
    definitions for reconstruction and stabilization, it does not define
    what constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations or explain
    how these operations differ from other types of military and civilian
    foreign assistance operations, such as counterinsurgency operations,
    counterterrorism operations, and standard development assistance. In
    addition, while S/CRS has developed a list of basic terms related to
    reconstruction and stabilization, staff from other bureaus and agencies
    had different definitions of these terms. As a result, it is not clear
    when agencies and bureaus are expected to apply the framework. S/CRS
    staff said that it is difficult to clearly define reconstruction and
    stabilization and difficult to determine when a response to a crisis
    constitutes a reconstruction or stabilization operation. Prior GAO work
    shows that the lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to
    improved planning and coordination of reconstruction and stabilization
    operations. In our previous report on DOD's stability operations
    approach, GAO found that the lack of a clear and consistent definition
    of stability operations caused confusion among military planners and
    limited progress in strengthening stability-operations
    capability.[Footnote 16]

    Civilian Interagency Partners Have Concerns about S/CRS and the
    Planning Framework:

    State and other U.S. civilian agencies have concerns about the planning
    framework for three key reasons. First, some civilian interagency
    partners are concerned that S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles
    and responsibilities. Staff from one of State's regional bureaus
    believed that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with
    the Regional Assistant Secretary's responsibility for leading an
    operation and coordinating with interagency partners. USAID staff noted
    how their agency had planned and coordinated reconstruction operations
    in the past and questioned why S/CRS now had these roles. Although most
    agency staff and outside experts we interviewed agreed that interagency
    coordination should improve, some USAID and State employees questioned
    why NSC was not given the primary role for planning and coordinating
    stabilization and reconstruction operations or for implementing NSPD-
    44.

    USAID and regional bureau staffs also said some aspects of the planning
    framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant since
    interagency teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing
    operations in accordance with NSPD-1. For example, planning for U.S.
    assistance to Sudan and Darfur before 2005 was led by State's Bureau of
    African Affairs. In 2005, S/CRS applied an early version of the
    planning guide to ongoing efforts in Sudan. USAID staff involved in
    both the regional bureau-led planning and S/CRS-led planning stated
    they were frustrated that S/CRS staff were not well-versed in Sudan
    policy and had to be educated before planning could occur. Other staff
    said S/CRS should focus more on filling the gaps in planning and
    operational mechanisms and focus less on policy development.

    Concerns about roles and responsibilities have led to confusion and
    disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource
    allocation. As a result, some of State's regional bureaus have resisted
    applying the new interagency planning process to particular
    reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS staff said one
    regional bureau discouraged the office's involvement in a country that
    S/CRS identified as appropriate for the framework; another bureau is
    generally reluctant to allow S/CRS to participate in its efforts in the
    region. In addition, State and other agency staff said S/CRS had
    conflicts with DFA over which office controlled resource allocation for
    these operations. These disputes made it difficult for S/CRS to
    coordinate and plan reconstruction and stabilization operations using
    the framework.

    Second, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have
    provided limited support for S/CRS and its planning framework. In our
    October 2005 report, we stated that committed leadership from all
    levels of an organization is needed to overcome the barriers that exist
    when working across agency boundaries.[Footnote 17] Staffs from various
    State offices said senior officials did not communicate strong support
    for S/CRS or the expectation that State and interagency partners should
    follow its framework for planning and coordinating reconstruction and
    stabilization operations. In addition, S/CRS was not selected to lead
    planning for recent high-priority operations. When the office was
    created in 2004, S/CRS and other State officials agreed that it would
    not focus efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq because these operations had
    existing processes, and policymakers feared that the scope of those
    operations would overwhelm S/CRS. However, S/CRS has not been given key
    roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as the
    ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and
    experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to
    address. These officials and experts stated that S/CRS has a large
    responsibility but little authority and no resources to achieve it.

    Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined
    in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for
    the results it produces. Officials who participated in the planning for
    Haiti stated that the process provided more systematic planning, better
    identification of interagency goals and responsibilities, and better
    identification of sequencing and resource requirements. However, some
    officials involved in planning operations for Haiti and Sudan stated
    that using the framework was time consuming, involved long meetings and
    extra work hours for staff, and was cumbersome to use because it was
    overly focused on process details. Staff also said that, in some cases,
    the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources,
    particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer. Other officials
    were frustrated when S/CRS processes were applied to interagency
    planning efforts that they believed were already functioning. As a
    result of these concerns, officials from some offices and agencies
    expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future reconstruction and
    stabilization plans.

    State Is Taking Steps to Revise and Strengthen the Framework:

    State is taking steps to strengthen the framework by revising and
    updating its draft planning guide based on feedback from other agencies
    and participants. S/CRS said it would commit to ensuring that the S/
    CRS-facilitated planning process is not duplicative or overly
    burdensome relative to its results and intends to provide assistance to
    State regional bureaus.[Footnote 18] S/CRS also said the revisions
    would provide more details about the framework's implementation at the
    field level and metrics to assess progress.

    State officials also said S/CRS's realignment under DFA would
    strengthen S/CRS's control over reconstruction and stabilization
    resources. On March 12, 2007, the Secretary of State aligned S/CRS with
    DFA, while still maintaining a direct reporting relationship between S/
    CRS and the Office of the Secretary. DFA is charged with reorganizing
    U.S. foreign assistance and has authority over all State and USAID
    foreign-assistance funding and programs. However, it is not clear how
    the change will affect S/CRS's role and the use of the framework. DFA
    has procedures and tools to guide the development of operational plans
    for foreign assistance, and its staff said some of those processes
    would likely be applied to S/CRS planning.

    According to S/CRS officials, S/CRS and DFA have recently developed a
    more productive working relationship than they had in the past. For
    example, the two organizations recently settled a dispute over funds
    State could receive from DOD under section 1207 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. This act authorized the
    Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year in fiscal
    years 2006 and 2007 to State to be applied to stabilization and
    reconstruction operations.[Footnote 19] According to State and DOD
    staff, in 2006 only $10 million was transferred to State due to a
    dispute between S/CRS and DFA over which office controlled the money.
    However, according to the March 2007 memo aligning S/CRS with DFA, S/
    CRS would be responsible for overseeing the transfer and use of these
    funds. S/CRS provided documents that indicated that State had obligated
    approximately $99.7 million of the $100 million available under section
    1207 for fiscal year 2007. This funding was applied to ongoing
    stabilization and reconstruction operations in Haiti, Nepal, Columbia,
    Yemen, and Somalia; to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership;
    and to infrastructure, economic development, rule of law programs, and
    counterterrorism activities in the Philippines, Indonesia, and
    Malaysia. In addition, S/CRS participated in DFA's review of U.S.
    assistance to some countries for fiscal year 2008 and, as S/CRS
    acquires new staff, it plans to assume responsibility for the budget
    process of countries in DFA's "rebuilding" category.[Footnote 20]

    Although S/CRS has not finished updating the framework guide or
    determined its role under DFA, it has taken other steps to strengthen
    the use of the framework and prepare interagency partners to coordinate
    effectively. For example, S/CRS offers Foreign Service Institute
    courses to train interagency participants in planning stabilization and
    reconstruction operations, leading and managing interagency
    coordination for such operations, and applying tools for early warning
    and conflict assessment. S/CRS reported that 352 federal employees
    participated in its training courses in 2006 and 452 employees
    participated in 2007.[Footnote 21] The majority of participants were
    from State, DOD, and USAID, although S/CRS reported that staff from
    seven other agencies also attended classes. Course instructors said it
    was difficult to attract participants from other agencies and described
    advertising to those agencies as ad hoc, in part because the Foreign
    Service Institute does not have an up-to-date list of contacts. S/CRS
    staff said they were exploring other strategies for recruiting course
    participants, such as identifying key agency leaders who agree that
    their staffs should attend.[Footnote 22] S/CRS also has developed tools
    and information to strengthen reconstruction and stabilization
    operations, such as information on guiding concepts and terms and tools
    for early warning and prevention, assessing best practices, and
    applying lessons learned.

    Differences between Military and Civilian Planning Pose Obstacles to
    Coordination:

    Although S/CRS made efforts to strengthen both coordination and the
    commitment of key DOD officials to the goals of S/CRS, several
    differences in military and civilian planning capacities and procedures
    pose obstacles to effective coordination.[Footnote 23] First,
    differences in planning capacities and resources make coordination
    difficult. In our report on DOD's stability operations
    approach,[Footnote 24] we found that DOD and non-DOD organizations do
    not fully understand each other's planning processes, and non-DOD
    organizations have limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range
    of planning activities. State officials noted its planning differs from
    DOD's; State is more focused on current operations and less focused on
    the wide range of potential contingency operations for which DOD must
    plan. State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to
    DOD's combatant commands. DOD officials noted that their efforts to
    include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts were
    stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer.
    State officials indicated it does not have DOD's capacity to staff
    operations and planning; both DOD and State staff doubted that civilian
    capacity and resources would ever match the levels desired.

    Second, State generally does not receive DOD military plans as they are
    being developed, which restricts its ability to harmonize
    reconstruction and stabilization efforts with military plans and
    operations as required by NSPD-44. DOD does not have a process in place
    to share, when appropriate, information with non-DOD agencies early in
    plan development without specific approval from the Secretary of
    Defense.[Footnote 25] DOD's hierarchical approach limits interagency
    participation while plans are being developed by the combatant commands
    at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. NSPD-44 working
    groups are developing a process for reviewing military plans, when
    appropriate, but are not yet ready to use it.

    Third, agency staff and outside experts have found that differences in
    organizational structure, terminology, and information systems pose
    obstacles to effective coordination between military and civilian
    agencies. For example, S/CRS found that differences between civilian
    agencies' headquarters and field organization and the strategic,
    operational, and tactical organization of the military can make
    coordination more difficult.[Footnote 26] The Administration's July
    2007 report to Congress stated it was developing common standards and
    systems, including blogs and other technologies, to address
    inconsistencies in U.S. information management systems and to support
    interagency collaboration and communication.[Footnote 27]

    In our stability operations report,[Footnote 28] we recommended that
    the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
    provide implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate
    and encourage interagency participation in the development of military
    plans; develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD
    agencies early in the planning process, as appropriate; and orient DOD
    and non-DOD personnel in each agency's planning processes and
    capabilities. In commenting on the report, DOD said it partially agreed
    with our recommendations but did not indicate the steps it would take
    to implement them.

    State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining
    Rapid Deployment Corps:

    State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to
    international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing
    and maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the
    department--the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response
    Corps (SRC)--and has collaborated with several other U.S. government
    agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however,
    face challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties
    in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training
    opportunities for State's SRC volunteers, (2) agencies' inabilities to
    secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core
    missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying volunteers could
    result in their home units having insufficient staff. Second, in May
    2007, State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps
    (CRC), which would be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and
    experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations,
    such as civil engineers, police officers, judges, and public
    administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S.
    government. If deployed, reservists would become federal employees.
    State, however, does not yet have congressional authority to establish
    the CRC or to provide the planned benefits package for CRC personnel.
    In addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for
    which CRC would be deployed. Further, State has estimated the costs for
    establishing and keeping CRC ready to deploy, including costs for
    recruiting, training, equipping CRC personnel, but these estimates do
    not include the costs of deploying CRC personnel to other countries or
    sustaining them once deployed.

    State, USAID, and the Department of the Treasury Have Developed Some
    Internal Capacity to Deploy Staff Rapidly in Support of Stabilization
    and Reconstruction Operations:

    To meet NSPD-44 requirements for developing a strong civilian response
    capability, State and other U.S. agencies developed internal mechanisms
    to reassign personnel in support of stabilization and reconstruction
    operations. S/CRS has taken the lead in expanding State's internal
    capacity to respond to conflict by creating ARC and SRC.[Footnote 29]
    S/CRS also collaborated with several other U.S. government agencies to
    initiate the development of ARC and SRC units within those agencies.

    In 2006, State developed ARC within S/CRS to deploy during the initial
    stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS has 15
    temporary staff positions for ARC; ARC staff serve 1-year rotations. In
    October 2007, 10 of the 15 authorized positions were staffed. ARC staff
    deploy to unstable environments to assess countries' or regions' needs
    and help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response.
    Since 2006, ARC staff have deployed to seven locations: (1) Sudan, to
    help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; (2) Eastern Chad, to monitor
    the displacement of civilians resulting from the conflict in Darfur;
    (3) Lebanon, to assist with the evacuation of American citizens and to
    coordinate assistance immediately following the Israeli-Hezbollah
    conflict; (4) Kosovo, to help plan for a follow-on to the United
    Nations Mission to Kosovo; (5) Liberia, to coordinate reforms of the
    security sector; (6) Iraq, to assist with integrating new Provincial
    Reconstruction Team members; and (7) Haiti, to plan the implementation
    and oversight of programs to improve security, local government
    capacity, and economic opportunity in Cit� Soleil. According to S/CRS,
    regional bureau staff, and State's Office of the Inspector General, ARC
    involvement and performance in these operations has been positive. When
    not deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning
    exercises and work with other S/CRS offices and State bureaus on
    related issues to gain relevant expertise.

    SRC would deploy during the second stage of a surge to stabilization
    and reconstruction operations. SRC works to support activities of ARC
    when additional staff or specialized skills are required. Unlike ARC,
    SRC does not have not dedicated staff positions. Rather, when not
    deployed, current employees on the SRC roster serve in other capacities
    throughout State. Currently, SRC is composed of about 90 State
    employees and 210 State retirees. In July 2007, NSC approved S/CRS
    plans to increase SRC to a roster of 500 volunteers government-wide by
    fiscal year 2008, and to a roster of 2,000 volunteers government-wide
    by fiscal year 2009. If called upon, SRC members would be available for
    deployment within 60 days and could be deployed for up to 6 months.
    According to S/CRS staff, the office aims to have up to one-quarter of
    this standby corps ready for deployment at any one time. However, to
    date, S/CRS has deployed SRC members to only two ongoing operations:
    one to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and one to Chad
    to support refugees from Eastern Darfur.

    Although S/CRS has started working with other U.S. agencies to
    establish units similar to ARC and SRC, these efforts are in very early
    stages. Currently, only USAID and the Department of the Treasury have
    established mechanisms for responding rapidly to stability and
    reconstruction missions. USAID uses the Office of Foreign Disaster
    Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives to respond to
    conflict situations.[Footnote 30] In addition, USAID has started
    developing its own internal surge capacity and has identified 15 staff
    available for immediate deployment to crises. USAID's Bureau of
    Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance developed a proposal
    to create a civilian reserve office to respond to stabilization and
    reconstruction operations and requested funds to hire, train, equip,
    and deploy more than 50 staff specifically for this purpose. The
    Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance has ongoing
    programs around the world and intends to build the capacity to lead
    long-term stability operations.[Footnote 31] In addition, the Office of
    Technical Assistance developed the First Responder Initiative in 2004,
    which includes approximately 30 staff who are willing to deploy rapidly
    to conflict areas in support of stabilization and reconstruction
    operations.

    State and Other Agencies Face Challenges That Limit Their Efforts to
    Establish and Deploy Rapid Response Units:

    State and other agencies face challenges in establishing their rapid
    response capabilities. These challenges include (1) difficulties in
    achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training
    opportunities for State's SRC volunteers, (2) agencies' inability to
    secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core
    missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying agency staff and SRC
    volunteers would result in staff shortages in their home units.

    S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting for ARC
    and training SRC members. S/CRS plans to increase the number of
    authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions to 33
    permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request.
    However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that State will
    receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Although S/CRS has not
    had difficulty recruiting SRC volunteers, it does not presently have
    the capacity to ensure they are properly trained for participating in
    stabilization and reconstruction operations. ARC staff and SRC
    volunteers would be required to complete five courses offered jointly
    by S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute. According to S/CRS staff,
    the Foreign Service Institute does not currently have the capacity to
    train the 1,500 new volunteers S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is
    studying ways to correct the situation.

    Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and
    reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff
    available for rapid responses to overseas crises. Most agencies'
    missions are domestic in nature. Nonetheless, domestic policy agencies,
    including the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, operate
    overseas programs. However, officials from these agencies said
    international programs are viewed as extensions of their domestic
    missions.[Footnote 32] As a result, it is difficult for these agencies
    to secure funding for cadres of on-call first and second responders.

    Finally, State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can
    leave home units without sufficient staff and, as a result, they must
    weigh the value of deploying volunteers against the needs of their
    units. For example, when not deployed to stabilization and
    reconstruction operations, current State SRC volunteers serve normal
    duty rotations at overseas posts or within State's various bureaus and
    offices within the United States. According to State's Office of the
    Inspector General, S/CRS has had difficulty getting State's other units
    to release the SRC volunteers it wants to deploy in support of
    stabilization and reconstruction operations.[Footnote 33] The home
    units of the volunteers do not want to become short of staff or lose
    high-performing staff to other operations. Other agencies reported a
    reluctance to deploy staff overseas or establish on-call units because
    doing so would leave fewer workers available to complete the offices'
    work requirements. Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify,
    train, and deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction
    operations provided that State fund the efforts. According to S/CRS
    staff, however, the training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC
    would not begin until fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 34]

    S/CRS Has Made Efforts to Establish CRC:

    In 2004, S/CRS developed an initial concept for CRC, which would be
    deployed in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. CRC
    would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences
    useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil
    engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are
    not readily available within the U.S. government. Reservists would
    serve 4-year terms of voluntary service and, if called upon, would
    deploy for rotations of up to 1 year. Reservists would remain in their
    daily jobs until called upon for service and would be ready for
    deployment within 30 to 60 days. Deployed CRC personnel would be
    classified as full-time term federal employees, with the authority to
    speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and
    employees. Volunteers would receive training upon joining CRC and would
    be required to complete annual training. In addition, they would
    receive training specific and relevant to an operation immediately
    before deployment.

    According to S/CRS staff, NSC has approved plans to develop a roster of
    2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009; however, a BearingPoint study
    commissioned by S/CRS found that CRC would require at least 3,550
    volunteers to respond to CRC goals.[Footnote 35] The BearingPoint study
    also noted that decisions about CRC's roster size would likely evolve
    over time.[Footnote 36] In addition, a panel of experts convened by the
    Congressional Research Service concluded that the proposed roster may
    represent only a portion of what is likely required.[Footnote 37] The
    panel noted that simultaneously deploying CRC to two large and one
    small operation, as defined by BearingPoint, could require deploying
    the entire CRC roster.[Footnote 38] S/CRS staff said the office would
    assess whether to expand the roster in subsequent years.

    CRC Lacks Congressional Authority in Key Areas and a Clearly Defined
    Mission:

    State cannot spend any funds for the CRC until Congress has authorized
    the CRC's establishment. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority
    to reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to
    support and maintain CRC.[Footnote 39] However, the legislation
    specified that no money may be obligated without a subsequent act of
    Congress. Legislation that would authorize CRC is pending in both the
    Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of October 2007,
    neither chamber had taken action on the bills.[Footnote 40]

    In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key
    elements of the planned compensation package for deployed volunteers.
    Under current plans, deployed volunteers would become full-time term
    federal employees and would receive compensation and benefits similar
    to those received by Foreign Service employees. Such compensation and
    benefits would include:

    * salary commensurate with experience;

    * danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and
    allowances;

    * recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions;

    * overtime pay and compensatory time;

    * leave accrual and payment for unused leave upon service completion;

    * competitive hiring status;

    * federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while
    deployed;

    * dual compensation for retired federal workers; and;

    * the ability to count deployed time toward retirement benefits.

    The pending legislation would address some of the compensation
    authorities needed by State to offer the full proposed benefits package
    to CRC personnel. Specifically, it would authorize State to provide the
    same compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to
    members of the Foreign Service. However, the proposed legislation does
    not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive
    hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time
    deployed would count toward government retirement benefits. In
    addition, deployed personnel would not have re-employment rights
    similar to those for military reservists. Currently, military
    reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called into service
    have the right to return to their previous place of employment upon
    completion of their military service requirements.[Footnote 41]
    However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does not include
    similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS staff said that the
    Civilian Reserve Task Force would assess whether re-employment rights
    are necessary based on the experience of recruiting the first 500
    personnel.

    Further, S/CRS is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a
    defined set of potential missions in which CRC would participate.
    According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation in the House and
    Senate that would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to specific
    nonhumanitarian stabilization and reconstruction missions when called
    upon by the President. However, as with the planning guide and IMS,
    there is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes a stabilization
    and reconstruction mission. S/CRS staff said they are still working
    through the conceptual differences between these and other types of
    operations, such as for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, but
    that under its current approach, CRC could be deployed to almost any
    operation in a conflict zone.

    State Has Estimated Some Costs for CRC:

    Although State has estimated some costs for establishing and sustaining
    CRC at home, the estimates do not include the costs of deploying CRC
    personnel to other countries or sustaining them once deployed.

    As shown in table 1, State has identified about $135 million in
    estimated costs for establishing and sustaining CRC at home during
    fiscal years 2008 and 2009.[Footnote 42] In comparison, Bearing Point's
    study estimated that a 3-year startup period would cost approximately
    $341 million. Under current State plans, these funds would come from
    the fiscal year 2007 reallocation authority and from State's fiscal
    year 2009 budget. The administration did not request any funds for CRC
    in fiscal year 2008.

    Table 1: State's Estimated Startup Costs for CRC for Fiscal Years 2007
    through 2009, Dollars in millions:

    Funding Purpose:
    Marketing, recruiting, screening, and enrolling;
    CRC Established with 500 Personnel: $7.7;
    CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: $17.2;
    Total: $24.9.

    Funding Purpose: Training;
    CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 5.1;
    CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 13.1;
    Total: 18.2.

    Funding Purpose: Equipment Purchases;
    CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 2.3;
    CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 45.4;
    Total: 47.7.

    Funding Purpose: Administration;
    CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 6.4;
    CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 12.6;
    Total: 19.0.

    Funding Purpose: Compensation;
    CRC Established with 500 Personnel: 4.2;
    CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: 20.7;
    Total: 24.9.

    Funding Purpose: Total;
    CRC Established with 500 Personnel: $25.7;
    CRC Expanded to 2,000 Personnel: $109.0;
    Total: $134.7.

    Source: Department of State documents and staff.

    [End of table]

    If Congress authorizes the CRC, State plans to obligate approximately
    $26 million of the $50 million authority in fiscal year 2007
    supplemental funds to market the program and recruit, screen, and
    enroll the first 500 CRC personnel, including 350 with expertise in
    rule of law issues ($7.7 million); train the first 500 personnel ($5.1
    million); purchase equipment such as armored vehicles, police weapons,
    electronics, cots, tents, and body armor ($2.3 million); administer
    CRC, such as establishing a home office and a U.S. Deployment Center,
    and hiring 37 new government staff and contractor positions to manage
    CRC's day-to-day administrative functions ($6.4 million); and
    compensate CRC personnel when they are being trained ($4.2 million).

    State currently estimates that it will cost about $109 million to
    expand the CRC to 2,000 personnel in fiscal year 2009 (see table 1). In
    this phase, State would hire up to 26 additional administrative staff
    and provide training for the new CRC volunteers.[Footnote 43] As of
    October 2007, the Office of Management and Budget had not yet approved
    State's request for $109 million. The actual funding request for 2009
    may differ from these estimates.

    S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000-
    volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million. According to S/CRS staff,
    these annual costs include the activities needed to ensure that CRC
    personnel are ready to deploy. However, they do not include costs for
    deploying CRC personnel outside the United States or sustaining them
    once overseas. Deployment and overseas sustainment costs could include
    security costs, which may be high in a conflict zone; salaries and
    allowances; operation and infrastructure costs, including for
    facilities; and life support, such as food, lodging, and medical
    support.

    Conclusions:

    Government personnel and outside experts in national security issues
    agree that the U.S. government must improve its capacity to plan for
    and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. To address
    these issues, S/CRS and its interagency partners have worked to develop
    a new interagency planning and coordination framework and rapid
    response corps of civilian government and nongovernment personnel.
    Since the framework has never been fully applied, an understanding of
    its benefits and drawbacks remains unknown. However, concerns about
    roles and responsibilities and the value of the framework have slowed
    its acceptance by interagency partners. Although there is no
    requirement that NSC approve all elements of the framework, without
    such approval it will be difficult to ensure that U.S. government
    agencies collaborate and contribute to interagency planning efforts to
    the fullest extent possible.

    S/CRS has not completed developing plans to fully establish and
    maintain CRC, but is seeking authorization to begin recruitment of CRC
    volunteers. Although State received authority to reallocate up to $50
    million for CRC, a separate act of Congress is required to authorize
    CRC before State may obligate that or future funding. S/CRS has
    developed a plan for using this funding to train, equip, and keep ready
    to deploy up to 2,000 CRC personnel by fiscal year 2009. However, costs
    of deploying CRC personnel to operations outside of the United States
    or of sustaining them at their new posts are not included. In addition,
    S/CRS has not yet specified types of missions for which the CRC would
    be used. Moreover, failure to provide full benefits and re-employment
    rights could affect State's ability to recruit and retain personnel for
    CRC. These are critical elements for Congress to consider when debating
    the long-term commitment associated with authorizing CRC and the future
    oversight of CRC operations and effectiveness.

    Recommendations for Executive Action:

    To strengthen interagency planning and coordination of stabilization
    and reconstruction operations, we recommend that the Secretary of State
    clarify and communicate specific roles and responsibilities within
    State for S/CRS and the regional bureaus, including updating the
    Foreign Affairs Manual.

    In addition, we recommend that the Secretary, with the assistance of
    interagency partners, finish developing the framework and test its
    usefulness by fully applying it to a stabilization and reconstruction
    operation.

    Matter for Congressional Consideration:

    To better understand the long-term fiscal and oversight commitments
    that would accompany authorizing CRC, when considering whether to grant
    such authority, the Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of
    State, in consultation with other relevant agencies, to report on the
    activities and costs required for its development; the administrative
    requirements and annual operating costs once it is established,
    including for sustainment at home, deployment, and sustainment once
    deployed; the types of operations for which it would be used; and
    potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and
    deployment of personnel.

    Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

    We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
    Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State (see appendixes II and
    III). In addition, State, DOD, and USAID submitted a joint statement to
    the draft report, which is included as part of State's comments. The
    Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense, Justice, and
    State and USAID also provided technical comments, which were
    incorporated into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of
    Homeland Security and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft
    report but did not comment.

    Commerce stated the report was a good overview of the new process for
    planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations,
    but did not comment on the report's recommendations and matter for
    Congressional consideration.

    State said it partially concurred with our recommendations. It said
    that while it had no objections to the recommendations, it believes the
    progress made toward developing a civilian R&S capability was
    underreported. State said that the data GAO presented preceded a
    tremendous period of growth and change for the interagency process. In
    a joint statement, State, DOD, and USAID reiterated the draft report
    did not reflect the achievements made over recent months, including the
    IMS, ARC, SRC, and CRC. The joint statement did not comment on the
    report's recommendations or matter for Congressional consideration.

    When providing technical comments, USDA, Justice, USAID each stated
    strong support for the new planning and coordination framework, and
    that they would continue to work with S/CRS to improve civilian
    deployment capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction
    operations. USAID further stated that more work is needed to clarify
    roles and responsibilities, particularly in the relationships between
    S/CRS and DFA, and between S/CRS and USAID.

    We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect
    changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We
    completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our
    draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC
    approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft
    report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC
    because those details were not provided until October 2007. We
    incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as
    other information from written and technical comments from six
    agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the
    status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007.

    As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
    of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
    from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
    Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security,
    Justice, State, and the Treasury and to the Administrator for USAID. We
    will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
    report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
    [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

    If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact
    me at (202) 512-4128 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
    Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
    the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
    this report are listed in appendix IV.

    Signed by:

    Joseph A. Christoff:
    Director, International Affairs and Trade:

    [End of section]

    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

    To address both of the objectives of our review, we examined U.S.
    government documents and research and conducted more than 50 interviews
    with staff from 31 offices and bureaus at eight U.S. agencies with
    roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations (see table 2). We
    also interviewed staff members and reviewed reports and documents from
    eight U.S. government and independent research organizations.

    Table 2: Agencies and Research Centers Contacted for GAO Review:

    Agency: Department of State;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Bureau of African Affairs;
    * Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
    * Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs;
    * Bureau of International Organization Affairs;
    * Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement;
    * Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs;
    * Bureau of Political Affairs;
    * Bureau of Political-Military Affairs;
    * Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs;
    * Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs;
    * Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance;
    * Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization;
    * Office of the Inspector General.

    Agency: Department of Agriculture;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Foreign Agricultural Service.

    Agency: Department of Commerce;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * International Trade Administration.

    Agency: Department of Defense;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Office of the Secretary of Defense;
    * Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy;
    * Joint Staff, J5.

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Office of International Affairs.

    Agency: Department of Justice;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * National Security Division.

    Agency: Department of the Treasury;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Office of Technical Assistance.

    Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Africa Bureau;
    * Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance;
    * Food for Peace;
    * Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance;
    * Office of Military Affairs;
    * Office of Transition Initiatives.

    Agency: U.S. Government Research Centers;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Institute for Defense Analyses;
    * National Defense University;
    * U.S. Institute for Peace.

    Agency: Independent Research Centers;
    Bureau or office contacted:
    * Brookings Institution;
    * Center for Global Development;
    * Center for Strategic and International Studies;
    * Project on National Security Reform;
    * RAND Corporation.

    Source: GAO.

    [End of table]

    To determine the Department of State's (State) efforts to improve
    interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and
    reconstruction operations, we interviewed current and former staff from
    the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/
    CRS) and reviewed documentation on its development, roles, and
    responsibilities. Documents reviewed include Presidential Decision
    Directive 56, National Security Presidential Directives 1 and 44,
    Section 408 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005,[Footnote
    44] the Foreign Affairs Manual, and internal State reports and memos.
    We also reviewed documentation from and held discussions with S/CRS,
    State's regional and program bureaus, other agencies, and public and
    private research institutions on the development of the new planning
    framework for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Topics
    reviewed and discussed included mechanisms for triggering the process,
    roles and responsibilities of various actors, the Interagency
    Management System, the new planning template, and monitoring and
    evaluation requirements. We also discussed planning efforts and, where
    possible, reviewed resultant plans for stabilization and reconstruction
    operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo with S/CRS, staff from State's
    relevant regional bureaus, and the U.S. Agency for International
    Development. Finally, we participated in five training courses on
    stabilization and reconstruction planning developed and taught by S/CRS
    staff in conjunction with the Foreign Service Institute.

    To determine State's efforts to improve the deployment of civilians to
    these operations, we reviewed documents and interviewed State and other
    agencies' staffs about the existing internal capacity each has for
    supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations and the actions
    they are taking to develop rapid deployment units and capabilities. We
    reviewed the development of the Active Response Corps, Standby Response
    Corps, and Civilian Reserve Corps by interviewing State staff from S/
    CRS, regional bureaus, select program bureaus, and the Office of the
    Inspector General. We reviewed BearingPoint's study for creating and
    maintaining the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) and S/CRS plans for
    implementing the study's recommendations, we examined proposals and
    assessments prepared by the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Institute for
    Defense Analyses, and the Congressional Research Service, and we
    reviewed pending legislation in the Senate and House of Representatives
    that would authorize CRC. Finally, we discussed S/CRS's civilian
    reserve concept with staffs from other agencies including the
    Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and the
    Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as
    with private research institutions, including the Brookings
    Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and
    the RAND Corporation.

    We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    [End of section]

    Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Commerce:

    United States Department Of Commerce:
    The Under Secretary for International Trade:
    Washington, D.C. 20230:

    October 23, 2007:

    David M. Walker:
    Comptroller General of the United States:
    United States Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, NW:
    Washington, D.C. 20548:

    Dear Mr. Walker:

    Thank you for sharing with us the draft United States Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, "Stabilization and
    Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a Planning and
    Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps," and
    for the opportunity to comment on the report. The report provides a
    good overview of the complexities associated with the development and
    implementation of a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning
    and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations for
    countries threatened by conflict.

    Technical comments and corrections have been attached in a separate
    document for your consideration.

    Thank you for your work in producing this report.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by:

    Christopher A. Padilla, Acting:

    [End of letter]

    Department Of Commerce Comments:

    Government Accountability Office Report GAO-08-39:
    Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions are Needed to Develop a
    Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
    Corps:

    Department of Commerce Contact:
    Merriam Mashatt, International Trade Administration:
    (202) 482-3499, MerrianaMashatt@mail.doc.gov:

    1. Page 25: Delete the reference to "Commerce" in the third sentence of
    the first paragraph (below). This sentence does not reflect the
    official position of the Department of Commerce and is factually
    incorrect. International programs are a central part of the
    Department's core mission and the Department's appropriations reflect
    this fact. Already, the Department plays a significant role in
    stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.

    In addition, insert the language as the last 2 sentences of the first
    paragraph. Commerce comments in bold text below:

    "Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and
    reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff
    available to respond rapidly to overseas crises. Most agencies have
    primary missions that are domestic in nature although many agencies,
    including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security
    and Justice operate overseas programs. However, according to (at this
    point the word "Commerce" has been struck through with a line) Homeland
    Security, and Justice officials, international programs are not viewed
    as central to their core missions, either by the agency or their
    appropriators. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to
    secure funding to deploy to active stabilization and reconstruction
    operations, whether as part of a cadre of on-call first and second
    responders or for longer-term assistance programs. Start Insert - The
    Department of Commerce is taking steps to develop a capability that
    could be deployed for reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Over
    the next year, the International Trade Administration intends to
    conduct analysis and execute a series of tabletop exercises to develop
    a reconstruction and stabilization response mechanism for relevant
    Department of Commerce agencies and bureaus. - End Insert."

    2. Page 14 through 16 and in Summary Sections:
    In the section entitled "Civilian Interagency Partners Have Not
    Accepted the Framework Due to Concerns about Roles and
    Responsibilities, Limited Support for the S/CRS, and a Cumbersome
    Planning Process," the current use of the term "interagency" is
    misleading. The Department of Commerce does not claim to have these
    objections to the framework and it is inaccurate to include implicit or
    explicit references to the Department of Commerce in this section.
    Please redraft this section and any other summary sections referring to
    this section to make it clear that the Department of Commerce, as a
    civilian interagency partner, does not hold the assertions made in it.

    [End of section]

    Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:

    Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
    end of this appendix.

    United States Department of State:
    Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
    Officer:
    Washington, D.C. 20520:

    October 24, 2007:

    Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
    Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
    Government Accountability Office:
    441 G Street, NW:
    Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:

    Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

    We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
    "Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
    Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
    Corps," GAO Job Code 320438.

    The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
    incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

    If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
    Sheila Gwaltney, Senior Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization at (202) 663-0842.

    Sincerely,

    Signed by:

    Sid Kaplan (Acting):

    cc: GAO � Sam Bernet:
    S/CRS � John Herbst:
    State/OIG � Mark Duda:

    [End of letter]

    Department of State, Defense, and USAID Joint Response:

    Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
    Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
    Corps (GAO-08-39, GAO Code 320438):

    On behalf of the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S.
    Agency for International Development, the Office of the Coordinator for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) thanks the Government
    Accountability Office for the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft
    report.

    We welcome the GAO's review of the U.S. Government's efforts to develop
    the systems and procedures for whole-of-government planning and
    management of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) policy and
    operations. Our nation's security will be strengthened by improving the
    capacity of civilian agencies to prevent or mitigate conflicts that may
    threaten us, and stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from
    conflict by fostering stability, democracy, and economic development.

    Our agencies share the view that the GAO report, which was over a year
    in preparation, does not reflect the achievements made over recent
    months in developing interagency mechanisms for effective management of
    R&S situations. Chief among those achievements was the formal approval
    by all agencies of the Interagency Management System (IMS), which
    provides the framework for comprehensive policy and program management
    for R&S operations, integrated within Washington agencies, as well as
    our embassies and regional combatant commands. We also have made
    significant strides in the planning for a Civilian Reserve Corps,
    which, if Congress funds it, will create a critically important
    capability benefiting the nation. We have determined the interagency
    composition of the Active Response Corps and the Standby Response
    Corps, and created additional interagency tools for R&S management. The
    results of these advances also can be seen in recent engagements in
    Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia, to name just three specific examples.

    Our agencies have each commented separately on the GAO report, but we
    also wanted to take this opportunity to provide a joint response in
    recognition of the unprecedented degree of interagency cooperation and
    collaboration on these issues of national importance.

    Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:

    Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
    Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
    Corps (GAO-08-39, GAO Code 320438):

    Introduction:

    The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and
    comment on the GAO Draft Report, "Stabilization and Reconstruction:
    Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and
    Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. " The Office of the Coordinator
    for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was established formally
    in August 2004, and received its mandate, as delegated by the Secretary
    of State, from National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) of
    December 2005. Its core mission is to enhance our nation's capacity to
    lead, coordinate, and institutionalize civilian capability to prevent
    or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and
    reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so
    they can reach a more sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a
    market economy. Over the three years since it was established, S/CRS
    has led the interagency effort in Washington to implement the
    President's vision to develop the systems and procedures to provide
    comprehensive, whole-of-government planning for and management of
    reconstruction and stabilization operations.

    In her February 8, 2007 remarks on transformational diplomacy,
    Secretary Rice stated:

    "When it comes to working comprehensively to help societies rebuild
    after conflict, one group of diplomats is truly at the forefront of our
    efforts; that is, our Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization. These individuals are not just helping our Department to
    plan for the next Bosnia or Liberia or Haiti. Some of them are actually
    deployed right now in the hottest spots overseas.... These men and
    women are part of our effort to create an expeditionary arm of the
    Department of State. It is a way of thinking and training and operating
    that is mostly new for us, but one that we must adopt."

    Over the last year, S/CRS has worked with fifteen agencies associated
    with reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) to develop integrated
    planning, operations, and civilian response systems. Based on S/CRS'
    demonstrated capacity for developing reconstruction and stabilization
    plans and operations, this office is prepared to take on the role for
    which it was created: to coordinate the interagency in managing the
    U.S. Government response to the next crisis with reconstruction and
    stabilization implications.

    S/CRS and its interagency partners have made great progress over the
    last several months in creating the procedures and tools for managing
    R&S operations. These are ready for use. The Interagency Management
    System (IMS) and its components can be activated to plan for, manage,
    and staff a whole-of-government R&S response to a foreign crisis. The
    Washington-based, interagency component of the IMS, the Country
    Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), can provide policy
    options and overall management of the R&S response. The CRSG's
    secretariat, an interagency, working level team, can immediately begin
    planning with the relevant regional bureau and embassy involved. If
    significant U.S. military involvement is anticipated, S/CRS can
    assemble an interagency team of planners and experts to send to the
    relevant Combatant Command as an Integration Planning Cell (IPC). If
    requested by the Chief of Mission, members of the Active Response Corp
    (ARC) can deploy immediately to assist the Embassy as the core element
    of an Advance Civilian Team (ACT).

    The S/CRS Interagency Process Has Just Begun:

    As noted above, S/CRS is a relatively new organization and is creating
    a fundamentally new approach to enable more timely, integrated, and
    effective management of U.S. Government efforts in reconstruction and
    stabilization. This new approach requires modification of long-standing
    bureaucratic practices and creation of new habitual relationships,
    lines of communication, and forms of cooperation. In the year since
    work on the GAO report was begun � which represents a third of the
    lifespan thus far for S/CRS � the office's engagement with interagency
    partners has expanded, deepened and been strengthened. [See comment 1]

    For example, a series of working groups and other formal structures
    regularly bring together representatives of the Departments of State,
    Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Homeland Security,
    Health and Human Services, Transportation, the U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID), the intelligence community, and the
    National Security Council (NSC) to prepare for effective whole-of-
    government planning for and management of reconstruction and
    stabilization efforts. Within the Department of State, regional bureaus
    and S/CRS have collaborated to develop and implement programs in Haiti,
    Nepal, Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Colombia, Liberia, Yemen, the
    trans-Sahara region, the tri-border region in Asia (Philippines,
    Indonesia and Malaysia) and in Somalia. The data presented in this GAO
    study, while perhaps accurate at the time of collection several months
    ago, preceded a period of tremendous growth and change for the
    interagency process and do not adequately reflect the current
    situation. [See comment 1]

    Areas of Significant Progress Not Adequately Recognized in the Report:

    The critical areas of progress listed below were not captured in the
    GAO report and are important developments that round out the report's
    findings.

    Implementation of NSPD-44: The GAO report states that two of three
    elements of an interagency framework for planning and coordinating R&S
    operations have been approved. In fact, since January 2007, the NSC has
    approved three of four major components of the interagency management
    effort for R&S engagements. The three approved components are the
    Interagency Management System (IMS); procedures for initiating the IMS;
    and the civilian surge mechanism, a critical component of which is the
    Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). Work on the fourth element, the planning
    framework, is in progress. [See comment 2]

    The GAO report at one point incorrectly stated that NSPD-44 delegates
    authority to S/CRS for leading U.S. Government R&S efforts, while in
    other sections correctly notes that the Presidential directive tasks
    the Secretary of State with this responsibility. Specifically, NSPD-44
    delegates to the Secretary responsibility for "integrated U.S.
    Government efforts involving U.S. Departments and Agencies with
    relevant capabilities" to prepare for, plan, and conduct stabilization
    and reconstruction operations in the range of failing and post-conflict
    states (Emphasis added). The Secretary of State in turn can delegate to
    S/CRS responsibility for leading these efforts. S/CRS has worked with
    its partners from a variety of relevant agencies to establish the tasks
    and systems needed for R&S mobilization, management and field
    operations as well as the exercises and experimentation necessary to
    test and refine these systems. The interagency agreed on an
    implementation work plan and timeline that will produce the interagency
    tools and procedures to enable whole-of-government engagement in R&S
    situations. Greater detail on these tools and procedures is provided
    below. [See comment 3]

    Interagency Management System (IMS): Early in 2007, the NSC approved
    the IMS and the procedures for initiating its use. The IMS provides the
    framework to enable Washington policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and
    military commanders to manage complex R&S engagements jointly. It
    ensures coordination among all U.S. Government stakeholders, elaborates
    the roles and responsibilities for interagency teams, and facilitates
    and supports integrated strategic and implementation planning. [See
    comment 4]

    The GAO report states that there is lack of clarity on roles and
    responsibilities among regional bureaus and S/CRS and among agencies of
    the U.S. Government. The Department notes that continuing work on the
    IMS by S/CRS, the Department's regional bureaus, and our interagency
    partners will refine and test the IMS through a number of events,
    experiments, and exercises with the goal of further identifying gaps
    and clarifying roles and responsibilities both within the Department of
    State and among executive branch agencies.

    Over ten U.S. Government departments participated in a recent
    demonstration of the IMS and in the after-action review that provided
    very useful input to help the interagency fine tune IMS procedures and
    mechanisms. The Department also notes that S/CRS works to complement
    the existing roles of regional and functional bureaus at State, USAID,
    and other agencies working in R&S. S/CRS may, depending on the
    circumstance, assist with conflict assessment and planning processes
    for reconstruction and stabilization in conjunction with its
    interagency partners; in the field � if asked by the Chief of Mission �
    elements of the interagency Advance Civilian Team may function as an
    executive office or clearinghouse for information and action, or
    provide critical liaison among various field elements that are
    executing the tasks routinely associated with their agency's mandate.

    Procedures for Initiation of Whole-of-Government Planning: Early in
    2007, the NSC also approved interagency-agreed criteria and processes
    for initiating or "triggering" whole-of-government planning for
    specific R&S engagements, including immediate crisis response as well
    as long-term scenario-based (or contingency) planning. Senior policy-
    level bodies, Chiefs of Mission and State Department Regional Assistant
    Secretaries may request that the Reconstruction and Stabilization
    Policy Coordinating Committee consider initiating whole-of-government
    planning for long-term scenarios, while senior officials (such as the
    Secretary of State or Defense) can authorize planning for imminent
    crises. The criteria for triggering whole-of-government R&S planning
    and response include significant actual or potential U.S. military
    involvement; significant threats to regional security; and actual or
    imminent state failure, particularly where the host government is
    unwilling or unable to respond; excessive mortality rates; or large-
    scale displacement of people. [See comment 5]

    Draft Planning Framework: Once planning is triggered by the above
    process, the interagency planning framework will be used to guide
    department and agency involvement in a whole-of-government planning
    effort at the levels of both strategy and implementation. The goal of
    the planning process is to translate a whole-of-government approach to
    policy and strategy development into operational effectiveness. The
    development of concepts and plans must ensure integration across major
    mission programs, as prioritized activities frequently have multiple
    effects, and when implemented and coordinated correctly can be
    synergistic and achieve multiple objectives. As a principle, the
    planning process should reflect the greatest amount of consultation in
    the field with local stakeholders that the environment allows. [See
    comment 6]

    Civilian Surge Capability: In the State of the Union address in January
    2007, President Bush called for the creation of an expeditionary or
    civilian reserve corps, noting that "such a corps would function much
    like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces
    by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on
    missions abroad when America needs them. And it would give people
    across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the
    defining struggle of our time." [See comment 7]

    In testimony on February 7, 2007, to the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee, the Secretary also underscored the importance of
    establishing the Civilian Response Corps that the President proposed in
    the State of the Union. She noted: "... we don't have a counterpart to
    the military, national guard, or reserve corps of civilians who can be
    ready and trained to go out and perform these functions: engineers,
    lawyers, agricultural specialists. And so we are charged with
    developing the concept for a Civilian Response Corps. We will be coming
    to the Congress for support for that concept and for funding for that
    concept so that we can have a ready reserve of civilians to take
    exactly this kind of task."

    Following the State of the Union address, and the inclusion of up to
    $50 million in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina
    Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-
    28), S/CRS formed an interagency Civilian Reserve Task Force, made up
    of representatives from the State Department, USAID, the Departments of
    Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland
    Security, and Treasury and with the Department of Defense (DOD). The
    Task Force has worked for the last eight months to develop the
    policies, procedures and infrastructure necessary to stand-up the U.S.
    Civilian Reserve Corps.

    The critical step remaining to create the CRC is securing the
    authorizing legislation necessary to access the supplemental funding.
    The key legislation, "The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian
    Management Act of 2006," passed by unanimous consent in the Senate
    during the 109th Congress. That important legislation, with minor
    changes, has been reintroduced as S. 613, with a similar bill being
    introduced on the House side in the form of H.R. 1084. While there is
    bipartisan support for the legislation, the bills nonetheless are still
    pending. If this authorizing legislation is enacted, up to $50 million
    in the P.L. 110-28 would become available to support and maintain the
    CRC.

    The GAO report does not fully convey the progress that has been
    achieved in preparing to stand up the CRC, pending authorization by
    Congress. These achievements include: [See comment 7]

    * An NSC-approved CRC Mission Statement;

    * Determination of the skills sets that will be required by the CRC to
    respond to critical stabilization and reconstruction missions. A total
    of 121 separate positions have been identified for which fully
    developed position descriptions have been completed;

    * Development of the necessary interagency human resources policies,
    mechanisms, and procedures for recruiting, hiring and compensating CRC
    members;

    * Development of a detailed training plan for the CRC members that will
    leverage existing training capacity and also create new courses
    tailored to the needs of the CRC;

    * Candidate search culminating in a short-list for the Chief Operating
    Officer of the CRC. The position will be filled once funding becomes
    available upon enactment of the CRC authorizing legislation;

    * Development of a draft memorandum of understanding between State and
    other U.S. Government civilian agencies regarding the roles and
    responsibilities for recruiting, selecting, training, and managing the
    CRC when deployed;

    * Secured space and staffing plan for the CRC Administrative Office
    (Home Office);

    * Concept development of the CRC deployment center, to be established
    and operated by USAID; and;

    * Draft CRC Agreement outlining the terms and conditions of CRC
    service.

    The GAO report contains a number of technical errors related to the
    CRC. First, the GAO states that CRC members will be temporary U.S.
    Government employees. It is important to clarify that all CRC members
    will be full-time, term federal employees if and when they begin their
    pre-deployment training. As envisioned by S. 613, CRC members will
    enjoy important benefits and employment rights. Following the
    recruitment of the first five hundred members of the CRC, the
    Department will evaluate whether other employment terms need to be
    considered, including the question of reemployment rights. [See comment
    7]

    Second, the GAO report raises the issue of whether and what punitive
    actions could be taken for CRC members who refuse to deploy. The
    Department notes that all Civilian Reservists will be required to sign
    a Service Agreement that will outline acceptable reasons for service
    deferments and actions that will be taken if the Reservist refuses to
    deploy. S/CRS is in the process of preparing this agreement. [See
    comment 7]

    Third, the GAO report states that S/CRS is moving the CRC's development
    forward without a set of potential missions for which it could be
    deployed. This point is somewhat puzzling to the Department. Similar
    entities, such as the military reserves, do not maintain lists of
    possible deployments and are not limited to certain missions specified
    in advance. The CRC is intended to provide the civilian surge and
    backup capability for R&S crises. Reservists will train for deployment
    under a variety of circumstances and must have the flexibility to
    respond to different situations. [See comment 8]

    Finally, the GAO report states that the plan for expanding the CRC from
    500 to 2000 members has not been made public. The Department notes that
    the expansion plan has been drafted and is still undergoing internal
    review and will be shared with the Congress when the review is
    completed.

    Development of Surge Capability in the ARC: The GAO report states that
    the Department of State has been unable to achieve planned staffing
    levels for the one of the other components of civilian surge, the
    Active Response Corps (ARC). The Department notes that the ARC
    currently has ten officers. These ARC members represent a mix of
    Foreign Service and Civil Service employees assigned to the ARC, plus
    detailee employees from other offices within State. All have training
    necessary to deploy; most also have experience from previous
    deployments and exercising with the military. In late Fiscal Year 2007,
    S/CRS added three new Civil Service positions to regularize the
    positions filled by detailees. S/CRS also began to recruit additional
    detailees from other agencies, effectively making the ARC interagency,
    and is actively recruiting Foreign Service Officers in the current
    assignment cycle. We are awaiting the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2008
    Department budget request to determine future ARC personnel levels.
    [See comment 9]

    The Standby Response Corps (SRC) currently has in excess of 90 vetted
    members, from all areas of the State Department. A small but growing
    number of those members have received at least the minimum necessary
    training. Efforts are currently underway to increase the current roster
    of 90 and add USAID employees to it, and to get written commitments
    from the State Department and other agency personnel systems to allow
    SRC members to train and deploy as needed while still filling their
    "day" jobs. [See comment 9]

    Elements of the ARC and the SRC have deployed to Sudan, Chad, Lebanon,
    Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Two SRC and
    approximately one dozen ARC members have deployed for periods of
    between one and five months.

    S/CRS has a full-time development officer devoted to building up the
    SRC. Both that position and the positions of the Director of the Office
    of Civilian Readiness and Response, the ARC Director and her deputy
    have as their number one goal the expansion of the ARC and the SRC.
    That is also the primary goal of a two-person training unit that is
    developing and maintaining the necessary training regime for a fully
    capable ARC and SRC.

    Training: The GAO report states that there is a lack of training
    opportunities for one of the three civilian surge capabilities, the
    Standby Response Corps (SRC). The Department notes that R&S training
    opportunities are available and are increasing at a rapid pace among
    the interagency as training, education, exercises, and experiments are
    being designed and delivered to meet the needs of current and future
    engagements. SRC volunteers have the opportunity to access training
    provided by multiple agencies and the Department is working to ensure
    that SRC members are able to take time from their current assignments
    to pursue professional development. ARC members, on the other hand, are
    able to complete an extensive training regimen and engage in exercises
    due to the nature of their jobs. [See comment 9]

    Based on the interagency R&S training strategy of 2005, S/CRS is
    currently involved in the design and delivery of courses at the Foreign
    Service Institute (FSI) and National Defense University, as well as
    helping design distance learning courses at Joint Forces Command, the
    DOD, and the Department of Commerce.

    S/CRS courses with FSI are increasing from five in 2006 to ten in 2008.
    All courses focus on integrated and interagency R&S topics. The R&S
    courses reserve informally 80% of the tuition-free slots for agencies
    and offices that do or will contribute SRC members. Outreach to the
    interagency community to increase enrollment in S/CRS's FSI courses has
    been successful. The number trained increased from 352 to 432 in the
    past year with basic courses having reached capacity. A majority of the
    participants are from State, USAID, and DOD as these are the leading
    agencies in overseas operations; however, nine other agencies are
    consistently involved as their leadership recognizes the new
    requirements outline. [See comment 9]

    Of equal significance, S/CRS convened an interagency body to develop a
    training program tailored to meet current and future needs. This group
    established an interagency training implementation strategy and is
    systematically addressing each component necessary to prepare to train
    future personnel.

    Expansion of 1207-funded activities and coordination with the Office of
    the Director for Foreign Assistance: The Department appreciates GAO's
    recognition of the expansion of R&S activities funded under Section
    1207. The GAO report states that the Department obtained only $10
    million of the $100 million of funds authorized in Fiscal Year 2006
    under Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
    R&S projects, and that confusion between S/CRS and the Office of the
    Director for Foreign Assistance (F, which had just been created)
    complicated transfer of additional funding that year. Building on the
    FY06 experience, and in complete coordination with F, S/CRS worked
    closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense during Fiscal Year
    2007 to identify and obtain approval for seven interagency projects,
    totaling $99.745 million of the $100 million Congress authorized DOD to
    transfer. [See comment 10]

    Conflict Prevention: The GAO asserts that S/CRS 's authorizing
    legislation does not include conflict prevention. While "conflict
    prevention" is not explicitly mentioned in Public Law 108-447 that
    created S/CRS, the law does call upon the office to "address crises in
    countries and regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict
    or civil strife." (Emphasis added) Conflict prevention is an important
    mechanism to support societies in this transitional phase to ensure
    that conflict does not re-emerge during the stabilization and
    reconstruction periods through support for stabilizing influences and
    deterrence of the destabilizing influences. Conflict prevention is thus
    inherent in the basic work of S/CRS. [See comment 11]

    Other Comments:

    Inclusion of personal observations by U.S. Government officials: The
    GAO report contains personal comments voiced by U.S. Government
    employees that are in direct contradiction to the official positions of
    these individuals' agencies. In some cases, these personal views are
    taken out of context; in others, it is not clear when the statements
    were made or if the individuals' views have changed due to intervening
    developments. While the Department fully respects the rights of
    individuals to express their personal opinions, the GAO report would be
    more balanced and would benefit if these personal observations were
    identified as such. [See comment 12]

    The Department's Response to the Recommendations:

    Partially concur. While the Department poses no objections to GAO's
    recommendations, we believe the progress made toward achieving the
    goals articulated in the recommendations, as well as the overall
    progress achieved toward developing a civilian R&S capability, is under-
    reported. [See comment 13]

    The Department stands ready to assist the GAO in the future to update
    this report's evaluation of the U.S. government's civilian interagency
    surge capabilities. The Department is confident that S/CRS will
    continue to develop this capability, fully implement a planning and
    coordination framework, and establish a Civilian Reserve Corps.

    [End of Department of State, Defense, and USAID Joint Response]

    GAO Response to State's Comments:

    We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect
    changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We
    completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our
    draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC
    approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft
    report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC
    because those details were not provided until October 2007. We
    incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as
    other information from written and technical comments from six
    agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the
    status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007. We also
    have specific comments to points raised by State (see below).

    1. While we are aware of the efforts S/CRS and regional bureaus have
    made in the countries cited, we note that S/CRS involvement in most of
    them includes the deployment of a small number of staff or the
    allocation of section 1207 funds, which we recognized in the report. We
    also note in the report that S/CRS applied its draft planning guide to
    operations in Haiti and Sudan, and we note the outcomes of those plans.
    We also report that interagency staff involved in those efforts had
    different points of view on the merits of the planning process, that
    the planning guide is still in development, and that S/CRS is revising
    the planning guide based on partners' concerns.

    2. We chose to discuss CRC separately because of the potential costs
    associated with its development and sustainment. However, we
    acknowledge within the report that State views civilian response
    mechanisms--ARC, CRC, and SRC--as the fourth major element of the
    framework.

    3. We have changed the text in our report to reflect State's comment.

    4. We reported on the basic structures of the IMS. We note that it is
    designed to ensure coordination between Washington and the field, and
    between the civilian and military sectors of government. However, since
    IMS has never been used, it is premature to state whether it is an
    effective tool. We found, however, that different documents outline
    different roles and responsibilities for S/CRS. While State and S/CRS
    have taken some steps to clarify S/CRS' role, some interagency partners
    stated more must be done. For example, when providing comments on a
    draft of our report, USAID stated it would like more definition on the
    relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and S/CRS and USAID. State would
    seem to agree with this assessment since it plans to use exercises to
    identify gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities. Although we are
    encouraged that State plans to take these actions, we believe the true
    test of IMS's effectiveness will come when it is applied to an actual
    operation.

    5. We reported on the procedures for triggering the use of IMS and,
    once finalized, the planning guide. As with IMS, the true test of the
    effectiveness of these procedures will come when it is used for an
    actual operation.

    6. We reported on the ongoing development of the draft planning guide,
    including its features; its use for planning operations in Haiti, Sudan
    and Kosovo; and revisions S/CRS is making based on partners' concerns.
    We also note that although NSC need not approve this element, such
    approval would add credibility to the guide and the framework, as a
    whole.

    7. Based on these comments and technical comments from State, we
    updated information on State's plans for establishing CRC, including
    startup costs, annual costs, and authorizing legislation. We
    acknowledge that NSC approved a plan to establish by 2009 a roster of
    2,000 CRC reservists who would deploy to stabilization and
    reconstruction operations. Although we constrain our discussion to
    higher-level considerations, we are encouraged by the list of
    achievements State says it recently made; however, we note that a
    number them are still in the draft or conceptual stage of development.
    In addition, we removed from the final report discussion on the
    punitive actions State could take against volunteers who refused to
    deploy.

    8. We did not state that lists of possible locations for deployment of
    CRC volunteers should be maintained. Our finding and conclusion pertain
    to the lack of clarity for the type of operations for which CRC would
    be used. As stated in the report, State has not clarified how
    stabilization and reconstruction operations differ from other
    operations, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, or
    traditional development assistance programs. Having a clear definition
    of the types of operations CRC volunteers could deploy to would enable
    State to better define the skill mix it needs for the CRC roster. It
    would also provide a basis for Congressional oversight and a valuable
    check against potential misuse.

    9. We updated our discussions or ARC and SRC based on information
    provided in these and other technical comments. We are encouraged that
    S/CRS has developed these courses--five of which GAO staff attended.
    However, based on our findings, we are concerned that S/CRS and the
    Foreign Service Institute may not have the capacity to provide full
    training to 3,000 SRC and CRC volunteers in fiscal year 2009.

    10. We adjusted the report to reflect this new information. We note
    that approximately $80 million of the $99.75 million was obligated in
    the final month of the fiscal year.

    11. We do not challenge States interpretation that the legislation
    implicitly authorizes S/CRS to engage in conflict prevention
    activities. Our point was to show that ambiguities between the sources
    of S/CRS authorities can lead to confusion among partners over S/CRS's
    true roles and responsibilities.

    12. Although agencies may have official positions that they support S/
    CRS and the new framework, our fieldwork revealed that many individuals
    within State's regional and program bureaus and other agencies have not
    yet accepted it.

    13. We disagree with the assertion that our report does not reflect
    changes that occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We
    completed our initial audit work in August 2007, and in October 2007 we
    obtained and incorporated additional information from agencies written
    and technical comments on a draft of our report. Our report reflects
    the status of the framework and development of civilian response
    capabilities as of October 2007.

    [End of section]

    Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

    GAO Contact:

    Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-4128 or christoffj@gao.gov:

    Staff Acknowledgments:

    In addition to the individual contact named above, Judith McCloskey,
    Assistant Director; Sam Bernet; Lynn Cothern; Marissa Jones; and Sona
    Kalapura made key contributions to this report. Technical assistance
    was provided by Joseph Brown, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Mark
    Dowling, Holly Dye, Francisco Enriquez, Timothy Fairbanks, Etana
    Finkler, Bradley Hunt, Marisela Perez, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jeremy Sebest.

    [End of section]

    Footnotes:

    [1] The Defense Science Board defines stabilization and reconstruction
    as the period following the cessation of high-intensity conflict. See
    DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from
    Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: December 2004).

    [2] In August 2004, State created S/CRS under the Secretary of State's
    authority. Congress subsequently authorized the office in section 408
    of the Fiscal Year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 108-
    447, Div. B, Title IV, sec. 408).

    [3] We provided preliminary observations on our findings in testimony
    before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed
    Services Committee. See GAO, Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions
    Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and Capabilities for Future
    Operations, GAO-08-228T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).

    [4] In May 2007, we reported on DOD's efforts to elevate stability,
    security, transition, and reconstruction operations to the same level
    as combat operations. GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to
    Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency
    Planning, GAO-07-549 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007). See also GAO,
    Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
    Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington,
    D.C.: Oct. 21, 2006).

    [5] In this report, we use the term "framework" to refer to the key
    elements developed to plan and coordinate reconstruction and
    stabilization operations under NSPD-44. The first section of our report
    discusses three elements for planning these operations, while civilian
    response mechanisms, which S/CRS considers a fourth element, are
    discussed in the second section of this report.

    [6] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. 108-447, sec. 408).

    [7] NSC policy coordination committees manage the development and
    implementation of national security policies and serve as the main day-
    to-day mechanism for interagency coordination of national security
    policies.

    [8] The Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization Operations created interagency working groups to develop
    plans and processes for implementing NSPD-44 that focus on sectors of
    reconstruction and stabilization, such as transitional security and
    rule of law, humanitarian response and social well-being, and conflict
    prevention and mitigation. Among other responsibilities, each working
    group was tasked with identifying current reconstruction and
    stabilization capabilities and gaps in those capabilities; lessons
    learned; and issues for diplomatic outreach.

    [9] United States Joint Forces Command J7 and Department of State,
    Pamphlet Version 1.0, U.S., Government Draft Planning Framework for
    Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (December
    2005).

    [10] Washington policymakers would include NSC, Assistant Secretaries
    for State's regional bureaus and their counterparts at other civilian
    agencies, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and DOD.

    [11] NSPD-1 organized NSC and its committees for the current
    administration. NSPD-1 placed oversight of stabilization and
    reconstruction operations under the six regional Policy Coordination
    Committees, which are chaired by officials of Under Secretary or
    Assistant Secretary rank, designated by the Secretary of State.

    [12] GAO-06-15.

    [13] Foreign Affairs Manual, 1 FAM 112 (a).

    [14] 22 U.S.C. 3927.

    [15] GAO-06-15.

    [16] GAO-07-549.

    [17] GAO-06-15.

    [18] State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for
    Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington,
    D.C.: August 2006). When S/CRS and U.S. Joint Forces Command issued the
    first draft in December 2005, they distributed it to stakeholder
    agencies and requested their feedback. S/CRS is currently developing a
    revised framework based on stakeholders' comments.

    [19] Pub. L. 109-163, sec. 1207.

    [20] DFA developed the Foreign Assistance Framework to guide the budget
    process for foreign-assistance programs. The framework identifies five
    categories of countries receiving foreign assistance including
    rebuilding, developing, transforming, sustaining partnership, and
    restricting. The rebuilding category includes countries "in or emerging
    from and rebuilding after internal or external strife."

    [21] This figure includes S/CRS staff who received the training. In
    addition, several GAO staff participated in courses in fiscal year 2007
    to obtain information about the S/CRS framework and the office's
    efforts to train interagency staff.

    [22] State currently pays tuition for non-State participants, and staff
    said other agencies do not have funds available for this purpose.

    [23] S/CRS has emphasized the importance of close coordination between
    military and civilian government, while acknowledging that not all
    reconstruction and stabilization operations require military
    participation. S/CRS has been involved in more than a dozen joint
    exercises to practice civilian and military coordination and strengthen
    interagency operations. For example, S/CRS partnered with the U.S.
    Joint Forces Command to support Multinational Experiment 4 in February
    and March 2006 to test crisis coordination among eight countries and
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. S/CRS also is coordinating
    interagency input into the U.S. Joint Forces Command-led Multinational
    Experiment 5 series.

    [24] GAO-07-549.

    [25] Specifically, DOD officials stated that DOD's policy is not to
    share DOD contingency plans with agencies or offices outside DOD unless
    directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense, who determines their
    need to know. However, these officials also noted DOD's planning
    policies and procedures state that a Combatant Commander, with
    Secretary of Defense's approval, may work in coordination with the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Joint Staff
    to seek input on plan development from other U.S. government agencies.

    [26] State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
    Stabilization, Update to Draft USG Planning Framework for
    Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Washington,
    D.C.: August 2006).

    [27] DOD, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Improving
    Interagency Support for United States 21st Century National Security
    Missions and Interagency Operations in Support of Stability, Security,
    Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, D.C., July 19,
    2007). Congress mandated this report in the John Warner National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Pub. L. 109-364, sec.
    1035).

    [28] GAO-07-549.

    [29] Before the creation of ARC and SRC, State had a program to provide
    operational capacity for stability operations through the Bureau of
    International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. However, according to the
    U.S. Institute for Peace, this capacity was limited to providing police
    for international police missions through a private contractor. U.S.
    Institute for Peace, Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability
    Operations (Washington, D.C.:, April 2004).

    [30] The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance uses Disaster Area
    Response Teams and Response Alternatives for Technical Services, among
    other mechanisms, in support of humanitarian assistance in
    stabilization and reconstruction missions. The office also has standing
    agreements with disaster assistance teams around the world that are
    trained and equipped to rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. The
    Office of Transition Initiatives has 16 staff available for deployment,
    but the staff take assignments by mutual consent. The staff also said
    that, depending on availability and needed skill sets, other employees
    may deploy to humanitarian missions.

    [31] These programs focus on economic governance for developing
    countries so that their governments can become legitimate sources of
    power. The Office of Technical Assistance focuses on countries in
    failed-state environments and has deployed staff to assist operations
    in such places as Iraq and Haiti.

    [32] Officials from the Department of Justice said the agency is not a
    foreign affairs agency and its base appropriations provide for its
    defined missions. Funding for Justice Department stabilization and
    reconstruction activities is achieved through interagency agreements,
    generally through agreements with State and USAID pursuant to section
    632 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2392).

    [33] State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector
    General, Report of Inspection: Office of the Coordinator for
    Reconstruction and Stabilization, ISP-l-07-26 (Washington, D.C., May
    2007).

    [34] State plans to request funds to deploy interagency response teams
    in the fiscal year 2009 budget. Training would occur only if this
    request was approved.

    [35] BearingPoint, Management Study for Establishing and Managing a
    Civilian Reserve (McLean, Virginia, 2006).

    [36] BearingPoint, pp. 11, 69, and 71.

    [37] Congressional Research Service, A Civilian Reserve for
    Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S.
    Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress
    (Washington, D.C., 2007).

    [38] BearingPoint's study said the reserve should be capable of
    deploying simultaneously to one large, one medium, and one small
    operation. BearingPoint defines these sizes in terms of deployment
    years. A large deployment year would see 900 to 1,200 volunteers
    deployed, a medium deployment year would see 600 to 900 volunteers
    deployed, and a small deployment year would see up to 600 volunteers
    deployed.

    [39] This authority was granted in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental
    appropriation to fund operations in Iraq and elsewhere. See U.S. Troop
    Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
    Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. 110-28, sec. 3810).

    [40] See 110th Congress, S. 613 and H.R. 1084.

    [41] See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C.
    Secs. 4301-4333.

    [42] This plan was developed by the Civilian Reserve Task Force, which
    is led by S/CRS, and approved by NSC in July 2007.

    [43] S/CRS stated that it would establish up to 63 total permanent and
    contract administrative positions depending on the actual size of CRC.
    These staff would be responsible for such functions as recruiting,
    training, logistics and supply management, payroll, and benefits
    management, among other duties.

    [44] Pub. L. 108-447.

    [End of section]

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