Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made Significant	 
Progress Implementing Security Recommendations, but Several	 
Recommendations Remain Open (17-DEC-07, GAO-08-306R).		 
                                                                 
For many years, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) owned and	 
operated the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located on an	 
island in the Long Island Sound off the coast of New York.	 
Scientists at Plum Island, often with the assistance of 	 
scientists from other countries, diagnose the pathogens that	 
cause foreign animal diseases and then conduct research to, among
other things, develop vaccines to protect against them. Some of  
the pathogens maintained at Plum Island, such as foot-and-mouth  
disease, are highly contagious to livestock and could cause	 
catastrophic economic losses in the agricultural sector if they  
are released outside the facility. Other pathogens known to have 
been maintained at Plum Island could also cause illness and death
in humans. For these reasons, USDA conducts its work on Plum	 
Island within a sealed biocontainment area that has special	 
safety features designed to contain the pathogens. After the	 
terrorist attacks on the United States, new laws and regulations 
required officials at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to	 
further restrict access to the pathogens in order to protect	 
animal health and, thereby, also help reduce the possibility of  
bioterrorism. In addition, Plum Island and its assets and	 
liabilities were transferred from USDA to the Department of	 
Homeland Security (DHS). Today, USDA continues to conduct its	 
diagnostic and research work on Plum Island, but it now does so  
in coordination with DHS as part of a broader joint strategy to  
protect against the intentional or accidental introduction of	 
foreign animal diseases. In 2005, we reported that, as part of	 
that strategy, DHS had started to develop plans to replace the	 
Plum Island Animal Disease Center with a new, modernized	 
facility. Since then, DHS has selected six possible sites for	 
this new facility, including Plum Island. This planned		 
higher-level biosecurity facility will enable the department to  
expand the research currently conducted on the island to include 
work on higher-consequence biological threats posed by zoonotic  
(i.e., transmittable from animals to humans) and foreign animal  
diseases.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-306R					        
    ACCNO:   A79030						        
  TITLE:     Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made	      
Significant Progress Implementing Security Recommendations, but  
Several Recommendations Remain Open				 
     DATE:   12/17/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Animal diseases					 
	     Animals						 
	     Biocontainment laboratories			 
	     Bioterrorism					 
	     Disease control					 
	     Diseases						 
	     Emerging infectious diseases			 
	     Facility security					 
	     Federal regulations				 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Laboratory animals 				 
	     Security threats					 
	     Strategic planning 				 
	     Sustainable agriculture				 
	     Zoonotic diseases					 
	     ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center		 

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GAO-08-306R

   

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December 17, 2007

Congressional Addressees:

Subject: Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS Has Made Significant
Progress Implementing Security Recommendations, but Several
Recommendations Remain Open

For many years, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) owned and operated
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located on an island in the Long
Island Sound off the coast of New York. Scientists at Plum Island, often
with the assistance of scientists from other countries, diagnose the
pathogens that cause foreign animal diseases and then conduct research to,
among other things, develop vaccines to protect against them. Some of the
pathogens maintained at Plum Island, such as foot-and-mouth disease, are
highly contagious to livestock and could cause catastrophic economic
losses in the agricultural sector if they are released outside the
facility. Other pathogens known to have been maintained at Plum Island
could also cause illness and death in humans. For these reasons, USDA
conducts its work on Plum Island within a sealed biocontainment area that
has special safety features designed to contain the pathogens.

After the terrorist attacks on the United States, new laws and regulations
required officials at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to further
restrict access to the pathogens in order to protect animal health and,
thereby, also help reduce the possibility of bioterrorism. In addition,
Plum Island and its assets and liabilities were transferred from USDA to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).^1 Today, USDA continues to
conduct its diagnostic and research work on Plum Island, but it now does
so in coordination with DHS as part of a broader joint strategy to protect
against the intentional or accidental introduction of foreign animal
diseases. In 2005, we reported that, as part of that strategy, DHS had
started to develop plans to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center
with a new, modernized facility.^2 Since then, DHS has selected six
possible sites for this new facility, including Plum Island. This planned
higher-level biosecurity facility will enable the department to expand the
research currently conducted on the island to include work on
higher-consequence biological threats posed by zoonotic (i.e.,
transmittable from animals to humans) and foreign animal diseases.^3

^1The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, S310, 116 Stat.
2135, 2174).

^2See GAO, Plum Island Animal Disease Center: DHS and USDA Are
Successfully Coordinating Current Work, but Long-Term Plans Are Being
Assessed, GAO-06-132 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005).

Prior to Plum Island's transfer from USDA to DHS, 71 employees of the
contractor USDA had hired to operate and maintain the facility went on
strike. This strike, accompanied by sabotage of the island's
infrastructure, heightened already existing concerns that someone might
try to steal certain pathogens from the facility to conduct terrorist
activities. In this context, the Congress asked us to review, among other
things, the adequacy of security at Plum Island. In 2003, we reported that
although security at Plum Island had improved since the terrorist attacks,
the facility was vulnerable to security breaches because physical security
arrangements were incomplete and limited, officials had been assuming
unnecessary risks by not adequately controlling access to areas where
pathogens were located, incident response capability was limited, and the
full array of risks and threats to Plum Island were not sufficiently
considered.^4 We made 24 recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland
Security to help the department overcome these limitations. DHS agreed
with the report and its recommendations.

As a part of our routine audit work, we have been tracking the status of
the 2003 Plum Island security recommendations. In addition, in May 2007,
we received a request from Senator Charles Schumer to report on this
matter. On September 28, 2007, we briefed interested congressional staff
on the extent to which DHS had implemented the recommendations at that
time. Because of broad-based congressional interest, under the Comptroller
General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his own
initiative, we are issuing this report, which summarizes that briefing. (A
list of addressees receiving this report appears on the last page of this
letter). To evaluate DHS's efforts to implement the Plum Island security
recommendations, we reviewed pertinent DHS and USDA documents; interviewed
DHS, USDA, and other personnel responsible for Plum Island's security;
and, during a visit to Plum Island in 2005, observed improvements in
physical security and the procedures securing the biocontainment area as
well as the facility's infrastructure. However, we did not conduct a
comprehensive audit of all decisions that DHS and USDA have made to
improve Plum Island security. We provided DHS and USDA an opportunity to
verify facts of this report. Officials from both agencies provided us with
additional information, which has been incorporated into this report. We
performed our work from February 2004 through December 2007.

In summary, DHS has made significant progress and has implemented 18 of
the 24 recommendations. However, implementation of the 6 remaining
recommendations is still under way. The following highlights DHS actions
to address our recommendations and discusses those that remain in
progress. Enclosure I lists all 24 recommendations and their status.

^3For more information on higher-level biosecurity facilities see GAO,
High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the
Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the
United States, GAO-08-108T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2007).

^4GAO, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum
Island Animal Disease Center, GAO-03-847 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19,
2003).

Addressing Physical Security Deficiencies

In 2003, physical security at Plum Island was deficient in several ways.
For example, alarms and door sensors for detecting intruders were not
fully operational; controls to account for the keys to the island's
facilities were deficient; and USDA was not providing sufficient physical
security for certain assets, including those critical to the continued
operation of the facility. These vulnerabilities were particularly
troubling because a strike was under way, and sabotage of the island's
infrastructure had already occurred. DHS has since taken many actions in
response to our recommendations. For example, alarms and door sensors are
now in use, and DHS has implemented procedures to better control access to
keys to facilities. In addition, the department has better secured certain
features of the physical infrastructure that supports the continued
operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. DHS has also improved
the security of North America's only foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank.
This bank represents years of cooperative research performed by Canada,
Mexico, and the United States, and the material it contains is considered
a critical asset for controlling a large outbreak.

The implementation of two of our recommendations to enhance physical
security remains in progress.

           o First, we had reported that the island's contracted security
           force reported to the administrative contract officer rather than
           to the security director--a situation that could have impeded
           prompt resolution of security-related issues. DHS agreed that this
           was problematic and told us the department was initiating changes
           to the security contract that would allow the security force to
           report directly to the security director. DHS also told us that
           changing the contract was dependent on resolution of a contract
           bid protest of the contract award submitted to GAO. Since our
           briefing, GAO's General Counsel has issued a decision leaving DHS
           free to make the necessary contract changes.^5 Subsequently, on
           November 1, 2007, DHS entered into a new security contract. DHS
           officials told us that the contract provides for the security
           force to report directly to the security director effective
           January 1, 2008.

           o Second, we also reported that USDA had no procedure for ensuring
           that contractors and visitors entering the biocontainment area did
           not have criminal backgrounds. We recommended that DHS check the
           backgrounds of these individuals before granting them access,
           using, for example, the National Crime Information Center
           (NCIC).^6 According to DHS officials, the department is developing
           a memorandum of agreement with the Federal Protective Service
           (FPS) ^7 that will provide full-time FPS presence on the island
           with the capability to verify contractors' and visitors'
           backgrounds using NCIC before these individuals enter the
           biocontainment area. However, this agreement has not yet been
           finalized because DHS has not determined how it will pay for
           maintaining FPS on the island 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The
           expense of this arrangement was not planned for or included in
           DHS' current budget.

^5See M&M Investigations, Inc., B-299369.2, B-299369.3, Oct. 24, 2007,
2007 CPD.

^6NCIC is operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
provides federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal
justice agencies with, among other things, information on criminal history
records.

^7FPS transferred from the General Services Administration to DHS in March
2003 and has responsibility for protecting federal facilities.

Limiting Access to Pathogens

In 2003, we reported that USDA was not adequately controlling access to
the pathogens. For example, we found that 12 Plum Island employees, some
with access to pathogens, had not had their background checks updated in
more than 10 years, even though USDA had told us that background checks
were updated every 5 years. Also, we found that as many as five cleaning,
maintenance, and repair staff--who are not required to have background
checks but are required to be escorted by an approved individual--were
working in the biocontainment area without escorts. DHS has taken several
actions in response to our recommendations. For example, DHS has developed
a process to update background checks on a regular basis and has developed
a line-of-sight escort policy that requires all cleaning, maintenance, and
repair staff entering the biocontainment area to be continually monitored
by individuals with completed background checks. According to DHS
officials, if an escort is not available, unapproved individuals are not
permitted access to the area.

However, DHS has not fully implemented our recommendation that the
department ensure that individuals involved in laboratory activities in
the biocontainment area--including students and regardless of
citizenship--be approved in accordance with the law. Specifically, in
2003, we reported that USDA did not require background checks on students
attending its foreign animal disease diagnostic classes that were
regularly held in the biocontainment area. We stated that this practice
might not have been consistent with the regulations implementing the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002.^8 According to the
regulations, individuals with access to pathogens should undergo
background investigations. However, these regulations also allow the
Administrator of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to
exempt individuals from background investigations if the Administrator
determines there is good cause and if doing so is consistent with
protecting animal health or animal products.

USDA officials recently told us that it has provided such an exemption for
the students attending its foreign animal disease diagnostic classes.
USDA's position is that background investigations are not required because
the risk of a student removing a pathogen is exceedingly low, largely due
to what USDA calls "unique and extraordinary security measures" it has
taken for students. According to USDA, these measures include denying
students access to areas where pathogens are stored or equipment necessary
to extract the pathogen from the tissue of the infected animal; not
allowing students to inoculate animals with the pathogens or to analyze
animal tissue or to isolate the disease from tissues; requiring students
to be escorted at all times by approved individuals while in the
biocontainment area; and requiring students to shower twice and completely
change clothing between showers while being continuously escorted. Any
remaining risk is acceptable, according to USDA, given the catastrophic
risks associated with not having adequately trained professionals who can
accurately diagnose and treat foreign animal diseases.

^8See Pub. L. No. 107-188, Tit. II, S 212, 116 Stat. 647.

While we recognize the importance of maintaining a cadre of trained animal
disease professionals, we continue to find it troubling that students are
not subject to any type of background check before handling animals
infected with diseases that have been determined to pose a severe threat
to animal health and the economy. DHS officials recently told us that they
are conducting background checks on international visitors, including
those attending the foreign animal disease diagnostic classes. DHS
officials also plan to do background checks on all individuals entering
the biocontainment area using NCIC, once FPS is on the island full time.
However, DHS does not yet have a firm timetable for when this will take
place. Until this occurs, DHS continues to follow USDA policy permitting
U.S. students to attend the classes without background checks.

Enhancing Incident Response Capability

In 2003, we also found the island's incident response capability to be
limited. For example, although the small guard force carried firearms, it
was not authorized to do so; and no policy was put in place defining if,
when, and how guards should use their weapons. In addition, because no
formal arrangements with local law enforcement existed in 2003, Plum
Island officials were unable to predict the extent to which surrounding
localities would provide backup assistance during an incident. DHS has
since taken actions to overcome these response limitations. For example,
the guard force on the island is now authorized to carry weapons, in
accordance with New York state law, and policies and procedures are in
place detailing how guards should deal with intruders. DHS also recently
established a memorandum of agreement with the town of Southold, NY, to
provide law enforcement backup assistance when necessary. As a result,
even though the guards do not yet have arrest authority, they can detain
an individual on the island until Southold police arrive and make arrests,
if necessary. The agreement with Southold also defines response times
according to the type of assistance required--such as marine and canine
patrol support--and provides for additional support from the Suffolk
County Police Department--such as helicopters, explosive ordinance
disposal capability, and other incident response assets--when warranted.

The implementation of two of our recommendations to enhance incident
response capability remains in progress.

           o First, we recommended that DHS develop an incident response plan
           that included precise detail about what to do if an incident
           occurred that exceeded the capability of the security system, such
           as a terrorist attack. In 2003, the island's incident response
           plan contained certain elements required under USDA regulation,
           such as how to respond to a bomb threat, but the plan did not
           clearly lay out the actions to be taken for incidents exceeding
           Plum Island's security capabilities. This was critical because at
           that time, according to DHS officials, the nation faced a
           significant risk of a terrorist attack. Although, in January 2007,
           DHS entered into a memorandum of agreement to obtain backup
           assistance from the town of Southold, DHS has not yet updated its
           incident response plan reflecting these new capabilities, but told
           us it intends to do so.

           o Second, we recommended that DHS conduct exercises with local law
           enforcement to test the efficiency and effectiveness of Plum
           Island's response capability. DHS agreed that it would be
           important to conduct such exercises once arrangements with local
           law enforcement were made. DHS conducted one exercise with the
           U.S. Coast Guard in 2006 to test response to a simulation
           involving a suspicious boat approaching the island. In addition,
           DHS recently informed us that, in November 2007, it conducted a
           security exercise with more than 40 law enforcement officials.
           While these exercises are positive developments, further steps are
           needed, including testing the effectiveness of the response plan
           once it reflects lessons learned from these exercises and the new
           arrangements with local law enforcement.

Reevaluating Risks and Threats

Finally, in 2003, USDA had not sufficiently reevaluated the extent of the
risks and threats to the security of Plum Island. For example, USDA had
identified a list of threats that applied to all of its laboratories, but
it had not reviewed these threats with the intelligence community and
local law enforcement officials to ensure that threats particular to Plum
Island and its vicinity were taken into consideration. The FBI, Suffolk
County officials, and others told us at the time that they considered this
step to be very important. DHS has since taken actions to respond to our
recommendations to reconsider risks and threats to the security of Plum
Island. For example, DHS officials told us they consult regularly with
appropriate local law enforcement and intelligence agencies--including the
U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI, FPS, and the Southold Police Department--to
reconsider and update threats specific to Plum Island.

Implementation of one of our recommendations to reevaluate the risks and
threats to Plum Island remains in progress. Specifically, we recommended
that DHS revise, as necessary, security and incident response plans to
reflect any redefined risks, threats, and assets. Although we have asked
DHS officials to provide us with an updated security plan, we have not
seen evidence that the security plan has been reviewed since 2004.

Concluding Observations

DHS has made significant progress in the years since 2003, implementing
most of our recommendations. Whether Plum Island continues to operate in
its current capacity

or as a higher level biosecurity facility, it is important that DHS fully
implement the

remaining recommendations to reduce the risk of pathogen theft and to
enhance response capabilities at Plum Island.

- - - - -

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security, and
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need
additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or
[email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations
and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in enclosure II.

Lisa Shames
Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Enclosures

List of Congressional Addresses

The Honorable Tom Harkin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Collin C. Peterson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Agriculture:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John D. Dingell, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Herb Kohl:
Chairman:
The Honorable Robert Bennett:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jack Kingston:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA and Related 
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jim Langevin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and 
Technology:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bart Stupak:
Chairman:
The Honorable John M. Shimkus:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton:
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer:
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Bishop:
The Honorable Steve Israel:
House of Representatives: 

Enclosure I: 

Status of GAO Recommendations on Plum Island Physical Security as of 
December 2007: 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; 
1. Fully implement the physical security measures; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
2. The security force reports directly to the Administrative Contract 
Officer and not to the Security Director--it is important for the 
security force to report directly to the Security Director of Plum 
Island to ensure that security-related issues are handled promptly; 
Status: In progress. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
3. There are no name or record checks given to contractors and visitors 
going into the biocontainment area. Contractors and visitors entering 
the biocontainment area could be checked for criminal charges (through 
the National Crime Information Center) before they are granted access; 
Status: In progress. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
4. The area outside of the biocontainment and administrative building 
is surveilled by stationary closed-circuit television cameras, which 
are insufficient. Installing pan, tilt, and zoom closed-circuit 
television cameras in certain areas would enhance surveillance 
capabilities; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
5. The island is easily accessible to the general public by boat, and 
there are limited "no trespassing" signs present on the island to 
advise the public that it is a government facility--more "no 
trespassing" signs in those areas of the island that are easily 
accessible to the public by boat would address this condition; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
6. In the event of a fire, Plum Island is not always able to respond 
appropriately because the fire brigade has limited hours of operation. 
The security force could be cross-trained for fire rescues and 
therefore provide 24-hour coverage; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
7. The building used for overnight accommodations lacks panic alarms 
for emergency response. Panic alarms could be installed in the building 
and, when visitors are present, security guards could drive by on a 
regular basis; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; Address the 
specific security shortcomings identified by our Office of Special 
Investigations; 
8. Control for keys and master keys of the facility are deficient. The 
security department could be assigned the responsibility for all keys 
and master keys. A key log could be created to better track possession 
of keys; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; 
9. Better secure certain features of the physical infrastructure that 
supports the continued operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease 
Center; Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Addressing physical security deficiencies; 
10. Better secure the foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens; 
11. Ensure that all individuals involved in laboratory activities in 
the biocontainment area--including students and regardless of 
citizenship--have been approved in accordance with the law; 
Status: In progress. 

Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens; 
12. Ensure that background checks of individuals involved in laboratory 
activities in biocontainment are updated regularly; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens; 
13. Ensure that cleaning, maintenance, and repair staff entering the 
biocontainment area are escorted at all times by individuals with 
completed background checks; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Limiting access to pathogens; 
14. Consult with other laboratories to identify ways to mitigate the 
inherent difficulty of securing pathogens; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
15. Resolve the issue of the guards' authority to carry firearms and 
make arrests; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
16. Develop and implement a policy on how guards should deal with 
intruders and use weapons; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
17. Increase the size of the guard force; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
18. Complete an agreement with local law enforcement agencies to ensure 
backup assistance when needed; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
19. Define an adequate response time for law enforcement to respond to 
incidents; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
20. Develop an incident response plan that includes precise detail 
about what to do in the event an incident occurs that exceeds the 
capability of the security system, such as a terrorist attack; 
Status: In progress. 

Recommendation: Enhancing incident response capability; 
21. Conduct exercises with local law enforcement to test the efficiency 
and effectiveness of Plum Island's response capability; 
Status: In progress. 

Recommendation: Reevaluating risks and threats; 
22. Reconsider the security risks at Plum Island, taking into account 
recent acts of disgruntled employees; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Reevaluating risks and threats; 
23. Consult with appropriate state and local law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to revisit the threats specific to the Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center; 
Status: Implemented. 

Recommendation: Reevaluating risks and threats; 
24. Revise, as necessary, security and incident response plans to 
reflect any redefined risks, threats, and assets; 
Status: In progress. 

Source: GAO.

Note: The recommendations listed in this table were made in GAO-03-847.

Enclosure II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Lisa Shames, (202) 512-3841, or [8][email protected]

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Charles Adams, Assistant
Director, and Mary Denigan-Macauley made key contributions to this report.
Kevin Bray, Nancy Crothers, Jennifer Gregory, Barbara Patterson, and
Raymond Rodriguez also made important contributions.

(360902)

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