Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical	 
Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and	 
Private Sector Coordination (31-OCT-07, GAO-08-36).		 
                                                                 
An outbreak of pandemic flu would require close cooperation	 
between the public and private sectors to ensure the protection  
of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as drinking water  
and electricity. Because over 85 percent of the nation's critical
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is
vital that both sectors effectively coordinate to successfully	 
protect these assets. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
is responsible for coordinating a national protection strategy	 
and government and private sector councils have been created as a
collaborating tool. GAO was asked to assess how the federal and  
private sectors are working together at a national level to	 
protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of a	 
pandemic, the challenges they face, and opportunities for	 
addressing these challenges. GAO reviewed 5 of the 17 critical	 
infrastructure sectors. These 5 sectors are energy (electricity),
food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation (highway
and motor carrier), and water.					 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-36						        
    ACCNO:   A77799						        
  TITLE:     Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address       
Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require	 
Federal and Private Sector Coordination 			 
     DATE:   10/31/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Critical infrastructure protection 		 
	     Disaster planning					 
	     Electric energy					 
	     Energy planning					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Food industry					 
	     Food supply					 
	     Influenza						 
	     Pandemic						 
	     Private sector					 
	     Private sector practices				 
	     Public key infrastructure				 
	     Telecommunications industry			 
	     Transportation industry				 
	     Transportation planning				 
	     Water supply					 
	     Water supply management				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Public/private partnerships			 
	     National Infrastructure Protection Plan		 
	     National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza		 
	     National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza		 
	     Implementation Plan				 
                                                                 
	     Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness,			 
	     Response, and Recovery Guide for			 
	     Critical Infrastructure and Key			 
	     Resources						 
                                                                 

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GAO-08-36

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]Sector-Specific Agencies Are to Coordinate Protection Effort
          * [4]Sector-Specific and Cross-Sector Councils Govern Federal and
          * [5]National Strategy and Implementation Plan Articulate Importa

     * [6]Federal and Private Sectors Are Working Together on Initial

          * [7]Federal Government and Private Sector Have Taken Preliminary
          * [8]Five Sectors Reviewed Are Working through Councils and Have

     * [9]Federal Government and Private Sector Face Challenges in Coo

          * [10]Federal and Private Sector Acknowledge Challenge of Sustaini
          * [11]Private Sector Perceives a Lack of Clarity on Federal and St
          * [12]Private Sector Concerned about Receiving Consistent Messages
          * [13]Federal and Private Sector Consideration of Cross-Sector Int
          * [14]Federal and Private Sector Identified Needed Investments in
          * [15]Federal and Private Sector Noted That Potential Legal and Re
          * [16]Sector-Specific and Cross-Sector Coordinating Councils Could

     * [17]Conclusions
     * [18]Recommendation for Executive Action
     * [19]Agency Comments
     * [20]GAO Contact
     * [21]Acknowledgments

          * [22]Collaboration
          * [23]Critical Infrastructure
          * [24]Emergency Response
          * [25]Influenza Pandemic
          * [26]Y2K

     * [27]GAO's Mission
     * [28]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [29]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [30]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [31]Congressional Relations
     * [32]Public Affairs
     * [33]PDF6-Ordering Information.pdf

          * [34]Order by Mail or Phone

Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

October 2007

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC

Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection
Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector Coordination

GAO-08-36

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4
Background 7
Federal and Private Sectors Are Working Together on Initial Pandemic
Preparedness Activities 12
Federal Government and Private Sector Face Challenges in Coordinating
Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic in Critical Infrastructure Sectors
17
Conclusions 30
Recommendation for Executive Action 31
Agency Comments 31
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 33
Appendix II Government Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as of
September 4, 2007 36
Appendix III Private Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as of
September 4, 2007 38
Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 42
Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44
Related GAO Products 45

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Abbreviations

BENS Business Executives for National Security
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOE Department of Energy
DOT Department of Transportation
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FDA Food and Drug Administration
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HSC Homeland Security Council
HSPD-7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council
NIPP  National Infrastructure Protection Plan
PCIS Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security
Y2K Year 2000 computer conversion

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

October 31, 2007

The Honorable Judd Gregg: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on the Budget: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The government's response to recent disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, and past national challenges, such as the Year 2000 computer
conversion (Y2K), which posed significant threats to the nation's critical
infrastructure, have shown the importance of coordination and
collaboration within and across both government and nongovernmental
organizations to respond to catastrophic events such as an influenza
pandemic. An influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat facing
the United States and the world. There is widespread agreement that it is
not a question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues
associated with the preparation for and responses to a pandemic flu are
similar to those for any other type of disaster or hazard. However, a
pandemic poses some unique challenges. Unlike many catastrophic events, an
influenza pandemic will not damage power lines, banks, or computer
networks; it will ultimately threaten all critical infrastructure by
removing essential personnel from the workplace for weeks or months. In a
severe pandemic, absences attributable to illness, the need to care for
ill family members, and fear of infection may, according to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), reach 40 percent during the peak
weeks of a community outbreak. Moreover, an influenza pandemic is likely
to occur in several waves, each lasting months, with outbreaks occurring
simultaneously across the country. The government's response to recent
disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and past national
challenges, such as the Year 2000 computer conversion (Y2K), which posed
significant threats to the nation's critical infrastructure, have shown
the importance of coordination and collaboration within and across both
government and nongovernmental organizations to respond to catastrophic
events such as an influenza pandemic. An influenza pandemic is a real and
significant threat facing the United States and the world. There is
widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but when such a
pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the preparation for and
responses to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any other type of
disaster or hazard. However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges.
Unlike many catastrophic events, an influenza pandemic will not damage
power lines, banks, or computer networks; it will ultimately threaten all
critical infrastructure by removing essential personnel from the workplace
for weeks or months. In a severe pandemic, absences attributable to
illness, the need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection
may, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
reach 40 percent during the peak weeks of a community outbreak. Moreover,
an influenza pandemic is likely to occur in several waves, each lasting
months, with outbreaks occurring simultaneously across the country.

An outbreak of influenza pandemic will require close cooperation between
the private and public sectors at all levels of government to ensure the
protection of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as drinking
water, electricity, and telecommunications. Because over 85 percent of the
nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private
sector, the federal government has a limited ability to directly influence
appropriate preparedness and mitigation actions. Unless the private sector
An outbreak of influenza pandemic will require close cooperation between
the private and public sectors at all levels of government to ensure the
protection of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as drinking
water, electricity, and telecommunications. Because over 85 percent of the
nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private
sector, the federal government has a limited ability to directly influence
appropriate preparedness and mitigation actions. Unless the private sector
takes actions to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from an
act of terrorism or natural disaster, such as a pandemic, the country will
be poorly prepared to deal with these possibilities. Therefore, it is
vital that the public and private sectors form effective partnerships to
successfully protect the nation's critical infrastructure. Such
partnerships will be key in helping ensure the continuing delivery of
critical public and private services.

A key player in these partnerships is the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and gave it
wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and coordinating the overall
national critical infrastructure protection effort.^1 Under the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the Secretary of Homeland
Security, among other responsibilities, is to establish uniform policies,
approaches, guidelines, and methodologies to help ensure that critical
infrastructures within and across the 17 designated sectors are protected,
and is to use a risk management approach to coordinate protection
efforts.^2 The Homeland Security Act also required DHS to develop a
comprehensive national plan for securing the nation's critical
infrastructure. In response, DHS developed a National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP describes a set of sector-specific and
cross-sector coordinating councils as the primary means of bringing
together the government and private sectors to protect critical
infrastructure. HSPD-7 further defines critical infrastructure protection
responsibilities for DHS and those federal agencies given responsibility
for particular industry sectors, such as transportation, energy, and
telecommunications, known as sector-specific agencies. DHS serves as the
sector-specific agency for 10 of the sectors: information technology;
telecommunications; transportation systems; chemical; emergency services;
commercial nuclear reactors, materials and waste; postal and shipping;
dams; government facilities; and commercial facilities.

^1Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).

^2The 17 critical infrastructure and key resource sectors are: food and
agriculture; banking and finance; chemical; commercial facilities;
commercial nuclear reactors, materials and water; dams; defense industrial
base; drinking water and water treatment systems; emergency services;
energy; government facilities; information technology; national monuments
and icons; postal and shipping; public health and healthcare;
telecommunications; and transportation systems. Critical infrastructure
are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a
debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, and
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. Key
resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to
minimal operations of the economy or government, including individual
targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems but could
create a local disaster or profoundly damage the nation's morale or
confidence. For purposes of this report, we will use the term critical
infrastructure to also include key resources.

In response to your interest in how the federal and private sectors are
coordinating their efforts to prepare for an influenza pandemic, we
assessed (1) how the federal government is working with the private sector
to ensure protection of the nation's critical infrastructure in the event
of an influenza pandemic, particularly in the transportation (highway and
motor carrier), food and agriculture, water, energy (electricity), and
telecommunications sectors, and (2) the challenges facing the federal
government and private sector in coordinating protection of the nation's
critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic,
particularly in these same five sectors, and what the federal government
could do to help to address these challenges.

To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed critical
infrastructure protection regulations, plans, and guidance, including the
NIPP; the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (the National
Strategy); the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation
Plan (the Implementation Plan); the Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources; and the Homeland Security Council's (HSC) 6-month and 1-year
summary reports on the  Implementation Plan. We also interviewed officials
from DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) CDC with
responsibility for leading and coordinating the overall national critical
infrastructure protection effort and for working with the private sector
to prepare for a possible pandemic.

We reviewed 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors in depth. (See
app. II for government council membership by sector and app. III for
private sector council membership by sector.) These sectors were selected
because, in addition to the public health and healthcare sector,^3 they
would provide the services most basic to the continued operation of the
economy and society during an emergency such as a pandemic. We also
gathered documentation from and conducted interviews with representatives
of each of the federal agencies with critical infrastructure protection
responsibility for these 5 sectors: DHS's Transportation Security
Administration (highway and motor carrier); the National Communications
System (telecommunications); the Department of Agriculture and HHS's Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) (food and agriculture); the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) (water); and the Department of Energy (DOE)
(electricity). In addition, we interviewed representatives from the
Department of Transportation (DOT) (highway and motor carrier). We also
gathered documentation from and interviewed representatives of companies
and associations in each of the 5 sectors as well as representatives from
business trade associations, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(Chamber), the Business Executives for National Security (BENS), the
Business Roundtable (Roundtable), and the Center for Health
Transformation. Because the focus of our work was on the pandemic planning
and coordinating efforts between the federal government and the private
sector at a national level, we did not examine individual state, local, or
private sector initiatives, such as private sector continuity of
operations plans, unless they were connected with federal initiatives.

^3GAO has engagements under way to examine the public health and
healthcare aspects of preparing for and responding to a pandemic,
including efforts looking at (1) global strategies to forestall pandemic
influenza, (2) HHS's pandemic influenza planning efforts, and (3) medical
surge capacity and capability for emergency preparedness.

We conducted our work from June 2006 through September 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Detailed
information on our objectives, scope, and methodology is in appendix I. A
list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report.

Results in Brief

The federal government and private sector are working together to protect
the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza
pandemic. Federal agencies--particularly DHS and CDC--and the private
sector have worked together at the national level to (1) develop general
pandemic preparedness guidance, such as checklists for continuity of
business operations during a pandemic; (2) identify the number of critical
workers essential to the critical infrastructure sectors' operations
during a pandemic; and (3) conduct pandemic preparedness presentations,
workshops, forums, and some exercises. In some instances the federal and
private sectors are working together through a set of councils as the
primary means of coordinating government and private sector efforts to
protect critical infrastructure. These councils are part of DHS's
framework for a coordinated national approach to address the full range of
physical, cyber, and human threats and vulnerabilities, including a
potential pandemic, that pose risks to the nation's critical
infrastructure. Federal and private officials from the councils in the
five sectors we reviewed told us that while their efforts within these
councils have mostly been focused on information sharing and developing
sector-specific plans required by the NIPP to enhance protection and
resiliency in an all-hazards environment, they have also taken some
initial pandemic preparedness actions within their respective sectors. For
example, the Communications Sector Coordinating Council has established a
working group to identify and address telecommuting issues for a pandemic.
In addition, the sectors are collaborating with DHS and other
sector-specific agencies, such as EPA, to develop additional pandemic
planning guidelines for each sector.

The federal and private sector representatives we interviewed identified
several key challenges they face in working together and coordinating
federal and private sector efforts to protect the nation's critical
infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic. The following
challenges extend across the critical infrastructure sectors and
addressing them will require coordinated federal and private sector
efforts.

           o Maintaining a focus on pandemic planning efforts due to the
           uncertainty of when a pandemic may occur and the emergence of
           other more immediate sector priorities, such as responding to
           outbreaks of foodborne illnesses.

           o Lack of clarity on the federal and state roles and
           responsibilities in areas such as state border closures and
           pandemic influenza vaccine distribution.

           o Multiple and potentially confusing or conflicting messages
           coming from the many agencies, at all levels of government, that
           are responsible for providing current and ongoing pandemic
           communications and information.

           o Identifying and developing strategies for addressing the crucial
           cross-sector interdependencies that will be important for the
           continued operation of our nation's economy and the free flow of
           goods and services during a pandemic, such as the electricity and
           telecommunications capabilities that are necessary to support all
           the other sectors.

           o Additional investments for training and infrastructure and
           potential legal and regulatory issues--which the federal
           government and the private sector have not yet fully addressed.

           While some discussion has occurred, there are opportunities to
           further address these issues through the increased federal and
           private sector use of the sector-specific and cross-sector
           coordinating councils. Despite the potential of these entities,
           the councils have mostly focused their efforts to date on the
           development of sector-specific plans to address all hazards rather
           than on pandemic-specific activities. With regard to pandemic
           activities, DHS has used the councils primarily to share
           information across sectors and government levels, but not to
           address many of the challenges presented above because DHS needs
           to more fully involve the federal and private sectors to reach
           over and beyond traditional sector boundaries to help solve
           problems that may affect multiple as well as individual sectors.
           The sector-specific and cross-sector council structure would
           provide a useful vehicle for accomplishing such a goal. Because an
           outbreak could begin at any time, there may be insufficient time
           and resources to adequately plan and prepare their members for
           changes in how their sectors may operate during a pandemic unless
           these discussions take place now. Since DHS is responsible for
           coordinating national critical infrastructure protection efforts
           and is the lead agency for over half of the critical
           infrastructure sectors, it is well positioned to lead federal and
           private sector efforts, using these existing coordinating
           mechanisms, to help identify and address the challenges involved
           in preparing for a potential influenza pandemic.

           To help the nation better protect critical infrastructure in the
           event of an influenza pandemic and to build on the progress made
           thus far, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security,
           working with sector-specific agencies, lead efforts to encourage
           the government and private sector members of the councils to
           consider and help address the challenges that will require
           coordination between the federal and private sectors involved with
           critical infrastructure and within the various sectors in advance
           of, as well as during, a pandemic.

           We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and
           comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in
           appendix IV. In commenting on the draft report, DHS generally
           agreed with the contents of the report and concurred with our
           recommendation. We also provided a draft of this report to federal
           and private sector representatives of the five sectors we
           reviewed. FDA (HHS); DOE; DOT; and representatives of the
           Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) and the
           Electricity and Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating
           Council provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
           appropriate. Representatives of the Food and Agriculture
           Coordinating Council and TSA informed us that they had no comments
           on the draft report.
			  
			  Background

           Sector-Specific Agencies Are to Coordinate Protection Efforts and
			  Develop Plans

           The protection of the nation's critical infrastructure against
           natural and man-made catastrophic events has been a concern of the
           federal government for over a decade. Several federal policies
           address the importance of coordination between the government and
           the private sector in critical infrastructure protection. HSPD-7,
           issued in December 2003, defined responsibilities for DHS, the
           sector-specific federal agencies that are responsible for
           overseeing the 17 specific critical infrastructure sectors, and
           other departments and agencies. HSPD-7 makes DHS responsible for,
           among other things, coordinating national critical infrastructure
           protection efforts and establishing uniform policies, approaches,
           guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal
           infrastructure protection and risk management activities within
           and across sectors. Sector-specific agencies are responsible for
           infrastructure protection activities in their assigned sectors,
           which include coordinating and collaborating with relevant federal
           agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector to
           carry out sector protection responsibilities. DHS developed and
           issued its NIPP in June 2006. The NIPP--along with more detailed
           guidance issued by DHS--required the individual sector-specific
           agencies, working with relevant government and private sector
           representatives, to submit sector-specific plans to DHS by the end
           of December 2006 detailing the application of the NIPP's core
           elements to each of their respective sectors. These individual
           plans, which DHS released on May 21, 2007, are to establish the
           means by which the sectors will identify critical assets within
           the sector, assess risks of terrorist attacks or other hazards,
           assess and prioritize those which have national significance, and
           develop protective measures for the sector.
			  
			  Sector-Specific and Cross-Sector Councils Govern Federal and Private
			  Sector Critical Infrastructure Protection Efforts

           The NIPP relies on a set of sector-specific and cross-sector
           councils as the primary means of coordinating government and
           private sector critical infrastructure protection efforts, as seen
           in figure 1.

Figure 1: Cross-Sector and Sector-Specific Councils for Critical
Infrastructure Protection

aEach of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors has a government
coordinating council and a sector coordinating council.

Under this framework, each of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors has
both a government council and a private sector council to address
sector-specific planning and coordination. DHS provides guidance, tools,
and support to enable these groups to work together to carry out their
respective roles and responsibilities. The councils are to work in tandem
to create the context, framework, and support for coordination and
information-sharing activities required to implement and sustain that
sector's critical infrastructure protection efforts. These councils create
the structure through which representative groups from all levels of
government and the private sector can collaborate in planning and
implementing efforts to protect critical infrastructure.

Government coordinating councils are to coordinate strategies, activities,
policies, and communications across government entities within each
sector. DHS chairs the government council for sectors where it is the
sector-specific agency. In the other sectors, DHS serves as co-chair with
the designated sector-specific agency. Private sector councils are
encouraged under the NIPP to be the principal entities for coordinating
with the government on a wide range of critical infrastructure protection
activities and issues. Under the NIPP, critical asset owners and operators
are encouraged to be involved in the creation of private sector councils
that are self-organized and self-governed, with a spokesperson designated
by the sector membership.^4 Specific membership can vary from sector to
sector, but is supposed to be representative of a broad base of owners,
operators, associations, and other entities--both large and small--within
the sector.^5 We reported in October 2006 on the extent to which these
councils have been established, and we noted that one of the factors
assisting the formation of the government and sector councils was the
existence of long-standing working relationships within the sectors and
with the federal agencies that regulate them. We found that the more
mature councils, such as banking and finance and telecommunications, were
able to focus on strategic issues, such as recovering after disasters,
while the newer councils--including public health and healthcare and
commercial facilities--were focusing on getting organized.^6

The NIPP also identified cross-sector councils that are to promote
coordination, communications, and the sharing of key practices across
sectors. On the government side, the government cross-sector council is
composed of two subcouncils: (1) the NIPP Federal Senior Leadership
Council, composed of representatives of each of the sector-specific
agencies, that is to enhance communication and coordination between and
among these agencies and (2) the State, Local, and Tribal Government
Coordinating Council--composed of state, local, and tribal homeland
security advisors--that is to serve as a forum for coordination across
these jurisdictions on protection guidance, strategies, and programs. On
the private sector side, the PCIS, composed of one or more members and
alternates from each of the sector councils, is to, among other things,
provide senior-level, cross-sector strategic coordination through
partnership with DHS and the sector-specific agencies and to identify and
disseminate protection best practices across the sectors. Another
cross-sector council, the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory
Council (CIPAC), created in 2006 by DHS, provides the framework for
members of the government and private sector councils to engage in
intragovernmental and public-private cooperation, information sharing, and
engagement across the entire range of critical infrastructure protection
activities. CIPAC, which has been exempted from the requirements of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act,^7 is a nondecisional body and includes
both private sector and government members drawn from both the government
and private sector-specific councils. An additional council, the National
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), was created by the President in
2001 to support a coordinated effort by the public and private sectors to
advise the President through the Secretary of Homeland Security on issues
related to security of the nation's critical infrastructure. NIAC, whose
members are appointed by the President from the private sector as well as
from state and local government, is also tasked with advising the federal
government lead agencies that have critical infrastructure
responsibilities.

^4Owners and operators of these assets include private sector entities
and, in some cases, state and local governments.

^5According to DHS guidance, government agencies may suggest the inclusion
of various parts of a sector but it is the responsibility of each private
sector coordinating council to identify the sector's boundaries, establish
the criteria for membership, seek broad participation and representation
of the diversity of the sector, and establish the governance, business
case, and work process of the sector's coordinating council.

^6GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating
Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors' Characteristics,
[35]GAO-07-39 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 16, 2006).

National Strategy and Implementation Plan Articulate Importance of Federal
Coordination with the Private Sector and Others

Government pandemic planning efforts are part of an all-hazards
preparedness strategy that recognizes that emergency prevention,
protection, response, and recovery can be applied to numerous disaster
scenarios, both natural and man-made. However, an influenza pandemic has
unique features that may require additional or different preparedness and
planning processes since it would affect the workforce rather than
physical assets and could come in waves, each lasting weeks or months. To
address the threat of an influenza pandemic, the President's HSC issued
two planning documents. The first of these, the National Strategy, was
issued in November 2005 and is intended to provide a high-level overview
of the approach that the federal government will take to prepare for and
respond to an influenza pandemic. The National Strategy recognizes that
preparing for and responding to a pandemic cannot be viewed as a purely
federal responsibility, stating that in addition to the federal
government, states and communities, the private sector, individual
citizens, and global partnerships all play a role in addressing the
pandemic threat. Among other things, it calls for the federal government
to provide guidance to the private sector and critical infrastructure
entities in their role in a pandemic response, and considerations
necessary to maintain essential services and operations. According to the
National Strategy, movement of essential personnel, goods, and services
and maintenance of critical infrastructure are necessary during an
outbreak of influenza pandemic that could span months in any given
community. It also states that the private sector and critical
infrastructure entities must respond in a manner that allows them to
maintain the essential elements of their operations for a prolonged period
of time, in order to prevent severe disruption of life in U.S.
communities. To ensure this, the National Strategy calls for (1) the
development of coordination mechanisms across American industries to
support activities during a pandemic; (2) guidance to activate contingency
plans to ensure that personnel are protected, the delivery of goods and
services is maintained, and sectors remain functional despite significant
and sustained worker absenteeism; and (3) the establishment of
partnerships within sectors to provide mutual support and maintenance of
essential services during a pandemic.

^7The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2)
was enacted, in part, to control the advisory committee process and to
open to public scrutiny the manner in which government agencies obtain
advice from private individuals and groups. See 648 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-59
(D.D.C. 1986). Pursuant to authority conferred by the Homeland Security
Act, 6 U.S.C. S 451, DHS established the CIPAC as a FACA-exempt body to
support the free flow of information and the need for regular, interactive
discussions concerning threats and vulnerabilities. See 71 Fed. Reg.
14,930 (Mar. 24, 2006).

The Implementation Plan was issued in May 2006. It is intended to support
the broad framework and goals articulated in the National Strategy by
outlining specific steps that federal departments and agencies should take
to achieve these goals. According to the Implementation Plan, federal,
state, and local governments; tribal nations; and the private sector have
important and interdependent roles in preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from a pandemic and ensuring that critical infrastructure is
protected and sustained. The Implementation Plan includes 324 action items
related to these requirements, responsibilities, and expectations. Since
then, HSC has issued two progress reports on the implementation of the
plan--a 6-month and a 1-year summary report.^8

^8Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan Summary of Progress (December 2006), and Homeland
Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation
Plan One Year Summary (July 2007).

Federal and Private Sectors Are Working Together on Initial Pandemic
Preparedness Activities

To protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an
influenza pandemic, the federal and private sectors are working together
to prepare for a pandemic. Multiple organizations, federal and private,
have collaborated to develop guidance, identify critical employees, and
hold workshops and training. To some extent, they have been working
through sector-specific and cross-sector councils--that were created to
bring together the government and private sector to coordinate and
collaborate for critical infrastructure protection--for pandemic
preparedness. The five critical infrastructure sectors we
reviewed--transportation (highway and motor carrier), food and
agriculture, water, energy (electricity), and telecommunications--have
also taken initial preparedness steps within their respective sectors. In
addition, they are working with DHS and the sector-specific agencies to
develop sector-specific pandemic planning guidance.

Federal Government and Private Sector Have Taken Preliminary Actions to Prepare
for a Pandemic

The federal government--particularly DHS and CDC--and the private sector
have worked together, to some extent through the councils, to develop
pandemic preparedness guidance and also to conduct presentations and
workshops on pandemic preparedness. DHS, working collaboratively with
partners in the public and private sectors, released a Pandemic Influenza:
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources. According to HSC's 1-year summary issued in July 2007, this
business continuity guidance, tailored to national goals and capabilities
and to the specific needs identified by the private sector, represented an
important first step in working with the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure to prepare for a potential severe pandemic outbreak. HSC's
summary stated that the guide supports private sector planning by
"complementing and enhancing, not replacing" existing continuity planning
efforts and that DHS developed the guide to assist businesses, whose
existing continuity plans generally did not include strategies to protect
human health during emergencies, such as those caused by pandemic
influenza. HSC's summary further explained that the guide was designed to
enhance the existing private sector business continuity planning already
in place. In addition to this guidance, the federal government has
produced several tools for businesses of all types and sizes to assist
them in planning for a pandemic. For example, CDC has issued planning
guidance, including a "Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist" and
also a community strategy for pandemic influenza mitigation.^9 The
community guide introduces the pandemic severity index that assigns
response actions for a pandemic based on expected levels of severity. All
of this pandemic guidance has been made available on
[36]www.pandemicflu.gov . Additional federal government pandemic planning
efforts and related guidance for business continuity can be found at
[37]www.ready.gov .

According to HSC's summary and documents received from DHS, multiple
workshops and forums, attended by more than 30 stakeholders with critical
infrastructure entities, were held in 2006. During these events, essential
functions and critical planning elements were identified and continuity of
business operations during a pandemic were discussed. DHS officials told
us that these information-sharing sessions were intended to provide
practical action-oriented information to identify essential functions and
critical planning elements and to assist businesses in protecting the
health of employees and maintaining continuity of business operations
during a pandemic. HSC's 1-year summary also states that the federal
government has conducted a number of pandemic preparedness exercises that
included financial institution officials, public health officials, and
other relevant federal, state, and local officials.

A number of business trade associations are working to advance pandemic
preparedness and response initiatives with the federal sector to protect
the nation's critical infrastructure. For example, the Executive Director
of the Chamber's Homeland Security Policy Division told us that the
Chamber has hosted several regional business pandemic roundtables with DHS
and CDC to discuss the role of business in pandemic planning and response.
In addition, the Chamber has convened a pandemic planning work group to
address pandemic policy issues and to provide private sector input into
government strategies, and is planning legal- and human-capital-related
pandemic seminars in conjunction with DHS. The Center for Health
Transformation, which is a collaboration of public and private sector
leaders, led a simulation with almost 100 leaders from the private and
public sectors to work through an influenza pandemic exercise in March
2006. According to a center project director, the exercise looked at the
consequences of such a disaster for the United States and the strategies
that might best mitigate these impacts. According to documentation from
the exercise, simulation participants concluded that the effects would
overwhelm the efforts of any one agency or sector and that the government
will need to drive the national response strategy and engage all sectors
early.

^9Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Community Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Mitigation (February 2007).

While not directed specifically toward a pandemic outbreak, two major
business entities have taken steps to enhance public-private disaster
response efforts. BENS is a nationwide, nonpartisan organization composed
of senior business executives working together to help enhance the
nation's security. In January 2007, a BENS-chartered task force issued
recommendations on better integrating business resources and capabilities
with those of the government's disaster response plans. According to the
BENS task force chairperson, BENS did so primarily in response to the
federal government's recognition of a pressing need for an integrated
response capability in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The report used
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and other disasters to highlight
its recommendations in three broad categories: (1) public-private
collaboration, (2) public-private resource coordination, and (3) legal and
regulatory environment. A BENS representative told us that its report and
recommendations represent an action plan for public-private disaster
response coordination, including a pandemic.^10 Further, a representative
of the Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers of leading
U.S. companies, told us that the organization, frustrated with the lack of
good government logistics to coordinate assistance during the Katrina
disaster relief effort, is attempting to leverage existing capabilities of
the private sector to create a more effective response to natural
disasters, including an influenza pandemic. The Roundtable has created a
task force to promote coordination of disaster response and recovery
efforts, as well as long-term rebuilding initiatives, and also to provide
tools and guides for businesses to develop a comprehensive disaster
response program. In December 2006, members of the task force met with HSC
and DHS officials, including the Secretary of Homeland Security, to
discuss improving private-public collaboration to strengthen the nation's
system for disaster preparedness and response. According to the
Roundtable, the federal government and private sector representatives
identified several areas for better collaboration, including the
identification of needs for private sector resources, increased private
sector representation in state emergency management operations, and
collaboration on improved communication, technology, and supply chain
logistics.

^10Business Executives for National Security, Getting Down to Business: An
Action Plan for Public-Private Disaster Response Coordination (January
2007).

Five Sectors Reviewed Are Working through Councils and Have Taken Some Actions
to Prepare for a Pandemic

DHS officials from the agency's Office of Infrastructure Protection within
the Directorate for National Protection and Programs, as well as federal
and private sector representatives from the five critical infrastructure
sector councils we interviewed, told us that they are using DHS's sector
partnership framework, which consists of sector-specific and cross-sector
councils, to coordinate critical infrastructure pandemic preparedness
efforts. DHS's Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership
and Outreach Division, told us that the agency's role is to convene and
facilitate interaction with the private sector through these councils.

The five sectors we reviewed have taken initial pandemic preparedness
actions within their respective councils. According to HSC, movement of
essential personnel, goods, and services and maintenance of critical
infrastructure are necessary during an event that spans months in any
given community, and critical infrastructure entities that provide
essential services, such as food, water, electricity, and
telecommunications, have a special responsibility to prepare and plan for
continued operation during a pandemic. The National Strategy states that
the private sector and critical infrastructure entities must respond in a
manner that allows them to maintain the essential elements of their
operations for a prolonged period of time, in order to prevent severe
disruption of life in our communities. Much of the recent efforts of
councils in the sectors we reviewed have focused on completing the
sector-specific plans required by the NIPP, which are not pandemic
specific. All of the five sector councils we reviewed reported that
preparing these plans was their overriding priority and took a majority of
their time but that they have also initiated pandemic planning efforts in
their sectors.

In recognition of the pandemic threat, the five sectors we reviewed all
were conducting activities to help them plan and prepare for a potential
pandemic. For example, Communications Sector Coordinating Council members
told us the council has established a working group to identify and
address issues related to the resilience of the telecommunications sector
during a pandemic (i.e., strengthening the telecommunications sector's
ability to function in the event of a disaster or incident). According to
the Chairperson of the Communications Sector Coordinating Council, the
group is working with the National Communications System, the
sector-specific agency for the telecommunications sector, to review the
potential consequences of predicted, extraordinarily high telecommuting
levels during an influenza pandemic.^11 Specifically, the group is
attempting to gauge telecommuting requirements in the event of a pandemic
and has developed models to represent how users would behave in accessing
the Internet, as well as models of how network infrastructure users would
behave during a pandemic. As part of this effort, the National
Communications System is working with industry and other sectors to
develop a set of best practices for businesses regarding
preparedness-related telework, as well as developing a list of
preparedness activities, also for businesses, that may be useful to
mitigate potential telecommunications challenges. Examples of such
activities include staggering work schedules for optimal capacity and
potentially providing temporary work centers where businesses could
conduct operations during contingency situations.

The Electricity Sector Coordinating Council Chairperson said that the
council began its pandemic planning effort in early November 2005. Shortly
thereafter, the council formed a pandemic planning committee and proceeded
to develop a two-page electricity sector influenza pandemic threat summary
that introduced the threat, framed it for discussion, and provided general
information, and an eight-page electricity sector pandemic planning,
preparation, and response reference guide that it has distributed to its
members. EPA officials said that EPA's Water Security Division gave a
presentation on EPA's Pandemic Preparedness for the Water Sector at a
meeting of the Water Sector Government Coordinating Council, which
highlighted EPA's actions in response to the pandemic threat and also
provided information on pandemic preparedness tools and guidance.
According to the Water Sector Coordinating Council Chairperson, a number
of individual utilities have developed their own pandemic planning and
response guides. The Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council
developed a pandemic preparedness plan, which it distributed throughout
the sector. Representatives from the Highway and Motor Carrier Sector
Coordinating Council, which is part of the Transportation Sector
Coordinating Council and one of the last private sector coordinating
councils to form, said that they have recently formed a pandemic working
group.

^11House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response, Hearing on
Leveraging the Private Sector to Strengthen Emergency Preparedness and
Response, July 19, 2007.

As directed by the Implementation Plan, DHS, in collaboration with the
appropriate representatives from the sector-specific councils, such as
EPA, has taken steps to develop sector-specific pandemic planning
guidelines. According to a DHS official with responsibility for overseeing
this activity, DHS is collaborating with the appropriate government and
private sector representatives to develop, evaluate, enhance, and support
their respective sector's pandemic planning guidelines. The DHS official
explained that these guidelines, developed jointly by the government and
private sectors, extend beyond the general pandemic guidance already
available and are intended to be a tactical checklist specific to each
sector for pandemic planning purposes. For example, with the water
sector-specific guidance, any waste water manager in the country would
have the necessary information to make his or her own pandemic plan as
comprehensive as possible. Documentation from DHS indicates that by
September 2007, the agency had engaged 13 sectors in the development of
the guidance and had draft guidelines in various phases of development.

Federal Government and Private Sector Face Challenges in Coordinating
Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic in Critical Infrastructure Sectors

A number of challenges face the federal and private sectors as they
attempt to coordinate efforts to plan and prepare for a potential
influenza pandemic in the critical infrastructure sectors. These include
continuity of attention on pandemic preparedness and response, lack of
clearly defined federal and state roles, need for consistent messages from
the federal government and adequate information-sharing mechanisms within
sectors, need to consider cross-sector interdependencies for a pandemic,
needed investments in training and additional infrastructure capabilities,
and potential legal and regulatory issues.

Federal and Private Sector Acknowledge Challenge of Sustaining Attention on the
Pandemic Threat

According to federal and private sector representatives, sustaining
preparedness and readiness efforts for an influenza pandemic is a major
challenge. Federal and private sector officials with responsibility for
pandemic planning and preparedness efforts in their sectors said they are
challenged to continue and maintain these efforts primarily because of the
uncertainty associated with a pandemic, limited financial and human
resources, and the need to balance pandemic preparedness with other
priorities.

The federal government has communicated the importance of remaining
vigilant and sustaining pandemic preparedness. For example, the HSC 1-year
summary states that although the visibility of avian influenza pandemic
preparedness has waned in the media, the threat of avian influenza and the
potential for an influenza pandemic are still imminent. While
acknowledging the uncertainty of a potential pandemic, the report
reaffirms the inevitable occurrence of a pandemic at some point in the
future and states that it is everyone's responsibility to remain vigilant
and to continue to take the threat of a pandemic very seriously.

According to DHS's Director of the Infrastructure Programs Office,
Infrastructure Partnerships Division, the critical infrastructure sector
councils have not designated pandemic planning as a priority. The current
Chairperson of the Food and Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating
Council told us that pandemic preparedness has not been a major focus of
the council, and that the council has been working on addressing issues
related to the contamination of the food and agricultural system and
supply. He further explained that the food and agriculture sector's
all-hazards approach to emergency planning, which encompasses threats
posed by terrorism as well as natural disasters, would ensure its ability
to effectively meet the challenges posed by a potential pandemic.
Similarly, representatives of the Communications Sector Government
Coordinating Council cited the difficulty with funding pandemic
preparedness efforts versus other, more immediate, organizational
priorities, such as protecting against cyberattacks and their
consequences. An electricity sector representative said that it is very
difficult to maintain up-to-date plans and preparedness materials over
time as people move, information becomes out of date, and circumstances
change.

The Chairperson of the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council
recognized that even though the public's interest in pandemic influenza
may have waned, the private sector has fiduciary and ethical
responsibilities that require continued maintenance of pandemic planning
efforts even though pandemic influenza may not be a current priority of
the public. Private sector representatives from the transportation
(highway and motor carrier) sector said they do not see a sense of urgency
in the federal government's interaction with businesses in their sector
regarding pandemic preparedness efforts. They explained that they had met
with officials from DOT 1 year earlier to discuss legal and regulatory
concerns related to interstate transportation that could facilitate
pandemic response activities, but that there have not been further
discussions or resolution of the issues raised.

Private Sector Perceives a Lack of Clarity on Federal and State Roles and
Responsibilities

According to the private sector council chairpersons and other
representatives we interviewed, the roles and responsibilities of the
federal and state governments are unclear on issues such as pandemic
vaccine distribution and state border closures. Given the multitude of
organizations within the federal, state, and local governments, and in the
private sector, that are involved in planning and preparing for a
potential influenza pandemic, it is important to ensure that the
leadership, roles, responsibilities, and authorities are clear.

The National Strategy emphasizes the need for coordination across
different government and private sector organizations. The Implementation
Plan contains a number of critical infrastructure-related action items
that involve coordinating roles and responsibilities for various
government and private sector organizations, a number of which have been
reported as completed by HSC. In its 1-year summary, HSC reported that at
the beginning of a pandemic, the scarcity of vaccine will require the
limited supply to be prioritized for distribution and administration and
noted that the federal government has begun a process to revise previous
interim guidance for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
planning about which groups to target for earlier access to pandemic
vaccines.

In August 2007, we reported that the National Strategy and the
Implementation Plan do not specify how the leadership roles and
responsibilities will work in addressing the unique characteristics of an
influenza pandemic.^12 According to the Chairperson of the President's
Council on the Year 2000 Conversion, one lesson learned in the
government's response to the Y2K computer challenge was that the federal
"facilitative" or "convener" role is key in supporting the necessary
government and private sector coordination related to preparedness, and
that clearly defining the government role in interacting with the private
sector is necessary. We have previously reported that in a catastrophic
disaster, the leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority
for the response at all levels must be clearly defined and effectively
communicated to facilitate rapid and effective decision making, especially
in preparing for and in the early hours and days after the event.^13

^12GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Federal
Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy, [38]GAO-07-781
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007).

The private sector council representatives from the sectors we reviewed
told us that they were unclear regarding federal, state, and local
coordination efforts related to vaccine distribution. An Electricity
Sector Coordinating Council member described the federal-state
coordination in this area as potentially "falling between the cracks." A
January 2007 report by NIAC on vaccine pandemic prioritization revealed
that critical infrastructure owners and operators involved in its study
were confused about the roles of the multiple federal, state, and local
officials both now and in the future.^14 NIAC's report recommended that
the federal government continue to work with critical infrastructure
owners and operators to educate them on the framework detailing how, when,
and in what capacity state, local, and private-sector response
participants will engage the federal government before, during, and after
a pandemic. The NIAC report also recommended that the federal government
continue developing a clearly defined vaccine and antiviral medication
distribution strategy. According to minutes from a NIAC meeting held in
July 2007, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at HHS
stated that NIAC's report and recommendations will help HHS guide vaccine
and antiviral distribution plans for all 50 states and 5 United States
territories.

Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council representatives
expressed concerns to us that state governments, during an influenza
pandemic, could potentially close their borders, which would have a great
impact on the national highway system and hinder the delivery of essential
goods and services. They explained that the federal government has yet to
address these and related issues that may be relevant during the potential
panic that may occur following an influenza pandemic outbreak.

^13GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, [39]GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2006).

^14National Infrastructure Advisory Council, The Prioritization of
Critical Infrastructure for a Pandemic Outbreak in the United States (Jan.
16, 2007).

Private Sector Concerned about Receiving Consistent Messages and the Adequacy of
Information-Sharing Mechanisms

According to several private sector representatives we interviewed,
receiving consistent messages and having adequate information-sharing
mechanisms remains a major challenge for federal and private sector
coordination efforts. Effective communications between the federal and
private sectors will be vital during a pandemic. It is essential for the
federal government to be a trusted source of information, and
communicating accurately and often will be necessary. Pandemic
preparedness involves information sharing across all critical
infrastructure sectors, government agencies, private businesses, and
federal and state information sources. Because an influenza pandemic is
expected to occur in multiple waves over a span of several months,
effective communications networks must be sustained over time despite
complications presented by a reduced workforce.

The Implementation Plan emphasizes the importance of and the need for
timely, accurate, credible, and consistent information that is tailored to
specific audiences. According to the Implementation Plan, this requires
coordinated messaging by spokespersons across government at the local,
state, tribal, and federal levels, and by our international partners. The
Implementation Plan includes a number of action items directed toward
enhancing communications, and in its 1-year summary, HSC reported that
several of these actions have been completed. The summary states that over
150 information-sharing workshops were held with industry over the last
year, particularly with stakeholders from critical infrastructure sectors.
According to the HSC 1-year summary, these information-sharing sessions
have provided practical, action-oriented information for identifying
essential functions and critical planning elements and assisting
businesses in protecting the health of employees and in maintaining
continuity of businesses operating during a pandemic.

Despite these actions, the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating
Council Chairperson stated that there remains a great need to establish
viable communication links between the federal and private sectors to
ensure that accurate and consistent messages are provided and received. He
explained that because a potential pandemic will involve public health
agencies as well as agencies with critical infrastructure
responsibilities, information will be coming from numerous sources and
coordination among those providing the information will be vital to ensure
the consistency of information provided. The Chairperson of the
Electricity Sector Coordinating Council told us that working toward a
strong, single pandemic preparedness message across federal, state, and
local levels of government was and would continue to be a top challenge
and priority. We reported in our 2007 biennial high-risk update that the
federal government still faces formidable challenges in analyzing and
disseminating key information among federal, state, local, and private
partners in a timely, accurate, and useful manner.^15

Several private sector representatives from the five sectors we reviewed
also expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of the councils as a
medium for sharing information. Although the critical infrastructure
coordinating councils are designed to allow members to freely share
sensitive information, a member of the Electricity Sector Coordinating
Council said that much of the information that the council members receive
comes from DHS and not from the council. Representatives from DOT voiced a
similar concern. They stated that the Highway and Motor Carrier Sector
Coordinating Council's information-sharing efforts may not include all of
the many small trucking companies that exist. They explained that as a
result, small trucking companies may not be aware of pandemic planning and
preparedness requirements, and that this could represent a major problem
in the trucking industry because more than 90 percent of businesses in the
industry are small-scale operators (fewer than 10 trucks). DHS's Director
of the Partnership and Outreach Division, Office of Infrastructure
Protection, agreed that effective communications with small trucking
companies is a challenge. DHS officials in this office explained that
there is a substantial role for outreach, communication, and education by
state and local governments to keep smaller companies, in particular,
properly informed. They further stated that many of the sector councils,
to be truly representational, include trade associations consisting of
smaller companies as members. According to the Highway and Motor Carrier
Coordinating Council, the combined small carrier membership of just three
of the council's member associations represent nearly 200,000 of the
nation's smallest trucking companies. These trade associations are
expected to act as channels of communication from the sector councils to
smaller businesses, complementing the communication and information
provided by general business and state and local government information
and coordination.

^15GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [40]GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).

Federal and Private Sector Consideration of Cross-Sector Interdependencies for
an Influenza Pandemic Is a Continuing Challenge

Private sector and federal representatives cited consideration of
cross-sector interdependencies as a key challenge for pandemic
preparedness efforts. Crucial interdependencies exist among the five
sectors that we reviewed. For example, because nearly every sector of the
economy depends on telecommunications and electricity, how well those
sectors can continue to provide services will affect every other critical
sector. Lessons from Hurricane Katrina demonstrate how overwhelmed
critical resources can become when agencies fail to adequately plan for
requirements in goods and services, and to clearly communicate predisaster
responsibilities to ensure that these goods and services are available
when needed. Due to the interconnected nature of critical infrastructure
sectors and the comprehensive challenge posed by an influenza pandemic,
failing to address cross-sector interdependencies effectively could place
all sectors of the nation's critical infrastructure at risk.

The Implementation Plan includes an action item that instructs DHS to map
and model critical infrastructure interdependencies across and within
sectors to share critical information with sectors and identify national
challenges during a pandemic. The HSC 6-month status report showed this
action item as complete and stated that DHS maintains a critical
infrastructure modeling capability and that this capability drives the
mapping of critical infrastructure interdependencies. The report also
noted that an ongoing effort using these capabilities is examining the
potential impact of a pandemic. HSC's 1-year summary explained that one
large business invited more than 300 of its top suppliers to a pandemic
preparedness workshop so it could pass along pandemic planning information
and encourage each one of the attending companies to start to prepare. The
summary also highlights a financial institution that "is assessing all of
its vendors to determine whether or not they have pandemic plans that can
support the organization's supply chain during a pandemic" and also notes
that the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council has established
working groups and convenes regular meetings to discuss preparations and
identify interdependencies in other critical sectors.

Coordinating councils in several sectors we reviewed identified
cross-sector interdependencies, although not pandemic specific, in their
sector-specific plans required by the NIPP. However, we recently reported
that given the disparity in the plans, it is unclear the extent to which
DHS will be able to use the plans to identify security gaps and critical
interdependencies across the sectors in order to plan future protective
measures.^16 As previously mentioned, DHS officials also held workshops
with business and government continuity planners, operations center
operators, and retail and distribution hub owners/operators where they
discussed issues that cut across sectors, as well as supply chains. DHS
officials also said that the planned sector-specific pandemic planning
guides are expected to include a section on cross-sector dependencies to
consider for a pandemic.

Additionally, federal and private sector representatives told us that some
preliminary and limited discussions regarding interdependencies had
occurred within sector-specific and cross-sector councils and some had
taken place in other forums. For example, the Electricity Sector
Coordinating Council Chairperson stated that he had participated in
limited discussions in coordinating council meetings about the electricity
sector's interdependencies with representatives from other sectors, such
as water, telecommunications, and healthcare. Communications Government
Coordinating Council representatives said that they had participated in
several collaborative cross-sector meetings that considered
interdependencies. On the other hand, Highway and Motor Carrier Sector
Coordinating Council representatives told us that they had been involved
in cross-sector discussions with the pharmaceutical industry and food and
grocery representatives, but stated that they had initiated these talks
through their own contacts and that they had not participated in
significant discussions of cross-sector interdependencies through the
sector-specific and cross-sector coordinating council structure.

Federal and Private Sector Identified Needed Investments in Training and
Infrastructure

According to federal and private sector representatives in the five
sectors that we reviewed, investment in private sector capabilities is
necessary for businesses to prepare for and respond to an influenza
pandemic. According to Communications Sector Coordinating Council members,
the amount of resources required to address these issues and the inability
of some businesses--particularly those that are smaller in size--to meet
these needs present a challenge to pandemic preparedness. They explained
that if the resource requirements for private sector preparedness are not
clearly identified and addressed, businesses in the critical
infrastructure sectors studied could potentially lack the staffing,
skills, and other assets to effectively deal with an influenza pandemic.

^16GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector
Councils Continue to Evolve, [41]GAO-07-706R (Washington, D.C.: July 10,
2007).

Private and federal sector council representatives that we interviewed
identified a number of areas where additional investment in private sector
capabilities may be needed to prepare for and respond to a potential
pandemic. The government has recognized the need for investment in private
sector critical infrastructure preparedness efforts. HSC's 1-year summary
states that "The scale and scope of a pandemic necessitate a dedicated
effort and investment beyond typical business continuity planning."
Representatives from the Electricity Sector Coordinating Council explained
that additional investments in coal stockpiles might be needed to ensure
that electricity producers have sufficient fuel if current supplies are
exhausted during a pandemic. Federal and private sector representatives
from both the Electricity and Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating
Councils told us that companies and agencies, anticipating significant
workforce absenteeism in the event of pandemic, were cross-training
employees to better ensure continuity of operations. Electricity sector
representatives also described other types of investment. For example, one
company established redundant physical facilities where multiple shifts of
workers could continue operations at a temporary location during a
pandemic.

DHS officials we spoke with from the National Communications System
described challenges related to adequate investment in network
infrastructure required to support the needs of the large telecommuting
workforce and other demands that would occur during an influenza pandemic.
The officials suggested that telecommunications companies have little
incentive for investing in excess capacity for a pandemic that may not
occur. They explained that small businesses that lack the resources and
staff face even greater challenges, as they are more limited in their
ability to allocate resources toward business continuity investments.

Federal and Private Sector Noted That Potential Legal and Regulatory Issues
Should Be Considered in Advance of a Pandemic

Federal and private sector officials also identified potential legal and
regulatory issues that could hinder the private sector's ability to
adequately respond to a pandemic outbreak and provide essential services,
and suggested that these issues should be considered in advance of a
pandemic. Past lessons and current industry views indicate that if key
legal and regulatory issues are not identified and addressed in advance of
an emergency, businesses in critical infrastructure sectors may be unable
to effectively prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic.

Lessons learned from previous emergency response challenges involving
critical infrastructure have highlighted the importance of addressing
legal and regulatory challenges in advance of emergency response efforts
as was done in the case of the Y2K challenge. For example, according to
the Chairperson of the President's Council on the Year 2000 Conversion, an
important aspect of the government's successful preparation for the Y2K
computing challenge was the passage of legislation limiting the liability
of companies engaged in preparedness actions.^17 BENS reported in January
2007 that a key challenge in prior disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina
involved "significant regulatory barriers" that hindered businesses'
ability to execute their own continuity plans and assist in supporting
their communities. For example, nearly all businesses included in the BENS
study reported the permitting and credentialing process imposed by public
authorities in the aftermath of Katrina as a major impediment to restoring
business continuity. They said that resolving the restrictions on
professionals licensed in one state from practicing in another and
granting access into the disaster area for owners and businesses to
inspect, repair, and reestablish their services were the key issues. The
BENS report recommends that agencies with oversight and regulatory
authority over the private sector need to clarify and promulgate
procedures that allow the agencies to quickly implement discretionary
authorities for the relaxation of regulations in the event of an
emergency. The Implementation Plan contains an action item that directs
DHS to "coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal efforts, including
legislative and regulatory additions/changes and waivers, to develop and
implement tailored support packages to address critical infrastructure
systems and essential operational requirements at each phase of the
pandemic." Although this action item is due to be completed in May 2007,
the July 2007 HSC summary did not provide a summary of progress for this
action item.

In March 2007, we reported that financial market participants are
collecting information on the types of and circumstances under which
regulatory relief may be needed during an outbreak of pandemic influenza.
Although willing to consider regulatory relief, Securities and Exchange
Commission staff indicated that market participants should not expect
wide-scale waivers of important securities regulatory requirements. They
said that although some form of regulatory relief would most likely be
part of the process for enabling the financial system to keep operating
during a pandemic, such relief should be one of the last stages in
continuity planning and preparation, not the first.^18 DHS's Director of
the Partnership and Outreach Division, Office of Infrastructure
Protection, told us that predisaster agreement on terms of relief was
unreasonable, due to potentially diverse circumstances that could be
encountered at the time of a crisis. The official suggested that companies
that were interested in regulatory relief should discuss these issues
directly with their specific regulatory agencies.

^17Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No.
105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (Oct. 20, 1998), and Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37,
113 Stat. 185 (July 20, 1999).

Sector council representatives in the transportation (highway and motor
carrier), food and agriculture, electricity, and water sectors all
expressed concerns related to legal and regulatory issues in their
respective sectors. Transportation (highway and motor carrier) sector
representatives stated that to facilitate response efforts, regulatory
waivers related to hours of service, oversized weight restrictions, and
types of fuel mix were issued during the Hurricane Katrina emergency. They
said that they had previously met, post-Katrina, with officials from DOT
to discuss how these types of regulatory relief could be applied in the
future, but to date DOT had not responded regarding the issues. Although
DOT officials noted that existing regulations already provide for relief
during emergencies, sector council representatives said that there are
issues that remain unaddressed by these regulatory relief provisions which
they believe require further discussion.^19 Representatives from the food
and agriculture and water sectors told us that they may be unable to
provide needed services during a pandemic outbreak while adhering to
regulations requiring certified plant operators and food inspectors if, as
estimated, up to 40 percent of their workforces are unable to work during
a pandemic. For example, representatives from the Water Sector
Coordinating Council told us that in the event of a pandemic there may not
be enough certified equipment operators available. Similarly, the Food and
Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council's Chairperson told us that the
number of certified food inspectors may be limited during a pandemic.

^18GAO, Financial Market Preparedness: Significant Progress Has Been Made,
but Pandemic Planning and Other Challenges Remain, [42]GAO-07-399 .
Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2007.

^1949 C.F.R. sections 390.23 and 390.25 provide automatic relief from
certain truck safety regulations during an emergency, including hours of
service for any motor carrier and driver providing emergency relief.

Sector-Specific and Cross-Sector Coordinating Councils Could Be Used More to
Address These Challenges

There are opportunities to build on the actions already taken to further
address the identified challenges through increased federal and private
sector use of the sector-specific and cross-sector coordinating councils.
DHS recognized that critical infrastructure owners and operators should be
involved in the critical infrastructure decision-making processes and that
a real partnership between these individuals and the federal government
was needed. As a result, DHS created a framework for the federal and
private sectors to interact and to establish the necessary level of
public-private cooperation needed to protect the nation's critical
infrastructure. Although DHS has established this structure for
collaboration among the federal and private sectors involved with critical
infrastructure, to date its activities have had a limited focus on
pandemic preparedness.

PCIS, which is composed of private sector leaders, and CIPAC, which is
composed of government and private sector leaders, provide a framework for
owner and operator members of the government and private sector councils
to engage in intragovernmental and public-private cooperation across the
entire range of critical infrastructure protection activities. According
to DHS, these councils have been used primarily to distribute information
across sectors and government levels but not to address many of the
identified challenges related to an influenza pandemic. We reported in
October 2006 that the councils could utilize their existing relationships
to help develop a strategic focus, such as planning for an influenza
pandemic.^20 In particular, because they bring together public and private
sector critical infrastructure leaders across the various sectors and
levels of government, PCIS and CIPAC can aid in addressing identified
federal and private sector challenges related to pandemic planning.

According to the outgoing chair of PCIS, its members are actively involved
in pandemic planning within their sectors, but have only recently begun to
share their pandemic planning assumptions, approaches, and issues with
each other. During their April 2007 meeting, PCIS members held a
roundtable discussion of the status of their pandemic planning efforts.
The outgoing PCIS Chair told us that PCIS members believe that these
discussions were helpful in identifying common issues and sharing
effective approaches for pandemic planning, and that the PCIS membership
is interested in exploring in greater detail items of cross-sector
importance, in particular, influencing government policy matters such as
social distancing strategies^21 and antiviral availability and
distribution.

^20 [43]GAO-07-39 .

CIPAC provides the framework for the public and private sectors to jointly
discuss relevant critical infrastructure issues such as a potential
pandemic and allows the various sector participants to reach over and
beyond traditional sector boundaries. According to DHS's Director of the
Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and Outreach Division, CIPAC's
focus over the last year has been on completing and issuing the
sector-specific plans required by the NIPP. Although the consequences and
vulnerabilities of a pandemic may have been discussed to a limited extent
at CIPAC meetings, the Director acknowledged that the sectors need to work
together on interdependencies and cross-sector issues related to the
pandemic threat. Our review of CIPAC meeting agendas showed that 8 of the
49 CIPAC meetings held since the spring of 2006, when CIPAC was created,
included "influenza pandemic" as an agenda item, and only one agenda
included a joint discussion of cross-sector interdependencies.

DHS, because it is responsible for coordinating national critical
infrastructure protection efforts and is the sector-specific agency for
over half of the critical infrastructure sectors, is well positioned to
help ensure that federal entities take advantage of these existing
coordinating mechanisms to further plan and prepare for a potential
influenza pandemic. DHS could develop and specify agenda items for the
government and cross-sector councils that address many of the challenges
that cut across the sectors and levels of government we identified. DHS,
along with other sector-specific agencies, could encourage the private
sector councils to do likewise. These organizations can discuss issues,
make and test realistic plans, and develop workable solutions to potential
challenges before an outbreak occurs. Otherwise, there may be insufficient
time and resources to adequately prepare their members for changes in how
their sectors may operate during a pandemic.

DHS, sector-specific agencies, and their counterparts among the critical
infrastructure sectors are responsible for convening CIPAC meetings,
typically upon request from sector members, but DHS's Director of the
Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and Outreach Division,
acknowledged that the department could encourage greater appropriate
federal and sector utilization of CIPAC. According to this official, DHS
has responsibility for communicating the structure, process, and purpose
of CIPAC for public and private collaboration. DHS is encouraging
appropriate use of CIPAC by (1) developing an internal DHS management
directive that highlights the benefits of and requirements for using the
current council framework, (2) highlighting relevant NIPP guidance that
encourages the use of the various councils through a NIPP outreach and
awareness program, and (3) creating a critical infrastructure/key
resources annex to the draft revised National Response Plan, now called
the National Response Framework,^22 that discusses use of the councils.

^21Social distancing is focused measures to increase social distance, or
to restrict activity. Depending on the situation, this may include
cancellation of public events (concerts, sports events, movies, plays) and
closure of recreational facilities and schools.

Conclusions

Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an
influenza pandemic requires an increased amount of coordination,
collaboration, and in some cases, partnerships, between the federal and
private sectors. Private sector planning must be well coordinated across
the interdependent critical infrastructures in the nation and between all
appropriate public and private entities. The federal government encourages
critical asset owners and operators to be involved in private sector
councils that are self-organized, self-run, and self-governed. The
critical infrastructure's coordinating and advisory committees, along with
the National Strategy and Implementation Plan, bring together government
and business owners and operators of critical infrastructure to plan and
prepare for all disasters, including a potential influenza pandemic.
Because a pandemic may last for weeks or months, these public and private
sector relationships must be developed and sustained over extended periods
of time. A pandemic will likely reduce dramatically the number of
available workers in all sectors, and significantly disrupt the movement
of people and goods, which will threaten essential services and operations
within and across the nation's critical infrastructure. Without working
effectively together, the public and private sectors risk being
insufficiently prepared to sustain the operations of critical
infrastructure during an outbreak of influenza pandemic.

Although the federal and private sectors have taken initial steps to
prepare for a pandemic, they face several key challenges that require
coordination among multiple sectors and all levels of government.
Opportunities exist to help address these challenges through increased use
of the critical infrastructure sector-specific and cross-sector councils.
These councils and their members are important because they provide a
structure and forum for the public and private sectors to collaborate on
appropriate planning and preparedness activities to prepare and respond to
a pandemic, particularly for those issues that require cross-sector
discussions and involvement of government at all levels.

^22The draft National Response Framework was released for public comment
on September 10, 2007.

To date, these councils have been used primarily for information sharing
among members, to develop the sector-specific plans for all hazards, and
are developing sector-specific plans for a pandemic. However, they could
be better utilized to have a more strategic focus and to initiate and
facilitate pandemic preparedness activities. Now is the time, before a
pandemic emerges, to leverage these coordinating mechanisms to ensure that
challenges and solutions are identified and cross-sector capabilities are
well understood by all. Discussing and addressing relevant pandemic
concerns and challenges prior to an outbreak would allow critical
infrastructure sectors and their organizations to provide training to
their employees and conduct tests and exercises that could provide
valuable insights into how to further improve their readiness. DHS
acknowledges that it could encourage greater appropriate federal and
private sector utilization of the councils to help address coordination
challenges and solve common problems for pandemic and other hazards. DHS
is well positioned to encourage federal and private entities to take
advantage of these coordinating mechanisms to further plan and prepare for
a potential influenza pandemic before an outbreak may occur.

Recommendation for Executive Action

To help the nation better protect critical infrastructure in the event of
an influenza pandemic and to build on the progress made thus far, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with
sector-specific agencies, lead efforts to encourage the government and
private sector members of the councils to consider and help address the
challenges that will require coordination between the federal and private
sectors involved with critical infrastructure and within the various
sectors in advance of, as well as during, a pandemic.

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. DHS
provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix IV. In
commenting on the draft report, DHS generally agreed with the contents of
the report and concurred with our recommendation. We also provided a draft
of this report to federal and private sector representatives of the five
sectors we reviewed. FDA (HHS); DOE; DOT; and representatives of PCIS and
the Electricity and Highway and Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Representatives of the Food and Agriculture Coordinating Council and TSA
informed us that they had no comments on the draft report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [44]http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6806 or [45][email protected] . Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix V.

Bernice Steinhardt
Director, Strategic Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this engagement are to identify (1) how the federal
government is working with the private sector to ensure protection of the
nation's critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic,
particularly in the transportation (highway and motor carrier), food and
agriculture, water, energy (electricity), and telecommunications sectors,
and (2) the challenges facing the federal government and private sector to
coordinate protection of the nation's critical infrastructure in the event
of an influenza pandemic, particularly in these same five sectors, and
what the federal government could do to help to address these challenges.

To address both of our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed critical
infrastructure protection regulations, plans, and guidance, including the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan, and the Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources. We
assessed the status of the action items in the implementation plan related
to critical infrastructure protection, and specifically to the challenges
that were identified by the federal and private sector representatives we
interviewed. In order to do this, we reviewed the Homeland Security
Council's 6-month and 1-year progress reports on the implementation plan,
and received updates from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials
on the status of these action items. We also interviewed officials from
DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) with responsibility for leading and
coordinating the overall national critical infrastructure protection
effort and for working with the private sector to prepare for a possible
pandemic. Within DHS, we met with the Chief Medical Officer; the Assistant
Secretary for the Private Sector Office, Office of Policy; the Director of
the Infrastructure Programs Office, Partnership and Outreach Division; and
the Director of the Partnership and Outreach Division, Office of
Infrastructure Protection, and their staff. Within CDC, we interviewed the
Director, Business Partnerships and Chief of the Private and Public
Partners Branch, Division of Partnerships, and other CDC staff. We also
interviewed representatives from business trade associations, such as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Executives for National Security,
the Business Roundtable, and the Center for Health Transformation.

We reviewed 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors for our study. The
sectors are energy (electricity), food and agriculture,
telecommunications, transportation (highway and motor carrier), and water.
These sectors were selected because, in addition to the public health and
healthcare sector, they will provide the services most basic to the
continued operation of the economy and society during an emergency such as
a pandemic. We reviewed sector-specific plans and guidance for the 5
sectors we studied in depth. We also interviewed representatives of each
of the sector-specific federal agencies with critical infrastructure
protection responsibility for the 5 sectors we reviewed: DHS's
Transportation Security Administration (highway and motor carrier) and
National Communications System Agency (telecommunications); the Department
of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (food and
agriculture); the Environmental Protection Agency (water); and the
Department of Energy (electricity). The membership of the 5 government
sector coordinating councils is provided in appendix II. In addition, we
also interviewed representatives from the Department of Transportation
(highway and motor carrier). We interviewed private sector representatives
for each of the 5 sectors, including the chairpersons of the respective
sector coordinating councils. These representatives presented their views
on how their respective councils are working with the federal government
to protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of a
pandemic, the challenges they face, and opportunities for addressing those
challenges; but they did not necessarily represent the views of each
member of their respective councils. The membership of the 5 private
sector coordinating councils is provided in appendix III.

In addition to these interviews, and to address both objectives, we
reviewed charters, meeting agendas and minutes, and other planning
documents and guides for the various coordinating councils. We also
gathered relevant documentation from the officials and representatives we
interviewed. In addition, we attended pandemic planning workshops and
conferences sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. As part of our
effort to identify possible challenges in the critical infrastructure
area, we reviewed the following sources:

           o prior GAO work on critical infrastructure protection, Year 2000
           computer conversion, emergency response, federal collaboration
           practices, and public and private partnerships;

           o related studies and reports by other government, nonprofit, and
           private sector organizations; and

           o business consulting, practitioner, and academic literature and
           studies in the areas of emergency management and governance.

           The results of our review of these five sectors cannot be
           generalized to the other critical infrastructure sectors given the
           limited number of sectors we reviewed and their nonprobabilistic
           selection. However, our general review of related literature
           suggests that the other sectors face similar challenges in how the
           federal and private sectors are coordinating their efforts to
           prepare for an influenza pandemic. Because the focus of our work
           was on the pandemic planning and coordinating efforts between the
           federal government and the private sector at a national level, we
           did not examine individual state, local, or private sector
           initiatives on their own, such as private sector continuity of
           operations plans, except in the case where these efforts were
           connected with federal initiatives.

           We conducted our work from June 2006 through September 2007 in
           accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
			  
Appendix II: Government Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as 
of September 4, 2007: 

Table: Government Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as of 
September 4, 2007: 

Council and sector: Energy; 
Government council members: U.S. Department of Energy, Chair; 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners; 
National Association of State Energy Officials; 
U.S. Department of Agriculture; 
U.S. Department of Defense; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
U.S. Department of the Interior; 
U.S. Department of State; 
U.S. Department of Transportation; 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

Council and sector: Food and Agriculture; 
Government council members: U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Food and Drug Administration, Chair[A]; 
U.S. Department of Agriculture; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials; 
Intertribal Agriculture Council; 
National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials; 
National Association of County and City Health Officials; 
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture; 
National Science Foundation; 
U.S. Department of Commerce; 
U.S. Department of Defense; 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 
U.S. Department of the Interior; 
U.S. Department of Justice; 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

Council and sector: Communications (Telecommunications); 
Government council members: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
National Communications Center, Chair; 
Federal Communications Commission; 
General Services Administration; 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners; 
U.S. Department of Commerce; 
U.S. Department of Defense; 
U.S. Department of Justice. 

Council and sector: Transportation; 
Government council members: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Transportation Security Administration, Chair; 
U.S. Department of Defense; 
U.S. Department of Energy; 
U.S. Department of Transportation. 

Council and sector: Water; 
Government council members: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Chair; 
Association of State & Interstate Water Pollution Control; 
Administrators; 
Association of State Drinking Water Administrators; 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
U.S. Department of Agriculture; 
U.S. Department of Defense; 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
U.S. Department of State; 
U.S. Department of the Interior. 

Sources: Government council representatives and DHS. 

[A] FDA is the current Chair. Chair position rotates on a yearly basis 
among FDA, DHS, and USDA. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Private Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as 
of September 4, 2007: 

Table: Private Sector Council Membership by Selected Sector as of 
September 4, 2007: 

Council and sector: Electricity (Energy); 
Sector council members: Independent Electricity System Operator, 
Ontario Canada, Chair; 
Arizona Public Service Company; 
Exelon Corporation; 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; 
New York Independent System Operator; 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation,; 
Reliability First Corporation; 
Southern Company Services, Inc. 

Council and sector: Food and Agriculture; 
Sector council members: International Dairy Foods Association, Chair; 
Agricultural Retailers Association; 
American Farm Bureau Federation; 
CF Industries, Inc; 
CropLife America; 
Food Marketing Institute; 
Food Processors Association; 
International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses; 
International Food Service Distributors Association; 
International In- flight Food Service Association; 
International Warehouse Logistics Association; 
McCormick & Company, Inc; 
National Association of Convenience Stores; 
National Cattlemen's Beef Association; 
National Corn Growers Association; 
National Milk Producers Federation; 
National Pork Producers Association; 
National Restaurant Association; 
National Retail Federation; 
National Food Service Security Council; 
United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association. 

Council and sector: Communications (Telecommunications); 
Sector council members: Verizon, Chair; 
Alcatel-Lucent; 
Americom-GS; 
Association of Public Television Stations; 
AT&T 
BellSouth Corporation; 
Boeing; 
Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association; 
Cincinnati Bell; 
Cingular; 
Cisco; 
Comcast; 
Computer Sciences Corporation; 
Hughes Network Systems; 
Internet Security Alliance; 
Intrado; 
Level 3; 
Nortel; 
Qwest; 
Rural Cellular Association; 
SAVVIS; 
Satellite Industry Association; 
Sprint-Nextel; 
Telcordia; 
Telecommunications Industry Association; 
United Telecom Council; 
U.S. Telecom Association; 
U.S. Internet Service Provider Association; 
VeriSign. 

Council and sector: Highway and Motor Carrier (Transportation); 
Sector council members: American Trucking Associations, Chair; 
American Bus Association; 
American Chemistry Council; 
American Petroleum Institute; 
American Road and Transportation Builders Association; 
Border Trade Alliance; 
Chemtron Corporation; 
Con-Way, Inc; 
Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry; 
Institute of Makers of Explosives; 
Intelligent Transportation Society of America; 
Intermodal Association of North America; 
International Bridge Tunnel and Turnpike Association; 
Kenan Advantage Group; 
Laidlaw Education Services; 
Mid-States Express, Inc; 
National Association of Small Trucking; 
National Association of Truck Stop Operators; 
National Industrial Transportation League; 
National School Transportation Association; 
National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc; 
Owner- Operator Independent Drivers Association; 
Schneider National, Inc; 
Taxicab, Limousine and Paratransit Association; 
The BusBank; 
Tri-State Motor Transit Company; 
Truck Manufacturers Association; 
Truck Rental and Leasing Association; 
United Motorcoach Association. 

Council and sector: Water; 
Sector council members: Columbus Water Works, Chair; 
Alexandria Sanitation Authority; 
American Water; 
American Water Works Association; 
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies; 
AWWA Research Foundation; 
Bean Blossom Patricksburg Water Corporation; 
Boston Water and Sewer Commission; 
Breezy Hill Water and Sewer Company; 
City of Portland Bureau of Environmental Services; 
Fairfax Water; 
Greenville Water System; 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; 
Manchester Water Works; 
Milwaukee Water Works; 
National Association of Clean Water Agencies; 
National Association of Water Companies, National Rural; 
Water Association; 
New York City Department of Environmental Protection; 
Pima County Wastewater Management Department; 
United Water; 
Water Environment Federation; 
Water Environment Research Foundation. 

           Sources: Sector council representatives and DHS.
			  
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]

October 15, 2007: 

Mr. Norman J. Rabkin: 
Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 
U. S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Rabkin: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity 
to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
draft report GAO-08-36 entitled Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist 
to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges that Require 
Federal and Private Sector Coordination (GAO Job Code 450489). We 
generally agree with the contents of the report. 

We concur with the recommendation that to help the nation better 
protect critical infrastructure in the event of an influenza pandemic, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with sector-specific 
agencies, build on the progress made thus far and use the coordinating 
councils as a mechanism to help ensure that critical infrastructure 
stakeholders are adequately prepared for a pandemic outbreak. 
Specifically, the Secretary should encourage the government and private 
sector members of the councils to consider and help address the 
challenges that will require coordination between the federal and 
private sectors involved with critical infrastructure and within the 
various sectors in advance of, as well as during, a pandemic. 

As a Government entity, DHS is unable to "ensure" private sector 
preparedness. We believe the appropriate language is that DHS continue 
to support and facilitate private sector preparedness. We believe that 
a strong architectural framework and multiple initiatives are in place 
and in progress to facilitate that goal. Further strengthening and 
utilization of the security partnership model will support the overall 
achievement of the Department of Homeland Security's objectives for 
pandemic preparedness. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and 
we look forward to working with you on future strategic issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 

Director: 

Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Bernice Steinhardt, (202) 512-6806 or [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Sarah Veale, Assistant 
Director; Clifton G. Douglas, Jr; Gwyneth Blevins; S. Mike Davis; David 
Dornisch; Karin Fangman; Carolyn Samuels; and members of GAO's Pandemic 
Working Group made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Collaboration: 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington, 
D.C.: October 21, 2005. 

Critical Infrastructure: 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector Councils 
Continue to Evolve. GAO-07-706R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2007. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government 
and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors Characteristics. GAO-07- 
39. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006. 

Emergency Response: 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07- 
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Continuity of Operations: Agencies Could Improve Planning for Telework 
during Disruptions. GAO-06-740T. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's Preliminary 
Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006. 

Influenza Pandemic: 

Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer 
Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy. GAO-07- 
781. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could 
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 
Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Avian Influenza: USDA Has Taken Important Steps to Prepare for 
Outbreaks, but Better Planning Could Improve Response. GAO-07-652. 
Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007. 

Financial Market Preparedness: Significant Progress Has Been Made, but 
Pandemic Planning and Other Challenges Remain. GAO-07-399. Washington, 
D.C.: March 29, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but 
Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and 
Focused Departmentwide. GAO-06-1042. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 
2006. 

Y2K: 

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Lessons Learned Can Be Applied to Other 
Management Challenges. GAO/AIMD-00-290. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 
2000. 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential Widespread Disruption Calls for 
Strong Leadership and Partnerships. GAO/AIMD-98-85. Washington, D.C.: 
April 30, 1998. 

[End of section] 

(450489)

To view the full product, including the scope

and methodology, click on [64]GAO-08-36 .

For more information, contact Bernice Steinhardt at (202) 512-6806 or
[email protected].

Highlights of [65]GAO-08-36 , a report to congressional requesters

October 2007

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC

Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection
Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector Coordination

An outbreak of pandemic flu would require close cooperation between the
public and private sectors to ensure the protection of our nation's
critical infrastructure, such as drinking water and electricity. Because
over 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by the private sector, it is vital that both sectors effectively
coordinate to successfully protect these assets. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating a national
protection strategy and government and private sector councils have been
created as a collaborating tool.

GAO was asked to assess how the federal and private sectors are working
together at a national level to protect the nation's critical
infrastructure in the event of a pandemic, the challenges they face, and
opportunities for addressing these challenges. GAO reviewed 5 of the 17
critical infrastructure sectors. These 5 sectors are energy (electricity),
food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation (highway and
motor carrier), and water.

[66]What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security lead efforts to
encourage the councils to consider and address the range of identified
challenges for a potential influenza pandemic. DHS concurred with this
recommendation and generally agreed with the report.

Federal agencies and the private sector have worked together to (1)
develop general pandemic preparedness guidance, such as checklists for
continuity of business operations during a pandemic; (2) identify the
number of critical workers essential to the critical infrastructure
sectors' operations during a pandemic; and (3) conduct pandemic
preparedness presentations, workshops, forums, and some exercises. In some
instances, the federal and private sectors are working together through
sector-specific and cross-sector councils as the primary means of
coordinating government and private sector efforts at the national level
to protect critical infrastructure. Federal and private sector
representatives from the councils in the five sectors reviewed told GAO
that they have taken some initial pandemic preparedness actions within
their respective sectors. Additionally, each of the sectors is
collaborating with DHS and other sector-specific agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, to develop sector-specific pandemic
guidance.

The federal government and the private sector face several challenges that
may impede their efforts to protect the nation's critical infrastructure
in the event of a pandemic. Maintaining a focus on pandemic planning
efforts is difficult in the face of more immediate priorities, such as
responding to outbreaks of foodborne illnesses. Private sector officials
are concerned about the lack of clarity on the federal versus state roles
in areas such as state border closures and pandemic vaccine distribution.
They are also concerned about receiving consistent messages from various
government entities providing pandemic-related information. Another
challenge is identifying and developing strategies for addressing crucial
cross-sector interdependencies that will be important for the continued
operation of the nation's economy and society during a pandemic, such as
the transportation sector to deliver critical supplies. Obtaining needed
investments for training and infrastructure and potential legal and
regulatory issues also present challenges.

Increased use of the critical infrastructure coordinating councils could
help address issues relating to a pandemic. These councils bring together
multiple sectors and levels of governments, linking activities between
these entities. Despite their potential, the councils' efforts thus far
have focused mostly on the development of sector-specific plans to address
all hazards. With regard to a pandemic specifically, DHS has used the
councils primarily to share information across sectors and government
levels rather than to address many of the identified challenges. Because
an outbreak could begin at any time, there may be insufficient time and
resources to adequately plan and prepare their members for changes in how
their sectors may operate and continue to provide essential services
during a pandemic. DHS officials acknowledge that they could encourage
greater federal and private sector use of the councils and that the
councils could be used to initiate and facilitate pandemic preparedness
initiatives. DHS, because it is responsible for coordinating national
critical infrastructure protection efforts, is well positioned to lead
efforts to use these councils to help address these challenges.

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References

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