Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International	 
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts (19-FEB-08, 
GAO-08-351).							 
                                                                 
Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991.  
In December 2006, the Ethiopian military intervened in Somalia to
support Somalia's transitional government, opening what many	 
considered a window of opportunity to rebuild the country and	 
restore effective governance. The United States has been the	 
largest bilateral donor to Somalia, providing roughly $362	 
million in assistance since 2001. In this report, GAO assesses	 
(1) U.S. and international efforts to stabilize Somalia, (2) U.S.
and international efforts to provide humanitarian and development
assistance to Somalia, and (3) strategic planning efforts to	 
guide U.S. activities related to Somalia. GAO reviewed documents 
from U.S. and international organizations; interviewed U.S.,	 
United Nations (UN), Somali, and other officials; and conducted  
fieldwork in Kenya and Ethiopia. GAO assessed U.S. strategy using
the six desirable characteristics of an effective national	 
strategy that GAO previously developed. 			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-351 					        
    ACCNO:   A80911						        
  TITLE:     Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International 
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts		 
     DATE:   02/19/2008 
  SUBJECT:   Economic stabilization				 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign aid programs				 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     International agreements				 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International economic relations			 
	     International food programs			 
	     International organizations			 
	     International relations				 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Africa						 
	     Somalia						 

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GAO-08-351

   

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

February 2008: 

Somalia: 

Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization, 
Humanitarian, and Development Efforts: 

Somalia: 

GAO-08-351: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-351, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991. In 
December 2006, the Ethiopian military intervened in Somalia to support 
Somaliaï¿½s transitional government, opening what many considered a 
window of opportunity to rebuild the country and restore effective 
governance. The United States has been the largest bilateral donor to 
Somalia, providing roughly $362 million in assistance since 2001. In 
this report, GAO assesses (1) U.S. and international efforts to 
stabilize Somalia, (2) U.S. and international efforts to provide 
humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia, and (3) strategic 
planning efforts to guide U.S. activities related to Somalia. GAO 
reviewed documents from U.S. and international organizations; 
interviewed U.S., United Nations (UN), Somali, and other officials; and 
conducted fieldwork in Kenya and Ethiopia. GAO assessed U.S. strategy 
using the six desirable characteristics of an effective national 
strategy that GAO previously developed. 

What GAO Found: 

Several challenges have limited U.S. and international efforts to 
stabilize Somalia. The international community, including the United 
States, is seeking to improve the security situation in the country, 
mainly by funding an African Union peacekeeping operation. However, a 
shortage of troops has hindered peacekeepersï¿½ ability to achieve their 
mission. In addition, the most recent attempt at political 
reconciliation was limited, in part because several important 
opposition groups were not involved. For example, while this key 
attempt resulted in resolutions to end the conflict and return all 
property to its rightful owners, these opposition groups denounced the 
resolutions, citing their lack of participation in drafting them. 
According to many officials, Somaliaï¿½s Transitional Federal Government 
lacks institutional structures and national acceptance, and these 
weaknesses, in our view, have constrained U.S. and international 
efforts to establish the transitional government as a fully functioning 
central government. To mitigate these challenges, the international 
community, including the United States, is taking steps that include 
encouraging all parties to participate in reconciliation discussions. 

While the international community, including the United States, 
continues to provide vital humanitarian and development assistance to 
Somalia, its efforts have been limited by lack of security, access to 
vulnerable populations, and effective government institutions. The 
international communityï¿½s humanitarian assistance to Somalia, which 
primarily consists of food aid, has not reduced the countryï¿½s acute 
malnutrition rates, which have remained above the emergency threshold 
in some parts of the country. According to UN officials, however, 
malnutrition is the result of a combination of immediate and underlying 
causes, including insufficient dietary intake, inadequate health care, 
and inadequate water and sanitation services. Ongoing insecurity 
constrains the international communityï¿½s ability to monitor its 
provision of humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. 
Furthermore, U.S. officialsï¿½ inability to travel to the country has 
prevented them from independently monitoring assistance. The 
international communityï¿½s plans to increase development assistance to 
Somalia depend on political progress and stability, which have not yet 
been achieved. 

U.S. strategy for Somalia, outlined in the Administrationï¿½s 2007 report 
to Congress on its Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia (the 
Comprehensive Strategy), is incomplete. While the Comprehensive 
Strategy addresses the components required of it by U.S. law, it does 
not include the full range of U.S. government activities related to 
Somalia, such as DOD efforts to promote regional stability, and it does 
not reference other key U.S. government strategic documents for 
Somalia. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Strategy does not fully address 
any of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national 
strategy, lacking information on necessary resources, investments, and 
risk management. A separate, classified report provides more 
information on selected U.S. strategic planning efforts for Somalia. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor, develop a more 
detailed strategy for Somalia, to include the full range of U.S. 
government activities in the region and all six characteristics of an 
effective national strategy. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially 
concurred with GAOï¿½s recommendation, while State did not directly 
respond to it. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-351]. For more information, contact 
Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Several Challenges Have Limited U.S. and International Efforts to 
Stabilize Somalia: 

Insecurity and Other Challenges Have Limited the International 
Community's Efforts to Provide Humanitarian and Development Assistance 
to Somalia: 

U.S. Strategic Planning for Somalia Is Incomplete: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: GAO's Description of the Six Characteristics of an 
Effective National Strategy: 

Appendix III: Extent to Which the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia Addresses GAO's Desirable Characteristics: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National 
Strategy: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Somalia: 

Figure 2: U.S.-Designed T-Shirt Used to Build Support for the NRC: 

Figure 3: Funding Requirements and Donor Funding by Sector for 
Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia through the UN Consolidated Appeals 
Process for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007: 

Figure 4: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Fiscal Years 2001 
through 2007 by Sector: 

Figure 5: International Community's Level of Access to Somalia: 

Figure 6: Extent to Which the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia Addresses the Desirable Characteristics of an Effective 
National Strategy: 

Figure 7: Extent to Which the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia Addresses the 27 Elements of the Desirable Characteristics of a 
National Strategy: 

Abbreviations: 

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia: 

CAP: Consolidated Appeals Process: 

CJTF-HOA: Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FTS: Financial Tracking Service: 

IDP: internally displaced person: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

NRC: National Reconciliation Congress: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs: 

RDP: Reconstruction and Development Program: 

SACB: Somalia Aid Coordination Body: 

TFG: Transitional Federal Government: 

UN: United Nations: 

UNDPKO: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: 

UNDP: United Nations Development Program: 

UNPOS: United Nations Political Office for Somalia: 

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

WFP: World Food Program: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

February 19, 2008: 

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on African Affairs: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991, when 
armed opposition groups' overthrow of the existing government resulted 
in turmoil, factional fighting, and anarchy. Somalia's current 
transitional government is the result of a national reconciliation 
process, 1 of 15 such efforts since 1991. Many observers believed a 
window of opportunity to rebuild Somalia and restore effective 
governance had opened up in December 2006, when the Ethiopian National 
Defense Force intervened in Somalia in support of the weak transitional 
government. Although an African Union peacekeeping mission was deployed 
to Somalia in March 2007, an ongoing insurgency against the 
transitional government and Ethiopian forces has contributed to 
continued instability in the country. In addition, floods and droughts 
have compounded the prolonged humanitarian emergency, with as many as 2 
million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Some United Nations 
(UN) officials have stated that the situation in Somalia is the worst 
in Africa. Moreover, the U.S. government reported that the instability 
in Somalia has provided sanctuary to al Qaeda operatives allegedly 
involved in the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998. 

In February 2007, in response to U.S. legislation,[Footnote 1] the 
Administration issued the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia 
(Comprehensive Strategy), which lists three objectives: (1) to 
eliminate the terrorist threat, (2) to promote political stability, and 
(3) to address the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. The United 
States has been the largest government donor to Somalia since 2001, 
providing approximately $362 million in humanitarian and development 
assistance, mostly in food aid, through the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Department of State (State). 
The United States has also provided roughly $60 million to support the 
African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The Department of 
Defense (DOD) conducts a variety of regional civil affairs and 
humanitarian assistance operations in countries neighboring Somalia out 
of Djibouti. 

In this report, we assess (1) the efforts of the international 
community, including the United States, to stabilize Somalia by 
improving security and political conditions; (2) the efforts of the 
international community, including the United States, to provide 
humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia; and (3) strategic 
planning efforts to guide U.S. activities related to Somalia. We are 
also issuing a separate, classified report on selected U.S. strategic 
planning efforts for Somalia. 

To assess U.S. and international stabilization, humanitarian, and 
development efforts in Somalia, we obtained data, reports, and 
contracts from and interviewed officials at State; USAID; DOD; the 
National Security Council (NSC); the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) of Somalia; the governments of Ethiopia and key donor countries; 
and numerous international organizations, including UN agencies, the 
World Bank, the African Union, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 
in Washington, D.C; New York; Nairobi, Kenya; and Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. We did not travel to Somalia due to restrictions on official 
U.S. government travel to the country. We also analyzed State, USAID, 
and DOD financial obligations for Somalia-related programs and UN- 
reported financial obligations from the international community to 
Somalia from 2001 to 2007. To assess the United States' strategic 
planning efforts, we examined the Comprehensive Strategy and supporting 
documents. We compared the strategy against the components required of 
it by U.S. law and assessed it using the six desirable characteristics 
of an effective national strategy, which we previously developed and 
used in several other contexts. The characteristics are (1) clear 
purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) detailed discussion of problems, 
risks, and threats; (3) desired goals, objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; (4) description of resources, investments, and 
risk management; (5) delineation of U.S. government roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination mechanism; and (6) description of 
the strategy's integration among and with other entities. We also spoke 
with officials from State, USAID, DOD, and NSC, and experts about the 
strategic planning process that resulted in the U.S. strategy for 
Somalia. We did not include covert activities conducted by U.S. 
government agencies in our review. We conducted this performance audit 
from January 2007 to February 2008 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Appendix I provides a detailed description of our 
objectives, scope, and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Several challenges have limited U.S. and international efforts to 
stabilize Somalia. The international community, including the United 
States, is seeking to improve the security situation in Somalia, mainly 
by funding an African Union peacekeeping operation. However, given the 
operation's shortage of troops, it has not been able to fulfill its 
mandate to improve security, support reconciliation, protect the 
transitional government, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
aid. In addition, the most recent attempt at national political 
reconciliation was limited, in part because several important 
opposition groups were not involved. For example, while this key 
attempt resulted in resolutions to end the conflict and return all 
property to its rightful owners, these opposition groups denounced the 
resolutions, citing their lack of participation in drafting them. 
Finally, according to many officials, Somalia's Transitional Federal 
Government lacks institutional structures and national acceptance, and 
these weaknesses have constrained U.S. and international efforts to 
establish it as a fully functioning central government. To mitigate 
these challenges, the international community, including the United 
States, is taking steps that include encouraging all parties to 
participate in reconciliation discussions. 

While the international community, including the United States, 
continues to provide essential humanitarian and development assistance 
to Somalia, its efforts are limited by lack of security, sustained 
access to vulnerable populations, local implementing capacity, and 
effective government institutions. The international community's 
humanitarian assistance to Somalia, which primarily consists of food 
aid, has not reduced the country's acute malnutrition rates, which 
remain above the emergency threshold in some parts of the country. 
According to UN officials, however, malnutrition is the result of a 
combination of immediate and underlying causes, including insufficient 
dietary intake, inadequate health care, and inadequate water and 
sanitation services. Ongoing insecurity constrains the international 
community's ability to monitor and evaluate the effect of its 
humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. Furthermore, U.S. 
officials' inability to travel to the country has prevented them from 
independently monitoring assistance. Finally, while the international 
community has pledged increased development assistance to Somalia, 
including to the south-central region, much of that assistance is 
conditioned on political progress and stability that have not yet been 
achieved. 

The strategic planning effort to guide U.S. activities related to 
Somalia is incomplete. Although the Comprehensive Strategy generally 
addresses the components required of it by U.S. law, it does not cover 
the full range of U.S. government activities related to Somalia, such 
as DOD activities in the region intended to prevent conflict and 
promote stability. In addition, the strategy does not reference other 
documents that further elaborate on U.S. strategy and activities to 
achieve U.S. objectives in Somalia. For example, the Comprehensive 
Strategy does not mention USAID's 2006-2008 Strategy Statement for 
Somalia, which provides an assessment of the country's operating 
environment and discusses relevant strategic issues. Moreover, the 
Comprehensive Strategy does not fully address any of the six desirable 
characteristics of an effective national strategy, lacking such key 
elements as information on resources, risk management, and performance 
measures. 

We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 
Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor, develop a more 
detailed U.S. strategy for Somalia, including the full range of U.S. 
government activities in the region and all six characteristics of an 
effective national strategy, in order to better inform Congress of U.S. 
policy and activities in the Horn of Africa. 

DOD provided comments on a draft of our report, which we have reprinted 
in appendix IV. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation, 
suggesting that we strengthen our recommendation by calling for a 
"detailed U.S. strategy for Somalia," rather than a "more detailed 
report on U.S. strategy for Somalia." We have modified our report to 
recommend the development of a "more detailed strategy for Somalia," 
because we report that a governmentwide strategy for Somalia already 
exists. In a classified letter, State did not directly respond to our 
recommendation.[Footnote 2] State's letter also included technical 
comments on this report, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 
Additionally, DOD, USAID, NSC, the World Bank, and various UN programs 
and offices provided technical comments and updated information, which 
we have included throughout this report as appropriate. 

Background: 

Somalia has lacked a functioning central government since 1991 and has 
experienced chronic humanitarian emergencies along with widespread and 
large-scale conflict. At least 15 national reconciliation conferences 
have been convened since 1991 to resolve Somalis' political differences 
and establish a central government. Because of insecurity in Somalia, 
the United States closed its embassy in Mogadishu in 1991 and has 
managed relations with Somalia from the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. 

Chronic Humanitarian Emergencies Plague Somalia: 

Somalia is prone to chronic humanitarian emergencies produced by 
natural and man-made disasters and has been the site of continuous 
humanitarian operations since 1990. The UN and the World Bank classify 
Somalia as a least-developed, low-income country and one of the most 
food-insecure countries in the world.[Footnote 3] Somalis have suffered 
from persistent high levels of poverty, and Somalia's human development 
indicators are among the lowest in the world. For example, according to 
the UN's 2006 Human Development Report, life expectancy at birth is 
only 46 years and only 29 percent of the population has access to a 
source of clean water. According to the UN, recent data suggest that 
the under-5 mortality rate is 135 per 1,000 births. Somalia currently 
has a population of about 8.8 million, according to State, of which 
roughly 1 million are considered internally displaced, having been 
forced or obliged to leave their homes to avoid conflict without 
crossing an internationally recognized border. 

Political Context Marked by Conflict and Insecurity: 

Somalia's recent history has been marked by long periods of 
dictatorship or instability. The former British Protectorate of 
Somaliland and the former Italian-administered UN trust territory of 
Somalia gained independence in 1960 and united to form the Republic of 
Somalia. Somalia democratically elected its first president in 1960. 
Less than a decade later, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre's regime 
overthrew the government and imposed a dictatorship that lasted until 
1991, when armed opposition groups drove Barre out of power and caused 
the collapse of the central government. The absence of a central 
government, combined with the impact of droughts, contributed to a 
series of humanitarian crises during the 1990s. In April 1992, the UN 
launched the UN Operation in Somalia, a peacekeeping operation aimed at 
providing security for humanitarian relief efforts. In December 1992, 
after the situation in Somalia further deteriorated, the United States 
launched a peace enforcement operation in Somalia aimed at establishing 
a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. That mission, 
the U.S.-led Unified Task Force on Somalia, imposed a cease-fire and 
facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid. A second UN operation in 
Somalia succeeded the Unified Task Force in May 1993 and was charged 
with the task of restoring peace, stability, law, and order in Somalia 
through disarmament and reconciliation. From 1993 to 1995, UN 
peacekeeping forces were drawn into a difficult and protracted conflict 
with Somali warlords. After 18 U.S. Army Rangers and hundreds of 
Somalis were killed in fierce fighting on October 3, 1993, the United 
States announced the withdrawal of its forces by March 1994. When the 
last UN forces withdrew, in March 1995, Somalia remained divided by 
warring factions and without a central government. 

In the absence of a national government, Somalia has struggled to 
remain unified. In May 1991, northwestern Somalia unilaterally declared 
independence as the Republic of Somaliland (see fig. 1). Somaliland's 
claim to independence as a sovereign nation-state has not gained 
international recognition. In August 1998, the Puntland State of 
Somalia was formed as an autonomous, self-governing entity in the 
northeastern region with the long-term goal of being part of a 
federated Somalia. Unlike south-central Somalia, the northern regions 
of Somaliland and Puntland have managed to limit violence, establish 
democratic systems and institutions, and provide some basic services. 

Figure 1: Somalia: 

This figure is a map of Somalia. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO from UN map. 

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. 

Note: A boundary dispute between Somaliland and Puntland remains 
unresolved. 

[End of figure] 

Efforts to Establish a Central Government Continue: 

At least 15 national reconciliation conferences have been convened 
since 1991. In 2000, a major reconciliation conference in Djibouti (the 
13th such effort) led to the formation of a new national government, 
the Transitional National Government, but this government was unable to 
establish itself as an effective administration beyond parts of 
Mogadishu, and its 3-year mandate expired in August 2003. In 2002, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional East African 
organization, organized a subsequent national reconciliation conference 
in Kenya. The conference concluded in 2004 with the formation of an 
interim government--the TFG[Footnote 4]--including an interim 
President, Prime Minister, and cabinet. The Transitional Federal 
Charter was approved in February 2004, following the 2002-2004 national 
reconciliation conference, and provided a temporary legal underpinning 
for the Somali state and a framework for the transitional political 
process. The charter called for the drafting of a new constitution, a 
national referendum on this constitution, and the undertaking of a 
national census. The TFG has a 5-year mandate that expires in 2009 and 
is supposed to lead to national elections for the establishment of a 
permanent government. 

Because of insecurity, the TFG was unable to establish itself in 
Mogadishu and instead based itself first in Jowhar and then in the 
southeastern town of Baidoa, where it eventually convened the 
transitional parliament in February 2006. The UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia reported that in early 2006, a third party provided financial 
support to help organize and structure a militia force, known as the 
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (the 
Alliance), to counter the threat posed by the growing militant 
fundamentalist movement in south-central Somalia.[Footnote 5] The 
Alliance and the Council of Islamic Courts[Footnote 6]--a loose 
coalition of clerics, business leaders, and Islamic court militias-- 
struggled for control of Mogadishu during the first half of 2006. The 
Islamic Courts defeated the Alliance in June 2006. With the TFG in 
command of little more than the government seat of Baidoa and warlords 
controlling much of southern Somalia, the Islamic Courts took control 
of Mogadishu. As its power in the south expanded, the Islamic Courts 
began to confront the TFG in Baidoa, and international efforts to 
broker an agreement between the two parties failed. 

In December 2006, Ethiopian troops intervened forcefully on the side of 
the TFG, routing the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and enabling the TFG 
to start establishing itself there. In January 2007, DOD carried out 
two military air strikes against al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia. The 
Director of National Intelligence reported that while the Ethiopian 
intervention disrupted al Qaeda's operations in the region, senior al 
Qaeda operatives responsible for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the 2002 attacks in 
Mombasa, Kenya, remain at large as of February 2008. While some 
officials in the international community have accused the Islamic 
Courts of linkages with terrorist organizations and pursuing a policy 
of aggressive expansionism, NGOs and UN agencies have said, during the 
Islamic Courts' 6-month rule, there was general security and they had 
better access to project sites. As of February 2008, Ethiopian troops 
remain in Somalia while the TFG struggles to overcome internal 
divisions and establish its authority. In October 2007, facing a vote 
of confidence in the Transitional Federal Parliament, the Prime 
Minister of the TFG resigned. One month later, Somalia's Parliament 
swore in a new Prime Minister. 

U.S. Government Has No Official Representation in Somalia: 

The United States, like most of the international community, has 
managed its diplomatic and programmatic activities for Somalia from 
Nairobi, Kenya. Although the United States never formally severed 
diplomatic relations with Somalia, the U.S. embassy in Somalia has been 
closed since the collapse of the government in 1991. The United States 
maintains regular dialogue with the TFG and other key stakeholders in 
Somalia through the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. Because of security 
concerns, U.S. government officials face stringent restrictions on 
traveling to Somalia that they do not face elsewhere. 

Several Challenges Have Limited U.S. and International Efforts to 
Stabilize Somalia: 

Several challenges have limited U.S. and international efforts to 
stabilize Somalia. The international community is seeking to improve 
the security situation in Somalia by funding an African Union 
peacekeeping operation and security sector reform programs, but a 
shortage of troops has hindered peacekeepers' ability to achieve their 
mission. In addition, attempts at political reconciliation, which have 
focused on the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC), have been 
limited by the lack of participation of all relevant Somali parties and 
the absence of a cease-fire or peace agreement. Finally, U.S. and 
international efforts to strengthen the central government, which have 
focused on capacity building, have been constrained by what many 
officials consider the TFG's lack of institutional structures and 
national acceptance. 

Efforts to Improve Security Focus on Peacekeeping, but They Are Limited 
by Shortage of Troops: 

The international community's efforts to improve security in Somalia 
have focused on support for the African Union peacekeeping mission to 
Somalia (AMISOM), but the peacekeeping efforts have been hindered by a 
shortage of troops and the African Union's limited capacity to plan, 
command, and conduct operations effectively. The African Union 
authorized sending a peacekeeping mission of about 7,600 troops to 
Somalia for 6 months in January 2007,[Footnote 7] and extended this 
mandate for an additional 6 months in July 2007. As of February 2008, 
Uganda and Burundi were the only countries contributing troops to 
AMISOM, with approximately 1,600 Ugandan and 800 Burundian troops in 
Somalia. The United States has provided roughly $60 million to support 
AMISOM, including funding to train and equip these troops. Additional 
funding from the international community will most likely be required 
to equip and deploy additional troops. 

Despite international support, the mission has so far failed to reach 
the planned level of 7,600 troops. Potential troop-contributing 
countries have cited the shortage of funds and equipment, the lack of 
significant political reconciliation or cease-fire agreement, and 
Somalia's rapidly deteriorating security situation, especially in 
Mogadishu, as reasons for not contributing troops to the mission. 
Additionally, some U.S. and UN officials told us that many African 
nations are unable to provide any additional troops given their 
peacekeeping obligations in other countries, such as Sudan. 

Given the limited number of troops deployed, AMISOM has not been able 
to fulfill its mandate to improve the security situation, support 
reconciliation, protect the transitional government, and facilitate the 
provision of humanitarian aid.[Footnote 8] The Ugandan troops are 
facing considerable security challenges and have therefore limited 
their activities to patrolling only parts of Mogadishu and assisting in 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. According to a U.S. official, 
the Ugandans are limited to protecting only the airport, seaport, and 
presidential compound. U.S. and UN officials told us that the 
peacekeeping operation would likely be unable to achieve all of its 
objectives even if it were fully deployed with 7,600 troops, as the 
number is too low given the severity of the situation. In addition, 
these officials noted that, based on their assessments, the best-case 
scenario would require roughly 20,000 troops, as well as a cease-fire 
agreement and all parties' agreement to the mission. If these 
conditions are not met, more than 20,000 troops would most likely be 
needed. This assessment was based on the current situation as well as 
lessons learned from UN peacekeeping missions to Somalia in the 1990s 
that failed to achieve their objectives, although they involved 25,000 
troops, including Americans, and what many experts consider better 
overall security conditions. 

In August 2007, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that 
requested the Secretary-General of the UN to continue developing 
contingency planning for the possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
mission in Somalia that would replace the existing AMISOM. However, the 
UN Secretary-General said in November 2007 that under the prevailing 
conditions in Somalia, a peacekeeping operation is not a realistic and 
viable option. According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO), proper conditions include a cease-fire agreement 
and an invitation from all relevant parties, and the peacekeeping 
operation should be parallel with and in support of an inclusive 
political process leading toward reconciliation. Despite the UN 
Secretary-General's statement, the UN Security Council has continued to 
request more contingency planning by the UN. In March 2007, at the UN 
Security Council's request, UNDPKO conducted a technical assessment 
mission to develop contingency planning. Unlike typical assessment 
missions, this mission was somewhat less robust given the security 
situation in Somalia. For example, the mission involved fewer staff 
than a typical mission and was based in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, with 
only two short trips into Somalia--neither of which was to Mogadishu, 
as all attempts to go there were thwarted by violence both in the city 
and on the roads leading to it. Furthermore, UNDPKO was unable to 
conduct a planned second technical assessment mission in August 2007 
because of heightened insecurity in Mogadishu. According to UN 
officials, UNDPKO conducted its second technical assessment mission in 
January 2008. 

In addition to peacekeeping efforts, the international community is 
implementing other programs to improve the security situation in 
Somalia, including security sector reform and conflict mitigation. For 
example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) implements 
programs aimed at contributing to Somali efforts to restore a peaceful 
and secure environment that will promote social and economic recovery. 
These programs include efforts to establish a professional, 
accountable, and effective police service and support the TFG's review 
of the role and size of its security sector to facilitate the 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, militia, and 
retiring members of the formal security forces. In addition, DOD 
approved a transfer of $25 million to State in 2007 for security sector 
reform and other stabilization programs for Somalia.[Footnote 9] This 
transfer includes $17.5 million for State and USAID programs aimed at 
security sector reform, peace and reconciliation, capacity building for 
the Transitional Federal Institutions, and quick-impact stabilization, 
and $7.5 million for USAID conflict mitigation programs in strategic 
border areas abutting Somalia in Kenya and Ethiopia. 

DOD is also working to promote stability and prevent conflict in the 
Horn of Africa through the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA). For example, CJTF-HOA has implemented reconstruction and 
civil affairs projects in Kenya and Ethiopia in an effort to reduce 
support for extremist elements. In addition, DOD is working with 
neighboring countries to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities 
through military-to-military training and foreign military financing. 

Lack of Participation by All Somali Parties Has Limited Efforts to 
Promote Reconciliation: 

International attempts to support political reconciliation, which have 
focused on the NRC, have been limited by the lack of participation of 
all relevant Somali parties. The international community, including the 
United States, has provided broad support for the NRC since it was 
announced in early 2007. The international community provided $8 
million through UNDP--including $2.25 million from the United States-- 
to help organize the NRC and to promote the independence and strengthen 
the capacity of its oversight body, the National Governance and 
Reconciliation Committee. UNDP provided technical assistance and advice 
to the committee and promoted progress toward completion of essential 
tasks related to NRC implementation. UNDP also provided the committee 
with 14 staff members to assist in organizing the NRC, including 4 in 
Mogadishu, and administered the NRC budget. State, USAID, and a public 
affairs team from DOD operating at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi also 
helped promote participation in the NRC by funding radio messages and 
designing T-shirts, stickers, and banners (see fig. 2). In addition, 
USAID funded efforts to facilitate meetings between subclans of a key 
Somali clan and encouraged dialogue on the various concerns of many 
subclans about the NRC, in an attempt to achieve full clan 
participation at the congress. UN officials made periodic trips to 
Mogadishu to observe the congress, but U.S. officials did not, because 
of restrictions on their travel to Somalia. 

Figure 2: U.S.-Designed T-Shirt Used to Build Support for the NRC: 

This figure is an illustration of a U.S.-designed t-shirt used to build 
support for the NRC. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: State. 

[End of figure] 

Because several key Somali opposition groups did not participate in the 
NRC in July and August 2007, attempts to achieve political 
reconciliation through the NRC have been limited. The NRC was held in 
Mogadishu and comprised over 2,600 delegates representing the clans, 
women, and the diaspora, but some of the relevant parties to the 
ongoing conflict in Somalia did not attend, such as some of the key 
Somali subclans, as well as some opposition groups based outside the 
country. An observer of the situation in Somalia noted that the 
opposition groups set the unrealistic precondition for attending the 
NRC of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. The NRC 
resulted in agreements to end the conflict and return all property to 
its rightful owners and called for a cease-fire amongst the clans, but 
opposition groups immediately denounced the agreements, citing their 
lack of participation in drafting them. Furthermore, according to UN 
officials, the NRC did not include any discussion of how to implement 
these agreements. In September 2007, a coalition of opposition groups 
met separately in Asmara, Eritrea, further diminishing the chances for 
political reconciliation among all Somali parties. Participants 
included representatives of the Islamic Courts, former members of the 
Somali Transitional Federal Parliament, members of the Somali diaspora, 
members of civil society, and clan elders. In its final communiquï¿½ from 
the conference, the Alliance for the Liberation and Reconstitution of 
Somalia stated its overriding aim was to liberate Somalia from 
Ethiopian occupation and launch a political reconstitution process that 
would involve all Somali stakeholders and rebuild a national state. 

Since the NRC concluded in August 2007, the security situation in 
Somalia has not improved. The situation in Mogadishu has remained 
volatile, with daily attacks by insurgents targeting TFG forces and 
Ethiopian military personnel. The international community has shifted 
its focus to the transition process as outlined in the Transitional 
Federal Charter while continuing to search for ways to bring the 
relevant parties together. UN Department of Political Affairs officials 
told us that the entire international community must work to further 
advance the political process, by taking actions that include creating 
a platform to bring the two competing reconciliation processes together 
and involving Somalis not included in those two groups. Participants at 
a September 2007 donors meeting determined that in order to fulfill the 
provisions of the transitional charter, the TFG needs a road map with 
elements such as an inclusive process to shape the permanent 
constitution, a referendum on the constitution, and preparations for 
elections, including a census. The donors also agreed that the 
international community should be more assertive in reaching out to the 
opposition and mediating its participation in an inclusive and genuine 
national reconciliation process. In particular, officials from the UN 
and donors we spoke with, including the United States, said that the UN 
Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) needed to take on a stronger 
leadership role in encouraging the government to be inclusive. 
According to UN officials, the UN Secretary-General's appointment in 
September 2007 of a new Special Representative for Somalia to oversee 
UNPOS showed that UNPOS was in fact taking on this more active role. 
UNPOS officials cautioned, however, that UNPOS's role is only that of 
an adviser and it is ultimately up to the TFG leaders to truly engage 
with the opposition parties. 

Weakness of Transitional Government Has Hindered International Efforts 
to Build Its Capacity and Create a Functioning Central Government: 

The international community's efforts to support the establishment of 
the TFG as a fully functioning central government have been constrained 
by the TFG's lack of institutional structures, as well as the absence 
of widespread support for the TFG by the Somali people. According to 
several U.S. and UN officials, the Transitional Federal Institutions, 
the underlying governance structures of the TFG, are not yet 
functioning, have almost no civil service staff, and lack the capacity 
to provide much-needed basic services to the Somali population. In 
addition, the TFG's lack of police and military forces hinders its 
ability to maintain security in Somalia. UN officials have reported 
that working with the TFG is often difficult, as most of its ministries 
exist in name only, with no support staff. For example, the TFG said 
after two meetings that it was not ready to participate in a committee 
through which donors were attempting to engage it in the prioritization 
and coordination of activities in Somalia, as it was still establishing 
itself and most of its ministries consisted only of an acting minister. 
Furthermore, some Somalia observers view the TFG as a narrow political 
and clan coalition rather than as an inclusive government of national 
unity. The Somaliland government, for example, considers itself wholly 
autonomous of the TFG. Moreover, an armed insurgency has continually 
staged attacks against the TFG, further hindering its ability to 
effectively govern Somalia. 

Despite these challenges, the international community has taken steps 
to help the TFG become a fully functioning central government. The UN, 
with funding from the international community, and the United States 
have implemented programs in Somalia aimed at building the TFG's 
governance capacity and credibility. UNDP has funded the construction 
of many of the government buildings in Baidoa and is providing 
technical assistance to the TFG. It has facilitated the deployment of 
experts from the diaspora, such as economists and legal advisers, to 
assist the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament in 
their duties. In addition, UNDP has provided support for administration 
reform to three civil service commissions. The United States is also 
conducting activities aimed at strengthening the capacity of the TFG's 
governing institutions and increasing its ability to provide basic 
social services. To support these activities, in May 2007, the 
Secretary of State appointed a Special Envoy for Somalia to represent 
the United States to the TFG. State has also increased the number of 
staff in the Somalia Unit at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi from one in 
December 2006 to six as of February 2008. 

The United States' efforts to support the establishment of a 
functioning central government in Somalia are further constrained by 
the lack of U.S. presence in Somalia. State Department officials in 
Nairobi have said that the lack of presence prevents them from 
effectively engaging with the TFG, as they must rely on telephone 
conversations rather than face-to-face meetings, which occur only when 
Somali government leaders visit Nairobi. Despite this limitation, State 
looked for ways to increase its political engagement with the TFG in 
2007. For example, in April 2007, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs visited Baidoa; this was the first visit to Somalia by 
a senior U.S. official in over a decade. While there, the Assistant 
Secretary met with TFG officials to express support for national 
reconciliation efforts and urge TFG leaders to reach out to key 
stakeholders in Mogadishu to prevent further violence. More recently, 
in December 2007, the Secretary of State met with the prime ministers 
of Somalia and Ethiopia and foreign ministers from the region in 
Ethiopia to discuss the situation in Somalia. At this meeting, she 
stressed the urgency of timely deployment of additional AMISOM 
contingents and the U.S. commitment to a regional approach to resolving 
the crises in Somalia and encouraged the Prime Minister of Somalia to 
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

Insecurity and Other Challenges Have Limited the International 
Community's Efforts to Provide Humanitarian and Development Assistance 
to Somalia: 

The international community's efforts to provide humanitarian and 
development assistance to Somalia have been limited by numerous 
challenges, including lack of security, sustained access to vulnerable 
populations, local implementing capacity, and effective government 
institutions. The international community's humanitarian assistance to 
Somalia, which primarily consists of food aid, has not reduced the 
country's acute malnutrition rates. These rates remain above the 
emergency threshold in some parts of the country. Ongoing insecurity 
constrains the international community's ability to monitor its 
provision of humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. U.S. 
officials have not been able to independently monitor assistance 
because they have not been able to travel to Somalia. The international 
community's plans to provide increased development assistance to 
Somalia hinge on political progress and stability, which have not yet 
been achieved. 

Donors Have Primarily Funded Food Aid to Somalia; Malnutrition Rates 
Remain above Emergency Threshold: 

According to UN data, the international community, including the United 
States, provided at least $1 billion in humanitarian assistance to 
Somalia from 2001 through 2007.[Footnote 10] This included $745 million 
in assistance through the UN's annual appeals for funding to support 
humanitarian needs in Somalia from 2001 through 2007, of which roughly 
47 percent, or $349 million, was for food aid.[Footnote 11] Through the 
consolidated appeals, donors have funded a greater percentage of UN- 
estimated requirements for food aid than for any other individual 
sector. As figure 3 shows, from 2001 through 2007, donors funded 
consolidated food aid appeals at an average level of 86 percent of 
these estimated requirements, while all other sectors combined were 
funded at an average level of 45 percent. 

Figure 3: Funding Requirements and Donor Funding by Sector for 
Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia through the UN Consolidated Appeals 
Process for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007: 

This figure is a combination line graph showing funding requirements 
and donor funding by sector for humanitarian assistance to Somalia 
through the UN consolidated appeals process for fiscal years 2001 
through 2007. The X axis represents the humanitarian assistance 
sectors, and the Y axis represents the U.S. dollars in millions. One 
represents funding requirements, and the other represents donor 
funding. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of OCHA data. 

Note: Requirements represent the total value of all projects proposed 
by implementing partners through the UN's consolidated appeal for 
Somalia for each sector. Funding reflects contributions by donors or 
agencies as a result of the appeals. If a donor makes a contribution to 
the UN's annual appeals, but does not specify project and sector, the 
UN attributes the funds to "sector not yet specified." 

[End of figure] 

Somali Refugees in Dadaab, Kenya: 

Since 1991, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)has managed a refugee camp in the town of Dadaab, Kenya, which 

is 80 kilometers from the Kenya/Somali border. Currently, the camp is 
home to over 173,000 refugees, nearly all of whom are Somali. UNHCR is 
responsible for the protection of and provision of assistance to 
refugees in coordination with its implementing partnersï¿½the Kenyan 
government, UN agencies, and NGOs.UN agencies and NGOs provide 
humanitarian assistance, such as food, water and sanitation, shelter, 
health care, and education to the refugees. The Kenyan government 
maintains a strict encampment policy that confines refugees to the 
camps because local integration is not considered a durable solution. 
Although the Somali border with Kenya remains officially closed, UNHCR 
officials told us that the camp received over8,500 arrivals from 
Somalia from January to July 2007. Like Somalia, Dadaab has recently 
received increased international attention, which has raised the number 
of implementing and operational partners working in the camp from 4 in 
2006 to 12 in 2007. 

Figure: U.S. Commodities at Storage Facility. 

Source: GAO. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure: Shelter for Refugees. 

Source: GAO. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The UN has stressed the need for more balanced funding among the 
humanitarian sectors. According to UN officials, donors have typically 
funded stand-alone, short-term, visible interventions in Somalia, such 
as emergency food aid, rather than integrated, long-term, sustainable 
interventions.[Footnote 12] UN and U.S. officials said that while they 
recognize the need to reduce the country's food insecurity by focusing 
more on other sectors besides food aid, such as agriculture and 
livelihoods, Somalia's constant state of crisis necessitates an 
emergency response.[Footnote 13] Therefore, food aid and other 
humanitarian assistance to Somalia are primarily aimed at the immediate 
need to save lives rather than the improvement of livelihoods in the 
mid-to long term. Furthermore, donors have been reluctant to fully fund 
all humanitarian assistance sectors because of concerns that 
implementing partners in Somalia do not have the operational capacity 
or human resources to effectively use additional funding, as well as a 
desire for increased stability in Somalia before they provide 
additional funding. 

The United States is the largest government donor of humanitarian 
assistance, including food aid, to Somalia. From fiscal years 2001 
through 2007, the United States provided over $317 million in 
humanitarian assistance to Somalia through USAID and State (see fig. 
4), with agencies and offices contributing as follows:[Footnote 14] 

* $242 million in food aid in the form of commodities from USAID's 
Office of Food for Peace, to the UN World Food Program (WFP) and CARE; 

* $53 million from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to UN 
agencies and NGOs, to support a range of nonfood aid, such as 
logistics, nutrition, health, water, sanitation, and hygiene programs; 

* $22 million from State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration to UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
and NGOs, to provide assistance to conflict-affected populations, 
including internally displaced persons (IDP), in Somalia.[Footnote 15] 

Figure 4: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Fiscal Years 2001 
through 2007 by Sector: 

This figure is a bar graph depicting U.S. humanitarian assistance for 
Somalia in fiscal years 2001 through 2007 by sector. The X axis is the 
humanitarian assistance sector, and the Y axis represents the U.S. 
obligations (dollars in millions.) 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAI analysis of State and USAID data. 

Notes: 

"Logistics/relief commodities" include nonfood relief commodities, 
logistics, transportation, and air support. "Other sectors" includes 
agriculture and food security, economy and market systems, protection, 
coordination, stockpile, administrative support, travel, capacity 
building, research studies, shelter and settlements, and disaster 
support programs. 

"Refugee and IDP assistance" represent funding from State's Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration. In addition to this funding, 
USAID's Offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace also 
often provide a large percentage of their assistance to IDPs. 

[End of figure] 

While donors have funded food aid at high levels, acute malnutrition 
rates in Somalia have remained chronically above the emergency 
threshold. According to data provided by the UN's Food and Agriculture 
Organization's Food Security Analysis Unit,[Footnote 16] from 2001 
through 2007, the mean prevalence rate of global acute malnutrition 
throughout Somalia was 15.6 percent--above the emergency threshold of 
15 percent.[Footnote 17] During this period, global acute malnutrition 
rates were higher in south-central Somalia, at 17.3 percent, than in 
Somaliland and Puntland, which have a 12.5 and 11.7 percent 
malnutrition rate, respectively. In some regions in south-central 
Somalia, acute malnutrition rates have exceeded 20 percent. The UN 
estimates that 83,000 children are acutely malnourished in south- 
central Somalia, a figure that excludes IDPs, whose malnutrition rates 
are often higher. According to the Food Security Analysis Unit, 
malnutrition results from a complex set of elements, including high 
incidence of disease, lack of sanitation facilities and potable water, 
limited health services, and inappropriate child care practices. U.S. 
and UN officials told us that food aid by itself does not address the 
underlying causes of malnutrition in Somalia and the international 
community needs to implement a coordinated approach that integrates 
interventions in various sectors, such as water, health, and 
sanitation, to improve the nutritional situation in the country. 

Insecurity and Related Challenges Have Hindered International 
Humanitarian Aid Efforts and Oversight: 

Insecurity: 

Ongoing insecurity has been the most significant obstacle to the 
provision and oversight of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. 
Insecurity affects all aspects of the delivery of assistance to the 
country and prevents most UN international staff, international NGO 
staff, and donors from maintaining a permanent presence there, 
hindering assistance efforts and reducing monitoring capacity. The 
international community manages its assistance to Somalia by "remote 
control" from Nairobi through numerous working groups. Some UN 
officials told us that the coordination meetings on Somalia that occur 
in Nairobi consist mainly of information sharing and are burdensome and 
time-consuming. These officials also told us there is a need for more 
coordination to occur in Somalia rather than in Nairobi. UN agencies' 
and international NGOs' programs for Somalia are mainly implemented by 
Somali national staff, often without the on-site technical support, 
guidance, and authority of international program managers who remain in 
Kenya. 

Although humanitarian needs are greater in south-central than in 
northern Somalia, because of ongoing insecurity, the international 
community generally has less access to south-central Somalia, 
especially Mogadishu, than to the northern regions (see fig. 5). 

Figure 5: International Community's Level of Access to Somalia: 

This figure is a map showing international community's level of access 
to Somalia. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO from UN OCHA. 

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on 
this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. 

Notes: 

1. The UN security phases in effect in Somalia are indicative of the 
security situation there. Mogadishu is in phase five (evacuation of all 
United Nations staff), and the remainder of Somalia is in phase four 
(emergency operations only), except for the western part of Somaliland, 
which is in phase three. 

2. Full access: no restrictions on humanitarian activity in the area 
and unimpeded ability to reach vulnerable populations. 

Light restrictions: some interruptions on humanitarian activity and 
some constraints in reaching vulnerable populations. 

Light/partial/restricted access: significant interruptions in 
humanitarian activity and significant constraints in reaching 
vulnerable populations. 

Restricted access: seriously constrained humanitarian activity and 
minimal ability to reach vulnerable populations. 

Restricted/no access: ongoing restrictions that prevent any 
humanitarian activity in the area. 

3. A boundary dispute between Somaliland and Puntland over the Sool and 
Sanaag regions remains unresolved. On the map, these disputed regions 
are designated as restricted access. 

[End of figure] 

The insecure operating environment in Somalia has led to breaks and 
delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid, thereby affecting human 
survival. For example, insecurity has limited the international 
community's ability to provide humanitarian assistance to 230,000 IDPs 
living in desperate conditions along a road between Mogadishu and 
Afgooye and lacking access to urgently needed food, clean water, 
sanitation, and health care. Delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable 
populations has not been possible or has been interrupted when the 
safety and security of humanitarian aid workers could not be ensured. 
Humanitarian aid workers in Somalia have experienced harassment, 
arbitrary detention at key checkpoints, kidnapping, arrest, and attacks 
and have at times been completely prevented from conducting aid 
operations. In October 2007, for example, the WFP temporarily suspended 
its food distributions when TFG soldiers violated the UN premises in 
Mogadishu and arrested the program's Head of Office. The official was 
released 5 days later, and food aid and all other UN planned activities 
subsequently resumed. 

Insecurity in Somalia has also limited the international community's 
efforts to monitor and evaluate the provision of humanitarian aid. 
Because of security concerns, U.S. government officials have been 
unable to travel to Somalia to monitor and evaluate U.S. assistance to 
the country. The last time USAID officials visited Somalia was in 
January 2006, when two officials visited Puntland. USAID and State 
officials we met with said they must rely on the reports produced by 
their implementing partners and are unable to travel to Somalia to 
verify the reports and assess the effectiveness of their programs. 
According to USAID officials, Somalia is one of the few countries in 
which USAID cannot independently monitor the humanitarian aid provided. 
Monitoring and evaluation are necessary to determine whether 
interventions have been implemented as expected, if they need to be 
changed, and whether they have been effective. 

Lack of Access: 

Not only does it lack access to Somalia because of ongoing insecurity, 
the international community also faces logistical challenges in 
transporting humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations. UN agencies 
and NGOs told us that their lack of physical access to Somalia by sea, 
overland, and by air has created major delays and increased the cost of 
transporting supplies to the country. According to the UN, nearly 80 
percent of food aid to Somalia by WFP is shipped by sea, but the 
availability of shippers willing to carry food to the country has been 
reduced by half because of concerns about piracy. At least 15 
hijackings of ships off the coast of Somalia took place in 2007, with 3 
of the attacks involving WFP-chartered ships. In August 2007, the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution encouraging member states to take 
appropriate action--consistent with international law--to protect 
merchant shipping, particularly the transport of humanitarian aid. 
Subsequently, in November 2007, French Navy vessels escorted two WFP 
ships. When the Kenyan government closed its border with Somalia in 
January 2007, UN agencies and NGOs had difficulty transporting 
humanitarian supplies into Somalia and reloading trucks from Somalia 
with supplies in Kenya. Relief convoys eventually received permission 
to cross the border into Somalia, but inconsistent authorization and 
delays hindered travel through July 2007. Once in Somalia, humanitarian 
relief items are frequently subject to arbitrary taxation and customs 
fees at TFG checkpoints and at ad hoc roadblocks manned by armed 
militias. In 2007, the UN received reports of TFG-manned checkpoints 
demanding that passing traffic--including humanitarian convoys--pay 
fees ranging from $20 to $133, and later up to $520, per truck. The 
closure of key airstrips in south-central Somalia during the first half 
of 2007 often prevented aid staff from reaching the country, and access 
has been further complicated by poor road, sea, and air infrastructure 
and flooding. 

Limited Capacity: 

The limited implementing capacity of local NGOs in Somalia also 
constrains the delivery of humanitarian aid. UN agencies and 
international NGOs work through local Somali NGOs to implement their 
programs, but many of these local NGOs lack operational capacity, 
qualified staff, and technical expertise, and U.S. and UN officials we 
met with said there is a need to build their capacity to provide aid. 
In addition, NGO managers told us that the Somali staff they have 
trained often leave to work for the UN, further weakening the capacity 
of the NGOs. U.S. officials also expressed concern that local NGOs lack 
the capacity to spend additional funds effectively. Furthermore, the 
complex working environment in south-central Somalia prohibits the 
rapid start-up of new NGOs in districts or regions without exhaustive 
negotiations with community leaders and local authorities. 

Ineffective Government Institutions: 

The lack of effective government institutions, particularly in south- 
central Somalia, further hampers the implementation of humanitarian 
activities. The TFG lacks the capacity to coordinate humanitarian aid 
and sometimes hinders the provision of humanitarian aid in Somalia. For 
example, in March and April 2007, the TFG imposed restrictions on the 
delivery of humanitarian aid. The TFG restricted UN agencies to the use 
of TFG institutions as their sole implementing partner, restricted the 
use of airports for the delivery of aid, stated that research and data 
collection efforts without TFG approval were invalid, and halted 
distribution of food aid for unspecified inspections and approval by 
the TFG. Following international pressure, including engagement by the 
U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, the TFG removed these restrictions in late 
April 2007 and designated an Inter-Ministerial Committee, chaired by 
the Minister of Health, as the focal point on the coordination of 
humanitarian aid. 

Increase in International Community's Development Assistance Hinges on 
Political Progress and Stability in Somalia: 

In addition to humanitarian assistance, the international community, 
including the United States, pledged at least $771 million in 
development assistance to Somalia from 2001 through 2006 and plans to 
increase this amount in the future.[Footnote 18] However, plans for an 
increase in development assistance depend on political reconciliation 
and stability in Somalia, which have not yet been achieved. For 
example, implementation of the UN, World Bank, European Union, and 
Norway's transitional assistance plans for Somalia--based on the 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), a 5-year national 
development plan that was the result of a joint UN and World Bank 
postconflict needs assessment--will depend on political and security 
conditions, existing implementation capacities, the willingness of most 
donors to participate in the RDP, and resource availability.[Footnote 
19] Sweden and Italy had planned to arrange an international donor 
conference in 2006 to raise funds to support the RDP, but World Bank 
and UN officials told us that such a conference had not yet occurred, 
because of the continued lack of political reconciliation and stability 
in Somalia. More recently, at a meeting in Sweden in September 2007 to 
coordinate their assistance strategies for Somalia, donors including 
the United States, the UN, and the World Bank affirmed that the scope 
and effectiveness of their development assistance are contingent on 
reasonable stability in operating areas and genuine attempts at good 
governance at the country's federal, regional, and local levels. 

Since 2001, the United States has increased its development assistance 
to Somalia and has targeted more of it to south-central Somalia to 
support the TFG. From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, the United States 
provided nearly $45 million in development assistance to Somalia 
through UNDP and NGOs in support of programs aimed at strengthening the 
capacity of civil society, supporting conflict mitigation, and 
increasing access to basic services. U.S. development assistance to 
Somalia grew from $3 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $17 million in 
fiscal year 2007. In fiscal years 2001 through 2003, about 90 percent 
of U.S. development assistance funds were targeted at Somaliland and 
Puntland. By contrast, in fiscal year 2007, the majority of these funds 
were targeted at south-central Somalia. In 2007, U.S. development 
assistance to Somalia was aimed at building the TFG's capacity to 
govern and deliver social services, such as education, water, and 
health, to increase its credibility among its constituencies.[Footnote 
20] This assistance also supported grassroots peace and reconciliation 
processes, conflict mitigation programs, civil society, education 
activities, and media outreach. 

U.S. Strategic Planning for Somalia Is Incomplete: 

While the Administration's March 2007 Comprehensive Strategy generally 
includes all the components mandated by U.S. law, it is incomplete 
because it does not include the full range of U.S. government 
activities for Somalia and does not reference other U.S. government 
strategic planning documents for Somalia. Furthermore, the 
Comprehensive Strategy does not address the six characteristics of an 
effective national strategy, which, in our view, enhance a strategy's 
usefulness in resource and policy decisions and better ensure 
accountability.[Footnote 21] Several officials told us that U.S. 
strategy for Somalia comprises three separate documents. Our analysis 
shows that these strategies, considered together, provide more detail 
on important elements, such as costs and overall desired results, but 
still do not address all the characteristics of an effective national 
strategy.[Footnote 22] 

Comprehensive Strategy Addresses Legislation, but Does Not Cover Full 
Range of Activities: 

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007 required the 
Comprehensive Strategy to include the following: 

1. a clearly stated policy towards Somalia that will help establish a 
functional, legitimate, and unified national government in Somalia that 
is capable of maintaining the rule of law and preventing Somalia from 
becoming a safe haven for terrorists; 

2. a description of the type and form of bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral efforts to coordinate and strengthen diplomatic engagement 
with Somalia; 

3. a description of an integrated political, humanitarian, 
intelligence, and military approach to counter transnational security 
threats in Somalia and throughout the countries of the Horn of Africa; 

4. a description of an interagency framework involving the federal 
agencies and departments of the United States to plan, coordinate, and 
execute U.S. policy and activities in Somalia and throughout the 
countries of the Horn of Africa and to oversee policy and program 
implementation; and: 

5. guidance on the manner in which the comprehensive regional strategy 
will be implemented. 

While the strategy submitted to Congress contains sections that 
generally address each of these requirements, it is incomplete in two 
ways. First, the strategy does not include all of the U.S. government 
activities mentioned earlier in this report, notably DOD efforts, 
although, according to a DOD official in Nairobi, DOD plays a role in 
each of the three U.S. strategic objectives for Somalia.[Footnote 23] 
For example, although the strategy contains sections on security and 
stability and counterterrorism, it does not mention DOD efforts to 
prevent conflict and promote regional stability through CJTF-HOA. 
According to DOD officials, DOD maintains an official policy of "no 
boots on the ground" in Somalia. However, it conducts civil affairs 
projects, provides military-to-military training, delivers humanitarian 
assistance, and enhances disaster management capabilities in other 
countries in the Horn of Africa. 

Second, the Comprehensive Strategy does not refer to other U.S. 
government strategic planning documents, which some officials consider 
part of the overall U.S. strategy for Somalia, nor do these other 
documents refer to the Comprehensive Strategy. For example, the 
Comprehensive Strategy does not mention USAID's Strategy Statement for 
2006-2008, although the statement provides a detailed description of 
the country context and strategic issues that remained relatively 
constant as priority objectives evolved. Furthermore, the Comprehensive 
Strategy does not refer to agency planning documents, such as State's 
fiscal year 2007 Operational Plan for Somalia, which USAID officials 
said was a key document that discusses USAID's current and future 
strategy for Somalia, or the Mission Performance/Mission Strategic 
Plans for Somalia or Kenya, which outline the intended goals, priority 
initiatives, and performance indicators with targets for the country 
team in Nairobi. In addition, while the Foreign Assistance Strategy for 
Somalia--which lays out a strategy and estimated funding requirements 
for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to implement programs that advance U.S. 
interests in Somalia--refers to an "aggressive diplomatic strategy" and 
an "active public diplomacy approach," it does not refer specifically 
to the Comprehensive Strategy. State's report on the status of 
implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy, issued subsequent to the 
Foreign Assistance Strategy, does not mention other strategic 
documents, reflecting the lack of integration between the Comprehensive 
Strategy and other key planning documents. 

Comprehensive Strategy Does Not Address the Characteristics of an 
Effective National Strategy: 

The Comprehensive Strategy does not fully address any of the six 
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we 
have identified and used in our previous work, limiting its usefulness 
as a planning tool. While national strategies are not required by 
executive or legislative mandate to address a single, consistent set of 
characteristics, the six desirable characteristics, along with their 
underlying elements, are important because they help implementers 
effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, and resource 
allocations so that federal agencies and other stakeholders can achieve 
the desired results. We recognize that strategies are not end points, 
but dynamic working documents, and that implementation is the key to 
any strategic planning effort. The ultimate measure of the 
Comprehensive Strategy's value will be the extent to which it provides 
useful guidance for policy and decision makers in allocating resources 
and balancing priorities with other important objectives. Appendix II 
describes the six desirable characteristics of an effective national 
strategy in detail. 

As shown in figure 6, the Comprehensive Strategy partially addresses 
five of the six characteristics and does not address one of them at 
all. The strategy addresses some elements related to its purpose, 
goals, and activities to achieve results but does not address other 
elements related to costs, risk management, and integration with 
relevant documents from other agencies. Appendix III provides more 
detail on our assessment of the Comprehensive Strategy. 

Figure 6: Extent to Which the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia Addresses the Desirable Characteristics of an Effective 
National Strategy: 

This figure is a chart depicting the extent to which the comprehensive 
regional strategy on Somalia addresses the desirable characteristics of 
an effective national strategy. 

Criteria: 1. Clear purpose, scope, methodology; 
Comprehensive Strategy: Partially addresses. 

Criteria: 2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats; 
Comprehensive Strategy: Partially addresses. 

Criteria: 3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance 
measures; 
Comprehensive Strategy: Partially addresses. 

Criteria: 4. Description of resources, investments, and risk 
management; 
Comprehensive Strategy: Does not address. 

Criteria: 5. Delineation of U.S. government roles, responsibilities, 
and coordination mechanism; 
Comprehensive Strategy: Partially addresses. 

Criteria: 6. Description of strategyï¿½s integration among and with other 
entities; 
Comprehensive Strategy: Partially addresses. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis. 

Note: The six characteristics can be subdivided into 27 separate 
elements for more detailed assessment. If the strategy addressed all of 
the elements related to a characteristic, we determined that it 
addressed this characteristic. If the strategy addressed at least one 
but not all of the elements related to a characteristic, we determined 
that it partially addressed this characteristic. If the strategy 
addressed none of the elements related to a characteristic, we 
determined that it did not address this characteristic. 

[End of figure] 

Our analysis found the following key weaknesses: 

* Purpose, scope, and methodology. Although the Comprehensive Strategy 
clearly explains that it was written in response to a legislative 
mandate, it does not discuss the process through which it was produced 
and only partially addresses other elements related to its purpose, 
scope, and methodology. For example, it does not clearly state its 
purpose, and it does not explicitly discuss the assumptions that guided 
its development. A more complete description of these elements could 
make the strategy more useful to organizations responsible for its 
implementation and to oversight entities such as Congress. 

* Problem definition and risk assessment. The strategy only partially 
describes the problems it is intended to address and the operating 
environment in which it will be implemented; for example, the strategy 
does not mention the severe restrictions on official U.S. travel to 
Somalia. Furthermore, the strategy includes no discussion of the causes 
of the problems it is intended to address or the quality of data 
available. A more detailed description of the problems and their causes 
would give the responsible parties better guidance on implementing the 
strategy. 

* Goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures. The strategy 
clearly states that U.S. objectives in Somalia are to eliminate the 
terrorist threat, promote political stability, and respond to the 
humanitarian needs of the Somali people. The strategy also outlines 
priority initiatives and lists several activities intended to achieve 
these objectives. However, the discussion of performance measures and 
the process to monitor and report on progress is very limited; having 
these elements could enable more effective oversight and 
accountability. Without these elements, policy makers cannot 
effectively monitor the strategy's progress toward its stated goals. We 
acknowledge the existence of significant limitations on monitoring 
performance; for example, U.S. and UN officials in Nairobi repeatedly 
told us of the difficulties of traveling to Somalia to monitor and 
evaluate their programs. However, the strategy neither addresses these 

limitations nor describes plans to obtain better data. 

* Resources, investments, and risk management. The strategy does not 
identify current or future costs of implementation, risk management 
principles, or resource allocation mechanisms. Guidance on determining 
costs and resources based on a risk management approach helps 
implementing parties allocate resources according to priorities, track 
costs and performance, and shift resources as appropriate. Risk 
management is especially important in planning for Somalia, where 
overall needs outweigh resources available because of the prolonged 
crisis. 

* Roles, responsibilities, and coordination. The strategy generally 
indicates who will implement it, stating that "the Comprehensive 
Regional Strategy on Somalia will be implemented by the Department of 
State, in coordination with appropriate U.S. government agencies and 
departments," but it does not elaborate on the roles and 
responsibilities of agencies other than State, notably DOD. In 
addition, although the strategy identifies the Africa Policy 
Coordination Committee as the "interagency framework for planning, 
coordinating, and executing" U.S. policy in Somalia, it does not 
identify a process for resolving conflicts among agencies.[Footnote 24] 

* Strategy's integration among and with other entities. Although the 
strategy references other organizations, such as the International 
Contact Group on Somalia,[Footnote 25] the UN, and the African Union, 
it does not address how it relates to these organizations' strategies 
or objectives for Somalia. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the 
strategy does not refer to other U.S. government strategic documents, 
such as the National Security Strategy or USAID's Strategy Statement 
for Somalia. However, the strategy does mention Somalia's Transitional 
Federal Charter and describes how efforts to promote political dialogue 
fit into the charter's framework. More information on how the strategy 
relates to these other documents would further clarify the 
relationships between various implementing partners within the U.S. 
government and the international community. 

While the other documents that State and USAID officials consider part 
of the United States' overall strategy for Somalia provide more detail 
on certain elements within the six desirable characteristics of an 
effective strategy, they still do not fully address any of the 
characteristics. For example, the Foreign Assistance Strategy for 
Somalia provides significantly more detail on resource requirements, 
sources, and allocation mechanisms. In addition, USAID's Strategy 
Statement for Somalia includes a detailed discussion of the problems it 
is intended to address and the causes of these problems. However, none 
of these documents refer to the others, highlighting their lack of 
integration. 

Our analysis of the joint UN-World Bank RDP--the international 
community's framework for development activities for Somalia--found 
that it does address the majority of elements of the six desirable 
characteristics, providing significantly more detail than the United 
States' Comprehensive Strategy. For example, the RDP clearly identifies 
its purpose, scope, and methodology; defines the problems it is 
intended to address and discusses the causes of these problems; 
addresses overall results, strategic goals, and activities; and 
identifies how much the strategy will cost and how resources should be 
targeted to balance risks and costs. 

Conclusions: 

Enormous challenges have limited efforts to establish peace, stability, 
and a functioning central government in Somalia and to meet the 
Somalis' basic needs. Although State officials have encouraged African 
countries to contribute troops to the African Union peacekeeping 
mission in Somalia, the ongoing insurgency and lack of a peace 
agreement have limited AMISOM's ability to achieve its mission. State 
officials had hoped that a fully deployed AMISOM force would allow 
Ethiopian defense forces to withdraw from Somalia, which, in turn, 
would allow key nonviolent opposition groups to return to Somalia and 
participate in reconciliation efforts. To date, however, these groups 
and the transitional government have not engaged in any meaningful 
dialogue toward reconciliation. In addition, the transitional 
government's lack of institutional structures and national acceptance 
has hindered international activities to build governance capacity. 
Furthermore, insecurity, lack of access to Somalia, and other 
challenges have made it very difficult for humanitarian organizations 
to adequately address the needs of the country's most vulnerable 
populations--such as internally displaced persons--for food, water, 
housing, and health care. Addressing these challenges is critical, as 
Somalia will likely need humanitarian assistance for several years to 
come. 

Moving Somalia toward the goal of national elections in 2009 will 
require sustained and concerted efforts from donors, international 
organizations, African nations, and, most important, Somalis 
themselves. The U.S. government has increased its political engagement 
with the Somali government and funding for assistance in Somalia, but 
the strategic planning effort to guide U.S. activities related to 
Somalia has been incomplete. As the United States continues to 
formulate its role and respond to the volatile conditions in Somalia, a 
comprehensive strategy that fully addresses critical issues such as 
overall costs and monitoring and evaluation becomes increasingly 
important. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

In order to better inform Congress on U.S. policy and activities in 
Somalia and the Horn of Africa, we recommend that the Secretary of 
State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and the National 
Security Advisor, develop a more detailed U.S. strategy for Somalia, 
including the full range of U.S. government activities in the region 
and all six elements of an effective national strategy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided comments on a draft of our report, which we have reprinted 
in appendix IV. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation, 
suggesting that we strengthen our recommendation by calling for a 
"detailed U.S. strategy for Somalia," rather than a "more detailed 
report on U.S. strategy for Somalia." As this report discusses, 
however, a governmentwide strategy for Somalia already exists, so we 
have modified our report to recommend the development of a "more 
detailed strategy for Somalia." In a classified letter, State did not 
directly respond to our recommendation. State's letter also included 
technical comments on this report, which we have incorporated as 
appropriate. We have reprinted this letter in our classified report. 
Additionally, DOD, USAID, NSC, the World Bank, and various UN programs 
and offices provided technical comments and updated information, which 
we have included throughout this report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested 
Members of Congress; the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the 
Treasury; and the Administrator of USAID. We will also make copies 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9601 or [email protected]. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix V. 

Thomas Melito: 

Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

In this report, we assess (1) U.S. and international efforts to 
stabilize Somalia; (2) U.S. and international efforts to provide 
humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia; and (3) strategic 
planning efforts to guide U.S. activities related to Somalia. 

To assess U.S. efforts to stabilize Somalia and provide humanitarian 
and development assistance, we examined documents and interviewed 
officials from five U.S. government agencies in Washington, D.C; New 
York; Nairobi, Kenya; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, about their activities 
for Somalia. Because of restrictions on official U.S. government travel 
to Somalia, we did not conduct fieldwork in the country. We reviewed 
various strategic, planning, budgetary, and reporting documents from 
these agencies outlining their ongoing activities for Somalia. At the 
State Department (State), we met with officials from the Bureaus of 
African Affairs, Diplomatic Security, and Population, Refugees, and 
Migration; the Offices of the Director of Foreign Assistance, the 
Undersecretary of Management, and the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization; and the U.S. missions to Kenya, Ethiopia, the United 
Nations, and the African Union. At the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), we met with officials from the Africa Bureau and 
the Offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Food for Peace, Transition 
Initiatives, and Conflict Management and Mitigation. At the Department 
of Defense (DOD) we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Joint Task 
Force-Horn of Africa. We also met with experts on Somalia from academia 
and the private sector, as well as numerous nongovernmental 
organizations implementing programs in Somalia, to discuss their views 
on U.S. activities related to Somalia. 

To assess international assistance efforts for Somalia, we reviewed 
United Nations (UN) and World Bank reports, research, and strategic 
planning documents and met with officials in 10 UN offices and 
programs, the World Bank, nongovernmental organizations, the Somali 
government, and other donor governments. We conducted interviews with 
officials of the following UN entities: the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program, UN Development 
Program, UN Department of Safety and Security, UN Department of 
Political Affairs, UN Children's Fund, UN Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations, Food and Agriculture Organization, UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and World Health Organization. We also interviewed 
officials of the European Commission, the Arab League, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy. In Ethiopia, we met with officials of the African 
Union and the Ethiopian government. In addition, we traveled to a UNHCR 
camp in Dadaab, Kenya, to observe programs to assist Somali refugees. 
Finally, we attended several conferences whose attendees included 
representatives from the U.S. and Somali governments and Somali civil 
society organizations. 

To determine U.S. funding for programs related to Somalia, we analyzed 
State, USAID, and DOD financial obligations for Somalia programs from 
fiscal years 2001 through 2007. We obtained data on U.S. humanitarian 
and development funding for this period, as well as the number of staff 
focused on programs relating to Somalia, from officials within State, 
USAID, and DOD. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing 
relevant existing information and interviewing cognizant agency 
officials, as well as by cross-checking the data we obtained from the 
agencies with other sources. We found all agencies' data sufficiently 
reliable for the purpose of our report, which was to show the large 
difference in U.S. funding between food aid and other humanitarian aid 
sectors, as well as development aid funding levels. 

To determine the international community's funding for humanitarian 
assistance to Somalia from 2001 through 2007, we obtained data reported 
by OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) on both assistance provided 
in response to the UN's annual Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 
Somalia from 2001 through 2007, as well as other humanitarian 
assistance provided (not in response to an appeal) from 2001 through 
2007. To assess the reliability of these data, we discussed with OCHA 
officials their processes for receiving and compiling the information 
from donors and implementing partners and for ensuring fund totals are 
accurate and not double-counted. 

In assessing the data from FTS on humanitarian funding through the CAP 
for Somalia, we found that firm reporting arrangements exist with 
implementing agencies that request funding through the CAP to ensure 
all funding received is reported. In particular, OCHA officials told us 
that the CAP funding data are tracked according to specific required 
project numbers and to related sector categories. The humanitarian 
funding through the CAP is therefore limited to funding for specific 
projects listed in the CAP, and is not trying to capture all assistance 
going to Somalia. We determined the funding information for the CAP to 
be reliable enough to provide as part of the total humanitarian 
assistance[Footnote 26] provided to Somalia and as part of our evidence 
that food aid is funded at higher levels than other sectors in Somalia. 

For humanitarian assistance reported to FTS for projects outside of the 
CAP, we found several limitations. OCHA officials and some Somalia 
experts told us that there are likely large amounts of humanitarian 
assistance being provided by some Gulf States that are not reported to 
the UN. Additionally, all donors may not report the full amount of 
assistance provided outside of the CAP (through FTS), and therefore it 
is possible for some donors' data to be incomplete. As a result, the 
figures we report here likely undercount total global humanitarian 
assistance. We found that despite these limitations, the data are 
reliable enough for reporting broadly on the minimum of total 
assistance provided, with the caveat that certain countries' data or 
portions of their data are excluded. Recognizing these limitations, we 
report a minimum funding total calculated by adding the CAP total to 
the total reported funding for humanitarian projects outside of the 
CAP. 

We do not provide figures by sector for the data on funding provided 
for projects outside of the CAP because of possible inconsistencies 
and/or inaccuracies in how donors report the data to FTS. The UN 
provides guidance to donors on criteria for categorizing assistance by 
sector. However, OCHA officials told us that some donors use their own 
criteria rather than OCHA's. Additionally, we determined that because 
of the general nature of the guidance, countries may interpret the 
classifications of assistance that the UN provides differently. For 
these reasons we do not provide sector-specific figures for these data, 
but instead only report sector-specific data reported under the CAP. 

To determine the international community's funding for development 
assistance to Somalia from 2001 through 2006, we obtained data from 
annual reports of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), which 
consists of donors, UN agencies, and implementing partners active in 
Somalia. Through interviews and review of donor reports, we found that 
the Somali Support Secretariat,[Footnote 27] which collects the data 
and issues the donor reports, attempts to ensure that assistance is 
counted only in one year and not recounted in subsequent years. 
However, a secretariat official told us that there is no extensive 
verification of information reported by donors, and there is little to 
no effort to include data on assistance provided by non-SACB donors, 
particularly those from the Middle East. We were only able to obtain 
data on development assistance through 2006 to provide a context for 
the level of development assistance pledged to Somalia over the past 6 
years. Because of these limitations the amounts reported do not 
represent all development assistance to Somalia. 

To assess the U.S. strategic planning efforts, we examined the 
Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia (Comprehensive Strategy) and 
supporting documents and spoke with officials from State, USAID, DOD, 
and the National Security Council who were involved in the development 
of the Comprehensive Strategy. Officials from these agencies identified 
the following three documents, combined, as the United States' overall 
strategy for Somalia: the Comprehensive Strategy, the Foreign 
Assistance Strategy for Somalia for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, and 
USAID's Strategy Statement for Somalia (2006-2008). In addition to 
these documents, we reviewed other U.S. government documents that 
provide useful information though they were not identified as key 
supporting documents by State, USAID, or DOD officials. These documents 
include the Mission Performance Plan for the U.S. Mission to Kenya for 
fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008; the Mission Strategic Plan for the 
U.S. Mission to Somalia for fiscal year 2009; the fiscal year 2007 
Operational Plan for Somalia; and the report on the status of 
implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy. We focused our analysis 
on the Comprehensive Strategy because it was the only one identified as 
a comprehensive, U.S. governmentwide strategy for Somalia and compared 
it against the components required of it by U.S. law. 

To determine whether the Comprehensive Strategy contains all six 
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we 
developed and used in our prior work, we first developed a checklist of 
these characteristics, along with their 27 component elements. (See 
app. II for a more detailed description of the six characteristics.) 
Three GAO staff members then independently assessed the Comprehensive 
Strategy for its inclusion of the 27 elements, recorded their findings 
on separate checklists, and met to reconcile any differences in their 
assessments. Once these assessments were reconciled, two additional GAO 
staff members reviewed this analysis for completeness and accuracy. 

To determine the extent to which the Comprehensive Strategy addressed 
the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, we developed 
the following three categories: the strategy (1) addresses a 
characteristic when it explicitly cites all elements related to that 
characteristic; (2) partially addresses a characteristic when it 
explicitly cites at least one, but not all, of the elements related to 
that characteristic; and (3) does not address a characteristic when it 
does not explicitly cite any of the elements related to that 
characteristic. By applying these categories to our checklists of the 
27 elements, we developed a consolidated summary of the extent to which 
the strategy addressed the six characteristics of an effective national 
strategy. We applied the same methodology to the Foreign Assistance 
Strategy and the USAID Strategy Statement to determine the extent to 
which these documents, combined with the Comprehensive Strategy, 
address these desirable characteristics. In addition, we applied this 
methodology to the joint UN-World Bank Reconstruction and Development 
Program to determine the extent to which it addresses the six 
characteristics. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2007 to February 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO's Description of the Six Characteristics of an 
Effective National Strategy: 

In a prior report, we identified six desirable characteristics of an 
effective national strategy that would enable its implementers to 
effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations, 
and standards and that would enable federal departments and other 
stakeholders to achieve the identified results.[Footnote 28] We further 
determined in that report that national strategies with the six 
characteristics can provide policy makers and implementing agencies 
with a planning tool that can help ensure accountability and more 
effective results. To develop these six desirable characteristics of an 
effective national strategy, we reviewed several sources of 
information. First, we gathered statutory requirements pertaining to 
national strategies, as well as legislative and executive branch 
guidance. We also consulted the Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993, general literature on strategic planning and performance, and 
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget on the President's 
Management Agenda. In addition, among other things, we studied past 
reports and testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to 
the desirable elements of a national strategy. Furthermore, we 
consulted widely within GAO to obtain updated information on strategic 
planning, integration across and between the government and its 
partners, implementation, and other related subjects. We developed 
these six desirable characteristics based on their underlying support 
in legislative or executive guidance and the frequency with which they 
were cited in other sources. We then grouped similar items together in 
a logical sequence, from conception to implementation. Table 1 provides 
these desirable characteristics and examples of their elements. 

Table 1: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National 
Strategy: 

Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology; 
Brief description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope 
of its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. 

Desirable characteristic: Problems, risks, and threats; 
Brief description: Addresses the particular national problems and 
threats the strategy is directed toward. 

Desirable characteristic: Desired goals, objectives, activities, and 
performance measures; 
Brief description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve; 
steps to achieve those results; as well as the priorities, milestones, 
and performance measures to gauge results. 

Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management; 
Brief description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources 
and types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and 
investments should be targeted by balancing risk reductions and costs. 

Desirable characteristic: U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination mechanism; 
Brief description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, 
what their roles will be compared to those of others, and mechanisms 
for them to coordinate their efforts. 

Desirable characteristic: Integration among and with other entities; 
Brief description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other 
strategies' goals, objectives, and activities--and to subordinate 
levels of government and their plans to implement the strategy. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

The following sections provide more detail on the six desirable 
characteristics. 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology: 

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope 
of its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. For 
example, a strategy should discuss the specific impetus that led to its 
being written (or updated), such as statutory requirements, executive 
mandates, or other events like the Global War on Terrorism. 
Furthermore, a strategy would enhance clarity by including definitions 
of key, relevant terms. In addition to describing what it is meant to 
do and the major functions, mission areas, or activities it covers, a 
national strategy would ideally address its methodology. For example, a 
strategy should discuss the principles or theories that guided its 
development, the organizations or offices that drafted the document, or 
working groups that were consulted in its development. 

Problems, Risks, and Threats: 

This characteristic addresses the particular national problems and 
threats at which the strategy is directed. Specifically, this means a 
detailed discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends 
to address, their causes, and operating environment. In addition, this 
characteristic entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the 
threats to and vulnerabilities of critical assets and operations. If 
the details of these analyses are classified or preliminary, an 
unclassified version of the strategy should at least include a broad 
description of the analyses and stress the importance of risk 
assessment to implementing parties. A discussion of the quality of data 
available regarding this characteristic, such as known constraints or 
deficiencies, would also be useful. 

Goals, Objectives, Activities, and Performance Measures: 

This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to 
achieve and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the 
priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At 
the highest level, this could be a description of an ideal end state, 
followed by a logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, 
and specific activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be 
helpful if the strategy discussed the importance of implementing 
parties' efforts to establish priorities, milestones, and performance 
measures, which help ensure accountability. Ideally, a national 
strategy would set clear desired results and priorities, specific 
milestones, and outcome-related performance measures while giving 
implementing parties flexibility to pursue and achieve those results 
within a reasonable time frame. If significant limitations on 
performance measures exist, other parts of the strategy should address 
plans to obtain better data or measurements, such as national standards 
or indicators of preparedness. 

Resources, Investments, and Risk Management: 

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources 
and types of resources and investments needed, and where those 
resources and investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would 
also identify appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources. 
Furthermore, a national strategy should elaborate on the risk 
assessment mentioned earlier and give guidance to implementing parties 
to manage their resources and investments accordingly. It should also 
address the difficult, but critical, issues about who pays and how such 
efforts will be funded and sustained in the future. Furthermore, a 
strategy should include a discussion of the type of resources required, 
such as budgetary, human capital, information, information technology, 
research and development, procurement of equipment, or contract 
services. A national strategy should also discuss linkages to other 
resource documents, such as federal agency budgets or human capital, 
information technology, research and development, and acquisition 
strategies. Finally, a national strategy should also discuss in greater 
detail how risk management will aid implementing parties in 
prioritizing and allocating resources, including how this approach will 
create societywide benefits and balance these with the cost to society. 
Related to this, a national strategy should discuss the economic 
principle of risk-adjusted return on resources. 

U.S. Government Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination Mechanism: 

This characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the 
strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for 
coordinating their efforts. It helps to answer the question about who 
is in charge during times of crisis and during all stabilization and 
assistance efforts. This characteristic entails identifying the 
specific federal departments, agencies, or offices involved, as well as 
the roles and responsibilities of private and international sectors. A 
strategy would ideally clarify implementing organizations' 
relationships in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering. In 
addition, a strategy should describe the organizations that will 
provide the overall framework for accountability and oversight, such as 
the National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, 
Congress, or other organizations. Furthermore, a strategy should also 
identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration among 
sectors and organizations--and address how any conflicts would be 
resolved. 

Strategy's Integration among and with Other Entities: 

This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to 
other strategies' goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal 
integration) and how it relates to subordinate levels of government and 
other organizations and their plans to implement the strategy (vertical 
integration). For example, a national strategy should discuss how its 
scope complements, expands upon, or overlaps with other strategies 
prepared by other governments or international organizations. 
Similarly, related strategies should highlight their common or shared 
goals, subordinate objectives, and activities. In addition, a national 
strategy should address its relationship with relevant documents from 
implementing organizations, such as the strategic plans, annual 
performance plans, or the annual performance reports the Government 
Performance and Results Act requires of federal agencies. A strategy 
should also discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and plans 
produced by the state, local, private, and international sectors. A 
strategy also should provide guidance such as the development of 
national standards to link together more effectively the roles, 
responsibilities, and capabilities of the implementing parties. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Extent to Which the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia Addresses GAO's Desirable Characteristics: 

We reviewed the content of the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia to determine the extent to which it addressed each of the six 
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we 
previously developed and used in other contexts. (App. I explains our 
methodology in detail; app. II provides a detailed description of the 
six desirable characteristics.) We divided each characteristic into 
subelements for a more detailed assessment and then determined whether 
the Comprehensive Strategy addresses, partially addresses, or does not 
address each of the subelements and characteristics. Figure 7 shows the 
results of our assessment of the Comprehensive Strategy. 

Figure 7: Extent to Which the Comprehensive Regional Strategy on 
Somalia Addresses the 27 Elements of the Desirable Characteristics of a 
National Strategy: 

This figure is a chart showing the extent to which the comprehensive 
regional strategy on Somalia addresses the 27 elements of the desirable 
characteristics of a national strategy. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. 

Note: The strategy addresses a characteristic if it addresses all 
subelements of that characteristic. It partially addresses a 
characteristic if it partially addresses at least one subelement of 
that characteristic but does not address all subelements of that 
characteristic. It does not address a characteristic if it does not 
address any of the subelements of that characteristic. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Defense: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Washington, Dc 20301-2400: 

International Security Affairs: 

January 28, 2008: 

Mr. Thomas Melito: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Mr. Melito:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-08-351, "SOMALIA: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and 
International Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts," 
dated January 2, 2008 (GAO Code 320479).

DoD partially concurs with The Recommendation for Executive Action, 
that "the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of 
Defense and National Security Advisor, develop a more detailed report 
on U.S. strategy in Somalia, including the full range of U.S. 
government activities in the region and all six elements of an 
effective national strategy." DoD recommends this be changed to read 
that "the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of 
Defense and National Security Advisor, develop a detailed U.S. strategy 
for Somalia, including the full range of U.S. government activities in 
the region and all six elements of an effective national strategy." 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Theresa M. Whelan: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs: 

GAO Draft Report Dated January 2, 2008 GAO-08-351 (GAO Code 320479):  

"Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. And International 
Stabilization, Humanitarian, And Development Efforts":  

Department Of Defense Comments To The Gao Recommendation:  

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State, in 
conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and the National Security 
Advisor, develop a more detailed report on U.S. strategy for Somalia, 
including the full range of U.S. Government activities in the region 
and all six elements of an effective national strategy. 

(p. 38/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD Response: The Department of Defense partially concurs. 

The Department of Defense recommends that the GAO modify the 
recommendation to recommend that to Secretary of State, in conjunction 
with the Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor, develop a 
detailed U.S. strategy for Somalia, including the full range of U.S. 
government activities in the region and all six elements of an 
effective national strategy.

The following is GAO's comment on the U.S. Department of Defense's 
letter dated January 28, 2008. 

GAO Comment: 

6. We have modified our recommendation to address DOD's suggestion. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Thomas Melito, Director, (202) 512-9601, [email protected]: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Cheryl Goodman (Assistant 
Director), Robert Ball, Emily Gupta, and Michael Maslowski made key 
contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by 
Camille Adebayo, Muriel Brown, Debbie Chung, Elizabeth Curda, David 
Dornisch, Allen Lomax, Mary Moutsos, Mona Sehgal, and Christina Werth. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2007, 
Pub. L. 109-364, sec. 1226. This act called on the President to submit 
to Congress a report on a comprehensive regional strategy toward 
Somalia, including a clearly stated policy toward the country; a 
description of efforts to coordinate and strengthen diplomatic 
engagement; a description of an approach to counter transnational 
security threats in the region; a description of the interagency 
framework to plan, coordinate, and execute U.S. policy and activities 
in Somalia and in the region; and guidance on the manner in which the 
strategy will be implemented. 

[2] State's letter is reprinted in our classified report. 

[3] Food insecurity results from a lack of availability of food, from 
lack of access to food, and when food is not properly utilized. 

[4] During the formation of the Transitional National Government, a 
template for power sharing based on fixed proportional representation 
by clan, known as the 4.5 formula, was established and then adopted 
again during the 2002-2004 talks that produced the Transitional Federal 
Government. Under this formula, Somalia's four major clans were 
allocated an equal number of seats in parliament and half that number 
was allocated to remaining minority groups. The four major clans are 
the Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and Digle-Mirifle. 

[5] Somalia presents one of the most challenging security environments 
in the world, particularly in Mogadishu. The UN Security Council first 
imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992, requiring all member states 
to immediately implement a general and complete arms embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The UN 
Monitoring Group on Somalia, established to observe and report 
information regarding arms embargo violations and related matters in 
Somalia, reported in 2007 that "Somalia is literally awash with arms" 
from various sources, and that the quantity and variety of arms 
entering the country, in violation of the arms embargo, were greater 
than at any time since the early 1990s. The security situation in 
Mogadishu remains volatile. Elsewhere, lawlessness and interclan 
violence continue in large areas of south-central Somalia. 

[6] The Courts have operated under various names, including the Supreme 
Council of the Islamic Courts and Union of Islamic Courts. 

[7] Following the African Union's authorization of AMISOM, the UN 
passed Security Council Resolution 1744, which authorized African Union 
member states to establish a mission in Somalia for 6 months to carry 
out the following mandate: (1) to support dialogue and reconciliation 
in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage, and 
protection of relevant individuals; (2) to provide, as appropriate, 
protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry 
out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure; 
(3) to assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other 
parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization 
Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all- 
inclusive Somali security forces; (4) to contribute, as may be 
requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary 
security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance; and 
(5) to protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment, and 
mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel. 

[8] UN officials note that AMISOM's ability to facilitate the provision 
of humanitarian aid is problematic, as AMISOM troops have been targeted 
by insurgents in Somalia, and AMISOM lacks the resources to provide 
this assistance when requested. 

[9] Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2006 (Pub. L. 109-163) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to 
provide services and transfer defense articles and funds to the 
Secretary of State with an aggregate value of up to $100 million per 
year to facilitate the Secretary of State's provision of 
reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign 
country. 

[10] The $1 billion in humanitarian assistance represents $745 million 
in funding for projects included in the UN's consolidated annual 
appeals for Somalia from 2001 through 2007, as well as an additional 
$275 million in humanitarian assistance to Somalia from 2001 through 
2007 that does not fund projects listed in the appeals. Officials from 
the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
told us that they do not have a complete source of data on donor 
contributions for humanitarian aid to Somalia that are not included in 
the UN's appeals. These officials said that while Western donor 
contributions are largely captured, OCHA does not capture all 
humanitarian aid provided by the Gulf States, as well as additional 
bilateral or other funds provided by other donors. Therefore, the 
figure of over $1 billion is a minimum funding level. 

[11] The UN issues an annual appeal through its Consolidated Appeals 
Process (CAP) for donor funding to support humanitarian needs. The CAP 
identifies funding requirements in the following humanitarian sectors: 
agriculture, coordination and support services, economic recovery and 
infrastructure, education, food, health, mine action, multisector, 
protection, security, shelter and nonfood items, and water and 
sanitation. We only report the food aid total provided through the CAP 
because it is not clear how much of the $275 million reported outside 
the CAP funded food aid. 

[12] The 2008 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for Somalia emphasizes 
the need for integrated multisectoral programs. Noting that the chronic 
nutrition crisis in south-central Somalia is the result of the 
cumulative effect of many factors--including high rates of illness, 
limited health services, poor water and sanitation services, poor care 
practices, and reduced availability of and access to nutritious food-- 
the 2008 CAP states that a coordinated response involving all sectors 
is required. 

[13] UN officials also noted that the security situation also usually 
dictates food assistance as the most appropriate short-term emergency 
mitigation measure. Furthermore, insecurity--such as that in south- 
central Somalia--prevents or limits the implementation of agriculture 
and livelihood initiatives. 

[14] The $317 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia is 
included in the more than $1 billion in humanitarian assistance from 
the international community reported for Somalia. 

[15] Between fiscal years 2001 and 2007, State's Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration also provided almost $119 million in support to 
Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. In addition, this 
office provides general funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, 
a portion of which assists Somalia. 

[16] According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Food 
Security Analysis Unit provides evidence-based analysis of food 
security, nutrition, and livelihoods in Somalia. 

[17] Global acute malnutrition" is the term used to include all 
malnourished children whether they have moderate wasting, severe 
wasting or edema, or some combination of these conditions. Elevated 
rates of global acute malnutrition directly contribute to increased 
rates of morbidity and mortality in children under 5 years of age. 

[18] The $771 million is reported by the Nairobi-based Somali Support 
Secretariat, formerly known as the Somalia Aid Coordination Body. The 
secretariat serves as the main coordinating entity linking UN agencies, 
NGOs, and donors with relevant Somali ministries. The secretariat 
reports on annual donor pledges for development assistance. The data in 
the report are self-reported by donors with verification by the 
secretariat to ensure accuracy of the reported information. However, 
secretariat officials reported that the data exclude likely funding 
from Islamic charities and Gulf States, as they do not report their 
contributions to the secretariat. Therefore, the total amount of 
pledged assistance to Somalia during this period is likely higher. 

[19] The RDP's framework is aimed at bolstering peace; establishing 
good governance; improving security and basic social services, such as 
education and health; and reducing poverty. 

[20] In 2007, the U.S. Secretary of State waived legislative 
restrictions on foreign assistance applicable to the government of 
Somalia as a result of the country's default on certain loans from the 
United States. The legislative provisions outlining the restrictions 
contain authority to waive the restrictions if there is a determination 
that the assistance to the country is in the U.S. national interest. 

[21] We previously developed and used these criteria in other contexts, 
such as assessments of the Administration's strategies for combating 
terrorism, rebuilding Iraq, and protecting intellectual property 
rights. See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-
408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); Rebuilding Iraq: More 
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-
06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006); and Intellectual Property: 
Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) Requires Changes for 
Long-term Success, GAO-07-74 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2006). Appendix 
II provides further detail on these characteristics. 

[22] We focused our analysis on the Comprehensive Strategy because it 
was the only one identified as a comprehensive, governmentwide strategy 
for Somalia. 

[23] State's report on the status of implementation of the 
Comprehensive Strategy through June 2007 does provide general 
information on DOD's activities related to Somalia, including planning 
support for AMISOM, public affairs support for the National 
Reconciliation Congress, and support for counterterrorism capacity-
building efforts in the region. Although many of these activities were 
ongoing when the Comprehensive Strategy was initially issued, they were 
not included in the strategy. 

[24] Our classified report contains further information on the 
interagency planning process for Somalia. 

[25] The International Contact Group on Somalia was established to 
support the peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia. Its members 
include Italy, Kenya, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States, together with the African Union, European Union, 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States, and 
United Nations. 

[26] We combined the total funding provided in response to the UN CAP 
for Somalia from 2001 through 2007 with total humanitarian assistance 
provided to projects not listed in the appeal to get a minimum of total 
humanitarian assistance to Somalia for our reporting purposes. 

[27] In 2006, the SACB became known as the Coordination of 
International Support for Somalia, which is supported by the Somali 
Support Secretariat. 

[28] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics 
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

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